Antología del Desarrollo

José Antonio Alonso
Breno Bringel
Noé Cornago
Enara Echart
Juan Pablo Prado
Tahina Ojeda (coord.)
José Ángel Sotillo (dir.)
Javier Surasky

CATARATA

IUDC Instituto Universitario de Desarrollo y Cooperación
UCM UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE MADRID

JOSÉ ANTONIO ALONSO

CATEDRÁTICO DE ECONOMÍA APLICADA EN LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID Y DOCTOR EN CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, ES VOCAL EXPERTO DEL CONSEJO DE COOPERACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO Y MIEMBRO DEL COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY DE ECOSOC, DE NACIONES UNIDAS.

BRENO BRINGEL

PROFESOR ADJUNTO DEL INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS SOCIALES Y POLÍTICOS DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL ESTADO DE RÍO DE JANEIRO (BRASIL). DOCTOR EN CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS POR LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID DONDE FUE PROFESOR DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA III.

NOÉ CORNAGO

PROFESOR TITULAR DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL PAÍS VASCO Y DIRECTOR DEL MÁSTER EN COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DESCENTRALIZADA: PAZ Y DESARROLLO DE LA MISMA UNIVERSIDAD, ES DOCTOR EN CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA.

ENARA ECHART MUÑOZ

PROFESORA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD FEDERAL DEL ESTADO DE RÍO DE JANEIRO (BRASIL), ES DOCTORA EN RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES E INVESTIGADORA ASOCIADA AL INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO DE DESARROLLO Y COOPERACIÓN DE LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID.

TAHINA OJEDA MEDINA

DOCTORA EN CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS, MÁSTER EN ESTUDIOS CONTEMPORÁNEOS DE AMÉRICA LATINA Y MAGÍSTER EN COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL, ES INVESTIGADORA Y DOCENTE ADSCRITA AL INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO DE DESARROLLO Y COOPERACIÓN DE LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID.

JUAN PABLO PRADO LALLANDE

PROFESOR-INVESTIGADOR DE LA BENEMÉRITA UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE PUEBLA, MÉXICO, ES DOCTOR EN RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y MAGÍSTER EN COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL POR LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID.

JOSÉ ÁNGEL SOTILLO LORENZO

PROFESOR TITULAR DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID Y DIRECTOR DEL INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO DE DESARROLLO Y COOPERACIÓN DE LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID. DOCTOR EN CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS.

JAVIER SURASKY

MAGÍSTER EN COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL AL DESARROLLO Y ACCIÓN HUMANITARIA Y DOCTORANDO EN RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ES COORDINADOR DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DEL INSTITUTO DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE LA PLATA Y SECRETARIO GENERAL DE LA FEDERACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (FLAEI).

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FUENCARRAL, 70
28004 MADRID
TEL. 91 532 2077
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DONOSO CORTÉS, 65
28015 MADRID
TEL. 91 394 64 09
FAX 91 394 64 14
IUDCUCM@PDI.UCM.ES

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PRESENTACIÓN

JOSÉ ÁNGEL SOTILLO LORENZO Y TAHINA OJEDA MEDINA

El título de la obra es muy ambicioso, ateniéndonos a lo que el *Diccionario de la Real Academia* define como antología (“colección de piezas escogidas de literatura, música, etc.”; “Digno de ser destacado, extraordinario”). Tras un largo e intenso periodo de preparativos, ve la luz este libro, que tiene como objetivo la comprensión del concepto y la evolución de la cooperación internacional y los estudios del desarrollo. Dice Antonio Muñoz Molina que el título de una obra es como la clave en una composición musical al determinar su “tono dominante” y, en ese sentido, hemos seleccionado textos y documentos que permiten conocer las claves para interpretar el desarrollo en diferentes periodos y en distintas manifestaciones. Se trata, por tanto, de ofrecer una visión de conjunto, que no totalizadora, de una cuestión fundamental para la humanidad.

En paralelo, contrastamos obras similares, al estilo de los *reader* o libros de lecturas, como por ejemplo: *The women, gender and development reader*; *The Globalization and Development Reader: Perspectives on Development and Global Change*; *The development economics reader*; *Development Reader: An Introduction to International Development Issues*; *Sustainable Urban Development reader*; *The Community development reader*; *The Post-Development Reader*; que han sido publicados, en su mayoría, por universidades y centros de pensamiento anglosajones, centrando sus contenidos en los aportes académicos, técnicos y científicos que desde el mundo "desarrollado" se han producido, siendo materiales de estudio de alto valor académico e imprescindibles para los estudiosos de la materia.

Partimos de que los trabajos, análisis e investigaciones sobre los estudios del desarrollo y la cooperación internacional se van adaptando al vertiginoso cambio de todo tipo de entornos, desde lo local a lo global, de la superación de un modo de ayuda tradicional, de la aparición de multitud de actores que hacen más compleja y más dinámica la cooperación, y de una agenda del desarrollo y cooperación mucho más rica y diversa y, sobre todo, participativa, rompiendo el clásico molde de ser parte de las relaciones Norte-Sur.

Con esa idea y esos referentes, se planteó el plan de trabajo, a lo largo de un recorrido de ocho capítulos: La ayuda al desarrollo tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial y durante la guerra fría; Descolonización y desarrollo; El desarrollo y la cooperación internacional tras el nuevo orden mundial postguerra fría;

Cambios en la doctrina de desarrollo: el enfoque del desarrollo humano; La nueva arquitectura del sistema de cooperación para el desarrollo; La cooperación Sur-Sur y triangular en el sistema de cooperación para el desarrollo; Movimientos sociales, desarrollo y emancipación; ¿Superando el desarrollo? Post-desarrollo, paradigma decolonial y buen vivir; recorrido que culmina con un índice onomástico elaborado con la finalidad de facilitar la rápida identificación de autores, conceptos, términos clave y teorías a lo largo de la obra por parte del lector.

Para llevar a cabo esta tarea se conformó un equipo de profesores e investigadores a los que, en primer lugar, debemos agradecer su total disponibilidad y esfuerzo compartido para lograr esta publicación. La tarea consistió, partiendo de la idea general, en seleccionar aquellos artículos o documentos más significativos de cada capítulo y redactar un texto sobre cuestiones clave de los temas abordados en la obra. En el mismo orden de los capítulos, los autores son: José Ángel Sotillo, Javier Surasky, Juan Pablo Prado, José Antonio Alonso, Tahina Ojeda Medina, Enara Echart Muñoz, Breno Bringel y Noé Cornago, cuyos datos aparecen en la página de autores. Como rasgos identificativos hay que destacar la reconocida trayectoria académica e investigadora, la pluralidad de enfoques (desde la economía, la ciencia política, la sociología o las relaciones internacionales), el conocimiento crítico y el reconocimiento de la capacidad transformadora que tiene la cooperación, si deja atrás las formas tradicionales de la ayuda.

Esta recopilación aparece en un momento oportuno, pues se están definiendo la Agenda de Desarrollo Post-2015 y los

Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS), que se fijarán en la cumbre de septiembre de 2015. Junto a los datos positivos sobre el cumplimiento de algunos de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM), la realidad es que una buena parte de la humanidad vive sumida en la catástrofe —según ACNUR, hay 51 millones de refugiados y desplazados, la cifra más alta desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial— y el futuro no es muy alentador, especialmente en lo que se refiere a las consecuencias del cambio climático, con la escasa confianza en los acuerdos que se puedan adoptar en la Cumbre del Clima (París, diciembre de 2015).

Ahora la reflexión es más necesaria que nunca, junto a las acciones concretas. Un clásico de nuestros tiempos: el acceso a todo tipo de información es casi ilimitado pero inversamente proporcional al conocimiento que se promueve.

Esta obra no pretende rescatar, sin más, una serie de textos o documentos, sino ofrecerlos para una mayor y mejor comprensión del desarrollo y, por tanto, de las mejores políticas públicas y acciones para conseguirlo. Si algo hemos aprendido es que no hay un único modelo de desarrollo y, más aún, que la imposición de un tipo tradicional de ayuda quizá haya servido para la defensa de intereses nacionales, pero ha sido desastroso para la población llamada beneficiaria**.** Esperamos contribuir con esta aportación a la labor de los investigadores y docentes, facilitando el análisis de los diferentes elementos conceptuales, técnicos y teóricos de los estudios del desarrollo y de la cooperación internacional.

Queremos agradecer especialmente a Marian López

Fernández Cao, que ha realizado con entusiasmo las ilustraciones que acompañan a los textos. También, a la Universidad Complutense de Madrid por el apoyo concedido a través de la *XI Convocatoria de ayudas para proyectos de cooperación al desarrollo* de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid - 2014.

Madrid, julio de 2015

CAPÍTULO 1

LA AYUDA AL DESARROLLO TRAS LA SEGUNDA GUERRA MUNDIAL Y DURANTE LA GUERRA FRÍA

JOSÉ ÁNGEL SOTILLO LORENZO[1]

> En el breve lapso de tiempo de una vida, la técnica moderna, eliminando las distancias, ha fundido súbitamente en una unidad la totalidad del mundo habitado. Todos los pueblos y culturas, todas las comunidades de creencia del planeta se encuentran hoy, por primera vez en la historia, en estrecho y mutuo contacto físico. Y no obstante seguimos estando tan alejados mentalmente unos de otros como antes, ya que el corazón y la sensibilidad de los hombres no son capaces de seguir el ritmo que marcan los descubrimientos mecánicos. Lo cual significa que entramos en una de las épocas más peligrosas que jamás haya tenido que atravesar la especie humana. Tenemos que vivir en estrecho contacto unos con otros para poder llegar a conocernos mutuamente.
>
> Arnold Toynbee, en el prefacio de *Historia de la humanidad,* de Kurt Breysig (1933)[2].

El objetivo de este capítulo es ubicar la cooperación y el desarrollo en el contexto de sus orígenes y evolución como parte de las relaciones internacionales. En concreto, se estudia la génesis de la ayuda al desarrollo, en tanto que se convertirá en

uno de los elementos que configura el mundo desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, en el que detrás del concepto “ayuda” subyace fundamentalmente una forma de asistencialismo realizada en función de los intereses del donante y no para conseguir los fines que persigue el desarrollo.

El desarrollo (en cuanto a objetivo) y la cooperación (como medio) forman parte de la dinámica y estructura de la vida internacional. Analizar lo que Renouvin y Duroselle llamaron las “fuerzas profundas”[3] de las relaciones internacionales supone conocer mejor el desarrollo y la cooperación y cómo han evolucionado desde sus orígenes, para comprobar continuidades y cambios en su dinámica, es decir, cómo se han transformado a lo largo del tiempo.

LA AYUDA EN CONTEXTO: EL MUNDO TRAS EL FINAL DE LA SEGUNDA GUERRA MUNDIAL

Al contrario de lo que sucedió con sus predecesoras, incluida la Primera Guerra Mundial, conocida como la Gran Guerra (1914-1918), la Segunda Guerra Mundial (1939-1945) finalizó sin tratados de paz, lo que no fue obstáculo para que, una vez más, los vencedores impusieran sus condiciones a los vencidos.

A pesar de ello, los aliados, una coalición internacional liderada por Estados Unidos, la Unión Soviética, Gran Bretaña, no solo trabajaron conjuntamente para derrotar a las potencias del Eje (Alemania, Japón e Italia), sino que sus líderes se reunieron en varias ocasiones para configurar el mapa mundial de la posguerra.

De los varios encuentros celebrados, destacan especialmente tres: la Conferencia de Teherán, a finales de 1943, a la que asisten Stalin (URSS), Roosevelt (Estados Unidos) y Churchill (Gran Bretaña); la Conferencia de Yalta, en febrero de 1945, con los mismos asistentes; y la Conferencia de Postdam, de 17 de julio a 2 de agosto de 1945, con Stalin nuevamente, pero con cambios en la representación de Gran Bretaña (el laborista Clement Attlee sustituye a Winston Churchill, y en la de Estados Unidos que, tras el fallecimiento de Roosevelt, el 12 de abril de 1945, es sustituido por Harry S. Truman).

Desde su posición de líderes victoriosos, la vida —y la muerte — de millones de personas quedaban en manos de las decisiones que adoptaran. Este es el relato de Churchill de su reunión con Stalin en Moscú, el 9 de octubre de 1944:

Vamos a arreglar nuestros asuntos en los Balcanes. Sus ejércitos se encuentran en Rumanía y Bulgaria. Nosotros tenemos intereses, misiones y agentes en estos países. Evitemos posibles choques por cuestiones insignificantes. En lo que concierne a la Gran Bretaña y Rusia ¿qué le paree un predominio del 90% en Grecia para nosotros y la igualdad, 50% en Yugoslavia? Mientras traducían mis palabras escribí en una cuartilla: “Rumanía, Rusia 90%, los otros 10%; Grecia, Gran Bretaña (de acuerdo con los Estados Unidos) 90%, Rusia, 10%; Yugoslavia, 50/50%; Hungría, 50/50%; Bulgaria, Rusia 75%, los otros 25%”. Puse el papel ante Stalin, a quien ya habían traducido mis palabras. Hubo una pausa. Luego cogió su lápiz azul, trazó una gruesa línea en señal de aprobación y nos la

devolvió. Todo ocurrió en menos tiempo del que se tarda en escribirlo… Siguió un prolongado silencio. El papel, con el grueso trazo azul, seguía en el centro de la mesa. Yo dije al fin: "¿No puede parecer un poco cínico que tratemos estos problemas, de los que depende la suerte de millones de personas, así de manera aparentemente superficial? Quememos este papel". "No, guárdeselo", dijo Stalin[4].

Desde entonces, el sistema internacional combinará dos escenarios, el de la cooperación y el del conflicto entre dos actores protagonistas que rivalizarán como enemigos hegemónicamente incompatibles (Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética).

Conviene destacar un hecho de la mayor relevancia y es que, en el primero de los terrenos, el de la cooperación, los aliados van a dibujar un mapa de formas que, en buena medida, se mantendrá durante décadas. El papel fundamental en cuanto a los actores dominantes le corresponderá a los Estados, con Estados Unidos y la URSS a la cabeza, completándose el mapa de los actores con una serie de organizaciones y entidades internacionales, tanto de ámbito universal como en el regional, dando lugar a un multilateralismo débil frente al fuerte protagonismo de lo intergubernamental.

El máximo exponente de este escenario, en lo que se refiere a la puesta en marcha de organismos internacionales, será la creación de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU), a partir de la firma de la Carta de San Francisco, el 26 de junio de 1945, que entrará en vigor el 24 de octubre de 1945, con 51

Estados miembros. Generada desde el consenso, su objetivo central será el mantenimiento de la paz y de la seguridad internacionales. Con el fin de garantizar un control efectivo por los aliados, se creará una especie de directorio de grandes potencias que se encarnará en el Consejo de Seguridad como principal órgano en la toma de decisiones, en el que los cinco grandes (China, Estados Unidos, Francia, Gran Bretaña y la URSS) tendrán representación permanente y, lo que marcará la vida —y la inacción— de la ONU, derecho de veto. Aunque la Asamblea General, en la que están presentes todos los Estados miembros, será el órgano más representativo, las decisiones siempre quedan en manos del Consejo de Seguridad; debido al veto continuamente utilizado por la confrontación entre las superpotencias, la ONU estará paralizada durante décadas. Con todas esas dificultades, conviene resaltar el solemne comienzo de la Carta de San Francisco: “Nosotros los pueblos de las Naciones Unidas resueltos […] a promover el progreso social y a elevar el nivel de vida dentro de un concepto más amplio de la libertad”.

En cuanto al papel que le corresponderá en el ámbito de la cooperación, queda delimitado en lo que contempla el Capítulo IX de la Carta, dedicado a la cooperación internacional económica y social; el artículo 55 establece el siguiente mandato:

Con el propósito de crear las condiciones de estabilidad y bienestar necesarias para las relaciones pacíficas y amistosas entre las naciones, basadas en el respeto al principio de la igualdad de derechos y al de la libre determinación de los

pueblos, la Organización promoverá: a) niveles de vida más elevados, trabajo permanente para todos, y condiciones de progreso y desarrollo económico y social; b) la solución de problemas internacionales de carácter económico, social y sanitario, y de otros problemas conexos; y la cooperación internacional en el orden cultural y educativo; y c) el respeto universal a los derechos humanos y a las libertades fundamentales de todos, sin hacer distinción por motivos de raza, sexo, idioma o religión, y la efectividad de tales derechos y libertades.

Todo ello desde el propósito de “realizar la cooperación internacional en la solución de problemas internacionales de carácter económico, social, cultural o humanitario, y en el desarrollo y estímulo del respeto a los derechos humanos y a las libertades fundamentales de todos, sin hacer distinción por motivos de raza, sexo, idioma o religión”.

Junto a la ONU existen otras organizaciones dedicadas a la cooperación técnica o sectorial, que forman parte de la familia de las Naciones Unidas: OIT (1919), UNESCO (1945), FAO (1945), Unicef (1946), UNRWA (1949), ACNUR (1950)… Las ONG llegarán más tarde: Greenpeace nace en 1971.

En el ámbito de los derechos humanos se adoptará la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (por la Asamblea General de la ONU, París, 10 de diciembre de 1948), que se complementará con los Pactos Internacionales sobre Derechos Civiles y Políticos (16 de diciembre de 1966, con entrada en vigor el 25 de marzo de 1976) y sobre Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (firmado el mismo día, con

entrada en vigor el 3 de enero de 1976).

No habrá consenso en aquellos ámbitos que mejor reflejan la confrontación político-ideológica de las superpotencias: le economía y la seguridad.

En el campo económico, la Conferencia de Bretton Woods (1 a 22 de julio de 1944) dará vida a las dos instituciones que pretenden fomentar una organización económica internacional desde el modelo anglosajón. Se crean el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) y el Grupo del Banco Mundial.

La Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Empleo (La Habana, 21 de noviembre de 1947 a 24 de marzo de 1948) concluyó creando la Organización Internacional de Comercio, aunque nunca entró en vigor. Sí lo hizo el Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio (GATT).

En defensa y seguridad, bajo el principio de “si quieres la paz, prepara la guerra”, ambas superpotencias hegemonizaron sus alianzas, tanto desde lo bilateral como por medio de bloques y pactos defensivos. La URSS creó el Pacto de Varsovia, que desapareció con la propia URSS, mientras que Estados Unidos fomenta alianzas a escala regional, siendo la más importante la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN, 4 de abril de 1949); la OTAN, con su adaptación camaleónica llega hasta nuestros días, adaptándose, siempre bajo la batuta de Estados Unidos, al cambiante panorama internacional.

En línea con lo afirmado anteriormente, se crea un orden internacional, que convive con el enfrentamiento entre las superpotencias, en el que se crearán instituciones y entidades que llegan hasta nuestros días, prácticamente sin cambios

sustanciales, aunque adaptándose al paso de los tiempos.

Por otro lado, buena parte de los Estados que hoy conocemos no existían entonces; el proceso de descolonización, que tratamos en el capítulo 2 de este libro, es sin duda un elemento clave para reconfigurar el “orden internacional”.

El final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial también conocerá planes de reconstrucción, siendo el más relevante el European Recovery Program, más conocido como Plan Marshall, nombre del secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos, George Marshall, elaborado por el Departamento de Estado, en especial por William L. Clayton y George F. Kennan. Se presentó formalmente el 12 de julio de 1947, estableciendo una ayuda financiera con la que Estados Unidos promovía la reconstrucción europea. De las muchas consecuencias del plan, destaquemos tres, siendo innegable la que supuso para la recuperación económica europea: era una ayuda condicionada en cuanto a la forma económica de economía de mercado (de hecho, la Unión Soviética y sus aliados lo rechazaron); tras su lanzamiento originario en cuanto a la recuperación económica, se utilizó como otra de las “armas” de Estados Unidos en su confrontación con la Unión Soviética (ayudar para evitar la expansión del comunismo); para su gestión en Europa, se creó la Organización Europea para la Cooperación Económica (OECE, fundada el 16 de abril de 1948), siendo una de las entidades de referencia para la integración europea, convirtiéndose en 1960 en la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE). Es frecuente que, desde entonces, se escuche la propuesta de un “Plan Marshall” para ayudar a la reconstrucción

de un país o región que haya sufrido algún desastre.

Por tanto, tenemos un mundo cuya característica más importante es la rivalidad, en todos los terrenos excepto en la confrontación directa, entre dos enemigos (Estados Unidos y la URSS), que al mismo tiempo pone en escena diversas formas de institucionalización y trabajo colectivo.

LA GUERRA FRÍA: PAZ IMPOSIBLE, GUERRA IMPROBABLE

Un hecho trascendental es que los dos principales aliados se mantuvieron como tales hasta derrotar al enemigo común: las potencias del Eje. Finalizada la guerra, las dos superpotencias (Estados Unidos y la URSS) dejaron de serlo para convertirse en enemigos, con la paradoja de que, por primera vez en la historia dejaba de aplicarse racionalmente la clásica definición de guerra enunciada por Clausewitz: “La guerra es la continuación de la política, por otros medios”. Por supuesto, el comienzo de esa enemistad proviene del triunfo de la revolución soviética en 1917, con el antagonismo entre dos modelos que, además, son expansivos y tienen como escenario el mundo en su conjunto. El arma nuclear —utilizada por Estados Unidos contra Japón en Hiroshima y Nagashaki, 6 y 9 de agosto de 1945—, de la que uno de sus artífices, Robert Oppenheimer, hacía mención a una frase de Bhagavad-Gita, “Ahora, me he convertido en la muerte, destructora de mundos”, hace imposible la confrontación directa entre Estados Unidos y la URSS, lo que no va a evitar, todo lo contrario, distintos conflictos en varios lugares del planeta,

calificados como “guerras de baja intensidad” o “guerras por delegación”.

Es la guerra fría, que Raymond Aron definió como “paz imposible, guerra improbable”, o, utilizando el lenguaje de los manuales de la OTAN, una confrontación que, en sus últimas consecuencias, llevaría a la “destrucción mutua asegurada”, por lo cual las relaciones internacionales dominadas por esa hipoteca nuclear entre las dos superpotencias se basarán en el llamado equilibrio de poder, mejor dicho, en el equilibrio del terror. Todo quedará en función de la dialéctica amigo-enemigo, incluyendo la ayuda exterior.

Un mundo dominado, hasta sus últimas consecuencias, por el militarismo y la seguridad, y donde los dos enemigos utilizarán todo su potencial, excepto el más destructor, el nuclear, para vencer al otro (el económico, el diplomático, el propagandístico…), pugnando en todo tipo de terrenos (desde el espacial hasta los deportes) y actuando como potencias hegemónicas con el fin de ampliar todo lo posible su área de influencia para evitar la expansión de su rival. Esa es la base de la doctrina de la contención elaborada por George F. Kennan que, dada su condición de diplomático, publicó en su famoso artículo “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, bajo el nombre de Mr. X[5].

Para Eric Hobsbawm, “la singularidad de la guerra fría estribaba en que, objetivamente hablando, no había ningún peligro inminente de guerra mundial. Más aún: pese a la retórica apocalíptica de ambos bandos, sobre todo del lado norteamericano, los gobiernos de ambas superpotencias

aceptaron el reparto global de fuerzas establecido al final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, lo que suponía un equilibrio de poder muy desigual pero indiscutido”[6].

Junto a la defensa de los principios y valores que inspiran cada uno de los modelos, el estadounidense y el soviético (capitalismo versus comunismo), ambas superpotencias utilizarán todos los medios a su alcance para actuar contra el enemigo. Aunque quizá no dispongamos de mucha información con respecto al caso soviético, sí la encontramos para Estados Unidos. Como un dios Jano con dos caras, todopoderoso y omnipresente, ofrecerá, por un lado, la imagen moralista de defensor de la libertad y la democracia como valores de la civilización occidental; por otro, actuará en todo el mundo contra quienes considere subversivos contra ese orden estadounidense —mal llamado americano—, con todos los medios a su alcance, llevando la violencia y el terror a prácticamente todo el planeta, lo que incluye a subversivos estadounidenses o al mismísimo Charles Chaplin (es la época del macartismo, la caza de brujas y el papel del Comité de Actividades Antiamericanas); incluye también la defensa de los bienes y propiedades de ciudadanos “americanos” estén donde estén, lo que lleva a defender con todos los medios los intereses de las grandes transnacionales de capital estadounidense. Una prueba de hasta dónde alcanza esa violencia e injerencia es el relato en primera persona de John Perkins en su obra *Confesiones de un gánster económico: la cara oculta del imperialismo americano*, o la de Tim Weiner, *Legado de cenizas: la historia de la CIA.*

Con carácter estructural, Karl Polanyi advertía en 1944, en su

obra *La gran transformación. Crítica del liberalismo económico*, de los efectos sociales a los que conduciría la supremacía de esa conducta económica, que tendrá una de sus máximas expresiones teóricas en Walter Whitman Rostow y su obra *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, publicada en 1960. También en el año 1944, Friedrich Hayek publicaba su obra *The Road to Serfdom*, dedicada a "los socialistas de todos los partidos".

Las claves interpretativas del mundo de la posguerra mundial serán, por tanto, la rivalidad a escala planetaria —¡e incluso espacial!— soviético-estadounidense, sin dejar de subrayar que, por su voluntad, capacidad y recursos se impuso la supremacía y hegemonía de Estados Unidos. Y que para comprender el alcance de su presencia mundial, la elite gobernante estadounidense aplicará el Destino Manifiesto, que llevará el "sueño americano" a todos los confines del planeta y lo hará con todos los medios a su alcance (políticos, económicos, diplomáticos, militares…), incluyendo la ayuda al desarrollo como ayuda exterior. Esa presencia hegemónica, ese intervencionismo constante y planetario, convertirá el sueño en pesadilla y terror como, entre otros muchos casos, sucedió en Vietnam. El sargento Hartman lo explica de forma más contundente en *La chaqueta metálica*, dirigida por Stanley Kubrick: "El capellán Charlie os va a decir como el mundo libre vencerá al comunismo, con la ayuda de Dios y unos pocos marines". Un testimonio impresionante sobre el intervencionismo de Estados Unidos lo encontramos en el discurso de renuncia de Jacobo Arbenz como presidente de Guatemala, el 27 de junio de 1954[7].

EL PUNTO DE PARTIDA: EL ‘DESCUBRIMIENTO’ DEL SUBDESARROLLO Y EL PAPEL DE LA AYUDA

El 20 de enero de 1949, Harry S. Truman renovaba su mandato como presidente de Estados Unidos. En su discurso, contrapone la defensa de la libertad y la democracia que encarna Estados Unidos frente a la falsa filosofía del comunismo; como pilares de su política, propone cuatro puntos para ofrecer una nueva esperanza a toda la humanidad, siendo el cuarto el que más nos interesa, ya que afecta a las áreas subdesarrolladas[8]:

Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.

The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.

I believe that we should make available to peace-loving

peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development.

Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.

De nuevo, se combina un discurso moralista, que trata de llevar la libertad, la democracia y el progreso a todos los confines del planeta, mientras que, en la práctica, la ayuda será otro de los medios de la política exterior estadounidense. El realismo político será la basé teórica y doctrinal que impulse a la política exterior de Estados Unidos, siendo su referente Hans J. Morgenthau y su obra *Política entre las naciones. La lucha por el poder y la paz*, publicada en 1948. En 1962, aparece un texto básico de Morgenthau para comprender los motivos de la ayuda al desarrollo, en sus distintas modalidades: “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid”[9].

La teoría realista se centra en el poder y en sus distintas expresiones; una de ellas será la ayuda exterior. La ayuda será una herramienta, otro de los recursos de la política exterior en defensa de los intereses de Estados Unidos —será la zanahoria frente al palo—, argumentando que se utiliza como escaparate del modo de vida americano, del mundo libre y para contrarrestar la influencia del comunismo; más tarde habrá otros “ismos” contra los que utilizar la ayuda. Este mantra figurará en los principios de la política exterior estadounidense, con

independencia de quién sea el máximo mandatario de la Casa Blanca. Para John F. Kennedy, que hizo de la Alianza para el Progreso su “Plan Marshall” para América Latina, era “el recurso más barato para combatir el comunismo”[10], argumento utilizado para contrarrestar el de “despilfarro” con el que se critica en ocasiones la ayuda exterior.

Nada más ilustrativo que esta forma de “ayuda” que el Programa Alimentos para la Paz, también iniciativa de Kennedy, sobre la base de la Ley Pública 480, de 10 de julio de 1954, del presidente Eisenhower (“la alimentación puede ser un poderoso instrumento para todo el mundo libre en la construcción de una paz duradera”), que no escondía el argumento de favorecer la expansión de los productos agrícolas de Estados Unidos, con beneficios para ese país y, eso sí, también para otros pueblos.

El modelo estadounidense occidental se expande por todo el mundo, siendo una de sus herramientas la ayuda al desarrollo, como parte de unas teorías y un pensamiento dominante que también conlleva el destino manifiesto. La ayuda será como una especie de “caballo de Troya”: bajo la apariencia de un buen regalo, se esconde la intromisión en muchos ámbitos de la vida de los receptores (alimentación, cultura, genera dependencia…).

En todo caso, es difícil llegar a comprender el origen y la evolución de la ayuda al desarrollo sin tener en cuenta el mundo de la que es parte.

En paralelo a las tensiones y conflictos de la guerra fría, el mundo presenta una imagen de progreso, de crecimiento ilimitado, de rápida expansión económica (recordemos “el milagro alemán”), donde el acceso al mercado supone el éxito de

cualquier persona, convirtiéndola en consumidora de bienes y servicios y, cuántos más, mejor. Una imagen que esconde la explotación de millones de personas, migraciones forzadas, el expolio de los recursos naturales y el mantenimiento del colonialismo por otras vías. Hasta que se den señales de alarma en relación, por ejemplo, a los límites del crecimiento.

La ayuda será un medio, no un fin que pretenda contribuir al bienestar de países o grupos de población; será un instrumento de control para mantener fidelidades y, entre otros efectos, de imposición cultural. De ahí el título de la obra de Gilbert Rist, *El desarrollo. Una creencia occidental*.

Desde la opción dominante, el mundo en desarrollo vive bajo las trampas de la pobreza, que condiciona un crecimiento económico sostenido, por lo que la ayuda se convierte en un instrumento para paliar esa situación.

Siendo ese el modo dominante, podemos trazar algunos perfiles de las formas de la ayuda en este periodo. Será básicamente bilateral (de gobierno a gobierno), combinada con la multilateral (desde organizaciones internacionales). Los donantes (países ricos) llevarán a cabo su ayuda en función de sus intereses (geopolíticos, comerciales, postcoloniales…), aunque conviene tener en cuenta la ayuda de los países nórdicos, que estará más en consonancia con la contribución al desarrollo en los países más pobres. Se crearán organismos de coordinación entre donantes, siendo el más relevante el Comité de Ayuda al Desarrollo (CAD), que comienza su actividad en 1961 como parte de la OCDE.

El vínculo entre la ayuda y la política exterior será objeto de

estudio y análisis, como el que realiza Manuel de la Iglesia Caruncho[11], estableciendo tres modelos para la política de cooperación: como instrumento de la política exterior, como elemento definitorio de esa política y cuando se convierte en política de desarrollo.

En cuanto a los motivos de la ayuda:

Lo que se proponen sobre todo las grandes potencias es hacer valer su influencia en el Tercer Mundo, reforzar su propio 'campo' y debilitar el contrario. Se trata de conquistar o reforzar posiciones estratégicas mediante la ayuda al desarrollo (y la ayuda militar), y las potencias coloniales intentan mantener determinadas posiciones en sus antiguas colonias. Los países industrializados más pequeños pueden aspirar a conseguir prestigio o ser obligados por las grandes potencias a soportar parte de la carga. Hay que amortiguar el conflicto Note-Sur haciendo algunas concesiones y aumentando algo la ayuda. Desde un punto de vista económico, de lo que se trata es de asegurarse el suministro de materias primas importantes y los mercados de salida para los productos industriales, o bien prepara el camino de las inversiones privadas directas mediante preinversiones. Cuanto más se desarrolla un país, mayor es su demanda de productos industriales. A largo plazo —se dice— los países industriales y los países en vías de desarrollo van "en el mismo barco". Los motivos humanitarios están indicados sobre todo para las organizaciones privadas y para las Iglesias.

Por eso, "la ayuda al desarrollo apenas ha supuesto hasta hoy más que una pequeña fracción del plusvalor extraído por las naciones industriales, otorgada además siguiendo principios de

puro oportunismo político”[12].

La ayuda que conocemos desde hace décadas, la ayuda tradicional, nace con el pecado original que conllevan algunas de sus características: jerárquica (donante-receptor), etnocéntrica (se impone la ayuda desde los criterios occidentales del desarrollo), unilateral en el fondo (se diseña y se aplica en función de las prioridades del donante) y bilateral en la forma, en cuanto que se realiza de gobierno a gobierno.

Como veremos, frente a ello encontraremos otras voces, en paralelo a la independencia de los países del Tercer Mundo, asociados al subdesarrollo, que intentarán una emancipación también desde el ámbito de las ideas, reivindicando cambios estructurales en el sistema mundial.

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Lectura 1

Foreign aid: next phase[13]

M. F. Millikan and W. W. Rostov

In the past year American economic foreign policy has moved perceptibly, if indecisively, back towards the path marked out by the Point Four Program launched in 1949, the Gordon Gray Report of 1950 and the Nelson Rockefeller Report of 1951—a path from which the United States was diverted by the Korean War and the subsequent concentration on the build-up of military pacts (backed by military aid) around the periphery of the Communist bloc.

The acceleration of economic growth in non-Communist Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America is beginning to be recognized, in fact as well as in word, as a major national objective, quite apart from military aid and the use of money to help salvage crisis situations. The Development Loan Fund exists; some $290 million has been scraped up to postpone too drastic a cutback in the Indian Second Five-Year Plan; surplus food and fibers available under Public Law 480 are beginning to be understood, both abroad and in Washington, as potentially a major constructive instrument for economic development; and before or during the NATO meeting of last December significant gestures, at least, were made by the German, Italian and American Governments looking toward coordination of the free world's development effort.

Whether there will now emerge into maturity an American and free-world economic development policy capable of protecting the common interest in a world dominated by expensive military stalemate on the one hand, and by the accelerating nationalist

revolutions of Asia, the Middle East and Africa on the other, hinges in part at least on a clarification of three major issues. These are: the nature of the American interest in the revolutionary areas; the relations between private and public capital in the early stages of economic growth; the special position and problems of India.

II

The American interest in economic development flows from the historical status of most of the nations and regions' of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

Economically, these stand somewhere along the path between a relatively static agricultural society and a society capable of applying promptly and productively the fruits of modern science to its natural and human resources. These transitional societies have absorbed varying degrees of modern economic activity; but they have not yet woven them together in such a way as to make economic growth a regular, automatic condition: productive investment is not yet high enough regularly to yield increases in output substantially greater than increases in population. Politically, they are somewhere in the transition from regionally based hierarchical societies, rooted in traditional land relations, to centralized states capable of providing a unified national framework for modern economic, social and political activity.

Both historically and at present the building of modern economies and centralized modern governments has been driven along less by the profit motive than by the aspirations for

increased national and human dignity. Merchants and the profit motive played their part in the modernization efforts of Bismarck's Germany, Meiji Japan, Witte's Russia and Ataturk's Turkey; but soldiers, civil servants and nationalism were the more powerful agents. And so it is today in Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

In these transitional stages, nationalism may be turned in varying proportions to these three objectives: towards the consolidation of the central power of the new state over the old regional interests (as with Diem and his sects in post-1954 South Viet Nam); towards external adventure, to redress real or believed old humiliations (as with Nasser in the Middle East since 1955); or towards the economic and social modernization of the domestic society (as with the Indian Five-Year Plans). No successful politician in a transitional society can afford wholly to neglect any one of these tasks; that is, he must build up the power of the central government, assert a position of increased authority and sovereignty on the world scene, and launch some kind of program for economic and social modernization. And these three elements of policy cannot be cleanly separated.

How do these objectives relate to each other? If the local political leader concentrates merely on consolidating his central power or on rallying his people around an external objective, he may well achieve short-run success; but he will not meet the demand for economic and social progress pressing up steadily from the grass roots. He runs the longer-run risks of creating a centralized state without a viable political basis; or of exhausting his popular mandate in efforts to assert the sovereignty and power of the new nation against the external world, efforts which

fail to satisfy his people's rising expectations for material advance. To be successful, a politician in a transitional society must, in the end, link nationalist fervor and the new centralized state to programs of economic and social substance.

The length of time and the vicissitudes of transition to modem economic and political status thus depend substantially on the degree to which local talent, energy and resources are channelled into the constructive tasks of modernization. The powers of the central government must, of course, be reasonably well established as a prior condition, and the government must present to its people a record of enhanced international standing; but the long-run influence of the central government depends, in the end, on its becoming a major source of energy, initiative and resource for modernizing the economy—a lesson Soekarno is being taught, painfully and late.

Communist policy is based squarely on an understanding of this precarious transitional process. Increasingly since the summer of 1951, Moscow and Peking have sought to associate Communism (as well as the Soviet Union and Communist China as governments) with the aspirations of the political leaders and peoples of the transitional areas for national independence, economic development and peace. On the other hand, Soviet diplomacy and propaganda have systematically sought to divert their attention from the tasks of modernization towards "bloody shirt" policies; that is, an obsessive concern to redress real or believed past humiliations—colonialism, Israel, Kashmir, West Irian, etc. In this connection, the resolutions generated out of the recent Cairo conference of the Afro-Asian bloc are worth careful

study.

This strategy does double work for Moscow. In the short run, it creates costly disruption within the free world; it threatens the supply of essential raw materials to Western Europe; it threatens to disrupt the American air base structure; and, on the colonialism issue, it further splits the United States from Western Europe. In the long run, it creates the conditions which will help the Communists take over power. It creates these future conditions by diverting the energies of the new nations away from the tasks of economic and social modernization; and thus the people's hopes for improved welfare are frustrated. It is the Communist intent that, when these hopes for progress are sufficiently frustrated, men and women in these areas will turn to Communism. The local Communist parties are already steadily at work seeking to heighten and to exploit these frustrations.

The Communist policy being pursued in Asia, the Middle East and Africa is modelled closely—and, we believe, quite consciously—after the Communist success in China. Sun Yat-sen turned to Moscow for guidance and support after he failed to get economic and political support from the United States. In the 1920s and 1930s Moscow did, to a degree, support the Kuomintang while seeking to give it an anti-Western cast; but the Chinese Communists at the same time, with Moscow's help and encouragement, pursued a policy first of infiltration of the Kuomintang and then of military and political obstruction designed to make it impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to achieve the social and economic progress which Chinese men and women ardently sought. And this double pattern persisted

virtually down to the end: while the Soviet Union remained solemnly committed to support Nationalist China diplomatically, it turned captured Japanese arms over to the Chinese Communists in 1946. Chiang Kai-shek's view of reform as a second priority played, of course, into the hands of Communist policy throughout this sequence.

There is little doubt that Moscow and Peking regard Nasser, Nehru, Soekarno and the other non-Communist leaders of the new nations as the Chiang Kai-sheks of the future.

It is in this perspective—of short-run and long-run Communist strategic objectives—that the Soviet economic offensive should be viewed. In Jugoslavia, Egypt, Syria and Afghanistan, Moscow has urgent short-term strategic objectives; and those four countries get about three-fourths of Soviet aid outside the Communist bloc. In India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and elsewhere, the amounts of aid doled out are sufficient to build up a measure of good will and a favorable image of Communist intentions; but they are grossly insufficient to supply the foreign exchange requirements for a serious economic development effort.

Nevertheless Moscow is laying out considerable capital in this effort at a time when there are ample alternative claims on Soviet resources for civil and military purposes within the Communist bloc. The problem of getting agreement within the Soviet Presidium for this rather expensive program is undoubtedly eased, however, by the increasing dependence of the Communist bloc on imported foodstuffs and raw materials. Mikoyan is probably able to claim that he can make the effort virtually pay for

itself: the old Soviet principle of balancing the foreign policy books every night can be roughly maintained.

In facing Communist policy, then, we are not engaged in a popularity contest or in a numbers racket centered on total figures for aid and trade. We are confronted with a systematic effort-diplomatic, psychological, economic and political—to exploit the weaknesses, confusions and temptations of new nations in the transitional period so as to clamp Communism down firmly on them before steady economic growth and the political resilience of a modern state emerge.

Indeed, in the sweep of history, Communism as we have known it thus far in the twentieth century is likely to be viewed as a diseased form of modern state organization, capable of being imposed by a determined minority on a confused, frustrated transitional society. Conversely, a society which has passed through its economic take-off and restructured its political and social institutions around the requirements of modern statehood is likely to have a high immunity to the Communist appeal. Russia almost made it, but the First World War came at a bad time in the Russian evolution.

If this view is correct, the central objective of American policy in the transitional areas is to use whatever influence we can bring to bear to focus the local energies, talents and resources on the constructive tasks of modernization. American military strength must be used to give these nations relative security, with a minimum diversion of their own efforts; and when it is mutually judged necessary to generate local military forces, these in turn should be made to contribute wherever possible to the

constructive tasks of modernization. The nineteenth century role of the American Corps of Engineers is a suggestive guide. Diplomatically, our stance should put a greater premium on the posture of governments towards the modernization of their own societies than on their day-to-day position in the politics of the cold war. Finally, our economic foreign policy must make it both possible and attractive for local politicians to set the aspirations of their peoples on long-term programs of modernization rather than on tempting but diversionary “bloody shirt” nationalism.

This incentive cannot be created unless American resources available for economic development are sufficiently big and offered with a continuity and on terms such that a serious operating politician can plot a long-period course with reasonable confidence[14].

Thus the American interest in Asia, the Middle East and Africa is fundamentally political. The American interest lies in assisting the new nations to advance toward modern economic and political status while maintaining their independence and assuring the possibility of a domestic evolution which employs the political techniques of consent and safeguards the liberty of the individual. If we are prepared to recognize—as we should—that democracy is a matter of degree and of the direction of change, then our objective can be described as the creation of a world of independent, democratically oriented states which have built economic growth into their societies as a regular condition. This is an objective we should be prepared to state frankly, without embarrassment. It requires an American economic development effort larger and with more continuity, one with criteria for lending

vastly less ambiguous (and economically more hard-headed) than our present programs. We are unlikely to get such an effort under way until its purposes in relation to Communist strategy are widely understood.

III

There is a second prerequisite for a mature and effective American economic development effort. This is increased clarity and consensus on the relation between private and public enterprise both within the areas receiving American government loans and as between the public and private sources of capital and technical assistance in the United States.

In the course of the last year's re-examination of American economic foreign policy, there were interesting and forceful assertions of three propositions: first, that private enterprise is superior in efficiency to public enterprise, even in the underdeveloped areas; second, that substantial untapped potentialities exist in public policy both for expanding American private capital exports and for increased collaboration between public and private sources of American capital; and third, that the American Government could do more than it is now doing to create a more favorable climate for private investment in the underdeveloped areas. These views were presented against the background of what appeared to be a relatively substantial increase in American private investment abroad, opening up a somewhat more optimistic vista of the future role of private capital exports than that generally accepted in the recent past.

So far as the ideological debate on public versus private enterprise is concerned, several things have been happening. In Western Europe and in other industrial societies, the old banner of nationalization has faded markedly within the Social Democratic parties. Men have come to learn that Marx was wrong when he regarded the public ownership of property as the only effective form of ensuring that the public interest in the economy is respected. Ways have been found for protecting the legitimate public interest in economic activities without burdening the state with heavy operating bureaucracies which, on the whole, tend to impede rather than to encourage good public as well as good economic policy. The slogans of youth are not easily surrendered, and political banners fade slowly. There is little doubt, however, that in the postwar decade the Social Democratic movements have shifted as rapidly as they safely could away from the commitment to nationalization which had grown up in the first four decades of the century.

This transition may, in time, be expected to have its impact on the politics of the underdeveloped areas, since so many of the leading figures there were strongly marked by Western Social Democratic views, and many important connections remain. More relevant, however, than the vicarious experience of Europe is the evidence accumulating in those underdeveloped areas which have gathered economic momentum: that the expansion of the local private sector, including the development of vigorous efficient modern businessmen, can constitute a valuable support to the government's larger economic and social objectives; and that, within reasonable limits, it can be made politically quite safe

and economically quite wholesome to permit private foreign enterprise to operate within their countries. These trends are mainly to be observed in Latin America, but they color hopefully some American visions of the future in Asia, the Middle East and Africa; for it now appears possible that vigorous private sectors can emerge more rapidly than our somewhat static sociological analyses of entrepreneurship would suggest. Once the expectation becomes general that next year's output is likely to be larger than this year's, businessmen begin to think about plowing back profits, expanding capacity and introducing new machinery, rather than merely clinging to the older pattern of fixed output with big profit margins syphoned off to keep the family comfortable. These transitions in the outlook and operations of businessmen obviously take time; but they seem to come more quickly than many had thought, once the economy as a whole begins to gather momentum.

In this mood, a good many measures have been put forward designed to expand the role of American private direct investment in the underdeveloped areas. These include: improved administration of the government guarantee programs; more substantial tax incentives for private investment overseas; the merging of government and private funds in particular projects; the expanded use of management contracts; the more firm negotiation of treaty and other conditions designed to protect American private investment; and the spreading of information on the virtues and efficiency of private over public enterprise.

Even the most ardent of the recent advocates of private over public investment have been clear, however, about two things.

One is that certain kinds of government investment are not only required in the underdeveloped areas but are essential to create a setting within which efficient and profitable private operations can grow: notably, investment in education, health, agricultural extension work, irrigation, transport, fuel and power. The second is that American influence to encourage the strengthening of private sectors in underdeveloped areas and to enlarge the flow abroad of American private capital is a matter in which great tact must be observed. What is basically involved is that other peoples come to accept, sometimes in the face of long-held views rooted in difficult past experience, that a vigorous private sector and foreign private investment can be made to reinforce rather than to disrupt public purposes to which they are committed.

In short, it should now be possible to crystallize a clear and well-balanced American attitude toward the issues of public and private enterprise in economic development and to mount an American policy that harnesses them in more vigorous collaboration than we have had in the past.

What such a generally hopeful perspective and policy must take into account, however, is that what we call underdeveloped areas are at very different stages on the path from traditional to modern status. The currently successful cases of private international investment tend to cluster about two extreme points along this path—that is to say, in areas which have barely moved beyond the traditional stage and where oil and other extractive foreign enterprises operate in relative (but rapidly decreasing) comfort, as in the Middle East and parts of Central Africa; and

again in such new nations as Mexico which have, in fact, passed through the take-off into sustained growth and are rapidly becoming thoroughly modernized societies. Vigorous, competent businessmen have emerged in large numbers only in these latter advanced societies, and only there has the attitude towards foreign private enterprise been generally hospitable.

In between lies the difficult transitional period in which a good deal of Asia, the Middle East and Africa finds itself. In economic terms, an extremely high percentage of investment in this transitional period must go into social overhead capital. At the local end this means a high proportion of government investment. At the American end, this means a high proportion of inter-governmental loans, unless the pre-1914 private market for foreign government bonds suddenly recreates itself. Moreover, in these transitional periods, while the new corps of modern industrial businessmen are emerging it is likely to be a simple fact of life that civil servants and politicians (and, sometimes, soldiers) will perform more of the functions of entrepreneurship than American experience would find normal. Economically, this stage can give way to a more familiar and congenial balance between public and private sectors only when the whole modernization process has gathered momentum. American advice and negotiation can help in this evolution; but economic progress itself is the decisive variable.

The nature of this intermediate stage explains why governments—and inter-governmental loans—may have to play temporarily a disproportionately large role even outside the area of social overhead capital. The risk of investment—and the time

before payoff becomes possible—does not lie in the nature of the individual project or its intrinsic soundness by conventional banking standards. The question is: When will the economy as a whole enter the stage of self-sustained growth? Private investors understandably draw back from gambling on the timing of such profound historical changes. Governments—theirs and ours—must live with and operate on precisely such risks; because, without adequate governmental investment, the take-off may not occur rapidly enough to meet the political pressures for it.

The nature of this intermediate stage explains also why such devices as dollar loans repayable in local currencies make sense. Many nations moving forward—whose take-offs are in the American interest, but which have not yet occurred—can use capital productively but they cannot generate sufficient foreign exchange and international credit-worthiness until they achieve the stage of self-sustained growth. Soft loans are one way of covering this interval whose length cannot be predicted with confidence. The temporary accumulation of local currencies is, thus, a minor embarrassment in an essentially rational course of action.

Politically, in between the two relatively comfortable stages for foreign private enterprise, occurs the passage of local history in which a modern centralized government is created and effectively takes hold. It is to be expected on the basis of history that at some stage in the political transition the nationalist emotions which drive local politics create a somewhat critical, if not hostile, atmosphere towards foreign investment, notably if the foreign positions in the economy became entrenched during a colonial or

semi-colonial past. Knock-down, drag-out crises in the status of foreign enterprise are, of course, not inevitable; but changes in relationship and attitude are inevitable as the new nations take shape and become increasingly conscious of their sovereignty. A wiser and more forehanded free-world policy towards, for example, Indonesia and Egypt in recent years might well have prevented or softened the current crises in the status of foreign enterprise there; and Western oil companies (and their governments) would do well to avoid clinging rigidly to old formulas in the Middle East. But it is in the nature of the historical process taking place that a certain amount of awkwardness and readjustment will be required.

Thus it will take an understanding of what it is like to move from a traditional to a modern society—a sense of history, and patience as well as a vigorous collaboration between American public and private authorities—to see us through into the stage when most men and governments in the world come to perceive that private capitalism, domestic and foreign, has an expanding role to play in the new nations capable of reinforcing their larger political and social objectives.

IV

India provides a critical focus for our economic development policies for the next decade, and a test of their meaning. There are a number of reasons for this. In the first place, the population of India includes about 40 percent of all the people in the underdeveloped countries of the free world. Politically and

strategically India is even more important than the numbers of her people would suggest. The success or failure of Indian development efforts will affect the course of events from the Celebes to Morocco. We have not yet devoted the attention and resources to Indian development problems that the American interest requires.

There are compelling technical economic reasons why, at the moment, we should be concentrating a much larger share of our capital assistance on India than even her size would dictate. To allocate development assistance to countries in proportion to their population or their relative claim on our sympathies is to misconstrue the relation between capital and the development process. The requirements for outside capital of countries seeking development vary widely depending on the stage of development they have reached. In the early precondition stages in which many of the underdeveloped countries find themselves, the amounts of capital they can productively absorb are sharply limited by shortages of skills, education, administrative capability, essential social overhead such as roads, ports, communications and the like, and by the absence of the attitudes, motivations and political leadership that make growth possible. Technical assistance and limited amounts of capital may have to be supplied for some years before the country is technically and politically ready for the take-off—the concentrated effort to launch a growth process that will be self-sustaining.

But there does come a time when the stage is set for the big push. The country finds itself in a position to launch simultaneously a wide variety of interdependent activities which

reinforce each other, and whose combined effect is to produce for the first time a substantial forward movement in all major sectors of the economy at once. India is, in our judgment, at this critical turning point. For a decade or so, during this take-off, requirements for foreign capital are at a maximum. Then, if the process is successful, the country's own rising income increasingly provides the new resources which can be plowed back into investment to stabilize growth as a regular feature of the economy; and the fact of regular growth itself permits the country, once the take-off has occurred, to acquire external capital from private or other orthodox sources.

The evidences that India is ready for the take-off—indeed has already started it—are many. Over the past eight years her output of goods and services has grown by about 25 percent. This growth has occurred in agriculture, in large-scale industry, in small-scale industry, in transport and services. In all these fields there are investment projects on the drawing boards, Indian designed and engineered, to continue the expansion. There is a growing class of competent administrators, both public and private, to undertake the work. There are clear signs of growing domestic markets to buy the new output when it is ready. There are many more things which Indian leaders must do vigorously if they are to accomplish the take-off, but they now have it in their power to take most of the necessary steps themselves.

There is, however, one major economic threat to the maintenance of momentum which can be met only by action outside India: there is a shortage of foreign exchange with which to acquire the resources needed from abroad for the investment

program. The drain which India has recently suffered on her foreign exchange reserves has been caused not, as in the case of some countries, by a decline in her export earnings nor, as in others, by an expansion of domestic consumption. Rather it has come about mainly by an import of capital goods, primarily for the private sector, much larger than anticipated by Indian government planners. This drain has been accentuated by two relatively poor harvests; but the essential reason that India's foreign balance is in trouble is not that her development efforts have not been succeeding but that investment has gathered more momentum than anyone anticipated. The problem facing India today is how this momentum can be preserved.

The availability of help and resources from outside is important at all stages of the growth process. But there is a peculiarly critical moment in that process, which India has now reached, when external capital in adequate amounts and over a long enough period becomes the key determinant of what happens. After the take-off, as in Mexico, the external environment is important, but non-governmental sources of capital can carry most of the load. Before the take-off technical assistance and some outside capital for social overhead are necessary; but the critical bottlenecks are the needed transformations in the social, political and economic structure of the nation for which its own leadership must take prime responsibility. A time comes, however, when the domestic prerequisites for success have been largely met and when the availability of substantial external resources on an investment basis is the single most important condition of success. India is the prime case in the year 1958 of a

country in this position. No one can, of course, guarantee that if the foreign exchange bottleneck is removed, success is assured. Development is always a gamble. But the risk in the Indian case appears eminently worth taking from the American point of view.

We have taken a first step toward meeting India's immediate needs by arranging for a series of credits with the Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund and our agricultural surplus disposal program. They aggregate $290 million for the current year. In our judgment this requires extension of three sorts. First, the annual volume of American loans needs to be increased to at least $500 million; second, a serious effort needs to be made to find substantially more capital from sources other than the United States, such as Western Europe; finally, India requires some assurance that she can count on this general level of new credit for a period of some years.

In terms of the preceding analysis of the American interest in economic development, the Indian scene has two characteristics that lend special urgency to an adequate program of American loans to that country. The first is that the present Indian leadership has quite clearly centered its bid for national unity on a common effort to achieve constructive economic goals, in a framework of democratic consent. Economic development goals are a live political issue in India, as they are not (to anything like the same extent) in any other underdeveloped country. Indian foreign policy, anti-colonialism and the Kashmir issue frequently reach the headlines of the Western press; and, of course, they play a significant role in domestic Indian politics. But the Congress Party will not stand or fall at home, as Nasser and

Soekarno may, on its external successes. Indians will judge the Congress Party on how far and how fast it achieves the modernization of India by the voluntary and essentially democratic methods it has chosen to employ.

In India we have the opportunity of confronting the Communists with a serious dilemma. They would, of course, like to exploit Indian-Western tensions. But these are not as much at the center of the thinking of Indian intellectuals as is the case, for example, in the Middle East. The Russians would like to appear as the friends of Indian economic development, which has come to have genuine importance to a great many Indians. But ultimate Communist success in India depends on the failure of the economic development efforts sponsored by what Communists would describe as the present bourgeois regime. As long as the West fails to insure adequate resources for a successful Indian take-off the Communists can successfully pursue the tactic of providing enough help to be symbolically persuasive of their good intentions, but not enough to make a significant difference to the outcome of the Indian Second Five-Year Plan. Thus the success of current Communist tactics in India depends on an American and Western European failure to cover the foreign exchange gap.

The present leaders of the Indian state of Kerala, which went Communist at the last elections, are likewise giving evidence that they are faced with a dilemma. If within the state for which they have responsibility they pursue aggressive and coercive Communist policies, which the Indian electorate finds uncongenial, they may lose their slim parliamentary majority. On the other hand, if they are constructive and reasonable,

suppressing their distinctively Communist policies and cooperating with private interests and with the national government, they weaken their case that only Communism can satisfy Indian aspirations for economic advance. Their great hope, of course, is that the national effort will fail and that they can contrast national failure under Congress leadership with at least partial success in Kerala. We have it in our power to help frustrate this Communist hope; but it will take substantially more than we are now doing.

Let us be clear about the nature of the danger confronting us. There is no immediate threat of an extension of Communist control from Kerala to the national government in India. The commitment of most elements of Indian leadership to the methods of consent and non-violence is so deep that even if economic development lags, an early Communist take-over is exceedingly unlikely. What is likely over the years, if development loses its momentum, is increasing conflict and confusion within the Congress Party, a resurgence of sectional and linguistic interests perhaps breaking into violence, a heightening of the political and social tensions created by mass unemployment—in short, a reversion to the kind of political instability which tempts otherwise moderate persons to support anyone who can maintain order. While there is no Communist-inspired crisis at present, the prospects are poor for stable and effective democratic government if the present development program fails.

It is precisely in the fact that no serious political crisis is on the immediate horizon in India that our great opportunity lies, for we have learned in many other places around the globe that the

salvage of situations which have been permitted to degenerate into crises is an exceedingly expensive, precarious and time-consuming business. In India there is still time in hand for us to use. We can demonstrate that we have a national interest in the development of the underdeveloped countries that lies deeper than our concern to chalk up day-to-day points in the game of cold-war diplomacy. Indian-American relations are important for their own sake. But they are even more important as an earnest of America's determination to play a constructive as well as a fire-fighting role in world affairs. In India, where a serious and promising attempt is being made to forge a new nation around the ideals of domestic progress by democratic procedures, it would be most shortsighted of us not to do what we can to make the effort a success.

The second characteristic of the Indian scene that gives it special urgency is the interesting relation between private and public economic activity that has begun to reveal itself in the last two years. The fact that public and private investment are not alternatives but can support each other in the early take-off stage of development has been nicely demonstrated by the Indian experience. In spite of an explicitly socialist governmental ideology, private investment in India has recently been booming. The private sector has, in the first 18 months of the Second Five-Year Plan, undertaken as much investment as the planners initially expected it to undertake over the entire five years. An analysis carried out at the Center for International Studies, M.I.T., of the composition of the unusually heavy volume of imports into India over the past two years reveals that the big increase has

been in capital goods imported on private account. The purchasing power created by public investment and the improved transport, communications, power and other services resulting from the activities of the public sector have created an environment in which private investment opportunities have multiplied. As mentioned earlier, it is this buoyancy of private economic activity which has been principally responsible for the foreign exchange difficulties with which India now finds herself confronted.

These difficulties—essentially growing pains—pose a serious dilemma for Indian policy. If additional foreign resources are not forthcoming, India must cut down her imports by strict controls to much lower levels. Her leaders are now politically committed to a variety of public projects. But even if they were not so committed, technical economic considerations would suggest that a sharp cut in investment in social overhead might ultimately throttle private as well as public activity. Further expansion of the private sector is conditioned upon a steady rise in purchasing power and a continuing expansion of transport, power and other services. Even steel might become a bottleneck if present plans were sharply cut back. On the other hand, if the core of the public program is to be maintained, imports can be sharply reduced only by restricting severely the licensing of capital imports for private Indian business.

In short, the volume of public and private investment required over the next decade to make full use of visible Indian resources for growth calls for a supply of foreign capital substantially above current levels. If this supply is forthcoming, there is an excellent

prospect that Indian productivity and output will expand sufficiently over the next decade or so to permit India to carry without difficulty the higher level of foreign indebtedness which would result. If the supply is not forthcoming, not only will Indian development be threatened, but also a chance will have been missed for a practical demonstration of the complementarity of public and private activities which would be enormously persuasive in other underdeveloped countries with socialist preconceptions.

The conclusion might be drawn from this line of argument that what we need is not a more vigorous program of economic assistance in general but rather a special program specifically focussed on and tailored to Indian requirements. This, in our view, misses the essence of our case. A successful Indian program is important at least as much for the model it can set for political leadership in other underdeveloped countries as for its own sake. If our economic assistance program sets up the kinds of criteria for foreign loans that we believe desirable, emphasizing the productivity of such loans for domestic development, India will, over the next two or three years, qualify for a larger share than her population would suggest. But the program as a whole should be so designed as to provide maximum incentives for the leaders of countries less far along to concentrate their energies on preparing their countries to make similar take-off efforts at a later stage. Our attitude should be that we are ready to help any country that has demonstrated its determination to focus its energies seriously on the problem of meeting the economic and social aspirations of its people. This requires a Development

Loan Fund with larger resources and a longer Congressional lease than exists under present legislation.

We should not be drawn by the exigencies of cold-war diplomacy into making investments which are unproductive and economically foolish from the standpoint of the development of the recipient. We will gain little long-run advantage from competitive blackmail. But we stand to gain a great deal as time goes on from a clear demonstration that we believe our interests and those of countries prepared to make a real development effort based on political consent are sufficiently common to justify sustained American investment.

India, under its present political leadership, has made the commitment to harness its nationalist aspirations to the tasks of modernization. The American stake in India is that this commitment shall not fail of its purpose. The more difficult task for American policy is to use our limited but real margin of influence to make it as easy and attractive for other transitional nations to do likewise. Among the many aspects of American policy which can contribute to this outcome, not the least important are the actions we take at this promising but difficult period in Indian history.

V

If we can, during the current examination of the foreign aid issue, clarify our national purposes in the program as a whole, establish the possibilities and limits of the role of private capital within it, and grasp the significance of the special case of India, it should

be possible over the next year to build a stable and effective economic development policy for the longer pull. Essentially, three elements are involved: continuity, scale and coordination.

It is evident that the Development Loan Fund will not be able to fulfil its mission until its Congressional lease on life, is, by one device or another, extended. The Congress may wish to postpone such action until 1959, since the Fund is only now beginning to disburse loans; and it is reasonable for definitive action to await evidence of vigorous and effective administration in terms of criteria of productivity. Similarly, it is evident that the present *ad hoc* emergency aid to India will not do the job and that the flow of American lending must be put on a longer-term basis if Indian leaders are to proceed with confidence and the Second Five-Year Plan is not to falter dangerously.

With respect to scale, it seems likely that the Loan Fund and the level of assistance to India will both have to be somewhat expanded. It is difficult to be dogmatic until further examination is undertaken; but it seems altogether possible that the Development Loan Fund will be able to justify an annual disbursement rate of about $1 billion in loans when it has worked itself properly into business. So far as India is concerned, it seems likely that American loans on something like the order of $500 million per year will be necessary for the duration of the next Five-Year Plan and, perhaps, for some time thereafter.

The maturing of the development program requires, finally, that methods of coordination improve both in Washington and on the international scene. As the Loan Fund has emerged it is simply one of a number of American instruments for accelerating

economic growth in the underdeveloped areas. Grants and technical assistance flow from the I.C.A.; the Export-Import Bank dispenses dollar loans, and is likely to do so on a rising scale; food and fiber surpluses are being increasingly used for development purposes—as working capital—rather than merely to salvage famine situations; and the Government, in its guarantee program and other arrangements can influence to a degree the flow of private capital abroad. Finally, the United States has some influence in the allocation of the hard currency loans available from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. There is evidently a need in Washington for strong central leadership in orchestrating these instruments around a coherent policy towards each of the nations applying for development assistance. The individual institutions and programs involved have grown up, each with its own history, criteria and *mystique*. Purposeful direction, backed by strong staff work, will be required in the Department of State to make them serve the nation's interests. In this connection, the *ad hoc* organization of $290 million for India was, on the whole, a hopeful exercise.

In addition, there remains the challenging and extremely important task of finding a method and an instrument for coordinating the economic development programs, now mainly bilateral, within the free world. There are powerful political undercurrents in Western Europe, Japan, Canada and elsewhere, which look to such a coordinated effort as a means of giving increased unity, meaning and vitality to the free world alliance. On the other hand, as the NATO conference of December 1957 revealed the countries of Western Europe are

reluctant to commit themselves to an expanded and coordinated development effort until the American Government—in both its branches— exhibits the determination to build a serious and sustained program around economic (as opposed to military) aid. The passage of the current proposals before the Congress should open the way, over the next year, to the exploration of the enormous constructive potentialities of a common free-world economic development program in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

Lectura 2

A political theory of foreign aid[15]

Hans Morgenthau

Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid. The very assumption that foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy is a subject of controversy. For, on the one hand, the opinion is widely held that foreign aid is an end in itself, carrying its own justification, both transcending, and independent of, foreign policy. In this view, foreign aid is the fulfilment of an obligation of the few rich nations toward the many poor ones. On the other hand, many see no justification for a policy of foreign aid at all. They look at it as a gigantic boondoggle, a wasteful and indefensible operation which serves neither the interests of the United States nor those of the recipient nations.

The public debate on foreign aid has contributed little to understanding. In the spring of every year the nation engages in such a debate, carried on almost exclusively in terms of the amount of money to he spent for purposes of foreign aid rather than o the substantive purposes which a policy of foreign aid is supposed to serve. The Administration tries, as it were, to sell a certain amount of foreign aid to Congress, and Congress refuses to buy that amount. Congress generally appropriates about ten per cent less than what the Administration has requested, and the Administration spends what is appropriated as it sees fit within the general categories authorized. Only when glaring abuses and inefficiencies are uncovered, as for instance in our foreign aid to Laos, is the question of the substance of our foreign

aid policy raised in public, and even then it is put in the negative terms of remedying the abuses and inefficiencies rather than in the positive terms of the purposes our foreign aid policy may he supposed to advance and the kinds of measures best calculated to serve these aims.

It is in fact pointless even to raise the question whether the United States ought to have a policy of foreign aid—as much so as to ask whether the United States ought to have a foreign political or military policy. For the United States has interests abroad which cannot be secured by military means and for the support of which the traditional methods of diplomacy are only in part appropriate. If foreign aid is not available they will not be supported at all.

The question, what kind of policy of foreign aid we ought to have, can then not be evaded. As it has developed in recent years, the kind we have is fundamentally weak. It has been conceived as a self-sufficient technical enterprise, covering a multitude of disparate objectives and activities, responding haphazardly to all sorts of demands, sound and unsound related or only by accident related to the political purposes of our foreign policy. The United States, in short, has been in the business of foreign aid for more than two decades but it has yet to develop an intelligible theory of foreign aid that could provide standards of judgment for both the supporters and opponents of a particular measure.

I. SIX TYPES OF FOREIDN AID

The first prerequisite for the development of a viable foreign aid policy is the recognition of the diversity of policies that go by that name. Six such can be distinguished which have only one thing in common: the transfer of money, goods and services from one nation to another. They are humanitarian foreign aid, subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for economic development.

Of these distinct types, only humanitarian foreign aid is *per se* nonpolitical. The aid which governments have traditionally extended to nations which are victims of natural disasters, such as floods, famines and epidemics falls in that category. So do the services, especially in the fields of medicine and agriculture, which private organizations, such as churches and foundations, have traditionally provided in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

While humanitarian aid is *per se* nonpolitical, it can indeed perform a political function when it operates within a political context. The foreign aid that private organizations provide will be attributed for better or worse to their respective governments insofar as humanitarian aid emanating from a foreign country is recognized by the recipient country or its inhabitants to perform a political function. Thus the agricultural aid which the Rockefeller Foundation has provided for many years to certain Latin American countries is likely to take on under contemporary conditions a political function which it did not perform previously. The same has from the beginning been true of the work the Ford Foundation has been doing in India. By the same token humanitarian aid extended by a government may have political effects.

Subsistence foreign aid is extended to governments, such as those of Jordan and Niger which do not command the resources to maintain minimal public services. The giving nation makes up the deficit in the budget of the recipient nation. Subsistence foreign aid is akin to the humanitarian type in that it seeks to prevent the breakdown of order and the disintegration of organized society. But it also performs the political function of maintaining the *status quo*, without, however, as a rule, increasing its viability. Where a political alternative to a nonviable regime may exist, subsistence foreign aid diminishes the chances of its materializing.

Bribes proffered by one government to another for political advantage were until the beginning of the nineteenth century an integral part of the armory of diplomacy. No statesman hesitated to acknowledge the general practice of giving and accepting bribes, however anxious he might be to hide a particular transaction. Thus it was proper and common for a government to pay the foreign minister or ambassador of another country a pension, that is, a bribe. Lord Robert Cecil, the Minister of Elizabeth, received one from Spain. Sir Henry Wotton, British Ambassador to Venice in the seventeenth century, accepted one from Savoy while applying for one from Spain. The documents which the French revolutionary government published in 1793 show that France subsidized Austrian statesmen between 1757 and 1769 to the tune of 82,652,479 livres, the Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz receiving 100,000.

The Prussian Ambassador in Paris summed up well the main rule of this game when he reported to his government in 1802:

“Experience has taught everybody who is here on diplomatic business that one ought never to give anything before the deal is definitely closed, but it has only proved that the allurement of gain will often work wonders”. It is worthy of note that the first appropriation act adopted by the first Congress of the United States in 1789 included a modest contingent fund for such purposes.

Much of what goes by the name of foreign aid today is in the nature of bribes. The transfer of money and services from one government to another performs here the function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered. These bribes differ from the traditional ones exemplified above in two respects: they are justified primarily in terms of foreign aid for economic development, and money and services are transferred through elaborate machinery fashioned for genuine economic aid. In consequence, these bribes are a less effective means for the purpose of purchasing political favors than were the traditional ones.

The compulsion of substituting for the traditional businesslike transmission of bribes the pretense and elaborate machinery of foreign aid far economic development results from a climate of opinion which accepts as universally valid the proposition that the highly developed industrial nations have an obligation to transfer money and services to underdeveloped nations for the purpose of economic development. Thus, aside from humanitarian and military foreign aid, the only kind of transfer of money and services which seems to be legitimate is one ostensibly made for the purpose of economic development. Economic development

has become an ideology by which the transfer of money and services from one government to another in peace time is rationalized and justified.

The present climate of opinion embraces another assumption as universally valid: that economic development can actually be promoted through such transfers of money and services. Thus economic development as an ideology requires machinery that makes plausible the postulated efficacy of the transfer for the stated purpose of economic development. In contrast to most political ideologies, which operate only on the verbal level and whose effects remain within the realm of ideas, this political ideology, in order to be plausible, requires an elaborate administrative apparatus serving as an instrument for a policy of make-believe. The government of nation A, trying to buy political advantage from the government of nation B for, say, the price of 20 million dollars, must not only pretend, but also act out in elaborate fashion the pretense, that what it is actually doing is giving aid for economic development to the government of nation B.

This practice of giving bribes as though they were contributions to economic development inevitably creates, in the giver and the recipient, expectations which are bound to be disappointed. Old-fashioned bribery was a relatively straightforward transaction; services were to be rendered at a price, and both sides knew what to expect. Bribery disguised as foreign aid for economic development makes of giver and recipient actors in a play which in the end they may no longer be able to distinguish from reality. In consequence, both may come to expect results in terms of

economic development which in the nature of things may not he forthcoming. Thus both are likely to be disappointed, the giver blaming the recipient for his inefficiency and the recipient accusing the giver of stinginess and asking for more. The ideology, if taken for reality, gets in the way of the original purpose of the transaction, and neither side believes that it has received what it is entitled to.

For the past decade, military aid took the lion's share of the foreign aid programs of the United States. A shift in favor of non-military aid occurred during the 1961 session when Congress appropriated somewhat over 2 billion dollars for military aid, while the total voted for all the other foreign aid programs ran in excess of 3 billion dollars. To the latter amount must be added the equivalent of approximately 1 billion dollars in foreign currencies, the proceeds of the sale of agricultural commodities abroad, to be used for economic grants and loans to purchasing governments.

Foreign aid for military purposes is a traditional way by which nations buttress their alliances. Rome used to receive tribute from its allies for the military protections it provided. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are the classic period of military subsidies, by which nations, and especially Great Britain, endeavoured to increase the military strength of their allies. Glancing through the treaties of alliance of that period, one is struck by the meticulous precision with which obligations to furnish troops, equipment, logistic support, food, money, and the like were defined. The loans which France extended to Russia after the conclusion of the alliance between the two nations in 1894 fall in the same category. This traditional military aid can be

understood as a division of labor between two allies who pool their resources, one supplying money, materiel, and training, the other providing primarily manpower.

In contrast to traditional practice, military aid today is extended not only to allies but also to certain uncommitted nations. The military aid the United States has been giving to Yugoslavia is a case in point. The purpose is here not so much military as political. It seeks political advantage in exchange for military aid. It obligates by implication, the recipient toward the giver. The latter expects the former to abstain from a political course which might put in jeopardy the continuation of military aid. Military aid is here really in the nature of a bribe.

What appears as military aid may also be actually in the nature of prestige aid, to be discussed below. The provision of jet fighters and other modern weapons for certain underdeveloped nations can obviously perform no genuine military function. It increases the prestige of the recipient nation both at home and abroad. Being in the possession of some of the more spectacular instruments of modern warfare, a nation can at least enjoy the illusion of having become a modern military power.

As bribery appears today in the guise of aid for economic development, so does aid for economic development appear in the guise of military assistance. In the session of 1961, for instance, Congress appropriated 425 million dollars for economic aid to strategic areas, and it is likely that in the total appropriations of over 2 billion dollars for military aid other items of economic aid are hidden. This mode of operation results from the reluctance of Congress to vote large amounts for economic

aid in contrast to its readiness to vote virtually any amount requested for military purposes. Yet the purposes of aid for economic development are likely to suffer when they are disguised as military assistance, as we saw the purposes of bribery suffer when disguised as aid for economic development. The military context within which such aid is bound to operate, even though its direct administration be in the hands of the civilian authorities, is likely to deflect such aid from its genuine purposes. More particularly, it strengthens the ever-present tendency to subordinate the requirements of aid for economic development to military considerations.

Prestige aid has in common with modern bribes the fact that its true purpose, too, is concealed by the ostensible purpose of economic development or military aid. The unprofitable or idle steel mill, the highway without traffic and leading nowhere, the airline operating with foreign personnel and at a loss but under the flag of the recipient country—all ostensibly serve the purposes of economic development and under different circumstances might do so. Actually, however, they perform no positive economic function. They owe their existence to the penchant, prevalent in many underdeveloped nations, for what might be called “conspicuous industrialization”, spectacular symbols of, and monuments to, industrial advancement rather than investments satisfying any objective economic needs of the country.

This tendency sheds an illuminating light upon the nature of what is generally referred to as the “revolution of rising expectations”. We are inclined to assume that the urgent desire

to improve one's lot by means of modern technology and industry is a well-nigh universal trend in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Actually, however, this trend is universal only in the sense that virtually all underdeveloped nations want to appear as having achieved industrialization, while only a fraction of the population, and frequently only small elite groups within it, seek the social and economic benefits of industrialization and are willing to take the measures necessary to achieve them. For many of the underdeveloped nations the steel mill, the highway, the airline, the, modern weapons, perform a function that is not primarily economic or military, but psychological and political. They are sought as the outward show of modernity and power. They perform a function similar to that which the cathedral performed for the medieval city and the feudal castle or the monarch's palace for the absolute state. Nehru is reported to have said, when he showed Chou-En-Lai a new dam: "It is in these temples that I worship". And the more underdeveloped and less viable a nation is, the greater is likely to be its urge to prove to itself and to the world through the results of prestige aid that it, too, has arrived in the mind-twentieth century.

The advantage for the giver of prestige aid is threefold. He may receive a specific political advantage in return for the aid, very much like the advantage received for a bribe. Also, the spectacular character of prestige aid establishes a patent relationship between the generosity of the giver and the increased prestige of the recipient. The giver's prestige is enhanced, as it were, by the increase of the recipient's prestige. Finally, prestige aid comes relatively cheap. A limited

commitment of resources in the form of a spectacular but economically useless symbol of modernity may bring disproportionate political dividends.

The giver of foreign aid is therefore well advised to distinguish between prestige aid and aid for economic development, though both are justified by the prospective recipient in terms of genuine economic development. Thee prospective giver, if unaware of the distinction, is likely to fall into one of two errors. By mistaking prestige aid for aid for economic development, he may waste human and material resources in support of the latter when the purpose of prestige aid could have been achieved much more simply and cheaply. Or else he may reject out of hand a request for prestige aid because he cannot justify it in terms of economic development, and may thereby forgo available political advantages. The classic example of this error is the American rejection of the Afghan request for the paving of the streets of Kabul as economically unsound. The Soviet Union, pursuing a politically oriented policy of foreign aid, did pave the streets of Kabul.

II. FOREIGN AID FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PARTICULAR

None of the types of foreign aid discussed thus far poses theoretical questions of great magnitude; rather they raise issues far practical manipulation which can be successfully met by common sense tested by experience. Foreign aid for economic development has been the primary area for theoretical analysis

and speculation, and these have been primarily of an economic nature. Economic thought, true to its prevailing academic tradition, tends to look at foreign aid as though it were a self-sufficient technical enterprise to be achieved with the instruments, and judged by the standards, of pure economics. And since Western economic development, from the first industrial revolution onwards, has been due to the formation of capital and the accumulation of technical knowledge, we have tended to assume that these two factors would by themselves provide the impetus for the economic development of the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This tendency has been powerfully supported by the spectacular success of the Marshall Plan, the political origins and motivations of which were easily forgotten in its justification as a strictly economic measure for the provision of capital and technological know-how. Yet it is not always recognized that this success was made possible only by the fact that, in contrast to the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the recipients of Marshall aid were among the leading industrial nations of the world, whose economic systems were but temporarily in disarray.

The popular mind, on the other hand, and, through it, much of the practice of foreign aid have proceeded from certain unexamined assumptions, no less doubtful for being deeply embedded in the American folklore of politics. Thus the popular mind has established correlations between the infusion of capital and technology into a primitive society and its economic development, between economic development and social

stability, between social stability and democratic institutions, between democratic institutions and a peaceful foreign policy. However attractive and reassuring these correlations may sound to American ears, they are borne out neither by the experiences we have had with our policies of foreign aid nor by general historic experience.

The first of these assumptions implies that underdevelopment is at least primarily the result of lack of capital and technological know-how. Underdevelopment is regarded as a kind of accident or at worst as a kind of deficiency disease, which can be taken care of through subcutaneous injections of the missing ingredients. Yet a nation may suffer from deficiencies, some natural and insuperable, others social and remediable, which no amount of capital and technological know-how supplied from the outside can cure. The poverty of natural resources may be such as to make economic development impossible. Nations such as Jordan and Somalia are in al1 likelihood permanently incapable of economic development for that reason. Many of the nations which are the perennial recipients of subsistence aid are likely to fall in the same category.

A nation may also suffer from human deficiencies which preclude economic development. As there are individuals whose qualities of character and level of intelligence make it impossible for them to take advantage of economic opportunities, so are there nations similarly handicapped. To put it bluntly: as there are bums and beggars, so are there bum and beggar nations. They may be the recipients of charity, but short of a miraculous transformation of their collective intelligence and character, what

they receive from the outside is not likely to be used for economic development.

Other nations are presently deficient in the specific qualities of character and intelligence that go into the making of a modern economic system, even though their general or inherent capabilities qualify them potentially for the necessary transformation sometime in the future. They are, to use a rough analogy, in a medieval stage of cultural development, still awaiting the equivalent of the moral and intellectual revolutions which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries created the cultural preconditions for the economic development of the West. Yet we tend to take the existence of these preconditions for granted, forgetting that without the secularization and rationalization of Western thought and society the industrialization of the West would not have been possible.

A civilization, such as the Burmese, which deprecates success in this world because it stands in the way of success in the other world, puts a cultural obstacle in the path of industrial development, which foreign aid by itself cannot overcome. Saving, that is, the preservation of capital o1 goods for investment or future use, has become so integral a part of our economic thought and action that it is hard for us to realize that there are hundreds of millions of people in the underdeveloped areas of the world who are oblivious of this mode of operation, indispensable to economic development. We have come to consider the productive enterprise as a continuum in the betterment of which the individual owner or manager has a personal stake. Yet in many underdeveloped areas the

productive enterprise is regarded primarily as an object for financial exploitation, to be discarded when it has performed its function of bringing the temporary owner the largest financial return in the shortest possible time. Foreign aid poured into such a precapitalistic and even prerational mould is less likely to transform the mould than to be forced by it, in ways hardly predictable in advance, into channels serving the interests of a precapitalistic or prerational society.

The economic interests which tend to prevent foreign aid from being used for economic development are typically identified with the ruling groups in underdeveloped societies, which derive their political power in good measure from the economic *status quo.* The ownership and control of arable land, in particular, is in many of the underdeveloped societies the foundation of political power. Land reform and industrialization are in consequence an attack upon the political *status quo.* In the measure that they succeed, they are bound to affect drastically the distribution of economic and political power alike. Yet the beneficiaries of both the economic and political *status quo* are the typical recipients of foreign aid given for the purpose of changing the *status quo*. To ask them to use foreign aid for this purpose is to require a readiness for self-sacrifice and a sense of social responsibility which few ruling groups have shown throughout history. Foreign aid proffered under such circumstances is likely to fail in its ostensible purpose and, performing the function of a bribe to the ruling group, to strengthen the economic and political *status quo.* It is more likely to accentuate unsolved social and political problems than to bring them closer to solution. A team of

efficiency experts and public accountants might well have improved the operations of the Al Capone gang; yet by doing so, it would have aggravated the social and political evils which the operations of that gang brought forth.

Given this likely resistance of the ruling group to economic development, foreign aid requires drastic political change as a necessary condition for its success. Foreign aid must go hand in hand with political change, either voluntarily induced from within or brought about through pressure from without. The latter alternative faces the giving nation with a dilemma. On the one hand, to give foreign aid for economic development without stipulating conditions that maximize the chances for success will surely maximize the chances for failure. On the other hand, to give aid “with strings” arouses xenophobic suspicions and nationalistic resentments, to be exploited both by the defenders of the *status quo* and the promoters of Communist revolution.

Furthermore, once one has decided to bring about political change in opposition to the ruling group, one must identify some alternative groups as the instrument of political change. Sometimes, the only choice is among alternative groups which are equally unattractive. Sometimes, and not infrequently, the absence of any available alternative group leaves only the choice between creating one or doing nothing.

Finally, the promotion of drastic social change on the part of the giving nation may create the indispensable condition for economic development, but it also conjures up the spectre of uncontrollable revolution. In many of the underdeveloped nations peace and order are maintained only through the ruthless use of

the monopoly of force by the ruling group. Determined and skillful foreign intervention may find little difficulty in weakening or even removing altogether the power of the ruling group. It is not so easy to finish what has thereby been started. While the interventionist nation may be able to control events up to the point of instigating drastic reform and revolution, it may well prove unable to control the course of the revolution itself. More particularly, a democratic nation, such as the United States, is greatly handicapped in competing with Communists in the control of a revolution. The revolution may start, as it did in Cuba, under the democratic auspices of unorganized masses dedicated to social reform and supported by the United States, and may in the course of its development be taken over by the highly organized and disciplined Communist minority, the only organized and disciplined revolutionary group on the scene.

Successful foreign aid for economic development may have similarly unsettling political results. Economic development, especially by way of industrialization, is bound to disrupt the social fabric of the underdeveloped nation. By creating an urban industrial proletariat, it loosens and destroys the social nexus of family, village and tribe, in which the individual had found himself secure. And it will not be able, at least not soon, to provide a substitute for this lost social world. The vacuum so created will be filled by social unrest and political agitation. Furthermore, it is not the downtrodden peoples living in a static world of unrelieved misery who are the likely protagonists of revolution, but rather those groups that have begun to rise in the social and economic scale have not enough to satisfy their aroused expectations.

Thus, economic development is bound to disturb not only the economic *status quo* but, through it, the political *status quo* as well. If the change is drastic enough, the social and political effects of economic development may well bring about a pre-Revolutionary or revolutionary situation. And while the United States may have started the revolutionary process, it will again be uncertain under whose auspices it will be ended.

The United States faces a number of formidable handicaps in trying to control social and political change in the underdeveloped nations either as a prerequisite for, or a result of, foreign aid for economic development. First of all, as a Western capitalistic nation, the United States is a conservative power both domestically and internationally, and must appear particularly so to the underdeveloped nations. Both in its civilization and its social and economic structure, it belongs to that complex of nations which until recently were able to hold Africa, Latin America, and the outlying areas of Asia in a condition of colonial or semicolonial dependency. It has military alliances with these nations, and while it has generally shunned and even opposed outright colonial policies, it has actively and successfully participated in the semicolonial exploitation of backward nations. Thus the resentment against the former colonial powers attaches also, to it and its policies of foreign aid are frequently suspect, as serving in disguise the traditional ends of colonialism.

Furthermore, the United States, by dint of its pluralistic political philosophy and social system, cannot bring to the backward nations of the world a simple message of salvation, supported first by dedicated and disciplined revolutionary minorities and

then by totalitarian control. In the nature of things, the advantage lies here with the Communist powers. They are, as it were, specialists in exploiting a revolutionary situation, which is bound to cause us embarrassment. For while the Communists are able to direct a revolution into the desired channels through their use of a disciplined minority, we, even if we are convinced that revolution is inevitable and therefore do not oppose it, tend to look on it with misgivings since we cannot control the direction it will taken.

The Communist powers have still another advantage over the United States in that, at least on the surface their problems and achievements are more meaningful to the underdeveloped nations than ours. The Soviet Union has achieved, and Communist China attempts to achieve, what the more enlightened underdeveloped nations seek: a drastic increase in national output through rapid industrialization. The Communist powers use totalitarian control as their instrument and Communist doctrine as rationalization. Seeking the same results, the underdeveloped nations cannot help being attracted by the methods which brought about these results elsewhere. In contrast, the slow process, stretching over centuries, through which the nations of the West achieved a high standard of living through industrialization must appeal much less to them. That appeal is further lessened by the economic processes of the free market and the political processes of liberal democracy through which in large measure Western industrialization was achieved. For these processes require a degree of moral restraint and economic and political sophistication which are largely absent in

the underdeveloped nations. The simple and crude methods of totalitarianism must appear to them much more congenial.

Thus we arrive at the disconcerting conclusion that successful foreign aid for economic development can be counterproductive if the social and political goal of the giving nation is the recipient's social and political stability. In some cases at least, the failure of American aid for economic development may have been a blessing in disguise in that it did not disturb a stable *status quo* whose continuance was in our interest. Such aid, intended for economic development, actually performs the function either of a bribe or of prestige aid. Here again, however, these functions are likely to be impaired by disappointed expectations of economic development on the part of the giving and the recipient nation.

It is equally a moot question whether successful foreign aid for economic development is conducive to the development of democratic institutions and practices. Without stopping here to examine the complexities of the relationship between democracy and economic development, it is enough to observe, as recent history has made clear, that no necessary casual relationship exists between the two. The most impressive example is the Soviet Union. Its rapid economic development has gone hand in hand with totalitarian government, and a case could well be made for the proposition that the former would have been impossible without the latter. It is more likely than not that where the intellectual and moral preconditions for economic development are lacking in the population at large and are present only in a small elite, as is true in many of the underdeveloped nations, the imposition of the will of that small minority upon the majority of

the population is a prerequisite not only for the start of economic development but also for sustained economic growth.

As concerns the promotion of a peaceful foreign policy, economic development is likely to be counterproductive if a political incentive for a belligerent foreign policy is present. The contrary conclusion derives from the popular, yet totally unfounded assumption that “poor” nations make war on “rich” nations for economic advantage and that “rich” nations are by definition peaceful because they have what they want. In truth, of course, most wars have been fought not for economic but political advantage, and, particularly under modern technological conditions, only economically advanced nations are capable of waging modern war. We did not consider the Soviet Union a military threat as long as it was economically underdeveloped; it became one when its economic development had transformed it into a modern industrial power. Similarly, Communist China today, except to its immediate neighbours, is only a potential military threat by virture of its economic potential, both likely to be activated by economic development.

Foreign aid for economic development, then, has a very much smaller range of potentially successful operation than is generally believed. Its success depends in good measure not so much upon its soundness in strictly economic terms as upon intellectual, moral, and political preconditions, which are not susceptible to economic manipulation, if they are susceptible to manipulation from the outside at all. Furthermore, the political results of successful foreign aid for economic development may be either unpredictable or counterproductive in terms of the

political goals of the giving nation. In any event, they are in large measure uncontrollable. Foreign aid proffered and accepted for purposes of economic development may turn out to be something different from what it was intended to be, unless it is oriented toward the political conditions within which it must operate. Most likely, it will turn out to be a bribe or prestige aid or else a total waste. To do too much may here be as great risk as to do too little, and “masterly inactivity” may sometimes be the better part of wisdom.

III. CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY

The major conclusions for policy to be drawn from this analysis are three: the requirement of identifying each concrete situation in the light of the six different types of foreign aid and of choosing the quantity and quality of foreign and appropriate to the situation; the requirement of attuning withing the same concrete situation, different types of foreign aid to each other in view of the over-all goals of foreign policy; and the requirement of dealing with foreign aid as an integral part of political policy.

The task of identifying concrete situations with type of foreign aid appropriate to them is a task for country and area experts to perform. Can country A not survive without foreign aid? Is its government likely to exchange political advantages for economic favors? Would our military interests be served by the strengthening of this nation’s military forces? Does this country provide the no economic preconditions for economic development to be supported by foreign aid? Are our political

interests likely to be served by giving this nation foreign aid for purposes of prestige? Can a case be made for foreign aid in order to alleviate human suffering? What kind and quantity of foreign aid is necessary and sufficient achieve the desired result?

To answer these questions correctly demands first of all a thorough and intimate knowledge and understanding of the total situation in a particular country. But it also requires political and economic judgment of a very high order, applied to two distinct issues. It is necessary to anticipate the receptivity of the country to different kinds of foreign aid and their effects upon it. When this analysis has been made, it is then necessary to select from a great number of possible measures of foreign aid those which are most appropriate to the situation and hence most likely to succeed.

In most cases, however, the task is not that simple. Typically, an underdeveloped country will present a number of situations indicating the need for different types of foreign aid simultaneously. One type given without regard for its potential effects upon another type risks getting in the way of the latter. One of the most conspicuous weaknesses of our past foreign aid policies has been the disregard of the effect different types of foreign aid have upon each other. Bribes given to the ruling group, for instance, are bound to strengthen the political and economic *status quo*. Military aid is bound to have an impact upon the distribution of political power within the receiving country; it can also have a deleterious effect upon the economic system, for instance, by increasing inflationary pressures. Similarly, the effect of subsistence foreign aid is bound to be the

support of the *status quo* in all its aspects. Insofar as the giving nation desires these effects or can afford to be indifferent to them they obviously do not matter in terms of its over-all objectives. But insofar as the giving nation has embarked upon a policy of foreign aid for economic development which requires changes in the political and economic status quo, the other types of foreign aid policies are counterproductive in terms of economic development: for they strengthen the very factors which stand in its way.

This problem is particularly acute in the relations between prestige aid and aid for economic development. The giving nation may seek quick political results and use prestige aid for that purpose; yet it may also have an interest in the economic development of the recipient country, the benefits of which are likely to appear only in the more distant future. Prestige aid is at best only by accident favourable to economic development; it may be irrelevant to it, or it may actually impede it. What kind of foreign aid is the giving country to choose? If it chooses a combination of both it should take care to choose an innocuous kind of prestige aid and to promote economic development the benefits of which are not too long in coming. Afghanistan is the classic example of this dilemma. The Soviet Union, by paving the streets of Kabul, chose a kind of prestige aid that is irrelevant to economic development. The United States, by building a hydroelectric dam in a remote part of the country, chose economic development, the very existence of which is unknown to most Afghans and the benefits of which will not appear for years to come.

It follows, then, from the very political orientation of foreign aid that its effect upon the prestige of the giving nation must always be in the minds of the formulators and executors of foreign aid policies. Foreign aid for economic development, in particular, which benefits the recipient country immediately and patently is a more potent political weapon than aid promising that are obscure and lie far in the future. Furthermore, the political effects of foreign aid are lost if its foreign source is not obvious to the recipients. For it is not aid as such or its beneficial results that creates political loyalties on the part of the recipient, but the positive relationship that the mind of the recipient establishes between the aid and its beneficial results, on the one hand, and the political philosophy, the political system, and the political objectives of the giver, on the other. That is to say, if thee recipient continues to disapprove of the political philosophy, system, and objectives of the giver, despite the aid he has received, the political effects of the aid are lost. The same is true if he remains unconvinced that the aid received is but a natural, if not inevitable, manifestation of the political philosophy, system, and objectives of the giver. Foreign aid remains politically ineffectual—at least for the short term—as long as the recipient says either: “Aid is good, but the politics of the giver are bad”; or “Aid is good, but the politics of the giver—good, bad, or indifferent—have nothing to do with it”. In order to be able to establish psychological relationship between giver and recipient, the procedures through which aid is given, and the subject matter to which it is applied, must lend themselves to the creation of a connection between the aid and the politics of the giver which

reflects credit upon the latter.

The problem of foreign aid is insoluble if it is considered as a self-sufficient technical enterprise of a primarily economic nature. It is soluble only if it is considered an integral part of political policies of the giving country which must be devised in view of the political conditions, and for its effects upon the political situation, in the receiving country. In this respect, a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armory of the nation.

As military policy is too important a matter to be left ultimately to the generals, so is foreign aid too important a matter to be left in the end to the economists. The expertise of the economist must analyze certain facts, devise certain means, and perform certain functions of manipulation for foreign aid. Yet the formulation and over-all execution of foreign aid policy is a political function. It is province of the political expert.

It follows the political nature of foreign aid that it is not a science but an art. That art requires by way of mental predisposition a political sensitivity to the interrelationship among the facts, present and future, and ends and means. The requirements by way of mental activity are two-old. The first is a discriminating judgement of facts, ends and means and their effects upon each other. However, an analysis of the situation in the recipient country and, more particularly, its projection into the future and the conclusions from the analysis in terms of policy can only in part be arrived at through rational deduction from ascertainable facts. When all the available facts have been

ascertained, duly analyzed, and conclusions drawn from them, the final judgements and decisions can be derived only from subtle and sophisticated hunches. The best the formulator and executor of a policy of foreign aid can do is to maximize the chances that his hunches turn out to be right. Here as elsewhere in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, the intuition of the statesman, more than the knowledge of the expert, will carry the day.

Lectura 3

Foreign Aid and the National Interest*

Robert A. Packenham**

There is much in popular writings which purports to “explain” the shortcomings of foreign aid[16] and scholars have devoted some attention to this question[17]. However, these “explanations” of foreign aid’s shortcomings have seldom been put to any kind of empirical test. They remain at best plausible hypotheses and at worst largely meaningless polemic.

The purpose of this article is not to test all or even one of these hypotheses fully.

Rather it is to take one hypothesis-perhaps the one that has received the most attention-and subject it for the first time to some preliminary empirical testing. Perhaps a byproduct may be greater interest in more careful empirical examination of these “explanations”. Briefly put, the hypothesis with which I am concerned is that the basic concept guiding foreign aid is

“humanitarianism” rather than “national interest”[18].

My partial test of this hypothesis was to find out how some aid officials justify aid *in verbal terms*. What do they say are the guiding principles of United State foreign policy? Do they say they believe aid should be related to United States national interests, and that aid should be an instrument of United States foreign policy? If so, to what extent? Sometimes? Always? Answers to these questions are a first step toward testing empirically one “explanation” of the causes of the shortcomings of foreign aid.

It may be said (it has been said to me) that a finding that aid administrators verbally justify aid decisions in national interest terms does not refute the humanitarianism hypothesis, on the grounds that despite their verbal obeisance to “national interest”, they are guided largely by humanitarian considerations. Such a critique might be relevant *if* the content of “humanitarianism” and “national interest” were spelled out by the proponents of the “humanitarian” explanation. But this is hardly the case. The best-known proponents of this “explanation” are Edward G. Banfield and Hans J. Morgenthau[19]. However, neither Banfield nor Morgenthau is precise about the content of national interest; they do not give the concept operational meaning beyond the level of verbal justifications[20]. Hence, if the foremost advocates of the humanitarianism “explanation” refuse to define this key term—even deliberately keep it obscure—it is not incumbent on me to define it for them. (Such a task might well be the impossible one of finding order where none exists.) What I am asserting is that their “explanation”, as stated, has no explanatory power

whatever. It is not incumbent on me or anyone to deal with the explanatory power of a more precise “explanation” which they might advance, but do not advance, and seem determined to avoid advancing. Since they are the ones who purport to “explain”, it is incumbent upon others only to examine the truth or falsity of such hypotheses, not necessarily to advance other hypotheses. This is my main concern in this paper.

OCCASION FOR THE TEST

Between November 1962 and January 1963, I interviewed 54 officials of the Agency for International Development (AID) in Washington. My primary interest was their views about the relationship between aid and broadscale political change in the recipient country, but questions were also asked about the justification of aid, the answers to which are reported here[21].

I paid heaviest attention to the four regional bureaus. Of the total of 36 interviews there, I talked with all the 20 office directors, the four chief planning officers, the four chief technical assistance officers, the four chief capital assistance officers, and four of the five deputy assistant administrators. This enabled me to cover the major policy-making positions in each region, and by covering each region, I was able to cover the whole universe of countries to which the Agency provided aid.

These interviews are the major basis for the test reported here. I also read a good deal of published and other documentary material including laws, hearing testimony, speeches, administrative policy guidelines, manual orders and regulations,

Congressional reports and various other kinds of agency memoranda.

THE TEST AND ITS RESULTS

The questions asked were: How should aid fit into the overall foreign policy of the United States, if at all? Should aid be a political instrument, that is, an instrument of foreign policy? What do you think of the notion that the national interest ought to be an essential justification for foreign aid? The questions were not read word for word and the respondent was not always asked all three forms of the central question. But the central question was always raised.

The first 19 respondents supported without qualification the "national interest" concept as the proper guide to aid decisions. Many were emphatic. One official said, for example, "You've go to remember that aid is *always* an instrument, *never* an end in itself". Another official said firmly, "Anyone who doesn't believe this shouldn't be in the aid program and is wasting the taxpayer's money". A third observed, "It's a fact of life". These remarks suggest the tone of their comments. There was no doubt in their minds that this was a necessary justification. Interestingly, several respondents remarked how *others* justified aid only on humanitarian grounds-but not they themselves. But in fact no aid official did this.

After the first 19, I stopped asking the question. Even thereafter, however, the topic continued to arise in connection with other questions, always with the same result[22]. In addition,

the available published documentation says the same thing. For example, the Program Guidance Manual of AID for 1962 (Fiscal Year 1963) begins, “Aid is an instrument of foreign policy”.

Ironically, the academic writer cited most often by the officials was Professor Morgenthau. I did not solicit or offer any names for comment but several officials volunteered the information that they found Professor Morgenthau the most useful academic theorist on foreign policy that they knew about. No other academic theorist of international relations—such as Thomas I. Cook, Malcolm Moos, or Frank Tannenbaum, who are identified with the “idealist” school of foreign policy in alleged contradistinction to Professor Morgenthau’s national interest (“realist”) approach—was suggested as useful by the interviewees[23]. Nor were any other academic theorists of foreign aid, such as Wolf, Staley, or Liska[24]. One respondent, a regional office director, said, “I like Morgenthau’s stuff; it’s about the only theory which makes sense to me”. He particularly endorsed Morgenthau’s emphasis on the use of aid for short-term political purposes. Another respondent, who also accepted the aid-as-a-political-instrument justification, argued with equal intensity that the best way to advance the national interest was to use aid mainly for economic development, free from short-term political considerations. Numerous officials mentioned examples of strictly humanitarian aid; the one most often cited was disaster relief aid to Iran in the fall of 1962, since it had occurred most recently. However, such strictly humanitarian aid-a miniscule fraction of the total-was sharply distinguished from the “real” aid program.

To say all this is not to deny that aid officials have humanitarian

goals or that they also justify aid on humanitarian grounds. They do have such goals and they do offer such justifications. But it must be remembered that aid officials, like everyone else, seldom have just one goal for the things they do; they have clusters of goals. Again like everyone else, they can justify what they do and the views they hold on several grounds. However, both aid officials and "everyone else" have priorities of goals and justifications. Some goals and justifications are *sine qua non's*. The *sine qua non* goal and justification of aid is that it be an instrument of foreign policy and justified in terms of the national interest. If other goals and justifications can be added, all the better; if they cannot, the decision to go ahead is forthcoming anyway. In no case[25], however, does the doctrine justify using aid for humanitarian purposes when justification in national interest terms is lacking. A simple table summarizes these points:

A. I. D. OFFICIALS' VERBAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AID

	HUMANITARIAN JUSTIFICATION	YES	NO
National Interest Justification	Yes	YES 1	YES 2
	No	NO 3	NO 4

AID officials give the responses indicated in the table. If this test of the hypothesis-that for some aid officials the major justification for aid is not the national interest but humanitarianism —were to indicate support for it, there would have to be some "yes" cases in box 3. However, there are none. All the responses in box 3 are negative.

Thus, so far as this test is an adequate measure, and to the extent the sample is representative, AID officials never justify

their decisions solely according to the principle of humanitarianism. This can be said with considerable confidence of AID. Moreover, among all agencies participating in aid decisions (except the Peace Corps), AID is generally regarded as most likely to bypass the national interest criterion. Thus it would follow that the other agencies would be equally or even more likely to hold that aid must be an instrument of national foreign policy.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

I have offered evidence that the concept of national interest has completely penetrated the thinking of 54 members of AID at least to the level of verbal justification, which is about as far as Professors Banfield and Morgenthau take it in their critiques of American aid policy. More impressionistic evidence also suggests that there has been a similar penetration in the rest of AID. Because AID is probably more prone to altruism than other agencies making aid policy (except the Peace Corps), this penetration has probably spread to the rest of the aid establishment as well.

If, then, there is a small but important increment of knowledge here, what implications may be drawn from it?

1. One inference is that the national interest “school” of foreign policy has been displacing a more moralistic bureaucracy in Washington, if such ever existed. If so, this is perhaps a testimony to the influence of writers like Professors Morgenthau and Arnold Wolfers. It is surely

one of the virtues of the national interest school that it stresses the political aspects, broadly defined, of all foreign policy, including foreign aid. This lesson appears to have been learned at the level of verbal justifications.

2. Writers on American foreign aid doctrines need to be more explicit about whose doctrines they describe. For example, there may well be major differences on basic concepts between official opinion and public opinion. (Who knows, however, how great the influence of Professors Morgenthau and Wolfers may have been outside government as well? Public opinion data on this question would be quite interesting.)
3. The end, or the non-existence, of the debate between national interest and humanitarian verbal justifications in aid policy-making has not stilled another debate between the pure-development, “strictly economic” school and the short-term political school of aid policy makers. The battle rages now about as fiercely as ever, all in the same of the national interest[26].
4. In trying to account for the shortcomings of foreign aid, we need to go beyond explanations primarily in terms of the relative adequacy or inadequacy of national interest and humanitarianism as guides or justifications. These concepts are useful but they do not take the strategist very far into specifics. As Liska says, “What matters are the particulars”. On the particulars, other factors than the concept itself affect aid decisions. One of the most obvious factors, for example, is institutional position[27],

both within AID and throughout the Executive branch. In very general terms, most regional bureau officials, planners, and capital development officers tend to see the best way of implementing the national interest as the economic development of the regions with which they are concerned. The political leadership of the Agency, the assistant administrators, the Department of State, and the White House often agree but are more likely also to see it in terms of short-term political uses. Finally, technical assistance officials, both in and out of the regions, and others scattered elsewhere, tend to perceive the national interest in terms of their own particular instrument—i.e., public administration, community development, public safety, or whatever. Whatever the different means proposed, however, the essential justification is always the same—the national interest.

Lectura 4

Truman's Inaugural Address[28]

January 20, 1949

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Chief Justice, fellow citizens:

I accept with humility the honor which the American people have conferred upon me. I accept it with a resolve to do all that I can for the welfare of this Nation and for the peace of the world.

In performing the duties of my office, I need the help and the prayers of every one of you. I ask for your encouragement and for your support. The tasks we face are difficult. We can accomplish them only if we work together.

Each period of our national history has had its special challenges. Those that confront us now are as momentous as any in the past. Today marks the beginning not only of a new administration, but of a period that will be eventful, perhaps decisive, for us and for the world.

It may be our lot to experience, and in a large measure bring about, a major turning point in the long history of the human race. The first half of this century has been marked by unprecedented and brutal attacks on the rights of man, and by the two most frightful wars in history. The supreme need of our time is for men to learn to live together in peace and harmony.

The peoples of the earth face the future with grave uncertainty, composed almost equally of great hopes and great fears. In this time of doubt, they look to the United States as never before for good will, strength, and wise leadership.

It is fitting, therefore, that we take this occasion to Proclaim to the world the essential principles of the faith by which we live, and to declare our aims to all peoples.

The American people stand firm in the faith which has inspired this Nation from the beginning. We believe that all men have a right to equal justice under law and equal opportunity to share in the common good. We believe that all men have a right to freedom of thought and expression. We believe that all men are created equal because they are created in the image of God.

From this faith we will not be moved.

The American people desire, and are determined to work for, a world in which all nations and all peoples are free to govern themselves as they see fit, and to achieve a decent and satisfying life. Above all else, our people desire, and are determined to work for, peace on earth-a just and lasting peace-based on genuine agreement freely arrived at by equals.

In the pursuit of these aims, the United States and other like-minded nations find themselves directly opposed by a regime with contrary aims and a totally different concept of life.

That regime adheres to a false philosophy which purports to offer freedom, security, and greater opportunity to mankind. Misled by that philosophy, many peoples have sacrificed their liberties only to learn to their sorrow that deceit and mockery, poverty and tyranny, are their reward.

That false philosophy is communism.

Communism is based on the belief that man is so weak and inadequate that he is unable to govern himself, and therefore requires the rule of strong masters.

Democracy is based on the conviction that man has the moral and intellectual capacity, as well as the inalienable right, to govern himself with reason and justice.

Communism subjects the individual to arrest without lawful cause, punishment without trial, and forced labor as the chattel of the state. It decrees what information he shall receive, what art he shall produce, what leaders he shall follow, and what thoughts he shall think.

Democracy maintains that government is established for the

benefit of the individual, and is charged with the responsibility of protecting the rights of the individual and his freedom in the exercise of those abilities of his.

Communism maintains that social wrongs can be corrected only by violence.

Democracy has proved that social justice can be achieved through peaceful change.

Communism holds that the world is so widely divided into opposing classes that war is inevitable.

Democracy holds that free nations can settle differences justly and maintain a lasting peace.

These differences between communism and democracy do not concern the United States alone. People everywhere are coming to realize that what is involved is material well-being, human dignity, and the right to believe in and worship God.

I state these differences, not to draw issues of belief as such, but because the actions resulting from the Communist philosophy are a threat to the efforts of free nations to bring about world recovery and lasting peace.

Since the end of hostilities, the United States has invested its substance and its energy in a great constructive effort to restore peace, stability, and freedom to the world.

We have sought no territory. We have imposed our will on none. We have asked for no privileges we would not extend to others.

We have constantly and vigorously supported the United Nations and related agencies as a means of applying democratic principles to international relations. We have consistently

advocated and relied upon peaceful settlement of disputes among nations.

We have made every effort to secure agreement on effective international control of our most powerful weapon, and we have worked steadily for the limitation and control of all armaments.

We have encouraged, by precept and example, the expansion of world trade on a sound and fair basis.

Almost a year ago, in company with 16 free nations of Europe, we launched the greatest cooperative economic program in history. The purpose of that unprecedented effort is to invigorate and strengthen democracy in Europe, so that the free people of that continent can resume their rightful place in the forefront of civilization and can contribute once more to the security and welfare of the world.

Our efforts have brought new hope to all mankind. We have beaten back despair and defeatism. We have saved a number of countries from losing their liberty. Hundreds of millions of people all over the world now agree with us, that we need not have war-that we can have peace.

The initiative is ours.

We are moving on with other nations to build an even stronger structure of international order and justice. We shall have as our partners countries which, no longer solely concerned with the problem of national survival, are now working to improve the standards of living of all their people. We are ready to undertake new projects to strengthen a free world.

In the coming years, our program for peace and freedom will emphasize four major courses of action.

First, we will continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies, and we will continue to search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase their effectiveness. We believe that the United Nations will be strengthened by the new nations which are being formed in lands now advancing toward self-government under democratic principles.

Second, we will continue our programs for world economic recovery.

This means, first of all, that we must keep our full weight behind the European recovery program. We are confident of the success of this major venture in world recovery. We believe that our partners in this effort will achieve the status of self-supporting nations once again.

In addition, we must carry out our plans for reducing the barriers to world trade and increasing its volume. Economic recovery and peace itself depend on increased world trade.

Third, we will strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression.

We are now working out with a number of countries a joint agreement designed to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic area. Such an agreement would take the form of a collective defense arrangement within the terms of the United Nations Charter.

We have already established such a defense pact for the Western Hemisphere by the treaty of Rio de Janeiro.

The primary purpose of these agreements is to provide unmistakable proof of the joint determination of the free countries

to resist armed attack from any quarter. Every country participating in these arrangements must contribute all it can to the common defense.

If we can make it sufficiently clear, in advance, that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur.

I hope soon to send to the Senate a treaty respecting the North Atlantic security plan.

In addition, we will provide military advice and equipment to free nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security.

Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people.

The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.

I believe that we should make available to peace-loving

peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development.

Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.

We invite other countries to pool their technological resources in this undertaking. Their contributions will be warmly welcomed. This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies whenever practicable. It must be a worldwide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom.

With the cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture, and labor in this country, this program can greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations and can raise substantially their standards of living.

Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to the benefit of the peoples of the areas in which they are established. Guarantees to the investor must be balanced by guarantees in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labor go into these developments.

The old imperialism-exploitation for foreign profit-has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.

All countries, including our own, will greatly benefit from a constructive program for the better use of the world's human and

natural resources. Experience shows that our commerce with other countries expands as they progress industrially and economically.

Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.

Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.

Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies-hunger, misery, and despair.

On the basis of these four major courses of action we hope to help create the conditions that will lead eventually to personal freedom and happiness for all mankind.

If we are to be successful in carrying out these policies, it is clear that we must have continued prosperity in this country and we must keep ourselves strong.

Slowly but surely we are weaving a world fabric of international security and growing prosperity.

We are aided by all who wish to live in freedom from fear-even by those who live today in fear under their own governments.

We are aided by all who want relief from lies and propaganda-those who desire truth and sincerity.

We are aided by all who desire self-government and a voice in deciding their own affairs.

We are aided by all who long for economic security-for the

security and abundance that men in free societies can enjoy.

We are aided by all who desire freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom to live their own lives for useful ends.

Our allies are the millions who hunger and thirst after righteousness.

In due time, as our stability becomes manifest, as more and more nations come to know the benefits of democracy and to participate in growing abundance, I believe that those countries which now oppose us will abandon their delusions and join with the free nations of the world in a just settlement of international differences.

Events have brought our American democracy to new influence and new responsibilities. They will test our courage, our devotion to duty, and our concept of liberty.

But I say to all men, what we have achieved in liberty, we will surpass in greater liberty.

Steadfast in our faith in the Almighty, we will advance toward a world where man’s freedom is secure.

To that end we will devote our strength, our resources, and our firmness of resolve. With God’s help, the future of mankind will be assured in a world of justice, harmony, and peace.

NOTAS

1. José Ángel Sotillo Lorenzo es doctor en Ciencias Políticas, profesor titular de Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid y director del Instituto Universitario de Desarrollo y Cooperación de misma universidad.

2. Citado en Wolfgang Benz y Hermann Graml (1984): "El Siglo XX. III. Problemas mundiales entre los dos bloques de poder", *Historia Universal Siglo XXI*, vol. 36, Siglo XXI de España Editores, Madrid, p. 1.

3. "Las condiciones geográficas, los movimientos demográficos, los intereses económicos y financieros, las características mentales colectivas, las grandes corrientes sentimentales, nos muestran las fuerzas profundas que han formado el marco de las relaciones entre grupos humanos y que, en gran medida, han determinado su naturaleza"; Pierre Reonuvin y Jean-Baptista Duroselle (2000): *Introducción a la Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México D. F., pp. 9-10.

4. Tomado del capítulo "El arte de disponer", del libro de André Fontaine (1970): *Historia de la Guerra Fría*, Barcelona, Luis de Caralt, pp. 205-206.

5. *Foreign Affairs* 25, nº 4, pp. 566-582 (1947). El texto se puede consultar en Juan Carlos Pereira y Pedro Martínez Lillo (1995): *Documentos básicos sobre historia de las Relaciones Internacionales*, Editorial Complutense, Madrid.

6. "La guerra fría", en su obra *Historia del siglo XX*, Crítica, Barcelona, p. 230 (1994). Véase también John Lewis Gaddis (2008): *La Guerra Fría*, RBA, Barcelona. "Guerra Fría y orden internacional. El nacimiento del Tercer Mundo", en Juan Carlos Pereira (coord.) (2009): *Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales contemporáneas*, Ariel, Barcelona, 2ª edición actualizada, pp. 447-634.

7. "Discurso de renuncia de Jacobo Arbenz, como presidente de Guatemala, el 27 de junio de 1954. Disponible en https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXFihj4wD_k

8. Incluimos el Punto Cuarto completo en las lecturas que acompañan a este capítulo. Acerca de sus repercusiones, véase el artículo de José María Tortosa, "Los desafíos del desarrollo en el siglo XXI".

9. Además de incluir el texto original en este capítulo, una versión en español se puede consultar en Grupo de Estudios de Relaciones Internacionales GERI-UAM (2015): *Relaciones Internacionales*, nº 28, febrero-mayo, pp. 147-161.

10. Diario *El Tiempo*, 25 de febrero de 1962.

11. "Política exterior y política de cooperación: ¿Amistades peligrosas?", *Nombres Propios*, Fundación Carolina, Madrid, 2011.

12. En Wolfgang Benz y Hermann Graml, *op. cit.*, “Aspectos de la ayuda al desarrollo”, pp. 409-415.

13. In *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 36, nº 3, April 1958, pp. 418-436.

14. Such was the purpose of the policy outlined last year by the present authors in “A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy” (New York: Harper, 1957).

15. This paper was prepared for the Public Affairs Conference Center, University of Chicago. It appeared in *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 56, nº 2, pp. 301-309.

* In *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, vol. 10, nº 2, May 1966, pp. 214-221.
** I am indebted to Vernon Van Dyke, Aaron Wildavsky and Raymond E. Wolfinger for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

16. For examples, see Eugene Castle, *The Great Giveaway* (Chicago: Regnery, 1957); *Billions, Blunders, and Baloney*: *The Fantastic Story of How Uncle Sam is Squandering our Money Overseas* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1955); Thomas S. Loeber, *Foreign Aid*: *Our Tragic Experiment* (New York: Norton, 1961); and William Lederer and Eugene Burdick, *The Ugly American* (New York: Norton, 1958).

17. See especially Hans J. Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56 (June, 1962), pp. 301-309; *idem*, “Foreword”, in George Liska, *The New Statecraft*: *Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); *idem*, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Knopf, 1951), pp. 113-128, esp. pp. 121-128; and Edward C. Banfield, *American Foreign Aid Doctrines* (Washington: American Enterprise Association, 1963). Banfield’s monograph appears in slightly different form in C. J. Friedrich and S. E. Harris, eds., *Public Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961). Also notable are Edward S. Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1964); and Lucian W. Pye, “Soviet and American Styles in Foreign Aid”, *Orbis*, 4 (Summer, 1960), pp. 159- 173, reproduced as ICA Secretariat Note 14 (January 24, 1961), and “The Political Impulses and Fantasies Behind Foreign Aid”, in *The New Look in Foreign Aid*, Proceedings, Academy of Political Science, Vol. 27 (January, 1962), pp. 92-111.

Other important works about foreign aid which devote some attention to trying to explain its shortcomings include Amos A. Jordan, Jr., *Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1962); John D. Mont- gomery, *The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries*: *Political Implications of Economic Development,* Revised Edition (New York: Praeger, 1961); Charles Wolf, Jr., *Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia* (Princeton, New

Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Liska, *op. cit.*

18. Those who propose this hypothesis argue not only an "is"—the humanitarian concept pervades American foreign aid-but also an "ought"—that it is wrong and should be replaced by the concept of "national interest". My main object here is to examine the empirical validity of the "is" statement.

19. *Ops. cit.* Lucian W. Pye (*ops. cit.*) in both articles also takes as his theme the "apolitical" nature of much of U. S. aid. However, he is talking primarily of the specific level where aid is applied, i.e., field decisions, not its broad justification, i.e., high-level decisions about the extent and character of aid. This is an important distinction between his hypothesis and that of Morgenthau and Banfield.

20. Vernon Van Dyke writes, "Morgenthau repeatedly uses the formula, 'interest defined in terms of power'. But, so far as I have been able to discover, he does not himself advance a definition explicitly, whether or not in terms of power. In truth, he seems almost deliberately to accentuate the vagueness of the key terms". "Values and Interests", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56 (September, 1962), pp. 573-74.

21. Before beginning the interviews I made a preliminary investigation of the policy-making process in AID by studying congressional committee hearings and agency documents and interviewing about 25 executive branch officials. The conclusion which emerged from this preliminary investigation was that the major decision-making units in AID were the Administrator's Office, the Regional Bureaus, the Program Coordination Staff, and the Office of Human Resources and Social Development. Hence the interview respondents were selected from these units.

22. In all the 54 formal interviews and the even more numerous informal conversations and discussions with aid officials in which I participated in Washington, no official argued that it was justifiable as a general practice to provide aid on humanitarian grounds if such action could not first be justified against the standard of promoting the national interest.

23. See Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos, *Power Through Purpose: The Realism of Idealism as a Basis for Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), and Frank Tannenbaum, "The American Tradition in Foreign Relations", *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1951), pp. 31-50. For the names of other "idealists", see Robert Endicott Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, 1955).

24. See footnote 2 for citations. This statement does not mean that no one in AID knows the work of these writers; I know that some do. But none volunteered their names during the interviews as examples of useful academic theorists in the way that some mentioned Morgenthau.

25. There are a few exceptions to this in the form of aid which from time to time is used for strictly humanitarian purposes like disaster relief, as in the case of the earthquake in Iran in the fall of 1962. There is even some reason to believe that the U. S. asked for—and received—concessions in return for this aid, which make it serve political ends, also. In any case, the amount of aid of this type relative to the total aid cost is very, very small.

26. See Robert A. Packenham, "Political Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program", *World Politics*, Vol. 18 (January, 1966), pp. 194-235.

27. Numerous other factors could be mentioned. Some of these, such as time perspective, ideology, and social and educational background, are less obvious than institutional position but possibly just as important. See Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963). These authors write that the factors which determine "self interest" include (1) *who* the self is, (2) what *value* the self maximizes, (3) the *time period* over which self interest is measured or postulated, (4) the amount and kind of *information* at hand, and (5) the *motivation* to get more information (pp. 472-475).

28. See at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm

CAPÍTULO 2

DESCOLONIZACIÓN Y DESARROLLO

JAVIER SURASKY[1]

Uno de los procesos que marcaron con mayor fuerza las dinámicas de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo (CID), junto al establecimiento de las lógicas de la guerra fría, fue el proceso de descolonización que se inició con el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y alcanzó su cénit durante de la década de 1960[2].

La llegada a la vida independiente de más de 50 países, sustancialmente africanos pero también asiáticos e incluso —en menor medida— latinoamericanos, se tradujo en un cambio de las dinámicas internacionales que fue dando lugar a una agenda propia de reclamos de los países que durante la década de 1950 eran denominados por las Naciones Unidas como “insuficientemente desarrollados”.

Esos países llegaron a su independencia con estructuras burocráticas y economías débiles y recursos humanos insuficientemente capacitados para enfrentar los desafíos que se les presentaban y se sumaron a los reclamos por mayor y mejor cooperación internacional que hasta entonces habían encabezado en la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU), más precisamente en su Asamblea General (AGNU) y Consejo Económico y Social (ECOSOC), los países de América Latina,

quienes ya habían logrado crear la Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL) mediante la Resolución 106 (VI) del Consejo Económico y Social en febrero de 1948[3].

El incremento numérico de los países “subdesarrollados” en los mencionados órganos no tardaría en producir modificaciones de trascendencia en los debates sobre los temas de nuestro interés, tanto más porque se dieron en un proceso de organización y de coordinación.

La Conferencia Afroasiática, reunida en Bandung en 1955, significó un momento trascendental en este proceso. Además de los muchos sentidos que suelen reconocerse a ese encuentro como movilizador de voluntades políticas de los países “insuficientemente desarrollados” y como catalizador del proceso de descolonización, la reunión de Indonesia señala el “momento cero” de la cooperación técnica entre países en desarrollo, a la que hoy denominamos cooperación Sur-Sur: su Declaración Final refleja, en el párrafo 2, el compromiso de los líderes allí presentes de proveerse mutua asistencia técnica, “hasta el máximo posible”.

Las reivindicaciones planteadas en Bandung serán asumidas como propias por el conjunto de países latinoamericanos que participaron en la Primera Conferencia de Solidaridad de los Pueblos de Asia, África y América Latina, reunida en La Habana en 1966, cuya Declaración General afirma: “Aún existen territorios sometidos a las más crueles formas de sistema colonial. En la conferencia están presentes los representantes de muchos de esos pueblos. Para afrontar los graves peligros que suponen el desarrollo económico y social y la liberación completa

de los de Asia, África y América Latina, es indispensable mantener en alto los principios de autodeterminación de los Estados, de soberanía nacional y de independencia política".

Bajo el influjo de Bandung, en 1961 se creó el Movimiento de Países No Alineados (MNOAL); en 1964, la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas para el Comercio y el Desarrollo (UNCTAD) y el Grupo de los 77 (G-77), que fueron a la vez consecuencia e impulsores de un cambio sustancial en la orientación de la cooperación internacional, por entonces centrada en las actividades realizadas por el sistema de la ONU: desde los debates en la Conferencia de San Francisco de 1945 que dio origen a la Carta de la ONU —y aun antes si consideramos las reuniones de Bretton Woods, de las que surgieron el Fondo Monetario Internacional y el Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento— y a pesar de los persistentes reclamos de los países "insuficientemente desarrollados", los esfuerzos de la cooperación internacional se habían dirigido a la reconstrucción de Europa, postergándose el abordaje de la promoción de la mejora de las condiciones económicas y sociales existentes en el mundo subdesarrollado.

Los cambios generados en la conformación de la AGNU que venimos señalando harían insostenible esa posición y ya, en 1961, cuando la ola descolonizadora recién comenzaba a circular por África, esta proclamaba mediante su Resolución 1710 (XVI) el inicio del Decenio de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo.

Paralelamente, daba comienzo la institucionalización de la CID dentro de las estructuras gubernamentales de los países

desarrollados, ya sea a través de la creación de agencias nacionales de cooperación internacional —como ocurrió con Estados Unidos, que estableció la USAID en 1961— o insertando nuevos órganos destinados a su gestión dentro de la estructura de sus poderes ejecutivos —Francia establece, en 1961, su Ministerio de Cooperación—. En la misma línea, en 1960 se establece la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), dentro de la cual se crea el Grupo de Ayuda al Desarrollo (GAD) que apenas un año más tarde se transformaría en el Comité de Ayuda al Desarrollo (CAD), que en 1969 adoptó la primera definición de Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD).

En directa relación con esa vía hacia la institucionalidad seguida en los países desarrollados, Hans Morgenthau publicaba en 1962 su trabajo “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid”, cuyo texto se encuentra disponible en las lecturas del capítulo 1 de este libro, donde sostiene que los Estados Unidos “tienen intereses en el extranjero que no pueden ser garantizados por la vía militar y los métodos tradicionales de la diplomacia son solo parcialmente apropiados para apoyarlos”, por lo que “si la ayuda exterior no está disponible, no tendrán apoyo en absoluto” (Morgenthau, 1962: 301).

El autor señala que las políticas de ayuda exterior pueden asumir seis formas “que solo tienen una cosa en común: la transferencia de dinero, bienes y servicios de una nación a otra. Ellas son la ayuda exterior humanitaria, la ayuda exterior para la subsistencia, la ayuda exterior militar, el soborno, la ayuda exterior para el prestigio y la ayuda exterior para el desarrollo

económico” (ibídem). A la última le presta especial atención y en su tratamiento dedica un párrafo específico a las consecuencias que trae aparejadas el colonialismo para una política de CID de los Estados Unidos. Sostiene Morgenthau (1962: 306):

Los Estados Unidos se enfrentan a una serie de desventajas formidables al intentar controlar el cambio social y político en las naciones subdesarrolladas, ya sea como un requisito previo para, o como resultado de, la ayuda exterior para el desarrollo económico. […] Tanto en su civilización y su estructura social y económica, pertenecen a ese conjunto de naciones que hasta hace poco eran capaces de mantener a África, América Latina y las áreas periféricas de Asia en una condición de dependencia colonial o semicolonial. Tiene alianzas militares con esas naciones, y, aunque en general ha evitado e incluso se ha opuesto a las políticas abiertamente coloniales, ha participado activamente y con éxito en la explotación semicolonial de naciones atrasadas. Así, el resentimiento contra las antiguas potencias coloniales [los vincula con] el encubrimiento de los fines tradicionales del colonialismo.

Resulta claro que el periodo de la descolonización fue también una etapa de intensa actividad en el campo de la CID, tanto en la perspectiva de los países recientemente independizados como por parte de los países desarrollados. Esta actividad y las visiones políticas que se encontraban detrás de unos y otros fueron dando visibilidad a lo que luego se conocería como “la brecha Norte-Sur”.

MIRADAS SOBRE EL DESARROLLO

Para comprender mejor nuestras afirmaciones conviene dedicarnos brevemente a las miradas sobre el desarrollo que se encontraban en pugna, y para ello es necesario comenzar por recordar que los debates sobre el concepto mismo de desarrollo eran por entonces nuevos.

Nacida a partir de la preocupación de algunos economistas de la época por intentar comprender el funcionamiento de la economía de los países insuficientemente desarrollados, la economía del desarrollo planteará entre sus debates iniciales la necesidad de hacerse de nuevas herramientas analíticas y la identificación de las trabas que las estructuras productivas de los países subdesarrollados imponen a sus procesos económicos. No es de extrañar, en consecuencia, que la idea de desarrollo naciera estrechamente vinculada a la del crecimiento económico.

Será Walter Whitman Rostow[4] quien mejor exprese la posición que servirá de base para la construcción del modelo teórico de desarrollo que imperó en aquellos momentos: la teoría de la modernización[5]. En su obra *Las etapas del crecimiento económico: un manifiesto no-comunista*, publicada en 1960, presenta al desarrollo como una etapa evolutiva histórica sobre la base de una sucesión de cinco periodos: la sociedad tradicional, las condiciones previas al despegue, el despegue, la marcha hacia la madurez y, finalmente, la era del alto consumo masivo. Sobre la base de su trabajo el autor va a sostener que “el desarrollo requiere una inversión sustancial de capital” (Rostow, 1973: 291).

De esta manera, el desarrollo era visto como “una carrera

individual donde algunos países, por razones históricas, coyunturales y reformables irían más retrasados que otros" (Ramírez, 2008: 38), premisa que será asumida por la ONU y se verá traducida en el apoyo a la ejecución de proyectos que demandaban abultadas cantidades de dinero: si el problema era cómo incrementar la acumulación de capitales, la solución radicaba en la promoción de la industrialización de los países subdesarrollados como una forma de "acelerar" la circulación a través de las etapas que conducían hacia el desarrollo, y esto se lograba inyectando capitales en esas sociedades.

La idea de que el crecimiento económico requería superar estructuras ligadas al atraso no era, sin embargo, nada nuevo. Ya en 1951 un Grupo de Expertos designados por el secretario general presentaban su informe titulado "Medidas para el Desarrollo Económico de los Países Subdesarrollados" donde se afirmaba: "Hay un sentido en el que el progreso económico acelerado es imposible sin ajustes dolorosos. Las filosofías ancestrales deben ser erradicadas; las viejas instituciones sociales tienen que desintegrarse; los lazos de casta, credo y raza deben romperse, y grandes masas de personas incapaces de seguir el ritmo del progreso deberán ver frustradas sus expectativas de una vida cómoda".

Frente a esa visión se alzaban voces desde los países en desarrollo que, sin oponerse a la consideración centralmente económica del mismo, sumaron la denuncia de las condiciones políticas que afectaban las relaciones entre ambos grupos de países. La descolonización actuó amplificando estos discursos: líderes políticos y personalidades destacadas de las excolonias,

muchos de ellos formados en universidades europeas, se pusieron al frente de los reclamos. Entre los más destacados encontramos a Frantz Fanon y Aimé Césaire, nacidos ambos en la Martinica colonizada por Francia.

Fanon publicó en Francia, durante 1961, su libro más conocido, *Los condenados de la Tierra*, prologado por Jean Paul Sartre, donde sostiene que la colonización implica la negación del otro, al que se priva de la calidad de humano. Afirma, en consecuencia, el valor de la cultura como herramienta para sostener e impulsar los procesos de descolonización, idea que bien podría ser extendida a la realidad de la inmediata postindependencia nacional:

En un país colonizado, el nacionalismo más elemental, el más brutal, el más indiferenciado, es la forma más ferviente y más eficaz de defensa de la cultura nacional. La cultura es, en primer lugar, expresión de una nación, de sus preferencias, de sus tabús, de sus modelos. En todos los niveles de la sociedad global se constituyen otros tabús, otros valores, otros modelos. La cultura nacional es la suma de todas esas apreciaciones, la resultante de las tensiones internas y externas en la sociedad global y en las diferentes capas de esa sociedad. En la situación colonial, la cultura, privada del doble sostén de la nación y del Estado, se deteriora y agoniza. La condición de existencia de la cultura es, por tanto, la liberación nacional, el renacimiento del Estado (Fanon, 1983: 122).

Años antes[6] Césaire había escrito su *Discurso sobre el colonialismo*, donde mantenía que:

Si yo aparto los ojos del hombre para mirar las naciones, constato que todavía aquí el peligro es grande; que la empresa colonial es al mundo moderno lo que el imperialismo romano fue al mundo antiguo: preparador del desastre y precursor de la catástrofe […] Los indios masacrados, el mundo musulmán vaciado de sí mismo, el mundo chino mancillado y desnaturalizado durante todo un siglo; el mundo negro desacreditado; voces inmensas apagadas para siempre; hogares esparcidos al viento; toda esta chapucería, todo este despilfarro, la humanidad reducida al monólogo (Césaire, 2006: 41).

El tema cultural también preocupaba a Césaire. Su participación en el Primer Congreso de Escritores y Artistas Negros, reunido en septiembre de 1956 en París, dio lugar a su conocido discurso *Cultura y colonización*, que finaliza con la siguiente frase, referida a la situación colonial: “Estamos actualmente en el caos cultural. Nuestro papel es declarar: liberad al demiurgo, que es el único que puede organizar en una nueva síntesis de este caos, una síntesis que merecerá el nombre de cultura, una síntesis que será reconciliación y superación de lo antiguo y de lo nuevo. Estamos aquí para decir y para reclamar: dad la palabra a los pueblos. Dejad entrar a los pueblos negros en el gran escenario de la historia” (Césaire, 1956: 205).

Hemos optado, sin embargo, por incluir aquí un texto menos conocido de uno de los grandes luchadores contra el colonialismo portugués en África: Amilcar Cabral. Sus instrucciones al partido de 1965, que se harían conocidas bajo el título “No digas mentiras, no clames victorias fáciles” ilustran

perfectamente el espíritu de las luchas anticoloniales y expresan con claridad la necesidad de construir autoconfianza como un requisito para la construcción nacional. Se trata de un llamado a los militantes del Partido Africano para la Independencia de Guinea y Cabo Verde que tiene un contenido propositivo centrado en la acción de lucha independentista pero con un alto nivel de autocrítica por los errores propios, estableciendo una vinculación entre la lucha armada y su contenido político, afirmando que se debe “desarrollar el trabajo político en nuestras fuerzas armadas, ya sea regular o de guerrilla, donde quiera que se encuentren. Llevar a cabo reuniones frecuentes. Exigir el trabajo político serio de comisarios políticos. Comience comités políticos formados por el comisario político y comandante de cada unidad en el ejército regular […] hacer de cada luchador un militante ejemplar de nuestro Partido” (Cabral, 1974: 71-72).

Desde una posición muy diferente pero compartiendo la mirada crítica hacia la conceptualización del desarrollo como un mero asunto económico, y proponiendo respuestas alternativas a las tradicionales dentro de ese campo, la ya mencionada CEPAL será la plataforma desde la cual Raúl Prebisch, junto a un equipo de economistas latinoamericanos, impulsarán una visión alternativa y latinoamericana: el estructuralismo cepalino. El artículo del economista argentino que acompaña este texto refleja la génesis y evolución de esa posición, que significó la inclusión en los debates sobre desarrollo el problema del centro y la periferia, la irrupción de la variable hegemónica y las múltiples expresiones de la misma que obstruían las posibilidades de desarrollo de los países subdesarrollados, en

otros términos, “frente a los postulados de la teoría de la modernización, Prebisch y la economía del desarrollo partían de los efectos del dominio colonial. El colonialismo saqueó el mundo y dejó a más de la mitad de este desprovisto de capital y rebosante de pobreza” (Prashad, 2007: 123).

Prebisch se centra en la cuestión de la dependencia intelectual, a la que define como “la subordinación incondicional de ciertos círculos de la periferia a teorías elaboradas en los centros”, para agregar luego: “No voy a negar el valor de estas teorías, pero sostengo que no responden generalmente a la realidad periférica” (Prebisch, 1988: 208).

En sus trabajos, Prebisch expone a la luz la “brecha comercial” que condena a los países en desarrollo, productores de bienes primarios básicos, a una constante situación de debilidad frente a los países desarrollados, exportadores de bienes manufacturados. De esa situación nacerá un reclamo que durante años se convertirá en una bandera de los países subdesarrollados y que alcanzará su mayor expresión durante la Segunda Conferencia de la UNCTAD, reunida en Delhi en 1968: *Trade, not Aid* (Comercio, no ayuda). Consecuencia de la descolonización y sus dinámicas las políticas comerciales llegaban a ser identificadas como indisociables de las de cooperación internacional.

No debe extrañarnos que del cruce de las miradas reseñadas no solo se fortalecieran identidades políticas y de intereses entre los países desarrollados por una parte, y los que se encontraban en situación de insuficiente desarrollo por la otra. Tampoco debería entonces extrañarnos que uno de los problemas que

surjan en los debates sea el de la utilización de la CID como una herramienta de injerencia de los países desarrollados en cuestiones soberanas de los que recibían su ayuda. Sobre este asunto avanza el texto de David Baldwin “Foreign Aid, Intervention, and Influence” publicado en 1969, cuando el proceso de descolonización estaba ya adelantado. Allí, tras señalar la dificultad de intentar explicar el mundo del siglo XX con vocabulario del siglo XIX, propone pensar la CID no en relación con la “intervención” sino con la “influencia”, señalando que esto permite una mejor comprensión de lo que efectivamente ocurre.

Aborda entonces la ayuda exterior como una actividad políticamente motivada y plantea que tanto la concesión de ayuda como su no otorgamiento se traducen en términos de influencia, y afirma que el reconocimiento de tal realidad “nos ayuda a tener una cierta idea sobre cómo los donantes pueden controlar el impacto de su ayuda” dada la inevitabilidad del mismo. El análisis que realiza del otorgamiento de donaciones en comparación con el de préstamos, de la ayuda económica en relación con la militar, de la ayuda multilateral en oposición a la bilateral y de la privada contra la pública, es una buena muestra de las discusiones por entonces instaladas en un área donde la economía del desarrollo comenzaba a abrirse a la consideración de variables no tradicionales pero propias de la problemática del desarrollo/subdesarrollo.

Finalmente, tras señalar sus dudas respecto de la fórmula “comercio, no ayuda”, Baldwin (1969: 447) sostiene que “para aumentar el bienestar económico y garantizar la paz mundial

ciertos tipos de intervención son probablemente útiles, incluso necesarios”[7].

Igualmente interesante para entender los caminos que fueron tomando los debates sobre el desarrollo a partir de su intersección con la descolonización resulta el trabajo de Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson y James A. Robinson (2001) quienes, tras recordar que pese a que los países europeos adoptaron políticas de colonización diferentes entre sí, estos evitaban establecerse en aquellos sitios donde sus tasas de mortalidad resultaban más altas, tendiendo a concentrarse allí en la creación de instituciones extractivas que han persistido. A partir de esa verificación realizan un análisis entre las tasas de mortalidad europeas en tiempos de la colonización, los grados de institucionalidad que de ellas se derivó en las colonias y la institucionalidad actual en los países que fueron colonias europeas, encontrando fuertes correlaciones positivas entre cada una de las variables. Demuestran así la continuidad del impacto de la estructura colonial en los países africanos hasta el día de hoy a través de la variable del desarrollo institucional.

CONCLUSIONES

La década de 1960 está signada por algunos de los momentos de mayor tensión mundial asociados a la “guerra fría”: en 1959 se iniciaba la guerra de Vietnam, en 1960 la URSS derribaba un bombardero U2 norteamericano, en 1962 estalló la “crisis de los misiles”, en 1965 dio inicio la “revolución cultural” de Mao Zedong en China. Al mismo tiempo, transcurrían sucesos que

fueron vinculando directamente el proceso de descolonización en marcha a esa lógica de superpotencias en disputa: el asesinato de Patrice Lumumba en 1961 y el encarcelamiento de Nelson Mandela en 1962, año en que también finalizó la guerra entre Argelia y Francia, son especialmente significativos en este sentido.

Nada de ello, sin embargo, obstaculizó la descolonización en marcha: ni los Estados Unidos ni Rusia poseían enclaves coloniales y ambos veían con simpatía ese proceso que les permitiría lograr influencia en los territorios independizados. África se convirtió, así, en un espacio clave del tablero de enfrentamiento indirecto entre ambas naciones.

Pero, en su marcha, la descolonización no solo produjo cambios por la llegada a la vida independiente de los territorios anteriormente coloniales sino que, en el campo específico de la cooperación internacional, ese cambio cuantitativo tuvo fuertes expresiones en el contenido y forma de los debates en marcha, modificando las fuerzas de dos grupos que ya estaban en pugna en el seno de la ONU: los países desarrollados, centralmente preocupados por la reconstrucción europea, y los países en desarrollo.

La idea de desarrollo percibida como crecimiento económico no fue frontalmente impugnada por los países subdesarrollados que, lejos de enfrentarla, la enriquecieron, trayendo al debate dimensiones culturales y de ejercicio del poder a escala global que anteriormente eran apenas tenidas en cuenta, si no abiertamente ignoradas.

De ese proceso no solo va a resultar la creciente

institucionalización de las actividades de cooperación internacional tanto a escala nacional como internacional que ya hemos señalado, sino que van a conformarse los pilares sobre los que se hará cada vez más evidente la existencia de una segunda ruptura que se solapará con la que se había producido entre Este y Oeste como consecuencia de la guerra fría: el eje Norte-Sur, que se trazaba ahora tomando como baremo el desarrollo económico de los Estados. Recordemos que "la unidad de los pueblos del Tercer Mundo vino de la adopción de una postura política contraria al colonialismo y al imperialismo, y no de ningún rasgo cultural o racial intrínseco compartido" (Prashad, 2007: 73).

Esta realidad derivaría en dos procesos diferentes aunque estrechamente vinculados: por una parte, condujo hacia el diálogo Norte-Sur y, por la otra, a la lucha de los países subdesarrollados por establecer un Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional[8].

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Lectura 1

Dependencia, interdependencia y desarrollo[9]

Raúl Prebisch

INTRODUCCIÓN

Este trabajo póstumo de Prebisch plantea el siguiente interrogante: ¿cuál es el pensamiento de la CEPAL sobre los temas de la dependencia, la interdependencia y el desarrollo? Para responder a esta pregunta Prebisch analiza diversos temas.

En primer lugar, se examina el papel de la periferia y la gravitación de los centros hegemónicos en los diversos periodos, considerándose algunas variables interpretativas del desarrollo resultante. Un tema de gran importancia en este sentido es el de las fallas internas del desarrollo periférico, incluyendo la imitación superficial y la baja priorización del desarrollo técnico.

En segundo lugar, se determina la necesidad de analizar el capitalismo periférico en el contexto de una teoría global del desarrollo capitalista, evitando caer en la dependencia intelectual al respecto. La sustitución de importaciones no fue un invento tecnocrático, sino una respuesta a las cambiantes condiciones

internacionales: en el pensamiento de la CEPAL nunca existió un prejuicio antiexportador. El deterioro de los términos del intercambio, por otra parte, tiene su raíz en el cambio técnico y su impacto diferencial respecto de los bienes industriales y los primarios.

En la última parte se analizan diversas prescripciones originadas en los centros para los países en desarrollo y que, sin embargo, no son aplicadas en los países industriales. Se determina también la necesidad de lograr nuevos arreglos comerciales mundiales que permitan a nuestros países avanzar en su proceso de desarrollo.

CENTRO-PERIFERIA Y DEPENDENCIA

En los años sesenta adquirieron gran vigor polémico las teorías de la dependencia y la preocupación por los problemas que ellas planteaban y que, por cierto, eran de larga data. Mirando hacia atrás ahora que las ideas se han sedimentado, es posible discernir dos grandes aproximaciones. Una de ellas, correspondiente al pensamiento más tradicional, identificaba el problema de la dependencia con la bien conocida hegemonía de los países más fuertes sobre los más débiles; la relación de dependencia se veía como unilateral e invariablemente negativa y se le atribuían todos los males de la periferia. La otra corriente aceptaba desde luego la existencia y las importantes implicaciones de tal hegemonía, e intentaba ir más lejos mediante el esclarecimiento de los elementos sobre los cuales se basaba esa hegemonía y de las complejas manifestaciones

de este fenómeno que se daban en el concepto centro-periferia. Así, por ejemplo, hacía hincapié en que la índole de la tendencia al deterioro en la relación de precios del intercambio era clara expresión de la posición desventajosa de la periferia. Más adelante, el concepto centro-periferia se enriqueció con las valiosas aportaciones de sociólogos, politólogos y economistas empeñados en destacar fenómenos internos inherentes a la periferia que fortalecían las relaciones de dependencia. Al respecto cabe recordar especialmente la obra de Fernando Cardoso y Enzo Faletto[10], desarrollada bajo el signo de la CEPAL.

¿Cuál es ahora el pensamiento de la CEPAL en esta materia, enriquecido con las aportaciones mencionadas? Antes de responder a esta pregunta conviene pasar revista a los grandes cambios que han ocurrido en la realidad.

Examinaré primero el papel de la periferia en el desarrollo capitalista en tiempos anteriores a la industrialización. Por la misma dinámica de los centros, la periferia había quedado al margen del proceso industrializador, en su papel apendicular de productora y exportadora de productos primarios. Los beneficios del aumento de la productividad que el progreso técnico de los centros trajo consigo no se difundieron al resto del mundo mediante el descenso de los precios de las manufacturas, sino que se manifestaron en los mismos centros con el acrecentamiento del ingreso, de la demanda de bienes y servicios, y de la acumulación de capital para satisfacerla. La demanda de bienes primarios producidos por la periferia también se acrecentó en este proceso, generalmente con gran

intensidad, y el aumento correspondiente de ingresos se desplazó hacia los centros en procura de bienes manufacturados.

Este esquema comenzó a resquebrajarse durante la primera guerra mundial. Pero el impulso decisivo a la industrialización surgió sobre todo de la crisis de los años treinta. No fue una exigencia doctrinaria, sino una imposición de circunstancias adversas que obligaron, asimismo, a la sustitución de importaciones. Nadie pudo pensar en esos tiempos en exportar manufacturas a los centros; tampoco durante la segunda guerra mundial y los difíciles años de la posguerra. Sin embargo, después vinieron tiempos propicios para la exportación de manufacturas. Algunos países de la región los aprovecharon bien, en tanto que otros, como Argentina, no supieron hacerlo con suficiente intensidad y persistencia de objetivos.

Al no participar la periferia en la industrialización, grandes sectores de la población quedaron sustraídos al desarrollo, como consecuencia de la dinámica de los centros y del cambio y la diversificación de la demanda. En la periferia la demanda de bienes manufacturados tiende a crecer con celeridad, en tanto que sus exportaciones primarias tienden a acrecentarse con relativa lentitud. Existe una disparidad muy grande entre los países centrales y los periféricos con respecto al ingreso de la demanda de importaciones. De ahí la significación de las exportaciones de manufacturas. Sucede, sin embargo, que las manufacturas que la periferia está en condiciones de exportar son precisamente aquellas cuya demanda en los centros tiende a crecer con relativa lentitud. De ahí que estos no solo se

muestren renuentes a desmantelar su proteccionismo, sino que más bien lo acentúen. La gran liberalización del intercambio que trajeron consigo las rondas de negociaciones Kennedy y Tokio apenas alcanzó a la periferia, pues esas negociaciones abarcaron bienes cuya demanda está impulsada por las innovaciones tecnológicas de los centros. Cabría concluir entonces que, de nuevo, la dinámica de los centros no favorece a la periferia en la misma forma en que beneficia a los centros mismos. Volveré sobre esto más adelante.

Al comenzar afirmé que la polémica sobre la dependencia había enriquecido el esquema centro-periferia. Acaso la contribución más importante haya sido la incorporación de las relaciones de poder en ese esquema. En el desarrollo apendicular los centros se habían articulado con los grupos similares de la periferia; había una cierta comunidad de intereses entre esos grupos sociales, aunque con una clara subordinación de los periféricos. La hegemonía de los centros, y especialmente del centro dinámico principal, se asentó en su superioridad económica, financiera y tecnológica, en la fragmentación de la periferia, en la tendencia al desequilibrio del intercambio, y en aquella subordinación o dependencia, como quiera llamársele.

La superioridad de los centros siguió manifestándose durante la industrialización periférica, y adquiriendo nuevas modalidades. A la succión de ingresos de las empresas productoras y exportadoras de bienes primarios e importadoras de manufacturas, antes de la industrialización, así como de las empresas de servicios públicos, se añadió la sangría de ingreso a través de las empresas transnacionales, al participar estas más

y más en la industrialización, amparándose con frecuencia en una protección excesiva. (No excluyo desde luego a las compañías bancarias y financieras.) Se modificó así la composición de los grupos periféricos dominantes articulados a los centros y se tejió una urdimbre de relaciones propicias a sus intereses económicos, políticos o estratégicos.

Trátase de formas manifiestas o sutiles de gravitación hegemónica de los centros. Y cuando la periferia reacciona contra esta dependencia y compromete esos intereses, no tarda en moverse en contra toda una constelación de elementos dominantes en los centros, a fin de aplicar medidas punitivas.

Conviene hacer una distinción, que no siempre aparece clara y neta entre estos fenómenos de dependencia y la índole de las relaciones centro-periferia a las cuales nos hemos referido antes y que son consecuencia del retardo histórico en el desarrollo integral de la periferia, de su inferioridad económica, financiera y tecnológica, y de su fragmentación económica.

Existe otra corriente de ideas acerca de la dependencia, entre cuyas expresiones más significativas está aquella que sostiene que el alto nivel de vida de los centros se debe fundamentalmente a la explotación sistemática de la periferia mediante diversas formas de transferencia de ingresos a los centros, y al deterioro de la relación de precios del intercambio en detrimento de los productos primarios de la periferia. Sin duda que históricamente ha habido elementos de explotación que la CEPAL ha expuesto de manera reiterada. Pero esa conclusión acerca del origen periférico del bienestar de los centros desconoce la influencia del enorme progreso tecnológico de

estos.

No es de extrañar entonces que hasta se haya llegado a recomendar la desvinculación de los centros, el corte más o menos profundo de las relaciones con ellos, a fin de que la periferia, aprovechando a fondo su propia potencialidad, pueda dar impulso decisivo a su desarrollo.

Es cierto que los centros, y sobre todo el centro dinámico principal del capitalismo, solo se han interesado en el desarrollo de la periferia en la forma y medida en que ha respondido a sus propios intereses, y generalmente sin una visión de gran alcance. No han buscado el desarrollo de la periferia en profundidad social, ni fórmulas de convergencia de intereses.

Se precisará un enorme y esclarecido esfuerzo, un impulso propio, tenaz y dilatado, para que un país periférico deje de serlo. Así ocurrió con los Estados Unidos, hasta que este país llegó a ser el centro dinámico principal. Y así se ha dado la transformación del Japón en un centro de extraordinaria pujanza, no obstante su carencia de recursos naturales, salvo el poder de su mente y su voluntad.

Ellos no se empeñaron en cortar sus relaciones con los centros, sino en aprovecharlas inteligentemente para su propio desarrollo.

Por lo general, en la corriente que acabo de mencionar se ha hecho muy poco hincapié en las fallas internas del desarrollo periférico. Así como la periferia muestra una tendencia persistente al desequilibrio exterior, también tiende al desequilibrio dinámico interno entre el ritmo del gasto y el de la acumulación de capital reproductivo, que es el capital

indispensable para que se multiplique el empleo, la productividad y el ingreso global de la economía. Dicho desequilibrio pone de manifiesto, sobre todo en la periferia latinoamericana, una falla fundamental.

Con una productividad media inferior a la de los centros, nos empeñamos en imitar con celeridad sus formas de existencia, en acrecentar la demanda de bienes y servicios diversificados. Se ha desenvuelto así la sociedad privilegiada de consumo en los estratos sociales favorecidos en la apropiación del fruto del progreso técnico, en claro detrimento de las inversiones reproductivas de capital. Y en el curso de las mutaciones estructurales de la sociedad, al desenvolverse el poder redistributivo de la fuerza de trabajo, fue acrecentándose también su consumo privado y social, a la par que el Estado elevaba considerablemente sus propios gastos civiles y militares.

Estas erogaciones no se hacen a expensas de los gastos de los estratos favorecidos, incesantemente estimulados por las innovaciones tecnológicas, sino que se superponen a su consumo privilegiado. Tarde o temprano se resiente de esta manera el ritmo de la acumulación reproductiva en desmedro de la intensidad del desarrollo y de la equidad distributiva. Y este desequilibrio dinámico termina fatalmente en un nuevo tipo de inflación que es imposible atacar eficazmente con la restricción monetaria, contraproducente por sus consecuencias económicas, sociales y políticas.

Que todas estas formas de gasto privado y social, civil y militar, constituyan una franca imitación de los centros, es un hecho que podría inducir a los teóricos de la corriente señalada a

atribuir también a la dependencia el debilitamiento del ritmo de acumulación, así como sus consecuencias inflacionarias, lo cual obligaría a llevar la desvinculación a un extremo difícil de concebir en la práctica del desarrollo.

LA DEPENDENCIA INTELECTUAL

Deseo referirme también a otra manifestación conspicua de dependencia. Se trata de la subordinación incondicional de ciertos círculos de la periferia a teorías elaboradas en los centros. No voy a negar el valor de estas teorías, pero sostengo que no responden generalmente a la realidad periférica que he tratado de describir en diversos trabajos. No es extraño entonces que se considere el concepto de periferia como un simple cambio de nombre, o que se le atribuya el designio de elaborar una teoría propia que difiera del pensamiento de los centros. Nada de eso: los fenómenos del capitalismo periférico tienen que insertarse en una teoría global del desarrollo capitalista. Considero muy importante esta aclaración para disipar equívocos.

Cuando por la fuerza de las circunstancias internacionales se inició la industrialización de la periferia, se atacó en los centros el concepto mismo de esta industrialización deliberada, basada en la protección y la sustitución de importaciones. Conviene recordarlo, porque a pesar del tiempo transcurrido se sigue atacando la sustitución como un engendro maligno de la CEPAL.

Recuerdo que a principios de los años cincuenta el profesor Jacob Viner la emprendió en contra nuestra en la Universidad de

Río de Janeiro, atribuyéndonos la peregrina idea de que la agricultura era símbolo de pobreza. Tuve oportunidad de replicarle poco tiempo después. ¿Cómo podría yo sostener esa idea si mi país, la Argentina, había alcanzado gracias a la agricultura un ingreso per cápita sumamente elevado a principios de este siglo? En vez de industrializarse, decía el profesor Viner, había que introducir el progreso técnico en las actividades agrícolas, a fin de aumentar la productividad y acrecentar las exportaciones. De acuerdo, dije a mi vez, pero el progreso técnico de la agricultura dejaría fuerza de trabajo redundante. Y a la industria, así como a otras actividades que con ella se desenvuelven, correspondía el papel, entre otros, de absorber con creciente productividad esa población redundante. De lo contrario, se corría el riesgo de acrecentar las exportaciones primarias más allá de lo que exigía el crecimiento de la demanda internacional, con el consiguiente deterioro de la relación de precios del intercambio. La protección de la industria ayudaría a reorientar capital y fuerza de trabajo de la agricultura hacia la industria, contrarrestando esa tendencia al deterioro. Que la protección haya sido exagerada y abusiva no invalida esa tesis. Aunque lo ha sido en realidad y en algunos casos —y vuelvo a mencionar la Argentina— ha tenido efectos adversos en la agricultura y las exportaciones.

La defensa teórica de una protección adecuada fue muy simple. Dada la elasticidad-ingreso excesivamente baja de la demanda internacional de productos agrícolas —y también de productos primarios en general— el aumento de las exportaciones de estos productos tendía a deprimir sus precios

relativos. Convenía la protección si el aumento de costos para un país resultaba inferior al quebranto originado por la baja de precios de los productos agrícolas.

Pero el argumento no terminaba allí. Había que sustituir importaciones y, al mismo tiempo, emprender la exportación de manufacturas otorgándole estímulos similares a los de la sustitución para el mercado interno. Creo que en la CEPAL hemos figurado entre los primeros en defender esta tesis en un trabajo presentado a los gobiernos hace un cuarto de siglo. Se decía allí:

La necesidad de sustituir importaciones, y de proteger para ello las actividades sustitutivas, ha sido ineludible. Pero no se ha dado el mismo estímulo a las exportaciones. Se ha discriminado en favor de la sustitución industrial y en contra de las exportaciones, principalmente de las exportaciones industriales. La política ideal habría sido dar a las exportaciones un estímulo que restableciera la paridad de condiciones con las actividades sustitutivas, y ello no significa necesariamente equivalencia de estímulos.

Conviene examinar este aspecto por la importancia que reviste. Consiste esencialmente en lo siguiente. La limitación de la demanda exterior de exportaciones primarias obliga a destinar parte del incremento de factores productivos a actividades sustitutivas. Como su productividad es inferior a la de los grandes centros, es necesario darles un subsidio de cierta cuantía en forma de protección aduanera. Sin embargo, existirían posibilidades de desarrollar con un subsidio de cuantía inferior nuevas actividades de exportación industrial, con las cuales se podría obtener por el intercambio mayor cantidad de artículos industriales que los que se conseguiría con la producción sustitutiva.

Al subsidiarse esta última producción, y no la destinada a nuevas exportaciones (industriales o primarias), se han malogrado posibilidades de exportar que, de haberse aprovechado eficazmente, habrían disminuido la amplitud de la política sustitutiva o habrían permitido un mayor ritmo de crecimiento de la economía[11].

La CEPAL subrayó que la industrialización era asimétrica: además de basarse en una protección generalmente exagerada, no alentaba las exportaciones de manufacturas mediante el correspondiente estímulo. Y, sin embargo, se dijo reiteradamente que la CEPAL desconocía la necesidad de combinar sustitución y exportación de manufacturas.

Y ya que he mencionado al profesor Viner, me referiré también al profesor Bela Balassa, que nos ha reprochado siempre el haber ignorado la necesidad de efectuar esa combinación. Y lo que es más grave, en un informe reciente atribuye a esta supuesta unilateralidad de la CEPAL todos los males del desarrollo latinoamericano[12].

Evidentemente, solo ha conocido fragmentariamente nuestros trabajos, con citas de segunda o tercera mano, generalmente truncas e incompletas. Así, menciona un párrafo de mi trabajo de 1961 recién citado en que denuncio la protección exorbitante, pero no incluye mi recomendación de combinar las exportaciones con la sustitución de importaciones en mercados más amplios que los nacionales. Con todo, celebro que el profesor Balassa haya llegado a coincidir conmigo después de tan dilatado tiempo. Y espero que se rectifique en el trabajo que está preparando acerca del desarrollo latinoamericano.

Si me refiero a este caso no es solo por la influencia que el

profesor Balassa tiene en el Banco Mundial, al cual asesora, sino porque es representante de ciertas actitudes que parecerían disgustarse ante el empeño nuestro, de la CEPAL, de interpretar con criterio propio los fenómenos de nuestro desarrollo. Por lo general, no se realiza un esfuerzo serio por comprender las ideas antes de atacarlas. No se reconoció nuestra determinación de librarnos de una persistente dependencia intelectual de serias consecuencias en la praxis del desarrollo.

Desde los primeros tiempos de la CEPAL —para citar un ejemplo importante— no se consideraron con objetividad las razones teóricas que nos llevaron a sostener que, debido al progreso técnico, había una tendencia al deterioro de la relación de precios del intercambio. Ya lo dijimos antes: si el aumento de productividad elevaba la producción por encima de la demanda, tendía a producirse ese deterioro. ¿Por qué no se daba este fenómeno en los bienes manufacturados? Pues sencillamente porque cuando sobrevenía el deterioro, la flexibilidad de la industria llevaba a desplazar el capital y la fuerza de trabajo en respuesta a la demanda diversificada que las innovaciones tecnológicas siempre traen consigo. Pero esto no ocurre con los productos agrícolas, salvo de un modo limitado. Se arguyó entonces que el deterioro era una simple ilusión. El precio de los bienes diversificados se elevaba por el mejoramiento de su calidad y eficacia; si el precio que un agricultor debía pagar por un tractor era más elevado, se debía a este hecho. Sin embargo, no hay deterioro cuando por análogas razones sube el precio de una máquina utilizada por los productores industriales. No lo hay, porque la diversificación (y otros factores) impide que los precios

de los bienes industriales en su conjunto desciendan a medida que aumenta la productividad. He ahí la diferencia fundamental entre precios agrícolas e industriales, que tanta importancia tiene en el desarrollo de la periferia.

En cuanto a los otros productos primarios, hay casos en que, además de verse afectada por la tendencia antedicha, la demanda se debilita también por las innovaciones tecnológicas que sustituyen el producto natural por nuevos bienes producidos industrialmente. El progreso técnico obra pues adversamente por los dos extremos. Adversamente a la periferia, pero no a los centros.

No tienen los países periféricos las mismas posibilidades de contrarrestar la tendencia al deterioro como lo hace los Estados Unidos, restringiendo la producción de granos, o la Comunidad Económica Europea, lanzando al mercado mundial la sobreproducción provocada por la fijación de altos precios, con serio perjuicio para los otros países productores, especialmente los de la periferia. Y, sin embargo, se sigue insistiendo en la falsedad de la teoría del deterioro.

Este doble criterio para juzgar los hechos no es por cierto infrecuente. Lo estamos viendo en materia de protección. Se ha impugnado la protección periférica a la producción de manufacturas. No se niega, por supuesto, que sus costos, por lo menos inicialmente, son superiores a los de los centros, por la superioridad económica y tecnológica de estos. ¿Por qué no devaluar, se dice entonces, en vez de acudir a medidas de intervención arbitraria en las leyes del mercado? Devaluar, sin embargo, significa abaratar los precios de los productos

primarios que ya eran internacionalmente competitivos, lo cual, si bien beneficia a los centros, tiene efectos adversos sobre el desarrollo de la periferia.

Pues bien, desde los centros se nos ha aconsejado tenazmente exportar manufacturas en vez de sustituir importaciones, como ya he dicho. Algunos países periféricos han seguido el consejo, adquiriendo la tecnología necesaria y exportando bienes que, gracias a ello y a menores salarios, compiten favorablemente con los bienes de los centros. Estos recurren entonces a la protección. ¿Por qué no se les aconseja la devaluación para enfrentar el problema? Creo que prevalecen consideraciones de sensatez: entre otras, la de que en esta forma se deterioran los precios de sus exportaciones competitivas, haciéndolas perder parte del fruto de su progreso técnico.

Los efectos de esta dependencia intelectual han sido generalmente muy serios, debido a la autoridad académica que suele atribuirse a quienes preconizan ciertas formas de pensar. Son recientes los estragos que trajeron consigo las teorías llamadas de Chicago en varios países latinoamericanos, especialmente el mío. Más aún cuando tales teorías se vuelven operativas, como en el caso conspicuo del Fondo Monetario Internacional. Tardó varios años esta institución en reconocer que los desequilibrios exteriores no solamente provenían de una inadecuada expansión monetaria interna, sino de factores internacionales, como veníamos sosteniendo en la CEPAL de mucho tiempo atrás. Y frente a esos desequilibrios, se recomienda comprimir la actividad económica para reducir las

importaciones, pues el respeto a las leyes del mercado no aconseja seguir una política selectiva de importaciones. Las consecuencias económicas, sociales y políticas de la compresión de la economía no parecen haber estado en el cuadro de las preocupaciones del Fondo, para no decir nada de la política sustitutiva, que este ha impugnado resueltamente.

También han sido muy serias las consecuencias de acudir a la contracción monetaria para combatir la inflación, fórmula eficaz en tiempos del capitalismo pretérito en que la fuerza de trabajo se subordinaba a las leyes del mercado y el Estado era prescindente en la distribución del ingreso. Para evitar, o por lo menos atenuar ese extremo monetarismo, sería necesaria una política de ingresos en la cual se diera la importancia que merece a la acumulación de capital. El Fondo mencionó alguna vez esta idea, pero desgraciadamente parecería haber seguido adhiriendo a su ortodoxia inveterada.

También se preconiza ahora la reducción de las importaciones para hacer frente al pago de intereses de la deuda externa, con muy grave detrimento de la actividad interna y el empleo. Hay que reconocer que el Fondo no es responsable de la deuda. Fue puesto sencillamente de lado cuando los grandes bancos, guiados por el incentivo de ganancias, aprovecharon los abundantes recursos del mercado de eurodólares para prestar a países que tomaron esos recursos sin un sentido elemental de previsión. Hubo convergencia de irresponsabilidades de las dos partes, salvo en cuanto se trató de hacer frente al alza del petróleo. Los bancos privados proclamaron el valor de su propia sabiduría y de las leyes del mercado en la asignación de

recursos, y exaltaron su superioridad sobre instituciones internacionales formadas por Estados.

Se está jugando con fuego al esquivar una solución política del problema de la deuda. A todo ello ha venido a añadirse el deterioro de la relación de precios del intercambio y las crecientes dificultades para acrecentar las exportaciones en las presentes circunstancias. El Plan Baker significa el reconocimiento del carácter político del problema. Pero es nada más que el comienzo, mientras siguen prevaleciendo elevadísimas tasas de interés. La deuda ha acentuado la dependencia de nuestros países. El factor financiero siempre ha tenido gran relevancia y ahora la tiene aún más en países cuya acumulación de capital ha descendido sobremanera, sobre todo por la crisis inflacionaria y el pago de servicios, y que van a precisar capital extranjero. De ahí la necesidad de un arreglo político que, además de resolver el problema, abra el camino a una política selectiva de inversiones.

Las anteriores consideraciones nos llevan al tema de la condicionalidad. Las operaciones internacionales de crédito exigen condicionalidad. ¿Pero qué condicionalidad? Hay que plantear este asunto ahora que el Banco Mundial también está hablando de condicionalidad. No la observa ron por cierto aquellos bancos privados que acabo de mencionar. La condicionalidad no debería consagrar nuestra dependencia del pensamiento de los centros; al contrario, su contenido tendría que discutirse con la participación de economistas independientes de la periferia, hasta llegar a un conjunto razonable de ideas que orientasen la acción de las instituciones

mencionadas, así como la del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.

Asimismo, la condicionalidad solo podría tener sentido constructivo en el marco de una franca política de expansión económica. Y para ello se imponen transformaciones de gran significación. La cooperación financiera internacional, por amplia y esclarecida que fuese, no tendría efectos positivos perdurables sobre los países periféricos si estos no tomasen medidas eficaces para corregir la tendencia a que el ritmo de crecimiento del gasto sobrepase el de las inversiones reproductivas. Y tampoco se lograrían plenamente esos efectos si no se tomaran medidas correctivas de la tendencia al desequilibrio exterior. Aquí radica el papel clave de los centros, principalmente del centro dinámico principal.

DEPENDENCIA E INTERDEPENDENCIA

He discurrido acerca de la dependencia. Pero no de la interdependencia. Todos somos interdependientes, pero unos son menos interdependientes que otros. Así como en aquella igualdad citada por Orwell en que algunos son menos iguales que otros.

Hay interdependencia positiva e interdependencia negativa. Y en ella el papel del centro dinámico es de importancia primordial. Una expansión vigorosa y continua de este último difundiría sus efectos positivos en el resto del mundo, y especialmente en los países de la periferia, si ellos se propusieran aprovechar ese estímulo. Por el contrario, si el crecimiento del centro fuese débil

y fluctuante, se daría un caso inquietante de interdependencia negativa.

No digo que un país periférico no tendría medios para atenuar las consecuencias adversas, sino que no los tendría para contrarrestarlas. Y en la medida en que, a pesar de sus propósitos, no pudiera acrecentar sus exportaciones con suficiente ritmo, se vería forzado a elevar su política sustitutiva más allá de lo que de otro modo hubiese sido necesario.

¿Perjudicaría a los centros esta política sustitutiva? Simplemente cambiaría la composición pero no la cuantía de las importaciones provenientes de ellos, que tendrían que crecer con la intensidad del desarrollo[13]. Es este un caso interesante de asimetría que no suele comprenderse bien. El desequilibrio, como ya lo hemos explicado, se debe fundamentalmente a la disparidad provocada por el crecimiento relativamente lento de las exportaciones primarias comparado con el de las importaciones de bienes diversificados que tienden a crecer con relativa celeridad. Pues bien, si un país periférico sustituye ciertas importaciones es para acrecentar otras. Por el contrario, cuando es sobre todo el centro principal el que hace lo mismo y restringe sus importaciones, priva a los países periféricos de los medios para seguir importando en igual o mayor medida que antes, con el consiguiente debilitamiento del ritmo de desarrollo.

Compréndase pues, la significación adversa que tiene el menguado ritmo de desarrollo de los centros en estos tiempos, agravado por el recrudecimiento de un proteccionismo inveterado. Habrá que encontrar fórmulas multilaterales que permitan a los países periféricos participar sin perturbaciones en

el incremento de consumo de los centros, mientras el desempleo persistente en ellos impida medidas de mayor envergadura. Como quiera que fuese: ¿podría sostenerse que esto resolvería a fondo el problema del desequilibrio?

Quienes no estamos persuadidos de ello tenemos que seguir insistiendo en la necesidad de combinar las exportaciones con la sustitución de importaciones. Es de esperar que la comprensión de los centros y la emancipación periférica de su dependencia intelectual faciliten la aplicación de esta política.

La sustitución impulsará a nuestros países a entrar en nuevas líneas de producción que requerirán la cooperación tecnológica de los centros avanzados. Se abrirá así un promisorio campo de explotación de una tecnología que ya los centros han desarrollado, y que están superando gracias a nuevos avances tecnológicos.

Para que esta política tuviese éxito sería indispensable que esas nuevas líneas de producción, esos cambios en la estructura productiva, contaran con mercados más amplios que los nacionales. Hemos golpeado con insistencia las puertas de los centros para favorecer nuestras exportaciones. Pero no hemos sabido hacerlo entre nosotros. Hay que encontrar aquí también fórmulas más eficaces que las concebidas hace un cuarto de siglo.

Por primera vez en el desarrollo capitalista, la periferia —hasta ahora pasiva— podría tener una influencia dinámica sobre los centros, siempre que se llegara a nuevas formas de cooperación. El aumento de las exportaciones de bienes de tecnología menos avanzada que la de los centros y su intercambio por bienes más

complejos significaría para ambas partes recoger bien reconocidas ventajas con el acrecentamiento consiguiente de la productividad. En tanto que la explotación en la periferia de una tecnología que se renueva incesantemente en los centros ofrecería también innegables ventajas recíprocas.

Dije en otro lugar que los centros solo se han interesado en el desarrollo periférico en la medida que ha convenido a sus propios intereses. Nadie podría reprochárselos. Tendríamos que reprocharnos a nosotros mismos el no haber sabido sacudirnos una dependencia intelectual que nos ha empañado la visión de nuestro propio interés. Hemos llegado, sin embargo, a una etapa en nuestras relaciones con los centros, en que hay grandes posibilidades de intereses convergentes.

Pero no hay solo una convergencia de intereses económicos, sino también políticos, y de una enorme relevancia. Nuestros países latinoamericanos, para seguir circunscribiéndonos a ellos, están pasando por una crisis estructural aguda, cuyas consecuencias están a la vista. Al problema de las grandes masas humanas que han quedado relegadas en el fondo de la estructura social con muy precarios ingresos, se agrega ahora el desempleo, y una creciente pugna distributiva, que lleva fatalmente a la inflación y en algunos casos a la hiperinflación. Se estrecha el horizonte vital de las nuevas generaciones y sus elementos dinámicos se ven seriamente frustrados, con gérmenes muy potentes de resentimiento y rebelión. No es tanto un problema de ideologías foráneas, sino de campo de cultivo de cualquier forma de violencia. El signo es desde luego importante. Pero lo es mucho más su aptitud de trastornar la convivencia

social y el avance del proceso de democratización.

El poder hegemónico de los Estados Unidos es un hecho que no nos es dado cambiar. Puede ejercerse en dos formas: una es dejar los acontecimientos latinoamericanos a la deriva y afrontar los trastornos consiguientes con medidas punitivas o el empleo de la fuerza; la otra es practicar una política previsora y esclarecida de interdependencia positiva. No hay otras opciones.

Lectura 2

Tell no lies, Claim no easy victories…[14]

Amilcar Cabral

Always bear in mind that the people *are* not fighting for ideas, for the things in anyone's head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children.

We should recognise as a matter of conscience that there have been many faults and errors in our action whether political or military: an important number of things we should have done we have not done at the right times, or not done at all.

In various regions-and indeed everywhere in a general sense-political work among the people and among our armed forces has not been done appropriately: responsible workers have not carried or have not been able to carry through the work of mobilization, formation and political organisation defined by the party leadership. Here and there, even among responsible workers, there has been a marked tendency to let things slide

and even a certain demobilisation which has not been fought and eliminated…

On the military plane, many plans and objectives established by the Party leadership have not been achieved. With the means we have, we could do much more and better. Some responsible workers have misunderstood the functions of the army and guerilla forces, have not made good co-ordination between these two and, in certain cases, have allowed themselves to be influenced by preoccupation with the defence of our positions, ignoring the fact that, for us, attack is the best means of defence.

And with all this as a proof of insufficient political work among our armed forces, there has appeared a certain attitude of "militarism" which has caused some fighters and even some leaders to forget the fact that we *are armed militants and not militarists.* This tendency must be urgently fought and eliminated within the army.

If ten men go to a rice field and do the day's work of eight, there's no reason to be satisfied. It's the same in battle. Ten men fight like eight; that's not enough… One can always do more. Some people get used to the war, and once you get used to a thing it's the end: you get a bullet up the spout of your gun and you walk around. You hear the motor on the river and you don't use the bazooka that you have, so the Portuguese boats pass unharmed. Let me repeat: one can do more. We have to throw the Portuguese out.

Create schools and spread education in all liberated areas. Select young people between 14 and 20, those who have at least completed their fourth year, for further training. Oppose without

violence all prejudicial customs, the negative aspects of the beliefs and traditions of our people. Oblige every responsible and educated member of our Party to work daily for the improvement of their cultural formation.

Oppose among the young, especially those over 20, the mania for leaving the country so as to study elsewhere, the blind ambition to acquire a degree, the complex of inferiority and the mistaken idea which leads to the belief that those who study or take courses will thereby become privileged in our country tomorrow… But also oppose any ill will towards those who study or wish to study-the complex that students will be parasites or future saboteurs of the Party.

In the liberated areas, do everything possible to normalise the political life of the people. Section committees of the Party (*tabanca* committees), zonal committees, regional committees, must be consolidated and function normally. Frequent meetings must be held to explain to the population what is happening in the struggle, what the Party is endeavouring to do at any given moment, and what the criminal intentions of the enemy may be.

In regions still occupied by the enemy, reinforce clandestine work, the mobilisation and organisation of the populations, and the preparation of militants for action and support of our fighters.

Develop political work in our armed forces, whether regular or guerilla, wherever they may be. Hold frequent meetings. Demand serious political work from political commissars. Start political committees, formed by the political commissar and commander of each unit in the regular army.

Oppose tendencies to militarism and make each fighter an

exemplary militant of our Party.

Educate ourselves, educate other people, the population in general, to fight fear and ignorance, to eliminate little by little the subjection to nature and natural forces which our economy has not yet mastered. Convince little by little, n~ particular the militants of the Party, that we shall end by conquering the fear of nature, and that man is the strongest force in nature.

Demand from responsible Party members that they dedicate themselves seriously to study, that they interest themselves in the things and problems of our daily life and struggle in their fundamental and essential aspect, and not simply in their appearance Learn from life, learn from our people, learn from books, learn from the experience of others. Never stop learning.

Responsible members must take life seriously, conscious of their responsibilities, thoughtful about carrying them out, and with a comradeship based on work and duty done.

Nothing of this is incompatible with the joy of living, or with love for life and its amusements, or with confidence in the future and in our work…

Reinforce political work and propaganda within the enemy's armed forces. Write posters, pamphlets, letters. Draw slogans on the roads. Establish cautious links with enemy personnel who want to contact us. Act audaciously and with great initiative in this way. Do everything possible to help enemy soldiers to desert. Assure them of security so as to encourage their desertion. Carry out political work among Africans who are still in enemy service, whether civilian or military. Persuade these brothers to change direction so as to serve the Party within enemy ranks or desert

with arms and ammunition to our units.

We must practice revolutionary democracy in every aspect of our Party life. Every responsible member must have the courage of his responsibilities, exacting from others a proper respect for his work and properly respecting the work of others. Hide nothing from the masses of our people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories…

Lectura 3

Prefacio a 'Los condenados de la Tierra', de Frantz Fanon[15]

Jean-Paul Sartre

No hace mucho tiempo, la tierra estaba poblada por dos mil millones de habitantes, es decir, quinientos millones de hombres y mil quinientos millones de indígenas. Los primeros disponían del Verbo, los otros lo tomaban prestado. Entre aquéllos y estos, reyezuelos vendidos, señores feudales, una falsa burguesía forjada de una sola pieza servían de intermediarios. En las colonias, la verdad aparecía desnuda; las "metrópolis" la preferían vestida; era necesario que los indígenas las amaran. Como a madres, en cierto sentido. La elite europea se dedicó a fabricar una elite indígena; se seleccionaron adolescentes, se les marcó en la frente, con hierro candente, los principios de la cultura occidental, se les introdujeron en la boca mordazas sonoras, grandes palabras pastosas que se adherían a los

dientes; tras una breve estancia en la metrópoli se les regresaba a su país, falsificados. Esas mentiras vivientes no tenían ya nada que decir a sus hermanos; eran un eco; desde París, Londres, Ámsterdam nosotros lanzábamos palabras: “¡Partenón! ¡Fraternidad!” y en alguna parte, en África, en Asia, otros labios se abrían: “¡…tenón! ¡…nidad!”. Era la Edad de Oro.

Aquello se acabó: las bocas se abrieron solas; las voces, amarillas y negras, seguían hablando de nuestro humanismo, pero fue para reprocharnos nuestra inhumanidad Nosotros escuchábamos sin disgusto esas corteses expresiones de amargura. Primero con orgullosa admiración: ¿cómo?, ¿hablan solos? ¡Ved lo que hemos hecho de ellos! No dudábamos de que aceptasen nuestro ideal, puesto que nos acusaban de no serles fieles; Europa creyó en su misión: había helenizado a los asiáticos, había creado esa especie nueva. Los negros grecolatinos. Y añadíamos, entre nosotros, con sentido práctico: hay que dejarlos gritar, eso los calma: perro que ladra no muerde.

Vino otra generación que desplazó el problema. Sus escritores, sus poetas, con una increíble paciencia, trataron de explicarnos que nuestros valores no se ajustaban a la verdad de su vida, que no podían ni rechazarlos del todo ni asimilarlos. Eso quería decir, más o menos: ustedes nos han convertido en monstruos, su humanismo pretende que somos universales y sus prácticas racistas nos particularizan. Nosotros los escuchamos, muy tranquilos: a los administradores coloniales no se les paga para que lean a Hegel, por eso lo leen poco, pero no necesitan de ese filósofo para saber que las conciencias infelices

se enredan en sus gemidos, sería la de la integración. No se trataba de pues, su infelicidad, no surgirá sino el viento. Si hubiera, nos decían los expertos, la sombra de una reivindicación en sus gemidos, sería la de la integración. No se trataba de otorgársela, por supuesto: se habría arruinado el sistema que descansa, como ustedes saben, en la sobreexplotación. Pero bastaría hacerles creer el embuste: seguirían adelante. En cuanto a la rebeldía, estamos muy tranquilos. ¿Qué indígena consciente se dedicaría a matar a los bellos hijos de Europa con el único fin de convertirse en europeo como ellos? En resumen, alentábamos esa melancolía y no nos parecía mal, por una vez, otorgar el premio Goncourt a un negro: eso era antes de 1939.

1961. Escuchen: “No perdamos el tiempo en estériles letanías ni en mimetismos nauseabundos. Abandonemos a esa Europa que no deja de hablar del hombre al mismo tiempo que lo asesina por dondequiera que lo encuentra, en todas las esquinas de sus propias calles, en todos los rincones del mundo. Hace siglos… que en nombre de una pretendida aventura espiritual’ ahoga a casi toda la humanidad”. El tono es nuevo. ¿Quién se atreve a usarlo? Un africano, hombre del Tercer Mundo, ex colonizado. Añade: “Europa ha adquirido tal velocidad, local y desordenada… que va… hacia un abismo del que vale más alejarse”. En otras palabras: está perdida. Una verdad que a nadie le gusta declarar, pero de la que estamos convencidos todos —¿no es cierto, queridos europeos?—.

Hay que hacer, sin embargo, una salvedad. Cuando un francés, por ejemplo, dice a otros franceses: “Estamos perdidos”

—lo que, por lo que yo sé, ocurre casi todos los días desde 1930 — se trata de un discurso emotivo, inflamado de coraje y de amor, y el orador se incluye a sí mismo con todos sus compatriotas. Y además, casi siempre añade: “A menos que…”. Todos ven de qué se trata: no puede cometerse un solo error más; si no se siguen sus recomendaciones al pie de la letra, entonces y solo entonces el país se desintegrará. En resumen: es una amenaza seguida de un consejo y esas ideas chocan tanto menos cuanto que brotan de la intersubjetividad nacional. Cuando Fanon, por el contrario, dice que Europa se precipita a la perdición, lejos de lanzar un grito de alarma hace un diagnóstico. Este médico no pretende ni condenarla sin recurso —otros milagros se han visto— ni darle los medios para sanar; comprueba que está agonizando, desde fuera, basándose en los síntomas que ha podido recoger. En cuanto a curarla, no: él tiene otras preocupaciones; le da igual que se hunda o que sobreviva. Por eso su libro es escandaloso. Y si ustedes murmuran, medio en broma, medio molestos: “¡Qué cosas nos dice!”, se les escapa la verdadera naturaleza del escándalo: porque Fanon no les “dice” absolutamente nada; su obra —tan ardiente para otros — permanece helada para ustedes; con frecuencia se habla de ustedes en ella, jamás a ustedes. Se acabaron los Goncourt negros y los Nobel amarillos: no volverá la época de los colonizados laureados. Un exindígena “de lengua francesa” adapta esa lengua a nuevas exigencias, la utiliza para dirigirse únicamente a los colonizados: “¡Indígenas de todos los países subdesarrollados, uníos!”. Qué decadencia la nuestra: para sus padres, éramos los únicos interlocutores; los hijos no nos

consideran ni siquiera interlocutores válidos: somos los objetos del razonamiento. Por supuesto, Fanon menciona de pasada nuestros crímenes famosos, Setif, Hanoi, Madagascar, pero no se molesta en condenarlos: los utiliza. Si descubre las tácticas del colonialismo, el juego complejo de las relaciones que unen y oponen a los colonos y los “de la metrópoli” lo hace para sus hermanos; su finalidad es enseñarles a derrotarnos.

En una palabra, el Tercer Mundo se descubre y se expresa a través de esa voz. Ya se sabe que no es homogéneo y que todavía se encuentran dentro de ese mundo pueblos sometidos, otros que han adquirido una falsa independencia, algunos que luchan por conquistar su soberanía y otros más, por último, que aunque han ganado la libertad plena viven bajo la amenaza de una agresión imperialista. Esas diferencias han nacido de la historia colonial, es decir, de la opresión. Aquí la Metrópoli se ha contentado con pagar a algunos señores feudales; allá, con el lema de “dividir para vencer”, ha fabricado de una sola pieza una burguesía de colonizados; en otra parte ha dado un doble golpe: la colonia es a la vez de explotación y de población. Así Europa ha fomentado las divisiones, las oposiciones, ha forjado clases y racismos, ha intentado por todos los medios provocar y aumentar la estratificación de las sociedades colonizadas. Fanon no oculta nada: para luchar contra nosotros, la antigua colonia debe luchar contra sí misma. O más bien ambas luchas no son sino una sola. En el fuego del combate, todas las barreras interiores deben desaparecer, la impotencia burguesa de los negociantes y los compradores, el proletariado urbano, siempre privilegiado, el lumpenproletariat de los barrios miserables, todos deben

alinearse en la misma posición de las masas rurales, verdadera fuente del ejército colonial y revolucionario; en esas regiones cuyo desarrollo ha sido detenido deliberadamente por el colonialismo, el campesinado, cuando se rebela, aparece de inmediato como la clase radical: conoce la opresión al desnudo, la ha sufrido mucho más que los trabajadores de las ciudades y, para que no muera de hambre, se necesita nada menos que un desplome de todas las estructuras. Si triunfa, la Revolución nacional será socialista; si se corta su aliento, si la burguesía colonizada toma el poder, el nuevo Estado, a pesar de una soberanía formal, queda en manos de los imperialistas. El ejemplo de Katanga lo ilustra muy bien. Así, pues, la unidad del Tercer Mundo no está hecha: es una empresa en vías de realizarse, que ha de pasar en cada país, tanto después como antes de la independencia, por la unión de todos los colonizados bajo el mando de la clase campesina. Esto es lo que Fanon explica a sus hermanos de África, de Asia, de América Latina: realizaremos todos juntos y en todas partes el socialismo revolucionario o seremos derrotados uno a uno por nuestros antiguos tiranos. No oculta nada; ni las debilidades, ni las discordias, ni las mixtificaciones. Aquí, el movimiento tiene un mal comienzo; allí, tras brillantes éxitos, pierde velocidad; en otra parte se detiene; si se quiere reanudarlo, será necesario que los campesinos lancen al mar a su burguesía. Se advierte seriamente al lector contra las enajenaciones más peligrosas: el dirigente, el culto a la personalidad, la cultura occidental e, igualmente, el retorno al lejano pasado de la cultura africana: la verdadera cultura es la Revolución, lo que quiere decir que se

forja al rojo. Fanon habla en voz alta; nosotros los europeos podemos escucharlo: la prueba es que aquí tienen ustedes este libro en sus manos; ¿no teme que las potencias coloniales se aprovechen de su sinceridad?

No. No teme nada. Nuestros procedimientos están anticuados: pueden retardar ocasionalmente la emancipación, pero no la detendrán. Y no hay que imaginar que podemos modificar nuestros métodos: el neocolonialismo, ese sueño lánguido de las metrópolis, no es más que aire; las “Terceras Fuerzas” no existen o bien son las burguesías de hojalata que el colonialismo ya ha colocado en el poder. Nuestro maquiavelismo tiene poca influencia sobre ese mundo, ya muy despierto, que ha descubierto una tras otra nuestras mentiras. El colono no tiene más que un recurso: la fuerza cuando todavía le queda; el indígena no tiene más que una alternativa: la servidumbre o la soberanía. ¿Qué puede importarle a Fanon que ustedes lean o no su obra? Es a sus hermanos a quienes denuncia nuestras viejas malicias, seguro de que no tenemos alternativa. A ellos les dice: Europa ha dado un zarpazo a nuestros continentes; hay que acuchillarle las garras hasta que las retire. El momento nos favorece: no sucede nada en Bizerta, en Elizabethville, en el campo argelino sin que la tierra entera sea informada; los bloques asumen posiciones contrarias, se respetan mutuamente, aprovechemos esa parálisis, entremos en la historia y que nuestra irrupción la haga universal por primera vez; luchemos: a falta de otras armas, bastará la paciencia del cuchillo.

Europeos, abran este libro, penetren en él. Después de dar algunos pasos en la oscuridad, verán a algunos extranjeros

reunidos en torno al fuego, acérquense, escuchen: discuten la suerte que reservan a las agencias de ustedes, a los mercenarios que las defienden. Quizá estos extranjeros se den cuenta de su presencia, pero seguirán hablando entre sí, sin tan siquiera bajar la voz. Esa indiferencia hiere en lo más hondo: sus padres, criaturas de sombra, criaturas de ustedes, eran almas muertas, ustedes les dispensaban la luz, no hablaban sino a ustedes y nadie se ocupaba de responder a esos zombis. Los hijos, en cambio, los ignoran: los ilumina y los calienta un fuego que no es el de ustedes, que a distancia respetable se sentirán furtivos, nocturnos, estremecidos: a cada quien su turno; en esas tinieblas de donde va a surgir otra aurora, los zombis son ustedes.

En ese caso, dirán, arrojemos este libro por la ventana. ¿Para qué leerlo si no está escrito para nosotros? Por dos motivos, el primero de los cuales es que Fanon explica a sus hermanos cómo somos y les descubre el mecanismo de nuestras enajenaciones: aprovéchenlo para revelarse a ustedes mismos en su verdad de objetos. Nuestras víctimas nos conocen por sus heridas y por sus cadenas: eso hace irrefutable su testimonio. Basta que nos muestren lo que hemos hecho de ellas para que conozcamos lo que hemos hecho de nosotros mismos. ¿Resulta útil? Sí, porque Europa está en gran peligro de muerte. Pero, dirán ustedes, nosotros vivimos en la Metrópoli y reprobamos los excesos. Es verdad, ustedes no son colonos, pero no valen más que ellos. Ellos son sus pioneros, ustedes los enviaron a las regiones de ultramar, ellos los han enriquecido; ustedes se lo habían advertido: si hacían correr demasiada sangre, los

desautorizarían de labios afuera; de la misma manera, un Estado —cualquiera que sea— mantiene en el extranjero una turba de agitadores, de provocadores y de espías a los que desautoriza cuando se les sorprende. Ustedes, tan liberales, tan humanos, que llevan al preciosismo el amor por la cultura, parecen olvidar que tienen colonias y que allí se asesina en su nombre. Fanon revela a sus camaradas —a algunos de ellos, sobre todo, que todavía están demasiado occidentalizados— la solidaridad de los "metropolitanos" con sus agentes coloniales. Tengan el valor de leerlo: porque les hará avergonzarse y la vergüenza, como ha dicho Marx, es un sentimiento revolucionario. Como ustedes ven, tampoco yo puedo desprenderme de la ilusión subjetiva. Yo también les digo: "Todo está perdido, a menos que…" Como europeo, me apodero del libro de un enemigo y lo convierto en un medio para curar a Europa. Aprovéchenlo.

Y he aquí la segunda razón: si descartan la verborrea fascista de Sorel, comprenderán que Fanon es el primero después de Engels que ha vuelto a sacar a la superficie a la partera de la historia. Y no vayan a creer que una sangre demasiado ardiente o una infancia desgraciada le han creado algún gusto singular por la violencia: simplemente se convierte en intérprete de la situación: nada más. Pero esto basta para que constituya, etapa por etapa, la dialéctica que la hipocresía liberal les oculta a ustedes y que nos ha producido a nosotros lo mismo que a él.

En el siglo pasado, la burguesía consideraba a los obreros como envidiosos, desquiciados por groseros apetitos, pero se preocupaba por incluir a esos seres brutales en nuestra especie: de no ser hombres y libres ¿cómo podrían vender libremente su

fuerza de trabajo? En Francia, en Inglaterra, el humanismo presume de universal.

Con el trabajo forzado sucede todo lo contrario. No hay contrato. Además, hay que intimidar: la opresión resulta evidente. Nuestros soldados, en ultramar, rechazan el universalismo metropolitano, aplican al género humano el numerus clausus: como nadie puede despojar a su semejante sin cometer un crimen, sin someterlo o matarlo, plantean como principio que el colonizado no es el semejante del hombre. Nuestra fuerza de choque ha recibido la misión de convertir en realidad esa abstracta certidumbre: se ordena reducir a los habitantes del territorio anexado al nivel de monos superiores, para justificar que el colono los trate como bestias. La violencia colonial no se propone solo como finalidad mantener en actitud respetuosa a los hombres sometidos, trata de deshumanizarlos. Nada será ahorrado para liquidar sus tradiciones, para sustituir sus lenguas por las nuestras, para destruir su cultura sin darles la nuestra; se les embrutecerá de cansancio. Desnutridos, enfermos, si resisten todavía al miedo se llevará la tarea hasta el fin: se dirigen contra el campesino los fusiles; vienen civiles que se instalan en su tierra y con el látigo lo obligan a cultivarla para ellos. Si se resiste, los soldados disparan, es un hombre muerto; si cede, se degrada, deja de ser un hombre; la vergüenza y el miedo van a quebrar su carácter, a desintegrar su persona. Todo se hace a tambor batiente, por expertos: los “servicios psicológicos” no datan de hoy. Ni el lavado de cerebro. Y sin embargo, a pesar de todos los esfuerzos, no se alcanza el fin en ninguna parte: ni en el Congo, donde se cortaban las manos a

los negros ni en Angola donde, recientemente, se horadaban los labios de los descontentos, para cerrarlos con cadenas. Y no sostengo que sea imposible convertir a un hombre en bestia. Solo afirmo que no se logra sin debilitarlo considerablemente; no bastan los golpes, hay que presionar con la desnutrición. Es lo malo con la servidumbre: cuando se domestica a un miembro de nuestra especie, se disminuye su rendimiento y, por poco que se le dé, un hombre de corral acaba por costar más de lo que rinde. Por esa razón los colonos se ven obligados a dejar a medias la domesticación: el resultado, ni hombre ni bestia, es el indígena. Golpeado, subalimentado, enfermo, temeroso, pero solo hasta cierto punto, tiene siempre, ya sea amarillo, negro o blanco, los mismos rasgos de carácter: es perezoso, taimado y ladrón, vive de cualquier cosa y solo conoce la fuerza.

¡Pobre colono!: su contradicción queda al desnudo. Debería, como hace, según se dice, el ogro, matar al que captura. Pero eso no es posible. ¿No hace falta acaso que los explote? Al no poder llevar la matanza hasta el genocidio y la servidumbre hasta el embrutecimiento animal, pierde el control, la operación se invierte, una implacable lógica lo llevará hasta la descolonización.

Pero no de inmediato. Primero, reina el europeo: ya ha perdido, pero no se da cuenta; no sabe todavía que los indígenas son falsos indígenas; afirma que les hace daño para destruir el mal que existe en ellos; al cabo de tres generaciones, sus perniciosos instintos ya no resurgirán. ¿Qué instintos? ¿Los que impulsan al esclavo a matar al amo? ¿Cómo no reconoce su propia crueldad dirigida ahora contra él mismo? ¿Cómo no

reconoce en el salvajismo de esos campesinos oprimidos el salvajismo del colono que han absorbido por todos sus poros y del que no se han curado? La razón es sencilla: ese personaje déspota, enloquecido por su omnipotencia y por el miedo de perderla, ya no se acuerda de que ha sido un hombre: se considera un látigo o un fusil; ha llegado a creer que la domesticación de las “razas inferiores” se obtiene mediante el condicionamiento de sus reflejos. No toma en cuenta la memoria humana, los recuerdos imborrables; y, sobre todo, hay algo que quizá no ha sabido jamás: no nos convertimos en lo que somos sino mediante la negación íntima y radical de lo que han hecho de nosotros. ¿Tres generaciones? Desde la segunda, apenas abrían los ojos, los hijos han visto cómo golpeaban a sus padres. En términos de psiquiatría, están “traumatizados”. Para toda la vida. Pero esas agresiones renovadas sin cesar, lejos de llevarlos a someterse, los sitúan en una contradicción insoportable que el europeo pagará, tarde o temprano. Después de eso, aunque se les domestique a su vez, aunque se les enseñe la vergüenza, el dolor y el hambre, no se provocará en sus cuerpos sino una rabia volcánica cuya fuerza es igual a la de la presión que se ejerce sobre ellos. ¿Decían ustedes que no conocen sino la fuerza? Es cierto; primero será solo la del colono y pronto después la suya propia: es decir, la misma, que incide sobre nosotros como nuestro reflejo que, desde el fondo de un espejo, viene a nuestro encuentro. No se equivoquen; por esa loca roña, por esa bilis y esa hiel, por su constante deseo de matarnos, por la contracción permanente de músculos fuertes que temen reposar, son hombres: por el colono, que quiere

hacerlos esclavos, y contra él. Todavía ciego, abstracto, el odio es su único tesoro: el Amo lo provoca porque trata de embrutecerlos, no puede llegar a quebrantarlo porque sus intereses lo detienen a medio camino; así, los falsos indígenas son todavía humanos, por el poder y la impotencia del opresor que se transforman, en ellos, en un Techazo obstinado de la condición animal. Por lo demás ya se sabe; por supuesto, son perezosos: es sabotaje. Taimados, ladrones. ¡Claro! Sus pequeños hurtos marcan el comienzo de una resistencia todavía desorganizada. Eso no basta: hay quienes se afirman lanzándose con las manos desnudas contra los fusiles; son sus héroes; y otros se hacen hombres asesinando europeos. Se les mata: bandidos y mártires, su suplicio exalta a las masas aterrorizadas.

Aterrorizadas, sí: en ese momento, la agresión colonial se interioriza como Terror en los colonizados. No me refiero solo al miedo que experimentan frente a nuestros inagotables medios de represión, sino también al que les inspira su propio furor. Se encuentran acorralados entre nuestras armas que les apuntan y esos tremendos impulsos, esos deseos de matar que surgen del fondo de su corazón y que no siempre reconocen: porque no es en principio su violencia, es la nuestra, invertida, que crece y los desgarra; y el primer movimiento de esos oprimidos es ocultar profundamente esa inaceptable cólera, reprobada por su moral y por la nuestra y que no es, sin embargo, sino el último reducto de su humanidad. Lean a Fanon: comprenderán que, en el momento de impotencia, la locura homicida es el inconsciente colectivo de los colonizados.

Esa furia contenida, al no estallar, gira en redondo y daña a los propios oprimidos. Para liberarse de ella, acaban por matarse entre sí: las tribus luchan unas contra otras al no poder enfrentarse al enemigo verdadero —y, naturalmente, la política colonial fomenta sus rivalidades; el hermano, al levantar el cuchillo contra su hermano, cree destruir de una vez por todas la imagen detestada de su envilecimiento común. Pero esas víctimas expiatorias no apaciguan su sed de sangre; no evitarán lanzarse contra las ametralladoras, sino haciéndose nuestros cómplices: ellos mismos van a acelerar el progreso de esa deshumanización que rechazan. Bajo la mirada zumbona del colono, se protegerán contra sí mismos con barreras sobrenaturales, reanimando antiguos mitos terribles o atándose mediante ritos meticulosos: el obseso evade así su exigencia profunda, infligiéndose manías que lo ocupan en todo momento. Bailan: eso los ocupa; relaja sus músculos dolorosamente contraídos y además la danza simula secretamente, con frecuencia a pesar de ellos, el No que no pueden decir, los asesinatos que no se atreven a cometer. En ciertas regiones utilizan este último recurso: el trance. Lo que antes era el hecho religioso en su simplicidad, cierta comunicación del fiel con lo sagrado, lo convierten en un arma contra la desesperanza y la humillación: los zars, las loas, los santos de la santería descienden sobre ellos, gobiernan su violencia y la gastan en el trance hasta el agotamiento. Al mismo tiempo, esos altos personajes los protegen: esto quiere decir que los colonizados se defienden de la enajenación colonial acrecentando la enajenación religiosa. El único resultado a fin de cuentas, es que

se acumulan ambas enajenaciones y que cada una refuerza a la otra. Así, en ciertas psicosis, cansados de ser insultados todos los días, los alucinados creen un buen día que han escuchado la voz de un ángel que los elogia; los denuestos no desaparecen, sin embargo: en lo sucesivo, alternan con el elogio. Es una defensa y el final de su aventura: la persona está disociada, el enfermo se encamina a la demencia. Hay que añadir, en el caso de algunos desgraciados rigurosamente seleccionados, ese otro trance de que he hablado más arriba: la cultura occidental. En su lugar, dirán ustedes, yo preferiría mis zars a la Acrópolis. Bueno, eso quiere decir que han comprendido. Pero no del todo, sin embargo, porque ustedes no se encuentran en su lugar. Todavía no. De otra manera sabrían que ellos no pueden escoger: acumulan. Dos mundos, es decir, dos trances: se baila toda la noche, al alba se apretujan en las iglesias para oír misa; día a día, la grieta se ensancha. Nuestro enemigo traiciona a sus hermanos y se hace nuestro cómplice; sus hermanos hacen lo mismo. La condición del indígena es una neurosis

Reclamar y negar, a la vez, la condición humana: la contradicción es explosiva. Y hace explosión, ustedes lo saben lo mismo que yo. Vivimos en la época de la deflagración: basta que el aumento de los nacimientos acreciente la escasez, que los recién llegados tengan que temer a la vida un poco más que a la muerte, y el torrente de violencia rompe todas las barreras. En Argelia, en Angola, se mata al azar a los europeos. Es el momento del boomerang, el tercer tiempo de la violencia: se vuelve contra nosotros, nos alcanza y, como de costumbre, no comprendemos que es la nuestra. Los “liberales” se quedan

confusos: reconocen que no éramos lo bastante corteses con los indígenas, que habría sido más justo y más prudente otorgarles ciertos derechos en la medida de lo posible; no pedían otra cosa sino que se les admitiera por hornadas y sin padrinos en ese club tan cerrado, nuestra especie: y he aquí que ese desencadenamiento bárbaro y loco no los respeta en mayor medida que a los malos colonos. La izquierda metropolitana se siente molesta: conoce la verdadera suerte de los indígenas, la opresión sin piedad de que son objeto y no condena su rebeldía, sabiendo que hemos hecho todo por provocarla. Pero de todos modos, piensa, hay límites: esos "guerrilleros"[16] deberían esforzarse por mostrarse caballeros; sería el mejor medio de probar que son hombres. A veces los reprende: "Van ustedes demasiado lejos, no seguiremos apoyándolos". A ellos no les importa; para lo que sirve el apoyo que les presta, ya puede hacer con él lo que más le plazca. Desde que empezó su guerra, comprendieron esa rigurosa verdad: todos valemos lo que somos, todos nos hemos aprovechado de ellos, no tienen que probar nada, no harán distinciones con nadie. Un solo deber, un objetivo único: expulsar al colonialismo por todos los medios. Y los más alertas entre nosotros estarían dispuestos, en rigor, a admitirlo, pero no pueden dejar de ver en esa prueba de fuerza el medio inhumano que los subhombres han asumido para lograr que se les otorgue carta de humanidad: que se les otorgue lo más pronto posible y que traten luego, por medios pacíficos, de merecerla. Nuestras almas bellas son racistas.

Nos servirá la lectura de Fanon; esa violencia irreprimible, lo demuestra plenamente, no es una absurda tempestad ni la

resurrección de instintos salvajes ni siquiera un efecto del resentimiento: es el hombre mismo reintegrándose. Esa verdad, me parece, la hemos conocido y la hemos olvidado: ninguna dulzura borrará las señales de la violencia; solo la violencia puede destruirlas. Y el colonizado se cura de la neurosis colonial expulsando al colono con las armas. Cuando su ira estalla, recupera su transparencia perdida, se conoce en la medida misma en que se hace; de lejos, consideramos su guerra como el triunfo de la barbarie; pero procede por sí misma a la emancipación progresiva del combatiente, liquida en él y fuera de él, progresivamente, las tinieblas coloniales. Desde que empieza, es una guerra sin piedad. O se sigue aterrorizado o se vuelve uno terrible; es decir: o se abandona uno a las disociaciones de una vida falseada o se conquista la unidad innata. Cuando los campesinos reciben los fusiles, los viejos mitos palidecen, las prohibiciones desaparecen una por una; el arma de un combatiente es su humanidad. Porque, en los primeros momentos de la rebelión, hay que matar: matar a un europeo es matar dos pujaros de un tiro, suprimir a la vez a un opresor y a un oprimido: quedan un hombre muerto y un hombre libre; el superviviente, por primera vez, siente un suelo nacional bajo la planta de los pies. En ese instante, la Nación no se aleja de él: se encuentra dondequiera que él va, allí donde él está — nunca más lejos, se confunde con su libertad. Pero, tras la primera sorpresa, el ejército colonial reacciona: hay que unirse o dejarse matar. Las discordias tribales se atenúan, tienden a desaparecer; primero porque ponen en peligro la Revolución y, más hondamente, porque no tenían más finalidad que derivar la

violencia hacia falsos enemigos. Cuando persisten —como en el Congo— es porque son alimentadas por los agentes del colonialismo. La Nación se pone en marcha: para cada hermano está en dondequiera que combaten otros hermanos. Su amor fraternal es lo contrario del odio que les tienen a ustedes: son hermanos porque cada uno de ellos ha matado o puede, de un momento a otro, haber matado. Fanon muestra a sus lectores los límites de la "espontaneidad", la necesidad y los peligros de la "organización". Pero, cualquiera que sea la inmensidad de la tarea, en cada paso de la empresa se profundiza la conciencia social. Los últimos complejos desaparecen: que nos hablen del "complejo de dependencia" en el soldado del A.L.N. Liberado de sus anteojeras, el campesino toma conciencia de sus necesidades: ellos lo mataban, pero él trataba de ignorarlos; ahora los descubre como exigencias infinitas. En esta violencia popular, para sostenerse cinco años, ocho años como han hecho los argelinos, las necesidades militares, sociales y políticas no pueden distinguirse. La guerra —aunque solo fuera planteando el asunto del mando y las responsabilidades— instituye nuevas estructuras que serán las primeras instituciones de la paz. He aquí, pues, al hombre instaurado hasta en las nuevas tradiciones, hijas futuras de un horrible presente, helo aquí legitimado por un derecho que va a nacer, que nace cada día en el fuego mismo: con el último colono muerto, reembarcado o asimilado, la especie minoritaria desaparece y cede su lugar a la fraternidad socialista. Y esto no basta: ese combatiente quema las etapas; por supuesto no arriesga su piel para encontrarse al nivel del viejo "metropolitano". Tiene mucha paciencia: quizá

sueña a veces con un nuevo Dien-Bien-Phu; pero en realidad no cuenta con eso: es un mendigo que lucha, en su miseria, contra ricos fuertemente armados. En espera de las victorias decisivas y con frecuencia sin esperar nada, hostiga a sus adversarios hasta exacerbarlos. Esto no se hace sin espantosas pérdidas; el ejército colonial se vuelve feroz: cuadrillas, *ratissages*[17], concentraciones, expediciones punitivas; se asesina a mujeres y niños. Él lo sabe: ese hombre nuevo comienza su vida de hombre por el final; se sabe muerto en potencia. Lo matarán: no solo acepta el riesgo sino que tiene la certidumbre; ese muerto en potencia ha perdido a su mujer, a sus hijos; ha visto tantas agonías que prefiere vencer a sobrevivir; otros gozarán de la victoria, él no: está demasiado cansado. Pero esa fatiga del corazón es la fuente de un increíble valor. Encontramos nuestra humanidad más acá de la muerte y de la desesperación, él la encuentra más allá de los suplicios y de la muerte. Nosotros hemos sembrado el viento, él es la tempestad. Hijo de la violencia, en ella encuentra a cada instante su humanidad: éramos hombres a sus expensas, él se hace hombre a expensas nuestras. Otro hombre: de mejor calidad.

Aquí se detiene Fanon. Ha mostrado el camino: vocero de los combatientes, ha reclamado la unión, la unidad del Continente africano contra todas las discordias y todos los particularismos. Su fin está logrado. Si quisiera describir integralmente el hecho histórico de la descolonización, tendría que hablar de nosotros, y ese no es, sin duda, su propósito. Pero, cuando cerramos el libro, continúa en nosotros, a pesar de su autor, porque experimentamos la fuerza de los pueblos en revolución y

respondemos con la fuerza. Hay, pues, un nuevo momento de violencia y nos es necesario volvernos hacia nosotros esta vez porque esa violencia nos está cambiando en la medida en que el falso indígena cambia a través de ella. Que cada cual reflexione como quiera, con tal de que reflexione: en la Europa de hoy, aturdida por los golpes que recibe, en Francia, en Bélgica, en Inglaterra, la menor distracción del pensamiento es una complicidad criminal con el colonialismo. Este libro no necesitaba un prefacio. Sobre todo, porque no se dirige a nosotros. Lo escribí, sin embargo, para llevar la dialéctica hasta sus últimas consecuencias: también a nosotros, los europeos, nos están descolonizando; es decir, están extirpando en una sangrienta operación al colono que vive en cada uno de nosotros. Debemos volver la mirada hacia nosotros mismos, si tenemos el valor de hacerlo, para ver qué hay en nosotros. Primero hay que afrontar un espectáculo inesperado: el *striptease* de nuestro humanismo. Helo aquí desnudo y nada hermoso: no era sino una ideología mentirosa, la exquisita justificación del pillaje; sus ternuras y su preciosismo justificaban nuestras agresiones. ¡Qué bello predicar la no violencia! ¡Ni víctimas ni verdugos! ¡Vamos! Si no son ustedes víctimas, cuando el gobierno que han aceptado en un plebiscito, cuando el ejército en que han servido sus hermanos menores, sin vacilación ni remordimiento, han emprendido un "genocidio", indudablemente son verdugos. Y si prefieren ser víctimas, arriesgarse a uno o dos días de cárcel, simplemente optan por retirar su carta del juego. No pueden retirarla: tiene que permanecer allí hasta el final. Compréndanlo de una vez: si la violencia acaba de empezar, si la explotación y la opresión no

han existido jamás sobre la Tierra, quizá la pregonada “no violencia” podría poner fin a la querella. Pero si el régimen todo y hasta sus ideas sobre la no violencia están condicionados por una opresión milenaria, su pasividad no sirve sino para alinearlos del lado de los opresores.

Ustedes saben bien que somos explotadores. Saben que nos apoderamos del oro y los metales y el petróleo de los “continentes nuevos” para traerlos a las viejas metrópolis. No sin excelentes resultados: palacios, catedrales, capitales industriales; y cuando amenazaba la crisis, ahí estaban los mercados coloniales para amortiguarla o desviarla. Europa, cargada de riquezas, otorgó de jure la humanidad a todos sus habitantes: un hombre, entre nosotros, quiere decir un cómplice puesto que todos nos hemos beneficiado con la explotación colonial. Ese continente gordo y lívido acaba por caer en lo que Fanon llama justamente el “narcisismo”. Cocteau se irritaba con París, “esa ciudad que habla todo el tiempo de sí misma”. ¿Y qué otra cosa hace Europa? ¿Y ese monstruo supereuropeo, la América del Norte? Palabras: libertad, igualdad, fraternidad, amor, honor, patria. ¿Qué se yo? Esto no nos impedía pronunciar al mismo tiempo frases racistas, cochino negro, cochino judío, cochino ratón. Los buenos espíritus, liberales y tiernos —los neocolonialistas, en una palabra— pretendían sentirse asqueados por esa inconsecuencia; error o mala fe: nada más consecuente, entre nosotros, que un humanismo racista, puesto que el europeo no ha podido hacerse hombre sino fabricando esclavos y monstruos. Mientras existió la condición de indígena, la impostura no se descubrió; se encontraba en el género

humano una abstracta formulación de universalidad que servía para encubrir prácticas más realistas: había, del otro lado del mar, una raza de subhombres que, gracias a nosotros, en mil años quizá, alcanzarían nuestra condición. En resumen, se confundía el género con la elite. Actualmente el indígena revela su verdad; de un golpe, nuestro club tan cerrado revela su debilidad: no era ni más ni menos que una minoría. Lo que es peor: puesto que los otros se hacen hombres en contra nuestra, se demuestra que somos los enemigos del género humano; la elite descubre su verdadera naturaleza: la de una pandilla. Nuestros caros valores pierden sus alas; si los contemplamos de cerca, no encontraremos uno solo que no esté manchado de sangre. Si necesitan ustedes un ejemplo, recuerden las grandes frases: ¡cuan generosa es Francia! ¿Generosos nosotros? ¿Y Setif? ¿Y esos ocho años de guerra feroz que han costado la vida a más de un millón de argelinos? Y la tortura. Pero comprendan que no se nos reprocha haber traicionado una misión: simplemente porque no teníamos ninguna. Es la generosidad misma la que se pone en duda; esa hermosa palabra cantarina no tiene más que un sentido: condición otorgada. Para los hombres de enfrente, nuevos y liberados, nadie tiene el poder ni el privilegio de dar nada a nadie. Cada uno tiene todos los derechos. Sobre todos; y nuestra especie, cuando un día llegue a ser, no se definirá como la suma de los habitantes del globo sino como la unidad infinita de sus reciprocidades. Aquí me detengo; ustedes pueden seguir la labor sin dificultad. Basta mirar de frente, por primera y última vez, nuestras aristocráticas virtudes: se mueren; ¿cómo podrían

sobrevivir a la aristocracia de subhombres que las han engendrado? Hace años, un comentador burgués —y colonialista— para defender a Occidente no pudo decir nada mejor que esto: “No somos ángeles. Pero, al menos, tenemos remordimientos”. ¡Qué declaración! En otra época, nuestro Continente tenía otros salvavidas: el Partenón, Chartres, los Derechos del Hombre, la esvástica. Ahora sabemos lo que valen: y ya no pretenden salvarnos del naufragio sino a través del muy cristiano sentimiento de nuestra culpabilidad. Es el fin, como verán ustedes: Europa hace agua por todas partes. ¿Qué ha sucedido? Simplemente, que éramos los sujetos de la historia y que ahora somos sus objetos. La relación de fuerzas se ha invertido, la descolonización está en camino; lo único que pueden intentar nuestros mercenarios es retrasar su realización.

Hace falta aún que las viejas “metrópolis” intervengan, que comprometan todas sus fuerzas en una batalla perdida de antemano. Esa vieja brutalidad colonial que hizo la dudosa gloria de los Bugeaud volvemos a encontrarla, al final de la aventura, decuplicada e insuficiente. Se envía al ejército a Argelia y allí se mantiene desde hace siete años sin resultado. La violencia ha cambiado de sentido; victoriosos, la ejercíamos sin que pareciera alterarnos: descomponía a los demás y en nosotros, los hombres, nuestro humanismo permanecía intacto; unidos por la ganancia, los “metropolitanos” bautizaban como fraternidad, como amor, la comunidad de sus crímenes; actualmente, bloqueada por todas partes, vuelve sobre nosotros a través de nuestros soldados, se interioriza y nos posee. La involución comienza: el colonizado se reintegra y nosotros, ultras y

liberales, y colonos y “metropolitanos” nos descomponemos. Ya la rabia y el miedo están al desnudo: se muestran al descubierto en las “cacerías de ratas” de Argel. ¿Dónde están ahora los salvajes? ¿Dónde está la barbarie? Nada falta, ni siquiera el tam-tam: las bocinas corean “Argelia francesa” mientras los europeos queman vivos a los musulmanes. No hace mucho, recuerda Fanon, los psiquiatras se afligían en un congreso por la criminalidad de los indígenas: esa gente se mata entre sí, decían, eso no es normal; su corteza cerebral debe estar subdesarrollada. En África central, otros han establecido que “el africano utiliza muy poco sus lóbulos frontales”. Esos sabios deberían proseguir ahora su encuesta en Europa y particularmente entre los franceses. Porque también nosotros, desde hace algunos años, debemos estar afectados de pereza mental: los Patriotas empiezan a asesinar a sus compatriotas; en caso de ausencia, hacen volar en trozos al conserje y su casa. No es más que el principio: la guerra civil está prevista para el otoño o la próxima primavera. Nuestros lóbulos parecen, sin embargo, en perfecto estado: ¿no será, más bien, que al no poder aplastar al indígena, la violencia se vuelve sobre sí misma, se acumula en el fondo de nosotros y busca una salida? La unión del pueblo argelino produce la desunión del pueblo francés; en todo el territorio de la antigua metrópoli, las tribus danzan y se preparan para el combate. El terror ha salido de África para instalarse aquí: porque están los furiosos, que quieren hacernos pagar con nuestra sangre la vergüenza de haber sido derrotados por el indígena y están los demás, todos los demás, igualmente culpables —después de Bizerta, después

de los linchamientos de septiembre ¿quién salió a la calle para decir: basta?—, pero más sosegados: los liberales, los más duros de los duros de la izquierda muelle. También a ellos les sube la fiebre. Y el malhumor. ¡Pero qué espanto! Disimulan su rabia con mitos, con ritos complicados; para retrasar el arreglo final de cuentas y la hora de la verdad, han puesto a la cabeza del país a un Gran Brujo cuyo oficio es mantenernos a cualquier precio en la oscuridad. Nada se logra; proclamada por unos, rechazada por otros, la violencia gira en redondo: un día hace explosión en Metz, al día siguiente en Burdeos; ha pasado por aquí, pasará por allá, es el juego de prendas. Ahora nos toca el turno de recorrer, paso a paso, el camino que lleva a la condición de indígena. Pero para convertirnos en indígenas del todo, sería necesario que nuestro suelo fuera ocupado por los antiguos colonizados y que nos muriéramos de hambre. Esto no sucederá: no, es el colonialismo decadente el que nos posee, el que nos cabalgará pronto, chocho y soberbio; ese es nuestro *zar*, nuestro *loa*. Y al leer el último capítulo de Fanon uno se convence de que vale más ser un indígena en el peor momento de la desdicha que un ex colono. No es bueno que un funcionario de la policía se vea obligado a torturar diez horas diarias: a ese paso, sus nervios llegarán a quebrarse a no ser que se prohíba a los verdugos, por su propio bien, el trabajo en horas suplementarias. Cuando se quiere proteger con el rigor de las leyes la moral de la Nación y del Ejército, no es bueno que este desmoralice sistemáticamente a aquélla. Ni que un país de tradición republicana confíe a cientos de miles de sus jóvenes a oficiales putchistas. No es bueno, compatriotas, ustedes que

conocen todos los crímenes cometidos en nuestro nombre, no es realmente bueno que no digan a nadie una sola palabra, ni siquiera a su propia alma, por miedo a tener que juzgarse a sí mismos. Al principio ustedes ignoraban, quiero creerlo, luego dudaron y ahora saben, pero siguen callados. Ocho años de silencio degradan. Y en vano: ahora, el sol cegador de la tortura está en el cenit, alumbra a todo el país; bajo esa luz, ninguna risa suena bien, no hay una cara que no se cubra de afeites para disimular la cólera o el miedo, no hay un acto que no traicione nuestra repugnancia y complicidad. Basta actualmente que dos franceses se encuentren para que haya entre ellos un cadáver. Y cuando digo uno… Francia era antes el nombre de un país, hay que tener cuidado de que no sea, en 1961, el nombre de una neurosis.

¿Sanaremos? Sí. La violencia, como la lanza de Aquiles, puede cicatrizar las heridas que ha infligido. En este momento estamos encadenados, humillados, enfermos de miedo: en lo más bajo. Felizmente esto no basta todavía a la aristocracia colonialista: no puede concluir su misión retardataria en Argelia sin colonizar primero a los franceses. Cada día retrocedemos frente a la contienda, pero pueden estar seguros de que no la evitaremos: ellos, los asesinos, la necesitan; van a seguir revoloteando a nuestro alrededor, a seguir golpeando el yunque. Así se acabará la época de los brujos y los fetiches: tendrán ustedes que pelear o se pudrirán en los campos de concentración. Es el momento final de la dialéctica: ustedes condenan esa guerra, pero no se atreven todavía a declararse solidarios de los combatientes argelinos; no tengan miedo, los

colonos y los mercenarios los obligarán a dar este paso. Quizá entonces, acorralados contra la pared, liberarán ustedes por fin esa violencia nueva suscitada por los viejos crímenes rezumados. Pero eso, como suele decirse, es otra historia. La historia del hombre. Estoy seguro de que ya se acerca el momento en que nos uniremos a quienes la están haciendo.

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Lectura 4

Foreign Aid, Intervention, and Influence[18]

David A. Baldwin

Foreign aid can be "related" to intervention in many ways. Some argue, with Senator J. W. Fulbright, that aid tends to precede intervention and to increase the probability of intervention[19]. Others would say that aid follows intervention, contending, for example, that American aid to Vietnam was evidence of a prior diplomatic commitment. Still others see aid as an alternative to intervention-if we give aid now we are less likely to have to intervene in the future. Another group would contend that the aid-giving process may *constitute* intervention[20]. It is with the views of this last group that most of this article deals. In examining them, we shall focus on three topics: (1) the links between foreign aid and influence; (2) the links between particular types of aid and what is often called intervention; and (3) the possibility of functional equivalents for aid that do not involve intervention.

There are some conceptual problems, however, that we must address first.

1. THE CONCEPT OF ‘INTERVENTION’

Conceptual difficulties abound in thinking about the relationship of aid to intervention[21]. Although much has been written about intervention and “dollar diplomacy”, most of these writings have employed a traditional concept of intervention that is too limited for use today. This traditional concept shares legalistic and military connotations with many other terms in the standard vocabulary of the student of international politics. The old definitions of intervention in terms of illegal military infringement of national sovereignty are simply inadequate at a time when non-military techniques of statecraft are becoming increasingly important. Spokesmen for the developing states have found it frustrating to try to describe twentieth-century phenomena with a nineteenth-century vocabulary. They have resorted to such terms as “neo-colonialism”, “economic imperialism”, and the like, in an attempt to overcome some of these semantic obstacles.

How, then, should we proceed in a discussion of foreign aid and intervention? One way is to equate “intervention” with “influence”[22]. This would have three advantages. First, almost everyone’s definition of intervention would be included, since there is widespread agreement that intervention is a type of influence. Second, normative arguments that are unlikely to lead to agreement would be avoided. The breakdown in the consensus regarding what kinds of influence are legitimate and

what kinds illegitimate often mires discussions of intervention in fruitless arguments over values. A third advantage of equating “intervention” with “influence” is that it helps us understand what the developing states are really complaining about. Reasonable and responsible leaders from developing nations have applied the label of “intervention” to almost every conceivable form of influence during the last twenty years. Only a very broad definition of intervention will allow us to discuss the matter in a way that is relevant to the concerns of these nations.

2. FOREIGN AID AND INFLUENCE

Although few would deny the connection between aid and influence, there is very little agreement on the precise nature of this connection or on analytical methods to be used in studying the problem. Some general questions about the aid-influence relationship need to be asked: What does it mean to say that aid is “political?”. How can donors “control” their aid? Must aid be given in order to constitute intervention? Who wants this kind of intervention? Does the sword of intervention through aid cut two ways?

2.1. POLITICAL AID

Since the proposition that foreign aid is “political” is not self-explanatory, we would expect those who state it to explain it. Unfortunately, they rarely do. Lucian Pye, for example, alleges that Americans wrongly view their aid program as “inherently

‘non-political”[23]. He neglects to tell us precisely what this means, however[24]. Perhaps the most common meaning given to the proposition is that aid donors are motivated by self-interest, which in turn is usually equated with a desire to acquire power. Defining political aid in terms of motivation, however, can lead us to overlook important dimensions of the problem of intervention through aid. Must intervention be motivated by a desire to intervene or by other ulterior motives? The elephant who dances among the chickens may be accused of intervention regardless of his intentions. Likewise, many of the complaints of the developing states concern the effects of big powers’ actions rather than the motivation for such actions. In the eyes of many developing states, the big powers intervene in their affairs simply by existing[25].

Many of those who believe that foreign aid is political have in mind consequences rather than motivations of the donors’ actions. Given the importance of wealth as a power base, it would be difficult to imagine a foreign aid transaction that did not change the distribution of influence both within and among nations with respect to several issues.

In addition to those who would focus on the motivation or consequences of foreign aid are those who define its political nature in terms of the process by which it is given. Political processes, according to Quincy Wright, involve groups of people seeking to advance their purposes against the opposition of other groups[26]. The foreign-aid transaction process clearly qualifies as “political” in this sense. Within any aid-giving nation there are groups who disagree as to the priority that should be given to

foreign aid relative to alternative ways of using the resources, and who attempt to get their views accepted as government policy. Although we may not be able to name him, we may reasonably assume that Otto Passman has a Russian counterpart. More directly relevant to foreign intervention is the existence of conflicts between aid-donors and recipients. Such conflicts may concern amounts, repayment terms, fiscal policy, land reform, or myriad other issues.

Foreign aid may constitute intervention in terms of motivation, consequences, process, or all three simultaneously. Fruitful discussion of foreign aid and influence, however, requires us to differentiate among these three plausible meanings of the statement that “aid is political”.

2.2. CONTROLLING AID

If we are to recognize effective intervention, it helps to have some idea of how donors can control the impact of their aid. As an example of a “penetrated political system” Rosenau has suggested “the operation of any foreign aid program in which the aiding society maintains some control over the purposes and distribution of the aid in the recipient society”[27]. A clear understanding of what constitutes “control” of aid is required before we can identify such a situation in the real world.

Three methods are frequently suggested as “controls” for foreign aid-auditing the books, setting up formal coordinating machinery, and furnishing aid in the form of commodities. None suffices as evidence that control is actually being exercised by

the donor. Measuring effective control requires an estimate of the extent[28] to which things are different in the recipient society from what they would have been in the absence of aid. The world's most efficient auditors can go over the books of the donor nation and learn nothing about the actual impact of the donor's aid. Earmarking aid shipments for bookkeeping purposes and controlling the impact of aid are two different operations.

Likewise, elaborate, fully-staffed aid missions in the recipient nation may not exercise control. If they participate in the making of decisions that would have been made even without their participation, they are not controlling much of anything. On the other hand, to the extent that they participate in decisions that would not have been made in their absence, they are exercising some control"[29].

Similarly, providing aid in the form of particular goods fails to ensure that the donor controls the impact of his aid. Food aid does not necessarily feed people; nor does aid in the form of tanks necessarily bolster military forces. If the recipient of tanks reduces its own military budget by an offsetting amount and spends the saved money on housing, the effect of the tanks has been to build houses.

The point is that some alleged "controls" on distribution of aid may not be intervention at all. Some strings constitute intervention; others do not. A string that asks the recipient to do what it would have done anyway can hardly be considered intervention. On the other hand, control may be taking place without many outward appearances. If the donor can accurately estimate how the potential recipient would allocate its

resources[30] in the absence of aid, he is then in a position to exercise tight control over the use of his aid-funds without many of the formal trappings of control. In short, intervention may be real but not apparent, or apparent but not real.

2.3. ‘NON-AID’ AS INFLUENCE

There is more to the aid-influence relationship than controlling the use of aid actually given. At least as important, in both theory and practice, is knowing how and when *not* to give aid. This is not just a matter of playing with words. Although much has been written about how to give aid, very little has been written about how not to give it. There are several possible ways to say “no”—as every woman and every political candidate knows—and there are several possible ways not to give aid. Some of the more common ways to say “no” to a request for foreign aid include: (1) “My government would like to help you, but we have no (time, money, etc.)”. (2) Ignore the request or pigeonhole it. (3) Interpret the request to mean what the party saying “no” wants the request to mean. (4) “My government will study your request and let you know”. (5) “Not at this time-come back next (month, year, decade, century, etc.)”. (6) Say “no” in advance by establishing well-publicized policies. (7) “How dare you make such an outrageous request! Such behavior raises questions about your good sense and may affect my evaluation of your future requests”. (8) No. (9) *No*. (10) NO! Although each method says “no”, political influence is likely to vary from one method to another. How one says “no” does matter.

Suppose the United States wants to encourage developing states to be more hospitable to private foreign investors. Suppose, also, that American policy-makers believe that the attitudes of governments in developing states toward private foreign investors depend in part on their expectations regarding alternative sources of funds. In such a situation, the United States might adopt a tactic that game-theorists call the "commitment". "In bargaining, the commitment is a device to leave the last clear chance to decide the outcome with the other party, in a manner that he fully appreciates; it is to relinquish further initiative, having rigged the incentives so that the other party must choose in one's favor"[31]. Thus, the United States government may try to commit itself not to provide an alternative source of funds for developing states, in a way that they fully appreciate, in order to leave the developing states with the last clear chance to avert disaster. The United States would thus be using "non-aid" to get developing states to do something they would not otherwise do—i.e., be nicer to private foreign investors.

It is one thing to cite a hypothetical example; it is another to show counterparts in the real world. Has non-aid ever been seriously proposed as a technique for influencing the developing states? Yes, responsible members of the governmental, business, and academic communities have all argued for non-aid as a technique for influencing these states. During the preliminary planning for the Bretton Woods institutions, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau expressed the hope that the International Bank would "*scrupulously* avoid undertaking loans that private investors are willing to make on reasonable terms"[32]. Now, there

is a great difference between not making loans for which private capital is available and “scrupulously avoiding” such loans. The difference, in terms of bargaining theory, is that between neglect and blackmail. Similarly, the “General Policy Statement of the Export-Import Bank of Washington” in 1945 included a special section devoted to outlining what the Bank would *not* do[33]. The Randall Commission Report in 1954 exhorted the government to make it “abundantly clear to prospective borrowers”[34] that American public lending would not be a substitute for private investment. Such abundant clarity was supposed to remove the uncertainty about American aid policies that the Commission believed affected “the willingness of foreign countries to accept private capital from abroad”[35]. Using similar logic, the Clay Report in 1963 advocated “judicious withholding of funds” in order to encourage “internal reform” in developing nations”[36].

The American business community has also advocated non-aid. Perhaps the clearest statement of this position was made in 1951 by the National Foreign Trade Convention. In bargaining terminology the following excerpt is clearly a call for the American government to try to influence foreign governments by increasing the credibility of the promise not to provide aid to foreign governments:

> It cannot be expected that economic environments conducive to the investment of American private capital will be established in these foreign lands so long as the governments concerned have reason to believe-as they do have reason to believe-that they will continue to be the beneficiaries of the hand-outs our own Government has given them for so long. They have every

right to assume, on the evidence afforded, that this profligate practice will continue to be the order of the day. It is clear why this is so: our own Government, conscious of the fact that economic development abroad is highly desirable, has proceeded on the unfortunate assumption that private enterprise is unwilling or unable to undertake the task, and that, in consequence, the free provision of Government funds for the purposes in view is the only course open. This attitude has been seized upon by foreign governments as justification for their refusal to do the things they would otherwise find it necessary to do in order to attract the private capital they need. The dilemma is one which cannot be resolved until our Government brings itself to announce, as a fundamental element of our foreign economic policy, that we look upon industrial development abroad as the particular function of private enterprise, and that, until the receptive and cooperative attitudes called for are shown, no United States Government funds will be made available for *any* purpose except those of the most exigent military or humanitarian nature"[37].

Similar logic appears in a thorough and clearly reasoned study prepared by academics and presented to Congress in 1957, entitled "American Private Enterprise, Foreign Economic Development, and the Aid Program"[38].

Although strategic use of non-aid has been an important means of influencing developing states, its significance is rarely recognized. Even foreign-aid experts can look directly at this phenomenon and fail to understand it. Witness the following statement by a veteran aid administrator:

During the 1950's, U. S. aid policy was dominated by the curious notion that

aid should be denied countries that are potentially attractive to U. S. investors. Latin America was considered capable of attracting all the foreign capital it needed from private sources; aid was considered to be a palliative that discouraged countries from creating appropriate conditions to attract foreign investors[39].

Why should this be regarded as a “curious” situation? It is precisely the kind of behavior we should expect from a nation for which avoidance of competition with private capital is one of the basic guiding principles of its aid program. After we grow accustomed to thinking of non-aid as a technique of statecraft, there is nothing at all puzzling about the situation described. It was clearly United States policy to withhold aid from certain countries in order to force (encourage?) them to rely on foreign private investment. The same author notes that since the ten states that harbor two-thirds of all U. S. private investment in developing areas have received less than 7 percent of U. S. postwar economic aid, the United States cannot be accused of allocating its aid funds so as to further the interests of its private investors[40]. Precisely the opposite conclusion can and should be drawn. For twenty years American private investors have been exhorting the government to withhold aid funds from areas where they might compete with private capital. Official policy statements have repeatedly committed the government to comply with this exhortation. The empirical evidence is consistent with an American aid policy designed to help private investors, that is, designed to use non-aid to influence foreign investment climates. If we are to understand the relationship between foreign aid and

intervention in developing states, we cannot afford to overlook the significance of non-aid.

2.4. DESIRED INTERVENTION?

Analysis of aid and intervention is further complicated by the difficulty of determining whether intervention is being resisted. Nations are not the monolithic corporate entities that we often imply they are. Within the government of an aid-recipient there are usually many groups with a variety of opposing views on policy matters. “To ‘intervene’”, says Schelling, “is usually to encourage or support one part of the government rather than another, or one political force rather than another”[41].

Sometimes the intervention might be on behalf of the government vis-a-vis domestic political pressures. For example, the government might want to adopt measures to control inflation but might fear that it would thereby lose domestic popularity. Intervention by an aid donor on behalf of an anti-inflationary policy would strengthen the hand of the government by giving it a scapegoat on which to blame the unpopular measures. It is rumored that the International Monetary Fund has played the role of scapegoat on several occasions. The point here is that the desires of the donor and the recipient government may actually coincide even though they appear to conflict. Politics defined as group conflict may be more apparent than real.

2.5. TWO-WAY INTERVENTION

Karl Deutsch has pointed out that a nation can increase its autonomy in two ways. Either it can break its linkages with the outside world or it can reverse the flow of influence while maintaining the links[42]. This second possibility is rarely acknowledged in discussions of foreign aid. Although intervention of the donor in the recipient's affairs comes up often, we almost never find references to the converse situation. Even though they may not use the vocabulary of intervention, many American Negro leaders have made it quite clear that they think the plight of their people has been worsened by the activities of Marshal Ky and his countrymen.

This is not to say that Vietnam exercises more influence vis-a-vis the United States than the United States does vis-a-vis Vietnam. It is to say that Vietnam now has more influence on American affairs than it would have had if the United States were not injecting massive aid into Vietnam. We live, as one study put it, in "the era of reciprocal involvement"[43].

3. TYPES OF AID AND INTERVENTION

It is often suggested that particular types of foreign aid involve more intervention in the recipient's affairs than do other types. Let us examine four types that are frequently mentioned in this context: (1) loans as opposed to grant aid; (2) economic as opposed to military aid; (3) multilateral as opposed to bilateral aid; and (4) private as opposed to public capital.

3.1. GRANTS VS. LOANS

During the 1950's a frequently suggested means for eliminating intervention by aid donors in recipients' affairs was a shift from grants to loans. Loans were often described as a more "businesslike" way to provide aid. Loans allocated on the basis of "strictly economic" considerations were alleged to be politically sterile. Such a contention, however, cannot withstand even cursory analysis. In the first place, it is impossible to judge the credit-worthiness of a nation without reference to broad considerations of fiscal and monetary policy, the probability of internal civil disorders, and the overall role of the government in the economy. "In a world where governments can expropriate property, manipulate exchange rates, and control the currency supply, it is nonsense to speak of evaluating the economic soundness of a project without reference to governmental behavior"[44]. Raymond Mikesell has described "political factors" as "the most fundamental consideration in the determination of credit worthiness"[45].

The implication of the necessity for taking political factors into account in evaluating loan applications is that potential borrowers may have to take politically significant steps in order to qualify as credit-worthy. Controlling inflation, for example, is not a purely economic matter. Basic changes in the institutional structure of the society are involved. Joseph Schumpeter has described inflation as "one of the most powerful factors that make for acceleration of social change"[46]. In spite of this, neither the International Monetary Fund nor the World Bank has hesitated to advise developing states to control inflation in order to qualify for loans on the basis of purely "economic considerations".

In addition to the argument that loans can be allocated by strictly economic criteria is the contention that loans provide “no excuse” for donors to interfere in the affairs of the recipient states. “So long as the payments of interest and repayments of principal are made in full on the due dates, as stipulated in the terms of the loan, the details of how it is spent are no concern of the creditor. The independence of the borrowing country remains inviolate”[47]. This does not apply to grants, argues Frederic Benham. “A country which makes grants is entitled to make sure that they fulfill their purpose and are not frittered away in corruption and waste”[48].

Do loans provide no excuse for intervention by the lenders? The bank that lent me money to buy a car seems to think that it has a right to tell me how much insurance I should carry on that car. Likewise, foreign-aid lenders have often cited an outstanding debt as reason enough for them to take an extraordinary interest in the domestic affairs of a debtor. The World Bank maintains a “close relationship with its borrowers throughout the life of each loan” and claims the right to give “continuing attention throughout the life of each loan to the general economic and financial conditions in the borrowing country” in order to “ensure that the maintenance of service on Bank loans is not jeopardized by the emergence of conditions which might be prevented”[49].

It would seem that we could make a fairly good case for the proposition that loans provide more opportunity for intervention than do grants. A grant transaction is unlikely to extend over a time-span as long as a typical foreign aid loan-agreement-ten to fifty years. Thus, the apparatus for administering the repayment

of the loan may provide a conduit for influence over a considerable period of time. A loan-agreement is not just an excuse for interesting oneself in another's affairs; it is an eminently respectable excuse. Also, a one-time grantor is in a very weak position to intervene. Although he may be "entitled" to make sure that his grant is not wasted, the recipient has no incentive to allow such intervention. It is the expectation of the next grant that provides this incentive. Similarly, the hope of getting future loans acts as an incentive for a borrower to let his creditors examine his books.

During the early 1950's there was one aspect of American grant-aid that strengthened the argument for loans as a means of reducing intervention. It was customary for the United States to require a recipient of grant-aid to place an "equivalent" amount of its own currency in a "counterpart fund". This fund was owned by the recipient government but could be used only by joint agreement between the governments. "The exercise of American influence over the use of counterpart funds inevitably raised the question of interference with the internal affairs of countries in receipt of assistance"[50]. Counterpart funds and grant aid were gradually replaced by soft loans repayable in inconvertible local currency during the later 1950's[51]. This resulted in a rapid build-up of enormous amounts of American-owned foreign currencies and even greater fears about intervention than had been generated by the counterpart funds[52]. Once again the advantages of loans over grants proved to be illusory.

The most obvious weakness in the argument that loans do not involve intervention is that loans are not just an "excuse" for

intervention; they are a *means* of intervention and have been advocated as such. One writer speaks of the desire to place aid on a loan basis “for the benefit of superior discipline”[53]; another refers to “our efforts to employ loan assistance as a means of influencing or compelling economic reforms in developing countries”[54]. Perhaps the single most frequently heard argument in favor of placing the American aid program on a loan basis was that of the desirability of ensuring that the funds would be used economically”[55]. Other control devices would be unnecessary because the necessity of repayment would provide the discipline needed to prevent waste.

One final aspect of the loan-grant debate deserves attention. If loans do not involve less intervention than do grants, how do we explain the expressed preference for loans by several developing states during the 1950’s? There are at least two plausible explanations that do not depend on an expected reduction of intervention. The first is that governments in developing states might not want to appear in the eyes of their domestic public as dependent on foreign charity. It might be good domestic politics to refuse grants-regardless of the real merits of grants as opposed to loans. A second explanation is in terms of Friedrich’s “rule of anticipated reactions”[56]. The growing preference of the American Congress for loans as opposed to grants during the 1950’s was no secret. Yet, writers on foreign aid rarely consider the possibility that potential recipients decided to ask for loans not because they preferred them but simply because they thought they were more likely to get them[57].

In sum, loan aid appears to offer at least as much opportunity

for the donor to intervene in the recipient's affairs as does grant aid.

3.2. ECONOMIC VS. MILITARY AID

Those who want to limit intervention through aid often point to military aid as an especially odious type. Economic aid, on the other hand, is supposed to involve less intervention. The weakness in this line of reasoning stems from a failure to distinguish between the commodities actually financed by the aid and those to which the aid is tied in a bookkeeping sense. As we noted earlier, aid in the form of tanks does not necessarily add to military strength; it may, in fact, buy milk for babies. If the recipient nation had intended to allocate one million dollars of its own funds for tanks in the absence of aid, and if it then received the equivalent of one million dollars worth of tanks as aid, it would be free to take the one million dollars that it had intended to spend on tanks and spend it some other way. If it used the money for a school lunch program, the "military aid" would actually have financed a school lunch program. We can tell little or nothing about the net impact of aid by looking at its commodity content as described by the bookkeepers. Instead, we must estimate how the recipient would have allocated its resources in the absence of aid and then compare this with the actual allocation after aid has been given. Only thus can we tell whether the military sector of the economy is really being strengthened by what is often called "military aid"[58].

Measuring allocation of economic resources, however, is not

the only way to measure influence. It may be that there are side effects of a military aid program that could be considered intervention. The administration of the program by military men may increase their ability to influence people in the recipient nation. In addition, a donor who gives aid labeled “military” may be perceived as giving a stamp of approval to the military establishment in the recipient nation, thereby bolstering its prestige. It is easy to see how reasonable men could describe either of these side effects as intervention.

One particular type of economic aid is often alleged to be especially free from overtones of intervention-technical assistance. To suggest that technical assistance may involve as much intervention as do other types of aid is to tread on what many consider to be sacred non-political ground. Without repeating the previous discussion of military aid, it should be obvious that technical assistance is merely another way of labeling the commodity-content of aid; and it is no more indicative of the actual impact of the aid than is the label of military aid.

The technical-assistance label is a very useful public-relations device. A primary source of political opposition to foreign aid had always been the business community, who had traditionally feared and resisted government intervention in the economy. Use of the technical-assistance label was supposed to reassure private foreign investors that the government did not intend to compete with them. In fact, technical assistance did compete with private investment in at least two ways. First, the services provided under technical-assistance programs could and would have been provided by private firms if the price had been high

enough. Second, indirect competition was given to potential direct investors. For example, surveys of investment opportunities might provide the government with enough information to enable it to establish a public enterprise instead of relying on private enterprise. The point is that investigating investment opportunities has always been one of the services offered at a price by potential direct investors, even though we are unaccustomed to describing their activities this way. Describing this aid as “technical” was a way of making it sound as if it were something other than “capital” assistance. The United Nations Special Fund’s “pre-investment surveys” are merely an extreme form of the attempt to make technical aid sound non-controversial. Using technical language to divert attention from controversial issues is an old political tactic, one that has worked well in the case of technical assistance[59]. The technical-assistance label implied a qualitative difference between this type of aid and other types. It implied that technical assistance involved services that the private investment community would be unwilling to provide *at any price*. It also benefited from the vague widespread feeling that the technical and the political are two mutually exclusive realms. Those who would understand the relationship between aid and influence, however, should not overlook technical assistance.

3.3. MULTILATERAL VS. BILATERAL AID

Perhaps the most frequently heard proposal for political sterilization of aid giving is to multilateralize it[60]. In this context it

has been argued that multilateral aid is (1) non-political, (2) stringless, (3) more acceptable to recipients, and (4) insulated from the foreign policies of donor nations. These arguments will be examined in turn.

Is multilateral aid political in any of the three ways referred to earlier? It is difficult to see how the process of distributing multilateral aid could be anything but political in the sense of involving group conflict. Even if various nations could be effectively coordinated from the lending side, it is inconceivable that recipients and donors would agree on the amount of aid needed by the recipient. Given the limited amounts of aid likely to be channeled through international agencies and given the almost limitless needs of the poor nations, conflict seems inevitable. Some sort of impact on the distribution of political influence within and among nations also seems to be a necessary concomitant of multilateral aid. Thus, international aid would be political in this sense also. Whether multilateral aid would be politically motivated is more difficult to determine. Although it is doubtful that a desire for power as an end in itself would be an important motivating factor, it is highly probable that some attempt would be made to get recipients to do things that they would not otherwise do. The experience of the World Bank provides many examples of just such behavior[61].

It is sometimes argued that multilateral aid does not carry with it the strings associated with bilateral assistance. The lending pattern of the Inter-American Development Bank gives some credence to this argument. Its funds are apparently earmarked in advance for allocation to specific countries, thus eliminating

competition for funds and making it fruitless for the Bank to attach many strings. It does not follow, however, that multilateral aid necessarily involves fewer strings. It is interesting to note that some advocates of multilateral aid see it as a way of increasing the effectiveness of intervention in recipient nations. One proponent of multilateral aid, for example, sees the relevant question as "to what extent and in what ways the United Nations may provide a better channel for such intervention than bilateral programs of economic assistance"[62]. International agencies, so the argument goes, are less likely to be accused of intervention and are thus freer to intervene. Multilateral aid, then, has been proposed as a means of both impeding and facilitating intervention. Channeling aid through international agencies does not guarantee fewer or weaker strings; in fact, aid through the World Bank complex is likely to involve a limited number of very strong strings-perhaps even ropes[63]. Those who want stringless aid should be wary of proposals for channeling more aid through the IBRD and its affiliates.

The argument for multilateral aid is often bolstered by the statement that such aid, with or without strings, is more acceptable to developing states[64]. There is some evidence, however, that this may not be true. John Lewis has described a pronounced shift from bilateral to multilateral operations as "one of the last things the government of India wants"[65]. He notes that the existence of several bilateral aid channels permits India to fend off intervention by playing off one benefactor against another. The Indian government, according to Lewis, "is no readier to surrender to the World Bank or the United Nations than

it is to the United States or the Soviet Union"[66]. The acceptability argument usually carries an implicit assumption that multilateral aid involves no increase in the amount of intervention in the recipient's affairs. Thus, it is usually implied that, "other things being equal", multilateral aid is more acceptable. Other things, however, may not remain equal. The centralized coordination that would probably accompany a massive shift to multilateral aid would make intervention by the international donor much easier than it is now for an individual donor nation. If the World Bank, for example, were the only major source of development aid, its bargaining position vis-a-vis borrowers would be enormously strengthened.

A fourth argument for multilateral distribution of aid holds that it prevents individual donor nations from using such aid as a tool of national policy. Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, describes such programs as "obviously insulated against political manipulations" by donor states[67]. Does channeling aid through international agencies neutralize it as a tool of national policy? An influential RAND Corporation study is based on the assumption that those interested in foreign aid as an instrument of United States foreign policy need not concern themselves with the activities of the International Bank[68]. There are three reasons to doubt the wisdom of this assumption, however. First, a donor nation may choose to distribute its aid through international agencies purely on the basis of its calculations of its own national interest. The United States, for example, "may seek the comparative anonymity of multilateralism when the recipient regime or local opposition suspect 'strings' or other undue influence by the

donor”[69]. Such a move would not mean political neutralization, however. “To seek a measure of anonymity,” Liska rightly observes, “is not to suspend the primarily political character of aid; it is merely to adopt a politically more proficient method in situations where direct involvement may be onerous for either the donor or the recipient”[70].

A second reason for skepticism about the degree to which multilateral aid is insulated from national policy is that some donors exercise extraordinary influence on the activities of international aid agencies. The United States, for example, wields over one-fourth of the voting power in the World Bank, an institution that has always had an American president. When the United States diverts some of its funds from bilateral channels to the World Bank complex, it is not giving up as much influence over aid-distribution policies as it seems to be. Likewise, when the United States gives aid to the Inter-American Development Bank, it does not lose as much control over distribution of funds as the formal arrangements would indicate. Although Latin American nations can outvote the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank, their hope for future funds gives them an incentive not to do so. In Friedrich’s terms, they are anticipating the reactions of the United States and acting accordingly. Note that the Inter-American Development Bank has never made a loan to which the United States specifically objected. Anticipated reactions are far more important as a link between aid and influence than are formal voting arrangements.

There is a third reason for rejecting the hypothesis that multilateral aid cannot be a tool of national statecraft. To the

extent that any nation can predict the aid-distribution pattern of an international agency, it can use that agency as a tool of its foreign policy. That is, it can frame its foreign policy so as to allow for the activities of the international agency. Thus, if there is reason to suspect that Ruritania will be successful in getting a loan from the International Development Association to finance a dam that the United States had intended to finance, the United States may decide to take the funds it had earmarked for financing the dam and use them to promote some other foreign policy goal. Successful use of this foreign policy technique depends on one's ability to predict accurately the aid-distribution patterns of international agencies. Doing this permits one to identify those projects that will probably be financed anyway and those that are on the margin. By confining its aid to marginal projects, a nation can strengthen its bargaining position vis-a-vis aid recipients[71]. A former AID administrator's description of the American negotiating process indicates that the United States does try to strengthen its bargaining position in this way: "Before even a tentative program is put together, the resources available from other countries, the United Nations specialized agencies, and foreign private business must be estimated. Only at this stage does it become relevant to look at the resources available from the United States"[72].

In conclusion, there are several reasons to doubt Henry Cabot Lodge's assertion that multilateral aid programs are "obviously insulated against political manipulations" by individual states. Channeling aid through international agencies will not necessarily reduce the intervention in developing states; it may even increase

it.

3.4. PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC CHANNELS

One of the great American myths is that the private sector of the economy is “non-political”. It is not surprising, therefore, to encounter the argument that private “non-political” investment would involve less intervention in developing states than does “political” public foreign aid[73]. The following discussion will focus on two questions: First, is private capital “political” in the three ways mentioned earlier? Second, in what ways is private investment linked to foreign policies?

The motivation of private businessmen is usually described in terms of a desire for profit. Without denying the importance of the profit motive, we may point out that profit can be pursued in various ways by different organizations. The rationale that typically underlies a description of business as non-political implies the existence of numerous small firms obedient to impersonal market forces. Such a rationale ignores one of the most important economic institutions in the world today the giant corporation. We are only beginning to perceive the far-reaching political and economic implications of this form of social organization[74]. It is clear, however, that these firms are not the slaves of the market envisioned in the model of pure competition. Many of them own more assets than the annual GNP in several developing states. It is these giant corporations that account for most of the American direct investment abroad. Roughly one-third of this investment is in the petroleum industry, which is so

well organized that it has been described as a private world government[75]. Pursuing power and pursuing profit are not necessarily mutually exclusive undertakings.

Regardless of the motivations of private foreign investors, it is difficult to deny the political impact of their actions. The provision of forty million dollars in revolving credit to South Africa by a group of American banks has a profound effect on the distribution of influence within the recipient nation and among various nations. This same group of banks is unlikely to extend similar credit to Cuba in the near future. This is not to imply any sort of devious plan by bankers to promote racism or any other ideology. The point is that in making judgments about what constitutes a "safe" investment they tend to favor certain social systems. This link between private international capital flows and particular social institutions was identified by Eugene Staley in his classic study, *War and the Private Investor*: "Indeed, the export of capital to countries previously untouched by capitalistic industrialism necessitates the simultaneous "export" of specialized governmental forms and institutions, such as commercial law, and specialized economic institutions, such as the wage system. Out of this fact, a deep and inevitable conflict emerges between capital-importing and capital-exporting countries when their social institutions are radically different"[76].

Is international private investment a political process in the sense that it involves conflict among groups? There are at least two reasons to think that it is. First, many of the developing states, rightly or wrongly, associate private foreign investors with their former colonial masters. As long as these attitudes persist,

friction between developing states and private foreign investors is to be expected. Second, a substantial degree of group conflict in the process of transferring capital from the developed to the developing states should be expected even if there were no colonial heritage to stigmatize foreign investors. Staley sees such conflict as inevitable: “The process of international investment establishes between a capital-importing and a capital-exporting country a relatively permanent capital-labor conflict, a creditor-debtor conflict, a conflict of vested interests with groups interested in social reform or revolution, not to speak of cultural conflicts unleashed by the industrialization which accompanies capital investment”[77].

It is quite possible for private foreign investment to be political in all three ways mentioned above and still be insulated from the foreign policies of the government in the lending country. Although we often hear allegations that foreign policy is molded to suit private investors, we rarely hear private investment described as a “tool” of foreign policy. The United States government, however, has clearly tried to use private foreign investment to promote some of its foreign policy goals in developing states. It has used diplomacy, investment guarantees, propaganda, and non-aid to stimulate the flow of private capital to developing areas[78]. The Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid recently pointed out that “private institutions may be far more effective instruments of national policy in some situations than government institutions[79]. The committee report went on to describe private investment abroad as an effective way to exert “pressure” on the developing states

to adopt the kind of pluralistic social system that the authors of the report believe exists in the United States[80]. The report made it clear that the authors viewed private capital as a means of intervening in the affairs of developing states.

After examining several types of aid, we conclude that none of them offers much hope to those who oppose any and all intervention in the recipient's affairs. Each of them can serve, and has served, as a mechanism for intervention. Although there may be types of foreign aid that cannot be used by the donor to intervene, they are not among those examined here.

4. TRADE, NOT AID: A WAY OUT?

A commonly suggested substitute for aid might be thought to provide a way out for those interested in preventing donors from influencing recipients. "Trade, not aid" has been a slogan heard intermittently for the last twenty years. Preferential treatment of developing countries in their trade relations with the developed ones could serve as a functional equivalent for aid, at least to some extent. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 proposed a variety of ways to cloak foreign aid in the guise of special trading arrangements[81]. If this could be done, would donors still be able to intervene? There would be no need for annual Congressional appropriations, no negotiating for each project, and no need for aid missions. It would appear that many opportunities for intervention by donors would thus be foreclosed.

Appearances can be deceiving, however. International trade

can also be an instrument of national foreign policy. Implicit in all trade among nations is the potential threat of each trading partner to terminate the trade"[82]. Three potential sources of intervention are obvious: (1) actual termination of trade by a rich country, (2) threatened termination, and (3) actions by developing states anticipating potential reactions by the developed states. One cannot make an *a priori* judgment as to which nations would be in the strongest bargaining positions with regard to terminating or threatening termination of trade. Other things being equal, however, nations gaining the most from the trade would have the most to lose and would thus be more vulnerable to threats to end the trade. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that several of the Unctad proposals involve measures to increase the developing nations' gains from trade with the rich nations. We are presented with the irony of a situation in which the developing states ask the rich nations to do many of the same things that Hirschman views as ways to maximize a nation's potential influence over its trading partners[83]. The Unctad proposals may be worthwhile, but developing states are deluding themselves if they think that implementation of the proposals will necessarily insulate them from intervention by rich nations.

5. CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion focused on three major topics: (1) the links between aid and influence, (2) the links between particular types of aid and intervention, and (3) the links between trade and intervention. The section on aid and influence was devoted to

highlighting some of the less obvious aspects of the relationship and to noting a variety of analytical problems that confront the student of foreign aid. The examination of several types of aid revealed that all were likely to involve significant amounts of intervention in the developing states. The third section held out some hope, but not much, for minimizing intervention by the functional equivalent of special trading arrangements.

We did not discuss the question of whether certain types of intervention are desirable-by whatever standard. The preceding analysis will seem to have isolationist policy implications only for those who refuse to recognize that the doctrine of non-intervention was “fashioned for a world in which nations were set apart in space and did not interact significantly; a world in which there were no countries so much more powerful than others that they ‘intervened’ simply by being and acting… a world that has ceased to exist”[84]. To increase economic well-being and to ensure world peace, some types of intervention are probably useful, even necessary. We live in a highly interdependent world and might as well make the best of it. As a Syracuse University study pointed out several years ago: “We cannot undertake any significant action without becoming involved in some nation’s internal affairs, either in technical assistance, in economic planning, or in military training… The appropriate attitude toward this new role of ours is acceptance of involvement, or joint participation, as a permanent part of our international life and on this basis to participate as intelligently and usefully as we can”[85].

NOTAS

1. Javier Surasky es magíster en Cooperación Internacional al Desarrollo y Acción Humanitaria y doctorando en Relaciones Internacionales. Coordinador del Departamento de Cooperación Internacional del Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Secretario general de la Federación Latinoamericana de Estudios Internacionales (FLAEI).

2. Solo en ese año se independizaron Camerún, Togo, Senegal, Madagascar, República Democrática del Congo, Belice, Benín, Níger, Burkina Faso, Costa de Marfil, Chad, República Centroafricana, República del Congo, Chipre, Gabón, Nigeria y Mauritania.

3. Mediante la Resolución 1984/67, aprobada en julio de 1984, el consejo modificó su denominación por la de Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, aunque se mantienen sus siglas.

4. Su obra también es analizada en el capítulo 1 de este libro.

5. En realidad, Rostow integra un conjunto de economistas que, con diferencias entre sí, defendieron dichas ideas. Podemos mencionar a Albert Hirschman, Gunnar Myrdal, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan o Hans Singer, entre otros.

6. Existe una versión original publicada en 1950, que luego se amplió y fue vuelta a publicar en 1955.

7. La aproximación que realiza Singer (1964) en su artículo titulado “International Aid for Economic Development: Problems and Tendencies” sigue una línea similar, pero se orienta a analizar otras cuestiones tales como la problemática de la medición de la ayuda, la ligazón de la ayuda, la necesaria coordinación internacional, la relación entre comercio y desarrollo y el recurso a programas y proyectos de cooperación.

8. Que es abordado en el capítulo 6 de este libro.

9. Este artículo corresponde a una conferencia dada por el doctor Prebisch en el Centro de Desarrollo Económico de la Universidad de Londres en 1986. Junto a otros trabajos será publicado por Basil Blackwell en un libro titulado *The State of Development Economics*. Extraído de *Revista de la CEPAL,* nº 34, abril 1988, pp. 205-212.

10. Fernando H. Cardoso y Enzo Faletto (1974): *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina. Ensayo de interpretación sociológica,* Siglo XXI Editores, México, D. F., p. 166.

11. Raúl Prebisch (1961): "El falso dilema entre desarrollo económico y estabilidad monetaria", *Boletín Económico de América Latina,* vol. 6, n° 1, marzo, CEPAL, reproducido en A. Gurrieri (1982): *La obra de Prebisch en la CEPAL*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, D. F., vol. 11, p. 19.

12. Prebisch, Raúl (1986): "Notas sobre el intercambio desde el punto de vista periférico", *Revista de la CEPAL*, nº 28, abril (LC/G.1392), Santiago de Chile.

13. Aníbal Pinto, el destacado economista latinoamericano, que tanto ha contribuido al desenvolvimiento de las ideas de la CEPAL, en un trabajo titulado "La apertura al exterior en la América Latina", *El Trimestre Económico,* nº 187, México, D. F., julio-septiembre de 1980, manifestó que para que América Latina pudiera mantener hasta el año 2000 la tasa de crecimiento de 6,4% registrada entre los años 1955 y 1974, tendría que duplicar cada decenio sus importaciones. No se trata, pues, de reducir, sino de aumentar y cambiar la composición de las importaciones en forma correspondiente, según las exigencias del desarrollo.

14 In Amilcar Cabral (1974): *Revolution in Guinea*, Stage 1, London, pp. 70-72, https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/cabral/1965/tnlcnev.htm

15 "Prefacio", en Frantz Fanon, *Los condenados de la Tierra* (primera edición en francés en 1961: primera edición en español en 1963), Fondo de Cultura Económica, México D. F.

16. En español en el original. [E.]

17. Literalmente, "cacería de ratas", término utilizado por los colonialistas para calificar los asaltos a los barrios y viviendas argelinos. [E.]

18. This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Conference on Intervention and the Developing States sponsored by the Princeton International Law Society, November IO-II, 1967. The author has benefited from comments on earlier drafts by Howard Bliss, Charles Frank, Christian Potholm, Laurence Radway, Richard Sterling, and W. Howard Wriggins. Appeared in *World Politics*, vol. 21, nº 3, April 1969, pp. 425-447.

19. J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York 1967), 232-37.

20. James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston 1966), 27-92. See also Andrew M. Scott, *The Functioning of the International Political System* (New York 1967).

21. A thoughtful series of essays on the concept of intervention is found in the *Journal of International Aflairs,* xxii, nº 2 (1968).

22. "Influence" is defined by Robert Dahl as "the ability of A to get B to do something he would not otherwise do." For elaboration on the use of this definition, see Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs 1963), 39-54.

23. Lucian W. Pye, "Soviet and American Styles in Foreign Aid", *Orbis*, iv (Summer 1960), 168.

24. For similar examples, see David A. Baldwin, "Analytical Notes on Foreign Aid and Politics," *Background*, x (May 1966), 66-90.

25. On this point, see Scott, 23, and Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000* (New York 1967), 365.

26. Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York 1955), 130-32.

27. Rosenau, 66. Rosenau defines a "penetrated political system" as one "in which non members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals." 65.

28. The word "extent" is somewhat misleading. We might be interested in at least three important dimensions of control: (1) scope, (2) weight, and (3) domain. Cf. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven 1950).

29. Cf. Dahl, 53.

30. These "resources" can be political as well as economic.

31. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), 37.

32. *New York Times,* November 24, 1943, 9. Italics added.

33. *Department of State Bulletin*, September 23, 1945, 443.

34. Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, *Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington 1954), 23

35. Ibid., 18.

36. Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, *The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs* (Washington 1963), 13. (Hereafter cited as the "Clay Report.")

37. *Report of the Thirty-Eighth National Foreign Trade Convention* (New York 1952), XXXII.

38. American Enterprise Association, “American Private Enterprise, Foreign Economic Development, and the Aid Program,” *Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys*, 85th Cong., IST SESS., S. Doc. 52 (Washington 1957), 539-618, esp. 548, 558-59.

39. Jacob J. Kaplan, *The Challenge of Foreign Aid* (New York 1967), 179. 22.

40. bid., 179-85.

41. Thomas C. Schelling, “American Foreign Assistance,” *World Politics*, VII (July 1955), 623. On this point, see also George Liska, *The New Statecraft* (Chicago 1960), 126-83.

42. Karl W. Deutsch, “External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States,” *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, 10-12.

43. Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, *The Operational Aspects of United States Foreign Policy*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee Print, 86th Cong., IST SESS. (Washington 1959), 17.

44. David A. Baldwin, “The International Bank in Political Perspective”, *World Politics*, xviii (October 1965), 69.

45. Raymond F. Mikesell, “Problems and Policies in Public Lending for Economic Development,” Raymond F. Mikesell, ed., *U. S. Private and Government Investment Abroad* (Eugene, Ore. 1962), 325.

46. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (3rd ed., New York 1950), 4211.

47. Frederic Benham, *Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries* (London 1961), 104.

48. Ibid.

49. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Policies and Operations of the World Bank,* IFC, and IDA (Washington 1962), 42.

50. William Adams Brown and Redvers Opie, *American Foreign Assistance* (Washington 1953), 188.

51. The evolution of this process is traced in David A. Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy:* 1943-1962 (Chicago 1966).

52. On this point, see Consultants on International Finance and Economic

Problems, *The Problem of Excess Accumulation of U. S.-Owned Local Currencies: Findings and Recommendations Submitted to the Under Secretary of State,* April 4, 1960.

53. Thomas C. Schelling, "American Aid and Economic Development: Some Critical Issues," *International Stability and Progress* (New York 1957), 157.

54. Raymond F. Mikesell, "Capacity to Service Foreign Investment," *U. S. Private and Government Investment Abroad*, 406.

55. It should be noted that the repayment requirement provides an incentive to allocate aid resources to *financially* remunerative projects, not necessarily to *socially* remunerative ones, such as feeding babies.

56. Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston 1941), 589-91.

57. For some evidence that this was indeed the case, see Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy.*

58. On this point, see Charles Wolf, Jr., *Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia* (Princeton 1960), 159-62, 187-89, 258, 417-19.

59. Cf. Scott, 210, and James Patrick Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics* (Princeton 1966), 43-44.

60. For a useful review of the arguments for multilateral aid, not all of which concern intervention, see Robert E. Asher, "Multilateral Versus Bilateral Aid: An Old Controversy Revisited," *International Organization,* xvi (Autumn 1962), 697-719. On international organizations and non-intervention see Scott, 208-II.

61. See Baldwin, "The International Bank," 68-81.

62. Benjamin Higgins, *United Nations and U. S. Foreign Economic Policy* (Homewood, Ill. 1962), II. For similar statements advocating multilateral aid as a means of facilitating intervention, see the following: Kaplan, 350; Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in *Foreign Aid, Foreign Aid, Through Private Initiative* (Washington 1965), 12; Clay Report, 15-16; Henry Cabot Lodge, "Mutual Aid Through the United Nations," *Department of State Bulletin,* April 4, 1960, 525.

63. For a description of the strings used by the World Bank, see Baldwin, "The International Bank," 75-79.

64. For examples, see Benham, 105; and Lodge, "Mutual Aid," 525.

65. John P. Lewis, *Quiet Crisis in India* (Washington 1962), 263.

66. Ibid., 264. Jacob Kaplan contends that the "only instance of the expulsion

of a Western aid mission for pressing unwelcome advice is that of the World Bank advisor who was resident in Turkey in the early 1950's," 361.

67. "Mutual Aid Through the United Nations," 525.

68. Wolf, 80 n.

69. Liska, 217.

70. Ibid.

71. On the importance of this, see Thomas C. Schelling, *International Economics* (Boston 1958), 443-44.

72. Frank M. Coffin, *Witness for AID* (Boston 1964), 14-15. See also Agency for International Development, *Loan Terms*, *Debt Burden, and Development* (April 1965), 23.

73. For examples, see Cleona Lewis, *The United States and Foreign Investment Problems* (Washington 1948), 277; American Enterprise Association, "American Private Enterprise, Foreign Economic Development, and the Aid Programs," Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys, 592; Clair Wilcox, *A Charter for World Trade* (New York 1949), 145; and John Pincus, *Trade, Aid and Development* (New York 1967), 344.

74. On this point see John K. Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston 1967); Adolph A. Berle, Jr., *Power Without Property* (New York 1959); and Michael D. Reagan, *The Managed Economy* (New York 1963).

75. Robert Engler, *The Politics of Oil* (New York 1961).

76. Eugene Staley, *War and the Private Investor* (Garden City 1935), 142.

77. Ibid., 367. See, also, Leo Model, "The Politics of Private Foreign Investment," *Foreign Aflairs*, XLV (July 1967), 639-51.

78. For details on the United States use of these techniques for promoting private foreign investment, see Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy.*

79. *Foreign Aid Through Private Initiative*, 5.

80. Ibid., 6-8.

81. For a description and analysis of the UNCTAD proposals, see Harry G. Johnson, *Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries* (Washington 1967).

82. On this point, see Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure*

of Foreign Trade (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945).

83. Ibid., 34-35. See also Pincus, 44.

84. Scott, 23.

85. Maxwell Graduate School, *The Operational Aspects of United States Foreign Policy*, 17.

CAPÍTULO 3

EL DESARROLLO Y LA COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL EN EL NUEVO ORDEN MUNDIAL

JUAN PABLO PRADO LALLANDE[1]

INTRODUCCIÓN

El final de la contención bipolar generó importantes cambios en la concepción del desarrollo y de las estrategias para promoverlo, en donde la cooperación internacional guarda un importante lugar.

En este contexto, los organismos internacionales de mayor impacto y los países más poderosos establecieron entre sus prioridades mejorar la capacidad institucional de los receptores y de la ayuda misma, en aras de promover con mayor eficacia el desarrollo. Como consecuencia de ello, la cooperación internacional al desarrollo (CID) se alineó a dicho propósito, generando importantes repercusiones. Esto fue fruto también del posicionamiento de nuevos paradigmas en materia de desarrollo tendientes a superar la dinámica imperante en el otorgamiento de la ayuda bajo los fundamentos de la teoría de la modernización.

A finales del siglo pasado se configuró un nuevo bagaje en materia de ayuda al desarrollo mediante los postulados de la

teoría institucionalista que puso en marcha novedosas normas, propósitos y procedimientos que guiaron a las estrategias internacionales a ese respecto.

El alcance de esta profunda transformación en la CID no fue menor, dado su calado en los diversos rubros de su implementación. Al respecto, sobresale el impulso de la ayuda externa a favor de la capacidad institucional de los países en desarrollo para promover el liberalismo económico y, en menor medida, a la democracia, los derechos humanos y al buen gobierno. En el año 2000 este proceso decantó en una nueva arquitectura de la ayuda, en donde los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM) y la Agenda Post-2015 son su expresión más clara.

De ahí que Mathew Lockwood calificó a esta nueva instrumentación de la CID mediante novedosas normas, objetivos, condiciones y estrategias para conseguirlos como la "*perestroika* de la ayuda" (Lockwood, 1999: 13).

¿Cuáles son estas transformaciones y repercusiones respecto a los nuevos fundamentos en que el desarrollo y, por consiguiente, la cooperación internacional son promovidos desde entonces hasta hoy en día? La respuesta a dicha pregunta conforma el principal objetivo de este capítulo.

DESARROLLO, INSTITUCIONES Y COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL

La principal transformación en el ámbito de la ayuda tras el final de la guerra fría consistió en que su otorgamiento por

motivaciones poscoloniales e intereses ideológicos caducó. En otras palabras, tras la caída del mundo socialista, la ayuda perdió buena parte de su matiz estratégico sustentado en la lógica bipolar, por lo que “ya no resultaba necesario proveer de asistencia a autocracias corruptas, pero diplomáticamente útiles a los donantes” (Lancaster, 1993: 13).

Desde el plano teórico, los postulados de la modernización, que priorizan el suministro de ayuda para incrementar crecimiento económico con miras a reducir la brecha entre desarrollo y subdesarrollo, también se debilitaron. Ello dio paso a la definición y subsiguiente praxis de los fundamentos teóricos dedicados a la capacidad institucional como principal fuente de desarrollo.

Si los teóricos de la modernización consideran que el desarrollo es consecuencia del cambio económico y social, los institucionalistas señalan que tales aspiraciones dependen esencialmente de las instituciones gubernamentales[2]. La implicación más relevante de ello es que, según esta segunda visión, las instituciones nacionales conforman un requisito esencial para la transformación social, política, económica y gubernamental de los Estados. En esa lógica, la ayuda externa debe estar orientada de manera preferente a crear, mantener o reforzar las capacidades institucionales de los gobiernos receptores (Krasner, 2010: 693).

Desde entonces, los arquitectos de las nuevas directrices del desarrollo y de su inherente ayuda externa para promoverlo coincidieron en que la dinámica de otorgamiento de la CID debe atender las razones por las que los gobiernos del Sur resultan

incapaces de utilizar correctamente los apoyos asignados.

El eje central de dichas consideraciones argumenta que las políticas macroeconómicas liberales dictadas por el Norte son correctas. Sin embargo, debido a la incapacidad estructural de sus gobiernos para llevarlas a cabo de forma adecuada, sus resultados no son exitosos. Esto significa que, para los donantes, el principal problema de la ayuda se encuentra en las condiciones internas (y, en una palabra, instituciones) de los receptores, especialmente en sus respectivos gobiernos. Es claro que esta postura no considera en su correcta dimensión a otros factores externos del orden estructural como un sistema político y económico a favor de los más poderosos, el cual debilita a los Estados más vulnerables.

Con base en este nuevo paradigma del desarrollo y, por consiguiente, de la ayuda, los donantes establecieron distintas condiciones a aquellos países, utilizando como principal referente el Consenso de Washington[3].

Esta transformación cualitativa del funcionamiento del sistema de la CID tomó fuerza a partir de los años noventa, dado que, desde entonces, los donantes, por consenso, establecieron nuevas condiciones para otorgar ayuda (ODI, 1992: 1). Es decir, la comunidad de donantes estableció entre las prioridades de su colaboración externa mejorar la capacidad institucional de los receptores de ayuda en torno al fomento a las reformas económicas y, posteriormente, políticas de los receptores, en el sentido de incentivar la democracia, los derechos humanos y el buen gobierno (Crawford, 1998; Robinson, 1994).

En síntesis, este cambio de modalidad de colaboración fue

producto de la transformación del entorno económico internacional, del cambio de las teorías sobre el desarrollo y de la manera en que los funcionarios de las instituciones financieras internacionales y países oferentes ubicaron los objetivos y estrategias de la cooperación suministrada por tales instancias (Toye, 1994: 158).

EL IMPACTO DEL FOMENTO DE LA CAPACIDAD INSTITUCIONAL EN LA COOPERACIÓN AL DESARROLLO

Las instituciones financieras multilaterales que tomaron la batuta de la aplicación en el Sur —en particular en los países afectados por la crisis financiera de los ochenta— de los postulados institucionalistas se dedicaron a promover (o exigir) las transformaciones estructurales necesarias para propiciar estabilidad, crecimiento económico y, a la postre, el desarrollo. En otras palabras, las reformas estructurales eran necesarias y la ayuda financiera otorgada por el Banco Mundial (BM) y el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) podría contribuir a que los receptores llevaran a cabo estas reestructuraciones económicas y políticas estimuladas desde Washington.

Fue entonces cuando el BM disminuyó su apoyo a proyectos locales de desarrollo y priorizó el ejercicio de la denominada "ayuda programa" (*programme aid*), misma que para otorgarse ameritó que el receptor atendiera determinadas condiciones establecidas por los funcionarios del BM.

Así, el BM diseñó programas de ajuste estructural (*Structural*

Adjustment Programmes, SAP), los cuales incluyen diversos requisitos que los receptores deben cumplir para recibir estos apoyos. Paralelamente, otorgó créditos para el ajuste estructural (*Structural Adjustment Credits*, SAC), así como préstamos de ajuste sectorial (*Sectorial Adjustment Loans*, SECAL). Las condiciones para otorgar créditos en el marco del SAC comprenden ámbitos de la macroeconomía de los países apoyados (principalmente, mayor rigor en el cuidado de la balanza de pagos), mientras que con los créditos SECAL las condiciones se refieren a un sector específico, tal como el de la agricultura o el financiero.

Por parte del FMI, además del *Extended Fund Facility* (EFF), se crearon el *Structural Adjustment Facility* (SAF) y el *Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility* (ESAF), otorgados a países de muy bajos ingresos con serios problemas en sus balanzas de pagos. En 1999, el ESAF se renovó por el *Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility* (PRGF).

La condicionalidad solicitada a terceros países por parte de las citadas instituciones financieras multilaterales se estipula formalmente a través de la Carta de Intención (*Letter of Intent)* del FMI y de la Carta de Política de Desarrollo (*Letter of Development Policy*) del BM, hoy Estrategia de Asistencia a Países.

Tras esta condicionalidad económica de primera generación (Stokke, 1995: 7), y dado que sus efectos no generaron suficiente crecimiento económico y, como complemento de esta, a finales de 1991 el Comité de Ayuda al Desarrollo (CAD) de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos

(OCDE) estableció que la democracia, el respeto a los derechos humanos y el Estado de derecho constituirían las condiciones esenciales para promover el desarrollo económico a través de la ayuda (en ODI, *op. cit.*: 1). Esta postura, identificada como una segunda generación de condicionalidad política de la ayuda (Stokke, *op. cit.*: 9), se basó en el principio del "buen gobierno" como el referente de las acciones de colaboración de sus miembros (OECD, 1994: 28).

A esta iniciativa se sumaron también los principales bancos multilaterales. Al respecto, el BM adoptó una concepción de "buen gobierno" que se utilizó como base para seleccionar los países receptores de sus apoyos financieros, mientras que el FMI señaló que el precepto es pieza clave de los aspectos económicos de la gobernabilidad (Crawford, 2001: 6).

Desde la perspectiva del buen gobierno, varios son los elementos que pueden generar condiciones de desarrollo. Estos consisten en un clima seguro para la inversión, el crecimiento económico sostenido, la inversión en las personas pobres, la estabilidad macroeconómica, el comercio y la inversión internacionales. Todo ello enmarcado en un programa de reformas estructurales (por cierto) planeadas, dirigidas y evaluadas por los más relevantes organismos financieros multilaterales (World Bank: 1998). Este planteamiento relativo al buen gobierno y de sus alternativas, para practicarlo llegó a convertirse tanto en los requisitos como en los objetivos mismos de la cooperación internacional (Santiso, 2001).

Ante estos inéditos hechos, Peter Uvin (1994: 64) afirma que "un nuevo orden mundial había sido creado y la ayuda al

desarrollo, mediante su condicionalidad, se convirtió en uno de los instrumentos para consolidarlo". Estas nuevas disposiciones transformaron al sistema de CID y de su financiación al grado que, según la OCDE en 1991, "alrededor del 70% de los préstamos del FMI, al menos el 30% de los préstamos otorgados mediante el BM y cerca del 25% de la ayuda bilateral otorgada por los miembros del CAD —alrededor de 20.000 millones de dólares anuales— fue dedicada a transferencias financieras condicionadas" (Mosley, 1992: 129).

Como lo señala Robert Archer (1994: 8), los objetivos políticos y económicos de la ayuda, al ser dedicados a mejorar la capacidad institucional de los Estados para incentivar el libre mercado y la democracia liberal como el único modelo a seguir, "representan una nueva ortodoxia en el plano del desarrollo".

CONDICIONALIDAD Y SELECTIVIDAD DE LA AYUDA: LA CAPACIDAD INSTITUCIONAL EN ACCIÓN

En este marco de reordenamiento de fundamentos y prioridades de la cooperación internacional, el CAD asentó que "[…] a los países en desarrollo comprometidos con las reformas de mercado, la democratización y el buen gobierno se les otorgará prioridad en la concesión de asistencia al desarrollo" (OECD, *op. cit.*: 8).

Esta postura defiende que la ayuda debe ser asignada en mayor cuantía a aquellos Estados con mejores niveles de orden institucional y gubernamental ya que ello, en principio, aumenta

la posibilidad de que estos gestionen de mejor manera y con mayor transparencia los montos de ayuda y, por ende, hacer de la misma un instrumento de desarrollo más eficaz.

Como una muestra de lo anterior, a partir de 1996, el BM inició la ejecución de unos 600 programas en materia de buen gobierno en 50 países para modernizar el sector público. En 1999 el BM dedicó una cuarta parte de sus recursos (entre 5.000 y 7.000 millones de dólares) a la denominada “reforma institucional” para promover la modernización del Estado (World Bank, 1999: 136). Sin embargo, debido a la ausencia de apropiación por parte de los gobiernos receptores sobre dichos programas, los referidos apoyos institucionales realizados a través del BM fueron ineficaces (World Bank, 2000).

En este sentido, estudios en la materia indican que, paradójicamente, la ayuda dirigida al “desarrollo institucional” puede generar efectos negativos en cuanto a la participación social, la calidad gubernamental y la interacción entre el sector público y el privado. Lo anterior es dado a que esta asistencia desincentiva el interés de las autoridades por instrumentar políticas adecuadas y transformadoras (Moss, Patterson y Van de Walle, 2005: 16-19).

Volviendo al tema de la selectividad de la ayuda, el planteamiento que le da sustento a este precepto se encuentra en el trabajo de Dollar y Burnside (2000), en donde se asevera que la eficacia de la ayuda depende de las condiciones nacionales en que esta se aloja. Es decir, según esta postura, la ayuda al desarrollo es funcional cuando se destina a países que ya cuentan con un determinado estatus de las condiciones de

desarrollo previamente descritas; esto es, en los países del Sur más estables y avanzados.

Para el BM, “dirigir la asistencia hacia los países con instituciones políticas acertadas aprovechará al máximo los recursos escasos de la ayuda para alentar la inversión, incitar el crecimiento y reducir la pobreza (Banco Mundial, 1999: 49).

Los estudios de Dollar y Burnside y sus subsiguientes recomendaciones en términos de selectividad de la ayuda generaron intensos debates entre los expertos en el tema de la eficacia de la ayuda. Consideraciones como qué se entiende por “un marco de buenas políticas”, o la supuesta existencia de un único modelo de desarrollo para los receptores son solamente algunas de las críticas a este paradigma.

De hecho, estudios como los de Hadjimichael, Dubarry o Hansen y Tarp, en plena discordancia con Dollar y Burnside, asientan que la ayuda por sí misma genera crecimiento, incluso cuando las variables políticas son incorporadas de forma independiente (Alonso, 2003: 172).

De ahí que el debate sobre la selectividad, a pesar de la postura del BM y otros donantes para sustentar sus políticas de ayuda al desarrollo con base en este planteamiento, continúe abierto. Esto lleva a Hansen y Tarp a aseverar que “el irresuelto tema acerca de la evaluación de la eficacia de la ayuda no es si la ayuda funciona, sino cómo lo hace, y si se puede hacer que los diversos instrumentos de la ayuda funcionen mejor adaptándose a las circunstancias de cada país” (ibídem)[4]. En un pronunciamiento conciliador entre los postulados referidos, Oliver Morrissey establece que mejores políticas gubernamentales, en

conjunción con una mejor calidad de la ayuda, sí pueden incrementar el crecimiento de los países (Morrissey, 2002: 6).

HACIA LA HOMOLOGACIÓN E INSTITUCIONALIZACIÓN DE LA AGENDA GLOBAL DE DESARROLLO

La ONU, aprovechando el citado contexto internacional favorable a una CID más ordenada, institucionalizada y, por ende, con directrices más claras, organizó a lo largo de los años noventa distintas cumbres internacionales. La finalidad fue lograr consensos y compromisos en diversas materias relacionadas con el desarrollo y el combate a la pobreza para contribuir a la conformación de una agenda más cohesionada en estos ámbitos.

En este orden de acontecimientos, en mayo de 1996 el CAD publicó el documento *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Developing Co-operation* (OECD, 1996), el cual constituiría el eje doctrinario de este Comité (y, en realidad, del sistema internacional de ayuda al desarrollo) en materia de objetivos de desarrollo para las siguientes décadas.

Aunque el CAD señala que la experiencia de los donantes en materia de promoción al buen gobierno se encontraba en una "etapa temprana", la publicación de referencia menciona que esta condición, misma que será apoyada con ayuda, es fundamental para establecer una relación de paternariado o asociación (*partnership*) entre donantes y receptores, precepto esencial para incentivar la eficacia de la asistencia al desarrollo

(ibídem: 13-14).

En el ánimo de “homologar” e institucionalizar de mejor forma mediante normas, instituciones y propósitos globales aspiraciones generales en materia de desarrollo (Sorensen, 2001: 53) a raíz de la mencionada e inédita convergencia de propósitos alrededor de la capacidad institucional, la ONU, el BM, el FMI y la OCDE presentaron el informe “Un mundo mejor para todos” (2000). En esta publicación se establecen siete objetivos generales de desarrollo humano, así como los respectivos compromisos e indicadores necesarios para su cumplimiento por parte de la comunidad internacional. En línea con las referidas directrices institucionales del sistema de CID, este informe reitera que el cumplimiento de los propósitos señalados debe pasar necesariamente por la instrumentación de buen gobierno, democracia y el respeto a los derechos humanos.

Tales propósitos globales fueron tomados como base por la Asamblea General de la ONU, que en el año 2000 aprobó los ODM a través de la Declaración del Milenio, firmada por 189 países, incluyendo 147 jefes de Estado y de gobierno.

Estas aspiraciones comprendieron ocho objetivos de desarrollo social y económico, los cuales debieron concretarse en distintas metas cuantificables durante el periodo 1990-2015, siendo la Agenda de Desarrollo Post-2015 su sucesora.

Si bien la democracia, los derechos humanos y el buen gobierno no se incluyen en los ODM, estos propósitos, además de las controversias generadas a su amparo, aportan importantes avances en cuanto a la institucionalización de la agenda global de CID de múltiples formas. Algunos de estos son

los siguientes: establecer por primera vez propósitos prioritarios, comunes y mesurables al respecto promovidos por todos los gobiernos e instituciones multilaterales; legitimar y moldear el marco de debate sobre el desarrollo internacional; simplificar y materializar el concepto mismo de desarrollo mediante la identificación de una agenda planetaria para promoverlo, cohesionar a los actores internacionales alrededor de esta (Sakiko, 2013: 37, 51, 52). En definitiva, los ODM son “un elemento clave de una nueva arquitectura de la ayuda que se puso en marcha a finales de la década de 1990” (ibídem: 55).

CONSIDERACIONES FINALES

Las variantes del contexto histórico y de las teorías dedicadas al desarrollo tienen un claro impacto en las directrices que guían la cooperación internacional en cada momento de su historia. Como muestra de ello, Stephen D. Krasner explica que en el periodo 2002-2007 casi el 20% de la ayuda externa se realizó en concordancia con los postulados de la teoría de la capacidad institucional (ibídem: 718)[5], mediante procesos de selección de la ayuda y apoyo institucional, independiente de la calidad de los resultados obtenidos, que, como se señaló, no son precisamente los más promisorios.

Estas estrategias, que como muchas más se derivan de otros fundamentos teóricos, pretenden aumentar la posibilidad de que este instrumento de apoyo externo contribuya de forma más sensible al desarrollo de los países beneficiarios[6], que en su conjunto alimentan al debate en torno a las condiciones en que

la ayuda puede ser más eficaz. Sin embargo, “las condiciones necesarias y suficientes para que la ayuda genere una contribución positiva a procesos de desarrollo continúan siendo controversiales” (Tarp, 2006: 48), lo que indica que el principal reto teórico y práctico continúa siendo la definición de modelos analíticos y fácticos para impulsar el bienestar de las personas con mayor certidumbre.

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Desarrollo estatal, construcción del Estado y ayuda externa[7]

Stephen D. Krasner[8]

INTRODUCCIÓN

En las últimas décadas hemos sido testigos de algunos intentos ambiciosos de comprender las distintas trayectorias del desarrollo tanto en países exitosos en lo que se refiere a estabilidad política y posible democratización como en aquellos que han fracasado en este campo. Si bien no existe un consenso, un enfoque, el de la elección racional —que enfatiza la importancia de estímulos y, en algunos casos, de instituciones— domina cada vez más la polémica teórica en Estados Unidos. En el mundo académico, la teoría de la modernización y la capacidad institucional —las otras dos perspectivas teóricas para entender el desarrollo del Estado— han pasado a segundo plano, aun cuando la teoría de la modernización siga siendo el único marco de referencia que haya dado lugar a un debate teórico y empírico coherente.

Por el contrario, en las discusiones de académicos y diseñadores de políticas en torno a la ayuda extranjera y en su propia distribución, la preponderancia relativa de estos tres enfoques es inversa: la teoría de la modernización y la capacidad institucional dominan el discurso y la práctica. Alrededor de 90% de toda la ayuda para el desarrollo que se brinda a otros países se asigna en concordancia con estas dos tendencias.

Esta situación no es resultado de la ignorancia sobre la

bibliografía académica; los organismos de ayuda nacionales e internacionales están repletos de especialistas. Más bien, los enfoques afines a la teoría de la modernización y a la construcción de capacidad institucional siguen alimentando las políticas porque son congruentes con los imperativos descritos por James Scott en *Seeing Like a State*[9] Las políticas públicas requieren un entorno social, económico y político de fácil lectura. La asistencia extranjera alimentada por la teoría de la modernización y la construcción de capacidad institucional sí se puede leer, particularmente, si quienes diseñan las políticas se enfocan en las aportaciones y no en los resultados; en la cantidad de ayuda otorgada y no en el impacto que ésta tiene. En contraste, es más difícil lograr que los programas diseñados para modificar los incentivos —factor fundamental de los enfoques de elección racional— se puedan descifrar.

Este trabajo comienza por esbozar las principales argumentaciones en torno al desarrollo de Estado: la teoría de la modernización, la construcción de capacidad institucional y la elección racional. Posteriormente muestra cómo algunos estudios recientes sobre asistencia extranjera reflejan estas tres perspectivas, aunque rara vez se reconozcan los vínculos explícitos entre los dos cuerpos bibliográficos. Finalmente proporciona cierta evidencia relativa a la asignación actual de apoyos.

ENFOQUES RESPECTO AL DESARROLLO POLÍTICO

LA TEORÍA DE LA MODERNIZACIÓN

De los tres enfoques que aquí se analizan, éste es el que cuenta con mayor reconocimiento y el que ha sido analizado con mayor profundidad. La teoría de la modernización sostiene que la transformación política y la democratización son resultado del cambio social y del crecimiento económico[10] La urbanización, los niveles de alfabetización más altos y la industrialización conducen a la movilización social, al cambio de actitud y a una expansión de la clase media. Una clase media más grande es más tolerante, más abierta a perspectivas políticas diversas, está más dispuesta a transigir y tiene mayores probabilidades de rechazar el extremismo. La modernización propicia que los individuos tengan mayor capacidad de autoexpresión y que participen en actividades políticas. Una mayor riqueza permitiría que incluso quienes se ubican en los primeros peldaños de la escala económica adoptaran perspectivas a más largo plazo. En un ambiente social y político más complejo, donde la población tiene un mayor nivel educativo, las divisiones transversales cobran mayor importancia. El conflicto entre clases se mitiga[11]. La democracia no es el resultado de una serie especial de atributos culturales exclusivos de Occidente; es un producto de la transformación social y económica[12].

Aunque los teóricos clásicos de la modernización como Lipset y Lerner no hayan intentado explicar el crecimiento económico, tenían —por lo menos de manera implícita— la seguridad de que éste ocurriría. La teoría del crecimiento de las décadas de 1950 y 1960 consideraba que el aumento del ingreso era un proceso probable, por no decir inevitable. El enfoque dominante, reflejado

en el modelo Harrod-Domar, ponía énfasis en la importancia del capital. Aun cuando los ahorros nacionales en países en vías de desarrollo pudieran no ser suficientes para soportar el nivel de inversión necesario para mantener altos índices de crecimiento, esta brecha podría cerrarse con apoyo del exterior. Por lo tanto, según la teoría de la modernización, había un proceso coherente que suponía la urbanización, la industrialización, la educación, la comunicación y la movilización, y que conducía a una diferenciación entre la política y otros campos de actividad, al desarrollo institucional y al triunfo de la democracia.

En 2000, Adam Przeworski y sus colegas publicaron *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World*, *1950-1990*, una investigación empírica de la relación entre democracia y crecimiento económico[13]. Señalaron que los argumentos de la teoría de la modernización habían, generado más estudios que cualquier otro tema de política comparada[14]. Encontraron que el desarrollo económico tiene un fuerte impacto en la permanencia de los regímenes democráticos[15]. La esperanza de vida de los regímenes democráticos en países con ingresos per cápita inferiores a mil dólares estadounidenses es de ocho años, mientras que en países donde esta cifra oscila entre mil uno y dos mil dólares la expectativa es de dieciocho años. Una vez que las democracias alcanzan un ingreso per cápita de cuatro mil dólares, prácticamente no existe posibilidad alguna de que se conviertan en dictaduras.

Sin embargo, en contra de lo que sugiere la teoría de la modernización, no existe ninguna relación directa entre los

niveles de ingreso y la permanencia de los regímenes autocráticos. Las autocracias son más estables en niveles de ingreso bajos y altos. Przeworski y sus colegas concluyen que “el poder causal del desarrollo económico en el derrocamiento de dictaduras parece mísero”[16]. Otro descubrimiento inconsistente con la teoría de la modernización es que la relación entre ingreso per cápita y transición hacia la democracia se puede describir, en el mejor de los casos, como endeble[17].

Un estudio reciente de Acemoglu y Robinson llega a una conclusión aún más negativa sobre la teoría de la modernización: los autores no encontraron relación estadística alguna entre la democratización de un país y su propio nivel de desarrollo, y hacen notar que absolutamente todas las afirmaciones empíricas de la teoría de la modernización se basan en variaciones entre distintas naciones y no en variaciones dentro de un mismo país. Su descubrimiento sugiere que la democratización no es consecuencia de niveles más altos de desarrollo, sino que existen otras condiciones que determinan tanto la democratización como el desarrollo. Los autores sugieren que la herencia colonial es un elemento fundamental que explica que los países hayan seguido distintas trayectorias. Mientras que las instituciones coloniales eran de índole represiva en las colonias donde la población europea era escasa (particularmente debido a enfermedades) y el foco estaba en los sectores de extracción de recursos, en las colonias donde la población original era pequeña y la población colonizadora alta, las instituciones coloniales eran significativamente más incluyentes. Estas distintas herencias coloniales encaminaron a

los países en diferentes direcciones[18].

Las evaluaciones empíricas negativas de la teoría de la modernización no han dejado de ser cuestionadas. Ronald Inglehart y Christian Welzel argumentan que la modernización conduce a cambios básicos de actitud y que a largo plazo estos cambios —asociados principalmente a la auto expresión y no a la sobrevivencia; a valores no tradicionales si no de naturaleza secular racional— favorecen la democracia. Sin embargo, la riqueza por sí misma no es un indicador de modernización. A pesar de su fortuna, los emiratos del Golfo Pérsico —exportadores de petróleo— no han experimentado la modernización. Según Inglehart y Welzel, "la tendencia general es clara: a fin de cuentas, la modernización genera democracia. Esto significa que el resurgimiento económico de China y Rusia tiene un aspecto positivo: hay cambios subyacentes en proceso gracias a los cuales es probable que en los próximos años surjan sistemas políticos cada vez más liberales y democráticos"[19].

CAPACIDAD INSTITUCIONAL

El reinado de la teoría de la modernización como explicación preeminente del crecimiento y la democratización duró únicamente alrededor de una década. En 1968, Samuel Huntington publicó *Political Order in Changing Societies.* Mientras que los teóricos de la modernización consideraban que el desarrollo de las instituciones —y, en particular, de las instituciones de democracia liberal— era consecuencia natural del cambio económico y social, Huntington argumentó que el

orden político y el crecimiento económico estaban supeditados a la capacidad institucional: más que un producto del cambio económico y social, las instituciones eran prerrequisito para dicha transformación. Para Huntington, sin institucionalización política, la movilización política solo podría conducir a la descomposición política. “La urbanización, el aumento en los índices de alfabetismo, la educación y la exposición a los medios de comunicación dan lugar a mayores aspiraciones y expectativas que, si no se satisfacen, impulsan a las personas y los grupos hacia la política. Cuando no hay instituciones políticas fuertes y adaptables, este aumento en la participación se traduce en inestabilidad y violencia”[20]. Para Huntington, el reto fundamental de la vida política es el orden y éste solamente se puede alcanzar por efecto de instituciones adaptables, complejas, autónomas y capaces de coacción[21].

La perspectiva analítica de Huntington no es más que uno de los muchos argumentos en una larga tradición intelectual cuyo reflejo más claro quizá sea el *Leviatán* de Hobbes, donde el análisis empieza por reconocer —como dice Huntington— que “la distinción política más importante entre países no tiene que ver con su forma de gobierno, sino con su grado de gobierno”[22]. Sin instituciones eficaces con capacidad de coacción, la vida sería desagradable, brutal y breve.

En años más recientes, también Francis Fukuyama señaló la importancia de la capacidad institucional o, para ser más precisos, de su inexistencia. *En State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, libro publicado en 2004, Fukuyama sostiene que en muchos países en vías de desarrollo

se puede observar una falta de correspondencia entre el alcance formal o legal de la autoridad del Estado y la capacidad institucional. La plantilla de la responsabilidad estatal es universal; incluye no solo lo que Fukuyama llama funciones estatales minimalistas —como la defensa, la preservación del orden público y el mantenimiento de los derechos de propiedad —, sino también funciones intermedias y activas, como brindar educación, protección medioambiental, regulación financiera, seguridad social y políticas industriales[23]. En el ahora mundo industrializado, el ámbito de actividad del Estado creció a lo largo de los siglos para responder a presiones internas y externas. Los países en vías de desarrollo han adoptado estas acciones porque los Estados que adquirieron su independencia inmediatamente después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial diseñaron sus estructuras organizacionales formales con base en las que ya operaban en Europa, América del Norte y, en algunos casos, la Unión Soviética[24].

Sin embargo, en los países en vías de desarrollo, la capacidad de muchos Estados es limitada. Fukuyama argumenta que la transferencia de patrones organizacionales formales es sencilla: los Estados saben qué ministerios deben tener. Sin embargo, es más complicado transferir el diseño del sistema político en su conjunto: las dimensiones de los distritos electorales, la naturaleza de la estructura de los partidos, las legislaturas bicamerales en oposición a las unicamerales, las normas electorales de representación proporcional contra las de mayoría relativa, los poderes ejecutivos presidenciales o parlamentarios… Estas disposiciones varían, según Fukuyama,

de Estado en Estado dependiendo no solo de las condiciones estructurales, sino también de la convergencia fortuita de los intereses y capacidades presentes en momentos históricos particulares. Finalmente, Fukuyama asegura que los factores culturales, incluidos actitudes de elite y valores sociales más amplios, solamente se pueden modificar marginalmente[25]. Los países en vías de desarrollo llevan la carga de una falta de relación entre el alcance legal formal de la autoridad del Estado y su capacidad real.

El gran reto de los estudios que ponen énfasis en la importancia de la capacidad institucional es aclarar de dónde procede dicha capacidad. La explicación más conocida es la de Charles Tilly. En *Coercion*, *Capital*, *European States*, *AD 990-1990*, Tilly argumenta que en Europa los líderes crearon instituciones nuevas para responder a desafíos externos; especialmente la guerra. La guerra hacía al Estado y el Estado hacía la guerra[26]. Durante varios siglos, los Estados probaron ser más aptos que otras estructuras políticas, particularmente las ciudades Estado, en la movilización de los recursos financieros y materiales necesarios para garantizar su independencia[27]. Otros especialistas han sostenido que la guerra no es el único camino hacia la consolidación de la capacidad del Estado: la creciente fuerza institucional también pude apoyarse en valores religiosos, legados coloniales, acuerdos de las elites y disposiciones institucionales existentes[28].

Por eso, la autoridad, la legitimidad y la eficacia de las instituciones centrales del Estado resultan fundamentales para los autores que ponen énfasis en la capacidad institucional. Las

instituciones estatales deben ser capaces de fijar y hacer cumplir las reglas del juego. Deben poder establecer el orden público, garantizar el Estado de derecho y proporcionar bienes colectivos.

Según la teoría de la modernización, si un sistema de gobierno puede encontrar la base de la escalera mecánica, será capaz de llegar hasta arriba. En los enfoques que se centran en la capacidad institucional, la escalera también puede ir hacia abajo. En la teoría de la modernización, las instituciones, particularmente las democráticas, son un producto del cambio económico y social; en los enfoques basados en la capacidad institucional, son un prerrequisito de la transformación.

ELECCIÓN RACIONAL

La elección racional es la tercera perspectiva sobre la trayectoria del desarrollo político y económico. Mientras que la teoría de la modernización subraya que el cambio socioeconómico conduce a la transformación política y la teoría de la capacidad institucional se centra en el grado de gobierno que realmente pueden ejercer las instituciones estatales centrales, la elección racional considera que el crecimiento económico y la gobernanza eficaz son resultado de decisiones tomadas por actores clave. Estas decisiones siempre responden a un interés personal; son el reflejo de incentivos materiales. Aunque no todos, la mayoría de los estudios sobre elección racional señalan la importancia de las instituciones, como organismos que facilitan la conclusión de acuerdos mutuamente benéficos porque resuelven los problemas de compromiso[29].

A diferencia de lo que sostiene la teoría de la capacidad institucional, los institucionalistas con un enfoque de elección racional consideran que las instituciones son un mecanismo que puede dar estabilidad y perdurabilidad a los pactos políticos, más que estructuras para concentrar el poder y la autoridad. Ya que inicialmente no se cuenta con un sistema de vigilancia externo, los acuerdos para la creación de instituciones deben ser compromisos autovinculantes entre actores clave de un sistema de gobierno. Más que habilitarlos, las instituciones limitan a estos distintos actores. Mientras que la concentración del poder es fundamental para quienes se centran en la capacidad institucional, para los institucionalistas con un enfoque de elección racional es fatal.

Como los actores tienen intereses personales, solo apoyarán políticas que aumenten el bienestar del sistema de gobierno en su conjunto cuando éstas los beneficien en lo particular. Las elites —quienes han acumulado recursos militares, económicos, ideológicos o de algún otro tipo— desempeñan un papel decisivo en cualquier sistema político. El problema fundamental para el desarrollo político y económico es que la búsqueda egoísta de las elites suele reducir el bienestar del sistema de gobierno en su conjunto.

Dadas las motivaciones personalistas de las elites, el desarrollo político y económico solo es factible cuando llegar a acuerdos que beneficien a la sociedad en su conjunto —o, por lo menos, a una parte considerable de la población bajo la regla 80-20 de Pareto— sirve a los intereses de las propias elites. En una democracia, los líderes políticos pueden mantenerse en el poder

únicamente defendiendo políticas que les alleguen votos. El reto para los analistas de la elección racional es explicar por qué los líderes de regímenes autocráticos adoptarían políticas que fueran socialmente favorables, especialmente si éstas pudieran, a fin de cuentas, conducir a la democratización.

Si bien todos aquellos que basan su estudio en la teoría de elección racional comparten el mismo marco analítico (actores con intereses personales y, en el caso de institucionalistas con este enfoque, instituciones como mecanismos de compromiso), no hay consenso sobre las condiciones específicas que conduzcan a resultados socialmente más benéficos en sistemas de gobiernos no democráticos. Hay dos libros recientes, *Violenceand Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* de Douglass North, John Wallis y Barry Weingast, y *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* de Daron Acemoglu y James Robinson, que consideran causas posibles diferentes de la transición a regímenes políticos y económicos más abiertos.

El argumento sustantivo de North, Wallis y Weingast es que la libertad y el crecimiento económico sostenido solo se pueden alcanzar por medio de lo que ellos llaman “órdenes de acceso abierto”, cuya característica definitoria es que una gran proporción —si no la totalidad— de los individuos dentro de una sociedad tiene el derecho de crear e incorporarse a organizaciones. Las organizaciones son la clave del éxito humano; permiten que los seres humanos alcancen objetivos que un esfuerzo individual desorganizado no podría lograr. En una sociedad de acceso abierto, los derechos son impersonales;

las organizaciones pueden ser permanentes. Todos y cada uno de sus integrantes tienen acceso al sistema legal. La libre competencia —en la política y la economía— mina cualquier intento de capturar rentas. El control de las fuerzas de seguridad está en manos de estructuras de autoridad centralizadas.

Para North, Wallis y Weingast, las sociedades de acceso abierto son un acontecimiento reciente en la historia humana que surgió apenas en el siglo XIX en algunos países de Europa Occidental y de América del Norte. Todas las sociedades anteriores estaban dedicadas exclusivamente a velar por su propio sustento y estaban compuestas por un máximo de 150 personas o eran —según el término utilizado por los autores— "órdenes de acceso limitado" o "naturales" en las que solo una pequeña elite podía crear organizaciones; los derechos eran personales; las organizaciones, aunque podían ser perdurables, rara vez se mantenían; el poder militar estaba disperso entre grupos de elite; el Estado de derecho, cuando lo había, solo existía para la elites; la actividad económica estaba restringida y los intentos por capturar rentas eran dominantes.

En concordancia con la lógica del institucionalismo según la teoría de elección racional, el gran desafío para North, Wallis y Weingast es explicar por qué las elites de un orden de acceso limitado aceptarían que se desarrollara un orden de acceso abierto. ¿Por qué las elites extenderían sus privilegios a un sector más amplio de la sociedad? Para que esta transición ocurra, debe partirse de un orden maduro de acceso limitado en el que coincidan tres condiciones previas que North, Wallis y Weingast llaman condiciones de umbral: Estado de derecho para

las elites, existencia de algunas organizaciones de carácter permanente y no estrictamente ligadas a un gobernante específico y un control centralizado de la milicia. Cuando se presentan estas condiciones, las elites pueden considerar que ampliar los derechos impersonales, incluyendo el Estado de derecho, servirá a sus propios intereses. La generalización de los derechos podría aumentar las compensaciones económicas de la elite; por ejemplo, al poner a disposición de un mayor número de personas las acciones de empresas privadas controladas por un grupo pequeño de individuos. Las sociedades de acceso abierto no surgieron a causa de un compromiso abstracto con la libertad, sino como consecuencia no deliberada de decisiones tomadas por las elites para favorecerse a sí mismas.

North, Wallis y Weingast ponen énfasis en que no necesariamente se camina hacia adelante. Es más frecuente que órdenes maduras de acceso cerrado se colapsen y regresen a ser órdenes básicas o frágiles de acceso cerrado a que se conviertan en sociedades de acceso abierto. Los autores argumentan que:

Ninguna teleología dirige la progresión de Estados naturales de frágiles, a básicos y, finalmente, a maduros. La dinámica de los Estados naturales es la dinámica de la coalición dominante, frecuentemente a través de nuevas negociaciones y rumbos que responden a condiciones cambiantes. Si los ajustes conducen a mayor poder y a capturar rentas con base en la identidad personal, las instituciones se vuelven más simples y las organizaciones menos sofisticadas; las sociedades se acercan al extremo más frágil en la progresión de Estados naturales. Si los ajustes conducen a mayor poder con

base en acuerdos perdurables, las instituciones se vuelven más complejas y las organizaciones más sofisticadas; las sociedades se acercan al extremo maduro en la progresión. No existe una lógica convincente que mueva a los Estados en una u otra dirección[30].

Acemoglu y Robinson presentan un argumento distinto sobre las condiciones que conducen de un sistema de gobierno más cerrado a uno más abierto. En *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* sostienen que la apertura surge cuando las elites de una sociedad autocrática se enfrentan a una pérdida del control. Más que a acuerdos entre las elites —que es el punto focal del análisis de North, Wallis y Weingast—, Acemoglu y Robinson hacen referencia a un pacto entre elites y no elites (a quienes ellos llaman ciudadanos). Las elites solo renuncian al poder cuando las no elites representan una amenaza convincente de derrocamiento.

Las elites aceptan instituciones más democráticas porque es la única manera en que pueden hacer un compromiso verosímil que les permita evitar algo que les resultaría peor: una rebelión exitosa[31]. En un régimen no democrático, el poder *de iure* —es decir el poder que procede de las instituciones— está únicamente en manos de las elites. Esta situación cambiará solo si los ciudadanos ejercen el poder *de facto* —la fuerza bruta— y obligan a las elites a ampliar el poder *de iure*. Para ejercer este último, los ciudadanos deben sortear problemas de acción colectiva, organizarse con tal eficacia que la estabilidad del régimen se vea amenazada. Las probabilidades de que esto suceda únicamente se presentan en momentos de crisis. El poder de facto es ineludiblemente temporal y, a sabiendas, la

ciudadanía demandará no solo cambios en las políticas —a las que se podría dar marcha atrás si las elites vuelven a monopolizar el poder institucional—, sino una ampliación del poder de iure. La única manera en que las elites pueden comprometerse de manera convincente es aceptando estas concesiones de índole institucional[32].

Acemoglu y Robinson plantean una serie de condiciones que simplifican la transición hacia la democracia. Argumentan que las elites harán concesiones con mayor facilidad si cuentan con capital industrial o humano en lugar de tierras, que son más fácilmente gravadas. Las elites con capital humano o industrial pueden amenazar con abandonar el país; las elites terratenientes, no. Un giro hacia la democracia es más probable cuando existe un nivel medio de inequidad. Si la inequidad es muy alta, las elites serán muy reticentes al cambio; si es relativamente baja, hay menos posibilidades de un levantamiento de la ciudadanía. Una sociedad civil más robusta es favorable para el cambio democrático, pues con ella es más probable que la ciudadanía sortee problemas de acción colectiva. Si bien es cierto que una clase media más extendida (aquí Acemoglu y Robinson incorporan una tercera categoría a las de elite y ciudadanía) puede ejercer presión en contra de las elites, también puede propiciar que el cambio resulte más aceptable pues garantiza que las políticas de redistribución sean contenidas[33].

Igual que North, Wallis y Weingast, Acemoglu y Robinson no ven ningún movimiento teleológico hacia la democracia. Inician su libro señalando casos en los que la democracia se ha

consolidado (Gran Bretaña), se ha resistido durante un largo periodo (África del Sur), no ha logrado consolidarse (Argentina a lo largo de la mayor parte de su historia) o nunca ha existido (Singapur)[34]. Las crisis económicas pueden conducir a la democratización, pero también precipitar golpes de Estado que pongan fin a regímenes democráticos. Un alto nivel de desarrollo no necesariamente conduce a la democracia. El ejemplo de Singapur es contundente.

Según los enfoques de elección racional, el desarrollo político y económico está supeditado a acuerdos en los que las elites siempre son los únicos actores de importancia o, por lo menos, desempeñan un papel fundamental. Generalmente, estos acuerdos solo son posibles cuando se crean instituciones formales. Históricamente, el tipo de disposiciones creado entre las elites es de carácter contingente. En el caso de la elección racional no existe un solo camino que todos los sistemas de gobierno deban seguir. Los pactos de las elites dependen de su composición, sus capacidades, sus intereses y sus creencias. Estos, a su vez, dependen de la trayectoria histórica particular que haya seguido una sociedad determinada. El progreso no es inevitable. Los acuerdos institucionales que favorecen a las elites, e incluso a las no elites, pueden deshacerse debido a un cambio en los equilibrios del poder, a un giro en las creencias o a estructuras de incentivos alteradas.

En resumen, las perspectivas de la teoría de la modernización, de la capacidad institucional y de la elección racional ofrecen explicaciones muy diversas para el cambio económico y político. En el caso de la teoría de la modernización, el desarrollo es

impulsado por el cambio económico y social. Aunque el camino puede ser sinuoso, la expectativa es que a largo plazo habrá progreso. Para los analistas enfocados en la capacidad institucional, el éxito depende de la concentración de recursos y autoridad en manos de instituciones políticas centrales. Para los institucionalistas de la elección racional, al dar solución a problemas de compromiso, las instituciones permiten mejorías de acuerdo a la regla de Pareto.

A ninguna de estas teorías preocupan, demasiado, si es que algo, los intentos de actores externos por influir directamente en estructuras de autoridad nacionales de otros sistemas de gobierno. Sin embargo sí reconocen que el entorno externo puede alterar las trayectorias de desarrollo. Según la teoría de la modernización, el entorno externo pude brindar recursos en forma de capital, nuevas tecnologías u oportunidades para el intercambio económico. Según la teoría de la capacidad institucional, las amenazas del exterior pueden crear incentivos, en ocasiones muy persuasivos, para aumentar el poder estatal; o bien, el entorno internacional puede sugerir una serie de actividades de Estado poco indicadas para la limitada capacidad de los países en vías de desarrollo contemporáneos. En el caso de los enfoques de elección racional, el entorno exterior puede ofrecer incentivos que podrían afectar los acuerdos alcanzados por las elites dentro de un sistema de gobierno particular. Ninguna de las grandes perspectivas teóricas sobre la construcción del Estado examina de manera sistemática el impacto de esfuerzos conscientes de actores externos para alterar las trayectorias de desarrollo de otros Estados. Todas dan

por hecho la premisa convencional de soberanía.

AYUDA EXTRANJERA

La ayuda extranjera —una práctica internacional que no se desarrolló sino hasta después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial— busca, de manera directa, cambiar las condiciones —los índices de crecimiento económico, las instituciones políticas, las prácticas sociales, los derechos legales— que prevalecen en otro país. Cada una de las tres principales teorías del desarrollo tiene una perspectiva distinta sobre la forma en que se puede hacer un uso más eficaz de la ayuda o, incluso, sobre si se debe recurrir a ella o no. La teoría de la modernización sugiere que los donantes deben brindar recursos. Los análisis basados en la capacidad institucional suponen que los donantes deben fortalecer instituciones en los Estados meta. Las conclusiones sobre la ayuda que se pueden desprender de los estudios con un enfoque de elección racional varían según la importancia que se adjudique a las instituciones formales y de las expectativas que se tengan respecto a la capacidad de los líderes locales para cerrar acuerdos autovinculantes sin la participación directa de actores externos. Las fórmulas que surgen de estos análisis basados en la elección racional oscilan entre la eliminación absoluta de la ayuda, porque ésta es origen de incentivos perversos, y la creación de nuevos fideicomisos posteriores al conflicto en lugares en los que, de otra manera, no se podría garantizar el bien colectivo, particularmente la seguridad.

LA TEORÍA DE LA MODERNIZACIÓN Y LA AYUDA EXTRANJERA

Jeffrey Sachs es el más reconocido exponente de una serie de recomendaciones políticas en materia de ayuda que son reflejo de la teoría de la modernización. En *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time*, argumenta a favor de enormes incrementos en ayuda extranjera. “Cuando un país pone el pie en la escalera del desarrollo, generalmente puede seguir subiendo. Todo lo positivo tiende a avanzar junto, peldaño a peldaño […] Si un país se encuentra atrapado debajo de la escalera y el primer escalón le queda demasiado alto, el ascenso ni siquiera comienza”[35]. Los países no alcanzan la escalera porque están atrapados en la pobreza. Hay países tan pobres que sus ciudadanos no pueden ahorrar. Existe la posibilidad de que el gobierno sea incapaz de prestar servicios porque la población está tan empobrecida que es imposible recaudar impuestos. Los Estados se pueden encontrar atrapados en la pobreza por su desfavorecedora ubicación geográfica, sin litorales, o por ser víctimas de desastres naturales como la sequía y la enfermedad[36]. Enfrentar estos retos que la pobreza y otras trampas plantean —dice Sachs— requiere niveles mucho más altos de asistencia extranjera. Afirma, por ejemplo, que Kenia requeriría ayuda extranjera por 1 500 millones de dólares, quince veces más de lo que recibía alrededor de 2005[37].

Sachs ha sido la fuerza motora detrás de la creación de los Pueblos del Milenio. Actualmente hay trece en África. Con estas comunidades se busca demostrar, inicialmente a pequeña escala, que una ayuda significativamente mayor tiene

consecuencias benéficas. El plan es extender este proyecto creando nuevos Pueblos del Milenio en torno al núcleo original. En cada caso se ha aumentado la ayuda. El Proyecto del Milenio, auspiciado por el grupo de desarrollo de la ONU en el que Sachs ha representado un papel fundamental, calcula las necesidades de cada habitante en 110 dólares; cuarenta de los cuales provienen de fuentes nacionales y locales[38]. El sitio de Internet del Proyecto del Milenio dice:

> Este modelo de financiamiento se cimienta en la premisa de que, con un apoyo modesto, las economías de los Pueblos del Milenio pueden transitar de una agricultura de subsistencia a una actividad comercial sostenida. Con el tiempo, los ingresos familiares aumentarán gracias a una mayor productividad, a la diversificación hacia cultivos de mayor valor y a una ampliación de los trabajos no vinculados directamente con el campo. Un mayor ingreso aumentará los ahorros por hogar, lo que acelerará la diversificación económica y las inversiones familiares en capital humano. Conforme aumente el crecimiento económico, los pueblos asumirán el costo de muchas intervenciones que actualmente son financiadas por la iniciativa de Pueblos del Milenio[39].

Según la teoría de la modernización, el cambio tecnológico y el capital, no el ejercicio del gobierno, son los impulsores del desarrollo. Es probable que Estados y comunidades languidezcan bajo la escalera del desarrollo por algún tiempo, pero una vez que hayan logrado subir el primer peldaño, habrán iniciado el ascenso. La vida de africanos golpeados por la pobreza puede cambiar si se proporciona el capital necesario.

Los temas de gobernanza ocupan un lugar incómodo al lado de cualquier análisis que se base en la lógica fundamental de la teoría de la modernización. Sachs ataca a quienes han atribuido el empobrecimiento de África a la corrupción y al mal gobierno. Argumenta que “tanto los detractores de la gobernanza africana como los opositores a la violencia e intromisión occidentales están equivocados. A fin de cuentas, la política simplemente no puede explicar la prolongada crisis económica del continente africano. El argumento de que la corrupción africana es la fuente primigenia del problema, no resiste un escrutinio serio ni se sostiene ante la experiencia práctica”[40]. Señala, además, que en África hay países “relativamente bien gobernados” que no han experimentado un crecimiento económico y países con una “corrupción extendida” que sí han crecido[41].

Si bien estas afirmaciones sugieren que Sachs no cree que exista relación alguna entre el ejercicio del gobierno y el crecimiento, también ha escrito sobre las consecuencias de los fracasos en la gobernanza. Reconoce que un mal gobierno puede minar el desarrollo económico, pero argumenta que un buen gobierno no garantiza el crecimiento y la prosperidad. Sin un financiamiento adecuado, ni siquiera los Estados bien gobernados pueden brindar a sus poblaciones los servicios necesarios. Acepta que los países mal gobernados “no tienen un derecho garantizado”[42] a la asistencia. Sin embargo, Sachs concluye que “actualmente el mayor problema no es que los países mal gobernados reciban demasiada ayuda, sino que los países bien gobernados reciben demasiado poca”[43].

Para mejorar el ejercicio del gobierno, Sachs argumenta a

favor de un incremento en la ayuda:

El problema de la corrupción ensombrece la relación entre los donantes y el gobierno de Kenia. Gran parte de la corrupción refleja secuelas de hace más de dos décadas, herencia del régimen anterior, funcionarios corruptos que aún no han sido descartados. Sin embargo, parte de la corrupción es nueva y absolutamente evitable, pero solo si los donantes ayudan a Kenia a mejorar el funcionamiento de la administración pública; no moralizando y haciendo acusaciones sino con la instalación de sistemas de computación, de la publicación de informes, de la capacitación para el empleo y los ascensos profesionales, de mejores salarios a los administradores de alto nivel para que no necesiten vivir de sobornos y pagos laterales, de un apoyo continuado a los importantes esfuerzos gubernamentales en curso para mejorar el sistema judicial, de la facultación de comunidades del ámbito local para la vigilancia de la prestación de los servicios públicos y a través de cierta humildad por parte de los donantes, en cuyos gobiernos también hay corrupción […][44].

Sachs termina por refrendar, sin reconocerlo explícitamente, el pacto acordado en la Conferencia sobre Financiamiento para el Desarrollo, celebrada en Monterrey, México, en 2002, donde los países industrializados prometieron aumentar el nivel de ayuda si los países en vías de desarrollo mejoraban su gobernanza[45].

La dificultad que representa para Sachs —o para cualquiera cuyo enfoque sobre la ayuda extranjera se base en último grado en los optimistas supuestos de la teoría de la modernización— honrar a cabalidad esta fórmula se refleja no solo en las inconsistencias presentes en *The End of Poverty*, sino también en la relación —o la falta de relación— entre la medición de la

corrupción y el proyecto de Pueblos del Milenio, la manifestación política de las ideas de Sachs. Si el ejercicio del gobierno fuera un factor que se tomara en serio, los pueblos deberían estar ubicados en Estados africanos mejor gobernados. No es el caso. Por el contrario, los criterios establecidos para seleccionar a los trece pueblos es que todas las zonas agroecológicas importantes del continente estuvieran representadas. Los Pueblos del Milenio se encuentran en Etiopia, Ghana, Kenia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Ruanda, Senegal, Tanzania y Uganda. El índice de percepción de la corrupción proporcionado por Transparencia Internacional incluye 45 países africanos cuyo *ranking* oscila entre 36, en el caso de Botswana, y 180, en el caso de Somalia. El promedio para los países africanos es de 121. La calificación de los diez países en los que hay Pueblos del Milenio oscila entre 67 (Ghana) y 147 (Kenia). El promedio es de 102[46]. Un programa que realmente tomara en cuenta el Consenso de Monterrey se habría centrado en los países pobres de África que tuvieran los indicadores de corrupción más bajos. Sin embargo, un enfoque de esta naturaleza habría significado reconocer la importancia de la gobernanza de tal manera que resultaría inconsistente con la teoría de la modernización y debilitaría el argumento a favor de importantes aumentos en ayuda extranjera, incluso en países donde el ejercicio de gobierno es problemático.

CAPACIDAD INSTITUCIONAL, AYUDA EXTRANJERA Y CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL ESTADO

Mientras que los temas de gobernanza se inmiscuyen de manera incómoda en los análisis enmarcados por la teoría de la modernización, son el centro de las discusiones que se basan en la capacidad institucional. Un caso concreto, aunque no único, es el de los entornos posconflicto. Las políticas del gobierno estadounidense en Afganistán e Iraq, por ejemplo, han puesto énfasis en la necesidad de que las instituciones nacionales desarrollen mayor capacidad. Una muestra es el Plan de Campaña Integrada Cívico Militar de Apoyo a Afganistán del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos (*United States Government Integrated Civilian Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan*), fechado el 10 de agosto de 2009, que establece, en el primer párrafo, su componente primordial: "una alianza sólida con el Gobierno de la República Islámica de Afganistán (GRIA) que construya la capacidad necesaria para que Afganistán tenga acceso a un futuro estable. El objetivo final es que el GRIA contraiga la responsabilidad absoluta sobre su propia seguridad y administración mientras la comunidad internacional continúa ofreciendo asistencia económica, capacitación y otros apoyos ajenos al ámbito del combate para el desarrollo sostenido del país". Las capacidades afganas, estipula el plan, tendrán que incrementarse no solo en el campo de la seguridad, sino también en lo relativo al Estado de derecho, las comunicaciones, los procesos electorales, el empleo, la administración fronteriza y el control de drogas. Según el plan, el primer "principio central" es el "liderazgo afgano, la capacidad afgana, la sustentabilidad afgana. Nuestros esfuerzos en Afganistán, deben ser diseñados, en todo momento, para ayudar

al gobierno afgano a asumir un papel de liderazgo más eficaz”[47].

En *Fixing Failed States* de Claire Lockhart y Ashraf Ghani —antiguo funcionario del Banco Mundial, ex Ministro de Finanzas de Afganistán y candidato que no ganó la presidencia de su país en 2009— se presenta una serie de argumentos muy similares sobre la importancia de la capacidad institucional[48]. Los esfuerzos de ayuda, aseguran Ghani y Lockhart, deben concentrarse en diez funciones: Estado de derecho, monopolio del uso legítimo de la fuerza, control administrativo con normas claras y predecibles, finanzas públicas, servicios de salud y educación, infraestructura, derechos ciudadanos, creación de mercados y política industrial, administración de bienes públicos y endeudamiento público[49]. El objetivo es el Estado típico ideal de Weber.

Al hacer sugerencias sobre cómo los donantes extranjeros podrían posibilitar que el Estado desempeñara estas funciones de mejor manera, Lockhart y Ghani refrendan las recetas de la comunidad internacional para el desarrollo, plasmadas —por ejemplo— en la Declaración de París[50]. Estos autores subrayan la necesidad de que exista mayor coordinación entre los actores involucrados, incluidas las ONG, las agencias oficiales de ayuda, tanto nacionales como internacionales y los diseñadores de políticas en los países receptores. Si la asistencia ha de eliminar la falta de soberanía, todas las partes arriba mencionadas deben acordar una serie de reglas comunes para la construcción de la capacidad del Estado[51].

La construcción de instituciones no es únicamente un problema técnico; no se limita a orquestar la provisión de

recursos, equipo y capacitación. La bibliografía clásica sobre la capacidad institucional —Huntington y Tilly, por ejemplo— explica el incremento en la capacidad de Estado en razón del deseo de los líderes de permanecer en el poder. En algunas situaciones —para ser más claros, cuando las elites se enfrentan a amenazas externas—, la sobrevivencia de las elites depende de que el Estado tenga mayor capacidad, particularmente capacidad de gravar y combatir. Las elites no pueden sostener su propia posición si sus sistemas de gobierno son incapaces de generar los recursos necesarios para repeler invasores externos. A fin de incrementar los recursos económicos, los líderes políticos crean instituciones con mayor capacidad para recaudar impuestos, hacer cumplir contratos y promover el crecimiento del crédito privado[52].

Sin embargo, en el mundo contemporáneo, no resulta evidente qué mecanismos alinearían los intereses de las elites políticas con los de la sociedad en su conjunto. La construcción del Estado no es un problema de ingeniería; es un reto político, no solo un desafío técnico. El apoyo de las elites políticas es condición necesaria, por no decir suficiente, para el ejercicio eficaz del gobierno. El argumento de Tilly sobre la amenaza externa ya no es aplicable; virtualmente, la muerte del Estado a causa de una invasión dejó de ser una posibilidad desde 1945[53]. Hay indicios de que las elites políticas en entornos posconflicto con un alto nivel de dependencia en la ayuda extranjera son sensibles a la presión externa de los donantes[54]. Sin embargo, la argumentación sobre la capacidad institucional se centra demasiado en el andamiaje necesario para un Estado eficaz y no

lo suficiente en los motivos originales por los que las elites políticas podrían haber optado por la construcción de dichas estructuras.

ELECCIÓN RACIONAL Y AYUDA EXTRANJERA

La teoría de elección racional no ofrece una receta única para que la ayuda extranjera sea de mayor utilidad para el crecimiento económico y para un mejor ejercicio del gobierno. Los autores que han escrito desde una perspectiva de la elección racional han hecho todo tipo de planteamientos: desde cesar completamente la ayuda hasta la ocupación militar. Sus fórmulas varían según la importancia que asignen a las instituciones formales y a su opinión sobre la capacidad de los actores locales para establecer dichas instituciones por sí mismos. En *Wars*, *Guns and Votes*, Paul Collier argumenta que hay situaciones en las que los participantes nacionales no pueden alcanzar un acuerdo autovinculante que ofrezca un nivel aceptable de seguridad para la sociedad en su conjunto. En estas condiciones, el crecimiento económico y el desarrollo político solo son posibles si intervienen actores externos. En contraste, Dambisa Moyo afirma en *Dead Aid* que la ayuda ha sido perjudicial para África —parcialmente, porque debilita la gobernanza— y debe eliminarse gradualmente. Como Moyo, William Easterly asume, en *The White Man's Burden*, que los problemas de gobierno no impiden el desarrollo. Las políticas de ayuda deben basarse —sostiene— en la búsqueda y no en la planeación, en la construcción a partir de programas exitosos

desarrollados por innovadores de los propios países receptores y no en la imposición de planes originados en el exterior que todo lo abarcan.

Según la elección racional, a los actores los impulsan incentivos materiales; sin embargo, se ha cuestionado la capacidad que tienen los donantes extranjeros de manipular estos incentivos. Los donantes podrían cambiar los escenarios de oportunidad externa que se presentan a los líderes políticos condicionando distintos beneficios económicos —como la ayuda o el comercio— a reformas políticas nacionales, o, por el contrario, modificar el contexto de oportunidades internas desplegando la ayuda de tal manera que la lucha de poder entre los distintos grupos dentro de un determinado sistema de gobierno se vea alterada, por ejemplo, a través del apoyo a las ONG, de la promoción de reformas al uso de la tierra para generar un tipo de individuo interesado en proteger sus derechos de propiedad, de mayor educación para las niñas o del fortalecimiento de la eficacia legislativa.

Sin embargo, algunos analistas han expresado su escepticismo sobre la utilidad de incentivos externos. Argumentan que los donantes no están dispuestos a implementar una condicionalidad predeterminada porque les conviene mantener el flujo de ayuda incluso si los destinatarios dejan de cumplir sus compromisos de reforma[55]. Algunos otros afirman que los actores externos no tienen suficiente información para manipular exitosamente ambientes políticos nacionales. Hay quienes han sostenido que la ayuda crea incentivos perversos y que los receptores estarían mejor sin ella. La lógica

de la elección racional ha conducido a que Moyo pida poner fin a la ayuda; Collier, a la soberanía; e Easterly, a la planeación.

FIN A LA AYUDA

En *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is A Better Way*, Dambisa Moyo sostiene que la ayuda debería reducirse significativamente. Escribe: “la idea de que la ayuda puede aliviar la pobreza sistémica y, que de hecho, así ha sucedido, es un mito. Millones de personas en África son más pobres hoy en día a causa de la ayuda; el sufrimiento y la miseria no han terminado; han aumentado. La ayuda ha sido, y sigue siendo, un rotundo desastre humanitario, económico y político para la mayor parte del mundo en vías de desarrollo”[56]. “La ayuda no es benigna; es maligna”[57].

La elección racional es el sustento intelectual de las conclusiones de Moyo. En lugar de fortalecer el buen gobierno, la ayuda lo debilita. La asistencia sesga los incentivos porque los gobernantes responden a donantes externos en vez de a sus propias poblaciones. La ayuda, al sustituir los ingresos tributarios, rompe el vínculo entre los líderes políticos y sus electores[58]. La ayuda frena la reforma porque los donantes externos no actúan con firmeza respecto a la condicionalidad. Primero se establecen condiciones que después serán violadas, pero la ayuda continúa. Como la ayuda carece de mecanismos de rendición de cuentas, la confianza social se debilita. Para los ambiciosos, controlar el gobierno y la posibilidad de disponer —y robar— los apoyos extranjeros que ese control trae consigo

resultan más atractivos que cualquier actividad socialmente productiva. Los gobiernos corruptos minan el Estado de derecho, desalientan el crecimiento de la clase media y debilitan las libertades sociales, factores que son necesarios para la inversión —interna y externa— que a fin de cuentas deberá impulsar el crecimiento. La ayuda puede fomentar una guerra civil porque el control del Estado se convierte en la fuente más importante de riqueza. Incluso sin estos funestos acontecimientos, la ayuda puede desalentar las reformas al despojar a los líderes políticos del sentido de urgencia que de otra manera podrían tener[59].

La ayuda no solo debilita el buen gobierno, también lastima el crecimiento económico. Los índices de ahorro son menores de lo que serían. Las entradas de capital pueden contribuir a la inflación; pueden conducir al síndrome holandés: una moneda sobrevaluada desalienta el crecimiento de sectores orientados a la exportación y distorsiona los precios entre bienes comerciables y no comerciables. Un alto nivel de ayuda puede desalentar la inversión extranjera, pues es reflejo de que el país no está funcionando adecuadamente[60].

Moyo afirma que los Estados africanos se pueden liberar de la ayuda extranjera en un periodo de cinco a diez años[61]. En promedio, 75% del dinero que ingresa a los países del continente proviene de este tipo de ayuda. Los líderes africanos deberían tener como meta que la entrada de capital estuviera distribuida de la siguiente manera: 5% proveniente del apoyo internacional, 30% del comercio, 30% de inversión extranjera directa, 10% de mercados de capital y 25% de remesas y ahorro interno[62]. Deberían obtener calificaciones de crédito internacionales para

sus países; un primer paso para acceder a los mercados de capital internacionales que les son inaccesibles en gran medida por el incumplimiento de sus gobiernos en la liquidación de deuda. Moyo hace notar que solo dos Estados africanos —Ghana y Gabón— han podido emitir bonos en los últimos años[63]. Aparte de permitir el acceso a mercados de crédito internacionales, la mayor contribución de los países desarrollados sería eliminar barreras comerciales, que han sido particularmente graves en el campo de la agricultura. Moyo no concede mayor importancia a dos esfuerzos de gran envergadura para fomentar las exportaciones africanas: La Ley de Crecimiento y Oportunidades para África de los Estados Unidos (AGOA, por sus siglas en inglés) y la iniciativa europea Todo Menos Armas. Señala que no ha habido un incremento significativo en las exportaciones y que la mayoría de los beneficios de la AGOA están dirigidos a solo cuatro países: Nigeria, Gabón, África del Sur y Lesotho[64]. Los líderes africanos deberían sacar mayor provecho a las oportunidades comerciales que ofrece China. Se podría lograr una mayor diversificación por efecto de un comercio intracontinental. El microfinanciamiento podría hacer una mayor contribución. Si los cargos por transacción se redujeran, las remesas podrían ser una fuente de capital aún más importante[65].

Para Moyo, una repentina reducción de la ayuda desataría el crecimiento económico. Rechaza los argumentos que condicionan el crecimiento económico a la democracia; afirma en cambio —en concordancia con la teoría de la modernización— que la democracia es consecuencia del crecimiento. Según su

opinión, la forma ideal de gobierno sería una dictadura benevolente. Sostiene que en China, Chile, Perú, Corea, Malasia, Singapur y Taiwán las políticas de crecimiento fueron promovidas por gobiernos autocráticos[66]. La democracia, si acaso llegó, vino después. La premisa tácita en el análisis de Moyo es que las cosas no se desmoronan[67]. Si hay problemas de gobernanza en Estados africanos, son el resultado de que se dependa de fondos provenientes de donantes externos. Sin esos recursos, el ejercicio del gobierno sería mejor. Lo que ha impedido el crecimiento económico ha sido una serie de políticas inadecuadas, efecto de esta dependencia. Sin este apoyo, las instituciones de gobierno no serían un impedimento para el crecimiento.

FIN A LA SOBERANÍA

La publicación del libro *The Bottom Billion* de Paul Collier en 2007 atrajo una gran atención. Collier apuntó que mientras los países con los 4 000 millones de personas de en medio —como él los llamó— habían crecido rápidamente en las décadas de 1980 y 1990, las naciones con la población de los mil millones más pobres se habían tambaleado: su situación era peor en 2000 de lo que había sido en 1970[68]. Collier identificó cuatro condiciones para que la pobreza se perpetuara: los conflictos armados, los recursos naturales, la falta de litorales cuando no se tiene buenos vecinos y el mal gobierno. A diferencia de Moyo, sostuvo que la ayuda sí tenía un impacto positivo; mejoraba el crecimiento económico en alrededor de un punto porcentual al

año[69]. A diferencia de Sachs, rechazó la idea de que mayor ayuda podría sacar de la miseria a los mil millones en el nivel inferior. Collier concluyó *The Bottom Billion* argumentando que para atacar cada una de las cuatro causas —o trampas— arriba mencionadas, había un tratamiento distinto que resultaba más adecuado. La mejor manera de enfrentar la trampa del conflicto era el compromiso a largo plazo de tropas extranjeras y el desarrollo de infraestructura cuidadosamente supervisado por donantes del exterior. La trampa de los recursos, con ayuda de normas que fomentaran la transparencia presupuestaria. Una ayuda adicional y proveedores de servicios internacionales podrían servir para apoyar a los países sin acceso al mar[70].

En su libro más reciente, *Wars*, *Guns*, *and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*, Collier analiza más detalladamente algunos de los temas que introdujo en *The Bottom Billion*, particularmente el de la trampa del conflicto. Hay situaciones —señala— en las que los actores locales no pueden crear un equilibrio estable y socialmente beneficioso. Los Estados con los mil millones que están en el rango inferior probablemente no tengan la capacidad para proporcionar rendición de cuentas o seguridad. Su reducido tamaño no da cabida a economías de escala, lo que agrava la demanda de recursos. Están desunidos por divisiones étnicas que dificultan la provisión de bienes públicos. Los líderes políticos alientan la ineficacia del Estado, abriéndose así oportunidades para capturar rentas[71]. La violencia civil es un problema inmanente. “Si una rebelión es factible —escribe Collier—, seguro ocurrirá: el nicho del rebelde será ocupado por algún empresario social”[72].

La democracia no puede solucionar los problemas de gobernanza de los mil millones en el rango inferior. Con base en su propio análisis empírico, Collier concluye que la democracia aumenta la violencia en países con ingresos per cápita por debajo de los 2.700 dólares estadounidenses[73]. La imperfección de la información a la que tiene acceso el "club de la miseria" debilita la posibilidad de que una rendición de cuentas democrática mejore el ejercicio del gobierno. Los ciudadanos no cuentan con la información suficiente para saber si un mal desempeño es resultado de decisiones gubernamentales o de sucesos externos fuera del control de sus propios líderes. En parte, los gobernantes participan en actividades para capturar rentas porque saben que sus electores no tendrán información para responsabilizarlos de las malas consecuencias resultantes[74]. Como los beneficios de estar en el poder son sumamente altos comparados con los de cualquier otra opción, quienes mantienen un cargo público buscarán arreglar los procesos electorales. La escasez de recursos dificulta frustrar este tipo de acciones[75].

Si bien Collier comparte el escepticismo de Moyo sobre las bondades de la democracia, también es cierto que se muestra pesimista ante el prospecto de las autocracias, por lo menos en África. Señala que a nivel mundial existe mayor variación en el desempeño económico de los gobiernos autocráticos que en el de los democráticos. Sin embargo, no hay ninguna autocracia africana altamente eficaz. Quizá el dictador benevolente de Moyo sería el gobernante ideal, pero, en el continente que nos ocupa, ningún Estado ha dado origen a una persona con esas

características. Collier sugiere que la autocracia puede ofrecer resultados socialmente beneficiosos únicamente cuando existe un partido fuerte, un partido cuyos seleccionadores puedan remover a las cabezas sin afectar las instituciones del Estado. Las divisiones étnicas en los Estados africanos del "club de la miseria", aunadas a estructuras partidistas poco sólidas, minan los incentivos para que un reducido grupo de seleccionadores llame a cuentas a su líder por la pobreza de las políticas. Si un dirigente cae, todos sus seguidores caen con él[76].

Los problemas de gobernanza, seguridad y prestación de servicios son más agudos en entornos de conflicto y posconflicto. Según Collier, aun cuando hay menores posibilidades de que los regímenes autocráticos regresen a la violencia a que lo hagan los democráticos, no hay grandes probabilidades de paz en ninguno de los dos casos. El crecimiento económico puede reducir el riesgo de violencia, pero solo si se trata de un crecimiento sostenido a lo largo de una década[77].

Collier concluye que en muchos Estados africanos —y en especial en aquellos que ya han sido sacudidos por la guerra civil— es imposible alcanzar un equilibrio autovinculante entre los distintos actores nacionales que se acerque a la frontera de Pareto. La ayuda puede desempeñar un papel fundamental en ambientes de posconflicto. Los fondos extranjeros pueden sustentar un entorno monetario sólido y crear infraestructura. Pero más importante es que los actores externos pueden brindar seguridad. Según los resultados de las investigaciones de Collier, una inversión de 100 millones de dólares en operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz puede reducir el riesgo de guerra

civil en 21%[78].

Incluso cuando hay condiciones más propicias —países que no se están recuperando de una guerra civil—, Collier se mantiene pesimista en relación con las perspectivas de una rendición de cuentas en el ámbito nacional[79]. Propone un pacto en el que los donantes brinden mayor ayuda a cambio de que los líderes políticos se comprometan a elecciones libres y justas. Los donantes anunciarían que, en caso de que el gobierno subvirtiera posteriormente dicha elección, *no* se opondrían a un golpe de Estado militar, siempre y cuando los líderes golpistas estuvieran, a su vez, dispuestos a prometer un regreso al régimen democrático. Así sería menos probable que los líderes políticos —conscientes de que podrían ser derrocados por la milicia— sabotearan un proceso electoral. Otra posibilidad es que si un gobierno libremente electo fuera depuesto por un golpe de Estado, los garantes internacionales anunciaran que ellos mismos destituirían al nuevo régimen. El anuncio serviría como mecanismo de compromiso y, en la mayoría de los países con los mil millones de personas más pobres, el costo de una intervención militar sería reducido. Ante la verosimilitud de esta amenaza, los militares se abstendrían de derrocar a un gobierno libremente electo[80]. Collier no es un autor que se resista a llevar sus argumentos hasta su lógica conclusión.

Collier también profundiza en la necesidad de contar con proveedores de servicios independientes, una sugerencia que hizo originalmente en *The Bottom Billion.* El Estado establecería las políticas pertinentes, pero la prestación del servicio estaría a cargo de una serie de entidades distintas, entre ellas,

organizaciones no gubernamentales, grupos religiosos o empresas privadas. Con el fin de garantizar que los fondos se utilizaran apropiadamente, sería preciso crear una dependencia que fungiera de intermediario entre los ministerios encargados de establecer las políticas y los proveedores de servicios propiamente dichos. Los donantes, el país anfitrión y la sociedad civil estarían a cargo de monitorear los trabajos de esta oficina[81]. La Comisión de Consolidación de la Paz de las Naciones Unidas y el gobierno nacional podrían compartir la soberanía en situaciones de posconflicto. Algunos actores proporcionarían fuerzas de seguridad; otros, asistencia extranjera, y unos más, servicios. El gobierno tendría la responsabilidad de la orientación general en materia de políticas[82].

Collier concluye que “lejos de avanzar de manera sostenida desde la violencia política hacia una democracia legítima y responsable, el “club de la miseria” se ha dirigido a un callejón sin salida: unas elecciones competitivas sin limitación alguna frustrarían la cooperación interna y una soberanía presidencial frustraría la cooperación externa”[83]. Collier opina que los actores locales no serán capaces de lograr un equilibrio autovinculante, cada vez mayor, según el principio de Pareto. Un equilibrio de esta naturaleza solo se puede alcanzar si los actores externos se involucran directamente. Para que los países con los mil millones en el rango inferior progresen, se debe violar el entendimiento convencional de los principios de soberanía Westfaliana-Vatteliana.

Por lo tanto, mientras que Moyo considera liberador el fin de la participación extranjera, Collier piensa que es potencialmente

desastroso. Para Collier no existe una expectativa natural de orden. La existencia de organizaciones de gobierno formales es fundamental y no hay garantía alguna de que surjan por sí mismas. La vida puede ser desagradable, brutal y breve para los mil millones más pobres. Los líderes políticos en este rango inferior, como en cualquier otro Estado, responden a incentivos. Sin la intervención de actores externos, con frecuencia estos incentivos podrían ser abyectos.

FIN A LA PLANEACIÓN

La obra de William Easterly, como la de Moyo y la de Collier, se basa en el análisis de elección racional. Para Easterly, uno de los mayores retos a los que se enfrentan los donantes es la asimetría en la información. Los actores locales saben mucho; los donantes externos apenas un poco. Easterly sostiene que por este motivo los donantes solo pueden obtener resultados positivos si limitan sus aspiraciones. Está en contra de las grandes estrategias o, para fines prácticos, de cualquier tipo de estrategia. En *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So little Good*, Easterly argumenta que las agencias de ayuda deben dedicarse a buscar y no a planear; deben aferrarse a programas específicos que alivien la pobreza, de preferencia programas diseñados desde adentro y no por donantes externos.

En *The White Man's Burden*, el autor tiene mayores reservas en sus recomendaciones sobre políticas que en su libro anterior, *The Elusive Quest for Growth*, donde analiza la triste historia de

la ayuda en relación con su impacto —apenas perceptible— y con las teorías que se habían utilizado para defenderla. Concluye que ninguna de ellas estaba sustentada en evidencia empírica. Los donantes seguían casados con el modelo de la brecha financiera —modelos de crecimiento que dependían totalmente del capital e ignoraban tanto la mano de obra como la tecnología— incluso mucho después de que se hubiera desacreditado su fundamentación teórica. No prestaban atención a los resultados de la evidencia empírica que indicaban que no había relación alguna entre la ayuda y el crecimiento[84]. Easterly descarta otros enfoques sobre la ayuda que se basan en supuestos sobre la importancia del capital humano, el rápido crecimiento poblacional y el exceso de deuda. En *The Elusive Quest* señala que los incentivos son fundamentales, que el mal gobierno y las políticas gubernamentales equivocadas podrían ser apabullantes, que la corrupción —particularmente la descentralizada— podría acabar con el crecimiento y que las poblaciones polarizadas impulsaban a los líderes políticos a proporcionar bienes privados más que colectivos[85]. Finalmente indica que, para que haya desarrollo, se debe conjuntar una serie de factores —entre ellos, un gobierno aceptable, el uso apropiado de la tecnología, la educación y políticas adecuadas —, y argumenta que, inevitablemente, existe un elemento de suerte aunado a la consecución idónea de todos estos componentes[86].

La lectura que se puede hacer de *The White Man's Burden* es que Easterly reconoce que los agentes externos no pueden hacer mucho por alinear los incentivos, crear instituciones

pertinentes y fomentar las políticas correctas. Señala que son contados los ejemplos del éxito de esfuerzos de actores externos por transformar una sociedad determinada.

Es posible —apunta— que la ocupación estadounidense después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial sea uno de los pocos casos en la historia donde alguien ajeno logra la transformación verticalista de una sociedad. De ser así, este hecho no se presta a ser reproducido, pues solo con la aniquilación absoluta se tuvo la oportunidad de rehacer Japón. Sin embargo, la mayoría de las pruebas apuntan hacia factores endógenos: en el escenario más favorecedor, los estadounidenses estaban reconstruyendo una economía ya en sí avanzada[87].

Los grandes éxitos de un crecimiento económico sostenido posteriores a la guerra —los de China, Corea del Sur, Hong Kong, Singapur y Botswana incluidos— han sido éxitos obtenidos por cada uno de estos países[88]. “Incluso cuando Occidente no logra ‘desarrollar a El Resto, El Resto se desarrolla por sí mismo’. El éxito de desarrollo de El Resto se debe, mayoritariamente, a esfuerzos independientes y exploratorios; a tomar prestadas ideas, instituciones y tecnología occidentales cuando así le conviene a El Resto”[89].

Desde el punto de vista de Easterly, la ayuda está desafortunadamente dominada por planeadores y no por buscadores. Los planeadores establecen metas específicas —como los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio— y diseñan elaboradas estrategias para alcanzarlas. Los planeadores fracasan porque las circunstancias locales siempre son complejas. Por lo general, los actores externos no comprenden a cabalidad el entorno en el que operan. Los programas tienen

consecuencias no previstas. Los buscadores, en cambio, establecen metas generales —como reducir la pobreza— y después identifican programas específicos que sean eficaces. El modelo organizacional adecuado, señala Easterly, debería ser el de “salir del paso” de Lindblom[90].

Easterly no niega que un mal gobierno pueda destruir las posibilidades de crecimiento y desarrollo. “Sabemos que la flagrante violación del libre mercado y el autoengrandecimiento brutal de los autócratas suele impedir el éxito”[91]. Sin embargo, es muy escéptico ante el llamado a que actores externos intervengan. En un artículo publicado en la revista *Boston Review* en el que retoma las propuestas de Collier sobre la provisión externa de seguridad, Easterly afirma que: “las intervenciones agresivas de esa naturaleza tendrán, casi sin lugar a duda, consecuencias negativas tencionadas. ¿Generará más violencia local la violencia occidental? ¿Habrá un contragolpe dirigido a la intervención extranjera? […] El lema ‘primero, no lastimes’ pone el peso de la prueba en los académicos que intervienen”[92].

Moyo, Collier, Easterly —todos autores que se basan en la lógica causal de la elección racional— llegan a conclusiones muy diferentes sobre la ayuda y la construcción de Estado. Moyo pide la supresión de la ayuda; Collier, el fin de la soberanía Wesfaliana-Vatteliana; Easterly, esfuerzos poco sistemáticos para mejorar la vida individual de las personas. La diferencia entre los estudiosos que trabajan desde una perspectiva de elección racional estriba en la importancia que atribuyan a la falta de un buen ejercicio de gobierno, en particular en lo que se

refiere a la provisión de seguridad. Raymond Fisman y Edward Miguel lo explican con claridad: “Entre los economistas existe un desacuerdo fundamental en el tema de ayuda externa. [Esencialmente,] se reduce a si los países ricos ya han proporcionado demasiado dinero […] o ni siquiera el suficiente. Resulta que la respuesta depende enormemente del punto de vista que se tenga sobre el papel de la corrupción y la violencia en el empobrecimiento de las naciones”[93]. Moyo asume que si se pone fin a la ayuda extranjera, la corrupción disminuirá significativamente. Collier argumenta que algunos países se ven atrapados en una situación de conflicto que impide acuerdos autovinculantes beneficiosos según el principio de Pareto entre las elites locales y que, en ese caso, la intervención extranjera es el único camino a seguir para lograr el crecimiento. Easterly, refutando a Collier, opina que una intervención torpe por parte de Occidente —y nada lo es más que la provisión de seguridad— puede, fácilmente, empeorar la situación: es mejor permitir que los países salgan del paso y que las agencias de ayuda apoyen los pasos exitosos.

CONCLUSIONES: TEORÍA Y PRÁCTICA

En el ámbito académico estadounidense, la elección racional ha llegado a dominar la discusión intelectual sobre el desarrollo del Estado. Sin embargo, en el ámbito de la ayuda extranjera, más relacionado con las políticas, es un elemento menor, si no es que completamente inexistente. En la práctica, la asignación de fondos de asistencia exterior se basa principalmente en la teoría

de la modernización y en inquietudes relativas a la capacidad institucional.

Alrededor de 90% del flujo de la ayuda es consistente con la teoría de la modernización y con enfoques que ponen el acento en la capacidad institucional. El Sistema de Notificación por parte de los Países Acreedores (CRS, por sus siglas en inglés) de la OCDE recoge información sobre los flujos de ayuda oficial al desarrollo (OAD) por actividad para los veintidós miembros del Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo y para varios otros donantes multilaterales como la Asociación Internacional de Desarrollo (AID) y la Comunidad Europea. El CRS tiene 194 códigos de sector destino que incluyen prácticamente cualquier tipo de actividad de ayuda imaginable; por ejemplo: salud, educación, seguridad, consolidación de la paz, abastecimiento de agua, alivio de deuda, ayuda humanitaria, apoyo presupuestal, medio ambiente, agricultura, pesca, infraestructura y apoyo a las ONG.

Estos códigos son una manera de ver cómo los flujos de la asistencia extranjera caen sobre los tres distintos enfoques que se describen en este artículo. En el periodo 2002-2007, un poco más de 70% de los apoyos se realizaron en concordancia con la teoría de la modernización. Entre los grandes rubros de esta categoría están el apoyo presupuestal directo y el alivio de deuda. Alrededor de 19% siguió patrones afines a la capacidad institucional. La mayoría de estos fondos fueron asignados a gestión administrativa y capacitación de varios sectores. Aproximadamente 9% de los fondos se desembolsaron de acuerdo con el principio de elección racional.

La aceptación implícita de la teoría de la modernización y la construcción de capacidad institucional que se observa tanto en declaraciones públicas como en la propia asignación de recursos no es resultado del conocimiento empírico. Los resultados de la investigación sobre la eficacia de la ayuda son, en el mejor de los casos, ambivalentes[94]. Si la ayuda fuera un negocio que tuviera como objetivo promover el crecimiento económico, habría caído en bancarrota hace muchos años, incluso si se considera que una gran parte de la ayuda ha sido utilizada con fines estratégicos y políticos que pueden no guardar relación alguna con el apoyo al desarrollo[95].

A pesar de los cuestionables resultados obtenidos por el flujo de ayuda distribuida de acuerdo con la teoría de la modernización y, desde la década de 1990, con los principios de la capacidad institucional, se ha prestado poca atención a los enfoques sustentados en la elección racional. El escaso atractivo de estos últimos en el ámbito de las políticas no se debe a la falta de conocimientos académicos. Las agencias para el desarrollo, tanto nacionales como multilaterales, según decíamos, están repletas de especialistas. El grado en que las teorías de la modernización y de la capacidad institucional siguen orientando la asignación de recursos más bien refleja lo que James Scott llama “desde el punto de vista de un Estado”[96].

Los Estados —señala Scott— deben ser capaces de hacer “legibles” los entornos social, económico y político, es decir, manejables desde el punto de vista administrativo. Antes del siglo XX, la actividad del Estado se limitaba fundamentalmente a los impuestos, al servicio militar y al mantenimiento del orden

político interno. Cuando el Estado quiso gravar la tierra, promovió que un sistema de plena propiedad delimitada por mapas catastrales sustituyera las prácticas tradicionales donde los derechos de suelo se podían dividir según las distintas actividades (pastoreo, agricultura, tala) y las lindes podían traslaparse entre distintos dueños y la propiedad de la tierra podía ser colectiva, familiar e incluso individual. Cuando el Estado buscó reclutar o gravar a los individuos, insistió en que se asignaran apellidos, un distintivo superfluo cuando la actividad política estaba en manos del noble local. La ampliación del campo de acción del Estado en los siglos XIX y XX no habría sido posible si no se hubiera hecho legible un número significativamente mayor de esferas de la vida social y económica[97].

Es difícil lograr que la ayuda extranjera sea *legible*, particularmente cuando se trata de analizar las aportaciones en términos de resultados. Rara vez los donantes tienen un control fidedigno de las acciones dentro de los países receptores. Su conocimiento del entorno local es —como señala Easterly— inevitablemente limitado. En la mayoría de los casos, la enorme cantidad de factores que pueden afectar el desenlace dificulta juzgar la utilidad de cualquier programa determinado[98].

Sí se puede lograr que las aportaciones de ayuda extranjera concordantes con la teoría de la modernización y la construcción de capacidad institucional sean *legibles* o manejables. En el caso de la teoría de la modernización, la atención se centra en destinar recursos a los Estados meta. La aspiración más frecuente de la comunidad internacional ha sido que se destine

0,7% del PIB a asistencia para el desarrollo. Medir ese objetivo no representa ningún problema.

Es posible lograr que la construcción de capacidad institucional se pueda leer midiendo el número de personas capacitadas o la cantidad de asistencia técnica proporcionada. Por ejemplo, un elemento crítico de la política estadounidense en Iraq y Afganistán ha sido la capacitación de un número previamente determinado de policías y militares. Medir qué hacen esas personas después de haber sido capacitadas resulta más complejo y puede generar cuestionamientos sobre la conveniencia de haberlos capacitado en primera instancia. Las aportaciones a la construcción de capacidades institucionales son legibles; los resultados quizá no lo sean.

No es del todo posible, en cambio, lograr que los programas de asistencia basados en la elección racional sean legibles por el simple hecho de reportar las aportaciones, particularmente cuando se trata de programas diseñados para modificar los escenarios internos de elección más que los externos. Es difícil defender la inversión en organizaciones de la sociedad civil, en capacitación de legisladores o para apoyar un sistema judicial más independiente como un fin en sí mismo. Más bien, es de esperarse que gracias a este tipo de programas la adopción de políticas que procuren mayor bienestar a la sociedad en su conjunto sea más atractiva para los líderes políticos. Sin embargo, no existe donante internacional alguno que pueda tener una certeza sobre el impacto real de estos programas. Es difícil saber cómo una legislatura que contara con mayores apoyos cambiaría los cálculos personales de los líderes políticos.

La elección racional indica que la ayuda extranjera es como el capital de riesgo donde solo un porcentaje pequeño de las inversiones tienen resultados positivos. La diferencia radica en que los Estados requieren mayor previsibilidad y consistencia que los inversionistas de capital de riesgo.

Actualmente, las discusiones en el entorno académico están dominadas por las perspectivas de elección racional que subrayan la importancia de incentivos, conductas estratégicas y, por lo general, también de las instituciones. Por el contrario, en el ámbito de los sistemas de gobierno, la teoría de la modernización y la construcción de instituciones alimentan tanto la retórica como el comportamiento en sí de las agencias para el desarrollo. Sin importar cuán lógicamente convincente sea el razonamiento de la elección racional, para quienes diseñan las políticas será difícil aceptar sus implicaciones en el campo de la ayuda extranjera. Aun cuando Easterly probablemente esté en lo correcto cuando señala la necesidad de contar con buscadores más que con planeadores, el tipo de programas de asistencia que él suscribe es *ilegible*. Las conclusiones a las que llegan Collier y Moyo, independientemente de su mérito, se encontrarían con la oposición de importantes electores en los principales países donantes. Por lo menos en la Europa social demócrata, gran parte del electorado quiere brindar ayuda. Por otro lado, los Estados no están deseosos de comprometer tropas, aunque —como señala Collier— en muchas situaciones el número requerido para imponer la paz sea bastante modesto. Tal vez la ayuda fundamentada en las teorías de la modernización y de la capacidad institucional no funcione —o

por lo menos ha resultado difícil demostrar que sí lo hace—, pero seguirá dominando las prácticas de las agencias de ayuda tanto a nivel nacional como multilateral.

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Lectura 2

Should global goal setting continue, and how, in the post-2015 era?[99]

Sakiko Fukuda-Parr[100]

INTRODUCTION

The 21st century began with an unprecedented commitment to a new consensus on ending poverty as the central purpose of international development. World leaders from 189 countries, including 147 Heads of State and Government, gathered at the United Nations General Assembly to define the central challenges for the new century. They adopted the Millennium Declaration (UN 2000 (A/RES/55/2)) which stated their determination to work towards development and poverty eradication, peace and security, environmental conservation, democracy and human rights. They pledged to “spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty” (paragraph 11). They further emphasized that the global reach of these commitments went beyond their own national borders to people worldwide, notwithstanding the primary responsibility that Governments have for their own citizens.

The Declaration was a visionary document that reiterated the shared values of solidarity, equality, dignity and respect for nature

as the basis for their consensus and was exceptional for its clear vision and articulation. It was also particularly powerful because it went beyond vision and values and included a concrete action plan by setting ambitious and measurable goals with a clearly defined deadline. One year later, the Secretary-General published his implementation plan, the Road Map document (A/56/326), which contained, in an annex, a list of goals derived from the Declaration. These were structured and elaborated as 8 goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators and packaged with a new catchy name, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)[101]. The purpose of this list was to “harmonize reporting on the Millennium Declaration” (p. 55, paragraph 1).

The expiration of the MDGs in 2015 raises several questions: should they expire, be renewed with an extended deadline, or be replaced with a new set of global goals?

The objective of this paper is to argue for the last option. The expiry is an opportunity to correct some of the deficiencies of the MDG approach, and to set new goals that more adequately reflect the equitable growth and human rights-based development strategy set out in the Millennium Declaration. The paper begins with a critical review of the MDG experience, highlights its importance in development debates and outcomes, and its flaws in composition and implementation. The subsequent section details the MDG experience by explaining their goals as a normative instrument rooted in human rights and their origins in the controversies of the 1980s and 90s. The paper then proposes an approach to setting post-2015 goals based on the ethical commitments of the Millennium Declaration. The final section

concludes.

THE MDG EXPERIENCE: 2001-2011

THE IMPORTANCE OF MDGS

Poverty as a global priority

According to Weiss, Jolly and Emmerij (2009), the MDGs were among the most important UN ideas that changed the world. Like most UN resolutions, the MDGs could have been forgotten within a few weeks or months of their introduction, but they continue to dominate international debates on development. As one of the architects of the MDGs remarks, “The conceivers of the MDGs never expected the support to spread so wide and so deep” (Vandemoortele, 2009). The MDGs have become the standard reference point around which international debates on development revolve. They are used as a proxy to judge progress in tackling global poverty. The UN, the World Bank and numerous other international bodies monitor MDG implementation and issue annual reports with detailed data. The staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) systematically include data on MDG targets in their country reports, along with key macroeconomic performance indicators. UN meetings to review progress in achieving MDGs have become both frequent and high-profile political events that are significant for a country’s prestige and international standing. Political leaders make speeches defending policy initiatives with the warning: “Without

such and such action the MDGs will not be achieved". Economists write research papers on macroeconomic policy choices and evaluate them against contributions to achieving MDGs. Local NGOs advocate national budget reforms "to achieve the MDGs", however critical they may be of these goals, because the MDGs are the accepted standard to evaluate policy. Media reports on poverty refer to failure to achieve MDGs as a demonstration of pervasive abject poverty. In other words, MDGs have become a convenient shorthand of development and poverty alleviation…

The MDGs have raised awareness of ending global poverty as an urgent challenge and a priority for global action. They have helped to maintain development as a priority, not only at the UN, but also in other fora such as meetings of the G-8 and G-20. But their importance in shaping international development debates goes further. Since their introduction in 2001, the MDGs have become increasingly accepted and consolidated as the legitimized framework for debates on international development. Even those who initially opposed them or hesitated to embrace them now use them[102]. In so doing, MDGs have shaped the international development debates in several ways.

First, the MDGs institutionalized the consensus on ending poverty—their broad purpose as a whole or a package—as an international norm (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, 2011)[103].

Second, the MDGs have come to reshape the concept of "development" to mean ending poverty. Poverty has not been the central issue in development, but has been more about transforming economic structures and creating capacity for

sustainable growth. Yet, as I will explore later in this paper, this reconceptualization of development has also had perverse effects on development policy debates by over-simplifying the challenges involved.

Third, the MDGs have helped defining poverty as a multidimensional deprivation in the lives of people, including such dimensions as education, health, environment, food, employment, housing, and gender equality—or "human poverty"[104]. Since the 1990s, the question of how poverty should be defined and measured has been a subject of much controversy. Though it is now widely recognized that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon and a human centred concern, the most frequently used definition has been consumption based, and its measurement defined as the money-centric headcount below a threshold level of income[105].

MDGS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY

National Governments and donor agencies have consistently adopted MDGs as an important part of their policy frameworks. What this has meant, in practice, has ranged from rhetorical adoption, such as referring to them in general policy statements, to instrumental adoption, such as using the targets to drive resource allocation and policy shifts. For example, as part of the MDG implementation effort, the UN Millennium project made a major effort to assist Governments with the necessary cost and programme investments to achieve the 2015 targets. In most

cases, these estimates were controversial and were not incorporated into national planning, budgeting and resource mobilization processes such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, national development plans and budgets. In fact, in a 2008 study (Fukuda-Parr 2008) I reviewed 22 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)[106] under implementation and found that they consistently referred to the MDGs as a major national development objective, but not all included timelines or action plans for achieving the targets. Moreover, those that did were selective about which of the 8 goals and 18 targets were incorporated in the papers. While many included income poverty, primary education, child mortality and water goals, other goals (e.g., decent work, food and nutrition, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and global partnerships) were consistently neglected. Additionally, many PRSPs adopted a strategy of economic growth and social sector investments without considering distributional challenges. Implicitly, PRSPs have assumed that aggregate national economic growth and social sector expansion would lead to the achievement of the goals through a process of “trickle down” without acknowledging the considerable evidence that macroeconomic policies may have distributional impacts that can undermine poverty reduction. Only one of the PRSPs reviewed mentioned inequality and gave attention to the most vulnerable.

The same study reviewed policy frameworks of 21 bilateral donors and found all consistently mentioned MDGs as overall objectives. Environmental sustainability, education, health and global diseases as well as income poverty were the goals mostly

cited. Priority was also given to governance, including human rights and democracy, as well as peace and security that are chapters of the Millennium Declaration but were not included in the MDGs. However, none of the donors have adopted MDGs as a framework for allocation of resources and for programming purposes.

Nonetheless, there has been a perceptible increase in funding for social sectors and within these sectors, for primary basic services (see tables 1 and 2). ODA for other MDG priorities, notably food production and agriculture, which are important for reducing hunger and malnutrition and for reducing rural poverty, also increased but less markedly. Increased ODA allocation to primary basic services took place at the expense of other sectors. The proportion of aid allocated by member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to basic social services increased from 10.1% in 1999 to 21.0% in 2009 while the proportion of ODA for building trade capacity declined from 38.5% in 2001 to 28.9% in 2009.

TABLE 1
ODA COMMITMENTS BY OECD/DAC BILATERAL DONORS, 1990-2010 ($2010 MILLIONS)

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Social Infrastructure and Services	19,844	20,231	20,919	34,174	44,333
Production Sectors	10,322	6,755	4,405	5,997	8,977
Agriculture	-	2,142	2,219	3,042	5,372
General Budget Support	1,155	1,291	561	1,826	2,365
Education Total	8,631	7,307	5,522	6,656	9,470
Basic Education	-	775	1,166	1,910	2,510
Health Total	2,441	2,845	2,385	4,076	5,116

Basic Health	-	1,266	1,329	2,532	2,945
Food Crop Production	-	83	66	102	239

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (2011A), HTTP://MDGS.UN.ORG/UNSD/MDG/RESOURCES/STATIC/DATA/2011%20STAT%20ANNEX.PDF. ACCESSED APRIL 14, 2012.

TABLE 2

PROPORTION OF TOTAL BILATERAL, SECTOR-ALLOCABLE ODA OF OECD/DAC BILATERAL DONORS TO BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES AND AID FOR TRADE, 1999-2009 (PER CENT)

	1999	2001	2003	2005	2007	2009
Basic social services (MDG indicator 8.2)	10.1	14.0	15.7	15.9	19.9	21.0
Aid for trade (MDG indicator 8.9)	-	38.5	29.0	30.7	27.7	28.9

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (2011A) HTTP://MDGS.UN.ORG/UNSD/MDG/RESOURCES/STATIC/DATA/2011%20STAT%20ANNEX.PDF. ACCESSED APRIL 14, 2012.

While the years following the introduction of the MDGs were notable for the ambitious and high profile political commitments made by the G-8 countries, such as the pledge to double development aid to Africa (or 0.51% of their GNIs) made at the Gleneagles Summit in 2005, they have largely not been implemented (United Nations, 2011: 12, figure 3), except for a few cases[107]. Moreover, no significant international poverty initiatives were launched, and the rich countries have not shifted their positions on critical international economic policies including trade, finance, investment and technology transfer. As the title of the UN MDG Gap Task Force 2011 report, “The Global Partnership for Development: Time to Deliver”, makes clear, donor countries have fallen far short of implementing their Goal 8 targets for aid, trade, debt and technology (United Nations, 2011a). So far, the only tangible progress in these areas has

been the reduction of the debt burden of the poorest countries. Multilateral trade negotiations—the Doha Round, labelled the "development round"—have become deadlocked, largely over differences between developing and developed country positions on agricultural subsidies in the developed countries. Aid commitments have increased in volume, but these trends started before 2000 and have slowed since 2006. Moreover ODA flows still remained at 0.31% of donor GNI in 2010, far short of the UN target of 0.7% of GNI. There has been substantial reallocation to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)—from $21 billion in 2000 to $29 billion by 2009 (2009 prices and exchange rates). But this is still only 0.10% cent of donors' GNI compared with the UN target for ODA to LDCs of 0.15-0.2% of GNI (United Nations, 2011a: 10, table 1).

Beyond Governments, the MDGs have spawned numerous responses on the part of local governments, civil society and businesses across the world. For example, in Ecuador, local governments used MDGs as a framework for establishing priority action plans. In Brazil, the MDGs have mobilized the national petroleum company to initiate social projects. The numbers participating in the "Stand Up Against Poverty" campaign have mushroomed into millions. There are numerous other examples, though it is difficult to assess the impact of these diverse and disparate initiatives.

TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF GLOBAL AND NATIONAL PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING THE MDGS

	IMPROVEMENT	DISTANCE	ON TRACK	FASTER	FASTER

	SINCE 1990	PROGRESSED TO GLOBAL GOAL (100% = GOAL ATTAINED)		PROGRESS 1990-2000/2000-8	THAN HISTORICAL PATTERNS
I. Global Progress					
Poverty	Y	80	Y	Y	-
Undernourishment	Y	77	N	N	-
Primary Education	Y	90	N	Y	N
Gender Equality*	Y	96	Y	N	N
Child Mortality	Y	69	N	Y	Y
Maternal Mortality	Y	57	N	Y	Y
Drinking Water	Y	88	Y	N	-

II. National Progress	% OF COUNTRIES MAKING PROGRESS	% OF COUNTRIES ON TRACK	% OF COUNTRIES FASTER PROGRESS THAN PRE-MDGS	% OF COUNTRIES OUTPERFORMING HISTORICAL PATTERNS	FASTER THAN HISTORICAL PATTERNS
Poverty	63	47	51	-	-
Undernourishment	55	25	-	-	-
Primary Education	75	55	35	68	-
Gender Equality*	61	89/82**	46	56	-
Child Mortality	95	36	32	51	-
Maternal Mortality	83	30	-	33	-
Drinking Water	73	66	34	-	-

NOTES: * REPRESENTS THE PROPORTION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR WHICH THE APPROPRIATE DATA IS AVAILABLE. ** GENDER EQUALITY FOR PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, RESPECTIVELY.
SOURCE: MELAMED (2012: 12).

Surprisingly, the consensus on poverty as a policy priority has not led to fundamental debates or new thinking about policy alternatives for faster poverty reduction. Over the last half-century, many ideas have marked the evolution of development thought and driven historical shifts in theory and strategies. Some examples that come to mind include Basic Needs in the 1970s,

structural adjustment and neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, and Human Development in the 1990s, all of which brought elements of theoretical ideas with practical policy strategies. Such shifts in policy strategies did not occur since the consensus on poverty as a priority emerged. While poverty reduction was identified as the "overarching" objective, development strategies continued to follow the approach of the 1990s that emphasized macroeconomic stabilization as the priority objective through the application of "Washington Consensus" policies to promote aggregate economic growth through private investments. Greater focus has been placed on social sector investments to meet basic needs and on social protection, including conditional cash transfers.

For sure, important studies have been published and there have been many departures from the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s. Social investments and protection, including initiatives such as conditional cash transfers, have emerged as important priorities. But the core macroeconomic strategies have remained unchallenged. The MDGs did not propel new thinking about challenging the macroeconomic policy approaches of the Washington Consensus framework and their implications for poverty reduction have not emerged into mainstream international policy debates. In other words, the core Washington Consensus policies aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization have continued to dominate development strategies, only supplemented by emphasis on social investments. New development strategies and approaches have emerged not from mainstream thinking and advice from the

international community, but from innovation within developing countries that have not been in IMF policy-based lending programmes. These approaches have included not only alternative growth strategies, but also poverty reduction strategies, particularly in Brazil and several other Latin American countries which have achieved not only stable economic growth and weathered the global financial crisis, but have also reduced inequality. These policy approaches are similar to those that have been raised by interventionists, in terms of promoting expansionary macroeconomic policies, expanding employment, and raising incomes of the poorest through targeted programs such as conditional cash transfers.

OUTCOMES

It is difficult to assess whether the MDGs have had an impact on the pace of poverty reduction and development outcomes, since it is impossible to attribute any recent trends to the MDGs as opposed to the myriad of other factors that have driven national poverty outcomes. But the problem remains that while poverty reduction has continued globally, progress has been too slow and unevenly distributed (table 3). Overall, the pace of progress has not accelerated, with Sub-Saharan Africa showing faster progress than other regions (table 4). Progress has been uneven also among different social groups, thus reflecting persistent horizontal inequalities (table 5).

TABLE 4
GLOBAL POVERTY ESTIMATES, 1990-2015

	PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION			NUMBER OF POOR (MILLIONS)		
	1990	2005	2015	1990	2005	2015*
$1.25 Poverty line						
East Asia and Pacific	54.7	16.8	5.9	873.3	316.2	119.0
China	60.2	15.9	4.8	683.2	207.7	66.1
Europe and Central Asia	2.0	3.7	1.2	9.1	17.3	5.8
Latin America and the Caribbean	11.3	8.2	4.7	49.6	45.1	29.1
Middle East and North Africa	4.3	3.6	1.3	9.7	11.0	4.8
South Asia	51.7	40.3	22.4	579.2	595.6	379.3
India	51.3	41.6	22.4	435.5	455.8	276.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	57.6	50.9	35.8	295.7	388.4	344.7
Total	41.7	25.2	14.4	1,816.6	1,373.5	882.7
Total, excluding China	-	-	-	1,133.4	1,165.8	816.6
$2 Poverty line						
East Asia and Pacific	79.8	38.7	19.7	1,273.70	728.7	399.4
China	84.6	36.3	15.4	960.8	473.7	213.4
Europe and Central Asia	6.9	8.9	4.5	31.9	41.9	21.4
Latin America and the Caribbean	19.7	16.6	10.7	86.3	91.3	66.3
Middle East and North Africa	19.7	16.9	7.2	44.4	51.5	26.2
South Asia	82.7	73.9	57.1	926	1,091.5	967.2
India	82.6	75.6	56.9	701.6	827.7	702.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	76.2	73.0	57.7	391.2	556.7	555.6
Total	63.2	47.0	33.1	2,753.5	2,561.5	2,036.1
Total, excluding China	-	-	-	1,792.7	2,087.8	1,822.7

NOTES: * PROJECTIONS.
SOURCE: MELAMED (2012: 13-14).

The UN and other international agencies assess progress made against the 2015 targets, focussing on the level of achievement. According to the 2011 UN MDG Progress Report (United Nations, 2011c), globally, the 2015 targets for income poverty (goal 1) and water (goal 7) are on track to be met, while

there is steady progress in the reduction of child mortality (goal 4), malaria and other global diseases (goal 6). Primary school enrollment has been advancing, but the pace has begun to slow down and the goal of universal enrollment may not be achieved. More alarmingly, there has been either stagnation or regress for some goals and targets. For instance, the proportion of people who are hungry (goal 1) has plateaued at 16% since 2000/2002; the number of undernourished people grew from 817 million in 1990/92 to 830 million in 2005/2007; employment and decent work (goal 1) have shown a setback in many countries; progress has been slow in gender equality and empowerment, other than in primary education (goal 3), and in reducing maternal mortality (goal 5).

TABLE 5
SELECTED MDG INDICATORS: NATIONAL AVERAGE AND SELECTED SOCIAL GROUPS

	NATIONAL AVERAGE	WOMEN	RURAL POPULATION	POOREST 20%
MDG 1 - Underweight prevalence in children under five, 2003-2009 (%)				
Developing countries excl. China	23	24	28	40
Sub-Saharan Africa	22	21	25	29
South Asia	42	42	45	56
LDCs	28	27	30	34
China	6	7	8	-
India	43	43	46	57
MDG 4 - Measles coverage, 2008 (%)				
Developing countries excl. China	81	64	61	51
Sub-Saharan Africa	72	58	55	45
South Asia	74	59	58	44
LDCs	76	65	62	56

	NATIONAL AVERAGE	RURAL WOMEN	RURAL POPULATION	POOREST 20%
China	94	-	-	-
India	70	56	54	40
MDG 5 - Births attended by skilled health personnel, 2003-2009 (%)				
Developing countries excl. China	63	-	50	28
Sub-Saharan Africa	46	-	36	24
South Asia	42	-	33	17
LDCs	38	-	29	24
China	98	-	97	..
India	47	-	38	19

SOURCE: MELAMED (2012: 17).

The impact of the MDGs on changing policy behaviour and outcomes would be reflected not on the levels of achievement but rather on whether the pace of progress had improved. Countries have different starting points, and, for many countries, achieving the MDGs may not be feasible even if they were to adopt improved efforts resulting in better performance (Clemens and others, 2007). In another paper (Fukuda-Parr and others, forthcoming), my co-authors and I have argued that the criterion for success should be improvement in performance to be measured by the pace of progress. We proposed a methodology for this criterion and made estimates for 24 MDG indicators.

Our findings were disappointing at the country level, but more encouraging for sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia as regions. We found improved performance by a majority of countries for just five of the 24 indicators studied. On the other hand, the majority of sub-Saharan African countries showed improved progress for 16 indicators (table 3). At the global level, the pace of progress improved for under-5 mortality rate, measles

immunization and gender parity in primary schooling, but not for attended births or safe drinking water. For income poverty, the pace improved in all developing regions. South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa—the two regions with the highest concentrations of poverty—showed consistent improvement and performed better than the other regions. In sub-Saharan Africa, progress has been made at a faster rate for all but one indicator for which data are available since the MDGs were introduced. In South Asia, improvements have accelerated for all indicators, except child mortality and child malnutrition. While it is not possible to attribute the improved progress to the MDG initiative, the record of improvement is encouraging.

In brief, the impact of MDGs on outcomes and policy is ambiguous, uneven and limited at best, while the initiative has been a significant factor in shaping international debates. The MDGs did not introduce a new concept or policy strategy, but created a narrative that has raised global awareness of poverty as a compelling moral challenge requiring urgent action. The narrative has become a consensus framework for debate on international development. The MDGs are widely accepted among the key development stakeholders, including national governments, donor agencies, NGOs, and local civil society groups, regardless of their views about the MDG relevance as a development strategy. The importance of this new awareness and consensus should not be underestimated considering that the pursuit of development priorities in the globalized and democratically governed world requires the public at large to share commitments to these priorities as a matter of ethical

imperatives of a common humanity. The MDGs are associated with an increase in social sector investments, notably in aid allocations, but this is the continuation of a trend that started prior to the introduction of the MDGs. If there is causation, we might ask if donor policies drove the MDGs rather than the other way round.

THE CONTROVERSIES

The MDGs have generated critical debates among both development practitioners and researchers, particularly when they were initially introduced. The numerous points that have been raised can be categorized into two sets of issues: (1) those that concern the composition of the goals, targets and indicators, and (2) those that relate to the development and implementation processes.

With respect to the composition of the lists, critics have raised the following issues:

- *Poorly designed development goals:* The methodology for setting the goals has been inconsistent and apparently arbitrary (Easterly, 2009; Saith, 2006), the levels set are unrealistic for many countries (Clemens and others, 2007) and biased against countries with low starting points (Clemens and others, 2007; Easterly, 2009; Fukuda-Parr forthcoming).
- *Composition is too narrow and excludes important dimensions of development:* The publication of MDGs led to strong reactions from many constituencies whose

agendas were left out including: reproductive health rights particularly as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)/International Development Goals (IDGs) included this agenda; gender inequality that was only reflected in the primary education goal; employment; governance; the macroeconomy and structural change; and in more recent years, climate change. In 2005, three new targets and 12 new indicators were added to the list in response to some of these criticisms. Concern for the narrow and unbalanced composition of the targets continues to be raised. While the MDGs draw on chapter III of the Millennium Declaration, they leave out the objectives of chapters IV (environment), V (human rights, democracy and good governance), VI (protecting the vulnerable), and VII (meeting the special needs of Africa).

- *Lack of attention to important norms and principles*, *in particular falling short of human rights standards:* The human rights community has been highly critical of the MDGs (Alston, 2004). Although the MDGs overlap with many economic and social human rights, they lack some of the key human rights principles including: concern for the most vulnerable and the marginalized; removing discrimination and respecting the equal rights of all; participation; accountability; and standards for rights that require universal access to services (Darrow forthcoming; OHCHR, 2008).
- *Lack of attention to equality:* the MDGs do not reflect

important ethical concerns expressed in the Millennium Declaration for the poorest of the poor and the most vulnerable. Similarly, the principles of equality, empowerment and participation have not been adequately reflected (Nelson, 2007; Fukuda-Parr, 2008; Saith, 2006).

- *Unbalanced international political economy:* Goal 8 is weak and lacks hard quantitative 2015 targets. It is also narrow in scope. It is a poor reflection of the agendas advocated by developing countries, notably those related to the asymmetric rules of global trade, international investment and finance, the reduced policy space and quality of aid. From the onset, many developing countries were skeptical of the MDGs for fear they would present another set of conditionalities, while imposing a stronger accountability framework for the developed countries.
- *Distortion of national priorities:* From the start, many civil society groups in developing countries expressed dismay with the MDGs for undermining their advocacy and policy dialogue with their Governments. For example, some of the goals such as universal primary education took the agenda backwards in countries where the challenge was to improve quality in primary schooling and advance access to secondary education. This led one activist to rename the MDGs as the “Most Distracting Gimmick” (Atrobus, 2001).

Critics have raised a number of issues with respect to the process of formulation and implementation, as follows:

- *Lack of broad consultation in formulation:* the MDGs were introduced in the 2001 report of the UN Secretary-General, derived from the Millennium Declaration. Both documents built on the outcome documents of the UN development conferences of the 1990s, but the selection of these outcomes for these documents did not involve wide consultations. This led to criticism from civil society organizations (Bissio, 2003) and lukewarm responses from Governments of developing countries.
- *Global or national goals?:* An important debate exists on the applicability of the goals at the country level. Some have argued that the global goals should be adapted at the national level (Vandemoortele and Delamonica, 2010), while others have held that they should be achieved in each and every country (Sachs, 2005). The Millennium Declaration and subsequent UN official documents leave the question unanswered. In practice, the UN monitoring reports[108] apply the goals to each country, though many countries have also adapted the goals to their national contexts. Applying them at the national level and holding Governments accountable is highly problematic, since they impose a one-size-fits-all set of 2015 targets for countries with hugely divergent starting points, constraints, financial resources and capacity (Clemens, 2004; Easterly, 2005; Fukuda-Parr and others, forthcoming).
- *Criteria for success and methodology of measuring progress:* The methodology for assessing performance

used by official national and international monitoring reports focuses on the level of achievement relative to the target. This method is biased against countries with low starting points. A more appropriate metric would be to focus on the pace of progress as discussed above (Fukuda-Parr and others, 2010). Countries are committed to doing their best, and they should be held accountable for making faster progress towards ending poverty. It does not make sense to apply a set of one-size-fits-all targets to countries of enormously divergent conditions and means, and judge their success and failure.

- *Aid-centric process:* Development aid has been a major focus of much of the MDG debates and their use. They are applied to developing countries and not to developed countries, and the international monitoring efforts focus on the performance of developing countries, rather than the challenge of poverty worldwide.

MDGS IN CONTEXT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Much of the MDG experience can be explained by a clearer understanding of the concept of global goals as a policy instrument. Global goals are international normative instruments that differ in important ways from national economic and social policies. They draw attention to neglected global priorities. They create incentives to national governments, donors and other

development stakeholders, but are not used in a system of resource allocation and legislative enforcement. They are set through a process of political negotiations rather than through technocratic economic management. The strong impact of the MDGs on narrative and their weak influence on development strategies reflect the political dynamics that drove the consensus. The criticisms about the list and its implementation as national planning instruments reflect an incorrect interpretation.

ORIGINS OF THE MDGS: CONTROVERSIES OVER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

In an earlier article co-authored with David Hulme (2011), I have explained the motives that drove leaders of the international development community—heads of the World Bank and UN development agencies, the European development ministers and others —to create the MDGs and invest in promoting them. To summarize, their creation was motivated by the need to forge a united community to defend international development as a global project and to reverse the declining support for development aid. During the 1980s and 1990s, the development community was divided by sharp controversies over the structural adjustment lending programmes of the World Bank and IMF which were conditioned on the adoption of Washington Consensus policy reforms. These controversies not only pitted the NGOs and academics against the World Bank and IMF, but also UN agencies such as UNICEF, as well as some stakeholders within national governments, which advocated

alternatives. Moreover, development agencies became internally divided as individuals took divergent positions. The MDGs/poverty narrative could help unify this divided community, since no one could argue against ending poverty as a moral concern. It was particularly important for the UN leadership and the development ministers of major bilateral donor countries to put an end to these controversies, because they faced declining support for international development within their respective constituencies. With the end of the Cold War, the geo-political interests no longer sustained support for aid budgets.

These motivations led bilateral donors to introduce the IDGs, a list of six quantitative goals with timeframes for achievement, in three areas: economic well-being, social development, and environmental sustainability and regeneration (OECD, 1996). As Colin Bradford of the United States delegation explained, it was important to tell a story of aid that spoke directly to conditions of people's lives to win over the "parliaments and publics"[109].

The IDGs were effective in articulating the meaning of international cooperation for development and had gained traction in raising awareness in the donor countries. They were a concrete articulation of a consensus donor vision of development published in the 1996 statement of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD/DAC, 1996) entitled "Shaping the 21st Century: Contribution of Development Cooperation in the 21st Century". The statement gave three reasons why rich countries should support development: the humanitarian purpose of ending dire dehumanizing poverty; enlightened self-interest in a world free of threats of terrorism, global disease, political

instability, and uncontrolled migration; and solidarity for joint action to solve common challenges such as environmental sustainability.

The IDGs developed considerable traction and demonstrated the effectiveness of a simple list of concrete goals to communicate a compelling story of development. They had already begun to pay o as the secular decline in aid commitments began to be reversed. The World Bank and UN agencies began to support them and, in 2000, published a joint document monitoring their progress using the IDG framework. They inspired the UN to include goals in the Millennium Declaration. But the IDGs could not be “owned” by all stakeholders since they were invented by the bilateral donors[110]. The MDGs built on the IDGs to forge a broader consensus, including the Bretton Woods institutions, UN agencies and national governments.

The MDGs could build a narrative behind which dissenting stakeholders could stand united and argue for development aid. For example, Lord Mark Malloch Brown, then UNDP Administrator, who played a central role in building the Millennium Declaration into the MDGs and creating an implementation plan, recounts the view that the MDGs could bridge the divide between the UN and the World Bank over structural adjustment[111]. The consensus on the MDGs can be attributed precisely to the fact that they allowed the protagonists in the 1980s and 1990s to exchange views over structural adjustment— IMF, World Bank, United States Treasury, UNICEF, NGO networks, and academics on both sides of the issue— and to agree on the purpose of development while disagreeing on the means. It allowed bilateral

development ministers, who needed to support and were supported by all of these dissenting stakeholders, to get out of the dilemma. Why did the developing countries buy into the Millennium Declaration that included the global goals? Ambassador Rosenthal of Guatemala, who was one of leading figures in coordinating the negotiations, explains that the priority for the developing countries was to keep the development issue a high priority on the UN agenda, on par with the political issues[112].

THE POST-2000 AID ARCHITECTURE: NEW NARRATIVE, NEW INSTRUMENTS, OLD POLICIES

The divisions over structural adjustment programmes centred around the issues of conditionality as an aid modality, liberalization and privatisation as economic growth strategies, while the “social dimensions” of the process focussed primarily on the consequences of fiscal austerity and stabilization measures on the poor and the vulnerable and on social investments. While economic arguments over macroeconomic policy choices drove the controversies, the social dimensions commanded a moral high ground. In this context, the narrative of poverty as the “overarching” purpose of international development provided a way out for all sides of the controversies. Consensus could be reached on the ends without resolving differences over the means. It is therefore not surprising that the Millennium Declaration and MDGs define the ends, but not the means. The Washington Consensus policies did not need to

disappear, but continued as a part of a broader agenda, and behind the headline of the MDGs. It is also not surprising that the last decade has seen little by way of new proposals by the World Bank and on new policy strategies to foster economic growth combined with social justice that addresses poverty, inequality and the fulfilment of human rights.

MDGs are thus a key feature of the new aid architecture that was put in place in the late 1990s. The MDG narrative justifies aid on humanitarian grounds. The consensus defines the relationship between donors and recipients as a partnership, constructed in pursuit of a shared commitment to end poverty. For this purpose, donors would support national strategies that would integrate the MDGs and be elaborated in the national PRSPs. The partnership is to be guided by principles of mutual accountability and respect for national ownership. Donor support would be provided to implement the PRSPs through the IMF new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) along with other multilateral and bilateral support and debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt reduction initiative.

These elements, introduced towards the end of the 1990s, retained the core policy elements of the instruments of the controversial structural adjustment lending programmes of the 1980s and had also replaced them. The PRSPs and the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) replaced the Policy Framework Papers that spelled national policy agendas, including key economic policy reform measures. While these reform agendas are not found consistently in the PRSPs, they are included in the PRGF and HIPC agreements and condition

the release of financing under these arrangements. The principles of ownership and mutual accountability expressed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness[113] would guide partnership between donors and the Governments of developing countries. But the policy space for aid dependent countries remains limited under financing conditionalities. The underlying economic/development strategies continue to be driven by the Washington Consensus agenda aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization. To this end, the MDGs added a basic needs agenda, emphasizing priorities for social investments and commitments for partnership.

A normative instrument, not an economic and social policy

Many of the criticisms of the MDGs reflect an incorrect interpretation of MDGs as economic planning instruments which is not their intended purpose. The MDGs are derived from the Millennium Declaration, which is a normative document that defines how the world should look. Applied to development policy making, the Declaration offers a framework for evaluating progress and assessing priorities. The 8 goals, 21 targets and 60 indicators, are best interpreted as benchmarks for monitoring implementation, not as hard planning targets. According to UN officials involved in drafting the Millennium Declaration[114], the original idea behind including some quantitative targets in the Declaration was to give concreteness to the development agenda. And, as officials who were involved in formulating the

MDGs have pointed out, the MDGs were not intended to apply to each and every country, but rather to monitor global progress and to encourage donors and national governments to make greater efforts to end poverty (Vandemoortele and Delamonica, 2010). In this regard, it is not surprising that they are considered overambitious for many countries since they did not originate from a technocratic planning process based on consideration of economic variables necessary for achievement of social and economic outcomes. The same misinterpretation has led to confusion about whether the MDGs should be applied at the country level.

Understanding the MDG concept as a normative instrument also explains at least in part their success in influencing debates and their weakness on policy thinking. Norms define ends not the means. Accordingly, it is erroneous to interpret them as a new development paradigm or a policy strategy since that was not the purpose for which they were intended.

GLOBAL GOALS AFTER 2015

NEW DIRECTIONS

With the expiration of the MDGs in 2015, the promises of the Millennium Declaration remain unrealized, and the extent of global poverty and the slow pace of progress remain unacceptable in today's world of prosperity. The benefits of global economic integration have been as unevenly distributed since 2000 as in the previous decade—the gaps between the rich and

poor within and between countries remain considerable.

It may be argued that global goals would not be worth setting after 2015, because the MDGs did not have adequate impact on shifting policy. Nonetheless, the MDGs have demonstrated the power of global goals and the value of comprehensive development goals in raising awareness, maintaining political support for development, and in coordinating policy debates. Without the MDGs, it is likely that the Millennium Declaration would have been shelved soon after its adoption along with numerous other decisions by the General Assembly. For these reasons, new global goals should be set to advance the implementation of the Millennium Declaration, but they need to be pursued with the institutional weight of the UN Secretary-General and with the UN investing in efforts to promote and mobilize support for them. The UN has set many global goals since the 1960s, but none has had the reach—or the investment—of the MDGs.

What should be in the new goals? The expiry of the MDGs in 2015 presents an opportunity to correct the deficiencies of the current list and emphasize new priorities, which are becoming clearer as the 21st century advances. It is also an opportunity to build goals consistent with their function as normative instruments to promote inclusive and equitable development, rooted in the ethical commitments of the Millennium Declaration.

ETHICAL COMMITMENTS OF THE MILLENNIUM DECLARATION: SHARED VALUES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UN DEVELOPMENT

AGENDA

In setting out a vision for the 21st century, the Millennium Declaration expresses shared social objectives based on universal values. The first chapter of the Declaration states the "fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century" (UN, 2000, paragraph 1): freedom; equality; solidarity; tolerance; respect for nature; and shared responsibility. The Declaration commits Governments to pursue a particular pattern of growth and development—one that is equitable and human rights-based. The core theme of equality is articulated throughout the document and reflects not only equality within countries, but also between countries. This includes gender equality (paragraph 6), equitable and non-discriminatory trading and financial systems (paragraph 13), with special attention to the poorest and vulnerable people (chapter 6) and the needs of Africa that face multiple challenges (chapter 7). And most importantly, it includes the ideal notion of inclusive globalization, the central theme which is articulated in paragraph 5 as follows: "We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for *all* the world's people. For, while globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed".

Human rights principles

The ethical framework of the document derives from the consensus international norms set out in the UN Charter that

have evolved over the decades and been codified in international law. The framework goes beyond the economic concept of development “with equity” and seeks a world that is not only more peaceful and prosperous but “just” (paragraph 1). It draws explicitly on international human rights norms and principles, which are reflected throughout the document; to the core principle of “human dignity and freedom, equality and equity” (paragraph 1), the respect for economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights (paragraph 25). It rearms commitment to the UN Charter (paragraph 1), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (paragraph 25), to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (paragraph25), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (paragraph 26). Interestingly, it also refers to the right to development (paragraph 24), the only international human rights concept that addresses development as a process.

The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development arms development as a fundamental human right, and is important for two reasons. First, it defines development as a “constant improvement in the wellbeing of individuals” (UN, 1986, Preamble). Second, it articulates responsibilities for development as involving not only individual, but collective actions of states. It not only states desirable development objectives, but also the obligations of states; “as leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable” (paragraph 2). The Declaration commits to strengthen international cooperation (paragraph 26).

For these reasons, the development strategy that the

Declaration commits to is “human rights based”, characterized by the realization of all human rights (economic, social, cultural, civil and political) as its objective; the well-being of the individual as the focus and unit of assessment; and the application of core principles of equality and non-discrimination, empowerment and participation in the development process, and rooted in the norms of international human rights law. This contrasts with the concept of development that focuses more narrowly on economic growth and the improvement of living conditions, including meeting basic (material) needs. This conceptual framework for evaluating the development process is closely related to and overlaps signicantly with the capability approach to development, or human development, which is based on the concept of development as expansion of the capability of individuals to lead lives they value developed by Amartya Sen[115].

The UN development agenda

These ethical values, and the theme of human centered, equitable and sustainable development, have been reflected in the origins of the Millennium Declaration and MDGs in the UN conferences on topics ranging from environment to children to habitat held throughout the 1990s. The Internationally Agreed Development Goals (IADGs) and the UN Development Agenda are comprised of the full set of goals emerging from the 34 summits and conferences held up to 2005.

Taking place in an era of active debates about structural adjustment and liberalization, these conferences were particularly

concerned with the consequences of this policy shift on poor people and poor countries. These meetings raised the common concern that reflected a strong voice of the civil society and the Governments of developing countries[116] that the benefits of globalization were not broadly shared. The major commitments of these conferences were combined in a single package in the 2000 Millennium Declaration, while the MDGs are a select list from the broader list.

As highlighted in the The United Nations Development Agenda: Development for All (UN DESA, 2007, p. iii) which reviewed UN conferences in the 1990s, the resulting UN development agenda is strongly embedded in the UN ethical values and fundamental purpose—namely, human freedom and dignity, solidarity and burden-sharing, equality, and tolerance, and can be seen as a concrete means to implement the UN Charter. According to José Antonio Ocampo, “Two elements have permeated the content and character of the Agenda since its inception. First, a fundamental concern for equity and for equality of all persons, as human beings and as citizens ... [And] the second essential element [is] partnership. The conference process has engaged all the key stakeholders: Governments, UN system organisations, other intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, civil society, and the private sector” (UN DESA, 2007, Preface, p. iii).

SETTING NEW GOALS, MEASURING PROGRESS

Like the MDGs, the purpose of the goals, targets and indicators beyond 2015 would be to harmonize reporting and to facilitate monitoring of progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Declaration. But a new approach is needed to setting the goals, targets and indicators. To begin with, in order to redefine progress in alignment with the vision of the Declaration for development as inclusive, equitable and sustainable, there is need to expand beyond the current focus of the MDGs on poverty and chapter 3 (development and poverty eradication) of the Declaration, to reflect chapter 1 (values and principles) and to acknowledge the important ways in which development and poverty eradication are intertwined with the challenges of peace and security (chapter 2), environment (chapter 3), human rights, democracy and good governance (chapter 4). Moreover, goal setting needs to be framed with a methodological coherence. Finally, the new approach should include some critical means as well as ends considering the drawbacks of the MDGs.

Monitoring progress in human well-being

The new approach to setting goals should also build on a coherent framework in development thinking about the nature of progress and what we have learned from development economics research in the 1990s. The following essential considerations are worth highlighting here.

First, the multidimensionality of human well-being needs to be fully acknowledged. The work of Amartya Sen is particularly helpful in defining progress as the expansion of capabilities and

freedoms—or human development approach—and in emphasizing the multidimensionality of essential instrumental freedoms to encompass economic facilities, social opportunities, political freedoms, transparency guarantees and security (Sen, 1999). Sen's capabilities approach to development is closely related to human rights-based development and essential capabilities overlap considerably with the core human rights, including economic, social, cultural, civil and political areas (Sen, 1999; Vizard and others, 2011).

Second, there is need to promote security from downside risks. The work on human security (Ogata and Sen, 2003; UNDP, 1994) and on vulnerability and poverty (World Bank, 2000) has highlighted the importance of protection from threats of sudden changes in core life conditions. The recent crises in the global financial, fuel and food markets have highlighted these threats as important challenges of the 21st century as global market integration proceeds and expose the risks of instability and their contagious effects across countries.

Third, sustainability implications need to be considered and addressed. The threats to sustainability arising from environmental deterioration have become acute as global warming increases. Sustainability is an overriding challenge, where failure is likely to threaten all dimensions of human development, and requires major shifts in policy as well as in international cooperation.

Fourth, there is need to pursue equality of opportunities and rights. For all the reasons already elaborated, equality is a principle that is central to the normative framework of the

Millennium Declaration. In practical terms, policy strategies that respect equality provide for equality of opportunity and non-discrimination in the fulfilment of human rights.

Fifth, means—both at the global and the national level—to ending poverty need to be identified. The MDGs include one set of means to ending poverty in goal 8, but they need to be strengthened and set into clear quantitative targets. They should also be broadened to incorporate objectives of stable market environment necessary for human security, and agendas for systemic reform consistent with the principles of democracy and equity.

Sixth, while goals should be set as global targets, countries should be encouraged to adapt the goals to their national contexts, through a process of democratic consultation. Without such adaptation, the goals are both biased against countries with low starting points and under-ambitious for those with high starting points. They would distort not only government priorities, but also the efforts of civil society to hold authorities accountable for their development performance. Previous global goals set by the UN followed this approach, and the MDGs were the first goals whose applicability to country levels was left ambiguous.

Seventh, goal setting should involve a participatory process of consultations with national governments worldwide, and with civil society organizations at national, regional and global levels. The MDGs drew on the goals already adopted by the UN development conferences that in themselves involved widespread consultation among civil society and government in the national and regional preparatory conferences. In the

absence of such process, it is all the more important to set in place a process of broad consultations at national, regional and global levels. The implementation process will be as important as the composition of the goals; the new goals should build on the increasing use of the MDGs by civil society to demand more of Government. Furthermore, formal structures would strengthen accountability. At the national level, one approach would be to set up national commissions that would work out the implications of policy goals, and monitor implementation.

Finally, the new goals should apply not only to developing countries, but to all countries, since human poverty, inequality and exclusion are challenges facing developed countries as well.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The recent history of the MDGs reveals much about the history of development thinking and policy in the first decade of the 21st century. It highlights the reconceptualization of development as reconceptualised as poverty reduction, opening up to a concept applicable regardless of the stage of industrialization and diversification, and levels of income and technological capacity. It further underscores the role of ideas in shaping political support for “development” locally and globally as well as in shifting economic and social policies.

The MDGs were the first comprehensive development goals and were effective in drawing attention to poverty eradication as a global norm and priority, and provided a common framework for debate and action. They encouraged and, no doubt, contributed

to greater support for social investments in sub-Saharan Africa, but did not lead to changes in policy strategies or to addressing systemic issues that create unequal opportunities for people and countries.

The corollary to these policy trends has been the failure to address the systemic problems of protecting developing countries from the consequences of global market integration. A leading example of these trends is the inadequate response of international cooperation to protect the poor against the consequences of climate change, and the crises of the global financial, fuel and food markets. Seen in this light, the MDGs could arguably have provided a convenient “cover” behind which the economic model of the 1990s could be pursued. The MDGs perhaps co-opted the language of human development, and the social impact of adjustment while “defanging” critical debates about the impact of the liberalization agendas on poverty and inequality. The need for alternative macroeconomic policies that would favour distribution, job creation for the unskilled, and reduce inequality no longer resonates with policy-makers as urgent issues.

The impact of the MDGs brings home the importance of narratives, and the power of quantitative indicators as a communications tool that can have far-reaching impacts on how to reshape the definition of terms with positive and perverse consequences. The staying power and the reach of the term “MDGs” in framing international development policy debates can only be explained by the power of numbers to communicate complex ideas by simplification, and abstract ethical values by

reification, and to convey (misplaced) scientific precision and certitude. The definition of development is ambiguous, fraught with controversies over definitions, measurement and strategies. The process is complex involving human creativity and effort, social cooperation and mobilization, economic investments and political commitments. The challenges are complex and location specific, requiring high-risk solutions. But the magic of quantification renders such a complex challenge into a single number, intangible factors into concrete goods and outcomes, and risk prone processes into a predictable technological solution. But sociologists who study indicators as “technologies of governance” point out that it goes further. Quantification is “not merely a strategy for describing the social and natural worlds, but a means of reconfiguring them. It entails the imposition of new meanings and the disappearance of old ones” (Porter, 1994: 338).

By articulating the complex challenges of development in 8 goals and concrete targets for 2015, the MDGs have had unprecedented success in drawing attention to poverty as an urgent global priority. But the simplification and quantification have reduced the development agenda to meeting basic material needs, stripped of the Millennium Declaration’s vision for development with social justice and human rights. It has left out any mention of equity, empowerment of people, sustainability, and building sustainable productive capacity for economic growth. The simplified narrative has no room for understanding poverty as related to the underlying power relations within and between countries and the asymmetries in the global economy. It

leaves no room to draw attention to the issues that have long been and remain on the agenda of developing countries and in international economic negotiations, such as the lack of voice in the World Bank, WTO and other institutions of global governance. It similarly remains silent on the issues that have long been and remain on the agenda of critics of standard macroeconomic frameworks for their distributional consequences. The new global goals thus need to use the power of numbers to recapture the ethical principles and norms of the Millennium Declaration.

The MDG experience also highlights the limited reach of ethical norms or normative ideas and technocratic knowledge or positive ideas in international policy making. The MDGs were powerful and convincing to people—"the parliaments and publics" around the world—because they conveyed a compelling case for ending poverty as an ethical priority. Yet, for the development policy professionals, ethical norms and principles are not convincing arguments to change policy behaviour. They mobilized and invested in implementing the Millennium Declaration by interpreting the MDGs as economic policy tools as if they were technocratically constructed. Entrenched in the tradition of a "positivist" science driven by quantification and evidence, development economists incorporated only chapter 3 of the 8 chapters of the Declaration in the MDGs, picking out only those objectives which were measurable and for which data were available. The ethical principles laid out in chapter 1 of the Declaration were forgotten in the spirit of "only what can be counted counts".

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Lectura 3

An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa[117]

> The importance of public revenue to the underdeveloped countries can hardly be exaggerated if they are to achieve their hopes of accelerated progress.
>
> Nicolas Kaldor, Foreign Affairs, January 1963.
>
> I have made revenue collection a frontline institution because it is the one which can emancipate us from begging, from disturbing friends… if we can get about 22 percent of GDP we should not need to disturb anybody by asking for aid….instead of coming here to bother you, give me this, give me this, I shall come here to greet you, to trade with you.
>
> Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda (which collects 11% of GDP in taxes and receives a further 11% of GDP in aid), Washington DC, September 21, 2005.

INTRODUCTION

After a crisis of legitimacy throughout the 1990s, aid is popular again in the policy community. Several new studies have suggested that at least a doubling of overseas development assistance (ODA) from 2000 levels is necessary as a precondition for meeting international development targets (Zedillo Panel 2001; Devarajan *et al.*, 2002). The Commission for Africa (2005) chaired by British Prime Minister Tony Blair called for an immediate $25 billion increase in aid to sub-Saharan Africa, with an additional $25 billion to come by 2015. This would constitute roughly a tripling of aid to the continent. Further, the UN's Millennium Project (2005) has estimated that global ODA will need to rise even further than the previous estimates, reaching at least $195 billion by 2015 from current levels of some $79 billion in 2004. These calls for more ODA are echoed in various parts of the United Nations system, the World Bank,

many NGOs, recipient countries, and even some European governments.

Many of the low-income countries targeted for substantial increases in aid already receive historically unprecedented flows. For instance, ODA to sub-Saharan Africa was the equivalent of 11.7 percent of the continent's GNI in 2003 (excluding Nigeria and South Africa)[119]. Exactly half of the region's 46 countries with data for 2003 received in excess of 10 percent of GNI in ODA, and 11 received more than 20 percent. Globally, there is a core set of roughly three dozen countries that have received a tenth of GNI or more in aid for at least the last two decades. This is a lengthy time period for receiving sizeable aid with few historical precedents. The large flows to Europe during the Marshall Plan lasted only a few years and never exceeded 3 percent of GDP of any receiving country (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991; O'Connell and Soludo, 2001). While substantial US support during the early Cold War to allies such as Korea and Taiwan tapered off within a decade, contemporary aid ratios in these three dozen countries have tended not to recede, but to grow larger over three decades. Moreover, if the large increases in aid proposed actually materialize, aid ratios will rise substantially further and the number of countries crossing the 10 percent threshold will grow significantly (Moss and Subramanian, 2005).

Skepticism about the desirability of such aid increases has tended to emphasize economic and management issues. Some observers have expressed concerns about the capacity of low-income states to absorb large new flows in addition to the flows

they already receive, and have pointed to the weak management capacities of governments, the dearth of good new projects and programs to fund, or the ambiguous association between aid and measurable development outcomes (White, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Other observers have worried about the macro-economic impact of large aid increases; they have pointed to "Dutch disease" effects on small economies (see for example Heller, 2005, Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). Relatively less critical attention has been paid to the potential effects of large increases in aid on public institutions in low-income countries.

Yet institutional issues have recently returned to the foreground in debates on economic development. The critical importance of sound public institutions to the development process has become an article of faith, not only among political scientists (for example, Herbst, 1990, Haggard, 1990; Evans 1995), who could be supposed to have professional reasons to argue for the importance of institutions, but also has emerged more recently as a consensus among economists (for example, Rodrik, 2003; Ndulu and O'Connell, 1999; Acemoglu *et al.*, 2004). Sachs (2005) view that good institutions are entirely a result of development, rather than their cause, is now a minority view.

Aid is thought to work best in environments with high quality public institutions, presumably as part of a capable "developmental" state (among a large literature see Burnside and Dollar, 2000; World Bank, 1998). Increasingly, measures of institutions are an explicit factor for aid disbursement and allocation. Thus, "institutional development" is frequently an independent variable thought to affect the efficiency of aid, and

thus a legitimate factor in selecting aid recipients and determining allocation strategies. This suggests that aid should be "selectively" focused on countries that are thought to most effectively use resources to engage in poverty reduction. Such logic underlies IDA's performance-based allocation process and the Millennium Challenge Account, a new US aid program that explicitly targets assistance to countries that are thought best able to use additional resources (Radelet, 2003).

In many respects, this new approach is at odds with the more traditional argument that one of the primary purposes of aid (if not its most important) should be to build effective indigenous public institutions. By this formulation, institutional development is thought to be a dependent variable, affected by targeted aid. In contrast to the 'selectivity' philosophy, this older doctrine has been to channel aid instead to places with the greatest need for improved public institutions with the idea that aid itself will help to improve the institutional environment. This approach underlies growing donor efforts at so-called 'capacity building' and the 'big push' on aid first popular in the 1950s and 1960s and now advocated by the UN and others (Easterly, 2005). The Commission for Africa report wavers back and forth between these two views of aid and institutions. It recognizes the importance of good institutions to making aid effective, in part because it argues that improved institutions will allow absorption of the much larger aid flows it advocates. But it also believes that these large increases can serve to leverage a much greater commitment on the part of African governments to improving the domestic institutions important to growth and poverty reduction.

Does aid necessarily help to develop public institutions and state capacity, or can there be an *aid-institutions paradox*? In this essay, we review an emerging literature that explores the potential effects of large amounts of aid on institutional development, including some of the most basic functions of the state such as the ability to collect revenues. Given the current debates regarding large new infusions of additional aid, an analysis of the institutional effects of aid is particularly timely. Because Africa presents the greatest challenges to development, and is the region most aid dependent, we especially look at the aid-institutions relationship in that region. Many political scientists now argue that public institutions in the region are poorly suited to promote economic development because of neo-patrimonial tendencies (Callaghy, 1988; Sandbrook, 1992; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Van de Walle, 2001). In the poorly integrated and fragmented states of the region, political leaders have relied on systematic clientelism and the private appropriation of state resources for political ends. As a result, government resources have not been utilized primarily to promote economic development, as political elites have acted in a predatory fashion to maintain themselves in power. There are other reasons for which the economies of sub-Saharan Africa have failed to gain economic development, but it is now widely conceded that these political dynamics have constituted a significant brake on growth. As a result, it is thus possible that inflows of external resources like aid could be a disincentive to state transformation. Does aid, and the manner in which it is given, encourage the transition from patrimonialism and predation to rational developmental states?

It is far from impossible that certain types of aid could undermine long-term institutional development, despite donors sincere intentions. Such a paradox is, of course, not new to the development literature. The so called “resource curse” has long posited that unearned income undermines incentives to build local institutions and perhaps a social contract with the population (see Ross, 1999 for an excellent review; Karl, 1997; Birdsall and Subramanian, 2004). Natural resources represent an unearned rent accruing to governments; it is argued that this rent can have a negative and anti-developmental effect on the economy, public institutions, and even on the government’s relationship with the citizenry. We will argue that aid can have many of the same dysfunctional effects as natural resources; that is, there can be an “aid curse” as well that might create perverse incentives and lead to anti-developmental outcomes.

To analyze these issues, this review essay seeks to integrate two disciplinary literatures that have too long ignored each other. On the whole, political scientists have been remarkably oblivious to the political dynamics created by foreign aid, particularly in low-income countries where it is today the leading sector of economic activity and might thus be thought to have a significant impact on the local political economy. For their part, economists have mostly ignored a long tradition in the political science literature which establishes a historical link between the state’s revenues and its political and institutional attributes. The following section lays out the context for these questions, and explains why they are particularly relevant for today’s debates about aid and development. Section 3 reviews the well-known macro-economic

effects of large volumes of aid, and focuses on the institutional implications of these effects. Section 4 explores the potential negative effects of large aid flows on institution building through its effect on local bureaucratic and policy-making dynamics. Section 5 then examines the literature on state revenues and its relationship to foreign aid. The historical linkages between state revenue collection and state-building are considered in Section 6. A theme that emerges in the second half of the essay is the low quality of the available data on state revenues, particularly for Africa. At present, data deficiencies unfortunately prevent the formal empirical testing of many of the hypotheses developed in the essay. Nonetheless, the possibility of the existence of an "aid-institutions paradox" is significant, and Section 7 discusses the policy implications of our findings before concluding.

AID AND THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATES

Aid clearly can be useful and has certainly contributed to economic development and improvements in quality of life variables in many countries. Evidence for successful aid is particularly strong in targeted programs with defined objectives (see Levine 2004 for examples in global public health). But, at the same time, and especially at very high levels over a sustained period, aid could also have distorting effects on some of the very outcomes donors hope to encourage through aid, such as policy ownership, fiscal sustainability, institutional development, and, ultimately, autonomous long-term economic growth.

One way to consider this problem is to think of aid as a

subsidy. As such, aid is supposed to provide temporary financial assistance in order to encourage certain long-term behaviors: revenue collection, investment in physical and human capital, and the establishment of the institutions of a developmental state. There are clearly some cases where aid-as-subsidy has played this role, for example in South Korea or Botswana, where foreign assistance supported local efforts to do these things and the country gradually was weaned off aid. At the same time, there are many, indeed dozens, of other cases where aid is neither temporary, nor seeming to assist countries in fulfilling these roles. Instead, it could be argued that the subsidy has in fact discouraged revenue collection, distorted expenditure decision-making, and undermined the incentives to build state capacity. In these cases, aid could be viewed as not only a crutch delaying institutional development, but as potentially undercutting those efforts.

This possibility of harmful aid dynamics seems particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa, where some countries have now entered into their third and fourth decades of receiving substantial volumes of aid. Much of this aid has also included explicit capacity building technical assistance from donors. The World Bank alone provided Africa with 70 civil service reform projects between 1987 and 1997, for instance (Levy and Kpundeh, 2005, p. v), while a recent internal Bank evaluation estimates that over a quarter of all Bank credits to the region is explicitly devoted to capacity building (OED 2005, p. 9). Technical assistance to central banks seems to have been successful in building institutional capacity, but such examples appear more the

exception than the rule. Many experts argue that state capacity has improved little during this period, and point to specific cases of clear decline (see Van de Walle, 2001; 2005).

In some cases, the lack of progress on capacity building can be attributed to political instability. After all, at any given time in the last three decades, over a dozen economies in the region have been subject to violent civil conflict (see for example Collier, 2005) and the emergence of warlord rule in the context of the collapse of the central state (Reno, 1998). Long periods of political stress, conflict and state collapse, continue to have a significant impact on state capacity, even after the return to political stability because of their long-term institutional effects, notably on the supply of trained manpower. Perhaps more striking is the slow pace of institution-building in relatively stable political systems. Indeed, a substantial literature has documented the pervasive weakness of the central state in sub-Saharan Africa, which often exercises weak if any effective sovereignty over much of its territory, and has less legitimacy than a variety of sub-national and private governance structures that compete with it for popular support (Herbst, 2000; Englebert, 2000; Jackson and Rotberg, 1982). It has become fashionable in the donor community to blame this surprisingly slow pace of state capacity building on the nature of African bureaucracies, which are argued to be patrimonial and corrupt, and thus not particularly interested in the provision of public goods essential to development (Levy and Kpundeh, 2005; OED, 2005). But even if one accepts this diagnostic, the question remains, why has the large volume of aid devoted to capacity building not had a bigger impact on

improving these public institutions, and transforming them into, using the Weberian terminology, more “rational-legal” bureaucracies?

AID, FISCAL POLICY, AND MACROECONOMIC OUTCOMES

A number of potential negative effects of large aid volumes on institutional development can be identified. Much of the focus from economists has been on macroeconomic imbalances caused by large volumes of aid. One central issue has been the possibility of large ODA inflows affecting the real exchange rate and undermining the competitiveness of the export sector— the so called “Dutch disease” (most recently, see Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). Management of the real exchange rate is arguably rendered even more difficult by ODA volatility, which also is thought to have negative effects (see below). Dutch disease-type effects have been noted in a number of African aid recipients (see Younger, 1992 on Ghana; Adam and Bevan 2003). Experiences from Uganda (Atingi-Ego, 2005; Nkusu, 2004) and other countries suggest that an active central bank can manage these exchange rate appreciations and, for the most part, mitigate pernicious effects on competitiveness, but nonetheless, a number of country episodes suggests that in fact a large volume of aid can and does undermine competitiveness.

Another set of economic concerns emphasize the role of aid within the budget process itself, with most studies suggesting that foreign aid can undermine the ability of recipient governments to

budget appropriately. Several have implicated the volatility of aid flows as the source of distortions. In a 37-country survey, Bulir and Lane (2002) found that aid is more volatile than domestic fiscal revenues and that this volatility lessens any potential positive benefits of aid on recipients. McGillivray and Morrisey (2000b) found the volatility of aid often leads to poor budgeting and underestimation of revenues, particularly since aid commitments tend to overestimate actual disbursements. Similarly, Heller and Gupta (2002) argue that the fiscal uncertainty of dependence on external assistance makes long-term planning extremely difficult.

Beyond volatility, there have also been some questions about perverse incentives of aid on the process of economic policymaking. Brautigam and Knack (2004), for example, found that high levels of aid serve as a "soft budget constraint": the access to foreign resources convinces decision makers that budgets are flexible and encourages fiscal indiscipline. Two case studies looking at Ghana found that as donor financing increased, so did disparities between budgeted expenditures and actual spending, suggesting that the budget process was increasingly directed toward satisfying external donors rather than reflecting actual public spending preferences. Killick (2004) thus described Ghana's "budgetary façade" and Pradhan (1996) similarly called the budget a "deceptive mirage", in which aid was distorting both the budget process itself and the government's "ownership" of the country's purported development agenda.

A number of observers have examined the impact of large volumes of aid on the mix of public expenditure and the overall

spending levels. A number of papers suggest that aid results in excessive and unsustainable levels of government consumption, also leading potentially to macro-imbalances. Khan and Hoshino (1992) found aid to be generally treated as an increase in income leading to higher government consumption, but that the some public investment is also financed by aid. In a broad literature review, McGillvray and Morrissey (2000a) found that aid tends to be associated with government spending increases in excess of the value of the aid, although there is no clear answer on the impact of aid on consumption versus investment. This was reinforced in McGillvray and Morrissey (2000b) where they concluded that aid leads to increases in expenditure not financed by the corresponding increase in revenue. More recently, Remmer (2004) also found that aid leads to overall increases in government spending.

How might these possible macro effects of aid negatively impact public institutions? The potential loss of competitiveness means lower exports and economic growth, fewer jobs, and increased dependence on external assistance. Resource volatility contributes to macro-economic instability, which complicates public policy making in vital areas such as budgeting and planning, and tilt public spending toward consumption rather than investment. These can exact a negative effect on the quality of the civil service, public services, and infrastructure, all indirectly undermining the ability of the state to transition from patrimonialism to a more ‘developmental’ path.

The rest of this paper addresses more direct and, we argue, more significant but less well-documented negative institutional

effects of large volumes of aid. Much of the literature cited in this section describes dysfunctional economic outcomes but does not really explain them. To do so, we need to turn to institutional factors, which we begin to do in the next section.

DONOR PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

In addition to macroeconomic and fiscal effects, there are costs of aid related to the structures, practices, and procedures of the current international aid system. These include a longstanding and well-known list of common complaints about aid: volatility and uncertainty of ODA flows; fragmentation of donor efforts; project proliferation and duplication; conflicting or dominant donor agendas; competition for staff; and high administrative and oversight costs (Among many, see Cohen, 1992; Berg, 1993; Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Knack and Rahman, 2004; Van de Walle, 2005). Birdsall (2004) lists many of these as the “seven deadly sins” of the aid business. Such practices are argued to have substantial costs for public administration. For instance, the proliferation of donors and projects constitute a substantial burden for the small number of qualified public officials, who spend much of their time attending to donor concerns and managing aid activities rather than promoting the development of the country—that is, when they do not exit altogether from the civil service to go work for better wages in donor and NGO organizations. Management of donor visits (“missions”) became such a problem in Tanzania, that the country was forced to

declare a ‘mission holiday’, a four-month period when they take a break from visiting delegations to focus on budget preparation. Similarly, aid volatility and project proliferation complicate effective government control over budgets and development planning. Much, if not most, aid is not integrated into national budgets, thus posing real sustainability problems, and they are often implemented through parallel structures that cream the best staff from the civil service, and make government coordination of policy much more difficult.

Far from helping to develop effective state bureaucracies, certain aid practices can in fact serve to reinforce the patrimonial element within recipient governments at the expense of the legal-rational. Projects provide for the allocation of all sorts of discretionary goods to be politicized and patrimonialized, including expensive four-wheels drive cars, scholarships, decisions over where to place schools and roads, and so on. The common practice of paying cash “sitting fees” for civil servants attending donor-funded workshops, where the daily rates can exceed regular monthly salaries, even turns training into a rent to be distributed. More broadly, when donor projects are poorly integrated into national budgetary processes, and not subject to much transparency or effective control, it is argued, they help sustain anti-developmental practices within the state apparatus. Because local officials are not included in policy planning, they often come to view aid projects as little more than a set of scarce private goods to be allocated. Aid dependence thus leads to a situation in which bureaucrats are often not rewarded for focusing on their core developmental functions but rather on getting

money from donors. Technocrats, who are specialized in budget management and/or planning, say, are less rewarded than bureaucrats who are adept at interacting with donor organizations and accessing their resources. If these two are not part of the same skill set, the wrong kind of individual expertise may be rewarded and over time, real developmental capacities may atrophy within the administration.

Particularly pernicious for state institutions in Africa has been the combination of high aid flows and economic crisis, both sustained over a long period of time. As development policy has come to be dominated by repeated fiscal crises and driven by short-term adjustment and debt management, the patrimonial attraction of aid resources has been accentuated. In countries where power means access to state privileges and rents, and political systems are sustained by complex clientelist relationships, aid and the scarce goods it provides become all the more desirable for the political management of economic crises (Van de Walle, 2001). In short, states who find it difficult to meet civil service payrolls are more likely to politicize aid funded sitting fees, per diems and scholarships to study abroad. Indeed, they will endeavor to turn aid into a mechanism to increase government consumption rather than public investment.

It also seems reasonable to surmise that the larger the relative aid flows, the more these problems are likely to be exacerbated. In many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, aid flows are such that aid dynamics simply dominate local development efforts. Moss and Subramanian (2005) identify 22 low-income countries, 16 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa where ODA inflows are

equivalent to at least half of total government expenditure. In twelve poor countries, of which ten are African, the ratio of ODA to government expenditure was 75 percent or more. Looking at a slightly earlier period, Brautigam and Knack (2004) find roughly similar numbers of aid intensity.

Because most of the concerns listed in this section are directly related to the way in which aid is delivered and administered, in theory at least, many of these are fixable through changes on the donor side. These shortfalls have long been identified and some efforts are underway to address them, such as donor pooling or using budget support instead of project aid (Eifert and Gelb, 2005). There are also several large institutional attempts to improve the efficiency of aid delivery, such as various programs by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee or the Paris High Level Forum on Aid Harmonization and Alignment.

In practice, however, these inefficiencies exist because of very real political or bureaucratic constraints, and progress in reducing them has proven to be slow and uneven. In many ways, these problems seem to be actually getting worse; for instance, the number of distinct projects funded by donors has nearly tripled since 1995 (Roodman, forthcoming).

Perhaps most worrying, there appear to be few incentives for either donors or recipients to change their practices. As Brautigam and Knack (2004) argue, "political elites have little incentive to change a situation in which large amounts of aid provide exceptional resources for patronage and many fringe benefits" (2004, p. 263). Moreover, until very recently, the government's performance did not appear to affect whether or

not it received aid, so there appeared to be little or no cost to misusing aid. Alesina and Weder (2002) actually find that high levels of corruption within recipient countries were positively correlated with aid flows through out the 1990s. On the other hand, incentives to improve aid effectiveness appear less important within donor organizations than other concerns, related to bureaucratic incentives within aid agencies, and to the importance of commercial, foreign policy and ideological objectives on the part of donor governments (Easterly, 2003).

THE AID-REVENUE RELATIONSHIP

A third institutional effect of aid that has been posited in the literature concerns its impact on state revenues. This is an important issue since the ability of the state to collect revenues is critically linked to state capacity, while the central role of revenue collection in political development and state-building has long been accepted. Schumpeter was perhaps the first to argue that a country's tax system fundamentally reflects its political institutions (Schumpeter, 1918/1991). Reliance on citizens for raising public revenues, as opposed to unearned income via offshore extraction or external assistance, is considered an essential ingredient to establishing accountability between the state and society.

The contemporary literature suggests that taxation is a useful indicator of state capacity. Because revenues are necessary to fund the state's activities in a sustainable manner, the size and consistency of government revenues can tell us a lot about the level of capacity that exists within the state apparatus. This has

long been argued in the aid literature. According to Kaldor (1963), the key determination of whether a state moves from aid dependency to economic self-sufficiency is the degree to which the state learns how to tax, thereby leading to a lessening of the need for aid. According to Bauer (1976), foreign aid displaces the processes of institutional maturation essential to development, including the capacity of the state to collect revenue. Azam *et al.* (1999) arrive at a similar conclusion, claiming that the ability of a state to remove itself from reliance on aid will depend on the degree to which the state engages in learning-by-doing in the public sector, a process that is greatly affected by the level of aid in relation to overall revenue and the initial institutional conditions.

Early empirical tax effort studies focused on a small set of variables considered the main determinants of tax effort, most commonly measured as tax revenue as a share of GDP (Lotz and Morrs, 1967; Celliah, 1971, Celliah *et al.* 1975; Tanzi, 1981). The tax effort literature typically considers the level of development and the economic structure as primary determinants of tax shares: GDP per capita, the degree of openness of the economy, the agricultural and/or industrial share of GDP, and in some cases population growth (Tanzi, 1992; Leuthold 1991; Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Ghura 1998).

In the tax effort literature, foreign aid is generally expected to reduce tax shares since aid provides an alternative, non-earned source of revenue for governments in addition to tax revenue (Ghura, 1998; Remmer, 2004; Brautigam and Knack, 2004). Consequently, a government that receives significant amounts of

aid is thought to have less incentive to tax and improve its tax administration. That is, foreign aid may be used as a substitute for domestic revenue mobilization whilst allowing the same level of expenditure (Heller, 1975; Kimbrough, 1986). Not only may aid inflows lead to lower tax effort, but they may also slow down the development of domestic institutions such as the tax administration in recipient countries (Brautigam and Knack, 2004).

A negative relationship between tax revenue and aid is certainly suggested by Figure 1 that shows the four-year averages of tax revenue (excluding trade taxes) as a share of GDP against the four-year averages of aid as a share of GNI for 55 low and lower middle income countries for 1972-1999, using the standard IMF data on government finances. The point of this figure is merely to show the simple correlation between tax collection and aid receipts. There are many cases of low aid and low tax (those toward the bottom left). There are also a moderate number of high aid and low tax (bottom right) and low aid-high tax countries (upper left). However, there are no incidences at all of high aid (>10% of GNI) and high tax (>18% of GDP). These thresholds are of course arbitrary and the figure does not imply any causation, but it does indicate that based on historical experience, high levels of both do not occur at the same time.

What is the econometric evidence on behalf of this relationship? It is actually more ambiguous than one might think. Leuthold (1991) examines the effect of the standard variables, controlling for the economic structure and the level of development, and aid on tax revenue using panel data. All the

standard variables are statistically significant and have the anticipated signs, whereas foreign aid has the expected negative sign but is not significant. Using data from Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997), Brautigam (2000, p. 48) found that 71 percent of the African countries with aid/GDP above 10 percent in 1995 had lower than expected tax effort. Ghura (1998) examined the determinants of tax revenue for 39 sub-Saharan African countries between 1985 and 1996 and found foreign aid to have a significant, negative impact on tax shares. Teera and Hudson (2004) use data for 116 developed and developing countries for 1975-1998, but find aid to be insignificant. A panel study of 120 middle- and low-income countries over the period 1970-1999 by Remmer (2004) finds that aid dependency reduces tax revenue mobilization. The dependent variable is the change in tax revenue as a share of GDP, and the explanatory variables include the standard variables and three different measures of aid dependency (aid/GNI, aid/government expenditures, and aid/imports). All three aid dependency measures are negatively related to tax shares although only aid as a share of imports is significant. When reducing the sample to the period 1980-1999, both the aid share in imports and the aid share in government expenditures have a significant negative impact on tax effort.

One of the most recent studies focusing on the revenue response to foreign aid inflows separates total net aid into grants and loans to test if the impact of grants on domestic revenue is different from that of (concessional) loans (Gupta *et al.* 2004). This study suggests that some governments may consider grants to be a free substitute for tax revenue. By contrast, loans must be

repaid, which provides incentives for governments to at least maintain tax revenues at current levels if not to increase them (Brautigam, 2000). Gupta *et al.* use the standard variables controlling for the economic structure and level of development in a panel of 107 developing countries over the period 1970-2002, but augment the model by adding grants and loans separately and a corruption variable (the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index), to test their separate impact on the aid-revenue relationship. In their baseline regression the overall effect of total aid (grants and loans) on domestic revenue is negative and significant. When total aid is split into grants and loans, grants have a significant, negative effect on revenue while loans have a significant, positive impact. In their extended model, corruption is found to reduce revenue. To further test the negative effect of corruption on revenues, Gupta *et al.* rank countries according to their score on the ICRG corruption index and test the impact of grants versus loans on revenues in a sample consisting of the relatively corrupt countries. Their results suggest that countries with weaker institutions are likely to suffer a larger negative impact of grants on revenue than countries with better institutions.

In addition to the cross-sectional time-series studies there are several country case studies for which the results are more mixed. A negative relationship between aid and domestic revenue mobilization was found in Pakistan (Franco-Rodriguez *et al.*, 1998), Zambia (Fagernas and Roberts, 2004a) and Cote d'Ivoire (McGillivray and Outtara, 2003). By contrast, a positive relationship between aid and revenue collection was found in

Indonesia (Pack and Pack, 1990), Ghana (Osei *et al.*, 2003), and Uganda and Malawi (Fagernas and Roberts, 2004b, 2004c).

Generally, thus, the literature finds a negative relationship between aid and revenue collection, but this is not a conclusive result. For all of the studies, there are considerable concerns about the quality of the data and also the sensitivity of the results to specification changes, which make firm causal conclusions about the aid-revenue relationship impossible. Nevertheless, the typical explanatory channels are the replacement of tax with aid in the short term and the disincentives and moral hazard faced by aid-dependent governments to build tax administration and institutional capacity over the long-term.

To further test the hypothesis that there is a negative causal relationship between high levels of aid and domestic tax effort, we would need reliable revenue data for a broad range of countries over an extended time period. Ideally, we would also have disaggregated revenue data to be able to strip out the possible differential effects of aid on trade taxes versus direct taxation and other forms of revenue collection. This would allow us to isolate the revenues which require more state capacity to collect. Unfortunately, much of this data does not exist, especially for the set of countries that have been highly aid-dependent (indeed, the lack of data itself suggests capacity gaps). In addition to data shortages, much of the existing fiscal data is of extremely poor quality, particularly among low-income countries. This limits our ability to empirically analyze the hypothesis with any degree of confidence and of course also raises caution about drawing firm conclusions from any of the data-driven

assessments[120].

To summarize this section: a clear bivariate relationship appears to exist between high levels of aid and low levels of taxation. Poor data quality do not, however, allow us complete confidence that this relationship is not confounded by other factors that high aid-dependent countries have in common, such as low levels of economic activity and industrialization, that are also associated with poor revenue extraction. In addition, it is very hard to establish the exact nature of the link between state capacity and levels of state revenue. Intuitively, revenue generation is so central to state survival that one would think that states would not voluntarily abstain from collecting revenues it was able to collect. However, it is not completely possible to reject the alternative hypothesis that states choose not to seek revenues they have the capacity to collect because they are able to receive the equivalent revenues from foreign aid. To gain insights into this issue, it is perhaps useful to turn to an older political science literature on state building, which explores the impact of revenue collection on regime type.

AID, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE POLITICAL REGIME

A political regime can be defined as the set of institutions which determine the nature of political power, and which structures the relationship between the government and the citizenry. A third and perhaps most critical set of negative institutional effects of aid can be identified as those that influence the political regime in

a way that discourages the establishment of rational developmental states. The hypothesis here is that large sustained aid flows fundamentally alter the relationship between government elites and local citizens. Any kind of external financial flow changes the incentives faced by recipient government officials and their citizens, regardless of the precise nature of donor practices. That is, aid flows themselves, separate from particular inefficiencies in the aid system, can affect the evolution of state-society relations. If donors are providing the majority of public finance and governments are primarily accountable to those external agencies, then it may simply not be possible to also expect a credible social contract to develop between the state and its citizens. Using the current terminology, aid may undercut the very principles the aid industry intends to promote: ownership, accountability, and participation.

Large aid flows can result in a reduction in governmental accountability because governing elites no longer need to ensure the support of their publics and the assent of their legislatures when they do not need to raise revenues from the local economy, as long as they keep the donors happy and willing to provide alternative sources of funding. Although governments typically complain about conditions, it is still easier to manage donor demands than the slow and politically difficult task of building or improving domestic revenue collection. A reliance on aid as a substitute for local resources means the flow of revenues to the state is not affected by government efficiency, so there will be a tendency for governments to under invest in developmental capacity. This moral hazard effect of aid dependence is borne out

empirically, as high aid is associated with decreased quality of governance (for example, Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Knack, 2000). Heller and Gupta (2002) also argue that aid creates moral hazard because it reduces the incentive to adopt good policies and reform inefficient institutions, and thus weakens the government's developmental performance and encourages rent-seeking.

The link between the loss of accountability and aid is particularly striking in Africa since the region combines sharp economic decline with a relatively high level of political stability, at least if the latter is defined as the ability of office holders to remain in power. Thus, since 1980, the average African leader has remained in power just under 12 years, more than three times longer than democratically elected leaders in the prosperous democracies of the West (Van de Walle, 2001). The absence of accountability is then not a manner of speech, but a practical reality: it is literally true that African governments avoid accountability for their performance.

A long-term decline in governmental accountability also appears to have a direct impact on the degree of democracy prevailing in the system. Qualitatively, Moore (1998) has argued that countries which rely on a greater proportion of 'unearned' income will tend to be less democratic and have less effective institutional mechanisms and accountability. Simply put, the actions of such governments typically indicate they do not have to worry as much about maintaining legitimacy because they do not collect revenues from their own population. Guyer (1992) and others have made exactly such an argument about Nigeria, while

more recently the negative links between aid dependency and low levels of democratic rule have been argued in a number of country case studies (see Hoffman and Gibson, 2005 on Tanzania; Hanlon, 1991 on Mozambique). In these dynamics, aid can be compared with a natural resource, such as oil, that provides unearned rents for the government. An earlier literature on ‘rentier’ states in the Middle East had indeed argued that oil resources have allowed governments to resist pressures to democratize (Anderson, 1987; Chaudhry, 1997).

Of course, it might be argued that aid comes with more strings attached than oil, and that donors can affect governmental behavior by setting conditions on their aid. However imperfectly, donors do not condone government corruption, incompetence or authoritarianism. Though inconsistently, donors have promoted democracy and better governance in Africa, at least since the end of the Cold War (Van De Walle, 2001). Donors have also sought to explicitly promote accountability and participation, using intensified oversight of accounts and conditionality, such as the insistence on a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) process, which subjects the national budget to multiple rounds of consultation with civil society groups. But the PRSPs and conditionality, and other donor processes (even if better enforced), cannot fundamentally replace government accountability towards its citizens in an equally legitimate way, no matter how well-intentioned or vigilant the donors.

A large flow of aid over a sustained period also can undermine popular participation. On the one hand, the assent of the population is less important to governments that receive large

amounts of external support. They will devote less time and resources to explaining and defending policy decisions to their citizens, and will underfund the kinds of public institutions that encourage popular participation. On the other hand, the decline in ownership brought about by the externalization of decision-making necessarily results in departicipation. If citizens believe that their leaders respond to pressures from London, Paris or Washington, they will not devote as much time pressing demands on the local legislature and executive. More to the point, they may view the local legislature as the place to press for favors and patronage, rather than for policy outcomes, and this will once again tend to reinforce the patrimonial elements in the local political economy.

The African contemporary record is certainly compatible with such an interpretation. The region is characterized by strong presidential rule, as well as weak and pliant legislatures (Van De Walle, 2001; Joseph, 2003; Barkan and Gibson, 2005), and frail civil society organizations. The absence of participatory checks on the executive branch of government in the region can tentatively at least in part be ascribed to the high volume of aid governments receive. Indeed, the relationship with the donors may well have served to reinforce tendencies which other structural factors were already creating. Many early observers had noted the low levels of participation in African political systems following independence (Kasfir, 1971; Collier, 1982), while the tendency of these countries to produce highly presidential political systems, with powerful executives and impotent legislatures has also long been related in the literature

(Schatzberg, 2001; Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997). The weakness of civil society in the region has also been described by numerous observers (Ndegwa, 1995; Harbeson *et al.*, 1994).

To be sure, political systems with stronger traditions of both vertical and horizontal domestic accountability might have been affected differently by a large volume of aid. But in Africa's post-colonial regimes, these aid flows inevitably enhanced an evolution already under way. Poorly integrated political communities with substantial ethnic fragmentation, and a small (or non-existent) middle class to buttress democratic rule were more likely to fall prey to authoritarian rulers relying on clientelism to remain in power. A small number of countries, such as Botswana, avoided the worst of these pitfalls (Acemoglu *et al.*, 2003; Lewis, 1993), in part thanks to unusual leadership. But for most the post-independence period was characterized by the emergence of regimes that enjoyed little popular legitimacy and needed a combination of systematic clientelism and various repressive political instruments to remain in power. These types of regimes were comforted in these tendencies by steady increases in aid that seemed automatic throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Governments could undertake profoundly anti-developmental actions and not threaten their relationship with the western donors. Thus, the move to authoritarian and military government in the 1960s did not reduce aid. The replacement of independent civil service commissions and merit-based promotions by politicized presidential control of the civil service was similarly condoned, not least because donors found it convenient to rely on a large number of foreign experts, to

palliate weaknesses in the civil service (Berg, 1993). Disastrous nationalization of private firms owned by foreigners for the benefit of political cronies close to the president in countries as diverse as Nigeria and Zaire did not prevent aid to continue its upward trajectory (See Rood, 1976; Callaghy, 1984 on Zaire; Biersteker, 1987 on Nigeria).

A comparison with the historical experience in the West is instructive here. Much scholarly work has closely linked democratic development to the evolution of taxation (see Ross, 2004 for an excellent overview). Historians of the emergence of strong democratic states in the West emphasize the link between the progressive growth of democratic and accountable government, on the one hand, and the emergence of a state apparatus that had both the capacity and the legitimacy to extract an increasing amount of revenue from society, on the other. In an influential essay, North and Weingast (1989) showed that the emergence of Parliamentary sovereignty in Britain with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 dramatically increased the ability of the British government to raise taxes, and ensured the country's military and economic success in the 18th and 19th century.

Ardant (1975) showed that the European states that were able to finance and then win wars were the states that were able to build their extractive capacity, but also to gain the assent of their populations, often by extending political rights. In Tilly's famous aphorism, "the state made war and war made the state", the need to finance wars motivated states both to build their extractive capacity, but also to maintain their own legitimacy (Tilly, 1975, 1985). In short, taxation is important because it is essential to

democratic governance, but also because it holds the key to state building and state survival. The comparison with the low income countries in Africa is instructive, since they did not have to fight international wars to ensure their survival (Herbst, 2000; Jackson and Rotberg, 1982).

In the 20th and 21st centuries, the basic functions of a developmental low-income state are to raise revenues and make effective expenditures in order to promote development. Successful developing countries—Korea, Taiwan, Botswana—have typically been solidly extractive states, with above average tax effort ratios. Not all of these states have enjoyed democratic governance during the early phases of their development, but almost invariably, their governments enjoyed substantial political legitimacy, and none were highly repressive. Of course, most of the low–income states of Africa typically have low tax effort ratios.

In recent years, donors have financed a sharp increase in social services provision in sub-Saharan Africa, notably in health and education. Historically, such increases in provision have been the hallmark of democratic governments, or at least of governments facing substantial participatory pressures. Thus, in the West, the rise of public education coincided in general terms with the introduction of the electoral franchise. Pressures from below encouraged governments who wanted to remain in power to provide more services to its citizens. In most African countries, however, the pressures have been external. In fact, a substantial proportion of the national development effort is not integrated into the national budget and does not concern the government. It is

not uncommon for donors to fund over half of the country's public investment budget, while foreign NGOs with their local partners can be providing from a third to half of the social services available to African citizens in some countries (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1995). Indeed, somewhat ironically, African governments have found it politically convenient to blame the donors and NGOs for unpopular sectoral policies, poor social services and negative economic outcomes, as if these were not among their core responsibilities.

There are similar differences in the rise of civil society. In the West, an emerging middle class sought to build a counter-weight to the state and its organizations, and the result was a wide variety of membership organizations, unions and clubs with an independent basis of power, that with time were able to increase the accountability of the central state (Hall, 1995). In Africa, the absence of economic growth long undermined the development of an indigenous independent civil society. In recent years, there has been a flowering of small non-state actors and some of them were instrumental in the emergence of democratic movements that did topple some authoritarian governments in the early 1990s (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997; Harbeson *et al.*, 1994). Yet, there remain very few membership organizations in the region, and many of the bigger NGOs that have emerged are mostly funded by the donors, typically to help undertake donor initiatives in the social sectors. Because these organizations receive funding from the donors, they are less likely to seek to build up their own memberships, or autonomy. Because they help donors implement projects that governments fail to undertake,

they actually help governments escape accountability for their developmental failures.

As a result of these different dynamics, governments have escaped accountability and have been allowed to focus their resources on non-developmental expenditures that help them remain in office. Van de Walle (2001) shows that there have been substantial increases in the size of defense expenditures in the region for instance, and the number and size of public offices such as parliamentary bodies, ministerial cabinets, national commissions, and provincial governments have steadily risen through two decades of economic crisis, even as the share of aid in the funding of development has sharply increased. Paradoxically, as a result, in Africa, the extension of social services has often been accompanied by a decline of participation, low governance quality and an increase in clientelistic behavior. If we agree with Fox (1994) and others that the process of democratic consolidation in low-income states requires a transition from clientelism to citizenship, in which governments engage in participatory contractual exchange relationships with the population, then donors efforts may have paradoxically negative effects on citizen-government relations in the region.

CONCLUSIONS

Our review of the literature suggests that there are reasons to believe that a large and sustained volume of aid can have negative effects on the development of good public institutions in

low income countries. We have reviewed different bodies of literature that suggest that the current aid system may have undercut incentives for revenue collection and negatively affected public governance in Africa. In addition, we have examined a political science literature that finds both anti-development governance patterns across most of sub-Saharan Africa and strong historical evidence that revenue generation is central to the idea of accountability and the establishment of state institutions. Combined, they suggest that aid may undermine the development of effective state structures.

There are many gaps in the data needed to prove these tentative claims. Also, state revenues are an imperfect indicator for state capacity, since states are able to get revenues in many different ways, only some of which involve much extractive capacity. Nonetheless, the analysis does suggest that an aid-institutions paradox, whereby high levels of aid can have a negative effect on local institutions, is a potentially serious concern. Given the possibility for substantially more aid flowing to Africa in the near future, scope for such a harmful dynamic is likely to be exacerbated.

A quarter of a century ago, the World Bank issued its so-called Berg Report (World Bank, 1981), which called for a doubling of aid to address its many economic and social problems. It must be particularly distressing to the development community how many of those problems persist, despite the fact that increases in aid were considerably higher than those hoped. This fact alone should encourage skepticism about the current proposals that a sharp increase in aid volume will have the intended effects in the

region. It is not at all clear that the current aid practices–with the negative effects on institutions described above–will or can be reformed. But, as we have argued, there are good reasons to believe that high levels of aid over a prolonged period is likely to have negative institutional effects, at the very least, if the current aid delivery modalities are not substantially reformed.

How much is too much aid? We have studiously avoided this difficult question until the end of the paper. The same Berg (1997, 2000) suggested that aid starts to have negative effects on local institutions when aid flows reach 5 percent of GDP, which would mean that the overwhelming majority of states in the region are negatively affected. A more recent and thorough review of aid absorption (Clemens and Radelet, 2003) find the 'saturation point' (where additional aid would produce zero economic impact) highly dependent on local conditions, but ranging from 15-45 percent of GDP. Surely, the incentive dynamics raised by this easy come into play well before such an extreme level is reached.

Our analysis is in no way meant to disparage the desirability of general increases in aid flows, however, or suggest that additional aid could not necessarily be spent without producing the negative institutional effects. Our findings do not cover a range of activities that might be donor financed which could have positive institutional effects, such as debt relief, peacekeeping, and regional security arrangements. Similarly, we join other analysts who have advocated substantial increases in funding for regional and global public goods, such as agricultural research or anti-malaria research. All the available evidence on the likely

impact of the eradication of endemic diseases in the region suggest current funding levels to be inadequate (Ferroni and Mody, 2002), and a substantially larger flow of resources would be unlikely to have the kinds of negative institutional effects described here.

In sum, it seems likely that the extra public dollars now being proposed for traditional development assistance might well be better spent for other types of assistance that would in the long run have a greater impact on the development of the region. However, an historical view of the complex evolution of state institutions suggests that not only are they critical to producing developmental outcomes, but that donors should be unambiguously aware that their assistance can have perverse effects on some of the very outcomes they hope to encourage.

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Lectura 4

Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation*[121]

VALUES AND INTERESTS

As we approach the end of the twentieth century, the time is ripe to reflect on the lessons of development co-operation over the last 50 years and to put forward strategies for the first part of the next century. This report sets forth the collective views on these matters of development ministers, heads of aid agencies and other senior officials responsible for development co-operation, meeting as the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development[122].

In the year 2000, four-fifths of the people of the world will be living in the developing countries, most with improving conditions. But the number in absolute poverty and despair will still be growing. Those of us in the industrialised countries have a strong moral imperative to respond to the extreme poverty and human suffering that still afflict more than one billion people. We also have a strong self-interest in fostering increased prosperity in the developing countries. Our solidarity with the people of all countries causes us to seek to expand the community of interests and values needed to manage the problems that respect no borders—from environmental degradation and migration, to drugs and epidemic diseases. All people are made less secure by the poverty and misery that exist in the world. Development matters.

The record of the last 50 years, from Marshall Plan aid to the network of development partnerships now evolving, shows that the efforts of countries and societies to help themselves have been the main ingredients in their success. But the record also shows that development assistance has been an essential complementary factor in many achievements: the green

revolution, the fall in birth rates, improved basic infrastructure, a diminished prevalence of disease and dramatically reduced poverty. Properly applied in propitious environments, aid works.

Co-operation within the United Nations, the international financial institutions, the OECD and other global and regional fora has greatly enhanced these efforts and shaped an evolving multilateralism in which all countries hold a vital stake.

We have learned that development assistance will only work where there is a shared commitment of all the partners. We have seen the results in countries which have grown, prospered and achieved industrialisation; they no longer depend on aid but stand on their own feet and participate in the global economy. We have seen, on the other hand, the countries in which civil conflict and bad governance have set back development for generations. And we have learned that success takes time and sustained international and local effort.

As we look ahead, we see an overwhelming case for making that effort. As a crucial part of this undertaking, the international community needs to sustain and increase the volume of official development assistance in order to reverse the growing marginalisation of the poor and achieve progress toward realistic goals of human development. Domestic preoccupations in Member countries should not jeopardise the international development effort at a critical juncture. Today's investments in development co-operation will yield a very high return over the coming years.

We believe that ways must be found to finance multilateral development co-operation that are adequate, efficient,

predictable and sustainable. The full implementation of current agreements to pay arrears and create workable financing systems is an essential part of efforts to ensure that the United Nations and the multilateral development banks avoid severe crisis and continue to play their vital roles.

We also recognise that those responsible for public money are accountable for its effective use. We have a duty to state clearly the results we expect and how we think they can be achieved.

It is time to select, taking account of the many targets discussed and agreed at international fora, a limited number of indicators of success by which our efforts can be judged. We are proposing a global development partnership effort through which we can achieve together the following ambitious but realisable goals.

Economic well-being:

- A reduction by one-half in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015.

Social development:

- Universal primary education in all countries by 2015.
- Demonstrated progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005.
- A reduction by two-thirds in the mortality rates for infants and children under age 5 and a reduction by three-fourths in maternal mortality, all by 2015.
- Access through the primary health-care system to

reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015.

Environmental sustainability and regeneration:

- The current implementation of national strategies for sustainable development in all countries by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental resources are effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015.

While expressed in terms of their global impact, these goals must be pursued country by country through individual approaches that reflect local conditions and locally-owned development strategies. Essential to the attainment of these measurable goals are *qualitative factors* in the evolution of more stable, safe, participatory and just societies. These include capacity development for effective, democratic and accountable governance, the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law. We will also continue to address these less easily quantified factors of development progress.

Effective international support can make a real difference in achieving these goals. This is far from saying that they can be achieved by aid alone. The most important contributions for development, as in the past, will be made by the people and governments of the developing countries themselves. But where this effort is forthcoming it needs and deserves strong support from the industrialised countries. We commit ourselves to do the

utmost to help:

- First, by a willingness to make mutual commitments with our development partners, supported by adequate resources.
- Second, by improving the co-ordination of assistance in support of locally-owned development strategies.
- Third, by a determined effort to achieve coherence between aid policies and other policies which impact on developing countries.

These approaches were set out in broad terms in the statement of policy that we adopted in 1995 entitled *Development Partnerships in the New Global Context*[123]. The report that follows builds on this statement and proposes specific new practical measures to achieve the vision of partnership for development.

We intend our report to be a contribution to the broad contemporary effort to improve the effectiveness of development co-operation. A rich process of dialogue and decisions is underway—within the OECD, in the Interim and Development Committees of the World Bank and IMF, in the regional development banks, in the G7, and in the United Nations system. This heightened international focus on development co-operation reinforces our conviction that development matters.

The success or failure of poor people and poor countries in making their way in an interdependent world will have a profound influence in shaping the 21st century. We offer our proposals in this report with confidence that international co-operation can be

effective in supporting development, and that the results will be well worth the effort they will demand of our societies. The stakes in a stable, sustainable future for this planet and all who will inhabit it are far too high for us to forego that effort.

A VISION OF PROGRESS

NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN A TIME OF GLOBAL CHANGE

The management of global issues in the 21st century will require the active participation of all members of the international community. The developing countries, with 80% of the world's population, must be part of a shared vision for this new century. Their future will be ever more tightly linked to that of our own societies. Their role in preserving peace and stability, expanding the global economy, combating poverty, increasing choices and opportunities and respect for human rights, and achieving sustainable environmental and population balances will be more significant than ever before.

The new opportunities and challenges are coming into clearer focus:

- Globalisation is helping certain developing countries achieve the highest rates of economic growth in the world. Well before mid-century the present developing countries will account for half of global economic output.
- Population growth in the developing countries will

account for virtually all the increase in the world's population, from 5 billion in 1990 to about7.5 billion in 2015. This increase over 25 years is roughly equal to the total size of the human population in 1950.

- With growing economic interdependence, global competition and vigorous private sector activity are encouraging greater similarity in the policies of industrialised and developing countries.
- On the other hand, there is growing diversity within countries and among countries. Some developing countries are achieving considerable rates of growth and impressive reductions in poverty, although significant concentrations of poverty remain. Other countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, have been increasingly marginalised from the global system and suffer continuing deterioration in already deplorable living standards.
- Growing strains on the quality of water, soil and air, loss of biodiversity, depletion of fish stocks, current patterns of production and consumption and global climate change all raise questions about the continued capacity of the Earth's natural resource base to feed and sustain a growing and increasingly urbanised population.
- It is now clear that not only environmental, but also social, cultural and political sustainability of development efforts are essential for the security and well-being of people and the functioning of the complex, interdependent global system now emerging.

There is a compelling need for development co-operation strategies that will help the international community to manage these emerging challenges and opportunities into the next century. The choices before us involve far more than just the relevance and effectiveness of aid programmes. Decisions about international support for development will play a part in defining our societies' overall vision for the future. What can development do to help create a stable global order in which people can live secure and productive lives? How can it help to avoid a future of conflict and chaos, of poverty and environmental devastation? How will development co-operation adapt to the changing global context?

THE VITAL INTERESTS AT STAKE

The Member countries of the Development Assistance Committee spend about $60 billion dollars each year for official development assistance. There are three principal motivations for their efforts.

The first motive is fundamentally humanitarian. Support for development is a compassionate response to the extreme poverty and human suffering that still afflict one-fifth of the world's population. The people who live in extreme poverty, for the most part, lack access to clean water and adequate health facilities; many do not receive sufficient nourishment to live a productive life; the majority do not possess basic literacy or numeracy skills[124]. Their deprivation is unnecessary and its continuation is intolerable. The moral imperative of support for development is

self-evident.

The second reason for supporting development is enlightened self-interest. Development benefits people not only in poor countries, but also in the industrialised donor countries. Increased prosperity in the developing countries demonstrably expands markets for the goods and services of the industrialised countries. Increased human security reduces pressures for migration and accompanying social and environmental stresses. Political stability and social cohesion diminish the risks of war, terrorism and crime that inevitably spill over into other countries.

The third reason for international support for development is the solidarity of all people with one another. Development co-operation is one way that people from all nations can work together to address common problems and pursue common aspirations. Sustainable development expands the community of interests and values necessary to manage a host of global issues that respect no borders—environmental protection, limiting population growth, nuclear non-proliferation, control of illicit drugs, combating epidemic diseases.

In a changing world, old distinctions between “North” and “South”, as well as between “East” and “West”, are becoming blurred. Issues can no longer be divided into “domestic” and “international”. Risks of social disintegration and exclusion affect all countries, as do opportunities to benefit from participation in a growing global economic system. As underlined in the DAC’s 1995 *Development Partnerships* policy statement, the basic notion of security is being redefined, placing much more weight on the needs and concerns of human beings and the quality of

their environment. Everyone is made less secure by the poverty and misery that exist in this world.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Development progress over recent decades has been unprecedented in human history. In the early 1950s, when large-scale development assistance began, most people outside the developed countries lived as they had always lived, scraping by on the edge of subsistence, with little knowledge of and no voice in global or national affairs, and little expectation of more than a short life of hard work with slight reward. Since then, many countries have achieved truly dramatic improvement in overall indicators of human welfare:

- Life expectancy in the developing countries has risen by more than twenty years (from 41 to 62 years).
- The percentage of the population with access to clean water has doubled (from 35% to 70%).
- Adult literacy has risen from less than half the population to about two-thirds.
- Food production and consumption have increased at a rate about 20% faster than population growth.

These impressive strides have not been uniform. In some countries poverty is increasing, and in many countries the poor have not shared in the positive global trends described above. Millions of people still die each year from preventable and treatable diseases; 130 million primary school-age children do

not attend school; more than one-third of the children in developing countries are malnourished and one in ten dies before reaching the age of five years. Respect for human dignity, and in particular acceptance of the equality of women, remains an unfulfilled dream for too many.

While the distance that remains is less than the road already travelled, the journey is far from over. The striking progress that we have seen in recent decades gives us confidence that poverty can be overcome and development achieved. But history has shown us that progress is not inevitable. There is no room for complacency. Special attention by the international community is needed to build on the economic, social and political improvements underway in Sub-Saharan Africa, and to help counter further marginalisation of the continent.

It is clear that success has been achieved only where the people and the institutions of developing countries have made sustained efforts to help themselves. At the same time, the record demonstrates that international co-operation has also contributed greatly, and increasingly, to the development results we have witnessed over the past 50 years.

In this review we have considered where development co-operation has made the greatest difference. This can be examined at two levels. First, at the *global level*, some of the basic features of the human condition have been re-shaped over the past half-century, as is documented below. Second, there is much to be learned from the *performance of individual countries*, where the complex factors contributing to success or failure have produced such starkly different outcomes.

At the global level:

- The dramatic fall in infant and child mortality has been supported by a major international campaign to increase child survival, led by the World Health Organisation and the United Nations Children's Fund and supported by many bilateral donors.
- Almost 1.4 billion people gained access to clean water during the 1980s, the United Nations International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. This impressive result is an example of developing country efforts backed by effective aid.
- International development agencies have sponsored research, education and immunisation programmes to control smallpox (now eliminated), polio (eliminated in almost all countries), diphtheria and measles, and have introduced simple and effective ways to combat infant diarrhea, river blindness and guinea worm disease. The success of these efforts can be measured in millions of lives saved and billions of dollars of economic benefits.
- The "green revolution" that has contributed so much to the 20% increase in calorie consumption (and an accompanying decline in malnutrition) was given substantial impetus from international support for agricultural research, development of new crop varieties, extension services, irrigation and assistance to production and marketing, in addition to development co-operation in support of sound agricultural and other economic policies.

- Development co-operation has helped expand access to family planning and related education that have resulted in sharp falls in fertility rates and in desired family size in many developing countries. Contraceptive use in developing countries has risen from 10% of couples in 1960 to 50% in the 1990s.
- Development assistance has financed numerous projects to extend and improve energy, transportation and communications infrastructure as well as to strengthen capacity for the management of these systems. That physical investment and institutional capacity have been important to bring more people and more nations into the modern economy.
- Development co-operation can now also claim significant contributions to a broad range of less quantifiable factors of importance to sustainable development. These range from improved capacity for managing economic and social policies to heightened attention to issues of accountability, the rule of law and human rights, expanded participation and the accumulation of social capital, and appreciation for environmental sustainability. These aspects of development, more complex than some earlier challenges, are basic to international co-operation today.

At the country level, we see even more clearly that development co-operation is one factor among many affecting development results. In the course of this review, DAC Members contributed more than 60 country-specific examples, together

with many regional and generic lessons. In recent years, we have examined the overall experience of countries to try to assess the impacts of aid. Academics have also attempted to make statistical associations between the volume and types of aid and total economic and social progress achieved by countries. While the sceptical analyses have usually received more attention, some new work has pointed to more positive associations[125].

Isolating any single factor as *the* cause of development success or failure is usually impossible. When aid works best, it is as a catalyst or reinforcement of other factors. At the same time, the record shows that it has indeed contributed, in just these ways, to a wide range of development successes in a great many countries facing radically different circumstances. Independent evaluations and our own re-examination in this exercise show a solid and rising score of successful contributions in the economic and social performance of many individual countries, as well as at the global level.

Development and development co-operation reflect human experience. They never provide neat and simple stories of progress. Set-backs have occurred, resources have been wasted, and ill-conceived or poorly-managed aid has even been counter-productive. Some countries have become excessively dependent on aid. Both the successes and the failures have taught us a lot about how best to achieve results. In particular, we have learned that successful development strategies must integrate a number of key elements. They require a sound and stable policy framework; an emphasis on social development; enhanced participation by the local population, and notably by

women; good governance, in the widest sense; policies and practices that are environmentally sustainable; and better means of preventing and resolving conflict and fostering reconciliation.

These basic lessons inform our overall conclusion that development co-operation is only a complement, albeit often a vital one, to the efforts of the people, the institutions and the governments of the developing countries.

GOALS TO HELP DEFINE THE VISION

We agree with the 1995 G7 Summit at Halifax that a higher quality of life for all people is the goal of sustainable development. A higher quality of life means that people will attain increased power over their own future. The pursuit of that broad vision will put the focus on many unfinished tasks, some of which have already been identified in the preceding discussion. They include overcoming extreme poverty, achieving food security, increasing the effectiveness of market economies and the efficiency of government, fostering regional co-operation, enhancing the participation of all people, and notably women, and reducing the dependency of the poorest people and poorest countries by increasing their capacity for self reliance. This daunting array of tasks needs a defining structure.

We believe that a few specific goals will help to clarify the vision of a higher quality of life for all people, and will provide guideposts against which progress toward that vision can be measured.

Many goals have been formulated through the series of recent

United Nations conferences addressing subjects important to development—education (Jomtien, 1990), children (New York, 1990), the environment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), human rights (Vienna, 1993), population (Cairo, 1994), social development (Copenhagen, 1995), and women (Beijing, 1995)[126]. These conferences have identified a number of targets to measure the progress of development in particular fields. They reflect broad agreement in the international community, arrived at with the active participation of the developing countries.

The selection of an integrated set of goals, based on these agreed targets, could provide valuable indicators of progress. We are suggesting several such indicators in the fields of economic well-being, social development and environmental sustainability. The particular indicators we have chosen reflect our judgement of their importance in their own right and as meaningful proxies for broader development goals. Our selection does not indicate any diminished commitment to other goals accepted by the international community, at international conferences or elsewhere.

These targets are aspirations for the entire development process, not just for co-operation efforts. They represent only a proposal of what we as donors consider to be helpful measures of progress to inspire effective development co-operation. Their achievement will require agreement and commitment from developing country partners, through their own national goals and locally-owned strategies. They can be realised only through concerted actions developed through a process of dialogue and agreement in a true spirit of partnership

Success will depend upon the broad acceptance of a comprehensive approach, drawing on the resources, energies and commitment of institutions and individuals in government at all levels, in the private sector, in non-governmental organisations —in developing and industrialised countries and in international organisations. It will depend equally upon an individual approach that recognises diversity among countries and societies and that respects local ownership of the development process. We will need to change how we think and how we operate, in a far more co-ordinated effort than we have known until now.

1. Economic well-being: The proportion of people living in extreme poverty in developing countries should be reduced by at least one-half by 2015. The 1995 Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action set forth the goal of eradicating poverty in the world, through decisive national actions and international co-operation “as an ethical, social, political and economic imperative of humankind”. The World Bank has used the standard of $370 per capita in annual income, or about $1 per day, as the threshold of extreme poverty. Based on that standard, it has estimated that 30% of the population in developing countries—or some 1.3 billion people—live in extreme poverty, and that their numbers are increasing.

This goal obviously goes only part of the way toward meeting the global poverty eradication target identified at Copenhagen. But it seeks to give that target a concrete, attainable focus for the medium term. Reductions of poverty on this order of magnitude have been achieved in individual countries; we are proposing a generalisation of those individual successes. Even if the

incidence of extreme poverty can be reduced by one-half, there will still remain a human tragedy of enormous proportions. But success in achieving the 50% reduction will demonstrate both the need and the ability to continue the effort.

Obviously, this target will be much harder to reach in some countries than in others. But global averages are not enough. The objective must be pursued country by country, and substantial progress must be sought in all countries. This target implies significantly increased rates of per capita economic growth. However, growth rates will vary greatly among countries and we have concluded that a global growth target would be neither feasible nor useful to the formulation of country strategies.
2. Social development: There should be substantial progress in primary education, gender equality, basic health care and family planning, as follows.

a) There should be universal primary education in all countries by 2015. This goal, building on the ground laid at the Jomtien Conference on Education for All in 1990, was endorsed by the 1995 Copenhagen Summit on Social Development and also by the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women as a goal for 2015. The attainment of basic literacy and numeracy skills has been identified repeatedly as the most significant factor in reducing poverty and increasing participation by individuals in the economic, political and cultural life of their societies.

b) Progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women should be demonstrated by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005. The Cairo and Beijing Conferences, as well as the Copenhagen Summit,

recommended that the gender gap in primary and secondary education be closed by 2005. Investment in education for girls has been shown repeatedly to be one of the most important determinants of development, with positive implications for all other measures of progress. Achieving gender equality in education will be a measure of both fairness and efficiency.

c) The death rate for infants and children under the age of five years should be reduced in each developing country by two-thirds the 1990 level by 2015. The rate of maternal mortality should be reduced by three-fourths during this same period. The 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development established the goals of reducing the infant mortality rate to below 35 per thousand live births, and reducing under-five mortality to below 45 per thousand, by 2015. This target endorses those goals. Child mortality, as a measure of the availability of health and nutrition for the most vulnerable members of society, is a key indicator of the overall state of health in a society.

Maternal mortality is an area of one of the greatest disparities between developing and industrialised countries, although there is great divergence among countries. The Cairo Conference adopted targets of reducing the rate in every developing country by one-half from the 1990 level by 2000 and by a further one-half by 2015. These targets were confirmed at the Beijing Conference. The 1995 World Development Report estimates the maternal mortality rate per 100 000 live births in developing countries overall at about 350 during the 1980s.

d) Access should be available through the primary health-care

system to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages, including safe and reliable family planning methods, as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015. This objective, agreed to at the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development, is key to enabling people to make active choices on their reproductive behaviour and thus to contribute to stabilising the world population and assuring the sustainability of development.

3. Environmental sustainability and regeneration: There should be a current national strategy for sustainable development, in the process of implementation, in every country by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental resources —forests, fisheries, fresh water, climate, soils, biodiversity, stratospheric ozone, the accumulation of hazardous substances and other major indicators—are effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015. This objective is derived from the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment and Development. It is intended to supplement the global targets established under international environmental conventions. The national strategy for sustainable development, called for at Rio, is foreseen as a highly participatory instrument intended “to ensure socially responsible economic development while protecting the resource base and the environment for the benefit of future generations”.

This goal implies that all countries will have acquired by 2015 the capacity to address environmental issues and respond to environmental problems. The Rio Conference emphasised that progress in economic and social development, including progress toward all the goals outlined in this report, depends critically on

the preservation of the natural resource base and limitation of environmental degradation. Rio and other international fora have also reinforced the message that these goals can only be met if developing countries themselves drive the action, with full participation by all of their societies' stakeholders.

Sustainable development needs to integrate a number of additional key elements, not all of which lend themselves to indicators along the lines suggested here. The Copenhagen Declaration, for example, included a commitment to promote social integration by fostering societies that are stable, safe and just and based on the promotion and protection of all human rights. In the same vein, the 1995 DAC *Development Partnerships* policy statement identified democratic accountability, the protection of human rights and the rule of law as among the key elements of integrated development strategies. Inv estment of development resources in democratic governance will contribute to more accountable, transparent and participatory societies conducive to development progress. *While not themselves the subject of suggested numerical indicators*, *we reaffirm our conviction that these qualitative aspects of development are essential to the attainment of the more measurable goals we have suggested. Accordingly*, *we will continue to address them in our dialogues with partners and in our policies and programmes.*

NEW STRATEGIES FOR THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

A CHANGING DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION

We made a clear statement last year on our view of the roles of partners in development co-operation. Sustainable development, based on integrated strategies that incorporate key economic, social, environmental and political elements, must be locally owned. The role of external partners is to help strengthen capacities in developing partner countries “to meet those demanding, integrated requirements for sustainable development, guided by the conditions and commitments in each country”[127].

To give substance to our belief in local ownership and partnership we must use channels and methods of co-operation that do not undermine those values. Acceptance of the partnership model, with greater clarity in the roles of partners, is one of the most positive changes we are proposing in the framework for development co-operation. In a partnership, development co-operation does not try to do things for developing countries and their people, but with them. It must be seen as a collaborative effort to help them increase their capacities to do things for themselves. Paternalistic approaches have no place in this framework. In a true partnership, local actors should progressively take the lead while external partners back their efforts to assume greater responsibility for their own development.

Partnerships are becoming more complex. Earlier aid efforts involved working almost always with central governments. Today, we are working with many more partners to meet demands for greater efficiency, respond to more pluralistic and decentralised

political systems, and recognise the importance of a dynamic private sector, local ownership and participation by civil society.

Our understanding of development and development co-operation has undergone fundamental change. It has expanded to take more fully into account how societies operate and how the international system functions. We now see a much broader range of aims for a more people-centred, participatory and sustainable development process:

- Reducing poverty while achieving broadly-based economic growth.
- Strengthening human and institutional capacities within nations to meet internal challenges and help avert further tragic cases of social disintegration and “failed states”.
- Improving the capacity of developing countries to contribute to the management and solution of global problems.
- Reinforcing the transformation of institutions and enabling environments to facilitate the emergence of developing countries and transition economies as growing trade and investment partners in the global economy.

We are confident that development co-operation can make a crucial contribution toward these aims. At the same time, our expectations are now more modest about what can be achieved by development co-operation alone. We are convinced that a partnership approach is the way to meet the varied and complex challenges that we face, many of which are still quite new.

Development co-operation experience is still at an early stage in working with issues such as good governance, private sector development, capacity to manage environmental issues and gender equality, which have attained their current prominence only in recent years.

When development is viewed in this broad context of societal transformation it is evident that development co-operation and other policies must work together. Our crucial interests in the broad goals of peace, economic growth, social justice, environmental sustainability and democracy obviously go far wider than aid programmes. The resources devoted to development co-operation and the expertise in the development agencies need to be integrated into coherent policy frameworks in which development objectives are given their full weight. Within our governments, development is important not only to aid agencies, but also to ministries of foreign affairs, finance, trade, environment, agriculture, and defence. More broadly, our citizens have much at stake in how national policies interact to complement—or to frustrate—development.

A STRONGER COMPACT FOR EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIPS

We have stressed throughout this paper that each developing country and its people are ultimately responsible for their own development. Thus, the developing country is the necessary starting point for organising co-operation efforts, through relationships and mechanisms that reflect the particular local

circumstances. Some developing countries will need special help in building the necessary capacities. Development co-operation at the regional level, and on sectoral lines, is also important. However, these approaches should complement and enrich efforts to strengthen national capacities for sustainable development.

As a basic principle, locally-owned country development strategies and targets should emerge from an open and collaborative dialogue by local authorities with civil society and with external partners, about their shared objectives and their respective contributions to the common enterprise. Each donor's programmes and activities should then operate within the framework of that locally-owned strategy in ways that respect and encourage strong local commitment, participation, capacity development and ownership.

While the particular elements of partnerships will vary considerably, it is possible to suggest areas in which undertakings might be considered by the partners as their commitments to shared objectives.

Joint responsibilities:

- Create the conditions conducive to generating adequate resources for development.
- Pursue policies that minimise the risks of violent conflict.
- Strengthen protections at the domestic and international levels against corruption and illicit practices.
- Open up wide scope for effective development contributions from throughout civil society.
- Enlist the support of rapidly-developing countries and

regional development mechanisms.

Developing country responsibilities:

- Adhere to appropriate macroeconomic policies.
- Commit to basic objectives of social development and increased participation, including gender equality.
- Foster accountable government and the rule of law.
- Strengthen human and institutional capacity.
- Create a climate favourable to enterprise and the mobilisation of local savings for investment.
- Carry out sound financial management, including efficient tax systems and productive public expenditure.
- Maintain stable and co-operative relations with neighbours.

External partner responsibilities:

- Provide reliable and appropriate assistance both to meet priority needs and to facilitate the mobilisation of additional resources to help achieve agreed performance targets.
- Contribute to international trade and investment systems in ways that permit full opportunities to developing countries.
- Adhere to agreed international guidelines for effective aid, and monitoring for continuous improvement.
- Support strengthened capacities and increased participation in the developing country, avoiding the creation of aid-dependency.

- Support access to information, technology and know-how.
- Support coherent policies in other aspects of relations, including consistency in policies affecting human rights and the risks of violent conflict.
- Work for better co-ordination of the international aid system among external partners, in support of developing countries' own strategies.

MAKING AID WORK BETTER

In the final part of this paper we propose some specific measures to help to achieve more effective development co-operation. The following suggestions reflect our collective experience; they seek to build on our strengths and correct identified weaknesses. However, one of the key lessons about development co-operation is that donor-driven initiatives rarely take root and that developing countries and their people must be at the centre of any effective system. The ideas presented here, therefore, will require broader discussion, especially with our developing country partners, and will need to be tested in practice and adapted as necessary.

Support for locally-owned strategies

One of the most frequent weaknesses of past aid efforts was excessive proliferation of aid projects. Most donors have been moving beyond the project-by-project approach to reliance on explicit country strategies in working with the countries of their major concentration. These countries tend to be those that are

the most aid-dependent. There are often a number of donors working in them. While each donor's strategy seeks to respond to national priorities, the number and diversity of donor strategies raise questions about the burden they create for local institutions and the degree to which they foster or impair local ownership and participation.

DAC Members, working with multilateral agencies and other donors, will help developing country partners to strengthen their own development strategies, and will encourage co-ordinated support from the donor community. One way to reinforce locally-owned strategies may be for donors increasingly to finance those aspects of the strategy calling for public expenditure through the budget of the developing country. This approach is being tested in a number of pilot efforts with a view to assuring both effectiveness and accountability by the developing country.

Commitment of adequate resources

Development finance is becoming more diversified. In the mid-1980s official development finance was the major part of resource flows to developing countries. In the mid-1990s private flows far exceed those from official sources. Experience has demonstrated the fundamental importance of high rates of domestic savings, efficient local financial systems and sound economic policies in the developing countries. In all the fast-growing developing economies, domestic savings are one of the main engines of growth, often supported by private foreign investment. Development co-operation needs to address these

essential factors so that more developing countries will be able to compete for capital and technology.

Our vision of development is one that fosters self-reliance in which countries and people are less in need of aid. However, many poorer countries simply do not yet have access to other resources sufficient to achieve the outcomes that serve everyone's interests. Private flows are highly concentrated in a limited number of countries and sectors. The smaller and least developed countries still attract little of this potential source of development finance. Moreover, private resources generally do not flow directly to some key sectors of priority need, such as health and education. Development will depend upon the continued availability of concessional resources, while countries build the capacity to create and mobilise domestic resources and attract private capital flows. For a number of highly indebted poor countries, development will also depend upon concerted international action to alleviate an unsustainable burden of debt.

In our 1995 *Development Partnerships* policy statement we reaffirmed our commitment to generating substantial resources for development co-operation to back the efforts of countries and people to help themselves. In endorsing that statement, the OECD Council at Ministerial Level expressed its continuing commitment "to mobilise as many public resources as possible and to encourage private flows to back the self-help efforts of developing countries".

Only four of the DAC's 21 Member countries consistently meet the widely accepted volume target of 0.7% of GNP established by the United Nations in 1970 as an appropriate level for official

development assistance[128]. For the DAC as a whole, ODA disbursements are now only 0.3% of GNP. Moreover, a growing portion of available ODA resources has been devoted to humanitarian needs and debt relief in recent years, placing an even greater strain on aid budgets. Among other things, these strains have created unprecedented shortfalls in financing of the United Nations system and the multilateral development banks. These multilateral institutions remain a cornerstone in global efforts to foster development. Their difficult financial situation is a cause for concern.

As recently as 1992, in the programme of action agreed at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio, developed countries reaffirmed their commitments “to reach the accepted United Nations target of 0.7% of GNP for ODA, and to the extent that they have not yet achieved that target, agree to augment their aid programmes in order to reach that target as soon as possible...”. Other developed countries agreed at Rio “to make their best efforts to increase their level of ODA”.

In this report we have focused on indicators of development progress—on outcomes rather than the volume of inputs. Nevertheless, as we have pointed out, ODA is an essential investment to complement other development resources. Clearly, we need to sustain and increase official development assistance if we expect to see a reversal of the growing marginalisation of the poor and achieve progress toward realistic goals of human development. It is equally clear than an effort to build stronger compacts with developing countries on a foundation of shrinking

resources and declining commitment will lack credibility. Therefore, it is necessary to express, once again, our deep concern that domestic preoccupations and budgetary pressures in some Member countries seriously jeopardise the international co-operation effort at a critical juncture.

Enhanced co-ordination in international fora and on the ground

We are committed to better co-ordinate our aid efforts in line with the strategies of our partner countries. General and sectoral co-ordination among donors varies greatly from country to country. Given the variety of country situations, there is no single model that can be recommended. But methods of proven effectiveness could be given stronger encouragement. For example, the developing country should be the co-ordinator of development co-operation wherever possible. However, in cases where local interest or capability is weak, it remains for donors to encourage regular fora for co-ordination, and to assure that their own local representatives participate. Lead agencies from within the donor community (bilateral or multilateral) could be identified for particular themes or sectors, and developing country partners should be an integral part of the process. The in-country co-ordination could then be monitored in international Consultative Groups and Round Tables, as well as in DAC Aid Reviews. The objective would be to create incentives for effective co-ordination and to strengthen local capacity to lead the co-ordination process.

Monitoring and evaluation

We need to check continuously that planned improvements in aid co-ordination and delivery actually take place, with full feedback from the intended beneficiaries. The Development Assistance Committee already serves part of this role as a standard-keeper and co-ordination body without operational programmes of its own. More can be done in future, building on the many evaluation exercises underway (including those of the multilateral development banks), on the DAC's peer reviews of bilateral donor programmes, and new developing country-based aid reviews, now in a pilot stage. Many specific and hard-won lessons learned are identified in the *DAC Principles for Effective Aid* and other policy guidance, as well as in the growing body of work on results-oriented programming, evaluations and follow-up. Guidelines for effective aid need to be continuously disseminated and tested at the field level, and the results fed back into new programmes. We shall continue to monitor the application of all these lessons to future development co-operation efforts.

Expanding the base for co-operation

Aid is a scarce resource and, as we have stressed throughout this report, it must be targeted to meet priority needs and help generate other development investments. One of the most encouraging indications of progress over recent decades is that many countries have reduced or eliminated their need for aid, and some have become donors themselves.

The DAC has now established a regular system for review of

its *List of Developing Countries and Territories* with a view to identifying those that should progress from that list. Members already direct a substantial majority (some 63%) of their aid flows to low-income and least-developed countries, and they are committed to continuing that concentration as countries progress. As countries move toward a pattern of sustained growth and development, co-ordinated efforts should be made to assure that continued aid investments are directed to the sustainability of their own strategies, and that a conscious path toward a phase-out of aid is identified.

Countries, institutions and individuals with recent experience in successful development can be especially effective in sharing their experience and insights with others. They also provide concrete examples of the shared international benefits of development. We need to strengthen and encourage the participation of those who can bring the experience of their own development into an expanding base of international co-operation. Such efforts are now part of our joint work in the DAC.

BRINGING OUR POLICIES TOGETHER

This report has described how the linkages between industrialised and developing countries extend far beyond development assistance. There are many areas where policies of the industrialised countries can complement or frustrate development efforts. Fiscal deficits of industrialised countries can influence both the cost and the availability of capital for developing countries. Environmental, sanitary and other

restrictions on imports can sometimes operate as non-tariff barriers. The promotion of military exports can drain limited resources away from development priorities. On the other hand, industrialised country policies can foster trade and investment flows, can facilitate the sharing of technology, and can in many other ways advance development objectives.

The ramifications and opportunities of policy coherence for development now need to be much more carefully traced and followed through than in the past. We should aim for nothing less than to assure that the entire range of relevant industrialised country policies are consistent with and do not undermine development objectives. We will work with our colleagues in the broad collaborative effort now underway within the OECD to examine linkages between OECD Members and the developing countries, building on the promising work on this theme completed in 1994[129]. We are confident that we can do more than just avoid policy conflict. We will work to assure that development co-operation and other linkages between industrialised and developing countries are mutually reinforcing.

The 21st century can be one of increased co-operation, of hope and of opportunity. We put forward these ideas to show the importance of development for the security and well-being of all who will inhabit this planet in the coming century. We are confident that development co-operation, together with other modes of international co-operation, can work to produce results that will be well worth the effort they will demand of our societies.

3-4 May 1995 at the level of Development Co-operation Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies.

They agreed on shared orientations for their development co-operation efforts and preparing for key challenges of sustainable economic and social development into the 21st century.

Members also expressed deep concern that domestic preoccupations and budgetary pressures in some Member countries could seriously jeopardise the international development co-operation effort at a critical juncture.

For three decades, the highest rates of economic growth in the world have been achieved among developing countries, notably in Asia and Latin America. Many formerly poor countries have made rapid advances in standards of living, fuelled by expanded trade, capital and technology flows. Development co-operation has helped, and must continue to help, lay the foundations for their success.

Yet many countries and people have not yet shared in this progress, or have even lost ground. At the same time, numerous countries, including countries in Africa, are adopting far-reaching economic and political reforms. They seek to increase opportunities for their people, and to integrate successfully into a highly competitive, interdependent world.

Development and greater interdependence require high levels of domestic effort, high standards of accountability, and a strong civil society. Open, participatory economic and political systems are increasingly important factors. Meanwhile, the basic notion of security is being redefined, placing much more weight on the needs and concerns of human beings and the quality of their environment.

More widespread and sustainable progress now depends on building strong capacities to achieve good governance, reduce poverty, and protect the environment. Civil conflict, terrorism, population and migration pressures, epidemic disease, environmental degradation, and international crime and corruption hinder the efforts of developing countries and concern us all.

Within this new context, thriving developing country partners will contribute to greater prosperity and greater security in their own regions and globally. We therefore endorse the following strategic orientations, and commend them for active support in our own countries and throughout the international community.

1. Development co-operation is an investment

Support for development has contributed to extraordinary achievements in economic and social well-being. Well over two billion people have increased their incomes, life-expectancy, education, and their access to basic services. Development co-operation has also led to the emergence of new economic partners who play an increasingly dynamic role, generating new trade, investment, and jobs-as well as the need for adjustment-in our own countries. Developing country markets for OECD exports have expanded by 50% since 1990.

We regard development co-operation as a key investment in the future.

2. Combating poverty at its roots is a central challenge

Support for development reflects our enduring concern for the human dignity and well-being of others. Despite the promising trends in many developing countries, more than one billion people still live in extreme poverty. Yet, building on lessons learned, there are good prospects for significantly reducing poverty in the coming years.

We will focus our support on strategies and programmes that will work to enable the poorest to expand their opportunities and improve their lives.

3. Strategies for success are now available

Experience has shown that achievements in sustainable development, and effective co-operation, need to integrate a number of key elements:

- A sound policy framework encouraging stable, growing economies with full scope for a vigorous private sector and an adequate fiscal base.
- Investment in social development, especially education, primary health care, and population activities.
- Enhanced participation of all people, and notably women, in economic and political life, and the reduction of social inequalities.
- Good governance and public management, democratic accountability, the protection of human rights and the rule of law.
- Sustainable environmental practices.
- Addressing root causes of potential conflict, limiting military expenditure, and targeting reconstruction and peace-building efforts toward longer-term reconciliation and development.

We will focus our co-operation on helping to strengthen capacities in our partner countries to meet these demanding, integrated requirements for sustainable development, guided by the conditions and commitments in each country.

4. Development assistance is vital to complement other resources

Developing countries themselves are ultimately responsible for their own development. Their own earnings, savings and tax revenues are the most important source of investment in their economic and social progress. For development to succeed, the people of the countries concerned must be the “owners” of their development policies and programmes.

Private investment flows are mainly attracted by the most dynamic countries and sectors of the developing world, and private donations are directed primarily to immediate humanitarian needs. Official development assistance remains vital for many key investments in developing countries, especially the poorer countries.

We remain committed to generating substantial resources for development co-operation to back the efforts of countries and people to help themselves.

5. Other policies need to be coherent with development goals

Expanded trade, investment and other linkages, and the growing role of the developing countries in the international economic system (notably in the World Trade Organisation) have raised the stakes for OECD countries. It is critical that other policies not undercut development objectives.

We will work with the other policy-makers concerned to ensure that our countries follow consistent, open economic policies in relations with our development partners.

6. Our co-operation must be effective and efficient

Both bilateral and multilateral development assistance must be managed for maximum efficiency and effectiveness. We are confident that past achievements and lessons learned in development co-operation show clearly how best to reinforce current efforts of developing countries.

The agreed principles and best practices for effective aid must be implemented with rigor. Critical evaluation must be an ongoing feature of development assistance efforts, to identify the best and most cost-effective approaches. Public

accountability, based on indicators of achievement, is essential.
We will intensify our activities in aid co-ordination, the evaluation of aid effectiveness, peer reviews, and the implementation of best practices.
7. The Development Assistance Committee will advance these priorities
Co-operation for sustainable development is a fundamental concern of the OECD. Effective development co-operation helps to strengthen the multilateral system and promotes job-creating growth and social cohesion on an international scale. OECD members commit substantial resources toward this effort, including more than $50 billion annually in official development assistance, 90% of the world's total.
We reaffirm our commitment to work together in the Development Assistance Committee to implement the directions outlined here for this decade, to integrate the contributions of development co-operation with the other policy priorities of Members, and to help prepare strategies looking to the next century.

NOTAS

1. Juan Pablo Prado Lallande es profesor-investigador de la Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, México. Doctor en Relaciones Internacionales y magíster en Cooperación Internacional por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

2. Véase, por ejemplo, Francis Fukuyama (2004): *State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21*st *Century*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

3. El decálogo del Consenso de Washington establece los requisitos necesarios para generar desarrollo, en línea con la teoría institucional, son los siguientes: 1. Disciplina presupuestaria; 2. Reorientación del gasto público; 3. Reforma fiscal para ampliar la base impositiva; 4. Liberalización financiera; 5. Tipo de cambio competitivo; 6. Apertura comercial; 7. Liberalización de la inversión extranjera directa; 8. Privatización de empresas públicas; 9. Desregulación arancelaria; y 10. Garantía de derechos de propiedad (Williamson, 1990).

4. Existen más estudios críticos a las conclusiones de Bunrside y Dollar. Entre ellos se encuentra el realizado por Delgaard y Hansen, quienes asientan que el buen gobierno, más que incrementar la eficacia de la ayuda, la reduce, ya que un gobierno eficiente substituye el proceso de desarrollo económico de los países (Delgaard y Hansen, 2001: 37-38). Jan Pronk, en una postura más sensata, afirma que "el buen gobierno no debe ser considerado como una precondición para otorgar ayuda al desarrollo, sino como un objetivo de desarrollo" (Pronk, 2001: 626).

5. A su vez, según este analista 70% siguió los patrones relativos a la teoría de modernización y algo menos del 10% hizo lo propio con respecto al principio de la elección racional (*Ibid*).

6. Posturas más críticas argumentan que tales transformaciones albergan también el propósito de aumentar el poder de los organismos financieros multilaterales y de otros donantes, aplicando condicionantes no siempre alineadas de forma neutral a favor del desarrollo. Véase Juan Pablo Prado Lallande (2009): *El lado oscuro de la cooperación internacional. La discrecionalidad de la ayuda externa en el fomento de la democracia y los derechos humanos*, Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, México.

7. En *Foro Internacional*, vol. L, nº 3-4, julio-diciembre de 2010, El Colegio de México, México, pp. 689-723. Traducción de Gonzalo Celorio Morayta.

8. Agradezco a Larry Diamond, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Sean Yom, James Fearon, Michael Tomz y a mis colegas del Centro para la Democracia, el Desarrollo y el Estado de Derecho sus comentarios a versiones anteriores de este artículo. El apoyo de Alex Mayyasi y María Lattanzi para la investigación fue invaluable.

9. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998.

10. Ronald Inglehart y Christian Welzel (*Modernization*, *Cultural Change*, *and Democracy*, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 16) encuentran el origen de este concepto en el Renacimiento.

11. Para una de las exposiciones originales de la tesis de la modernización, véase S. M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, núm. 1, 1959, pp. 69-105. Para exposiciones más recientes, véase la obra citada de Inglehart y Welzel, así como su “How Development Leads to Democracy”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 88, núm. 2, 2009.

12. Para ilustrar el poco consenso que existe en relación con las teorías sobre el desarrollo del Estado, Acemoglu y Robinson (“On the Economic Origins of Democracy”, *Daedalus*, vol.136, núm. 1, 2007, p. 160) asocian a Lipset con una argumentación a favor de la cultura. Sin embargo, la cultura que describen está ligada a valores democráticos. Por su parte, Lipset atacaba la noción de que solo algunas culturas nacionales eran propicias para la democracia.

13. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub y Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World*, *1950-1990*, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

14. Ibid., pp. 78-79.

15. Przeworski y sus coautores (*ibid*., pp. 19-22) utilizan una definición de democracia más específica que la de Lipset. Para los primeros, una democracia es un régimen donde el poder ejecutivo y el legislativo son electos, hay elecciones multipartidistas y el partido en el poder ha enfrentado o enfrentará la posibilidad de perder la elección y ceder el cargo. Lipset (*op. cit.*) definió la democracia como un sistema político con cambios regulares de gobierno, un conjun to de instituciones gubernamentales y no gubernamentales que apoyan la apertura política —la prensa libre, por ejemplo— y una serie de valores que aceptan cambios pacíficos de gobierno

16. Przeworski *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

17. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub y Limongi (*op. cit.*) no encontraron relación alguna entre transiciones de autocracia a democracia. Boix y Stokes ("Endogenous Democratization", *World Politics*, vol. 55, núm. 4, pp. 517-549) encontraron una débil relación positiva; es decir, la transición era más probable en niveles de ingreso más altos.

18. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, Pierre Yared, "Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis", documento de trabajo 13334, nber, 2007, en http://www.nber. org/papers/w13334

19. Inglehart y Welzel, "How Development Leads to Democracy".

20. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 47.

21. Ibid., pp. 81-82.

22. Ibid., p. 1.

23. Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004, pp. 8-12.

24. El argumento de Fukuyama coincide con los resultados encontrados por John Meyer y sus colegas (Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas y Francisco O. Ramírez, "World Society and the Nation-State", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 103, núm. 1, 1997, pp. 144-181) sobre el grado al que prácticamente todos los Estados han adoptado un patrón universal de responsabilidades independientemente de la capacidad que tengan para cumplir con ellas.

25. Fukuyama, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-31.

26. Véase Charles Tilly, *Coercion*, *Capital*, *and European States*, *ad 990-1990*, Cambridge, Mass., Basil Blackwell, 1990; Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*, Princeton, Princeton University

Press, 1996; Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 5-7, 15-16; Timothy Besley y Torsten Persson, "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics", *Ame rican Economics Review*, vol. 99, núm. 4, 2009, pp. 1218-1244.

27. Véase también el libro citado de Spruyt.

28. Véase, para una crítica sobre Tilly, Tuong Vu, "Studying the State through State Formation", *World Politics*, vol. 62, núm. 1, 2010, pp. 148-175.

29. Acemoglu y James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. XII, 15-23.

30. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallace y Barry R. Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Human History*, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 78.

31. Acemoglu y Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, pp. xii-xiii.

32. Ibid., pp. 16-28.

33. Ibid., pp.31-40.

34. Ibid., pp. 4-14.

35. Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty Economic Possibilities for Our Time*, Nueva York, Penguin Books, 2005, p. 73.

36. Ibid., pp. 56-66, 83-85.

37. Ibid., p. 236.

38. Consúltese http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/mv/mv_cost.htm.

39. *Loc. cit.*

40. Sachs, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191.

41. Ibid., p. 191.

42. Ibid., p. 268.

43. Ibid., p. 269.

44. Ibid., p. 237.

45. *Loc. cit.*

46. A partir de información encontrada en http://www.transparency.org/policy_re-search/surveys_indices/cpi/2008

47. Embajada de Estados Unidos, Kabul, Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos, Afganistán, 2009, pp. 1-2.

48. Véanse los capítulos 2 y 5 de Ashraf Ghani y Claire Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, Nueva York, Oxford University Press, 2008.

49. Ibid., cap. 7.

50. OECD, *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, 2005, en http://www.oecd.org/data-oecd/11/41/34428351.pdf

51. Ghani y Lockhart, *op. cit.*, cap. 8.

52. Besley y Persson, art. cit., pp. 1235-1239.

53. Según Fazal (*State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest*, *Occupation*, *and Annexation*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007), solo dos países han muerto desde el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

54. Desha M. Girod, "Foreign Aid and Post-Conflict Reconstruction", tesis doctoral, Stanford, Stanford University, 2008.

55. Easterly, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*, Nueva York, Penguin Press, 2006, p. 149; Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*, Nueva York, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009, p. 56.

56. Moyo, *op. cit.*, p. xix.

57. *Ibid*., p. 47.

58. Para una argumentación similar, véase Bruce Bueno de Mesquita y Hilton L. Root, "The Political Roots of Poverty: The Economic Logic of Autocracy", *The National Interest*, 68, 2002, pp. 27-38.

59. Moyo, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

60. Ibid., cap. 4.

61. Ibid., p. 74.

62. Ibid., p. 141.

63. Ibid., pp. 86-87.

64. Ibid., pp. 117-119. Paul Collier (*The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest*

Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, Nueva York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 169), en cambio, sostiene que el programa estadounidense funcionó, mientras que el europeo resultó inútil debido a normas de origen más restrictivas. [*The Bottom Billion* se publicó en español con el título *El club de la miseria*. N. del T.]

65. Moyo, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-125, 133-136.

66. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

67. Véase la obra de Robert H. Bates (*When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late Century Africa*, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2008) para un análisis de cómo sí se desmoronaron las cosas en África a consecuencia del declive de las condiciones económicas mundiales.

68. Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, pp. 8-9.

69. Ibid., pp. 110-112.

70. Ibid., cap. 11.

71. Collier, *Wars*, *Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*, Nueva York, Harper Collins, 2009, pp. 182 y cap. 9.

72. Ibid., p. 134.

73. Ibid., pp. 19-21. Roland Paris (*At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2004) —argumentando fundamentalmente desde una perspectiva de construcción de instituciones y no de un institucionalismo basado en la elección racional— llega a una conclusión similar a partir de una serie de estudios de caso sobre esfuerzos de mantenimiento de la paz en situaciones de posconflicto desde 1990. Paris argumenta que la institucionalización debe preceder a la liberación política o económica.

74. Collier, *Wars*, *Guns and Votes*, pp. 25-27.

75. Ibid., pp. 44-50.

76. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

77. Ibid., p. 80.

78. Ibid., p. 91.

79. Ibid., cap. 9.

80. Ibid., pp. 202-212.

81. Ibid., p. 217.

82. Ibid., p. 225.

83. Ibid., p. 231.

84. William Easterly, *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists Adventures and Misadventures In the Tropics*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2001, cap. 2.

85. Ibid., caps. 11-12.

86. Ibid., caps. 10-14.

87. Ibid., p. 345.

88. Easterly, *The White Man's Burden*, cap. 10.

89. Ibid., p. 363.

90. Ibid., pp. 11-17.

91. Ibid., p. 363.

92. Easterly, *Boston Review*, 2009, en http://bostonreview.net/BR34.4/easterly.php

93. Raymond Fisman y Edward Miguel, *Economic Gangsters: Corruption*, *Violence*, *and the Poverty of Nations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 10.

94. Craig Burnside y David Dollar, "Aid, Policies, and Growth", *American Economic Review*, vol. 90, nº 4, 2000, pp. 847-868; Raghuram G. Rajan y Arvind Subramanian, "Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?", *Review of Economics and Stati tics*, vol. 90, núm. 4, 2008, pp. 643-665.

95. Para un análisis del valor, en términos de ayuda extranjera, de un escaño en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, véase Ilyana Kuziemko y Eric Werker, "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign AID and Bribery at the United Nations", *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 114, nº 5, 2006, pp. 905-930.

96. Scott, *op. cit.*

97. Ibid., caps. 1-2.

98. Existen algunas excepciones, como el Plan de Emergencia del Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América para el Alivio del Sida (PEPFAR, por sus siglas en inglés), que entrega antivirales directamente a las personas. Sin embargo, incluso en este caso, el impacto en el sistema de prestación de servicios de salud en su conjunto de los países receptores es incierto, ya que el PEPFAR podría conducir a una

asignación de recursos que no fuera la óptima para alcanzar objetivos de salud más amplios.

99. This paper appeared in José Antonio Alonso, Giovanni Andrea Cornia and Rob Vos (2013): *Alternative Development Strategies for the Post-2015 Era*, The United Nations Series, New York, pp. 35-68. The author is grateful for comments from the workshop on Alternative Strategies for the Post-2015 Era held at the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre in Florence, Italy on 7-8 December 2011, particularly those of Ana Luiza Cortez and Frances Stewart. The paper draws on collaborative work with Frances Stewart on the report of the UN Committee for Development Policy on its fourteenth plenary session to the Economic and Social Council and with Joshua Greenstein on MDG progress measurement. The usual caveats apply.

100. She is Professor of International Affairs at the New School University, New York. She is also member of the United Nations Committee for Development Policy (CPD).

101 101. In 2005 the list was expanded to include 21 targets and 60 indicators.

102. For example, initially many NGOs were hesitant to espouse the MDGs because they did not agree with the list of goals, targets and indicators or objected to the lack of adequate consultation in the way they were drawn up, or because they replaced agendas that they were pursuing. But over time, they have become more broadly accepted and some of the initial critics have begun to use them as the consensus framework for development efforts. For example, the human rights community initially ignored or criticized them (Alston, 2005) but changed course and adopted a more constructive approach to use the MDGs to pursue a human rights and development agenda (OHCHR 2008).

103. The MDG narrative meets the criteria of a norm that has become well established according to the trajectory of international norm dynamics elaborated by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Norms emerge, then cascade, and then reach the final stage of becoming “institutionalized”. At this stage, norms take on “a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate.” (p. 9). The mechanisms that keep the norm alive at this stage are “habit” and “institutionalization”. The main actors are the professions and bureaucracy who uphold and adhere to the norm in order to conform to a recognized standard. In contrast, it is the idealistically committed “norm entrepreneurs” who drive the emergence of a norm, and states and organizations that promote its “cascade”. See Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2010).

104. “Human poverty” was introduced by the 1997 UNDP Human Development Report and refers to multiple capability deprivations (UNDP, 1997).

105. See Stewart and others (2007) for a detailed review of alternative definitions and measures of poverty.

106. PRSPs are prepared by Governments of low-income countries and serve as a framework for reaching agreement with the donors on development priorities and financing requirements. The study included all “second generation” (second PRSP prepared by the country) PRSPs existing at the time of the study.

107. The US doubled aid to sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2009, one year ahead of the pledge; Canada doubled funding from 2001 levels; Norway surpassed the pledge to maintain ODA at 1% of GNI, and Switzerland increased its ODA to 0.41% of GNI.

108. The annual progress reports report global and regional aggregates. Country progress is tracked in the on-line system that also rates whether countries are “on track” or not to achieving the 2015 targets. http://www.mdgmonitor.org/ accessed 28 January 2012.

109. Interview with Colin Bradford, New York, 16 October, 2008.

110. This was patently apparent when the NGO community vigorously protested the UN Secretary-General joining the World Bank and the OECD in signing the 2000 progress document, Better World For All http://paris21.org/sites/default/les/bwa_e.pdf accessed Jan 28, 2012.

111. Interview with Lord Mark Moloch Brown, June 27, 2008, London.

112. Interview with Ambassador Gert Rosenthal, 25 August, 2008, New York.

113. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/3/46874580.pdf

114. Interviews with John Ruggie, former Assistant Secretary-General in the Oce of the Secretary-General, 6 August, 2008, Cambridge Massachusetts; with Andy Mack, former Director in the Oce of the Secretary-General, 11 September, 2008 by telephone. Ruggie and Mack were principal authors of the *Secretary-General’s report*, *We the Peoples to the General Assembly*. The last chapter of this report was transformed, with modifications, into the text of the Millennium Declaration.

115. Both Sen (2004; 2011) and Nussbaum (2011) have written about the close connection between capabilities and rights. See also UNDP (2000) Human Development Report that explores the theoretical overlaps between capabilities and rights, and the policy implications for development. See Vizard and others (2011).

116. These conferences were also noteworthy for their unusually open processes (UN DESA, 2007). Unlike most UN debates that involve only Governments, these conferences opened up to broader involvement of civil

society groups. They were involved in the preparatory meetings organized by national Governments and UN agencies at country and regional levels. Civil society groups were often included in official national delegations and involved in intergovernmental negotiations.

117 117. Working Paper, nº 74, Center for Global Development, January, 2006.

118 118. Todd Moss (tmoss@cgdev.org) is a Research Fellow and Gunilla Pettersson (gpettersson@cgdev.org) is a Research Assistant at the Center for Global Development. Nicolas van de Walle (nv38@.Cornell.edu) is Associate Dean for International Studies and Director of the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies at Cornell University. We thank Michael Clemens for his invaluable insights on data analysis, Scott Standley for research assistance, and Adrian Wood, Stephen Nelson, Erwin Tiongson and John Hicklin for comments on an earlier draft. All opinions and errors are those of the authors alone.

119. Including South Africa and Nigeria, two large economies that receive very little aid, brings this proportion down to 5.7 percent of GNI (WDI, 2005).

120. Including the data used in Figure 1. Some of the studies cited above appear to have benefited from access to privileged data from within the IMF that is presumably of higher quality but is not publicly available. Repeated attempts by the authors to gain access to internal IMF data were unsuccessful.

121. In Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 1996, http://www.oecd.org/dac/2508761.pdf

122 122. This report was adopted at the Thirty-fourth High Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee, held on 6-7 May 1996.

123. The text of the statement is an annex to this report. It is analyzed and discussed in the 1995 DAC report *Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee* (OECD, 1996).

124. The situation was described as follows in *Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 139): “The number of absolute poor, the truly destitute, was estimated by the World Bank at 1.3 billion in 1993, and is probably still growing. One fifth of the world lives in countries, mainly in Africa and Latin America, where living standards actually fell in the 1980s. Several indicators of aggregate poverty—1.5 billion lack access to safe water and 2 billion lack safe sanitation; more than 1 billion are illiterate, including half of the rural women—are no less chilling than a quarter-century ago. The conditions of this 20% of humanity—and of millions of others close to this perilous state—should be a matter of overriding priority”.

125. See *Aid Effectiveness: A Study of the Effectiveness of Overseas Aid in the Main Countries Receiving ODA Assistance* (Mosley and Hudson, ODA, 1996) and *Private Investment Recovery and Sustainable Growth after Adjustment: A study for the Overseas Development Administration*, ESCOR, nº RS914 (Fitzgerald and Mavrotas, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, February 1996).

126. Additional major conferences on the important issues of human settlements and food security are scheduled to take place in 1996.

127. See the annexed *Development Partnerships in the New Global Context.*

128. The four are Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. See the DAC 1995 Development Co-operation Report, Chapter IV, for analysis and detailed information concerning ODA performance of DAC Members.

129. The 1994 study concentrated on linkages with 15 “major” developing economies. *Linkages: OECD and Major Developing Economies* (OECD, 1995). In January 1996 the OECD Council authorised the initiation of a broader effort, with a planned completion date of May 1997, to be entitled “Globalisation and Linkages to 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for OECD Countries”.

CAPÍTULO 4

CAMBIOS EN LA DOCTRINA DE DESARROLLO: EL ENFOQUE DEL DESARROLLO HUMANO

JOSÉ ANTONIO ALONSO[1]

A lo largo de las dos últimas décadas se ha producido una alteración muy notable en la forma de entender el proceso de desarrollo. Los cambios afectan a muy diversos ámbitos doctrinales, dando origen a lo que con toda propiedad cabría denominar como una “nueva visión del desarrollo”. En la base de semejantes cambios se encuentran las aportaciones de Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum y una amplia relación de analistas que nutrieron el enfoque del “desarrollo humano”. Los trabajos que dan continuidad a este capítulo ofrecen una buena muestra del contenido innovador de ese enfoque. Aun cuando no sea posible detenerse en todos sus detalles, merece la pena aludir a alguno de sus fundamentos y de sus principales implicaciones. Para organizar la exposición, se distinguirá entre los cambios habidos en la concepción del desarrollo (qué se entiende por desarrollo) y los asociados con la definición de las estrategias que se derivan de esa concepción (cómo conseguir el desarrollo). Posteriormente, se aludirá al indicador que pretende medir el desarrollo humano, para finalizar con una alusión a los desafíos

que impone la sostenibilidad.

ASPECTOS RELACIONADOS CON LA CONCEPCIÓN DEL DESARROLLO

La nueva visión que aporta el desarrollo humano comportó una alteración en la “concepción” misma de lo que se entiende por desarrollo. Cabría ofrecer una imagen sinóptica de esas alteraciones, ordenándolas por ámbitos y estableciendo el contraste entre la visión originaria y la que postula el enfoque del desarrollo humano (tabla 1).

Pues bien, a finales de los cincuenta y comienzos de los sesenta, cuando se conforma la teoría del desarrollo, la concepción del proceso de cambio era de tono dominantemente economicista: en esencia, se entendía el desarrollo como un proceso de “ampliación progresiva de las capacidades productivas” de un país, lo que se traducía en una elevación de los niveles de bienestar material de su población. Se aceptaba que tal proceso comportaba cambios significativos en la estructura productiva y social y en el marco institucional, acorde con las pautas de su progresiva modernización, pero se consideraba que tales cambios tenían una base dominantemente económica. Aun cuando se aceptasen otras dimensiones implicadas en la caracterización del subdesarrollo —desigualdad social, debilidad institucional, elevado grado de ruralización, altos índices de natalidad y mortalidad, baja esperanza de vida o bajo nivel de escolarización, por ejemplo—, estas se consideraban más síntomas que factores explicativos del fenómeno

considerado. La dimensión clave en la que se dirimía el problema del subdesarrollo era de naturaleza dominantemente económica.

Esta concepción economicista tuvo serias implicaciones sobre la forma de entender los procesos de desarrollo, por cuanto legitimó la subordinación de otro tipo de propósitos —como los asociados con la equidad social— al logro de una más elevada tasa de crecimiento económico. Se justificó así una concepción ahistórica del desarrollo, poco sensible a las peculiares condiciones sociales, culturales e institucionales de los países afectados; y se formuló una terapia uniforme, basada en la mimética traslación de la experiencia vivida por los países ricos, que hacía descansar el proceso de cambio social en una sobrevaluada capacidad transformadora de la dimensión económica. El crecimiento pasaba a ser, de esta forma, no solo una condición necesaria, sino, acaso, suficiente para promover un genuino proceso de desarrollo. Aunque tal proceso comportase otro tipo de transformaciones sociales, se pensaba que estas serían, en buena medida, inducidas por el cambio económico, auténtico promotor del proceso de transformación social.

TABLA 1
CAMBIOS EN LA TEORÍA DEL DESARROLLO: ASPECTOS RELACIONADOS CON LA FUNDAMENTACIÓN

ÁMBITO	CONCEPCIÓN PRETÉRITA	NUEVA VISIÓN DEL DESARROLLO
Concepción	Desarrollo como ampliación de capacidades productivas	Desarrollo como ampliación de capacidades y opciones de las personas
Justificación	El desarrollo se asocia a una ampliación de los niveles de eficiencia y de bienestar	El desarrollo se asocia al ejercicio efectivo de los derechos humanos civiles, políticos, sociales y culturales

	material	
Naturaleza	Estadio diferenciado: países desarrollados frente a subdesarrollados	Proceso continuado de creciente realización de capacidades y opciones de las personas y los pueblos
Dimensiones	La dimensión económica como elemento central del desarrollo	Visión plural en la que se incluye: • Crecimiento económico • Equidad social • Democracia y participación social • Sostenibilidad ambiental • Interculturalidad

FUENTE: ELABORACIÓN PROPIA.

Un cambio notable en esta concepción del desarrollo tuvo lugar a comienzos de los años noventa con la consolidación del concepto de “desarrollo humano”, finalmente acuñado por el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), aunque con claros antecedentes en corrientes previas del enfoque de “necesidades básicas”. A través de esta concepción del desarrollo humano se pretendió desplazar el protagonismo de la dimensión material —ampliación de las capacidades productivas—, para convertir al ser humano, con sus potencialidades y múltiples dimensiones —ampliación de las capacidades humanas—, en protagonista y destinatario último del proceso de desarrollo. En consecuencia, se pasó a caracterizar el desarrollo como el proceso de “ampliación progresiva de las oportunidades y capacidades de las personas”, individual y colectivamente consideradas.

En la base de este cambio se encuentran las aportaciones teóricas de Amartya Sen, premio Nobel de Economía, de 1998. Desde sus primeras investigaciones, Amartya Sen produce diversas categorías de análisis —como dotaciones y titulaciones — con el objeto de diferenciar los atributos de las personas de la mera expresión de sus resultados en el mercado. Esta

aportación fue relevante para entender las causas de las hambrunas: frente a la teoría dominante que vinculaba esos fenómenos a la reducción de la disponibilidad de alimentos, Sen insistirá en la conveniencia de considerar las relaciones sociales —titulaciones (*entitlements*)— a través de las cuales las personas adquieren la capacidad de acceder de forma efectiva al alimento. Para comprobar la eficacia explicativa de este segundo enfoque, Sen estudia las hambrunas de Bengala (1943), de Wollo en Etiopía (1973), de Bangladesh (1974) y de Hareeghe en Etopía (1974). En estos casos comprobó que el problema no era tanto la ausencia de alimento como la incapacidad por parte de muchas personas de acceder a él de forma efectiva.

Esta interpretación se trasladó, posteriormente, al concepto de desarrollo. Hasta entonces se había identificado el desarrollo con el nivel de ingresos que, en términos promedios, tienen las personas. De ahí que el PIB per cápita se considerase el indicador más relevante para medir los niveles de desarrollo de los países. Sin embargo, advertirá Sen, los ingresos no son un fin en sí mismo, sino un medio para que las personas consigan aquello que desean. El desarrollo, entonces, habrá que identificarlo no tanto con un medio instrumental, sino con el grado de consecución de lo que se persigue, es decir, con las capacidades que las personas tienen para hacer aquello que realmente valoran.

Esta línea de trabajo condujo a Sen a trabajar más estrictamente sobre los conceptos de funciones y capacidades. Por “funciones” se entiende aquello que una persona valora ser o hacer. Las funciones pueden incluir cuestiones tan variadas

como el comer o evitar la enfermedad, ampliar sus conocimientos o mejorar su autoestima por sentirse valorado por la colectividad. A su vez, por “capacidad” se entiende el conjunto de funciones que están accesibles para una persona. Por tanto, la capacidad es un tipo de libertad: la de conseguir una determinada combinación de funciones (o estilos de vida). Un pueblo se desarrolla cuando amplía las capacidades de las personas, de modo que estas pueden elegir de manera más plena aquellas funciones que valoran. Dicho de otro modo, el desarrollo amplía el escenario de opciones de las personas y de los pueblos, por ello no es extraño el título que Amartya Sen dio a uno de sus libros más centrales sobre este tema: desarrollo como libertad (*Development as freedom*).

Semejante traslación en la concepción del desarrollo se nutrió, también, de concepciones bien fundadas sobre los principios de justicia social a las que accede Sen a partir de sus estudios previos sobre la distribución y el bienestar (por las que se le concede el premio Nobel de Economía) o Martha Nussbaum a través de sus estudios de filosofía política. A esta autora se debe, además, el análisis más detenido de las implicaciones que el nuevo concepto tiene para la equidad de género y el reconocimiento de los derechos de mujer. No en vano, en el nacimiento del nuevo concepto del desarrollo humano tendrá incidencia no solo el enfoque de las necesidades básicas de los años setenta, sino también —y de forma muy destacada— las aportaciones que las feministas hicieron en su crítica a la teoría del desarrollo.

Esta radical modificación en la concepción del desarrollo tuvo

implicaciones en muy diversos ámbitos. En primer lugar, en la "justificación" misma del desarrollo como proyecto social. En el pasado, tal justificación descansaba en razones de eficiencia social agregada: en definitiva, se consideraba que cuanto mayor fuera el nivel de desarrollo de un país, más elevado sería bienestar al que podría acceder su población. Así pues, era la búsqueda de crecientes niveles de bienestar —preferentemente, material— lo que justificaba el esfuerzo social en la promoción del desarrollo. Hoy, sin abandonar semejante justificación, se entiende que el desarrollo es, sobre todo, un modo de ampliar la libertad efectiva de las personas y, por tanto, una vía para consolidar sus derechos. A través del desarrollo se amplían los escenarios de opción futura de los pueblos, que se convierten en crecientes protagonistas de su historia.

La concepción señalada tiene otra implicación notable acerca de la "naturaleza del proceso": el desarrollo deja de ser un estadio al que accede un determinado grupo de países privilegiados, para convertirse en una senda de progresión infinita en cuyo tránsito se encuentran todos los pueblos del mundo. La dicotomía desarrollo/subdesarrollo deja de tener sentido (más allá del recurso identificativo o clasificatorio), para abrirse paso una concepción que considera que todos los países están en "una senda de progresivo desarrollo". La meta es móvil, porque el proceso de ampliación de las capacidades humanas no tiene límites; y ningún país puede considerarse en puridad como desarrollado, sino acaso en progresivo tránsito hacia niveles crecientes de desarrollo. De ahí que tenga relevancia establecer el marco normativo al que remite ese proceso de

progresiva realización.

Pues bien, un último aspecto relevante de los cambios mencionados se relaciona con las “dimensiones” implicadas en semejante marco normativo. En correspondencia con la creciente multidisciplinariedad de los estudios sobre el desarrollo, aquel enfoque dominantemente economicista del pasado se vio desplazado por una concepción más compleja y multidimensional del fenómeno estudiado. En definitiva, se parte de la evidencia de que una sociedad es una realidad compleja; y que el subdesarrollo es una categoría social y no meramente económica. En consecuencia, se considera que el proceso de desarrollo, para que sea genuino, debe integrar, con voluntad transformadora, el conjunto de las dimensiones que conforman la estructura social de un país.

Una consideración suficientemente integradora del cambio social obliga, cuando menos, a considerar las siguientes cinco dimensiones básicas en el proceso de desarrollo:

- *Crecimiento económico* socialmente equilibrado, pues si bien es cierto que no basta con que exista crecimiento para suponer que se está en presencia de un proceso genuino de desarrollo, no es menos cierto que no cabe un proceso sostenido de desarrollo si no se sustenta sobre una dinámica continuada de ampliación de las capacidades productivas de los pueblos.
- *Promoción de la equidad social*, ya que para que exista desarrollo es necesario que todos los sectores de la sociedad, incluidos sus colectivos más vulnerables o marginados, sean beneficiarios de los frutos del

progreso. La lucha contra la pobreza y por la equidad de género forma parte de esta dimensión de la equidad social.

- *Respeto a la sostenibilidad ambiental*, ya que el desarrollo no es sostenible si se basa en una utilización degradante del entorno: tal comportamiento constituiría un atentado contra un cierto principio de equidad intergeneracional. Es este principio el que justifica la sostenibilidad ambiental, pues igual responsabilidad debiera derivarse de nuestras acciones si afectan a las posibilidades de desarrollo de nuestros coetáneos (solidaridad intrageneracional) que si alteran las posibilidades de desarrollo de las generaciones sucesivas (solidaridad intergeneracional). De hecho, el desarrollo sostenible se define como aquel que no hipoteca las posibilidades de desarrollo de las generaciones futuras.
- *Defensa de los derechos humanos, la democracia y la participación social*, porque no cabe ampliar las capacidades humanas si se excluye a las personas de los procesos de decisión en todo aquello que les afecta, si se les margina o excluye de las instituciones o si se les limitan sus derechos como ciudadanos. El objetivo del desarrollo debe conducir a una creciente participación social, al objeto de que los pueblos se apropien de sus propios procesos de cambio: un propósito que es incompatible con la presencia de la opresión política o de género.

- *Respeto al diálogo cultural*, porque no es posible asentar un proceso de desarrollo sobre la base de la negación de las formas culturales sobre las que cada pueblo se constituye. El respeto a la diversidad cultural, la promoción de la libertad creativa y el reconocimiento de las raíces propias de cada pueblo debe ser una de las dimensiones obligadas del desarrollo. Todo ello asentado en un principio básico de respeto de los derechos humanos.

Todas estas dimensiones son necesarias en un proceso de desarrollo en su pleno sentido. Y, al contrario, la desconsideración de cualquiera de estas dimensiones da lugar a procesos atrofiados, a dinámicas sociales truncadas, a estrategias imperfectamente realizadas de desarrollo.

ASPECTOS FUNCIONALES Y OPERATIVOS

Los cambios habidos en la teoría del desarrollo se manifiestan también en el ámbito de las estrategias y políticas a aplicar. En concreto, las modificaciones más importantes en este ámbito se refieren a la identificación de las variables más relevantes, a la consideración de los actores sociales encargados de protagonizar el cambio y al contenido de las políticas a aplicar (tabla 2).

TABLA 2
CAMBIOS EN LA TEORÍA DEL DESARROLLO: ASPECTOS FUNCIONALES Y OPERATIVOS

ÁMBITO	CONCEPCIÓN PRETÉRITA	NUEVA VISIÓN DEL DESARROLLO
Variables relevantes	Capital físico (ahorro-inversión)	Visión plural del capital • Capital físico • Capital humano • Capital social • Capital natural
Actores	Protagonismo del Estado	Coprotagonismo de: • Estado • Sector privado • Sociedad civil
Políticas	• Intervencionismo estatal • Reserva frente al mercado • Voluntarismo social	• Estabilidad macro como requisito • Inserción internacional (gobernada) • Espacio para el funcionamiento de mercados • Fortalecimiento institucional • Cohesión social

FUENTE: ELABORACIÓN PROPIA.

Buena parte de los modelos dinámicos de los años cincuenta y primeros sesenta identifican al “ahorro y a la inversión” como los principales factores explicativos del crecimiento. Tal es la conclusión a la que apunta la propuesta que dio fundamento a buena parte de los modelos cuantitativos sobre la ayuda al desarrollo. Pero también desde otras perspectivas doctrinales más cercanas a la teoría del desarrollo, se secundó aquella proposición básica: las posiciones de Lewis, Nurkse, Rosentein-Rodan o Rostow, todos ellos relevantes analistas del desarrollo, confirmaron el papel crucial que la inversión tenía en la promoción del proceso de crecimiento y cambio social. La ayuda internacional podía contribuir a esa tarea, proporcionando, en condiciones de coste ventajosas, parte de aquellos recursos financieros —ahorro externo, en suma— que las economías en desarrollo precisaban.

Propuestas teóricas posteriores revelaron que los obstáculos al crecimiento en los países en desarrollo no solo provienen de sus bajas tasas de ahorro, sino también de las dificultades que

tienen para proveerse de las divisas necesarias para crecer. El progreso de las importaciones que el crecimiento provoca no siempre puede ser acompañado por una dinámica similar por el lado de las exportaciones, que suelen gravitar sobre productos primarios poco competitivos. Como consecuencia, se genera un desequilibrio exterior que impone una severa restricción a las posibilidades de crecimiento sostenido de la economía. De acuerdo con este modelo, inicialmente propuesto por Chenery y Strout, a la ayuda internacional se le encomienda la tarea de cubrir esas “dos brechas” a las que se enfrentan los países en desarrollo: la que surge entre la tasa de acumulación requerida y la tasa de ahorro disponible, por una parte; y la que tiene como base la diferencia existente entre la capacidad de generación de divisas de las exportaciones respecto a las que demanda las necesidades importadoras que impone el crecimiento.

Esta visión del crecimiento fue progresivamente cuestionada por excesivamente simple y lineal a medida que se avanzó en la década de 1960. A ello contribuyó la creciente implantación de un enfoque más flexible en sus supuestos y con capacidad para inspirar una importante línea de investigación empírica acerca de los factores explicativos del crecimiento. Los resultados de estas investigaciones —Solow, Denison o Kendrick, entre otros— pusieron en evidencia que el papel de la acumulación de capital era relativamente menor en la promoción del crecimiento; que, no obstante, encontraba en el progreso tecnológico —la productividad total de los factores— la variable explicativa de mayor relevancia. No obstante, el modelo no integraba dentro de su construcción analítica el comportamiento de esta variable.

A partir de comienzos de los años ochenta se produce una importante renovación en este cuerpo de doctrina, dando origen a lo que se llamará la “nueva teoría del crecimiento”. Gran parte de este esfuerzo de renovación pasa por admitir la presencia de un factor de producción capaz de ser acumulado a lo largo del proceso de crecimiento y que contribuya a la expansión del producto sin estar sometido a rendimientos decrecientes. Esta posibilidad se atribuye a factores, como el conocimiento, con capacidad para generar economías externas, ser fuente de ventaja monopolista o promover una dinámica acumulativa. De este modo, al concepto de “capital físico”, variable central en las explicaciones tradicionales del crecimiento económico, se fueron añadiendo los términos de “capital humano”, que expresa los niveles de formación y capacitación de las personas, de “capital natural”, asociado al patrimonio de recursos aportado por la naturaleza, y de “capital social”, que alude a los niveles de confianza social, al grado de asociacionismo, a la conciencia cívica y a los valores culturales dominantes en la sociedad. Junto a ello, hoy se insiste más que antaño en el papel crucial que para el progreso económico tiene la existencia de un “marco institucional y normativo” adecuado, al tiempo que se reclama como condición de desarrollo el establecimiento de una situación efectiva de “buen gobierno”. Se abre espacio así a factores intangibles relacionados con las instituciones, los saberes, las normas y los valores colectivos en la explicación del progreso.

Ahora bien, el cambio no solo afecta a las variables que se identifican como más relevantes en la explicación del desarrollo, sino también a la “función que se atribuye a los agentes sociales”

en dicho proceso de cambio. La teoría tradicional atribuía al Estado un papel protagonista en la promoción del desarrollo: era el responsable básico de poner en marcha la dinámica inversora, ya sea interviniendo directamente en el proceso productivo —a través de empresas de capital público—, ya incidiendo indirectamente en los mercados a través de una densa trama reguladora. La visión tradicional del desarrollo aparece así asociada a la defensa de un Estado paternalista, con una vocación fuertemente intervencionista y, en algunos casos, proteccionista. En el fondo de esta visión subyace una desconfianza hacia la capacidad que tiene la iniciativa privada para protagonizar los procesos de inversión y cambio económico en un país en desarrollo; al tiempo que se mantiene un notable escepticismo acerca de la capacidad del mercado para operar con eficacia, transmitiendo los estímulos correspondientes a los agentes económicos. Por ambas razones, el Estado debía asumir la responsabilidad básica en la promoción del desarrollo.

La experiencia internacional demostró que la desconfianza hacia la capacidad de iniciativa del sector privado no estaba debidamente fundamentada: incluso en los países de más bajo nivel de renta, el sector privado —especialmente de la pequeña empresa— se configura como uno de los componentes sociales más dinámicos del mundo en desarrollo. Al tiempo, se observó que si el mercado, en su función asignativa, tenía fallos, el Estado no estaba libre de ellos: es más, su excesiva intervención en la vida económica era fuente de potenciales ineficiencias que afectaban a las condiciones de coste y competitividad del conjunto de la economía, generando Estados hipertrofiados, con

problemas de financiación recurrentes, mercados distorsionados por una excesiva y arbitraria regulación y economías alejadas de las condiciones de competencia internacional.

En la actualidad se tiene una visión más equilibrada del papel que los agentes públicos y privados desempeñan en el proceso de desarrollo. Se reconoce que al Estado le cabe una función crucial en la prestación de bienes y servicios públicos, en la configuración del marco normativo en el que operan los agentes y en la determinación de la política necesaria para favorecer la equidad, la estabilidad y el crecimiento. Pero se considera también determinante la acción del sector privado, transformando las iniciativas creativas en proyectos empresariales. Al sector privado le corresponde el protagonismo en la tarea de generar tejido productivo, a través de su acción inversora, creando renta y empleo. Sin el concurso de ambos agentes, con una acción mutuamente reforzante, es difícil concebir un proceso de desarrollo vigoroso y sostenido en el tiempo.

Y si hoy rige una concepción más equilibrada entre el papel de ambos agentes económicos, también se considera imprescindible la función que le cabe a la sociedad civil en el proceso de desarrollo. A través de las organizaciones que median entre el Estado y el ciudadano, se articula y fortalece el tejido social, permitiendo una más plena, integradora y activa participación del conjunto de la sociedad en los procesos de cambio que todo proceso de desarrollo comporta. Disponer de una sólida sociedad civil es una garantía para la sostenibilidad de la democracia; y un requisito para hacer que el proceso de

desarrollo tome al ser humano como destinatario y protagonista de sus logros.

Por último, también se ha producido un cambio en la caracterización de las políticas promotoras del desarrollo. Aun cuando resulte una simplificación un tanto forzada, la política económica en el pasado venía teñida por su inclinación favorable al activismo estatal, por sus recelos frente a las capacidades asignativas del mercado, por su desconfianza respecto a los beneficios del comercio internacional y por su inclinación hacia la acción social programada a través de la planificación del desarrollo. Estas posiciones han sufrido una perceptible modificación en los últimos años. Hoy se asume de forma más generalizada que el mercado constituye un poderoso mecanismo de asignación, compatible con la acción pública en aquellos ámbitos en los que el mercado no es eficiente; que la defensa de la industria nacional debe hacerse compatible con el objetivo de una creciente inserción de la economía en los escenarios internacionales; y que la promoción de las capacidades nacionales de desarrollo debe hacerse compatible con la preservación de los equilibrios macroeconómicos básicos. Así pues, el logro de un cierto equilibrio entre la presencia pública y privada, la obligada apertura internacional, especialmente en el ámbito comercial, y la preservación de la estabilidad macroeconómica, parecen recomendaciones en las que existe hoy un amplio nivel de coincidencia en buena parte de la doctrina.

Al tiempo que se corrigen anteriores perspectivas, nuevos temas han emergido como cruciales para una estrategia de

desarrollo con éxito. Entre ellos, tres parecen de especial relevancia: la promoción de los procesos formativos, el logro de un cierto nivel de equidad social y el desarrollo de un marco institucional adecuado. Se trata de tres aspectos, por lo demás, íntimamente relacionados. La educación y la capacitación de las personas no solo constituye un derecho, sino también una de las vías más eficaces para promover el crecimiento y la equidad social; a su vez, es difícil que esos objetivos se consigan si no se dispone de un marco institucional que se considere legítimo para articular la acción colectiva y para la gestión del conflicto distributivo que el proceso de desarrollo comporta; y, en fin, dicho marco institucional será frágil si no se asienta sobre niveles suficientes de equidad y de cohesión social, un propósito que comporta la lucha contra la pobreza, pero que implica también a las pautas distributivas (ricos y pobres, hombres y mujeres, jóvenes y mayores) de la sociedad y no solo en el ámbito de los ingresos, sino también en el de las oportunidades efectivas y la voz.

EL ÍNDICE DE DESARROLLO HUMANO

Una de las aportaciones más originales y útiles del enfoque del desarrollo humano es que, en paralelo al desarrollo doctrinal, se definieron: 1) un índice para ofrecer una métrica solvente del concepto, al objeto de permitir un análisis cuantitativo de los progresos en el tiempo o comparativo entre países; y 2) un informe anual (el Informe de Desarrollo Humano) para dar seguimiento a ese indicador y abordar en mayor profundidad

aspectos temáticos relacionados con el concepto de desarrollo humano. La generación de ambos productos quedó en manos del PNUD. Aquí nos detendremos muy brevemente en el Índice de Desarrollo Humano (IDH).

En diversas ocasiones anteriores, desde la teoría del desarrollo se había tratado de elaborar un indicador que aproximase el nivel de desarrollo de los países de una manera más fiel que el PIB per cápita, sin embargo ninguno de esos intentos tuvo suficiente acogida, en parte porque carecía de un marco doctrinal convincente. Este no es el caso del IDH, que se fundamenta en la concepción del desarrollo antes enunciada. Se parte, por tanto, de asociar el desarrollo con el proceso de ampliación de las capacidades y de las opciones de las personas y se trata, por tanto, de incorporar una métrica que refleje el progreso en aquellas dimensiones que se consideran cruciales en las capacidades de las personas.

En concreto, el IDH toma en cuenta las tres dimensiones que se consideran más básicas para el ser humano: disponer de medios materiales para llevar una existencia digna, disfrutar de una vida larga y saludable y tener acceso a los procesos de educación para la ampliación de conocimientos y capacidades. Inicialmente, el IDH se construyó como media aritmética de esas tres dimensiones, que, a su vez, estas estaban medidas a través del PIB per cápita en paridad del poder adquisitivo, la esperanza de vida y una media de la tasa de alfabetización y las tasas de escolarización bruta primaria y secundaria. Cada uno de estos indicadores, de métricas muy distintas, fue previamente normalizado, situando a cada país en la escala que definen los

valores máximos y mínimos existentes a escala internacional.

Esa configuración del IDH fue modificada en 2010, en parte como consecuencia de algunas críticas que el indicador había recibido en el periodo previo. En concreto, se modificó la forma de medición de la dimensión educativa, que ahora queda definida como la media geométrica de los años de educación promedio y los años esperados de instrucción. A su vez, el indicador agregado se construyó como media geométrica de las tres dimensiones (renta, salud y educación), para subrayar que se trata de dimensiones que interactúan entre ellas. A su vez, los países se agrupan, de acuerdo a sus respectivos IDH, en cuatro grupos de países —de muy alto, alto, medio y bajo desarrollo humano— que se conforman en términos de escala relativa.

Para el desarrollo humano no solo es importante determinar los logros, sino también la forma en que estos se distribuyen: es decir, el grado de desigualdad que caracteriza a la sociedad. Este aspecto no había sido considerado en la versión originaria del IDH. En la revisión metodológica antes aludida, el PNUD ha incorporado como novedad una corrección de los valores obtenidos por un país en función de la desigualdad que rige en su seno. Para ello, se establece un factor de corrección de cada una de las dimensiones del IDH que viene dado por una transformación del cociente entre la media geométrica y la media aritmética de las correspondientes distribuciones. Cuanto más desigual sea la distribución, menor es el cociente entre ambas medias, de modo que se puede corregir el resultado obtenido en cada uno de los indicadores. De este modo, se puede saber cuánto restan al desarrollo humano los niveles de desigualdad

existentes en una sociedad.

Pese a los avances técnicos, persisten aspectos críticos que pueden atribuirse al IDH. Entre ellos, dos son frecuentemente mencionados. En primer lugar, el acotado ámbito de las dimensiones consideradas: se entiende que otros aspectos relacionados con los derechos humanos, el respeto a la dignidad de las personas, el ejercicio de las libertades o la sostenibilidad ambiental podrían ser merecedores de atención en un índice como el sugerido. Todos ellos aluden a dimensiones relevantes para identificar las posibilidades de despliegue de las capacidades humanas. La respuesta que se ha ofrecido es que estos aspectos son difíciles de medir de una forma consensuada a escala internacional, algo que, sin embargo, es más cierto en unos casos que en otros.

En segundo lugar, algunos de los indicadores elegidos (sobre todo en la primera versión del IDH) presentaban una distribución truncada en sus valores máximos, por lo que terminaban por ofrecer con el tiempo la falsa sensación de convergencia entre los países en desarrollo y los desarrollados, atenuando los niveles de desigualdad efectivamente vigentes. Este aspecto ha sido parcialmente corregido en la reciente versión del IDH.

Ahora bien, más allá de la pertinencia de alguna de estas críticas, es preciso reconocer que el IDH ha cosechado un muy amplio grado de aceptación a escala internacional, lo que lo ha convertido en un instrumento de enorme utilidad en los estudios de desarrollo.

LA SOSTENIBILIDAD Y EL DESARROLLO

HUMANO: CODA FINAL

La concepción del desarrollo humano se encuentra en estos momentos enfrentada a un importante desafío, que si no cuestiona sus fundamentos, sí le obliga a un ejercicio de reflexión y renovación importante. El desafío tiene que ver muy centralmente con los efectos que las condiciones de sostenibilidad tienen sobre las posibilidades de desarrollo a escala internacional.

La teoría del desarrollo, en sus orígenes, descansó sobre dos principios básicos, que de forma simplificada se podrían considerar como el de “diferencia” y el de “convergencia”. El primero remitía a la caracterización del sistema internacional, que se entendía que estaba conformado por dos realidades diferenciadas y distantes, el Norte y el Sur. El segundo aludía a la convicción de que si se le daba los medios apropiados, el Sur podría converger a las condiciones de desarrollo material del Norte.

Ambos principios, sin embargo, están ahora en cuestión. Se cuestiona el principio de diferencia, porque frente a la pretérita “brecha Norte-Sur” hoy lo que existe es una amplia escala de niveles de desarrollo en los que se localizan los países. Eso hace que la naturaleza de una parte importante de los problemas de “algunos Sures” no sea muy diferente a aquellos que padecen “algunos otros Nortes”. Como consecuencia, ha de entenderse que la política de desarrollo afronta una gama amplia de problemas compartidos entre países desarrollados y en desarrollo, algo a lo que también apunta la agenda de los bienes públicos internacionales incorporada a la Agenda de Desarrollo.

Pero, sobre todo, se cuestiona el principio de convergencia, ya que se entiende que las condiciones de sostenibilidad del planeta no permiten que el modelo de crecimiento de los países desarrollados se extienda al conjunto de los países. No se trata, por tanto, de que los países en desarrollo converjan a las condiciones de los países desarrollados, sino que unos y otros transiten hacia un modelo alternativo (y en gran medida desconocido) de desarrollo que garantice las bases de la equidad social y de la sostenibilidad. El logro de ese objetivo de sostenibilidad impone transacciones obligadas en objetivos relacionados con las dimensiones de crecimiento —y aun de equidad social— que deben ser cuidadosamente analizadas y debatidas. El ser humano debe seguir estando en el centro de la Agenda de Desarrollo, pero entendido como un ser no solo organizado políticamente y con raíces culturales propias, sino también condicionado por un entorno biofísico en el que despliega su vida y sus capacidades.

Lectura 1

The Ends and The Means of Development[2]

Amartya Sen

Let me start off with a distinction between two general attitudes to the process of development that can be found both in professional economic analysis and in public discussions and debates. One view sees development as a “fierce” process, with much “blood, sweat and tears”—a world in which wisdom

demands toughness. In particular, it demands calculated neglect of various concerns that are seen as 46 “soft-headed” (even if the critics are often too polite to call them that). Depending on what the author’s favorite poison is, the temptations to be *resisted* can include having social safety nets that protect the very poor, providing social services for the population at large, departing from rugged institutional guidelines in response to identified hardship, and favouring—“much too early”—political and civil rights and the “luxury” of democracy. These things, it is argued in this austere attitudinal mode, could be supported later on, when the development process has borne enough fruit: what is needed here and now is “toughness and discipline.” The different theories that share this general outlook diverge from one another in pointing to distinct areas of softness that are particularly to be avoided, varying from financial softness to political relaxation, from plentiful social expenditures to complaisant poverty relief.

This hard-knocks attitude contrasts with an alternative outlook that sees development as essentially a “friendly” process. Depending on the particular version of this attitude, the congeniality of the process is seen, as exemplified by such things as mutually beneficial exchanges (of which Adam Smith spoke eloquently), or by the working of social safety nets, or of political liberties, or of social development—or some combination or other of these supportive activities.

CONSTITUTIVE AND INSTRUMENTAL ROLES OF FREEDOM

The approach of this book is much more compatible with the latter approach than with the former. It is mainly an attempt to see development as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. In this approach, expansion of freedom is viewed as both 1) the *primary end* and 2) the *principal means* of development. They can be called respectively the "constitutive role" and the "instrumental role" of freedom in development. The constitutive role of freedom relates to the importance of substantive freedom in enriching human life. The substantive freedoms include elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well as the freedoms that are associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so on. In this constitutive perspective, development involves expansion of these and other basic freedoms. Development, in this view, is the process of expanding human freedoms, and the assessment of development has to be informed by this consideration.

Let me refer here to an example that was briefly discussed in the introduction (and which involves an often raised question in the development literature) in order to illustrate how the recognition of the "constitutive" role of freedom can alter developmental analysis. Within the narrower views of development (in terms of, say, GNP growth or industrialization) it is often asked whether the freedom of political participation and dissent is or is not "conducive to development." In the light of the foundational view of development as freedom, this question would seem to be defectively formulated, since it misses the crucial understanding

that political participation and dissent are *constitutive* parts of development itself. Even a very rich person who is prevented from speaking freely, or from participating in public debates and decisions, is *deprived* of something that she has reason to value. The process of development, when judged by the enhancement of human freedom, has to include the removal of this person's deprivation. Even if she had no immediate interest in exercising the freedom to speak or to participate, it would still be a deprivation of her freedoms if she were to be left with no choice on these matters.

Development seen as enhancement of freedom cannot but address such deprivations. The relevance of the deprivation of basic political freedoms or civil rights, for an adequate understanding of development, does not have to be established through their indirect contribution to *other* features of development (such as the growth of GNP or the Promotion of industrialization). These freedoms are part and parcel of enriching the process of development.

This fundamental point is distinct from the "instrumental" argument that these freedoms and rights may *also* be very effective in contributing to economic progress. That instrumental connection is important as well (and will be discussed particularly in chapters 5 and 6), but the significance of the instrumental role of political freedom as *means* to development does not in any way reduce the evaluative importance of freedom as an end of development.

The *intrinsic* importance of human freedom as the preeminent objective of development has to be distinguished from the

instrumental effectiveness of freedom of different kinds to promote human freedom. Since the focus of the last chapter was mainly on the intrinsic importance of freedom, I shall now concentrate more on the effectiveness of freedom as *means*—not just as end. The instrumental role of freedom concerns the way different kinds of rights, opportunities, and entitlements contribute to the expansion of human freedom in general, and thus to promoting development. This relates not merely to the obvious connection that expansion of freedom of each kind must contribute to development since development itself can be seen as a process of enlargement of human freedom in general. There is much more in the instrumental connection than this constitutive linkage. The effectiveness of freedom as an instrument lies in the fact that different kinds of freedom interrelate with one another, and freedom of one type may greatly help in advancing freedom of other types. The two roles are thus linked by empirical connections, relating freedom of one kind to freedom of other kinds.

INSTRUMENTAL FREEDOMS

In presenting empirical studies in this work, 1 shall have the occasion to discuss a number of instrumental freedoms that contribute, directly or indirectly, to the overall freedom people have to live the way they would like to live. The diversities of the instruments involved are quite extensive. However, it may be convenient to identify five distinct types of freedom that may be particularly worth emphasizing in this instrumental perspective.

This is by no means an exhaustive list, but it may help to focus on some particular policy issues that demand special attention at this time.

In particular, I shall consider the following types of instrumental freedoms: 1) *political freedoms*, 2) *economic facilities*, 3) *social opportunities*, 4) *transparency guarantees* and 5) *protective security*. These instrumental freedoms tend to contribute to the general capability of a person to live more freely, but they also serve to complement one another. While development analysis must, on the one hand, be concerned with the objectives and aims that make these instrumental freedoms consequentially important, it must also take note of the empirical linkages that tie the distinct types of freedom *together*, strengthening their joint importance. Indeed, these connections are central to a fuller understanding of the instrumental role of freedom. The claim that freedom is not only the primary object of development but also its principal means relates particularly to these linkages.

Let me comment a little on each of these instrumental freedoms. *Political freedoms*, broadly conceived (including what are called civil rights), refer to the opportunities that people have to determine who should govern and on what principles, and also include the possibility to scrutinize and criticize authorities, to have freedom of political expression and an uncensored press, to enjoy the freedom to choose between different political parties, and so on. They include the political entitlements associated with democracies in the broadest sense (encompassing opportunities of political dialogue, dissent and critique as well as voting rights and participatory selection of legislators and executives).

Economic facilities refer to the opportunities that individuals respectively enjoy to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production, or exchange. The economic entitlements that a person has will depend on the resources owned or available for use as well as on conditions of exchange, such as relative prices and the working of the markets. Insofar as the process of economic development increases the income and wealth of a country, they are reflected in corresponding enhancement of economic entitlements of the population. It should be obvious that in the relation between national income and wealth, on the one hand, and the economic entitlements of individuals (or families), on the other, distributional considerations are important, in addition to aggregative ones. How the additional incomes generated are distributed will clearly, make a difference.

The availability and access to finance can be a crucial influence on the economic entitlements that economic agents are practically able to secure. This applies all the way from large enterprises (in which hundreds of thousands of people may work) to tiny establishments that are run on micro credit. A credit crunch, for example, can severely affect the economic entitlements that rely on such credit.

Social opportunities refer to the arrangements that society makes for education, health care and so on, which influence the individual's substantive freedom to live better. These facilities are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a healthy life and avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in economic and political activities. For example, illiteracy can be a major

barrier to participation in economic activities that require production according to specification or demand strict quality control (as globalized trade increasingly does). Similarly, political participation may be hindered by the inability to read newspapers or to communicate in writing with others involved in political activities.

I turn now to the fourth category. In social interactions, individuals deal with one another on the basis of some presumption of what they are being offered and what they can expect to get. In this sense, the society operates on some basic presumption of trust. Transparency guarantees deal with the need for openness that people can expect the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity. When that trust is seriously violated, the lives of many people—both direct parties and third parties—may be adversely affected by the lack of openness. *Transparency guarantees* (including the right to disclosure) can thus be an important category of instrumental freedom. These guarantees have a clear instrumental role in preventing corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings.

Finally, no matter how well an economic system operates, some people can be typically on the verge of vulnerability and can actually succumb to great deprivation as a result of material changes that adversely affect their lives. *Protective security* is needed to provide a social safety net for preventing the affected population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death. The domain of protective security includes fixed institutional arrangements such as

unemployment benefits and statutory income supplements to the indigent as well as ad hoc arrangements such as famine relief or emergency public employment to generate income for destitutes.

INTERCONNECTIONS AND COMPLEMENTARITY

These instrumental freedoms directly enhance the capabilities of; people, but they also supplement one another, and can furthermore reinforce one another. These interlinkages are particularly important to seize in considering development policies. The fact that the entitlement to economic transactions tends to be typically a great engine of economic growth has been widely accepted. But many other connections remain underrecognized, and they have to be seized more fully in policy analysis. Economic growth can help not only in raising private incomes but also in making it possible for the state to finance social insurance and active public intervention. Thus the contribution of economic growth has to be judged not merely by the increase in private incomes, but also by the expansion of social services (including, in many cases, social safety nets) that economic growth may make possible.

Similarly, the creation of social opportunities, through such services as public education, health care, and the development of a free and energetic press, can contribute both to economic development and to significant reductions in mortality rates. Reduction of mortality rates, in turn, can help to reduce birth rates, reinforcing the influence of basic education—especially

female literacy and schooling—on fertility behaviour.

The pioneering example of enhancing economic growth through social opportunity, especially in basic education, is of course Japan. It is sometimes forgotten that Japan had a higher rate of literacy than Europe had even at the time of the Meiji restoration in the mid-nineteenth century, when industrialization had not yet occurred there but had gone on for many decades in Europe. Japan's economic development was clearly much helped by the human resource development related to the social opportunities that were generated. The so-called East Asian miracle involving other countries in East Asia was, to a great extent, based on similar causal connections.

This approach goes against—and to a great extent undermines—the belief that has been so dominant in many policy circles that "human development" (as the process of expanding education, healthcare and other conditions of human life is often called) is really a kind of luxury that only richer countries can't afford. Perhaps the most important impact of the type of success that the East Asian economies, beginning with Japan, have had is the total undermining of that implicit prejudice. These economies went comparatively early for massive expansion of education, and later also of health care, and this they did, in many cases, *before* they broke the restraints of general poverty. And they have reaped as they have sown. Indeed, as Hiromitsu Ishi has pointed out, the priority to human resource development applies particularly to the early history of Japanese economic development, beginning with the Meiji era (1868-1911), and that focus has not intensified with economic affluence as Japan has

grown richer and much more opulent.

DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF CHINA-INDIA CONTRAST

The central role of individual freedoms in the process of development makes it particularly important to examine their determinants. Substantial attention has to be paid to the social influences, including state actions, that help to determine the nature and reach of individual freedoms. Social arrangements may be decisively important in securing and expanding the freedom of the individual. Individual freedoms are influenced, on one side, by the social safeguarding of liberties, tolerance, and the possibility of exchange and transactions. They are also influenced, on the other side, by substantive public support in the provision of those facilities (such as basic health care or essential education) that are crucial for the formation and—use of human capabilities. There is need to pay attention to both types of determinants of individual freedoms.

The contrast between India and China has some illustrative—importance in this context. The governments of both China and India have been making efforts for some time now (China from 1979 and India from 1991) to move toward a more open, internationally active, market-oriented economy. While Indian efforts have slowly met with some success, the kind of massive results that China has seen has failed to occur in India. An important factor in this contrast lies in the fact that from the standpoint of social preparedness, China is a great deal ahead of

India in being able to make use of the market economy. While pre-reform China was deeply skeptical of markets, it was not skeptical of basic education and widely shared health care. When China turned to marketization in I979, it already had a highly literate people, especially the young, with good schooling facilities across the bulk of the country. In this respect, China was not very far. from the basic educational situation in South Korea or Taiwan, where too an educated population had played a major role in seizing the economic opportunities offered by a supportive market system. In contrast, India had a half-illiterate adult population when it turned to marketization in 1991, and the situation is not much improved today.

The health conditions in China were also much better than in India because of the social commitment of the pre-reform regime to health care as well as education. Oddly enough, that commitment, while totally unrelated to its helpful role in market-oriented economic growth, created social opportunities that could be brought into dynamic use after the country moved toward marketization. The social backwardness of India, with its elitist concentration on higher education and massive negligence of school education and its substantial neglect of basic health care, left that country poorly prepared for a widely shared economic expansion. The contrast between India and China does, of course, have many other aspects (including the differences in their respective political systems, and the much greater variation *within* India of social opportunities such as literacy and health care); these issues will be addressed later. But the relevance of the radically different levels of social preparedness in China and

India for wide-spread market-oriented development is worth noting even at this preliminary stage of the analysis.

It must, however, also be noted that there are real handicaps that China experiences compared with India because it lacks democratic freedoms. This is particularly so when it comes to flexibility of economic policy and the responsiveness of public action to social crisis and unforeseen disasters. The most prominent contrast lies perhaps in the fact that China has had what is almost certainly the largest recorded famine in history (when thirty million people died in the famine that followed the failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1958-1961), whereas India has not had a famine since independence in 1947. When things go well, the protective power of democracy may be less missed, but dangers can lie round the corner (as indeed the recent experiences of some of the East Asian and Southeast Asian economies bring out). This issue too will have to be discussed more fully later on in this book.

There are very many different interconnections between distinct instrumental freedoms. Their respective roles and their specific influences on one another are important aspects of the process of development. In the chapter to follow, there will be opportunities to discuss a number of these interconnections and their extensive reach. However, to illustrate how these interconnections work, let me here go a little into the diverse influences on longevity and life expectancy at birth—capabilities that people value almost universally.

GROWTH-MEDIATED SOCIAL

ARRANGEMENTS

The impact of social arrangements on the freedom to survive can be very strong and may be influenced by quite different instrumental connections. The point is sometimes made that this is not a separate consideration from economic growth (in the form of raising the level of per capita income) since there is a close relation between income per head and longevity. Indeed, it has been argued that it is a mistake to worry about the discord between income achievements and survival chances, since—in general—the statistical connection between them is observed to be quite close. As a point about intercountry statistical connections, seen in isolation, this is indeed correct, but this statistical relation needs further scrutiny before it can be seen as a convincing ground for dismissing the relevance of social arrangements (going beyond income-based opulence).

It is interesting, in this context, to refer to some statistical analyses that have recently been presented by Sudhir Anand and Martin Ravallion. On the basis of intercountry comparisons, they find that life expectancy does indeed have a significantly positive correlation with GNP per head, but that this relationship works mainly through the impact of GNP on: 1) the incomes specifically of the poor, and 2) public expenditure particularly in health care. In fact, once these two variables are included on their own in the statistical exercise, little extra explanation can be obtained from including GNP per head as an additional causal influence. Indeed, with poverty and public expenditure on health as explanatory variables on their own, the connection between GNP per head and life expectancy appears (in the Anand- Ravallion

analysis) to vanish altogether.

It is important to emphasize that this result, if vindicated by other empirical studies as well, would not show that life expectancy is not enhanced by the growth of GNP per head, but it would indicate that the connection tends to work particularly *through* public expenditure on health care, and *through* the success of poverty removal. The basic point is that the impact of economic growth depends much on how the *fruits* of economic growth are used. This also helps to explain why some economies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have been able to raise life expectancy so rapidly through economic growth.

The achievements of the East Asian economies have come under critical scrutiny—and some fire—in recent years, partly because of the nature and severity of what is called "the Asian economic crisis." That crisis is indeed serious, and points to particular failures of economies that were earlier seen—mistakenly—as being comprehensively successful. I shall have the opportunity of considering the special problems and specific failures involved in the Asian economic crisis (particularly in chapters 6 and 7). But it would be an error not to see the great achievements of the East Asian and Southeast Asian' economies over several decades, which have transformed the lives and longevities of people in the countries involved. The problems that these countries now face (and have potentially harbored for a long time), which demand attention (including the overall need for political freedoms and open participation as well as for protective security), should not induce us to ignore these countries' achievements in the fields in which they have done remarkably

well.

For a variety of historical reasons, including a focus on basic education and basic health care, and early completion of effective land reforms, widespread economic participation was easier to achieve in many of the East Asian and Southeast Asian economies in a way it has not been possible in, say, Brazil or India or Pakistan, where the creation of social opportunities has been much slower and that slowness has acted as a barrier to economic development. The expansion of social opportunities has served to facilitate high-employment economic development and has also created favorable circumstances of reduction of mortality rates and for expansion of life-expectancy. The contrast is sharp with some other high-growth countries—such as Brazil—which have had almost comparable growth of GNP per head, but also have quite a history of severe social inequality, unemployment and neglect of public health care. The longevity achievements of these other high-growth economies have moved more slowly.

These are two interesting—and interrelated—contrasts here:

1. For *high economic growth economies*, the contrast between:
    - Those *with* great success in raising in length and quality of life (such as South Korea and Taiwan).
    - Those *without* comparable success in these other fields (such as Brazil).
2. For *economies with high success in raising in length and quality of life*, in contrast between:
    - Those *with* great success in high economic growth

(such as South Korea and Taiwan).

- Those *without* much success in achieving high economic growth (such as Sri Lanka, *pre-reform* China, the Indian state of Kerala).

I have already commented on the first contrast (between, say, South Korea and Brazil), but the second contrast too deserves policy attention. In our book *Hunger and Public Action*, Jean Drèze and I have distinguished between two types of success in the rapid reduction of mortality, which we called respectively "growth-mediated" and "support-led" processes. The former process works *through* fast economic growth, and its success depends on the growth process being wide-based and economically broad (strong employment orientation has much to do with this), and also on utilization of the enhanced economic prosperity to expand the relevant social services, including health care, education and social security. In contrast with the growth-mediated mechanism, the support-led process does not operate through fast economic growth, but works through a program of skillful social support of health care, education and other relevant social arrangements. This process is well exemplified by the experiences of economies such as Sri Lanka, pre-reform China, Costa Rica or Kerala, which have had very rapid reductions in mortality rates and enhancement of living conditions, without much economic growth.

PUBLIC PROVISIONING, LOW INCOMES AND RELATIVE COSTS

The support-led process does not wait for dramatic increases in per capita levels of real income, and it works through priority being given to providing social services (particularly health care and basic education) that reduce mortality and enhance the quality of life. Some examples of this relationship are shown in figure 1, which presents the GNP per head and life expectancy at birth of six countries (China, Sri Lanka, Namibia, Brazil, South Africa and Gabon) and one sizable state (Kerala) with thirty million people, within a country (India). Despite their very low levels of income, the people of Kerala, or China, or Sri Lanka enjoy enormously higher levels of life expectancy than do much richer populations of Brazil, South Africa and Namibia, not to mention Gabon. Even the *direction* of the inequality points opposite when we compare Kerala, China and Sri Lanka, on one side, with Brazil, South Africa, Namibia and Gabon, on the other. Since life expectancy variations relate to a variety of social opportunities that are central—to development (including epidemiological policies, health care, educational facilities and so on), an income—centered view is in serious need of supplementation, in order a fuller understanding of the process of development. These contrasts are of considerable policy relevance, and bring out the importance of the support-led process.

FIGURE 1
GNP PER CAPITA (U.S. DOLLARS) AND LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1994



SOURCES: COUNTRY DATA, 1994, WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996; KERALA DATA, LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1989-1993, SAMPLE REGISTRATION SYSTEM CITED IN GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 81997), DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, WOMEN IN INDIA: A STATISTICAL PROFILE; DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA, 1992-1993, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (1997), MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1996-1997.

Surprise may well be expressed about the possibility of financing support-led processes in poor countries, since resources are surely needed to expand public services, including health care and education. In fact, the need for resources is frequently presented as an argument for *postponing* socially important investments until a country is already richer. Where (as the famous rhetorical question goes) are the poor countries going to find the means for “supporting” these services? This is indeed a good question, but it also has a good answer, which lies very considerably in the economics of relative costs. The viability of this support-led process is dependent on the fact that the relevant social services (such as health care and basic education) are very *labor intensive*, and thus are relatively inexpensive in poor and low-wage-economies. A poor economy may *have* less money to spend on health care and education, but it also *needs* less money to spend to provide the same services, which would cost much more in the richer countries. Relative prices and costs are important parameters in determining what a country can afford. Given an appropriate social commitment, the need to take

note of the variability of relative costs is particularly important for social services in health and education.

It is obvious that the growth-mediated process has an advantage over its support-led alternative; it may, ultimately, offer more, since there are more deprivations—other than premature mortality, or high morbidity, or illiteracy—that are very directly connected with the lowness of incomes (such as being inadequately clothed and sheltered). It is clearly better to have high income as *well* as high longevity (and other standard indicators of quality of life), rather than only the latter. This is a point worth emphasizing, since there is some danger of being "overconvinced" by the statistics of life expectancy and other such basic indicators of quality of life.

For example, the fact that the Indian state of Kerala has achieved impressively high life expectancy, low fertility, high literacy and so on despite its low income level per head is certainly an achievement worth celebrating and learning from. And yet the question remains as to why Kerala has not been able to build on its successes in human development to raise its income levels as well, which would have mode its success more complete; it can scarcely serve as a "model" case, as some have tried to claim. From a policy point of view this requires a critical scrutiny of Kerala's economic policies regarding incentives and investments ("economic facilities" in general), despite its unusual success in raising life expectancy and the quality of life. Support-led success does, in this sense, remain shorter in achievement than growth- mediated success where the increase in economic opulence and the enhancement of quality of life tend to move

together.

On the other hand, the success of the support-led process, as a route does indicate that a country need not wait until it is much richer (through what may be a long period of economic growth) before embarking on rapid expansion of basic education and health care. The quality of life can be vastly raised, despite low incomes, through an adequate program of social services. The fact that education and health care are also productive in raising economic growth adds to the argument for putting major emphasis on these social arrangements in poor economies, *without* having to wait for "getting rich" *first*. The support-led process is a recipe for rapid achievement of higher quality of life, and this has great policy importance, but there remains an excellent case for moving on from there to broader achievements that include economic growth as well as the raising of the standard features of quality of life.

MORTALITY REDUCTION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN

In this context, it is also instructive to reexamine the time pattern of mortality reduction and of the increase in life expectancy in the advanced industrial economies. The role of public provision of health care and nutrition, and generally of social arrangements, in mortality reduction in Europe and the United States over the last few centuries has been well analyzed by Robert Fogel, Samuel Preston and others. The time pattern of the expansion of life expectancy in this century itself is of particular interest, bearing in

mind that at the turn of the last century, even Britain—then the leading capitalist market economy still had a life expectancy at birth that was lower than the average life expectancy for low-income countries today. However, longevity in Britain did rise rapidly over the century, influenced partly by strategies of social programs, and the time pattern of this increase is of some interest.

FIGURE 2
IMPROVEMENTS IN LIFE EXPECTANCY IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1901-1960



SOURCES: S. PRESTON, N. KEYFITZ, AND R. SCHOEN, CAUSES OF DEATH: LIFE TABLES FOR NATIONAL POPULATION (NEW YORK: SEMINAR PRESS, 1992).

The expansion of programs of support for nutrition, health care and so on in Britain was not uniformly fast over the decades. There were two periods of remarkably fast expansion of support-oriented policies in this century; they occurred during the two world wars. Each war situation produced much greater sharing of means of survival, including sharing of health care and the limited food supply (through rationing and subsidized nutrition). During the First World War, there were remarkable developments in social attitudes about “sharing” and public policies aimed at achieving that sharing, as has been well analyzed by Jay Winter.

During the Second World War also, unusually supportive and shared social arrangements developed, related to the psychology of sharing in beleaguered Britain, which made these radical public arrangements for the distribution of food and health care acceptable and effective. Even the National Health Service was born during those war years.

Did this make any real difference to health and survival? Was there, in fact, a correspondingly faster mortality reduction in these periods of support-led policies in Britain? It is, in fact, confirmed by detailed nutritional studies that during the Second World War, even though the per capita availability of food fell significantly in Britain, cases of undernourishment also *declined* sharply, and extreme undernourishment almost entirely disappeared. Mortality rates also went down sharply (except of course for war mortality itself). A similar thing had happened during the First World War.

Indeed, it is remarkable that interdecade comparisons, based on decadal censuses, show that by a very wide margin the most speedy expansion of life expectanacy occurred precisely during those two “war decades” (as shown in figure 2, which presents the increase in life expectancy in years during each of the first six decades of this century). While in the other decades life expectancy rose rather moderately (between one year and four years), in each of the two war decades it jumped up by nearly seven years.

FIGURE 3
EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (ENGLAND AND WALES), 1901-1960



SOURCE: A. MADISON, PHASES OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT (NEW YORK: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1982): S. PRESTON ET AL., CAUSES OF DEATH (NEW YORK: SEMINAR PRESS, 1972).

We must also ask whether the much sharper increase in life expectancy during the war decades can be explained alternatively, by faster economic growth over those decades. The answer seems to be in the negative. In fact, the decades of fast expansion of life expectancy happened to be periods of *slow* growth of gross domestic product per head, as shown in figure 3. It is, of course, possible to hypothesize that GDP growth has its effects on life expectancy with a time lag of a decade, and while this is not contradicted by figure 3 itself, it does not stand up much to other scrutiny, including the analysis of possible causal processes. A much more plausible explanation of the rapid increase in British life expectancy is provided by the changes in the extent of social sharing during the war decades, and the sharp increases in public support for national services (including nutritional support and health care) that went with this. Much light is thrown on these contrasts by studies of health and other living

conditions of the population through the war periods, and their connection with social attitudes and public arrangements.

DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL INCENTIVES

Illustrations of linkages can come from a great many other connections. Let me briefly comment on one more: that between political liberty and civil rights, on the one hand, and the freedom to avoid economic disasters, on the other, the most elementary vindication of this connection can be seen in the fact, on which I commented earlier (in chapter 1, and indirectly—in discussing the China-India contrast—in the present chapter) that famine does not occur in democracies. Indeed, no substantial famine has ever occurred in a democratic country—no matter how poor. This is because famines are extremely easy to prevent if the government tries to prevent them, and a government in a multiparty democracy with elections and free media has strong political incentives to undertake famine prevention. This would indicate that political freedom in the form of democratic arrangements helps to safeguard economic freedom (especially freedom from extreme starvation) and the freedom to survive (against famine mortality).

The security provided by democracy may not be much missed when a country is lucky enough to be facing no serious calamity, when everything is running along smoothly. But the danger of insecurity, arising from changes in the economic or other circumstances or from uncorrected mistakes of policy, can lurk behind what looks like a healthy state. When this connection is discussed more fully, the political aspects of the recent “Asian

economic crisis" will need to be addressed.

A CONCLUDING REMARK

The analysis presented in this chapter develops the basic idea that enhancement of human freedom is both the main object and the primary means of development. The objective of development relates to the valuation of the actual freedoms enjoyed by the people involved. Individual capabilities crucially depend on, among other things, economic, social, and political arrangements. In making appropriate institutional arrangements, the instrumental roles of distinct types of freedom have to be considered, going well beyond the foundational importance of the overall freedom of individuals.

The instrumental roles of freedom include several distinct but interrelated components, such as economic facilities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security. These instrumental rights, opportunities and entitlements have strong interlinkages, which can go in different directions. The process of development is crucially influenced by these interconnections. Corresponding to multiple interconnected freedoms, there is a need to develop and support a plurality of institutions, including democratic systems, legal mechanisms, market structures, educational and health provisions, media and other communication facilities and so on. The institutions can incorporate private initiatives as well as public arrangements and also more mixed structures, such as nongovernmental organizations and cooperative entities.

The ends and means of development call for placing the perspective of freedom at the center of the stage. The people have to be seen, in this perspective, as being actively involved—given the opportunity—in shaping their own destiny, and not just as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs. The state and the society have extensive roles in strengthening and safeguarding human capabilities. This is a supporting role rather than one of ready-made delivery. The freedom-centered perspective on the ends and the means of development has some claim to our attention.

Lectura 2

The Central Capabilities[3]

Martha C. Nussbaum

The approach we are investigating is sometimes called the *Human Development Approach* and sometimes the *Capability* or *Capabilities Approach*. Occasionally the terms are combined, as in *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, the current name of the former Journal of Human Development—a title reflecting its new status as the official journal of the HDCA. To some extent these titles are used as mere verbal variants, and many people make no distinction among them. Insofar as there are any significant differences, “Human Development Approach” is associated, historically, with the Human Development Report Office of the United Nations Development Programme and its annual Human Development Reports. These reports use the

notion of capabilities as a comparative measure rather than as a basis for normative political theory. Amartya Sen had a major intellectual role in framing them, but they do not incorporate a1l aspects of his (pragmatic and result-oriented) theory; they simply aim to package comparative information in such a way as to reorient the development and policy debate, rather than to advance a systematic economic or political theory.

"Capability Approach" and "Capabilities Approach" are the key terms in the political/economic program Sen proposes in works such as *Inequality Reexamined and Development as Freedom*, where the project is to commend the capability framework as the best space within which to make comparisons of life quality, and to show why it is superior to utilitarian and quasi-Rawlsian approaches. I typically use the plural, "Capabilities", in order to emphasize that the most important elements of people's quality of life are plural and qualitatively distinct: health, bodily integrity, education, and other aspects of individual lives cannot be reduced to a single metric without distortion. Sen, too, emphasizes this idea of plurality and nonreducibility, which is a key element of the approach.

I prefer the term "Capabilities Approach", at least in many contexts, to the term "Human Development Approach", because I am concerned with the capabilities of nonhuman animals as well as human beings. The approach provides a fine basis for a theory of justice and entitlement for both nonhuman animals and humans. Sen shares this interest, although he has not made it a central focus of his work.

The Capabilities Approach can be provisionally defined as an

approach to comparative quality-of-life assessment and to theorizing about basic social justice. It holds that the key question to ask, when comparing societies and assessing them for their basic decency or justice, is, “What is each person able to do and to be?” In other words, the approach takes *each person as an end*, asking not just about the total or average well-being but about the opportunities available to each person. It is *focused on choice or freedom*, holding that the crucial good societies should be promoting for their people is a set of opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which people then may or may not exercise in action: the choice is theirs. It thus commits itself to respect for people’s powers of self-definition. The approach is resolutely *pluralist about value*: it holds that the capability achievements that are central for people are different in quality, not just in quantity; that they cannot without distortion be reduced to a single numerical scale; and that a fundamental part of understanding and producing them is understanding the specific nature of each. Finally, the approach is *concerned with entrenched social injustice and inequality*, especially capability failures that are the result of discrimination or marginalization. It ascribes an urgent *task to government and public policy-namely*, to improve the quality of life for all people, as defined by their capabilities.

These are the essential elements of the approach. It has (at least) two versions, in part because it has been used for two different purposes. My own version, which puts the approach to work in constructing a theory of basic social justice, adds other notions in the process (those of *human dignity*, the *threshold*,

political liberalism). As a theory of fundamental political entitlements, my version of the approach also employs a specific list of the *Central Capabilities*. Compared with many familiar theories of welfare, my approach also subtracts: my capability-based theory of justice refrains from offering a comprehensive assessment of the quality of life in a society, even for comparative purposes, because the role of *political liberalism* in my theory requires me to prescind from offering any comprehensive account of value. Sen's primary concern has been to identify capability as the most pertinent space of comparison for purposes of quality-of-life assessment, thus changing the direction of the development debate. His version of the approach does not propose a definite account of basic justice, although it is a normative theory and does have a clear concern with issues of justice (focusing, for example, on instances of capability failure that result from gender or racial discrimination). In consequence, Sen does not employ a threshold or a specific list of capabilities, although it is clear that he thinks some capabilities (for example, health and education) have a particular centrality. Nor does he make central theoretical use of the concept of human dignity, though he certainly acknowledges its importance. At the same time, Sen does propose that the idea of capabilities can be the basis for a comprehensive quality-of-life assessment in a nation, in that sense departing from the deliberately limited aims of my political liberalism.

At this point, however, we may continue to treat the approach as a single, relatively unified approach to a set of questions about

both quality of life and basic justice. The story of Vasanti and what is salient in her situation could have been cold by either Sen or me, and the same essential features would have been recognized—although Sen would not formalize them as a list or make assessments of minimal social justice, choosing instead to focus on quality-of-life issues. Enough has been said, 1hope, to draw attention to the shared contours of the approach and its guiding concepts, as well as to some specific concepts of my own version that will also be defined in this chapter, even though they do not figure centrally in Sen's theory.

What are capabilities? They are the answers to the question, "What is this person able to do and to be?" In other words, they are what Sen calls "substantial freedoms", a set of (usually interrelated) opportunities to choose and to act. In one standard formulation by Sen, "a person's 'capability' refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations". In other words, they are not just abilities residing inside a person but also the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and the political, social, and economic environment. To make the complexity of capabilities clear, I refer to these "substantial freedoms" as combined capabilities. Vasanti's combined capabilities are the totality of the opportunities she has for choice and action in her specific political, social, and economic situation.

Of course the characteristics of a person (personality traits, intellectual and emotional capacities, states of bodily fitness and

health, internalized learning, skills of perception and movement) are highly relevant to his or her “combined capabilities”, but it is useful to distinguish them from combined capabilities, of which they are but a part. I call these states of the person (not fixed, but fluid and dynamic) *internal capabilities*. They are to be distinguished from innate equipment: they are trained or developed traits and abilities, developed, in most cases, in interaction with the social, economic, familial, and political environment. They include such traits as Vasanti’s learned political skill, or her skill in sewing; her newfound self-confidence and her freedom from her earlier fear. One job of a society that wants to promote the most important human capabilities is to support the development of internal capabilities—through education, resources to enhance physical and emotional health, support for family care and love, a system of education, and much more.

Why is it important to distinguish internal capabilities from combined capabilities? The distinction corresponds to two overlapping but distinct casks of the decent society. A society might do quite well at producing internal capabilities but might cut off the avenues through which people actually have the opportunity to function in accordance with chose capabilities. Many societies educate people so that they are capable of free speech on political matters—internally—but then deny them free expression in practice through repression of speech. Many people who are internally free to exercise a religion do not have the opportunity to do so in the sense of combined capability, because religious free exercise is not protected by the

government. Many people who are internally capable of participating in politics are not able to choose to do so in the sense of combined capability: they may be immigrants without legal rights, or they may be excluded from participation in some other manner. It is also possible for a person to live in a political and social environment in which she could realize an internal capability (for example, criticizing the government) but lack the developed ability to think critically or speak publicly.

Because combined capabilities are defined as internal capabilities plus the social/political/economic conditions in which functioning can actually be chosen, it is not possible conceptually to think of a society producing combined capabilities without producing internal capabilities. We could, however, imagine a society that does well in creating contexts for choice in many areas but does not educate its citizens or nourish the development of their powers of mind. Some states in India are like this: open to those who want to participate but terrible ac delivering the basic health care and education that would enable them to do so. Here, terminologically, we would say that neither internal nor combined capabilities were present, but that the society had done at least some things right. (And of course in such a society many people do have combined capabilities, just not the poor or the marginalized.) Vasanti's Gujarat has a high rate of political participation, like all Indian states: so it has done well in extending political capabilities to all. (Notice that here we infer the presence of the capability from the actual functioning: it seems hard to do otherwise empirically, but conceptually we ought to remember that a person might be fully capable of voting

and yet choose not to vote.) Gujarat has not done similarly well in promoting related internal capabilities, such as education, adequate information, and confidence, for the poor, women, and religious minorities.

The distinction between internal and combined capabilities is not sharp, since one typically acquires an internal capability by some kind of functioning, and one may lose it in the absence of the opportunity to function. Bur the distinction is a useful heuristic in diagnosing the achievements and shortcomings of a society.

Internal capabilities are not innate equipment. The idea of innate equipment does, however, play a role in the Human Development Approach. After all, the term “human development” suggests t e unfolding of powers that human beings bring into the world. Historically, the approach is influenced by philosophical views that focus on human flourishing or self-realization, from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill in the West and Rabindranath Tagore in India. And the approach in many ways uses the intuitive idea of waste and starvation to indicate what is wrong with a society that thwarts the development of capabilities. Adam Smith wrote that deprivation of education made people “mutilated and deformed in a[n] … essential part of the character of human nature”. This captures an important intuitive idea behind the capabilities project. We therefore need a way to talk about these innate powers that are either nurtured or not nurtured, and for that we may use the term *basic capabilities*. We now know that the development of basic capabilities is not hardwired in the DNA: maternal nutrition and prenatal experience play a role in their unfolding and shaping. In that sense, even after a child is born

we are always dealing with very early internal capabilities, already environmentally conditioned, not with a pure potential. Nonetheless, the category is a useful one, so long as we do not misunderstand it. Basic capabilities are the innate faculties of the person that make later development and training possible.

The concept of basic capabilities must be used with much caution, since we can easily imagine a theory that would hold that people's political and social entitlements should be proportional to their innate intelligence or skill. This approach makes no such claim. Indeed, it insists that the political goal for all human beings in a nation ought to be the same: all should get above a certain threshold level of combined capability, in the sense not of coerced functioning but of substantial freedom to choose and act. That is what it means to treat all people with equal respect. So the attitude toward people's basic capabilities is not a meritocratic one—more innately skilled people get better treatment—but, if anything, the opposite: those who need more help to get above the threshold get more help. In the case of people with cognitive disabilities, the goal should be for them to have the same capabilities as "normal" people, even though some of chose opportunities may have to be exercised through a surrogate, and the surrogate may in some cases supply pare of the internal capability if the person is unable to develop sufficient choice capability on her own, for example, by voting on that person's behalf even if the person is unable to make a choice. The one limitation is that the person has to be a child of human parents and capable of at least some sort of active striving: thus a person in a permanent vegetative condition or an anencephalic person

would not be qualified for equal political entitlements under this theory. But the notion of basic capability is still appropriate in thinking about education: if a child has innate cognitive disabilities, special interventions are justified.

On the other side of capability is *functioning*. A functioning is an active realization of one or more capabilities. Functionings need not be especially active or, to use the term of one critic, “muscular”. Enjoying good health is a functioning, as is lying peacefully in the grass. Functionings are beings and doings that are the outgrowths or realizations of capabilities.

In contrasting capabilities with functionings, we should bear in mind that capability means opportunity to select. The notion of *freedom to choose* is thus built into the notion of capability. To use an example of Sen’s, a person who is starving and a person who is fasting have the same type of functioning where nutrition is concerned, but they do not have the same capability, because the person who fasts is able not to fast, and the starving person has no choice.

In a sense, capabilities are important because of the way in which they may lead to functionings. If people never functioned at all, in any way, it would seem odd to say that the society was a good one because it had given them lots of capabilities. The capabilities would be pointless and idle if they were never used and people slept all through life. In that limited way, the notion of functioning gives the notion of capability its end-point. But capabilities have value in and of themselves, as spheres of freedom and choice. To promote capabilities is to promote areas of freedom, and this is not the same as making people function in

a certain way. Thus the Capabilities Approach departs from a tradition in economics that measures the real value of a set of options by the best use that can be made of them. Options are freedoms, and freedom has intrinsic value.

Some political views deny this: they hold that the right thing for government to do is to make people lead healthy lives, do worthwhile activities, exercise religion, and so on. We deny this: we say that capabilities, not functionings, are the appropriate political goals, because room is thereby left for the exercise of human freedom. There is a huge moral difference between a policy that promotes health and one that promotes health capabilities-the latter, not the former, honors the person's lifestyle choices.

The preference for capabilities is connected to the issue of respect for a plurality of different religious and secular views of life, and thus to the idea of political liberalism.

Children, of course, are different; requiring certain sores of functioning of them (as in compulsory education) is defensible as a necessary prelude to adult capability.

Some people who use the Capabilities Approach chink that in a few specific areas government is entitled to promote functionings rather than just capabilities. Richard Arneson, for example, has defended paternalistic function-oriented policies in the area of health: government should use its power to make people take up healthy lifestyles. Sen and I do not agree with this position because of the high value we ascribe to choice. There is one exception: government, I hold, should not give people an option to be treated with respect and nonhumiliation. Suppose,

for example, that the U.S. government gave every citizen a penny that they could then choose to pay back to “purchase” respectful treatment. But if the person chose to keep the penny, the government would humiliate them. This is unacceptable. Government must treat all people respectfully and should refuse to humiliate them. I make this exception because of the centrality of notions of dignity and respect in generating the entire capabilities list. Similarly, virtually all users of the approach would agree that slavery should be prohibited, even if favored by a majority, and even if by voluntary contract.

Another area of reasonable disagreement involves the right to do things that would appear to destroy some or all capabilities. Should people be permitted to sell their organs? To use hard drugs? To engage in a wide range of risky sports? Typically we make compromises in such areas, and these compromises do not always make sense: thus alcohol, an extremely destructive drug, remains legal while marijuana is for the most pare illegal. We regulate most sports for safety, but we do not have an organized public debate about which areas of freedom it makes sense to remove for safety’s sake. We can certainly agree that capability-destruction in children is a particularly grave matter and as such should be off-limits. In other cases, reasonable safety regulation seems plausible—unless debate reveals that the removal of an option (boxing without gloves, say) is really an infringement of freedom so grave as to make people’s lives incompatible with human dignity. Usually situations are not so grave, and thus in many such cases the approach has little to say, allowing matters to be settled through the political process.

This issue will be further illuminated if we cum to a related arid crucial question: Which capabilities are the most important? The approach makes this valuational question central rather than concealing it. This is one of its attractive features. Other approaches always take some sort of stand on questions of value, but often without explicitness or argument. Sen and I hold that it is crucial to face this question head on, and to address it with pertinent normative arguments.

Sen takes a stand on the valuational issue by emphasis, choice of examples, and implication, but he does not attempt anything like a systematic answer, an issue to which we will return in Chapter 4· It is reasonable for him not to attempt a systematic answer, insofar as he is using the idea of capabilities merely to frame comparisons. Insofar as he is using it to construct a theory of democracy and of justice, it is less clear that his avoidance of commitments on substance is wise. Any use of the idea of capabilities for the purposes of normative law and public policy must ultimately take a stand on substance, saying that some capabilities are important and others less important, some good, and some (even) bad.

Returning to the idea of basic capabilities wi1l help us grasp this point. Human beings come into the world with the equipment for many “doings and beings” (to use a common phrase of Sen’s), and we have to ask ourselves which ones are worth developing into mature capabilities. Adam Smith, thinking of children deprived of education, said that their human powers were “mutilated and deformed”. Imagine, instead, a child whose capacity for cruelty and the humiliation of others is starved and

thwarted by familial and social development. We would not describe such a child as “mutilated and deformed”, even if we granted that these capacities have their basis in innate human nature. Again, suppose we were told that a particular child was never taught to be capable of whistling *Yankee Doodle Dandy* while standing on her head. We would not say that this child’s human powers had been “mutilated and deformed” because, even though the capability in question is not—unlike the capacity for cruelty—bad, and even though it is probably grounded in human nature, it is just not very important.

The Capabilities Approach is not a theory of what human nature is, and it does not read norms off from innate human nature. Instead, it is evaluative and ethical from the start: it asks, among the many things that human beings might develop the capacity to do, which ones are the really valuable ones, which are the ones that a minimally just society will endeavor to nurture and support? An account of human nature tells us what resources and possibilities we have and what our difficulties may be. It does not tell us what to value.

Nonhuman animals are less malleable than human animals, and they may not be able to learn to inhibit a harmful capacity without painful frustration. They are also hard to “read”, since their lives are not ours. Observing their actual capacities and having a good descriptive theory of each species and its form of life will thus rightly play a larger role in creating a normative theory of animal capabilities than it does in the human case. Still, the normative exercise is crucial, difficult though it may be.

How would we begin selecting the capabilities on which we

want to focus? Much depends on our purpose. On the one hand, if our intention is simply comparative, all sorts of capabilities suggest interesting comparisons across nations and regions, and there is no reason to prescribe in advance: new problems may suggest new comparisons. On the other hand, if our aim is to establish political principles that can provide the grounding for constitutional law and public policy in a nation aspiring to social justice (or to prop se goals for the community of nations), selection is of the utmost importance. We cannot select, however, using only the notion of capabilities. The title “Capabilities Approach” should not be read as suggesting that the approach uses only a single concept and tries to squeeze everything out of it.

At this point I invoke the notion of human dignity and of a life worthy of it—or, when we are considering other animal species, the dignity appropriate to the species in question. Dignity is an intuitive notion that is by no means utterly clear. If it is used in isolation, as if it is completely self-evident, it can be used capriciously and inconsistently. Thus it would be mistaken to use it as if it were an intuitively self-evident and solid foundation for a theory that would then be built upon it. My approach does not do this: dignity is one element of the theory, but all of its notions are seen as interconnected, deriving illumination and clarity from one another. In the case of dignity, the notion of respect is a particularly important relative, and the political principles themselves illuminate what we cake human dignity (and its absence) to mean. But the basic idea is that some living conditions deliver to people a life that is worthy of the human

dignity that they possess, and he s do not. In the fatter circumstance, they retain dignity, but it is like a promissory note whose claims have not been met. As Martin Luther King, Jr., said of the promises inherent in national ideals: dignity can be like “a check chat has come back marked ‘insufficient funds’”.

Although dignity is a vague idea that needs to be given content by placing it in a network of related notions, it does make a difference. A focus on dignity is quite different, for example, from a focus on satisfaction. Think about debates concerning education for people with severe cognitive disabilities. It certainly seems possible that satisfaction, for many such people, could be produced without educational development. The court cases that opened the public schools to such people used, at crucial junctures, the notion of dignity: we do not treat a child with Down syndrome in a manner commensurate with that child’s dignity if we fail to develop the child’s powers of mind through suitable education. In a wide range of areas, moreover, a focus on dignity will dictate policy choices that protect and support agency, rather than choices that infantilize people and treat them as passive recipients of benefit.

The claims of human dignity can be denied in many ways, but we may reduce them all to two, corresponding to the notions of internal capability and combined capability. Social, political, familial, and economic conditions may prevent people from choosing to function in accordance with a developed internal capability: this sort of thwarting is comparable to imprisonment. Bad conditions can, however, cut deeper, stunting the development of internal capabilities or warping their deve-

lopment. In both cases, basic human dignity remains: the person is still worthy of equal respect. In the former case, however, dignity has been more deeply violated. Think of the difference between rape and simple robbery. Both damage a person; neither removes the person's equal human dignity. Rape, however, can be said to violate a woman's dignity because it invades her internal life of thought and emotion, changing her relationship to herself.

The notion of dignity is closely related to the idea of active striving. It is thus a close relative of the notion of basic capability, something inherent in the person that exerts a claim that it should be developed. But whereas there is room to argue about whether innate potential differs across people, human dignity, from the start, is equal in all who are agents in the first place (again, excluding those in a permanent vegetative state and those who are anencephalic, thus without agency of any kind). All, that is, deserve equal respect from laws and institutions. If people are considered as citizens, the claims of all citizens are equal. Equality holds a primitive place in the theory at this point, although its role will be confirmed by its fit with the rest of the theory. From the assumption of equal dignity, it does not follow that all the centrally important capabilities are to be equalized. Treating people as equals may not entail equalizing the living conditions of all. The question of what treating people as equals requires must be faced at a later stage, with independent arguments.

In general, then, the Capabilities Approach, in my version, focuses on the protection of areas of freedom so central that their

removal makes a life not worthy of human dignity. When a freedom is not that central, it will be left to the ordinary workings of the political process. Sometimes it is clear that a given capability is central in this way: the world has come to a consensus, for example, on the importance of primary and secondary education. It seems equally clear that the ability to whistle Yankee Doodle Dandy while standing on one's head is not of central importance and does not deserve special level of protection. Many cases may be unclear for a long time: for example, it was not understood for many centuries that a woman's right to refuse her husband intercourse was a crucial right of bodily integrity. What must happen here is that the debate must take place, and each must make arguments attempting to show that a given liberty is implicated in the idea of human dignity. This cannot be done by vague intuitive appeals to the idea of dignity all by itself: it must be done by discussing the relationship of the putative entitlement to other existing entitlements, in a long and detailed process-showing, for example, the relationship of bodily integrity 1ns1de the home to women's full equality as citizens and workers to their emotional and bodily health, and so forth. But there will be many unclear cases. What about the right to plural marriages? The night to homeschooling? Because the approach does not derive value from people's existing preferences (which may be distorted in various ways), the quality of the argument, not the number of supporters, is crucial. But it is evident that the approach will leave many matters as optional, to be settled by the political process.

Considering the various areas of human life in which people

move and act, this approach to social justice asks, what does a life worthy of human dignity require? At a bare minimum, an ample threshold level of ten Central Capabilities is required. Given a widely shared understanding of the task of government (namely, that government has the job of making people able to pursue a dignified and minimally flourishing life), it follows that a decent political order must secure to all citizens at least a threshold level of these ten Central Capabilities:

1. *Life.* Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. *Bodily health.* Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. *Bodily integrity.* Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.
4. *Senses, imagination, and thought*. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason-and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in

ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.

5. *Emotions.* Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)
6. *Practical reason*. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
7. *Affiliation*. *(A)* Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.) *(B)* Having the social bases of selfrespect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national

origin.

8. *Other species*. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature.
9. *Play*. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. *Control over one's environment. (A) Political*. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association. *(B) Material*. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

Although this list pertains to human life, its general headings provide a reasonable basis for beginning to think more adequately about what we owe to nonhuman animals, a topic to be pursued in the final chapter.

Capabilities belong first and foremost to individual persons, and only derivatively to groups. The approach espouses a principle of *each person as an end*. It stipulates that the goal is to produce capabilities for each and every person, and not to use some people as a means to the capabilities of others or of the whole. This focus on, the person makes a huge difference for policy, since many nations have thought of the family, for

example, as a homogeneous unit to be supported by policy, rather than examining and promoting the separate capabilities of each of its members. At times groupbased policies (for example, affirmative action) may be effective instruments in the creation of individual capabilities, but that is the only way they can be justified. This normative focus on the individual cannot be dislodged by pointing to the obvious fact that people at times identify themselves with larger collectivities, such as the ethnic group, the stare, or the nation, and take pride in the achievements of that group. Many poor residents of Gujarat identify with that stare's overall development achievements, even though they themselves don't gain much from them. The approach, however, considers each person worthy of equal respect and regard, even if people don't always take that view about themselves. The approach is not based on the satisfaction of existing preferences.

The irreducible heterogeneity of the Central Capabilities is extremely important. A nation cannot satisfy the need for one capability by giving people a large amount of another, or even by giving them some money. All are distinctive, and all need to be secured and protected in distinctive ways. If we consider a constitution that protects capabilities as essential rights of all citizens, we can see how this works in practice: people have a claim against government if their constitution protects religious freedom and that freedom has been violated—even though they may be comfortable, well-fed, and secure with respect to every other capability that matters.

The basic claim of my account of social justice is this: respect

for human dignity requires that citizens be placed above an ample (specified) threshold of capability, in all ten of those areas. (By mentioning citizens, do not wish to deny that resident aliens, legal and illegal, have a variety of entitlements: 1simply begin with the core case.)

The list is a proposal; it may be contested by arguing that one or more of the items is not so central and thus should be left to the ordinary political process rather than being given special protection. Let's suppose someone asks why play and leisure time should be given that sort of protection. I would begin by pointing out that for many women all over the world, "the double day"—working at a job and then corning home to do all the domestic labor, including child care and elder care, is a crushing burden, impeding access to many of the other capabilities on the list: employment opportunities, political participation, physical and emotional health, friendships of many kinds. What play and the free expansion of the imaginative capacities contribute to a human life is not merely instrumental but partly constitutive of a worthwhile human life. That's the sort of case that needs to be made to put something on the list.

Sometimes social conditions make it seem impossible to deliver a threshold amount of all ten capabilities to everyone: two or more of them may be in competition. For example, poor parents in Vasanti's state may feel that they need to keep their children out of school in order to survive at all, since they need the wages from the child's labor to eke out an existence. In such a case, the economist's natural question is, "How do we make trade-offs?" However, when capabilities have intrinsic value and

importance (as do the ten on my list), the situation produced when two of them collide is tragic: any course we select involves doing wrong to someone.

This situation of *tragic choice* is not fully captured in standard cost-benefit analysis: the violation of an entitlement grounded in basic justice is not just a large cost; it is a cost of a distinctive sort, one that in a fully just society no person has to bear.

Sen has argued that such tragic situations show a defect in standard economic approaches, which typically demand a complete ordering over all states of affairs. In tragic cases, he insists, we cannot rank one alternative above the other, and thus any good ordering will remain incomplete. Here there is a nuance of difference between his critique and mine. 1would hold that not all tragic situations involve an inability to rank one state of affairs as better than another. We should distinguish between the presence of a tragic dilemma—any choice involves wrongdoing—and the impossibility of a ranking. Sometimes one choice may be clearly better than another in a tragic situation, even though all available choices involve a violation of some sort. (For the tragic hero Eteocles, in Aeschylus' play *Seven against Thebes*, it was a horrible wrong to choose to kill his brother, even though the alternative, which involved the destruction of the entire city, was clearly worse.) Sen is probably right that the demand for a complete ordering is misguided, but he is mistaken if he holds that all tragic dilemmas are cases in which no overall ordering is possible.

When we see a tragic choice—assuming that the threshold level of each capability has been correctly set—we should think,

“This is very bad. People are not being given a life worthy of their human dignity. How might we possibly work toward a future in which the claims of all the capabilities can be fulfilled?” If the whole list has been wisely crafted and the thresholds set at a reasonable level, there usually will be some answer to that question. To return to India, the dilemma faced by poor parents was resolved by the state of Kerala, which pioneered a program of flexible school hours and also offered a nutritious midday meal that more than offset children’s lost wages. The program has virtually wiped out illiteracy in the state. Seeing that it was possible for a relatively poor state to solve the problem by ingenuity and effort, the Supreme Court of India has made the midday meal mandatory for all government schools in the nation.

Such tragic choices abound in richer countries as well. In the United States, for example, a poor single mother may frequently be forced to choose between high-quality care for her child and a decent living standard, since some welfare rules require her to accept full-time work even when no care of high quality is available to her. Many women in the United States are forced to forgo employment opportunities in order to care for children or elderly relations; policies of family and medical leave, together with public provision of child and elder care, might address such dilemmas. One tragic choice ubiquitous in the United States is that between leisure time and a decent living standard (together with related health care benefits). It is widely known that Americans work longer hours than people in most other wealthy nations, and it is understood that family relations suffer in consequence, but the full measure of this tragic situation has not

yet been taken. The capabilities perspective helps us see what is amiss here.

In other words, when we note a tragic conflict, we do not simply wring our hands: we ask what the best intervention point is to create a future in which this sort of choice does not confront people. We must also consider how to move people closer to the capability threshold right away, even if we can't immediately get them above it: thus, for example, equalizing access to primary education for all when we are not yet in a position to give everyone access to secondary education.

The Central Capabilities support one another in many ways. Two, however, appear to play a distinctive *architectonic* role: they organize and pervade the others. These two are *affiliation* and *practical reason*. They pervade the others in the sense that when the others are present in a form commensurate with human dignity, they are woven into them. If people are well-nourished but nor empowered to exercise practical reason and planning with regard to their health and nutrition, the situation is not fully commensurate with human dignity: they are being taken care of the way we take care of infants. Good policy in the area of each of the capabilities is policy that respects an individual's practical reason; this is just another way of alluding to the centrality of choice in the whole notion of capability as freedom. What is meant by saying that the capability of practical reason organizes all the others is more obvious: the opportunity to plan one's own life is an opportunity to choose and order the functionings corresponding to the various other capabilities.

As for affiliation, the point is similar: it pervades the other

capabilities in the sense that when they are made available in a way that respects human dignity, affiliation is part of them—the person is respected as a social being. Making employment options available without considering workplace relationships would not be adequate; nor would forms of health care that neglect, for example, people's needs to protect zones of intimacy by provisions for personal privacy. Affiliation organizes the capabilities in that deliberation about public policy is a social matter in which relationships of many kinds (familial, friendly, group-based, political) all play a structuring role.

The capabilities on the list are rather abstract: who specifies them further? For the most part, the answer is given by each nation's system of constitutional law, or its basic principles if it lacks a written constitution. There is room for nations to elaborate capabilities differently to some extent, given their different traditions and histories. The world community poses unique problems of specification because there is no overarching government, accountable to the people as a whole that would supply the specification.

Part of the conception of the capabilities list, as we have already seen, is the idea of a *threshold*. The approach, in my version, is a partial theory of social justice: it does not purport to solve all distributional problems it just specifies a rather ample social minimum. Delivering these ten capabilities to all citizens is a necessary condition of social justice. Justice may well require more: for example, the approach as developed thus far does not make any commitment about how inequalities above the minimum ought to be handled. Many approaches to social justice

hold that an ample threshold is not sufficient. Some demand strict equality; John Rawls insists that inequalities can be justified only where they raise the level of the worst-off. The Capabilities Approach does not claim to have answered these questions, although it might tackle them in the future.

The threshold does, however, require equality in some cases. It is a difficult question how far adequacy of capability requires equality of capability. Such a question can be answered only by detailed thought about each capability, by asking what respect for equal human dignity requires. 1argue, for example, chat respect for equal human dignity requires equal voting rights and equal rights to religious freedom, not simply an ample minimum. A system that allotted to women one-half of the votes it allots to men would be manifestly disrespectful, as would a system that gave members of minority religions some freedom but not the same degree of freedom as is given to the majority. (For example, if Christians could celebrate their holy day without penalty because work days are arranged that way, but Jews and Seventh Day Adventists would be fired for refusing to work on a Saturday, that system would raise manifest problems of justice.) All the political entitlements, 1argue, are such that inequality of distribution is an insult to the dignity of the unequal. Similarly, if some children in a nation have educational opportunities manifestly unequal to those of other children, even though all get above a minimum, this seems to raise an issue of basic fairness —as Justice Thurgood Marshall famously argued in a case concerning the Texas public schools. Either equality or something near to it may be required for adequacy.

But the same may not be true of entitlements in the area of material conditions. Having decent, ample housing may be enough: it is not clear that human dignity requires that everyone have exactly the same type of housing. To hold that belief might be to fetishize possessions too much. The whole issue needs further investigation.

Setting the threshold precisely is a matter for each nation, and, within certain limits, it is reasonable for nations to do this differently, in keeping with their history and traditions. Some questions will remain very difficult: in such cases, the Capabilities Approach tells us what to consider salient, but it does not dictate a final assignment of weights and a sharp-edged decision. (The contours of an abortion right, for example, are not set by the approach, although it does tell us what to think about in debating this divisive issue.) Even at the level of threshold-drawing, the ordinary political process of a well-functioning democracy plays, rightly, an ineliminable role.

Another question raised by the idea of a threshold is that of utopianism. At one extreme, we might specify such a high threshold that no nation could meet it under current world conditions. Tragic conflicts would be ubiquitous, and even ingenuity and effort would not be able to resolve them. At the other end of the spectrum is lack of ambition: we might set the threshold so low that it is easy to meet, but less than what human dignity seems to require. The task for the constitution-maker (or, more often, for courts interpreting an abstract constitution and for legislators proposing statutes) is to select a level that is aspirational but not utopian, challenging the nation to be

ingenious and to do better.

Many questions remain about how to do this: for example, should the threshold be the same in every nation, despite the fact that nations begin with very different economic resources? To say otherwise would seem or be disrespectful to people who by sheer chance are born in a poorer nation; to say yes, however, would require nations to meet some of their obligations at tease partially through redistribution from richer to poorer nations. It might also be too dictatorial, denying nations a right to specify things somewhat differently, given their histories and situations.

The Capabilities Approach has recently been enriched by Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit's important book *Disadvantage*. In addition to providing support for the list of the ten Central Capabilities, and in addition to developing strong arguments in favor of recognizing irreducibly heterogeneous goods, Wolff and De-Shalit introduce some new concepts that enhance the theoretical apparatus of the Capabilities Approach. The first is that of *capability security*. They argue, plausibly, that public policy must not simply give people a capability, but give it to them in such a way that they can count on it for the future. Consider Vasanti: when she had a loan from her brothers, she had a range of health—and employment—related capabilities, but they were not secure, since her brothers could call in the loan at any point, or rum her out of the house. The SEWA loan gave her security: so long as she worked regularly, she could make the payments and even build up some savings.

Working with new immigrant groups in their respective countries (Britain and Israel), Wolff and De-Shalit find that

security about the future is of overwhelming importance in these people's ability to use and enjoy all the capabilities on the list. (Notice that a feeling of security is one aspect of the capability of "emotional health", but they are speaking of both emotions and reasonable expectationscapability security is an objective matter and has not been satisfied if government bewitches people into believing they are secure when they are not.) The security perspective means that for each capability we must ask how far ii has been protected from the whims of the market or from power politics. One way nations often promote capability security is through a written constitution that cannot be amended except by a laborious supramajoritarian process. But a constitution does not enforce itself, and a constitution contributes to security only in the presence of adequate access to the courts and justified confidence in the behavior of judges.

Thinking about capability security makes us want to think about political procedure and political structure: What form of political organization promotes security? How much power should courts have, and how should their role be organized? How should legislatures be organized, what voting procedures should they adopt, and how can the power of interest groups and lobbies to disrupt the political process be constrained? What are the roles of administrative agencies and expert knowledge in promoting citizens' capabilities? We shall return to these issues—as yet underexplored in the Capabilities Approach—in the final chapter.

Wolff and De-Shalit introduce two further concepts of great interest: *fertile functioning* and *corrosive disadvantage*. A fertile functioning is one that tends to promote other related capabilities.

(At this point they do not distinguish as clearly as they might between functioning and capability and I fear that alliteration has superseded theoretical clarity.) They argue plausibly that affiliation is a fertile functioning, supporting capability-formation in many areas. (Do they really mean that it is the functioning associated with affiliation, or is it the capability to form affiliations that has the good effect? This is insufficiently clear in their analysis.) Fertile functionings are of many types, and which functionings (or capabilities) are fertile may vary from context to context. In Vasanti's story, we can see that access to credit is a fertile capability, for the loan enabled her to protect her bodily integrity (not returning to her abusive husband), to have employment options, to participate in politics, to have a sense of emotional well-being, to form valuable affiliations, and to enjoy enhanced self-respect. In other contexts, education plays a fertile role, opening up options of many kinds across the board. Landownership can sometimes have a fertile role, protecting a woman from domestic violence, giving her exit options, and generally enhancing her status. Corrosive disadvantage is the flip side of fertile capability: it is a deprivation that has particularly large effects in other areas of life. In Vasanti's story, subjection to domestic violence was a corrosive disadvantage: this absence of protection for her bodily integrity jeopardized her health, emotional well-being, affiliations, practical reasoning, and no doubt other capabilities as well.

The point of looking for fertile capabilities/functionings and corrosive disadvantages is to identify the best intervention points for public policy. Each capability has importance on its own, and

all citizens should be raised above the threshold on all ten capabilities. Some capabilities, however, may justly cake priority, and one reason to assign priority would be the fertility of the item in question, or its tendency to remove a corrosive disadvantage. This idea helps us think about tragic choices, for often the best way of preparing a tragedy-free future will be to select an especially fertile functioning and devote our scarce resources to that.

NOTAS

1. José Antonio Alonso es catedrático de Economía Aplicada en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Doctor en Ciencias Económicas, es vocal experto del Consejo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo y miembro del Committee for Development Policy de ECOSOC, de las Naciones Unidas.

2. Sen, A. (1999): *Development as freedom*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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CAPÍTULO 5

LA NUEVA ARQUITECTURA DEL SISTEMA DE COOPERACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO

JOSÉ ANTONIO ALONSO[1]

INTRODUCCIÓN

Son muchas las señales que sugieren que nos encontramos ante una etapa de importantes cambios en la realidad internacional. Algunas de las tendencias de cambio (como la evolución demográfica o el deterioro ambiental) tienen larga trayectoria, otras son más novedosas (como el incremento de la desigualdad al interior de los países o la emergencia de nuevos polos dinámicos en la economía mundial) y aparecen acentuadas por la crisis desatada en 2007. En su conjunto, estas mutaciones hacen pensar que el mundo al que accedamos en 2030, la fecha a la que remite la nueva Agenda de Desarrollo, será muy distinto de aquel en el que se configuró el sistema internacional de cooperación para el desarrollo, hace ahora más de seis décadas.

Si las previsiones aciertan, nos estaríamos encaminando a un mundo, en 2030, en el que el número de países de bajo ingreso (tal como ahora se mide) apenas alcanzará la treintena y en el que las personas afectadas por pobreza extrema apenas superará el 5% de la población mundial; un mundo en el que los

países donantes —al menos, los tradicionales— se encontrarán altamente condicionados por presupuestos públicos restrictivos, como consecuencia de su más moderado crecimiento económico y del drenaje de recursos que comporta la atención a su población envejecida; un mundo en el que nuevas potencias procedentes del mundo en desarrollo compartirán protagonismo con las hasta ahora vigentes, contribuyendo a alterar la dinámica de acción internacional; y un mundo, en fin, obligado a revisar las pautas pretéritas de la producción y el consumo si quiere alejar los riesgos ambientales, agudizados por la extensión del crecimiento a nuevas áreas del planeta, y en el que la financiación asociada a este tipo de programas (piénsese en el cambio climático, por ejemplo) multiplicará la propia de la ayuda internacional.

En este contexto es obligado un cambio profundo en el sistema de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo. De hecho, ese cambio ya se está produciendo, si bien todavía las mutaciones son leves y no siempre operan en la misma dirección. Parte de esos cambios han dado origen a lo que en la literatura especializada se ha llamado “la nueva arquitectura del sistema de cooperación internacional”. Las páginas que siguen tratarán de reflexionar sobre esos cambios, sirviendo de marco a los textos que la sección acoge.

CAMBIOS EN EL ENTORNO INTERNACIONAL

Como se ha señalado en páginas previas, son muchos los cambios que afectan al entorno internacional y que tienen

incidencia sobre la configuración del sistema de cooperación para el desarrollo (un análisis más detenido de estos cambios puede verse en Alonso y Ocampo, 2012).

HETEROGENEIDAD DEL MUNDO EN DESARROLLO

La teoría de desarrollo nació en los años cuarenta del pasado siglo, confiada en que los países en desarrollo constituían una realidad relativamente homogénea y diferenciada del mundo industrializado. Básicamente, se pensaba que los países se encontraban sumidos en una trampa de pobreza, motivada por los bajos niveles de ingreso que, a su vez, les imposibilitaban el esfuerzo inversor requerido para salir de su postración socioeconómica. En este contexto, la ayuda internacional podía constituirse en una palanca promotora del desarrollo, en la medida en que impulsase a los países a salir de la trampa de pobreza en la que estaban sumidos.

Desde entonces, los países han experimentado sendas de progreso muy dispares, incrementándose como consecuencia la heterogeneidad en el seno del "mundo en desarrollo". De hecho, ese rótulo ha dejado de tener sentido, si con él se quiere expresar una realidad reconocible y relativamente compartida: mejor sería hablar hoy de la existencia de diversos y dispares "mundos en desarrollo". La desigualdad internacional sigue siendo elevada, pero frente a la *North-South divide* que caracterizaba el mundo del pasado, hoy tenemos un mundo más complejo y diferenciado, en el que los países ocupan una escala

más dilatada y gradual de niveles de desarrollo.

Los cambios descritos tienen muy diversas consecuencias, pero dos se revelan centrales para lo que aquí se discute. En primer lugar, la heterogeneidad creciente del mundo en desarrollo confirma que no hay espacio para terapias que se pretendan universales. Las estrategias de desarrollo pueden ser tan diversas como diferentes son las condiciones de partida de los países. En segundo lugar, la heterogeneidad del mundo en desarrollo obliga a revisar el principio de “responsabilidad común pero diferenciada”, que se asentó en la Cumbre de Río, en 1992. Hoy ese principio no cabe interpretarlo como una mera segregación dual de responsabilidades entre países desarrollados y en desarrollo, sino como una distribución más gradual de tareas, de acuerdo a la escala de capacidades de cada cual.

LA NUEVA GEOGRAFÍA DE LA POBREZA GLOBAL

Tradicionalmente, se ha supuesto que existía una correspondencia entre los países más pobres y aquellos donde vivía el grueso de la población pobre (aquella con menos de 1,25 dólares de gasto al día). Semejante asociación respondía a un fenómeno estadísticamente comprobable: el nivel de incidencia de la pobreza era mayor en los países más pobres y estos aportaban el grueso de la población con mayores carencias. En correspondencia con esta visión se demandó que la ayuda internacional se centrase, de forma más focalizada, sobre los

países más pobres: una demanda que se hizo más exigente tras la definición de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio.

El problema es que este nuevo patrón de la distribución de la ayuda no coincide con la nueva geografía de la pobreza global. En la actualidad, hay cerca de mil millones de pobres —dos tercios del total— que están viviendo en países de renta media, quedando un tercio restante (cerca de 300 millones) que reside en países de bajo ingreso (Sumner, 2010 y 2012). Este importante cambio ha sido debido, en buena medida, a la reciente graduación como países de renta media de un significativo número de países, entre ellos algunos de muy elevada carga demográfica, como China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria o Pakistán. La población agregada de estos cinco países es próxima a los 3.000 millones de personas y entre los cinco acogen a cerca del 70% de la población pobre mundial. Pese a ello, el cambio aludido expresa una tendencia que probablemente se mantendrá en el tiempo. La pobreza global ya no es meramente, ni dominantemente, un problema asociado a los países de bajo ingreso.

Este cambio tiene implicaciones, porque no solo supone una mutación de la geografía de la pobreza, sino también afecta al modo de combatirla. En los países de ingreso medio, la pobreza es consecuencia más de una mala distribución de la renta que de las carencias extremas del país. Dicho de otro modo, si hay pobres y el país tiene una renta media, necesariamente tiene que haber ricos: combatir la pobreza comporta, por tanto, mejorar la distribución de la renta a través de políticas sociales y fiscales adecuadas. Los aspectos distributivos —relacionados

más con la desigualdad que con la pobreza— han de entrar, por tanto, con más fuerza en la Agenda de Desarrollo.

UN MUNDO MULTIPOLAR

La teoría al desarrollo nació en el contexto de un mundo bipolar, caracterizado por la presencia de dos bloques en conflicto, cuya pugna permeaba el conjunto de las relaciones internacionales. En la actualidad, esa realidad internacional ha desaparecido y frente a ella se ha ido consolidando un mundo cada vez más complejo y multipolar. A las potencias tradicionales se han sumado otras procedentes del mundo en desarrollo, con notable capacidad de proyección: es el caso de Brasil y México en América Latina; Egipto, en el norte de África; Nigeria, en África Occidental; Sudáfrica, en África Meridional; Irán, en Asia Occidental; China e Indonesia, en Asia Oriental; India, en Asia Meridional y Rusia y Turquía, en Europa Oriental. Se trata en todos los casos de potencias emergentes provenientes del mundo en desarrollo que parecen estar llamadas a tener una creciente relevancia en el futuro. Así pues, nos encaminamos hacia un mundo cada vez más multipolar.

El análisis del peso —tanto demográfico como económico— que estos países tienen en su entorno regional los identifica como actores cruciales en sus respectivas áreas; pero más allá de estos entornos, algunas de estas potencias en ciernes ejercen una influencia que trasciende su entorno regional. Algunas han puesto en marcha políticas activas de inversión en el exterior, ya sea para garantizar el abastecimiento de recursos

a su economía, ya para asentar sus capacidades exportadoras. Como resultado, varias se han convertido en polos dinámicos de la economía internacional. Adicionalmente, mantienen políticas activas de cooperación Sur-Sur, con procedimientos en algunos casos más ágiles y menos condicionados que la cooperación tradicional, ganando áreas de influencia en el entorno de los países en desarrollo.

El cambio descrito tiene implicaciones para la Agenda de Desarrollo. En primer lugar, la nueva situación posibilita que los países en desarrollo puedan ampliar el ámbito de sus opciones estratégicas, buscando en estas nuevas potencias emergentes el respaldo que quizá las potencias tradicionales les nieguen. En segundo lugar, la multipolaridad ha puesto bajo presión las estructuras de gobernanza del sistema internacional, que tradicionalmente han descansado sobre el peso de las potenciales tradicionales, otorgando limitada voz y representatividad a los países de ingreso medio. Esa presión puede conducir a una reforma de la gobernanza global en el sentido de propiciar estructuras más incluyentes y democráticas, aunque este no es el único resultado posible. Por último, la creciente multipolaridad puede sentar las bases para una distribución más compartida de las responsabilidades en la gestión del proceso de globalización.

BIENES PÚBLICOS INTERNACIONALES

El proceso de globalización ha tendido a acentuar las interdependencias de carácter transnacional, dilatando el

espacio propio de los bienes públicos internacionales (BPI). Caracterizan a estos bienes una especial externalidad que hace que, una vez provistos, sus beneficios estén disponibles para todos de una forma no limitada (de manera equivalente, aunque inversa, cabría hablar de males públicos). Se trata, por lo demás, de bienes de muy diversa naturaleza, que se relacionan con el orden normativo internacional, la sostenibilidad de la vida y las posibilidades de progreso de las sociedades. Muchos de ellos están estrechamente relacionados con los objetivos de desarrollo. El descubrimiento de una vacuna contra la malaria o la adecuada gestión del cambio climático, la preservación de la paz o el más fácil acceso al conocimiento, la promoción de la estabilidad financiera o el establecimiento de un orden comercial más abierto y justo, todos estos objetivos que tienen naturaleza de bienes públicos internacionales pueden ser medidas que tengan mayor efecto sobre la pobreza que la propia ayuda internacional.

Las características de los bienes públicos hacen que, con frecuencia, el mercado se revele incapaz de asegurar su provisión eficiente, siendo requerida cierta forma de acción colectiva. En el seno de los países, esa respuesta se canaliza a través principalmente del Estado. En el ámbito supranacional, sin embargo, no existe institución semejante al Estado, de modo que la respuesta ha de propiciarse a través de fórmulas diversas de coordinación y de cooperación voluntaria entre los actores del sistema internacional. El sistema multilateral constituye el marco más apropiado para promover y articular esa acción cooperativa. No obstante, existe el juicio ampliamente compartido de que el

sistema multilateral, tal como hoy está configurado, no reúne las condiciones adecuadas para proveer de una forma eficiente los bienes públicos que la sociedad demanda. Organizar la provisión de estos bienes constituye, pues, una tarea pendiente.

De entre los bienes públicos internacionales, los que plantean mayores desafíos son los que tienen que ver con la sostenibilidad ambiental, incluyendo la acción frente al cambio climático y la protección de la biodiversidad. En estos casos, se trata de movilizar los recursos, las políticas y los mecanismos institucionales para garantizar que el mundo transita hacia estrategias de desarrollo sostenibles, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional. No es una tarea sencilla, porque ello comporta cambiar las pautas de producción y de consumo sobre las que se ha asentado, en buena medida, el modelo de crecimiento hasta ahora vigente. Sabemos que se ha de cambiar ese modelo, pero está por definir el escenario al que se pretende llegar. Es obligado, por tanto, que las estrategias de desarrollo abran espacio a la innovación, a la prueba y al error, a la búsqueda de alternativas; lo que obliga a un trabajo cooperativo de todos, Norte y Sur.

BASES ORIGINARIAS DE LA POLÍTICA DE AYUDA

Constituye un tópico atribuir al punto IV de la Declaración que el presidente norteamericano Truman hace a la nación, en 1949, el punto de origen de la política de cooperación para el desarrollo. Desde entonces, hasta aquí, han sido muchos los cambios que

ha experimentado el sistema de ayuda. Se fundamentó mejor su potencial contribución a la corrección de las desigualdades internacionales, al tiempo que se adoptó una nueva visión del desarrollo (la del desarrollo humano, véase el capítulo 4 de este libro), se definieron de forma más exigente los procedimientos y las buenas prácticas y se desplegó un arsenal más amplio de instrumentos. En el proceso de mejora tuvo un papel clave la presión crítica que ejerció la ciudadanía, tanto en el Norte como en el Sur, poniendo en evidencia los abusos, o malas prácticas de la ayuda. La investigación académica también contribuyó a ese proceso, al poner en evidencia algunas de las causas atribuibles a la limitada eficacia de la ayuda internacional. De forma adicional, los donantes pusieron en marcha mecanismos de aprendizaje mutuo y de evaluación entre pares (*peer review*) que se han demostrado, al cabo, aceptablemente eficaces en la tarea de promover una mejora en las prácticas de la ayuda.

En todo caso, y más allá de estos cambios, han permanecido en el tiempo algunos rasgos que se configuran como elementos identificativos de la política de ayuda. Buena parte de ellos están siendo puestos en cuestión en los últimos tiempos. Me referiré centralmente a cinco:

EL DESARROLLO: UN PROYECTO NACIONAL

La ayuda se basa en la idea de que los problemas del desarrollo se expresan y se resuelven preferentemente en el espacio nacional. Por este motivo, la ayuda se concibe como un mecanismo dominantemente bilateral, orientado a fortalecer las

capacidades y respaldar los esfuerzos que los gobiernos y las sociedades hacen para superar el subdesarrollo.

La globalización ha venido a desafiar, al menos en parte, esta idea. Por supuesto, se sigue admitiendo que la responsabilidad básica del desarrollo la tienen cada uno de los países, pero, al tiempo, se sabe que el desarrollo, entendido como un proceso sostenido en el tiempo, es imposible si no se actúa sobre los marcos internacionales que definen las reglas de juego y los mecanismos de gobernanza del sistema internacional.

Este último juicio se ha visto reafirmado como consecuencia del estudio más detenido de la relación existente entre ciertos bienes públicos globales y los objetivos de desarrollo. En esa tarea tuvieron un papel clave una serie de estudios promovidos por el PNUD (Kaul *et al.*, 1999 y 2003). En ellos se hace un repaso de los ámbitos relacionados con el desarrollo en los que para obtener logros no basta la acción individual de los Estados, requiriéndose de cierta acción coordinada a escala internacional. Para que esa acción se produzca es necesario disponer de instituciones y recursos globales, pero también es necesario corregir las desigualdades internacionales, para garantizar que todos los países estén en condiciones de implicarse en esa acción coordinada a escala internacional.

Así pues, el dilatado espacio de los bienes (y males) públicos internacionales define un nuevo ámbito problemático para la cooperación internacional. Al igual que lo constituye la definición de aquellas reglas y estructuras de gobernanza globales que condicionan los márgenes de acción de los países. Con ello no hace sino reconocerse que el propósito del desarrollo en un

mundo interdependiente no solo nos afecta a todos, sino también a todos conjuntamente.

SEMEJANZA Y DIFERENCIA

En 2007, Stuart Corbridge, conocido profesor del Development Studies Institute, de la London Shool of Economics, publicó un trabajo titulado *The (im)possibility of development studies*, en el que sugería que en la base de los estudios de desarrollo subyacían dos principios de apariencia contradictoria: el "principio de la diferencia" (el Sur es sustancialmente diferente del Norte y requiere, por tanto, de un campo de estudios propio) y el "principio de la semejanza" (con una política adecuada se puede conseguir que el Sur se haga más similar a nosotros, el Norte).

Ambos principios han quedado seriamente cuestionados en los últimos tiempos. En primer lugar, el mundo de hoy difícilmente puede caracterizarse por una simple división Norte-Sur. Los países ocupan una escala más dilatada y continua de niveles de desarrollo. En segundo lugar, porque no cabe aceptar tampoco el principio de la similitud, habida cuenta de los nuevos imperativos que impone la sostenibilidad ambiental. El planeta simplemente no puede soportar que el modelo de desarrollo hasta ahora practicado en el Norte se generalice al conjunto del mundo. Para hacer sostenible el desarrollo, ha de alterarse el modelo de producción y consumo hasta ahora vigente, y este es un desafío que comparten el Norte y el Sur: ambos deben encaminarse hacia un nuevo (y hasta cierto punto desconocido)

modelo de desarrollo compatible con las limitaciones biofísicas del planeta.

Desde esta perspectiva, la relación entre el Norte y el Sur no es aquella sobre la que se constituyó la ayuda, que presuponía la existencia de un Norte experimentado, poseedor de un modelo socioeconómico deseable, que con los medios adecuados cabía replicar en el Sur. Ahora, más bien, de lo que se trata es de que ambos, Norte y Sur, trabajen juntos para encontrar respuestas a un mundo que ansía el progreso, pero que es (más) consciente de los efectos perversos que las formas vigentes de conseguirlo han generado sobre el planeta.

UNA POLÍTICA CONCESIONAL

La ayuda internacional se concibió desde su origen como uno de los mecanismos concesionales que los países desarrollados ponían, de forma voluntaria y unilateral, al servicio de los países en desarrollo para promover su progreso económico y social. No existe ningún compromiso en el marco de la ayuda que tenga la naturaleza de exigible a los países donantes. Estos, en esencia, dan la cantidad de ayuda que quieren, a los países que desean (dentro de los potencialmente elegibles) y para las actividades que consideren (de entre las que genéricamente tienen relación con el desarrollo). La ayuda es, por tanto, una política notablemente discrecional, si bien los donantes se ven levemente condicionados por una cierta disciplina internacional que ellos mismos han diseñado.

Este carácter discrecional y unilateral de la ayuda ha sido

determinante en la configuración y eficacia de esa política. Por muy diversas razones: a) en primer lugar, porque los flujos quedaron sometidos a los ciclos políticos o a los ritmos presupuestarios de los donantes, haciéndolos poco previsibles para el receptor; b) en segundo lugar, porque introdujo en la ayuda objetivos espurios, no necesariamente conectados con las necesidades del receptor y más dependientes, sin embargo, de las conveniencias de los donantes; c) en tercer lugar, porque potenció los grados de autonomía de los donantes obligando a los receptores a operar en el marco de un sistema internacional —en realidad, un "no-sistema"— enormemente complejo y desordenado, con múltiples agencias, cada una con sus exigencias y procedimientos; y d) en fin, porque reprodujo las relaciones asimétricas de poder que subyacen al sistema internacional, generando dependencia y sumisión del receptor a los criterios y prioridades del donante, en ocasiones a través de fórmulas estrictas de condicionalidad de la ayuda.

En los últimos años, los donantes han tratado de corregir alguna de las consecuencias que se derivan de ese vicio originario de la ayuda. A través de la Agenda de París, puesta en marcha en 2005 y ampliada en Accra (2008) y Busan (2011), se ha pretendido incrementar los niveles de coordinación entre los donantes, potenciando la armonización de sus procedimientos y el alineamiento de estos con los sistemas e instituciones propias del país receptor; y se ha tratado de potenciar la voluntad y el protagonismo de este último, promoviendo los procesos de apropiación del desarrollo y una asociación (*partnership*) más estable y equilibrada con el donante.

No cabe subvalorar los logros derivados de estos esfuerzos, pero se está muy lejos de conseguir lo que se pretendía. Las resistencias y dificultades del proceso son notables, en parte por la propia naturaleza del sistema de cooperación a la que aquí se alude. Avanzar en la coordinación internacional obligaría a los donantes a perder parte de la autonomía de la que hasta ahora han gozado; y tampoco es fácil avanzar en un reequilibrio de las relaciones entre donante y receptor, cuando una parte de la relación concentra el dinero y la capacidad de decisión y la otra parte apenas tiene algo más que sus demandas de apoyo.

Superar de forma efectiva los problemas señalados obliga a avanzar hacia un sistema en el que los países en desarrollo tomen parte en los procesos de decisión y gobernanza de la cooperación, un sistema basado en garantías y reglas, que se nutra de recursos menos sujetos a la discrecionalidad de los donantes (impuestos globales, por ejemplo) y donde la naturaleza de los acuerdos de cooperación adquieran una mayor fuerza vinculante, particularmente en aquellos casos relacionados con los bienes públicos.

LA DESPOLITIZACIÓN DE LA AYUDA

El cuarto rasgo alude al carácter técnico que se le ha querido otorgar a la ayuda, velando su inocultable dimensión política. Los donantes asentaron la ayuda sobre el supuesto de que tanto las prioridades como las estrategias de desarrollo respondían a un conocimiento técnico, que encontraba su respaldo en la exitosa experiencia de los países desarrollados. Se conocían, pues, las

soluciones, bastaba con aplicarlas. Expuesto de la manera más simple posible, ese enfoque vendría a sugerir que lo que condiciona el logro de resultados es básicamente la disposición de los recursos para promoverlos. Semejante enfoque condujo a juicios enormemente dañinos para la ayuda, como suponer que siempre un mal proyecto es mejor que la ausencia de proyectos o que siempre es mejor más que menos ayuda, sin advertir de los costes que genera una intervención mal diseñada o, en general, la excesiva dependencia de la ayuda.

En la base de estos planteamientos está esa equívoca convicción de los donantes de hacer de la ayuda un proyecto meramente técnico, como si de una operación de ingeniería social se tratase. Es obvio que la cooperación al desarrollo tiene componentes técnicos obligados, pero más allá de estos ámbitos, el desarrollo comporta cambios en la estructura de voz y de poder en el seno de las sociedades, modificaciones en las instituciones y reglas con las que operan los actores, y todo ello tiene implicaciones políticas. Comprender esa realidad supone eludir algunos de los planteamientos más ingenuos de la ayuda y desechar las visiones simplificadas del cambio social que, en ocasiones, abrazan los donantes.

UNA POLÍTICA PROTAGONIZADA POR LOS ESTADOS

El último rasgo es el predominio que en la política de ayuda han tenido tradicionalmente los gobiernos, donante y receptor. En su origen, la ayuda se concibió como una política interestatal. Los

gobiernos donantes retiraban una parte de los recursos procedentes de sus contribuyentes y los transferían a los gobiernos de los países receptores, para que estos los invirtiesen en aquellos proyectos de desarrollo previamente convenidos. No varía en nada este esquema el hecho de que una parte de la ayuda se hiciese a través de instituciones multilaterales, cuya membresía está conformada igualmente por Estados.

La situación descrita comenzó a cambiar en la década de 1980, cuando las ONG adquirieron un papel más relevante en el sistema de cooperación, tanto como generadoras de agenda cuanto como proveedoras de servicios de desarrollo. Su capacidad para detectar las necesidades de los sectores más desfavorecidos, su mayor agilidad y permeabilidad social, las convirtieron en agentes cruciales del sistema de cooperación.

Desde comienzos de la pasada década, a esos dos actores se han sumado otros actores procedentes del sector privado, como fundaciones y empresas, que han adquirido mayor relevancia en el sistema de cooperación y han incorporado nuevas formas de hacer y nuevas culturas de organización y de trabajo en el seno de la ayuda.

Los cambios mencionados han supuesto un enriquecimiento de la política de ayuda, al ampliar las capacidades, visiones y formas de hacer que operan en su seno. Pero, por supuesto, también ese proceso incorpora riesgos, derivados del efecto que la diversidad de propósitos de los actores puede tener sobre el sentido de la política de cooperación en su conjunto.

UNA MIRADA DE FUTURO: HACIA UNA POLÍTICA GLOBAL DE DESARROLLO

De cuanto se ha expuesto se desprenden algunos de los cambios a que está convocada la cooperación para el desarrollo si pretende seguir siendo un instrumento eficaz para la corrección de las asimetrías internacionales y para la promoción de una distribución más equitativa de las oportunidades de desarrollo. Trataré de articular esos cambios en torno a cinco grandes transformaciones, que aquí simplemente se enuncian.

UNA AGENDA COMPREHENSIVA

El primer cambio afecta a la Agenda de Desarrollo. En los últimos años, la cooperación ha convertido a la lucha contra la pobreza en el objetivo central de su acción, al menos a nivel declarativo. Sin duda, la lucha contra la pobreza deberá seguir siendo parte central de la Agenda de Desarrollo, pero —junto a ello— deben integrarse un conjunto más amplio de dimensiones en las que se debe desplegar la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo. Estas debieran articularse en torno a tres grandes ejes: a) en primer lugar, garantizar la prestación de los servicios sociales básicos a la población mundial: es decir, establecer un suelo mínimo de estándares de protección social al que todos los ciudadanos tengan acceso; b) en segundo lugar, proveer los bienes públicos internacionales que la sociedad demanda, especialmente aquellos que garantizan la seguridad y el progreso colectivo, gestionando las externalidades que el proceso de globalización ha acentuado; y c) por último, corregir

las asimetrías internacionales y promover la convergencia en los niveles de renta y bienestar entre países. Una agenda, pues, que es más amplia y comprehensiva que la que hasta ahora ha manejado la ayuda. La Agenda de Desarrollo Post-2015 de algún modo traduce este tránsito hacia una concepción más compleja, comprehensiva y universal de la acción de desarrollo. Una consecuencia de este cambio es que la política de desarrollo que se sugiere dejará de ser competencia de un solo departamento ministerial (tradicionalmente, el de Exteriores, que es donde se ubica la ayuda), para ser responsabilidad del conjunto de los gobiernos.

NUEVOS RECURSOS Y POLÍTICAS

La nueva agenda descrita debe comportar también un ensanchamiento del espacio propio en el que se definen las políticas de desarrollo. No se trata de persistir en el limitado perímetro que, hasta el momento, ha caracterizado a la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD). Si se quiere operar con la agenda descrita, necesariamente deben considerarse el conjunto de las políticas nacionales y de las reglas globales que tienen impactos en los ámbitos mencionados. Ha de pasarse, por tanto, hacia una visión del desarrollo que trascienda los problemas de la financiación y, a su vez, hacia una visión de la financiación que vaya más allá de lo que se computa como ayuda internacional. Entrarían en este ámbito los problemas asociados a los marcos que regulan las relaciones internacionales (comercio, inversión, tecnología…) para asegurar una mejor distribución de las

oportunidades de desarrollo, incluyendo la penalización de aquellas prácticas que limitan esas posibilidades (flujos financieros ilícitos, paraísos fiscales, etc.). Para hacer viable esa política sería necesario buscar en alguna(s) figura(s) impositiva(s) de escala internacional una base financiera complementaria a la que aporta la ayuda.

UN SISTEMA MÁS COMPLEJO

Más allá de los cambios mencionados, es necesario preservar el carácter público de la política global de desarrollo a la que se alude. Ahora bien, entendiendo lo público no como el espacio reservado a los Estados, sino como aquel que convoca al conjunto de actores de una sociedad en torno a intereses que les son comunes. En consonancia con ello, es necesario abrir la política de cooperación al desarrollo a la colaboración más activa, no solo de gobiernos y ONG, sino también del conjunto de los actores sociales, incluyendo al sector privado. Al tiempo, en un mundo mucho más heterogéneo es necesario superar la tradicional escisión entre donantes y receptores en que se ha basado el sistema de ayuda, para abrir paso a un marco de responsabilidades compartidas, aunque diferenciadas, en el que los países industriales, pero también los países en desarrollo con experiencia y recursos suficientes, pueden tomar parte de las tareas de cooperación internacional. Un sistema de este tipo será, sin duda, más rico y complejo, al integrar capacidades, visiones y culturas de organización y trabajo muy diferentes. Se ampliará, también de este modo, el respaldo social de la política

de desarrollo, al dilatar el espectro de cuantos se sienten implicados en ella. Ahora bien, se hará más difícil la coordinación entre actores. En un sistema descentralizado como el que se sugiere, esta no puede derivar del ejercicio de la autoridad y la coacción, sino del establecimiento de redes de trabajo entre actores y de la definición de incentivos correctos para propiciar la suma de esfuerzos y capacidades.

UN SISTEMA MÁS INCLUYENTE Y DEMOCRÁTICO

La política descrita requiere también de nuevas estructuras de gobernanza que otorguen voz al conjunto de los actores del sistema. Es claro que el Comité de Ayuda al Desarrollo, que reúne a 28 países donantes miembros de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE) no es representativo del conjunto de los actores que debieran formar parte de esa nueva política global de desarrollo; ni siquiera es representativo de los actores que ya hoy están participando en las acciones de cooperación internacional. Para generar una estructura de gobernanza más incluyente, se han puesto en marcha dos iniciativas recientes. La primera es el Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), ubicado en el seno de las Naciones Unidas y dependiente de Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), en el que tienen participación tanto países donantes como receptores. La segunda iniciativa deriva de la Conferencia de Alto Nivel de Busan, el Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), en el que se encuentran

integrados buena parte de los actores del sistema de cooperación, incluidos países, empresas y organizaciones. No está claro que ninguna de estas opciones satisfaga las condiciones de una estructura de gobernanza deseable. En el caso del DCF, se trata de una instancia altamente incluyente y que está localizada en el seno de la organización más representativa de la gobernanza internacional, las Naciones Unidas. Vista su trayectoria, hay que admitir que se trata de un buen foro para suscitar temas y debates, pero es más dudoso que cubra adecuadamente su papel como espacio generador de normas, acuerdos en materia de políticas y de seguimiento y evaluación de lo acordado. Por su parte, el GPEDC tiene una más dudosa representatividad y está muy marcado en su origen por el papel que los donantes tradicionales, a través de la OCDE, han jugado en su promoción. Es todavía pronto para un juicio definitivo sobre estas dos iniciativas, pero todo parece sugerir que la tarea de construir una gobernanza incluyente y eficaz de la cooperación internacional está todavía por realizarse.

UNA NUEVA NARRATIVA

Por último, la nueva política de desarrollo requiere ser comprendida y apoyada por la ciudadanía y para ello es necesario edificar una nueva narrativa que ayude a justificar el esfuerzo. En el pasado, la justificación de la ayuda descansaba en los supuestos básicos de justicia y solidaridad, que eran fácilmente entendidos al remitir a las necesidades de la población en extrema pobreza. En la medida en que la política

de desarrollo amplía sus objetivos y dilata el espacio de los actores implicados, hay que construir una narrativa más compleja. La pobreza, la corrección de las desigualdades, la garantía de derechos de las personas debe seguir ocupando el centro de la justificación de los esfuerzos de cooperación. Pero, junto a ello, es necesario insistir en el mensaje de la responsabilidad compartida, del esfuerzo por una justicia global, por la coherencia de las políticas puestas en uso por los países, por unas reglas y estructuras de gobernanza incluyentes, transparentes y equitativas. Se trata, en suma, de hacer ver que la mejor de las intervenciones de desarrollo puede no rendir frutos si no se alteran, al tiempo, algunas de las reglas básicas que gobiernan el entorno internacional. Insistir en que en un mundo interdependiente la promoción del desarrollo no solo es una empresa que nos concierne a todos, sino a todos conjuntamente.

CONSIDERACIONES FINALES

El análisis realizado en los epígrafes anteriores es suficiente para confirmar que nos encontramos ante un momento de cambio también en el sistema de ayuda internacional. El panorama actual es muy distinto del que existía cuando el sistema de ayuda inició su andadura: se han definido mejor los objetivos, es mayor el número de actores que operan en su seno y se dispone de un arsenal de instrumentos más amplio. Al tiempo, el fin de la guerra fría, al restar valor geoestratégico a la ayuda, ha permitido que los donantes presten más atención a los

aspectos relacionados con la eficacia y el impacto de sus intervenciones. Son todos cambios positivos que deben considerarse. No obstante, el mundo ha cambiado más y de forma más rápida que el sistema de ayuda. De acuerdo con las tendencias de cambio vigentes, el mundo post-2015 será muy distinto de aquel en el que ha venido operando la ayuda: será otra la estructura de las relaciones internacionales y otros los problemas, añadidos a los todavía no resueltos. Se hace necesario, por tanto, que la ayuda se plantee su futuro si quiere estar a la altura de los tiempos y responder a los desafíos que impone la gobernanza de un mundo complejo y cambiante, altamente integrado pero notablemente desigual, con nuevas potencias emergentes procedentes del mundo en desarrollo, que en breve acogerá a más de nueve millones personas y que se enfrenta a problemas ambientales difíciles de gestionar.

Desde luego, no faltan quienes, en las condiciones descritas, abogan por la progresiva disolución de la política de ayuda, salvando acaso como único reducto la acción humanitaria (la ofrecida frente a catástrofes o guerras). Se confía, desde estos sectores, en que los efectos positivos de la globalización, ejemplificados en el publicitado éxito de algunos mercados emergentes, alcancen a todo el planeta; y se piensa que en un mundo de mercados de capital abiertos, el papel de una financiación oficial (como la ayuda) resultará crecientemente irrelevante. En los casos más acerbamente críticos, se considera, además, que la ayuda ha sido una política fallida, a la que debe ponerse fin cuanto antes, mientras otros, más complacientes, admiten que la ayuda pudo haber sido útil en el

pasado, pero ya no lo es en el presente (y, desde luego, lo será menos en el futuro).

Frente a esta posición está la de aquellos que piensan que la ayuda puede seguir siendo útil, siempre que su acción se oriente de manera más selectiva y eficaz a combatir la pobreza extrema, en los países de menores niveles de renta. Se trataría, en este caso, de reforzar el mensaje originario de la ayuda (el combate contra la pobreza) y acentuar su sentido de política especializada, orientada a las necesidades de aquellos colectivos humanos que han quedado definitivamente marginados de las ventajas de la globalización. De esta argumentación se deriva la idea —no siempre explícita— de otorgar a la ayuda una fecha de caducidad definida: el logro de su objetivo la convertiría en innecesaria.

Por último, está la posición que se ha defendido páginas atrás y es la de quienes juzgan que la cooperación internacional puede tener un papel importante en el futuro como mecanismo obligado para la corrección de las asimetrías internacionales que el mercado genera. Si bien, para ello es requerido que esa política se someta a un cambio drástico en sus planteamientos y enfoque, alterando la narrativa que la justifica y las formas en que se financia y opera. En esencia, se trataría de transitar desde una política concesional, dominantemente bilateral, basada en la financiación oficial y orientada a combatir las carencias extremas (pobreza), a otra dotada de una agenda más amplia, orientada a combatir las asimetrías del sistema internacional, con más espacio para la concertación internacional y la implicación de un elenco más plural de actores (no solo

públicos) y con la capacidad de trascender el ámbito estricto de la financiación para incidir sobre las reglas, políticas y mecanismos que condicionan las posibilidades de desarrollo a escala internacional.

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Lectura 1

The End of ODA: Death and Rebirth of a Global Public Policy[2]

Jean-Michel Severino and Olivier Ray[3]

INTRODUCTION

"Official Development Assistance" (ODA) is dying. Not that it really ever existed, at least in the neat form of a global fight against poverty with consensual objectives and means. Nor that international solidarity is decreasing: it isn't less but *more* money that is being poured each year into what can be called "international public policies"[4]. But what we are witnessing is the

dilution of an outdated concept—one based on long gone illusions about the unity, the clarity and the purity of the “international community’s” goals—into a new complex breed of public policies that attempt to confront the challenges of a globalized world. A triple revolution of objectives, players and instruments is reshuffling the cards, dynamiting old practices and habits. The bustling creativity of development finance is precipitating a change of era: a new phoenix is rising from the ashes of a half-century old policy.

This sudden metamorphosis of the world of international development assistance leads to a problematic question. Do global standards such as the famous objective of allocating 0.7% of donor countries’ GDP to Official Development Assistance remain relevant? We will show that the fact that what this benchmark measures is senseless may give us a clue as to why it is not reached. As to why it cannot be reached. Time has come to change the thermometer—and speak the truth. For behind seemingly technical questions of measurement lay complex policy issues made even more abstruse by the absence of clear benchmarks: the world is treading a perilous mountain path blindfolded.

This paper walks us through the ever-expanding range of global concerns that the international community has come to deal with. It describes the rising tide of stakeholders active in the emerging field of global policy tasked with confronting these challenges. It then illustrates the amazing change in methods and instruments that are being used to do so. Changes that are commonly—and improperly—referred to as “innovative

development finance". It shows how, as a consequence of this triple revolution in goals, stakeholders and instruments, the current understanding of "ODA" is becoming increasingly irrelevant as a tool for action. This analysis leads us to suggest a few elements of common sense on how to make progress in measuring what counts. Because measurement matters.

FIGURE 1
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FROM DAC DONORS AND MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS TO IDA-ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES (NET DISBURSEMENTS, US$ MILLION AT 2004 PRICES, 1960-2005)



FROM AID ARCHITECTURE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TRENDS IN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS, IDA MAY 2008. SOURCE: DAC ONLINE (TABLE 2A)

1. THREE REVOLUTIONS IN ONE

1.1 A NEW SET OF CHALLENGES

The first major revolution recently undergone by international development assistance is one characterized by a drastic expansion of the very *goals* assigned to this emerging global public policy.

Development aid has always served a wide range of economic, political, social and cultural objectives. Yet for the greater share of

its existence its main driving force was geopolitical. Its actors were nation states. Financing expensive economic development projects helped European nations retain a say in the political and economic life of their former colonies. Development aid also served to purchase influence in the Cold War. The increase of ODA flows throughout the Cold War was largely due to the competition that raged between the capitalist and the communist alliances over the Third World: parallel to the global arms race, a “race for influence” took place in the South—one in which the economic performance of satellite nations served as a benchmark to assess the ideology of the patron. Vast sums were disbursed to keep regions in the right camp, ensuring a few swing states and shrewd leaders a comfortable geopolitical rent. This did not mean that donor states were deprived of more “noble” development objectives, or that the men and women serving this policy were not genuinely concerned about the fate of the countries they assisted. Nor that development aid was totally ineffective in promoting economic convergence. But ODA served a broader strategic policy of donor states.

Then came the fall of the Berlin Wall and the—presumed—“end of History”[5]. In this new world order economic liberalism prevailed on all continents and virtually all countries. The big ideological struggle that had defined and structured international relations (and heavily influenced international aid flows) had disappeared, leaving a form of vacuum. The birth of the “Last man” brought along a major identity crisis for official development assistance: logically or paradoxically, this period of hope for the world was characterized by a melting of official development

flows. ODA of the United States, France or the United Kingdom was halved in the space of seven years (the United States' ODA fell from $16.2 to 8.4 billion between 1990 and 1997[6]), which may explain why the structural adjustment of African economies was so painful. One reading of this evolution is that the main driver behind ODA—geopolitics—had disappeared. International solidarity was no longer part of a "grand scheme", it was no longer considered as a strategic public policy. Instead, the relationship with countries of the South was increasingly driven by "compassionate ethics". What mattered was less their long-term economic growth than their not collapsing into famine and chaos. In these "compassionate years", development assistance budgets were largely used to refinance developing countries' public debts, contain humanitarian crises and fight the most troubling social consequences of the structural adjustment programmes. This translated in a radical shift in the structure of development assistance: aid became much more people-centred than in the earlier decades[7], and much less growth-oriented. An increasing share of ODA went to the social sectors, while budgets for infrastructures or agriculture were sliced. This is also the time when private solidarity boomed. Because North-South relations were no longer perceived as strategic, states happily gave up the monopoly they once had—such that shrinking public aid flows were partly compensated by rising private aid. International aid programmes of philanthropic foundations doubled between 1998 and 2001, when they reached $3.3 billion[8].

FIGURE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF SECTOR ALLOCABLE ODA COMMITMENTS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. %, 1992-2006



FROM AID ARCHITECTURE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TRENDS IN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS, IDA MAY 2008.

Since the turn of the century however, the international community has come to discover other, less appealing characteristics of the "new world order" we live in. Challenges that begged to be managed, and whose management could not solely depend on compassionate ethics. For many, the attacks of 9/11 materialized the level of interdependency between developed and developing nations, and how dangerous the deepening global social divide can be. Much ODA was poured in the Iraqs and Afghanistans of this world—at least the ones that appeared most threatening for global prosperity. Vast amounts of money were dedicated to so-called "failed states" (or "low income countries under stress", to quote the charming acronym used by the World Bank to name the countries not supposed to perform according to its growth models). Conflict prevention and management became a high-level item in the agendas of global conferences and diplomatic talk. In the space of only a few years, brand new global collective action problems came to the fore of the international agenda. The SARS, Bird Flu and Ebola pandemics showed the risk of transmittable diseases spreading

globally in a few days or even hours though commercial trade or international travel. The increasingly perceptible loss of biodiversity and the first “chilling” effects of global warming brought home the urgency of finding international solutions to the global environmental crisis—and the realization that the world was ill-equipped to respond to such truly global challenges. The Asia crisis and the tough Doha round negotiations called for aid agencies to strengthen the capacities of developing countries to cope with economic globalisation. The international food crisis spelled the comeback, after decades of overproduction, of concerns for global food security. At the same time the energy crisis came as a reminder of the sensitivity of poor countries’ growth to the cost of production factors. Lately, the subprime crisis in the United States and the ensuing global financial meltdown illustrated that in an integrated world economy, misguided policy choices in one country could penalize the system as a whole. Of course this new set of global challenges has not replaced, but compounded the historic challenges of human poverty and inequality. Unlike what many early thinkers of globalisation believed it isn’t the global that has subsumed or transcended the local, but local challenges that have become an integral part of global stakes.

Because their work was the best proxy to a global public policy bringing together countries of the North and the South, because it quickly became clear that any efficient response would imply both financial and technical transfers from the former to the latter, international development banks and aid agencies have been tasked with finding solutions to this additional array of challenges.

After a decade of uncertainty and vacillation international development assistance has *de facto* been assigned a new "grand purpose": managing global interdependencies in a globalized world. This is no small task, as it implies three conceptually distinct (yet necessarily overlapping) subsets of objectives: 1) accelerating the economic convergence of developing nations with industrialised economies; 2) providing for basic human welfare (conceptualised by the Millennium Development Goals framework as universal access to essential services); 3) finding solutions for the preservation of global public goods.

1.2 A NEW SET OF ACTORS IN THE GROWING MARKET OF GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY

A second Copernican revolution has shaken the field of international development in the last ten to twenty years. Faced with a new array of challenges, the "market for aid"[9] has demonstrated an impressive capacity to expand the number and range of its players.

The end of state monopoly in development assistance has sparked a boom in private giving. Initiated in the 1990's, this trend has continued to this day. A whole range of left-wing, conservative, secular, faith-based, small, average or huge Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have mushroomed in all industrialized countries, and come to represent a considerable proportion of North-South financial transfers. The largest ones (Oxfam, Care, Save the Children…) have annual budgets in the

range of $700-$800 million, and have become key players in the field of international solidarity. In all, NGOs are estimated to have contributed $14.6 billion to actions of international solidarity in 2006, against $8.8 billion in 2002. Private foundations have also become major actors of the solidarity business[10]. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, endowed with a capital of close to $70 billion plans to disburse close to $6 billion over the next two years. It finances vaccine research with $287 million, i.e. a third of world R&D expanses on HIV-Aids vaccine. It has thus become one of the cardinal players of international health policy, with considerable influence on bilateral and multilateral aid institutions. In the United States, ODA already accounts for a smaller share of total economic engagement with developing countries than private philanthropy[11].

Businesses have also emerged as a growing component of international transfers. And they did not only join the field of traditional charity: corporate social and environmental responsibility agendas have also surged, linked to the globalization of world business. Indeed there is a growing sense among transnational companies that their economic fate is linked to the improvement of their public image in the countries where they invest, as well as to their capacity of delivering solutions to the major national public policy challenges. Most pharmaceutical firms have for example developed private programs aimed at improving access of poor countries to drugs, in order to avoid major changes to the intellectual property rights regime under the WTO.

The emergence of new challenges has also inspired

institutional creativity on the side of governments. Global institutions have flourished as never before: the United Nations now counts close to seventy organizations or special funds dedicated to development[12]—more than the least developed countries (LDCs) they are supposed to assist. Behind each of those structures lies a respectable international concern, but oftentimes a lobby that resists restructuring and streamlining: development institutions are born every year, yet they seldom die. Thematic funds such as the GAVI, the Global fund against AIDS or the Global Environment Facility (GEF) have considerably impacted the logics of international action: whereas the field of development used to be organised along a country-specific basis, the sector-specific entry has now become one of the main ways to address global issues. These new funds accounted for 7% of multilateral aid in 2005[13]—a share that has continued to expand since. The average number of agencies per donor country has also increased, while new donor countries joined the ball: many eastern European (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia…) and Asian countries (China, Malaysia, Thailand…) who received ODA until recently now have their own bilateral development agencies. Because overall cash transfers to the field have not significantly increased over the years, this mushrooming of development actors has implied that the average size of projects or operations financed has decreased sharply.

Recipient states themselves have contributed to making the international landscape more complex. Political liberalisation in many developing countries has led to the birth of many civil society organisations, themselves on the receiving end of an

increasing share of development funds. Local governments are also taking a greater role as political decentralization advances throughout the world—underwritten by the triple process of democratisation, urbanization and demographic growth. Local businesses and financial institutions have also been increasingly involved in socially and environmentally responsible projects. Their charities have grown tremendously, generating an unprecedented movement of local solidarity.

This changing and ever-denser institutional environment is commonly considered as a problem both for the efficiency and the coherence of the public policy[14]. And there are good grounds to do so. Indeed, the costs of coordinating the activities of multiple stakeholders with differing agendas have skyrocketed over the last decade. A 14-country survey showed that Cambodia receives an average 400 donor-missions per year, Nicaragua 289 or Bangladesh 250[15], imposing a considerable strain on recipient countries that are not all equipped to cope. In some cases, the gains from having more actors involved are outstripped by the losses that stem from policy incoherence and coordination costs. This is stereotypically the case in crisis or post-conflict settings where international actors abound, but local government capacities to coordinate them are low.

But the thesis that holds the proliferation of aid actors to be unambiguously harmful supposes that aid follows a single policy goal (such as economic growth, or improving access to essential services). As we have seen, this just isn’t the case. This view also suggests that there is no added-value in the plurality of actors—a stance that would be enthusiastically shared by central

planners in a socialist system. In fact, this bustling creativity of new development actors has dynamited traditional visions, and shaken old ways of acting. It has unleashed a form of innovation that would probably not have come about had conservative public administrations continued to monopolize this field of policy. NGOs have brought in “microsocial” and microeconomic concerns from civil societies of the North and the South. Philanthropic foundations have come into international development with modern business practices and a desire to provide systemic responses to system-wide problems. Sovereign funds, international financial institutions and other equity investors have introduced sophisticated financial techniques, bringing down the somewhat simplistic divide between “profitable” and “development” activities. Microfinance, which has brought together these three categories of new actors, their concerns and instruments, is particularly symptomatic of this evolution. Longstanding conceptual questions are brought to the fore by a wave of instrumental innovation carried out by actors who weren’t active in the development business only ten years ago.

We probably underestimate the consequences of this seismic change for our half-a-century-old public policy. The explosion of the number of both public and private actors in the development business will have considerable impacts on the way it is run. And it is not a move that can be curbed significantly: whether we applaud or lament it, the genie will not come back into the box. Tomorrow’s major development challenges will need to be resolved in this new, tumultuous field. In the era of globalization coherence will be built through multi-actor coalitions, and global

public policies managed through what we have called “hypercollective action”[16].

1.3 A BRAND NEW TOOLKIT

Quite logically, to each combination of goals and actors has historically corresponded a different set of tools. In the days when aid was about geopolitics and states, sovereign grants and loans had the lion’s share of ODA. These were largely channelled to infrastructure and agricultural projects. When compassion and private solidarity came to drive the field, smaller-scale social-sector projects surged in parallel to large-scale debt relief: in the 1990’s, the share of social sectors rose from under 30% to over half of ODA, while the share of infrastructure and production (including agriculture) fell from 60% to 40%. What will be the instruments of a new public policy tasked with finding solutions to very different global ills—and staffed with a wild combination of actors? Unsurprisingly, the tools are likely to be of a very diverse kind, and—for part of them at least—of very different nature from the ones that have existed until today.

Let us be clear: this new creativity in development aid should not—cannot—ambition to replace traditional aid channels and resources in any way. Many traditional development problems will require traditional development solutions, i.e. standard infrastructure or health projects financed by grants and loans to states. But faced with the new combination of needs and actors, it is both vital and natural that the field diversifies its tools and resources.

In fact a tract of the international aid community has already moved far beyond “old school” development aid. Because this has happened extremely rapidly, it has probably not fully realized that it has done so—nor the nature of the change this has brought to the policy. Yet over the space of a decade, international development assistance has witnessed an astonishing revolution in its set of instruments: taxation or quasi-taxation mechanisms (such as airline ticket taxes); increased investment in risk capital; increased tapping in the financial market toolkit (such as the International Finance Facility, insurance mechanisms, guarantee schemes, Advanced Market Commitments, “special” bond issues); new aid channels such as the “vertical” global funds and programs; countercyclical / contingent lending instruments, etc. This instrumental revolution is often referred to as “innovative development finance”—improperly, as these innovations are not exclusively financial, and as they do not only deal with “development”[17].

While they are often derived from mainstream market innovations, development finance’s new tools differ from the latter in one crucial way. Instead of exacerbating them, the financial engineering that has blossomed in this very peculiar financial market has the effect of *correcting* some of the excesses and limits of mainstream markets. Behind the proliferation of new instruments gradually developed to respond to these new challenges lie four broad types of innovations that are dynamiting traditional practices—and announce further instrumental revolutions for the years to come.

TABLE 1

VARIOUS MODES FOR MOBILISING AND USING FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION / RESOURCE USE	RECURRENT PUBLIC FINANCING	RECURRENT PRIVATE FINANCING	"ONE SHOT" COLLECTS	POOLING RESOURCES	USE OF MARKET INSTRUMENTS
RECURRENT USES	Payment of ecological services / Taxation systems	Socially responsible investing (ethical finance)	IFFIm	The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	Product (Red*) initiative (marketing for development)
INVESTMENT	Financing infrastructures through concessional loans	Clean Development Mechanisms		Improving productive use of migrant remittances	Thematic donor first-loss investment funds (e.g. microfinance, agriculture) / Migrant bonds
LEVERAGE EFFECTS		Microfinance	Debt-to-health (converting debt relief to investments in health)	Pooled procurement initiatives	Equity investment
SYSTEMIC EFFECTS	Climate policy loans	Awards for scientific advances in the field of development		GAVI / UNITAID	WFP local purchases / Advanced market commitments
SECURITIZATION / PREVENTION	Preventive against global pandemics	NGO projects in conflict prevention	Humanitarian appeals for trust funds	Emergency funds / IMF exogenous shocks facility	Guarantee and insurance instruments

*(RED) IS A BUSINESS MODEL CREATED TO RAISE AWARENESS AND MONEY FOR THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT HIV/AIDS BY TEAMING UP WITH THE WORLD'S MOST ICONIC BRANDS TO PRODUCE (RED) BRANDED PRODUCTS. A PORTION OF PROFITS FROM EACH PRODUCT SOLD GOES DIRECTLY TO THE GLOBAL FUND TO INVEST IN AFRICAN AIDS PROGRAMS.

From discrete to continuous financing

"Old-school" development assistance typically consisted in loans and grants from development budgets that subsidised start-up costs of projects whose recurrent *operational* costs were meant

to be borne by the beneficiaries themselves. The idea behind this practice was to avoid donor-dependency toward aid flows. The principle according to which projects need to be financially and economically viable had even become one of the cornerstones of development assistance[18]. Although such projects obviously continue to exist—and justly so, as the needs they respond to have not disappeared—the precondition of economic viability and the practice of discrete transfers have been set aside to allow for more long-term, recurrent transfers.

In the *Millennium Declaration* for example, the international community took the resolute decision to embody the principles of the United Nations Charter in concrete and operational programs. In this truly cosmopolitan logic, each citizen of the planet, by virtue of his or her humanity, is given the right to a minimum living standard. Figures, however, show that many states will not have the macroeconomic capacity to guarantee these basic standards for many decades to come. By aiming for targets that are out of reach from the neediest countries' public authorities, the "international community" (i.e. donor nations) has therefore accepted to substitute itself to some states in the provision of basic social services through long-term financial transfers[19]. The consequence is that the concerns of financial self-sustainability have been dampened: no one asks whether projects funding the education of Mali's children or the access to clean water for urban dwellers of Haiti are "economically viable" in themselves. This change of philosophy implies a real revolution for the development community, one which very few states have fully apprehended: the efficiency of a programme is no longer

evaluated on the basis of its recipients' capacity to emancipate themselves from international transfers through economic growth, but through the sole improvement of the targeted populations' basic living standards. In a way, official development flows have moved beyond a logic of economic investment to include one of long-term social redistribution.

The need to protect and finance global public goods, although very different in nature, leads to a similar paradigmatic shift in practice. International health, for example, responds to a "weakest link" logic: pandemics tend to break out in the countries with the least capacities for prevention, early warning and emergency treatment. If the world is to protect itself from global pandemics, it will continuously need to act so as to bring up the weakest links in the international health system up to internationally acceptable standards. Concretely, this form of "insurance" against global pandemics requires long-term financial and technical transfers to subsidise basic public health systems, veterinary programs or early-warning networks. The fight against climate change corresponds to what has been called the "additive production" logic, where every actor's effort counts (although some clearly count more than others). Getting industrialising nations to improve the energy-efficiency of their factories or countries hosting large areas of rainforest to preserve them for the good of humanity will similarly require continuous programs and financial transfers. In both cases, the requirement of project-specific economic viability is incongruous: what we are doing instead is financing long-term cooperation in favour of a global public good (global health, a sustainable climate…) by sharing

the burden of action according to actors' capacity to pay.

This movement away from discrete financing of circumscribed programs and towards open-ended cooperation based on recurrent financial transfers has implied mobilising more stable sources of funding on the one hand, and finding corresponding disbursement mechanisms on the other.

On the resource mobilisation side, this new type of need has led to several promising initiatives to make the funding of long-term international efforts less vulnerable to highly volatile budget allocations. For example, the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) initiative, launched in 2005, consists in issuing bonds backed by legally-binding 10 to 20 year donor government commitments. By frontloading long-term aid flows, this resource-mobilization instrument aims to both lock in precious resources over a given period of time and achieve a critical mass of funding to allow for quick progress towards the MDGs. The 2006 bond launch raised US$ 1 billion. IFFIm aims to raise four times as much on capital markets over the next 10 years—enough to support the immunisation of half a billion children through campaigns against measles, tetanus, and yellow fever. Similarly, international taxation initiatives are likely to generate additional and much more predictable flows of resources. The airline solidarity contribution, in effect in several countries, is estimated to generate 22 million euros annually, and it is ultimately expected to raise up to ten times this amount. UNITAID, a specialised fund dedicated to bringing down the cost of drugs in developing countries, is partially funded by this airplane tax. But its promoters are appraising an additional

concept to provide resources to a mechanism that needs stable and more predictable funding: collecting very small amounts of money from the vast number of air travellers worldwide, on a strictly voluntary basis. Such a scheme would be a breakthrough in three respects: first the donation would not solely be based on developed country donors; second its stability in time would not be based on binding contributions, but rather on an anticipated stable or increasing level of goodwill from the general public; thirdly internet and automatic payment mechanisms would manage the system—thereby minimizing collection costs. Because these initiatives respond to an emerging need for additional and predictable resources, instrumental innovation is likely to tread further down this highly promising path toward financing recurrence.

The need to move to continuous funding has also had important instrumental implications on the *disbursement* side. Indeed traditional project aid quickly encountered its limits when used as a basis for long-term cooperation. In response to the need for continued subsidising of public efforts made by recipient countries, general budget and sector program support has risen as a percentage of total ODA commitments from 8% in 2001 to 20% in 2004[20]. The number of thematic trust funds and programs has also skyrocketed as the need became clear for multi-donor efforts to finance specific causes with long term commitments. This is particularly the case in the fields of health and environmental protection. In 2007, the World Bank's trust fund portfolio alone had reached a total of $21.4 billion, administered through 1,015 active funds and supported by 339 donor

agencies[21]. Other innovative schemes are being devised to channel resources to those in charge of protecting specific public goods. “Payments for environmental services” (PES) are a typical example. Such programs require for consumers of a given public good to compensate for some of the costs borne by those in charge of producing or preserving it. Typically, downstream users of water cleansed by an upstream forest can pay those who manage this forest to ensure a sustainable flow of this service into the future. Such schemes are operational locally in different areas of the world, on a variety of environmental services. We can envisage that tomorrow similar instruments will cater for the provision of global environmental services, such as the preservation of rainforests by countries like Congo, Indonesia or Brazil. We could also cite the “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM), a global arrangement under the Kyoto Protocol which provides resources to developing countries by allowing industrialised countries or their businesses with greenhouse gas reduction commitments to invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing countries as an alternative to more expensive emission reductions in their own countries. Budget support, thematic trust funds and programs, PES’ and the CDM are just a few of the new tools that have been designed to finance long-term, recurrent collaborative efforts between industrialized and developing nations. Similarly to the resource-mobilisation side, it is likely that most of these products will continue to coexist and form part of this emerging global public policy.

New financial instruments to scale up aid

Faced with the daunting task of finding quick and lasting solutions to a series of new global concerns, the international community realized that the scale of the response needed to be radically stepped up. As existing public resources would clearly be insufficient, this implied boosting the means dedicated to this emerging global public policy. The scaling up of development aid has therefore led to a series of innovations whose common aim is to harness private-sector capacities and resources for development purposes.

This, however, implied plugging in some of the gaps, limiting some of the excesses and filling in for some of the limits of financial markets. The former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan has famously spoken of financial markets' "irrational exuberance". The gregarious behaviour of global financial markets, the pro-cyclical effects of their instruments and the excessive volatility of their resources have considerably harmed developing economies in the past—most strikingly perhaps during the 1997 Asian crisis. Ten years later, speculation on derivative markets contributed to soaring wheat and rice prices, exacerbating the global food crisis. After a couple of decades of proactive deregulation, these inherent deficiencies of financial markets are now taking their toll on the world's most industrialized nations. At a time when these gaps have become visible, it is interesting to note that international development's new toolset has gone some way in improving the access of some of the world's poorest people and nations to the benefits of global markets while reducing their vulnerability to the latter's

imperfections.

Indeed lack of information on developing economies, risk aversion and gregarious behaviour often lead market players to shy away from investments that are profitable and generate considerable development impacts. A wide variety of guarantee, insurance and equity instruments have been developed over the last decades to usher pioneer market players to areas (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa or post-conflict countries) and fields of activity (e.g. microfinance, meso finance, agriculture) where they would not have otherwise invested—thus considerably leveraging scarce public resources. The creation of investment funds that combine the expertise of development actors, the resources of private investors and the public guarantee of philanthropic or public donors also enable to channel precious resources to under-funded areas or activities. For instance, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the bank Crédit Agricole (CA) bank and Danone have teamed up to establish an investment fund ("Danone Communities") that taps into mainstream financial markets to invest in programs with high social impact. This first common experience has led AFD and CA to launch a large fund for the general public that will guarantee the investors revenue, liquidity and security standards equal to those of any highly secure financial vehicles—but which will partly be invested in development projects. In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 global food crisis, specialized investment funds are also being devised to incite sovereign investors to finance agricultural production in Africa. The long-term yields of international financial institutions based on such business models

confirm that the conceptual distinction between “for-profit” and solely “for solidarity” activities is largely artificial. Not only can high development impact activities be profitable (or, said differently, can profitable activities have high development impact). But reaching the necessary scale of results in the fight against poverty, climate change or the rampant food crisis will *require* using the considerable firepower of the private sector.

Another example of how innovative development finance has made the most of market instruments while protecting beneficiaries from markets’ shortcomings are the new countercyclical loan instruments. After two decades of debt crisis and multiple debt-relief initiatives, credit risked drying up for financing crucial infrastructures in countries emerging from debt crisis. Yet creditors cannot take the political and economic risk of embarking developing nations into another cycle of unsustainable credit. One of the important causes of the debt crisis in the 1980’s had been the sudden collapse of the terms of trade, due to the intrinsic volatility of primary goods markets, which made it impossible for many indebted countries to pay back their loans. Countercyclical loans, whose repayments are conditioned on a country’s export revenues remaining above an agreed level, have been developed to continue important lending activities to economically viable initiatives while protecting recipient countries from the effects of sudden collapses of their terms of trade. The scaling up of such countercyclical instruments is another likely and welcome evolution in financing economic growth as development finance continues to harness market instruments for development purposes.

The quest for systemic effects

Finding a response to the series of global ills that have manifested themselves in recent years implies changing not only the strategy and the scale, but also the *nature* of the response. “Old school” development has tended to aim for concrete results project-by-project or program-by-program: resources went to the implementation of a given activity (i.e. building a school, a dam, or subsidising a country’s health budget), and the accumulation of a sufficient number of such projects was expected to yield macroeconomic development results. Development aid has recently made significant headway by going beyond the logic of one-off projects to seek more systemic effects—thanks to the contribution of actors coming to development from the private sector.

A fundamental threshold has been crossed with instruments such as GAVI and UNITAID. The GAVI Alliance is an organisation established to pool public and private resources together in a global effort to facilitate access to the benefits of immunisation. One of the ways in which it does this is by reducing the cost of one of the essential inputs of a global health policy (immunisation drugs) and by providing incentives for its production. By making “Advance Market Commitments” (AMCs), donors commit money to guarantee a market for vaccines once they are developed, provided they meet a number of criteria on effectiveness, cost and availability—thus enabling or accelerating the development and manufacturing of the vaccine. By guaranteeing an affordable long-term price, the AMC also supports sustained use of the vaccine. GAVI’s effects on both supply (development and

manufacturing) and demand (increased consumption) of vaccination provides an extremely powerful and conceptually innovative contribution to the global fight against communicable diseases. Similarly, UNITAID aims to reduce the cost of malaria, tuberculosis and HIV-Aids treatments through a mechanism that affects both demand and supply. By financing UNITAID, donors (who include governments as well as philanthropic organizations such as the Gates and Clinton foundations) give this global drug purchasing authority considerable purchasing power, enabling it to negotiate 25% to 50% rebates on the price of drugs (including antiretroviral medicine) that are then dispatched across the world to countries that need them most. By guaranteeing sustainable and predictable revenues for the purchase of drugs, UNITAID also plays an important role in influencing manufacturers—inciting them to invest in crucial research and development for drugs that would otherwise not be produced.

Another kind of innovation that aims for systemic impacts is the set of taxation or quasitaxation instruments that are currently under investigation. Carbon saturation and the depletion of fossil fuels, two of the planet's major environmental challenges, remain insufficiently incorporated in the pricing system. In other words, despite its rapid rise over the last few decades, the price of fossil fuels is still too low to serve as the necessary catalyser to change individual actors' behaviours. Carbon taxes are thus promising innovations to reach systemic changes by moving the lines of the incentive system. And they are not far down the road: in its new "energy and climate package", the European Union introduced a bidding mechanism for firms to *purchase* CO2 emission rights.

The proceeds will be given to member states, and 20% (minimum) of these will be affected to policies in favour of renewable energies. With this organised selling of emission rights to the benefit of public collectivity, Europe is, in effect, introducing a quasi-taxation mechanism. Other regional groupings could subsequently join or reproduce—ultimately creating a global carbon tax mechanism.

Another important example of how systemic effects are being produced is the way the World Food Program (WFP) has changed its way of operating. Instead of providing in-kind resources coming from their agricultural surpluses, more and more WFP donors are pledging money. This allows WFP to negotiate long-term production contracts with food producers in developing countries that help increase the productivity of their agricultural sector, the regularity and quality of their production as well as the redistribution of important revenues in poor rural areas[22]. In this case it is striking to see how additional development impacts do not come from additional resources, but from a change in the nature and way existing resources are used.

The fading barrier between public and private solidarity

“Old school” development aid also used to be essentially financed by public resources coming out of state budgets, and channelled to recipient states. This “double monopoly” has gradually been replaced by the extreme diversification of both demand and supply of aid—such that the barrier between public

and private solidarity has come to fade away.

This form of decentralisation of aid has given it a new dimension, i.e. a role of linkage between societies. For example, programs have recently been designed to use migrant workers as bridges to the economies of their regions of origin. Remittances from migrant workers established in the European Union to southern Mediterranean countries represent over 10 billion euros each year, an amount that has grown by roughly 10% per year since the turn of the century. Today the bulk of these transfers are subject to the payment of relatively high commissions, and only a small share is invested in activities with long-term development impacts. Migrant organisations, private banks and development agencies have begun working together to reduce transfer costs and provide incentives for channelling remittances toward investments. Small-scale today, these public-private initiatives involving banks, migrants and development experts can potentially channel considerable resources and expertise toward small and medium enterprises in developing countries.

The “Oudin-Santini” tax in France is another illustration of the simultaneous diversification of demand and supply in the aid industry. The objective of this levy is to mobilize stable financial resources for the improvement of water provision and sanitation in cities of some of the world’s poorest countries. Contrary to conventional taxes it is based on a principle of direct solidarity between the water consumer in the North and its counterpart in the South—channelled though their municipalities. In 2005 the “Oudin-Santini” law made it possible for local authorities and water agencies to allocate up to 1% of their water and sanitation

budget to decentralized cooperation projects in water and sanitation. In 2006 the city of Paris set aside one million euros from Parisians' water and sanitation bill for its "Water Solidarity" program toward municipalities in the developing world. It total, an estimated eight million euros were mobilised in France that year thanks to the "Oudin-Santini" law. This form of "consumer to consumer" donation is miles away from traditional public development aid. Yet it cannot be described as purely private aid either. This hybrid form of development assistance, halfway between states and their citizens, is likely to be one of the ways in which additional resources will be mobilised in the coming decades.

But this fading distinction between public and private policy funding is striking in a third, more significant way. In fact the headway of private actors in the development business is now so established that states have themselves largely privatized and subcontracted this formerly public policy, leaving it up to their citizens to decide both the amount of funds going to international development and the objectives pursued by this policy. First NGOs are increasingly becoming partners and operators of governments: the proportion of ODA disbursed through NGOs or public-private partnerships has increased ten-fold since 1990. But a more consequential evolution has gone virtually unnoticed. Tax exemptions on donations to international development activities have encouraged the blossoming of private, decentralised solidarity initiatives. They range from exemptions for small donations to charities to considerable opportunity costs for the governments that chose to exempt multi-billion dollar

philanthropic foundations from taxation. What is striking is that although the State subsidises these private activities (at the level of the tax exemption granted to donors), it controls neither the cost incurred by public finances (i.e. the level of the exemption, which is by definition proportional to the level of private donations) nor the use that is made of these resources[23]. Estimates show that these represent a growing share of global development assistance, and therefore public financial support for these initiatives mechanically accounts for a growing share of a state's development aid to developing nations[24]. It is as if States had decided to have a two-tier development aid system: the first level of public resources dedicated to international development are "compulsory", since they come from states' budgets and are determined and approved *ex ante* by Parliament. These funds are destined to specific actions, allocated according to government priorities. The second level is a form of "open-ended solidarity", whose volume and allocation depends solely on the choice of private citizens: if a taxpayer decides to donate to a given cause (say financing education in Mali through a charity), his or her State automatically subsidises this donation. This change of practice is a true revolution in the field of development aid—one whose implications the aid community has probably not fully thought through.

TABLE 2
TYPES OF NEEDS AND INNOVATIONS

TYPES OF NEEDS	TYPES OF INNOVATION	FINANCING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS	FINANCING ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES	FINANCING ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE

		E.g. protection of rain forests	E.g. supporting national health policies	E.g. financing heavy infrastructure
The move toward recurrent financial transfers	E.g. IFFIm, airplane tax, PES	+++	+++	+
New instruments to scale up aid	E.g. Investment funds, guarantees	++	++	+++
The quest for systemic effect	E.g. AMCs and bulk purchasing, carbon taxation	+++	++	+
The fading barrier between private and public solidarity	E.g. Water tax for solidarity, facilitation of migrant remittances	+	+++	++

THE “+” SIGNS SIGNAL THE DEGREE OF RELEVANCE OF EACH INNOVATION TYPE TO EACH NEED.

2. FROM ODA TO GPF

These are no small changes. Yet surprisingly, this triple revolution in goals, actors and instruments has not yet impacted the way the international development community measures the financial volumes dedicated to this emerging global policy. While the daily practice of aid is firmly rooted in the 21st century, the assessment of national contributions and their impacts has largely stuck to “old-school” methods. In a nutshell, the Development Aid Committee (DAC) continues to benchmark OECD State contributions to international development assistance by adding grants, certain types of loans plus a whole series of “other”

expenses—whose link to development financing is at times tenuous. It is hard to find other examples of public policies whose performance is assessed so little on the basis of results and so much on the basis of expenses—themselves measured so imperfectly. Although profoundly unsatisfactory, these figures continue to serve as the basis for official and highly-publicised promises of development assistance: since the “Monterrey Consensus”, a number of donors have restated their commitments to achieve the 0.7% target of ODA to GNI[25]. In May 2005, the European Council decided on a new EU collective target of 0.56% by 2010, which would result in an additional €20 billion a year in ODA. At the 8 July 2005 Gleneagles Summit of the G8, donors also agreed to a massive increase of aid.

While these promises were in the making, the “global public goods” theory prompted by Inge Kaul and her colleagues[26] was bringing to light the fantastic disconnect between old concepts and new realities. It was the first time that the task of dealing with market failures that characterize world commons was given the statute of public policy. Since then, many have tried to distinguish “ODA” from Global Public Goods promotion efforts, both conceptually and technically; they have gone as far as measuring how much of each counts in the official ODA statistics. Yet this move is being actively resisted by most governments, who are keen on pouring as much as possible into the ODA basket to reach overall and thematic international goals—including resources that have very little to do with these objectives. More importantly, the end result is that the debate about additionality of international funding to, for instance, climate change, is making

the Copenhagen negotiation more bitter than needed. It demonstrates the urgent need for clarity on what ill a given type of funding is designed to cure.

2.1 ODA'S THREE FATAL SINS

The disjunction between the innovations in development financing and ODA measurement, as well as the debate about additionality and the growing diversity of goals, leads to a politically embarrassing question: do the existing global financial targets have any sense? Technically, very little. ODA inhabits now a strange "Bermuda triangle" of international public statistics, as it measures at the same time too much, too little and the wrong types of things.

ODA measures too much

ODA is agonising out of its success. Born to measure a relatively narrow set of activities aimed at promoting the convergence of former colonies' economies with their former masters', it has become the only benchmark to assess official North-South financial flows. The result is that it measures things that are not remotely relevant to what really matters: capturing what people or institutions dedicate to a specific end, and confronting it to costs or outcomes.

In fact, ODA's technical relevance to its historic goal (measuring "development aid", whose pertinence is in no way eclipsed by the additional objectives of international aid) is even being increasingly questioned, due to the gaps OECD definitions

allow. Desai and Kharas write that “Of the more than $100 billion in ODA disbursed by rich countries to poor ones in 2005, $60 billion was used for debt relief, technical cooperation, emergency or humanitarian relief and food aid, [leaving only $40 billion for] actual development projects and programs”[27]. This understanding of efficient development aid would need to be nuanced: everything that doesn’t finance “actual development projects and programs” is not worthless.

Number-quarrels aside however, what is obvious to anyone who has eyes to see is that ODA figures include a motley series of expenses, a minority of which actually translates into fresh funds for development programmes in the world’s poorest nations. To start with, the administrative overheads of donor states count as aid—which clearly isn’t the best incentive to achieving resource-efficient aid bureaucracies.

Within “non-programmable” aid expenses, one also finds the costs of grants or schooling fees offered to students from the developing world who study in the donor nation. Close to $2 billion of such expanses were declared as ODA in 2004. This would have some justification if these students all came back to their home countries to work. This is rarely the case however, such that one can legitimately question whether the grant that pays for the British university degree of a Kenyan student who then proceeds to work for an American bank in the City should really count towards the UK’s development aid to Kenya.

One also finds the costs to the donor nation of catering for political refugees from developing nations. These expenses may be fully legitimate, yet their relationship to international

development is flimsy at best. Emergency relief and food aid sent to zones of natural disaster or conflict also counts as ODA. Since 1990, these humanitarian expenses for ex-post recovery have taken up a growing share of development assistance flows. There is no denying the importance of such expenses of international solidarity that aim to relieve human suffering. However their link to countries' long-term economic and social development is of a very indirect kind.

Non-programmable aid also includes debt relief. This part of development assistance is largely responsible for the progression of ODA flows since the late 1990's, and represented a record-high 25% of ODA declared by OECD DAC member states in 2005[28]. Debt relief has had significant development impact: the successive rounds of debt restructuring were clearly a progress for indebted nations who recovered essential margins of manoeuvre in their national budgets. Mali's debt relief for example helped the government free budgetary resources for worthwhile investments. However, much of Mali's debt forgiveness did not represent any budgetary cost for donors, since few of them actually expected to be paid back. And there is also something awkward in counting the cancellation of loans that at the time they were granted would not have counted as ODA. Iraq's sovereign debt, for example, largely served to pay sophisticated weaponry manufactured in industrialized nations during its long struggle against Iran. Yet the (oil-rich) country's debt cancellation today counts for official *development* aid—considerably boosting world aid statistics. ODA flows to Iraq amounted to over $6.5 billion in 2006, about half of which was in

the form of debt relief.

Beyond the endless polemic debates on “real” versus “artificial” ODA, one thing is clear: Official Development Assistance measures elements that do not contribute to financing development. It is in desperate need of brushing up[29].

ODA measures too little

Conversely, the ODA figure misses a whole range of things that actively contribute to financing this emerging global public policy.

For one thing, the development aid of non-DAC countries appears nowhere in statistics on international development—aside from very unofficial and approximate estimates. Yet non-OECD states have, over the last decade, clearly represented a growing share of development aid. China’s aid to Africa has recently been the subject of much debate. Because of the type of aid instruments it uses, it is extremely difficult to assess what would count as ODA were China to become an official DAC-donor. What is clear, however, is that Beijing has today become one of the major contributors to the financing of infrastructures in sub-Saharan Africa. Many oil-rich Arab states also have very generous aid policies, yet their efforts towards international development are nowhere to be found in world ODA figures. The world has changed. The club of 22 traditional sovereign donors that form the DAC can no longer claim to speak for the world’s “donor community”.

Estimates show that private solidarity has become the most dynamic share of development aid in recent years. In all, private

giving to development actions is estimated to have reached close to 50 billion dollars[30], i.e. half of what we know to be inflated official figures of global official development assistance. Yet this sizeable contribution to the financing of the global policy agenda does not appear either in the official measures of development aid. More surprising still, the public subsidies awarded to private actors of international solidarity in the form of tax rebates are themselves invisible in the DAC's official development aid statistics. For some nations, such as the United States, these amount to considerable sums.

Many of the innovative tools that have been designed over the last decades to finance development cannot count towards ODA, which only takes into consideration grants and loans with a 25% grant element. It is for example the case for a large part of equity investment or public investment guarantees, while both of these instruments can have considerable development impact. Most of the new instruments quoted above fail for one reason or another to fit in to the stone-age definition currently in effect. Not including such tools in the measure of development assistance reduces incentives for countries to use them—and thwarts further instrumental innovation. In the case of guarantees the perversion is extreme, as the official definition allows for their inclusion only if they are called. *Make bad development finance, and thou shall be rewarded…* It is also surprising that ODA does not capture non-concessional financing: when markets fail to play their part and credit is lacking, as we have recently witnessed in the global credit crunch, this type of funding can play a crucial policy role even in the absence of any grant element. It is moreover difficult

to understand the arbitrary level at which “concessionality” has been defined. The current definition creates an incentive to use more public funds than needed to achieve a specific goal. For untied assistance for example, concessionality implies that the grant element surpass 25% of the loan. But why should a grant element of, say, 10% be ruled out if no more than 10% is needed to support the targeted activity? Existing standards may be justified if the aim were to measure some form of budget cost. But this is not what the ODA benchmark does (as the inclusion of debt relief illustrates).

Many other crucial activities of the international community cannot be captured either, because they are deemed too remote from the so-called “core” of the MDGs agenda. This is for example the case of some peacebuilding and postconflict activities, the training of international police forces, the construction of prisons, etc. However, few would disagree that these efforts are essential to lay the basis for lasting economic recovery. This is also the case for the financial support to the preservation of culture and heritage, whose expenses can be registered only with difficulty as a development aid. Many of UNESCO’s programmes in the area of cultural heritage conservation or the promotion of contemporary cultures suffer from this arguably excessively strict definition of ODA.

ODA measures the wrong things

As we have seen, the current and complex ODA concept relates to an essentially political goal: reaching the famous 0.7% target.

But it gives us no information on what we would really need to pilot the policy coherently and efficiently. Four crucial bits of information aren't encompassed by existing measures:

- First, what are the overall funds actually mobilized to finance this global policy—regardless of their origin and delivery method? The international community is very ill-equipped today to assess this most basic and yet fundamental benchmark. Currently ODA does not capture the total volumes dedicated to global policies. This is especially the case when they are non-concessional or private, although non-concessional financing delivered by non-profit institutions (whether public or private) can often provide an efficient solution to market failures.
- Second, what are the outputs and impacts that are reached through the projects and programs that are financed? How many children gain access to vaccination? How many extra square kilometres of rainforest have been saved from deforestation? How much GDP is being created? Because it measures only financial inputs, and because it is unable to identify the policy goal that is sought after, ODA is absolutely mute about impacts. Raising the bar slightly, ODA isn't able to measure what it destroys either: if ODA projects create economic growth, how much CO2 emissions do they produce? How much natural resource do they deplete? Research, an item that is eligible to ODA declaration, is particularly illustrative of this uneasy relationship

between inputs and outcomes: have the vast amounts of scientific research financed by governmental, OECD, UNDP or World Bank teams and institutions led to successes? Were they beneficial for OECD states or developing countries? This needs to be assessed.

- Third, what budgetary costs does development aid represent for the different donor states? Although this seems as the most logical benchmark to compare states' contributions to international development, such figures are nowhere to be seen. Though grants relate directly to budgetary costs, the "fiscal expenditure" of tax exemptions that help NGOs and foundations appeal to public generosity (and avoid inheritance tax) are not captured. Neither are the budgetary costs of concessional funding, nor, to a large extent, of guarantees and innovative financing tools.
- Finally, what are the administrative costs of delivering these public policies? ODA standards allow for declaring administrative costs but, surprisingly, they are then conveniently melted in the hodgepodge of Official Development Assistance. One should also be able to identify clearly which part of the funds is spent in the field, with direct Keynesian impacts, and which part is spent outside of developing countries—which does not mean it is illegitimate or unproductive.

FIGURE 3
THE INTRICATE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AS WE KNOW IT TODAY



2.2. A NEW SET OF BENCHMARKS FOR GLOBAL POLICIES FINANCING

All in all, ODA turns out to be a poor benchmark for the emerging global public policy enriched of new objectives, actors and instruments. To sum up, it is not an indicator of *results*, but only an indicator of *means*. Yet it cannot be said to be an adequate indicator of means, since it measures both too little and too much of the means actually made available for development activities in the South—while it doesn't give any indication of the budgetary effort made by donor states.

Does all of this matter? Yes. Counting and naming things properly is crucial to lay a sound basis for 21*st* century global policies. Communication with public opinions North and South on the purpose and the efficiency of development aid is fundamental if this public policy is to preserve the support of citizens

worldwide. And this cannot be done if the actors of development aid are not capable of placing concrete results in front of the resources mobilised. Getting the measures right is also fundamental if the international community is to mobilize the amounts of resources of a comparable scale to the needs: the fog of the Bermuda triangle does not help to devise a rational public policy. After all, any decently-run company has precise figures for its revenues any given year, and estimates about projected revenues for the year to come. It can account for the impacts of its expenses. National public policies also have a fairly good vision of the costs implied by its programs, the expected results and whether or not the adequate budgets can be made available. This is basic public accounting, which donors typically ask of recipient nations. Can the donor community continue to ignore this fundamental rule of rational economic management? The challenges ahead are sufficiently daunting for the international community not to attempt to confront them blindfolded.

Besides, including the word “assistance” in the public policy’s name sends the wrong signal. In fact it misses a key change in the way global policies are being implemented: more and more developing nations contribute to financing global public policies. The airline ticket tax is funded by some of the poorest countries in the world. Middle income and emerging countries are starting to develop international funding programs, while they continue to sit on the receiving end of the World Bank, the UN or OECD bilateral agencies. MDGs have been designed jointly by developing and industrialized countries, and so has the Paris

agenda for aid efficiency. International solidarity and global public goods policies have inherently become common endeavours. ODA's original sin is to have been designed by OECD nations to assess OECD nations—with little input from recipient states. It forms an outdated supplyside index in a market where demand should matter.

What are the options to leave the current impasse? Steering this global public policy as efficiently as possible would require four things. First, putting an appropriate name on things. Second, devising an estimate of the overall funding made available for these goals, whatever its provenance. Thirdly, measuring aid's *results* so as to clarify the policy's goals, and leave for good the bureaucratic realm of *expenses*. Finally, assessing official aid's *budgetary costs* as a benchmark for states' efforts toward this policy.

Renaming the policy

We suggest forgetting about ODA. Why not move toward a new acronym: "Global policy finance" (GPF)? GPF is no less mysterious than ODA—a word that has long been associated with patronizing practices. It would include the funding of the three core components of sustainable development[31]: convergence between economies of the North and the South, better access to essential services across the world and the provision of global public goods (environmental protection, international health, etc.). Although GPF would encompass actions that go beyond "old-school" economic development

objectives and delivery methods, it would in no way exclude them. Broadening the scope of what counts as GPF would make it clear that there is a change in the nature of what the international community is undertaking, and thus in what needs to be measured. It would allow contributing countries to declare, along agreed lines, a range of activities that are all very legitimate and useful for the world but cannot honestly be captured as development assistance. Many consequences stem from this suggestion. Let's consider some of the most important.

Measuring volumes

We could begin by revising our statistics by looking for estimates of the overall volumes made available for financing the set of agreed goals of international development assistance—whatever their provenance and their degree of concessionality. Non-concessional resources could be declared as global policy funding if provided by non-for-profit stakeholders and/or disbursed in view of achieving one of the agreed policy goals. Such a measure would initially lack precision, but could provide a first yardstick of the actual financing gap once all existing public, private and "hybrid" resources currently working towards international public policies factored in.

Each institution (private or public) or country would declare gross and net volumes along three set of goals: 1) the promotion of economic growth of less developed nations; 2) the promotion of human welfare and the reduction of inequalities in the developing world; 3) the preservation or production of global

public goods, which could include a list of specific internationally agreed policies (global warming; biodiversity; international pandemics; peace and security; humanitarian relief; international financial and trade systems; international migrations and population policies; cultural diversity…). A specific category could be designed to capture generic capacity building efforts for governments and societies in developing countries.

Measuring results

One could also envisage a measure of the development *results* yielded by specific development activities or other global public policies. This would have the advantage of freeing up innovation and concentrating on what ultimately matters: impact. An agreed methodology would allow comparing the results reaped by very different actions, be they systemic (GAVI), programmatic (budget support for health policies) or project-oriented (building clinics). Each actor of development aid, whatever its nature (public or private, from traditional or emerging donor nations, etc.) would have the possibility to declare the results of his development action measured according to this methodology. Results would be open to verification.

As a consequence, ex-post evaluation would need to be revamped and improved. Donors (bilateral, multilateral, NGOs, foundations…) usually carry out internal evaluations. In the best cases the body in charge of it is independent, and its reports are available to the public. But many biases remain. Ex-post evaluation is focused on individual institutions, and does not

capture overall impacts of international policies at the global or country levels. It is delivered through very different methodologies, such that comparisons between institutions are impossible in most cases—let alone benchmarking. As suggested by the CGDev[32], an international effort would urgently need to fill the evaluation gap. It would involve recipient countries and their civil societies. It would imply harmonizing methodologies between institutions, increasing transparency, undertaking global, regional and local evaluations of policies, instruments, etc. An initiative of this sort would also imply undertaking a global rating and ranking of public and private institutions along the lines of agreed methodologies. This would create emulation, and ultimately encourage opting out of weak players.

Measuring efforts and public costs

We could finally consider defining “official global public finance” as states’ budgetary efforts towards a set of agreed global causes. It would be measured through the amounts of *public* resources destined to finance global policies—whatever the instruments they are channelled through. This approach through aid’s budgetary costs would incite countries to maximize the leverage of their instruments, so as to enhance the impact per euro or dollar spent. It would naturally include the costs of tax exemptions that subsidise private solidarity initiatives geared towards international causes.

FIGURE 4

GLOBAL POLICY FINANCE AS WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO MEASURE IT TOMORROW



This would allow for measuring *administrative* costs more clearly. Not only are those costs high, but little is known about their economics—and hence about the efficiency models on which institutions sit. Is GPF a fixed-costs or a variable-cost industry? Are small projects more efficient than large ones? How to compare the relative efficiency of operating in different sectors and with different players? None of these questions can be answered without knowing more about costs. Improving this item, as ancillary as it may appear, is critical to the overall improvement of our emerging global policy.

2.3 WHAT NOW?

What should we do with the 0.7% goal?

Keep it - and clarify it.

The 0.7% of GDP target has played an important communication role, and has helped naming-and-shaming ill-performing countries. Of course, defining a policy objective along its budgetary input is a weak basis. Bearing these deficiencies in mind, keeping a sort of minimum benchmark of policy input can be useful, as it is easy to communicate. One could therefore keep the 0.7% figure, but for instance specify that it should be applied only to the second category of actions (i.e. promoting human welfare and fighting inequalities). Alternatively, we could change the target (for instance, talk about 1% or 1.5% of GDP), and include all three sub-categories of the global public policy (i. economic growth, ii. human welfare, and iii. global public goods).

Should OECD DAC continue to exist?

Yes. And it should be extended.

However frustrating it may have been as a platform for negotiation, the OECD DAC (Development Aid Committee) would need to be reinvented if one were to suppress it. Too formal and too narrow in its current incarnation, it can be given more substance and a wider scope. Many countries and organizations do not want to or cannot be part of the OECD, but would be willing to access a forum where global policies are debated, standards set and evaluations processed so as to build a currently deficient collective knowledge. The remarkable powerhouse that the OECD constitutes can be used to provide this public good; such is exactly its mandate. The DAC could thus

widen its activity and allow non-OECD governments and agencies, NGOs, foundations and businesses (or their umbrella organizations) engaged in corporate social responsibility activities. This group would probably look very different from the current DAC. It would therefore need a new name, such as “global policy funding forum”.

Of course the UN system has a crucial act to play in this renovation, and it is likely that a UNDP/DAC joint-venture would provide the best and most legitimate platform to perform this global engagement. The Bretton Woods institutions would also have an active role to play, similar to the one they have been increasingly performing in the current DAC, which has consisted in bringing substance and drawing inputs from the gatherings.

How can such change be reached?

Through negotiation.

In today’s world of hypercollective action, there is no possibility to structure such an international policy change through authority. Collective thinking, discussing and negotiating is the only way forward, as none of today’s players in the global policy field would accept top-down decisions—be they taken by the G8 or the G20. As we have seen, OECD governments have lost the monopoly of global public policy, and it can be convincingly argued that they have actively contributed to this situation, if only through their fiscal policies. They must draw the consequences: new governmental and non-governmental players are now involved in this arena, and want to be part of the decisions.

This change will not happen overnight, or by itself. At some stage, a set of actors will need to take a bold initiative and clarify this emerging global policy by making it more inclusive, better measured, evaluated and communicated[33]. Such is the price of greater efficiency. Is it worth the effort? The world of the future will require more common action, not less. More public goods will need to be promoted, and more global public evils fought. International solidarity will have to be strengthened, not diminished. As global trade and financial ties are knot, new global social policies will need to accompany them. International migrations and inequalities have already created an international social landscape that will need to be managed. More and more destructive natural and manmade catastrophes will call for more international relief. Conflict resolution, prevention and management will continue to be at the forefront of our concerns. It is therefore high time to clarify our ideas.

Declaring the death of “ODA” is neither a claim of defeat nor a claim of victory over poverty, but a statement of reality—a speech of truth in which we admit times change. Moving from ODA to GPF is about recognising that with time policies, actors and instruments also change. Such that a specific administrative measuring instrument born several decades ago needs serious revamping in order to face up to the global policy challenges of this new century.

POST-SCRIPTUM

Initial versions of this paper have benefited from the sharp

comments of friends and colleagues with intimate knowledge of this complex field of policy. Their reactions have led us to add this short concluding section to dissipate any potential misunderstanding due to hasty or clumsy phrasing on our behalf.

Here are a few things that this paper is not saying:

- Although we hold that the stakes that characterize North / South today are very different from those of the post-colonial decades or the immediate post-cold war years, we are not saying that the new set of global challenges has eclipsed previous concerns in any way, nor that the changing objectives of development assistance should lead development aid to set aside the historic goal of poverty reduction though economic growth—much to the contrary.
- We are not saying that global policies should replace local action, but on the contrary that local problems such as environmental degradation, poor health, excessive inequalities or inadequate financial regulation feed into global disequilibria and generate global systemic concerns. An effective response to these systemic challenges needs both systemic and local instruments of action. The challenge for the years to come will be to build a global and multi-actor framework to provide public goods locally.
- Although we do claim that the entry of new and very different actors into the field of development assistance has provided it with a breath of fresh air (including new instruments and new sources of funding), we are not

saying that the current fragmentation of international assistance is unproblematic. Many countries find it impossible to devise coherent national policies in the face of a dispersed donor community. This urgently needs to be addressed through the creation of incentives for actors to converge.

- We are not saying that the arrival of new actors in the field of international development will crowd out public actors. On the contrary, the increasing fragmentation and dispersion of international public assistance begs for states to assume a coordinating role. Only this coordination effort needs to go beyond the chimera of a centrally-planned and centrally-coordinated system.
- Finally, we are not saying that financial innovation will dispense traditional donors of increasing the amount of public resources dedicated to this policy. The new set of challenges of North / South relations calls for more money (including more “traditional ODA”), not less. It is therefore vital that donor states respect the commitments they made in Monterrey and Gleneagles; yet for the stake of clarity, transparency and efficiency these should correspond to technically meaningful benchmarks. Moreover, assuming that these promises are kept, the additional public resources mobilised will not suffice to reach lasting results in North / South economic convergence, the financing of basic human welfare and protecting global public goods. Innovative methods to finance this global public policy will need to be found.

This paper, which makes a diagnosis and suggests paths of progress for the future, does not aim to provide an exhaustive review of the topics it touches upon. The questions raised in the pages above call for further research on a few critical issues, among which:

- The type of collective action mechanisms that can build convergence between the quickly-expanding range of aid actors described without weighing on their capacity to innovate and adapt;
- The type of collaborative ex post evaluation mechanisms that can be devised to close the evaluation gap;
- How the new benchmarks of Global Policy Finance called for in this paper (estimates of overall available funds for a given policy goal; benchmarks of aid's impacts; measures of budgetary costs for donor states; and estimates for administrative costs) could be designed;
- What is the scale of the financial resources needed to respond to the three broad policy objectives outlined in this paper—i.e. how big the financing gap is today;
- Finally the political economy of this vast reform of international development aid—i.e. how to move forward given the different actors' preferences and constraints.

Lectura 2

Receptores y contribuyentes: los países

de renta media y el futuro de la cooperación para el desarrollo[34]

José Antonio Alonso, Jonathan Glennie y Andy Sumner[35]

1. INTRODUCCIÓN

El papel que están llamados a jugar los países de renta media (PRM) en el sistema de cooperación para el desarrollo es objeto de un acalorado debate. Tras una década buena para el crecimiento global, la mayor parte de los países en desarrollo han pasado a pertenecer a la categoría de "renta media", tomando para ello la definición del Banco Mundial (que identifica como tales a los que se encuentran entre aproximadamente los 1.000 y los 12.000 dólares de PNB per cápita). Hay quien argumenta que es muy limitado el papel que la comunidad internacional puede jugar en este tipo de países, dado los recursos domésticos y de capital privado internacional que están a su disposición. Caben dos respuestas a este planteamiento. En primer lugar, que la mayor parte de los PRM todavía afrontan considerables déficit estructurales y vulnerabilidades que afectan a sus respectivos procesos de desarrollo. Y, en segundo lugar, que el futuro del progreso y del bienestar a escala internacional estará fuertemente influido por el grado de éxito que tengan los PRM en sus respectivos procesos de desarrollo.

Así pues, no solo los PRM necesitan del apoyo de la comunidad internacional, también la comunidad internacional necesita de los PRM para afrontar conjuntamente, con mayor capacidad de éxito, las metas globales de desarrollo. La

cuestión, por tanto, es cómo la comunidad internacional puede impulsar la activa contribución de un creciente grupo de exitosos PRM en la superación de los desafíos globales y comunes y, más específicamente, cuál es el papel que la cooperación para el desarrollo puede tener en todo ello.

En consonancia con la amplitud de las fronteras del grupo en términos del PNB per cápita, la categoría de los PRM acoge a un amplio número de países (103) y encierra en su seno, como es inevitable, una considerable diversidad. Algunos PRM son miembros del G20, mientras otros son pequeñas economías cercanas al límite que define a los países de bajo ingreso; algunos tienen dimensiones continentales, como China, India o Indonesia, mientras otros tienen muy pequeñas poblaciones, como Tuvalu o Vanuatu. Dentro del grupo hay muchas otras formas de diferenciación relevante para los criterios de asignación de la ayuda oficial al desarrollo (AOD): 19 PRM son Estados frágiles[36]; 17 son países menos adelantados (PMA); 13 son países pobres altamente endeudados (PPAE). Cerca de un tercio de los PRM se han graduado del estatus de bajo ingreso desde el final de la guerra fría, en 1990; dos tercios eran PRM antes de 1990 y lo siguen siendo en la actualidad.

Una forma obvia de diferenciar a los PRM es a través de la división entre países de renta media-baja y media-alta (PRMB/PRMA), que está situada en aproximadamente 4.000 dólares per cápita. De forma general los más antiguos PRM son PRMA de relativo mayor ingreso, mientras los PRM más recientes son todavía pobres PRMB. El PIB per cápita promedio en paridad del poder adquisitivo (PPA) en el grupo de PRMB es

todavía de menos de 4 dólares al día, que es solo un 5% del PIB per cápita de los miembros de la OCDE (también en PPA). Es más, la tasa de pobreza, medida por la población con menos de 1,25 dólares al día, es un cuarto de la población de los PRMB, elevándose esa ratio a la mitad de la población si la pobreza se mide por 2 dólares al día. Los indicadores son algo mejores para el grupo de PRMA, pero están todavía a considerable distancia de los niveles de la OCDE. La ayuda oficial al desarrollo (AOD) es drásticamente menor en los grupos PRMA y PRMB que en los países de renta baja (PRB). Mientras en este último grupo la ratio promedio de la AOD sobre el PNB es cercana al 10% y de casi del 40% cuando se relaciona con la formación bruta de capital, las correspondientes ratios son del 1% y del 3% en el caso de los PRMB y se aproximan ambas a cero en el caso de los PRMA (véase el cuadro 1).

CUADRO 1

INDICADORES SELECCIONADOS POR GRUPOS DE PAÍSES, 2012 O EL AÑO MÁS RECIENTE (MEDIA DEL GRUPO)

	RENTA BAJA	RENTA MEDIA-BAJA	RENTA MEDIA-ALTA	RENTA MEDIA	RENTA ALTA	OCDE
PNB per cápita, método Atlas (dólares corrientes)	588	1.913	6.977	4.383	38.182	37.612
PIB per cápita (dólares constantes 2005)	423	1.221	4.315	2.731	31.373	31.356
Índice de pobreza a 1,25 dólares al día (PPA) (% de la población)	48.3	27.1	8.4	18	-	-
Índice de pobreza a 2 dólares al día (PPA) (% de población)	74.3	56.3	19.5	38.3	-	-
AOD neta recibida (% del PNB)	9.1	0.8	0.1	0.3	-	-
AOD neta recibida (% de la formación bruta del capital)	37.6	2.6	0.3	0.8	-	-

FUENTE: DATOS PROCESADOS DEL WDI (2013)

Pese a que los problemas de desarrollo de los PRM subsisten, los donantes internacionales están reduciendo, o programan reducir, su apoyo financiero a estos países. En algunos casos, los donantes están cerrando sus delegaciones en los PRM; en otros han comenzado a excluir a estos países de sus receptores de ayuda. Consecuentemente, la cuota de AOD dirigida a los 103 PRM identificados como tales en 2011 cayó desde cerca del 55%, en 1990, a algo menos del 40% en los datos más recientes del Banco Mundial. Ello supone que los PRM quedaron virtualmente excluidos de la tendencia ascendente de la ayuda vivida a lo largo de la pasada década (véase el gráfico 1, abajo). Esto es preocupante. Nada automáticamente cambia cuando un país cruza una determinada línea de renta per cápita. Sin embargo, parece que cuando un país crece y la ayuda se hace menos significativa como proporción de su PNB, los donantes de la OCDE encuentran crecientemente difícil defender la ayuda dirigida a esos países; se entiende que ya no son “los más pobres del mundo”.

Mejorar la coherencia de políticas (es decir promover cambios en las políticas adoptadas por los países ricos para estimular el desarrollo en otras partes del mundo) es probable que sea más importante para los PRM que las transferencias financieras, y potencialmente también para los PRB, dado que sus efectos pueden ser más importantes que los de la ayuda. Pero ello no implica que las transferencias financieras carezcan de importancia. Las transferencias siguen siendo una parte crucial del esfuerzo global para alcanzar un crecimiento equitativo y

sostenible. El objetivo de este documento es sugerir orientaciones políticas a la comunidad de desarrollo relacionadas con cómo manejar los principales desafíos que implica el apoyo a los PRM, para que alcancen y contribuyan más plenamente al desarrollo global.

GRÁFICO 1
AOD A PRM EN MILLONES DE DÓLARES Y EN PORCENTAJE SOBRE EL TOTAL (DÓLARES CONSTANTES 2011)

FUENTE: WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS. EXCLUYENDO IRAQ.

En la siguiente sección estableceremos el marco para entender los problemas a los que se enfrentan los países al ascender en la escala de renta, distinguiendo entre las “trampas” de desarrollo y las “brechas” de financiación. En la sección 3 analizamos el papel de los PRM como receptores de cooperación para el desarrollo. ¿Qué prioridades deberían tener los donantes y por qué? En la sección 4 analizamos la otra cara de la moneda, el papel crecientemente importante que los PRM tienen como contribuyentes al desarrollo global. ¿Pueden otros países apoyar a los PRM en esta tarea y cómo? Finalmente, en la sección 5 reparamos en las implicaciones que para la asignación de los fondos de cooperación tiene mirar más allá de la renta per cápita; y, respecto a la agenda de la eficacia de la

ayuda, las consecuencias asociadas a la cooperación con y desde los PRM, que puede implicar formas de relación distintas a las de la ayuda “tradicional” Norte-Sur. El documento termina con una breve sección de conclusiones.

El tema aquí sugerido es complejo y admite diversas vías desde las que abordarlo. La que sugerimos es una más entre ellas. El documento pretende ayudar a los gestores y responsables políticos a conformar sus decisiones en materia de cooperación para el desarrollo.

Finalmente, una nota sobre la terminología empleada. En un intento por superar el empleo de la categoría PRM, que nosotros mismos criticamos, solemos referirnos a expresiones más genéricas como “países que ascienden en su escala de renta”. Usamos el término “cooperación para el desarrollo” para cubrir un concepto amplio de apoyo internacional, que incluye la “ayuda tradicional” (esto es, la Ayuda Oficial para el Desarrollo), las formas emergentes de cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS), y las contribuciones a los bienes públicos internacionales. Nuestra atención en este documento se refiere al apoyo financiero preferentemente, pero no desconsidera otros aspectos de la cooperación como igualmente apropiados.

2. ‘TRAMPAS’ Y ‘BRECHAS’: UN ANÁLISIS DE NECESIDADES

El intento de establecer, con carácter general, los problemas que encaran los PRM y que podrían ser objeto de apoyo internacional se enfrenta a dos tipos de limitaciones. En primer

lugar, como se ha visto, la categoría de los PRM acoge en su seno a países muy diversos, de modo que es difícil realizar generalizaciones que sean válidas para todos los casos. En segundo lugar, pocos de los desafíos a los que se enfrentan los países que tienen una renta per cápita media son exclusivos: tanto los países más ricos como los más pobres del mundo podrán reconocer como propios algunos de los problemas que a continuación se mencionan.

Dicho esto, se pueden hacer algunas observaciones útiles acerca de aquellas áreas de particular dificultad a las que se enfrentan aquellos países que recorren la (a veces larga y ardua) transición desde la pobreza a niveles superiores de bienestar, y que adquieren rasgos y efectos específicos como consecuencia del nivel intermedio en el que esos países se encuentran. Adicionalmente, como consecuencia de su progreso, también cambia la necesidad que los países tienen de apoyo financiero internacional, tanto en términos de cantidad como del tipo de apoyo demandado. Los desafíos a los que nos referimos no son inevitables o universales, pero resultan relativamente comunes a este tipo de países y sientan las bases para pensar sobre los fundamentos de la cooperación con los PRM.

En el diagnóstico de los problemas y desafíos enfrentados por los PRM emergen como particularmente útiles dos conceptos de larga tradición en los estudios de desarrollo: las “trampas” y las “brechas”. Merece la pena clarificar el sentido en el que estos términos serán usados en este documento, dado que no siempre han sido empleados con similar sentido. Cuando usamos el término de “trampas” nos referimos a aquellas restricciones o

estrangulamientos que resultan de la acción de un grupo de factores que mutuamente se refuerzan bloqueando el progreso. Técnicamente una trampa remite a un fallo de “coordinación”, que requiere respuestas de políticas en diferentes áreas, en un contexto de múltiples restricciones. En algunos casos es necesario el apoyo financiero, pero no necesariamente en todos. Por otro lado, cuando usamos el concepto de “brechas” nos referimos a aquellos problemas para cuya superación se requieren importantes volúmenes de financiación, que obviamente dependerán de la ambición con la que se plantean los objetivos que se consideran deseables[37].

Inevitablemente, hay un cierto grado de solapamiento entre estos conceptos, y en algunos casos un grupo de brechas que mutuamente interactúan podrían transformarse en una trampa. No obstante, creemos que este es un marco útil para ayudar a distinguir la clase de respuesta y apoyo requerido tanto a nivel nacional como internacional. Las teorías sobre la ayudan han tendido históricamente a enfocarse en las transferencias de capital y en las brechas, de modo que aludir a las trampas nos recuerda que no todo lo relevante tiene que ver con el dinero transferido. Ahora bien, los planes para reducir la ayuda dirigida a los PRM nos obliga a recordar también que todavía existen muchas brechas, cuya superación requiere significativas sumas de fondos.

2.1 TRAMPAS DE RENTA MEDIA

A medida que ascienden en la escala de renta, los países

tienden a estar afectados menos por las carencias absolutas y más por las asimetrías y estrangulamientos generados en su proceso de desarrollo (aunque es importante no olvidar que persisten ciertas carencias absolutas, como señalaremos en la siguiente sección). Estos estrangulamientos tienen un efecto similar a las bien conocidas “trampas de pobreza”, en la medida en que sumen a los países en equilibrios de bajo nivel que terminan por bloquear o retrasar su crecimiento (Alonso, 2007). Muchos PRM han mantenido —en algunos casos, de forma repetida— episodios de crecimiento acelerado que no les han permitido seguir una senda sostenible de crecimiento en el tiempo, justamente debido a este tipo de trampas (Spence, 2011). De hecho, de acuerdo a un estudio (que usa una definición de renta media algo diferente a la que establece el Banco Mundial), solo uno de cada diez países de renta media, en 1960, habían alcanzado el estatus de renta alta, en 2010 (Agenor, Canuto y Jelenic, 2012).

La “trampa de renta media” que ha sido objeto de mayor atención por parte de los analistas es aquella relacionada con las dificultades del cambio productivo y los problemas para competir que tienen los PRM, ya sea en los mercados de manufacturas de bajos costes laborales, debido a la subida de salarios que experimentan, ya sea en los mercados de alto valor añadido, debido a sus bajas inversiones en capital humano e innovación. Sin embargo, consideramos que existen, cuando menos, otras tres importantes trampas de renta media relacionadas con: 1) la transformación del patrón energético y tecnológico, 2) la estabilidad macroeconómica y la integración financiera

internacional, y 3) la cohesión social, la gobernanza y la calidad institucional (Alonso, 2007 y 2013). Presentamos brevemente estas trampas.

2.1.1 Productividad y cambio productivo

Esta “trampa de renta media” se relaciona con las dificultades que los países tienen para sostener un proceso continuado de cambio tecnológico y productivo. La especialización productiva de los países con mercados emergentes tiende a estar basada en sectores que son intensivos en recursos naturales y trabajo no cualificado. Para desplazarse hacia sectores más dinámicos, necesitan promover un cambio estructural, promoviendo el capital humano y generando empleo de calidad y capacidades tecnológicas (Agenor y Canuto, 2012; Aiyar *et al.*, 2013). Para alcanzar esos objetivos es necesaria una combinación de inversión en capital físico y humano, la promoción continua de las capacidades tecnológicas, la creación de una infraestructura eficiente y el establecimiento de un entorno apto para promover la creación y consolidación de nuevos emprendimientos. No es una tarea sencilla. Merece la pena señalar, además, que el creciente monopolio de China tanto en sectores de alta como baja tecnología está haciendo estas transformaciones estructurales incluso más problemáticas para muchos países (Paus, 2009).

2.1.2 Transformación de los patrones energéticos y tecnológicos

Los PRM necesitan aprovechar sus factores impulsores del crecimiento para alcanzar los objetivos de desarrollo en un plazo razonable de tiempo. Eso implica desarrollar nuevos sectores industriales y nuevas capacidades productivas. Pero, debido a que buena parte de sus vigentes patrones de crecimiento están vinculados al uso de tecnologías ambientalmente no sostenibles, ese proceso puede conducir a drásticos incrementos en la demanda energética y en la generación de desechos y de polución (especialmente si consideramos que buena parte de los PRM tienen una población creciente y cada vez más urbanizada). De hecho, los PRM muestran las más altas tasas de incremento en la emisión de gases de efecto invernadero en la última década. Esto implica la necesidad de promover importantes cambios en la base tecnológica y energética de los países, en favor de opciones sostenibles y bajas en carbono, al tiempo que se preserva el crecimiento de sus economías.

2.1.3 Estabilidad macroeconómica e integración financiera internacional

Un tercer grupo de vulnerabilidades se relaciona con las dificultades para alcanzar la integración en los mercados financieros internacionales y, al tiempo, mantener suficiente espacio fiscal para el manejo de políticas macroeconómicas contracíclicas. Dada su alta exposición a los mercados financieros internacionales, algunos PRM enfrentan especiales dificultades para preservar el equilibrio macroeconómico, derivadas de su alta tendencia al endeudamiento en moneda

internacional, su limitado espacio fiscal y la estrechez de sus mercados nacionales de capital. El entorno financiero internacional acentúa el tono procíclico de la política económica, que tiende a relajarse en las épocas de abundancia, cuando se producen entradas de capital, y se contrae cuando en las crisis los capitales abandonan el país. Las trampas de deuda y las recurrentes crisis financieras son exponentes de estos problemas, que se han visto agravados como consecuencia de la liberalización financiera y la apertura de las cuentas de capital; de hecho, los flujos financieros desregulados pueden ser origen de episodios de inestabilidad macroeconómica, particularmente en los países en desarrollo (Ocampo, 2003; Ocampo y Griffith-Jones, 2007).

2.1.4 Cohesión social, gobernanza y calidad institucional

A medida que un país progresa, requiere instituciones más complejas y de más calidad para gestionar una economía más desarrollada y para responder a una sociedad más demandante en relación con las condiciones de gobernanza. En otras palabras, el proceso de desarrollo requiere una senda de cambios institucionales. Sin embargo, frecuentemente los procesos de cambio económico e institucional evolucionan a ritmos dispares, al estar las instituciones sujetas a una poderosa inercia Hay problemas técnicos que tienen que ser resueltos para mejorar la eficiencia de las Administraciones, como es el caso de la reforma de la función pública. Pero los obstáculos no

son meramente técnicos; en ocasiones, descansan no solo en la debilidad y limitada eficiencia de las instituciones, sino también en su reducida credibilidad. Problemas que remiten a los extraordinarios niveles de desigualdad (y, en ocasiones, a la baja movilidad social) que caracteriza a muchos PRM y que corroen la legitimidad institucional. Por ejemplo, la debilidad institucional y la desigualdad social hacen más difícil construir un sólido sistema fiscal, capaz de financiar la provisión de bienes públicos que la sociedad demanda (Alonso y Garcimartin, 2013). Las recientes protestas y conflictos en Brasil y Turquía, pese al progreso económico de estos países, podrían ser ejemplos de este tipo de problemas. El fallo para integrar a todos los sectores de la sociedad en el marco en el que se definen los procesos políticos puede revelar que estos son monopolizados por una pequeña elite, en lugar de por la mayoría.

2.2 BRECHAS DE RENTA MEDIA

El análisis de las brechas financieras no es nuevo en el estudio del desarrollo internacional y tiene su origen en las propuestas económicas de los años 1950; el cálculo del 0,7% para la ayuda (que data de finales de los años sesenta) estaba basado en las brechas de ahorro y de divisas. En la última década, un grupo de estimaciones cifraron los costes económicos que supondría alcanzar los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM) en orden a dar a conocer la magnitud de financiación pública internacional requerida, tomando en cuenta la complementariedad de las fuentes privadas y locales. Por ejemplo, un plan de acción para

la aplicación de los ODM calculó que la brecha financiera para hacer realidad los ODM a escala global era de “121.000 millones de dólares en 2006, elevándose a 189.000 millones en 2015” (UN Millennium Project, 2005). Recientemente, el World Economic Forum ha adelantado la magnitud de los recursos financieros requeridos para poner fin a la extrema pobreza (WEF, 2014).

Claramente, tales estimaciones dependen crucialmente de los supuestos que se hagan acerca del crecimiento de las economías afectadas, de los niveles de desigualdad vigentes y, muy especialmente, de la ambición de la comunidad internacional: una menor ambición en los objetivos se traducirá en una menor financiación requerida, porque la brecha financiera resultante será más pequeña. La era de los ODM ha concitado un amplio acuerdo internacional, incluyendo la focalización del mundo en la tarea de reducir a la mitad (o incluso erradicar) la extrema pobreza como una prioridad central. Uno de los efectos colaterales negativos de esta orientación ha sido el reducido énfasis otorgado a otros aspectos del proceso de desarrollo. En este documento nos enfocaremos en dos aspectos: la pobreza no extrema (esto es, aquellos pobres que viven algo por encima de 1,25 dólares al día) y la infraestructura sostenible para apoyar el desarrollo económico nacional. Es nuestro criterio que si estos aspectos son adecuadamente enmarcados en objetivos de desarrollo, el tamaño de la brecha financiera a la que todavía se enfrentan la mayor parte de los PRM, y las necesidades para cubrirla, se harán crecientemente evidentes.

2.2.1 Pobreza persistente

La mayor parte de la pobreza global medida por el umbral de 1,25 o 2 dólares al día está localizada en los PRM (Sumner, 2012). Las estimaciones de Edward y Sumner (2014), considerando diversos supuestos sobre el crecimiento y la desigualdad, revelan que incluso en 2030 los PRM podrían continuar acumulando entre un tercio y la mitad de la pobreza global medida por los umbrales de 1,25 o 2 dólares diarios, o incluso más (cerca de los dos tercios) si las tendencias de desigualdad continúan en la trayectoria actual (véase el gráfico 2). Similares proporciones a los de la pobreza actual son estimadas por Alkire *et al.* (2011 y 2013) para la pobreza multidimensional; Glassman *et al.* (2011) para un rango de problemas relacionados con la salud; y Kanbur y Sumner (2011) para la nutrición y la educación primaria. Los PRM tienen también una buena cuota de la carga global de enfermedad, medida por los años de vida ajustados por la incapacidad (Salvado y Lah, 2013).

GRÁFICO 2
PROPORCIÓN (%) DE LA POBREZA GLOBAL (DE 1,25, 2 Y 10 DÓLARES AL DÍA) EN LOS PRM, 2010 Y PROYECCIONES PARA 2030



FUENTE: EDWARD Y SUMNER (2014). NOTAS: PRM = PAÍSES QUE SON EN LA ACTUALIDAD CLASICADOS COMO PRM; PREVISIÓN OPTIMISTA DE CRECIMIENTO = PROYECCIONES DEL FMI; PREVISIÓN PESIMISTA DE CRECIMIENTO= MITAD DE LAS

PROYECCIONES DEL FMI; LAS ESTIMACIONES ASUMEN QUE LA TENDENCIA DE LA DESIGUALDAD SE MANTIENE. PARA ESCENARIOS ADICIONALES, VÉASE EDWARD Y SUMNER (2014).

Incluso si uno es optimista sobre la pobreza de 1,25 o 2 dólares, las proyecciones para los próximos 20 años muestran que habrá un amplio colectivo de población en condiciones inseguras, con rentas entre 2 y 10 dólares; 3.000-4.000 millones de personas podrían encontrarse en esa situación y la mayor parte de ellos vivirán en PRM. El objetivo del desarrollo entendemos que no debe limitarse a situar a las personas por encima de 1,26 dólares diarios, sino en mover al conjunto de la población mundial hacia niveles de vida razonables y seguros, tales como los definen una línea de pobreza de 10 o quizá de 13 dólares al día en PPA (Ravallion, 2009). Mientras las estimaciones de los recursos necesarios para finalizar con la pobreza de 1,25 y 2 dólares son bajas en términos del PIB global, acabar con la pobreza de 10 dólares al día podría reclamar cerca del 20% del PIB global (Edward y Sumner, 2014), sugiriendo un proyecto de más largo plazo de la cooperación para el desarrollo.

2.2.2 Infraestructura

Ha de argüirse, en todo caso, que acotar los objetivos del sistema de cooperación para el desarrollo a la lucha contra la pobreza ofrece una versión excesivamente limitada de la agenda de desarrollo, incluso si se asume una versión menos extrema de pobreza; es necesario considerar otros objetivos, si lo que se persigue es alcanzar una más justa distribución de las

oportunidades de desarrollo a escala global, incluyendo la corrección de aquellos fallos de mercado que penalizan el proceso de convergencia. La creación de adecuadas infraestructuras es probablemente uno de los más costosos de este tipo de propósitos.

La inversión en las infraestructuras no solo promueve el crecimiento económico y la competitividad, sino también expande los mercados de capital y amplía la cartera de proyectos de inversión doméstica e internacional en un país. En el largo plazo, su impacto puede generar un incremento de la productividad y de la eficiencia energética, la reducción de los costes de transporte y comunicación, el fortalecimiento de la integración regional y una más adecuada oferta de servicios sociales. En el corto plazo, sin embargo, tales inversiones pueden ser muy intensivas en el uso de recursos financieros.

Algunos estudios recientes han replicado los análisis de la brecha financiera para alcanzar los ODM de hace una década. Por ejemplo, Greenhill y Ali (2013) analizaron cinco sectores que podrían ser incluidos en la agenda post-2015 (educación, salud, agua y sanidad, energía sostenible y seguridad alimentaria/nutrición/agricultura) y encontraron que la financiación adicional requerida, “más allá de la existente”, para financiar objetivos de desarrollo podría estar entre los 150.000 y 250.000 millones de dólares al año. Dado que el presupuesto anual de la AOD está situado en torno a 130.000 millones y los compromisos de financiación en materia climática son potencialmente más elevados, esta cifra no resulta irrazonable. Sin embargo, para alcanzar los objetivos de energía renovables,

que requieren muy significativas inversiones en infraestructuras, serán necesarios entre 400.000 y 900.000 millones adicionales. Los autores advierten que se trata de cifras “que probablemente estén subestimadas”. Otro informe reciente estima que, con el crecimiento de la población, los gastos anuales en infraestructuras en el mundo en desarrollo necesitarán incrementarse hasta suponer entre 1,8 y 2,3 billones de dólares por año, para 2020 (Bhattacharya, Romani y Stern, 2012). Los gastos actuales en infraestructuras en los países en desarrollo son de aproximadamente entre 0,8 y 0,9 billones de dólares al año.

Se pueden requerir todavía más recursos si se tiene en cuenta que las infraestructuras deben ser “verdes”. Para responder al cambio climático, que es el más acuciante mal público global, va a ser necesaria en los PRM una drástica mejora en la eficiencia energética y un acelerado cambio hacia fuentes sostenibles de energía, y esto podría significar difíciles transacciones en términos de crecimiento del consumo y del bienestar colectivo, lo que necesitará ser compensado. La financiación de intervenciones en materia de mitigación y adaptación frente al cambio climático remite a un aspecto que se ha definido en procesos de negociación diferentes a los que comúnmente utiliza la ayuda, pero inevitablemente, se hará cada vez más indistinguible de la cooperación para el desarrollo a medida que la agenda post-2015 entre en efecto y que el paradigma donante-receptor prosiga su evolución hacia una relación mutua más horizontal.

En suma, consideramos que la responsabilidad de la

comunidad internacional respecto a los pobres y marginados no finaliza cuando una familia o un país cruzan una línea de renta que es en gran medida arbitraria. La inmensa mayoría de los pobres del mundo y una creciente parte de los problemas relacionados con la sostenibilidad están localizada en los PRM. Tanto los países desarrollados como los PRM, deberían estar interesados en trabajar juntos en la búsqueda y difusión de tecnologías limpias y en alternativas a las energías fósiles para apoyar un cambio gradual en los patrones de consumo y producción. La comunidad internacional debería estar, y está de hecho, integrando más intensamente la agenda de los PRM en las discusiones internacionales. La cooperación para el desarrollo ha de orientarse a complementar y estimular las capacidades de los PRM. En la siguiente sección analizaremos cómo podría hacerse esto.

3. LOS PRM COMO RECEPTORES: EL PAPEL DE LA COOPERACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO

En la sección previa presentamos las necesidades de los PRM en términos tanto de restricciones y bloqueos, las trampas, como de insuficiencias en los presupuestos, las brechas. Se podría argüir que el grueso de la responsabilidad para gestionar estos problemas debe descansar en los propios países, pero ¿qué puede hacer la cooperación para apoyar a los PRM?

A medida que los países ascienden en la escala de la renta y acceden de forma más fácil (en la mayor parte de los casos) a fondos, tanto domésticos como privados internacionales, los

países requerirán menos financiación oficial del exterior en forma de ayuda. Esto es obvio y es algo cercano a un truismo. Es esta además una fuente de orgullo de los propios países, para los cuales la dependencia de la ayuda se sabe que puede tener consecuencias adversas tanto de tipo político como económico (Glennie, 2008). Pero el hecho de que los países no necesiten tanta ayuda como antes no significa que esos recursos no puedan hacer una importante contribución al desarrollo. Con mayores recursos, los objetivos de desarrollo podrán ser alcanzados antes y con mayor éxito que si ese apoyo no existe. Esto es especialmente cierto cuando los recursos son de naturaleza pública, deliberadamente enfocados en alcanzar objetivos mutuamente acordados y asociados a la transmisión de experiencia, conocimiento compartido, capacidades técnicas y apoyo institucional.

Desde luego, todo depende en gran medida del contexto del país. Algunos PRM podrán requerir grandes transferencias financieras, si su base impositiva es limitada, para ayudar a la reducción de la pobreza, construir una infraestructura sostenible y contribuir a un desarrollo sostenible a escala global. Otros PRM necesitarán mucho menos ayuda financiera, pero podrán beneficiarse del apoyo y del intercambio técnico, que supone cerca de un quinto de la AOD y es el pilar de buena parte de la cooperación Sur-Sur. En todo caso, el debate sobre el papel de la cooperación para el desarrollo con los PRM no es solo una cuestión de necesidades. Un dólar de ayuda es probablemente *más eficaz* en países que, como los PRM, tienen un relativo mayor desarrollo, donde el Estado tiene más capacidades y

donde, además, es más fácil reducir la pobreza si las personas afectadas, como de nuevo sucede en los PRM, están más cerca de la línea de pobreza.

Mientas el contexto global es ciertamente cambiante, hay un creciente número de países que son menos dependientes de la ayuda y, si bien en ocasiones se pasa por alto este aspecto, está bien establecido el papel comparativamente más positivo de la cooperación en los países de “baja ayuda” (Glennie y Prizzon, 2012). El análisis de la contribución que la ayuda ha tenido en este tipo de países, especialmente cuando ha sido eficaz, puede ayudar a definir las respuestas a las trampas y brechas subrayadas páginas atrás, proyectando cómo la función de la ayuda puede cambiar a medida que los países se desplazan de más elevada a más baja dependencia de la ayuda, o la que puede tener en países que nunca han sido, desde hace tiempo, dependientes de esos flujos.

En respuesta a las trampas, como ya hemos señalado, el principal papel de la ayuda será incentivar y catalizar el cambio, del modo en que lo hace una intervención pública. Cuanto más se asemejen las trampas a brechas, en mayor medida la ayuda continuará ejerciendo su papel como transferencia financiera, dependiendo su eficacia tanto de la cantidad como de la calidad del apoyo.

3.1 LA COOPERACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO Y LAS TRAMPAS DE RENTA MEDIA: UN ENFOQUE BASADO EN INCENTIVOS

El apoyo internacional puede ayudar a los países a superar las trampas de renta media, más a través del acompañamiento y estímulo a sus esfuerzos que de una financiación a gran escala. En la medida en que esto es lo que hace la cooperación Sur-Sur, se puede decir que esta modalidad está mucho más dirigida a lo que será la forma de cooperación dominante en los años venideros, de la que todos (del Norte y del Sur) pueden aprender. Sin embargo, aunque sean de limitada magnitud, los flujos financieros son casi siempre necesarios para facilitar tales procesos y las inyecciones catalíticas de dinero pueden propiciar cambios sustanciales.

En la medida en que los problemas que padecen los PRM son más cercanos a los propios que padecen los donantes (por ejemplo, desempleo juvenil, amenazas ambientales o cambio en los patrones energéticos), la cooperación con los PRM requerirá unas relaciones más horizontales y basadas en el trabajo en red, convocando las capacidades y conocimientos técnicos de varios actores, incluyendo a aquellos procedentes del Sur. Las agencias oficiales en estos casos deberán relegar su papel precedente como proveedores de servicios, convirtiéndose en mediadores capaces de identificar los problemas, establecer el diálogo con los afectados, crear las condiciones necesarias para propiciar la red de trabajo en común y definir los incentivos (incluyendo los incentivos financieros) para asegurar la eficiencia de la acción colectiva. En esta línea, cabe identificar cinco funciones clave de esta clase de cooperación orientada a los incentivos.

3.1.1 Promover mejoras en las políticas y en el entorno político

Sea el nivel de la cooperación elevado o reducido, su efecto en la generación de incentivos ha sido siempre una parte crucial de su eficacia, y continuará siéndolo en el futuro. En ocasiones, los incentivos han sido perversos, especialmente cuando el apoyo recibido es de cierta entidad y puede haber desincentivado la aplicación de políticas progresivas en los países receptores, o cuando las condiciones asociadas a la ayuda han promovido políticas equivocadas. Pero, igualmente, a menudo la comunidad internacional ha logrado estimular políticas eficaces y progresivas en los países receptores. En muchos casos la financiación o la presión política externas han marcado la diferencia, ya sea en materia de derechos humanos, de movilización de recursos domésticos o de promoción o apoyo a las políticas contra las desigualdades sociales.

Es un error suponer que lo pequeño es irrelevante. Hay muchos ejemplos de pequeñas cantidades de dinero que han sido usadas para promover cambios muy significativos. Por ejemplo, mientras la AOD es una muy pequeña proporción de la economía colombiana, ha promovido a menudo resultados positivos en áreas estratégicas. En el estudio de evaluación de la aplicación de la Declaración de París en Colombia, previo a Busan, Wood *et al.* (2011) señalan que “en ciertos campos — tales como el medio ambiente, el fortalecimiento institucional y el apoyo al sistema productivo, así como respecto a problemas relacionados con la lucha contra la desigualdad, la población interna desplazada y las violaciones de derechos humanos— el

uso selectivo de los recursos financieros de la ayuda, el conocimiento técnico y la experiencia compartida fueron factores determinantes en alcanzar mejores resultados de desarrollo". Otros ejemplos incluyen el modo en el que la cooperación para el desarrollo ha ayudado a difundir la información acerca de experimentos exitosos y ha provisto la financiación inicial para extenderlos, tal como cuando los donantes, entre ellos el Banco Mundial, respaldaron la difusión de los programas de transferencias condicionadas, inicialmente establecidas en México.

A menudo, la importancia de la cooperación para el desarrollo como incentivo se incrementa en proporción inversa a la escala relativa de la inversión. En los países de baja ayuda, este aspecto será el más importante a considerar por parte de las agencias. De hecho, las consecuencias negativas de la ayuda sobre la gobernanza, que están bien documentadas (Braütigam, 2000), es poco probable que ocurran en países de baja ayuda, en la medida en que están relacionadas con la dependencia de esos recurso externos, lo que sugiere que las oportunidades para otorgar "valor al dinero" resultan en cierto modo fortalecidas en esos contextos.

3.1.2 Apoyar a los actores no gubernamentales

A medida que los países crecen económicamente y los problemas de desarrollo se desplazan gradualmente desde las carencias absolutas, por la falta de recursos, a la inadecuada distribución de lo existente, las tareas de la sociedad civil en

materia de incidencia y exigencia de rendición de cuentas (entendida de forma amplia para incluir los medios de comunicación, los sindicatos, la iglesia, los centros de estudio, etc.), y el trabajo de los parlamentos se hacen cada vez más importantes. Un problema que sucede a menudo es que existen limitadas fuentes nacionales de recursos disponibles para la sociedad civil local, de modo que el papel de la financiación internacional puede ser crucial para la supervivencia y desarrollo de una sana sociedad civil, capaz de inclinar las relaciones de poder en favor de los más pobres y los marginados. Un importante problema a este respecto es la relación entre los financiadores externos y los actores no gubernamentales, muchos de ellos frecuentemente críticos con el gobierno: de hecho, esto es a menudo la razón por la que se les financia. Aunque esta es una fuente de tensión, es algo que la comunidad internacional ha sabido manejar con cierta habilidad a lo largo del tiempo, y debe seguir haciéndolo en el futuro.

3.1.3 Apalancar y añadir valor a la financiación privada

Dado su limitado peso en el PIB de los receptores, la eficacia de la cooperación para el desarrollo a menudo dependerá crucialmente de su apalancamiento: esto es, de su capacidad para movilizar capacidades y recursos adicionales. Del mismo modo que se hace a escala nacional, el dinero público de carácter internacional puede jugar un papel crucial en atraer fondos privados adicionales para invertir en proyectos de interés

público, ya sea liderándolos y demostrando su rentabilidad, ya sea compartiendo el riesgo de las operaciones. Este es el propósito, por ejemplo, de las Instituciones Financieras de Desarrollo que están a cargo de la gestión de instrumentos relacionados con la inversión en capital y cuasi capital, préstamos y garantías. La cartera consolidada de estas instituciones se acercaba a los 36.000 millones de dólares (6,5 de los cuales en nuevos proyectos) en 2012, pero movilizan recursos, dominantemente procedentes del sector privado, que podrían multiplicar esa cantidad por cuatro o por cinco (EDFI, 2012). La implicación de los actores públicos puede hacer en estos casos que los estándares sociales y ambientales estén algo más protegidos que si solo es el sector privado el implicado.

3.1.4 Desarrollar capacidades (individuales e institucionales)

La orientación de mucha de la cooperación Sur-Sur y el objetivo de alrededor del 20% de la AOD es el desarrollo de capacidades en los países, ya sea a nivel individual, ya a nivel de las instituciones. Mientras que es probable que las necesidades cambien a medida que el país se desarrolla, no existe evidencia o lógica que implique que se reduzca la necesidad de apoyo en el desarrollo de capacidades, a medida que uno progresa. De hecho, compartir conocimientos es una parte normal de las relaciones que existen entre los países ricos, lo que sugiere que esta área de trabajo debe seguir siendo importante incluso para los países que ocupan posiciones elevadas en la escala de la

renta. Sin embargo, la cooperación técnica debe superar alguna de sus típicas limitaciones, poniendo mayor énfasis en el desarrollo de las capacidades locales, en lugar de en el mero trasplante de la capacidades del donante. Esto implica que la cooperación se dirija al fortalecimiento de las capacidades institucionales, sea menos dependiente de los técnicos expatriados y sea más sensible a la aplicabilidad de los conocimientos a los entornos locales.

3.1.5 Cubrir riesgos, incluyendo los desastres ambientales y los shocks financieros

Este es un papel no discutido de la cooperación para el desarrollo. Algunos PRM están entre los países más expuestos a los desastres naturales, un aspecto de la geografía que es improbable que cambie a medida que el nivel de renta del país evoluciona. La cooperación para el desarrollo debería tomar este aspecto en cuenta, apoyando los mecanismos nacionales e internacionales de prevención y de fortalecimiento de la resiliencia de las comunidades en riesgo. Un ejemplo de este tipo podría ser el apoyo que algunos donantes ofrecen al Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, una iniciativa promovida por los gobiernos de la región con el apoyo del Banco Mundial para proveer liquidez de corto plazo que facilite los esfuerzos de recuperación después de huracanes o de terremotos.

Por otra parte, los PRM sufren un mayor riesgo que los PRB de padecer shocks financieros, en la medida en que están

generalmente más integrados en los mercados financieros internacionales. De nuevo, es necesario disponer de recursos accesibles como un mecanismo de aseguramiento frente a las crisis financieras, que tienen el efecto de dañar severamente las perspectivas de crecimiento de los países de forma, en ocasiones, inesperada (por ejemplo, Indonesia regresó temporalmente al estatus de LIC como consecuencia de la crisis asiática de finales de los noventa).

La cooperación para el desarrollo puede también respaldar iniciativas innovadoras en el ámbito de la política social y económica, que los gobiernos locales pueden ser reluctantes a financiar por los riesgos que comportan. Dado que el uso de los fondos internacionales rinde cuentas a entidades que están fuera de la arena política del receptor, los gobiernos son capaces de usar más flexiblemente estos recursos que sus propios fondos, que son vigilados estrechamente por el parlamento. Si bien la rendición de cuentas es una de las partes más complejas de la cooperación para el desarrollo, esta flexibilidad adicional puede, en las mejores circunstancias, permitir a los países asumir riesgos que, en otro caso, hubieran evitado, conduciendo al logro de rendimientos más elevados o a la generación de importantes aprendizajes.

3.2 LA COOPERACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO Y LAS BRECHAS DE RENTA MEDIA: APOYO CRÍTICO A LOS PRESUPUESTO DE DESARROLLO

En los ejemplos anteriores, en los cuales la cooperación para el desarrollo trata de responder a las trampas de renta media, la calidad (las características) del apoyo prestado es más importante que la cantidad de los recursos transferidos. Pero, como hemos visto, muchos PRM tienen significativas limitaciones en sus presupuestos públicos para reducir o eliminar la pobreza y para alcanzar una senda más sostenible de desarrollo. En algunos países, los situados entre los más pobres del espectro, el problema está todavía asociado a la falta de recursos; en otros, el problema es más bien la inadecuada distribución de los existentes u otras limitaciones en la gobernanza. En suma, las pretéritas formas de transferencia de recursos de cierta escala siguen siendo cruciales para muchos PRM. Pero, hay dos objeciones importantes. Primero, la percepción de que los PRM podrían obtener esos mismos fondos sin la necesidad de recurrir a la ayuda o a la cooperación para el desarrollo; y, segundo, que los fondos externos pueden hacer más lenta la senda de cambios deseables en el ámbito de las políticas (por ejemplo, la necesidad de mejorar la recaudación fiscal) al reducir la presión sobre los gobiernos para que actúen.

3.2.1 ¿Están disponibles otras fuentes de financiación?

La afirmación, crecientemente extendida, de que los PRM tienen recursos para gestionar su propio desarrollo depende de cómo se defina “desarrollo”, esto es, de la ambición que tenga la comunidad internacional. Algunos PRM tienen suficiente espacio

de políticas como para acometer una mejora sustancial en su sistema de imposición, pero otros se enfrentan a restricciones muy difíciles de superar. Buena parte de la “nueva clase media” que nutre estos países está todavía en un rango de renta de entre 2 y 13 dólares diarios (Ravallion, 2012), lo que sugiere que para muchos PRM la población susceptible de pagar impuestos es todavía limitada. Por ejemplo, solo el 5% de la población de Indonesia vive por encima de 10 dólares diarios en PPA, de acuerdo a los datos del propio país (Sumner y Edward, 2014). Otros factores en estos países dificultan también la creación de un sólido sistema impositivo, como el alto peso de la economía informal, el gran número de muy pequeñas empresas, la debilidad de las instituciones públicas y particularmente de las responsables de la recaudación, las deficiencias de las estadísticas fiscales y el limitado desarrollo del sistema financiero nacional, por no mencionar los problemas asociados a la evasión o a los flujos ilícitos de capital (Cotarelli, 2011; Keen, 2012; Cobham, 2014). Todos estos factores son particularmente limitantes en el caso de los PRM, en la medida en que esos países requieren desplazarse hacia un sistema de imposición más complejo, con más presencia de la imposición directa.

En tales contextos, la imposición doméstica no es suficiente para enfrentar los costes de poner fin a la pobreza de aquella población que vive por debajo de 1,25 o 2 dólares al día, todavía menos para quienes se encuentran por debajo de los 10 dólares. Puede haber también limitaciones en los términos de acceso a los mercados internacionales de capital. Aun cuando los países estén calificados para el acceso al crédito (y no todos los PRM lo

están), se da todavía la circunstancia de que, incluso entre los PRMA, puede haber alguno que tenga que endeudarse a tipos de interés del 10% o más en bonos del tesoro a diez años. En comparación, esos tipos están en la Unión Europea al 1,5%. La mayor parte de los gastos requeridos para la lucha contra la pobreza y para la generación de infraestructuras en el mundo en desarrollo son, y continuarán siendo, aportados por los presupuestos nacionales de los países, apoyados por una combinación de financiación privada, AOD, créditos de la banca multilateral y, más recientemente, créditos de las economías con mercados emergentes. La financiación privada continuará desempeñando un papel crucial en la tarea de financiar la inversión requerida en materia de energía renovable (Greenhill y Ali, 2013, sugieren que proveerá en torno al 75% de lo necesario). Pero, es claro que la financiación pública internacional debe también jugar un activo papel en el proceso. Las negociaciones sobre la financiación frente al cambio climático han asumido ya el principio de que los países desarrollados deben contribuir con fondos de entidad a la generación de una infraestructura “verde” en los países en desarrollo, de forma muy importante en los PRM, para propiciar cambios hacia tecnologías bajas en carbón y entornos de mayor resiliencia frente al cambio climático[38]. Otros bienes públicos internacionales también tendrán que ser pagados, al menos en parte, por los países desarrollados.

3.2.2 ¿Hay un peligro de azar moral?

Cuando los fondos externos cubren las brechas financieras que debieran cubrir los presupuestos nacionales, hay siempre un peligro de azar moral (Svensson, 2000, entre otros). Este peligro existe en todos los países, no solo en los PRM, y tiene que ser adecuadamente manejado por los financiadores externos.

Sin embargo, no conocemos ninguna evidencia concluyente de que la ayuda, a bajos niveles relativos respecto al PIB local, pueda entorpecer de manera significativa el progreso hacia un uso más eficiente y equitativo de los recursos: al contrario, en muchas ocasiones, cuando el apoyo es orientado de forma juiciosa, la ayuda puede constituir un mecanismo adicional de presión para el cambio (Alonso, Garcimartín y Martín, 2012). Es más, los dilemas morales operan en ambos sentidos: existe también un dilema si la comunidad internacional, apelando al criterio de azar moral, con la limitada evidencia confirmatoria existente, decide retirar su apoyo y dejar a los más pobres de una comunidad condenados a su suerte, conociendo la limitada capacidad que estos tienen para influir en las esferas políticas. En todo caso, siempre es posible orientar una parte de los esfuerzos de apoyo a la promoción del desarrollo a aquellas áreas donde el problema del azar moral esté menos presente. Tal es el caso, por ejemplo, de la financiación de aspectos tales como los bienes públicos internacionales.

En este breve documento nos hemos limitado a presentar de forma sumaria los papeles que la cooperación para el desarrollo puede jugar en apoyo al progreso de los PRM. El aspecto que deseamos enfatizar es que hay una variedad de posibilidades en este ámbito para quienes desean apoyar el desarrollo. En un

conflicto inevitable por recursos que son escasos, los países más pobres con seguridad aparecen como prioritarios para recibir esa financiación, porque su situación es mucho más desesperada. Dependerá de la comunidad internacional, particularmente de los países más ricos, decidir cuánto de las brechas de financiación de los PRM se deciden cubrir con financiación pública adicional de procedencia internacional. Tales fondos no necesitan ser donaciones; podrían ser financiación concesional. Somos conscientes de la presión a la baja que sufren los fondos de ayuda en muchos países de la OCDE, pero no creemos que el inseguro progreso de algunos países en su escala de renta sea una razón para la retirada de la ayuda: esta responde más bien a las discutibles percepciones políticas que se generan en el propio seno de los países de la OCDE.

En suma, los PRM pueden hacer un buen uso de los fondos públicos internacionales, sea para responder a las trampas (calidad de la financiación), sea para financiar las brechas (cantidad de la financiación) y complementar, de ese modo, la financiación nacional (pública y privada) y la financiación internacional privada. Que tales fondos sean o no provistos es una de las importantes opciones a las que se enfrenta la comunidad internacional en esta etapa de desarrollo.

4. LOS PRM COMO CONTRIBUYENTES: APOYANDO LA CONTRIBUCIÓN DE LOS PRM AL DESARROLLO INTERNACIONAL

La cooperación para el desarrollo no solo debe apoyar a los

PRM para que superen las restricciones que afectan a sus procesos de desarrollo: también debe respaldar los esfuerzos que esos países hacen para participar más intensamente en la agenda regional y global de desarrollo. A medida que el mundo se hace más heterogéneo, con un nuevo grupo de países asumiendo un rol más prominente en la escena internacional, los compromisos y esfuerzos de los países deben adaptarse a la nueva distribución internacional de la riqueza y de las capacidades. La escisión simplista entre países “desarrollados” y “en desarrollo” debería ser reemplazada por una más compleja y gradual distribución de responsabilidades a nivel internacional. En correspondencia con esta visión, los donantes tradicionales deberían respaldar los esfuerzos que los PRM realizan para participar en la acción cooperativa contra los problemas comunes, en particular en cuatro grandes áreas: la cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS); la contribución a la provisión de bienes públicos regionales y globales; el apoyo a la integración y cooperación regional; y la promoción de la coherencia de políticas y el establecimiento de nuevas reglas y estructuras de gobernanza globales.

4.1 APOYO A LA COOPERACIÓN SUR-SUR

El apoyo a la CSS es un modo de superar la concepción dual del sistema de cooperación, basada en la idea de “donantes y receptores”, remplazándola por una visión más incluyente, en la cual los países en desarrollo (particularmente, los PRM) con suficiente capacidad y recursos también tomen parte en las

actividades de cooperación internacional.

El volumen exacto de la CSS no es bien conocido, en parte debido a sus deficientes sistemas de registro, pero de acuerdo al CAD de la OCDE, 25 países que no son miembros de ese organismo proveían 10,6 mil millones de dólares en 2010, algo más del 8% del total de AOD, con Arabia Saudita (3,4 mil millones), China (2.000 millones), y Turquía (968 millones) como los más importantes contribuyentes (DAC, 2011b). Estas estimaciones no incluyen a todos los contribuyentes, lo que sugiere que las cifras totales de la CSS tienen que ser algo más altas. Al contrario que la AOD, además, que muestra notable resistencia a crecer en los últimos años, la CSS parece estar creciendo año tras año.

Aunque el rótulo de CSS oculta muy diferentes modelos y prácticas de cooperación, incorpora significativos y, a veces, novedosos componentes al sistema de cooperación, incluyendo:

- Una mayor apropiación del receptor, basado en la concepción de “horizontalidad”. La CSS puede también generar un “doble dividendo”, apoyando el desarrollo de las capacidades técnicas e institucionales tanto en el receptor como en el país contribuyente;
- Aprendizaje de la experiencia de otros países que han enfrentado los mismos problemas en contextos similares. En estos casos, la asistencia técnica provista por los PRM puede ser más apropiada y barata que la ofrecida por los donantes “tradicionales”.
- Ampliación del rango de modelos existentes, creando una saludable competencia entre los oferentes de

cooperación. Adicionalmente, la CSS amplía el espacio de maniobra de los receptores e incrementa su capacidad de negociación en la arena internacional (Kragelund 2008, Zimmermann y Smith, 2011).

- Promoción de un sentido de responsabilidad compartida para afrontar las desigualdades internacionales. Esto podría conducir a un sistema menos jerárquico, en el cual diferentes actores, provenientes de todo tipo de países, puedan operar conjuntamente en redes mutuas de trabajo y cooperación.

En función de lo señalado, los donantes de alta renta deberían promover la progresiva participación de todos los países, especialmente los más desarrollados de los PRM, en la cooperación internacional, a través de diversas formas de cooperación triangular y regional. Específicamente, los donantes de alta renta podrían apoyar a la CSS a través de:

- Ayudar a las agencias oficiales y a los cuerpos técnicos de los donantes emergentes para fortalecer sus sistemas de cooperación (con recursos financieros y técnicos y compartiendo experiencias).
- Tomar parte en iniciativas de cooperación triangular, facilitando las iniciativas de CSS a través de la provisión de fondos adicionales y de conocimiento técnico.
- Replicar innovaciones exitosas de la CSS.
- Respaldar las plataformas de CSS para propiciar el apoyo técnico, el intercambio de experiencias entre esos donantes y el apoyo a las iniciativas de cooperación

regional (véase más adelante).

Por su parte, los contribuyentes a la CSS podrían fortalecer su cooperación para el desarrollo a través de:

- La mejora de sus sistemas de información para una mayor transparencia y rendición de cuentas.
- El fortalecimiento de la implicación de los actores no gubernamentales, especialmente las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y el sector privado.
- La diversificación de las modalidades de cooperación, más allá de los programas bilaterales de asistencia técnica, a través de las contribuciones a programas multilaterales o multipaíses, particularmente relacionados con los bienes públicos internacionales y otros problemas globales, y programas de apoyo a la descentralización.
- Estableciendo mecanismos de aprendizaje a través de una más intensas prácticas de evaluación y revisiones entre pares[39].

4.2 PROVISIÓN DE BIENES PÚBLICOS REGIONALES Y GLOBALES

La apropiada provisión de bienes públicos regionales y globales es crucial para la promoción del progreso material agregado y para la reducción de la inestabilidad y de los riesgos internacionales. Para ello se requiere cierto nivel de acción coordinada a escala internacional y algunos PRM están llamados

a jugar un papel crucial en ese esfuerzo cooperativo, dado su incrementado peso en el orden mundial. Por ejemplo, los PRM son ya responsables del 54% de las emisiones mundiales de CO2, en una tendencia creciente; y, adicionalmente, un 65% de los bosques, los “pulmones” del planeta y depósitos de la biodiversidad, están localizados en PRM.

Al mismo tiempo, algunos PRM están entre los países más afectados por la subprovisión de los bienes públicos. Por ejemplo, un gran grupo de PRM (entre ellos algunas islas y países costeros en el Pacífico y el Caribe) podrían ser seriamente afectados por los efectos del cambio climático: de hecho, 13 de los 15 países más expuestos a los riesgos naturales son PRM (World Risk Report, 2012).

La provisión de bienes públicos comporta costes y algunos países tratarán de evitar el esfuerzo, adoptando un comportamiento “oportunista”. Para estimular a los países en desarrollo (particularmente los PRM) a asumir un papel más comprometido en la provisión de bienes públicos internacionales, la comunidad internacional tiene que definir los incentivos correctos y establecer medidas de apoyo para compensar los costes. La cooperación internacional puede jugar algún papel en esa tarea:

1. En primer lugar, es requerida la activa implicación de los PRA y de los PRM en las iniciativas internacionales orientadas a enfrentar los más urgentes males públicos (siendo las amenazas ambientales los más desafiantes). Los PARA y PRM deberían activamente compartir sus experiencias y proveer asistencia técnica y apoyo financiero de todo tipo a aquellos países de igual

o menor desarrollado en áreas tales como tecnologías limpias, la gestión de recursos naturales, medios de vida sostenibles, la prevención y resiliencia frente a los riesgos ambientales y los programas de adaptación al cambio climático.

2. En segundo lugar, todos los países contribuyentes (pero particularmente los PRA) deberían integrar la vulnerabilidad medioambiental y la referida a los riesgos globales en el marco de sus criterios de asignación de los fondos propios de cooperación para el desarrollo.

3. En tercer lugar, todos los países contribuyentes deberían trabajar conjuntamente en promover un progresivo cambio en los patrones de producción y de consumo en favor de las energías renovables. Una posible opción podría ser a través de la creación y financiación de un fondo internacional para la generación y diseminación de tecnologías limpias. Uno de los objetivos del fondo podría ser proveer incentivos para la creación de un contingente público de tecnologías “verdes” de libre acceso (a través, por ejemplo, de compromisos anticipados de mercado).

4.3 UNA PERSPECTIVA REGIONAL

Para los PRM es especialmente relevante el enfoque regional como parte de su incrementado papel en el escenario internacional, y ello al menos por tres razones. En primer lugar, porque su contribución a la gobernanza global podría ser más significativa a nivel regional, que es un entorno más propicio para crear mecanismos incluyentes de voz y representación y para

lograr respuestas más adaptadas a los problemas específicos de los países, fortaleciendo el sentido de apropiación entre los países implicados y permitiendo una más activa participación de los países de menor dimensión. El papel de los PRM en crear estas respuestas regionales es crucial, dado su peso en esos entornos.

En segundo lugar, diversos bienes públicos son de ámbito regional, tales como la gestión de una cuenca hidrográfica, un mecanismo de coordinación macroeconómica regional o las infraestructuras para promover la conectividad entre los países. Estos bienes públicos regionales tenderán a estar disponibles solo si los países afectados están dispuestos a financiar su provisión y a construir el marco institucional requerido para ello. Las iniciativas regionales podrían también contribuir a la provisión de bienes públicos globales, cuando no hay una adecuada respuesta a escala global. Por ejemplo, la estabilidad financiera es un bien público global que es deficientemente provisto a esa escala mundial, pero, sin embargo, existen algunas iniciativas regionales interesantes en el área de la provisión de liquidez, tales como el Fondo de Reservas de América Latina (que cubre el área andina) y la Iniciativa Chiang Mai en el Este de Asia, que son mecanismos cooperativos diseñados para evitar las crisis o enfrentarse a sus efectos de contagio. La experiencia de estas iniciativas muestra que incluso mecanismos con limitada financiación y con una perspectiva regional pueden tener un impacto importante sobre la estabilidad financiera nacional y regional.

En tercer lugar, algunos PRM son países de gran dimensión;

de hecho, en buena parte del mundo, un pequeño número de PRM suma la mitad de la población y del producto agregado de su región. La estabilidad y el crecimiento económico de estas economías es un factor de equilibrio y de progreso en ese entorno regional. La cooperación internacional debería tomar estas externalidades en cuenta para garantizar el máximo impacto en el apoyo al desarrollo de sus países vecinos.

Para avanzar en este campo:

1. Todos los países contribuyentes (PRA y PRM) deberían trabajar para promover un ambicioso plan de inversión en infraestructuras que potencie la conectividad regional en el mundo en desarrollo. Tal plan debería orientarse tanto a las infraestructuras físicas (tales como carreteras, redes ferroviarias y otras conexiones), tecnológicas (tales como la banda ancha) como energéticas (compartiendo recursos y energía).
2. Todos los países contribuyentes (PRA y PRM) deberían apoyar programas de cooperación regional en el ámbito tecnológico, promoviendo la difusión de las nuevas tecnologías y el fortalecimiento de los sistemas nacionales de innovación[40].
3. Los PRA deberían apoyar los procesos regionales de integración, fortaleciendo que los PRM asuman un comprometido rol en el proceso. Tal cooperación podría incluir el apoyo técnico a las instituciones regionales para mejorar sus capacidades para dirigir el proceso de integración, y el respaldo a los programas regionales, expandiendo una cultura de colaboración entre ellos.
4. Finalmente, un interesante ejemplo de cooperación entre PRM puede encontrarse en el fortalecimiento de los bancos de desarrollo y mercados de bonos regionales (y subregionales).

Aunque estas instituciones existen en todas las regiones del mundo en desarrollo, las dos que presentan una red más completa son los países Árabes e islámicos (Islamic Development Bank, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Monetary Fund, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, entre otros) y la región de América Latina y el Caribe (Corporación Andina de Fomento[41], el Banco Centroamericano para la Integración Económica o el Caribbean Development Bank). Más recientemente, la región de Asía y el Pacífico ha promovido mecanismos en apoyo a los mercados de bonos nacionales, y en la emisión de bonos regionales. Estas instituciones están limitadas por las restricciones financieras de sus Estados miembros, lo que sugiere la conveniencia de apoyo externo, en distintos ámbitos, por parte de la comunidad internacional, incluyendo las instituciones financieras regionales y los propios PRA.

4.4. COHERENCIA DE POLÍTICAS, REGLAS GLOBALES Y GOBERNANZA

Los PRM ocupan una difícil posición en la escala de desarrollo: están más profundamente integrados en los mercados internacionales que los LIC, pero carecen de la solidez económica y la capacidad institucional de los PRA. Como consecuencia, los PRM son altamente vulnerables a los fallos en la coherencia política de los países desarrollados, al tiempo que les afectan poderosamente las asimetrías y brechas propias de las reglas globales hoy existentes. Una parte importante del

apoyo internacional al desarrollo en los PRM debería, por tanto, descansar en una mejora en la coherencia de políticas (tales como en las reglas del comercio o en las de los derechos de propiedad intelectual).

En el nuevo escenario internacional, algunos PRM son negativamente afectados por las externalidades causadas, no solo por las políticas de los países desarrollados, sino también por las puestas en marcha por muchos PRM, particularmente aquellos de mayor tamaño y de mayor renta de su misma región. Por tanto, deberían promoverse mejoras en la coherencia de políticas también por parte de los PRM. El seguimiento de la coherencia de políticas en estos casos podría ser llevado a efecto a nivel regional, como parte de la CSS, en orden a mantener la apropiación de los procesos de seguimiento y estímulo[42].

Los esfuerzos de desarrollo serán infructuosos, si no se logra un entorno internacional adecuado que distribuya de modo más equitativo las oportunidades de desarrollo entre los países y que estimule respuestas cooperativas antes los problemas comunes. Un entorno eficaz y adecuado debería garantizar el deseado equilibrio entre la preservación de suficiente espacio político para las estrategias nacionales de desarrollo, por una parte, y la provisión de reglas globales efectivas para el gobierno de los problemas compartidos, por el otro. A este respecto, las estructuras de voz y representación en algunas instancias de gobernanza global deberían ser corregidas para reflejar adecuadamente el peso actual de los países en el escenario internacional, permitiéndoles una más plena implicación en la

modificación de las reglas y en las estructuras de gobernanza globales.

Hay muchas reglas e instituciones globales que requieren reforma, pero una es particularmente importante para los PRM: la coordinación fiscal internacional. Los PRM están siendo estimulados a mejorar sus sistemas fiscales nacionales para lograr una más plena movilización de los recursos financieros nacionales. Pero, mientras muchos PRM tienen espacio político para el diseño de unos sistemas de imposición más justos y eficientes y para mejorar las capacidades de sus administraciones fiscales y de gestión de las finanzas públicas, tales reformas deberían ser acompañadas por avances en la gobernanza fiscal a nivel global, para reducir la evasión fiscal y el fraude, detener la "carrera hacia abajo" de las políticas impositivas y los efectos debilitantes de los paraísos fiscales.

5. IMPLICACIONES PARA LA ASIGNACIÓN Y PARA LA EFICACIA

Las secciones precedentes han discutido el papel de la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo con los PRM a través de tres vías. En primer lugar, se han analizado las necesidades de los PRM, poniéndolas en relación con la identificación de trampas y brechas. En segundo lugar, se ha considerado el apoyo que la comunidad internacional puede dar a los PRM, para que estos avancen en su propio proceso de desarrollo. En tercer lugar, se ha discutido cómo la cooperación internacional puede ayudar a que los PRM apoyen el desarrollo y

la gobernanza más allá de sus fronteras. Ahora revisaremos dos áreas clave para las agencias de desarrollo, particularmente en el contexto de las negociaciones internacionales actuales: asignación y eficacia. ¿Qué implicaciones tiene el análisis previo para que los recursos de la ayuda sean adecuadamente priorizados y para que los medios de transferencia (modalidades) y los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas sean los más eficaces?

5.1 ASIGNACIÓN

5.1.1 ¿Qué es lo que está mal en la categoría de los PRM?

El Banco Mundial definió los umbrales de PRB/PRM/PRA sobre la base de sus categorías operativas de crédito, pero no ha publicado nunca la metodología exacta que los justifique. El sitio web del Banco Mundial explica que se consideró al PNB per cápita como el mejor indicador para ofrecer una medida amplia de la capacidad económica de un país, dada la alta correlación que existía entre esta variable y otros indicadores del desarrollo económico y social, definiendo los grupos inicialmente sobre esta base. De hecho, los umbrales se construyen con el PNB per cápita (utilizando el tipo de cambio como factor de conversión) y son actualizados en el tiempo para incorporar los efectos de la "inflación internacional", entendida como las tasas de inflación de los países desarrollados (el promedio ponderado de la Euro Zona, Japón, el Reino Unido y los Estados Unidos).

Se ha hecho un lugar común reconocer que el umbral de renta

per cápita al que los PRB se gradúan y alcanzan el estatus de PRM es arbitrario y ello constituye la principal crítica a la categoría. De forma más general, no se considera que el PNB per cápita sea una medida suficiente por sí misma para captar las capacidades y desafíos de desarrollo propios de los países, como evidencia la gran diversidad existente en el seno de los PRM. Es más, esta clasificación basada en la renta descansa en opciones técnicas que son abiertamente discutibles. El uso del tipo de cambio como factor de conversión (en lugar de la PPA) es cuestionable; la clasificación de los países cambiaría de forma significativa, y no necesariamente de forma lineal, si se adoptase la PPA como factor de conversión. No es claro si el uso de las tasas de "inflación internacional" de los países más ricos del mundo es un modo apropiado para actualizar los umbrales a lo largo del tiempo para los países más pobres del mundo; como mínimo, el cálculo de la "inflación internacional" debería incluir algunos PRM, especialmente, China y otras economías emergentes económicamente significativas. Finalmente, al ser definidos los umbrales en términos absolutos, aunque actualizados en el tiempo, la tendencia de crecimiento de la economía mundial ha supuesto una reducción significativa en el número de PRB y PRMB, mientras, por el contrario, se ha incrementado el número de los países de los estratos superiores (PRMA y PRA).

Por estas y otras razones los umbrales que definen los PRB/PRM/PRA requieren una sustancial revisión, y esto es algo que ya están acometiendo algunas instituciones, entre otras:

- El propio Banco Mundial que publicará una revisión al

final de 2014.

- El Comité de Políticas para el Desarrollo de Naciones Unidas, que ha incluido en su informe de este año a ECOSOC una mención a las clasificaciones de países[43].

Sin embargo, el principal problema no es la clasificación en sí misma, sino el hecho de que los donantes la usen para decidir la elegibilidad de los países y la asignación de la ayuda. Pocas agencias bilaterales confían solamente en el umbral PRB/PRM para la asignación de la ayuda o para la definición de los términos de sus créditos —tienen criterios adicionales que consideran—, pero lo cierto es que el PNB per cápita (y a veces el propio umbral de renta media) es un factor importante en esas decisiones. Esta forma de proceder es incluso más general en el caso de las instituciones multilaterales, incluyendo algunos fondos globales. Por ejemplo, las ventanas concesionales del Banco Mundial, el Banco Africano de Desarrollo, el Banco Asiático de Desarrollo, el FMI (a través del fondo fiduciario para el crecimiento y lucha contra la pobreza) y el Fondo Internacional para el Desarrollo de la Agricultura usan un umbral de renta per cápita (cercano al que diferencia PRB de PRM) para la elegibilidad y la asignación de los fondos.

Que la elegibilidad de un país para la ayuda y los términos de financiación se base en un criterio de renta puede tener los siguientes problemas:

- Adecuación: dado que los PRM están caracterizados por su elevada heterogeneidad social y económica, medidas promedio (como el PNB per cápita) son poco

representativas de los desafíos de desarrollo relativos.

- Equidad: países que están en un similar nivel de desarrollo, pero a cada lado de un umbral arbitrario de renta, podrían recibir tratamientos diferentes.
- Incentivos: porque las medidas de apoyo internacional son retiradas cuando el país mejora en sus logros, penalizando de este modo el éxito.
- Coordinación: porque al alcanzar la elegibilidad para la graduación puede provocar la retirada simultánea de apoyo de diversas fuentes, lo que podría afectar a la estabilidad y progreso en la senda de desarrollo de un país.

5.1.2 Un criterio de asignación de la ayuda basado en la identificación de problemas

Dadas las limitaciones que tiene una clasificación basada en la renta, han surgido diversas propuestas para crear categorías alternativas de países (véase Tezanos y Sumner, 2013, para la discusión). Sin embargo, dada la proliferación de clasificaciones de países y lo debatible que resultaría formular una nueva propuesta de clasificación, la mejor alternativa es identificar a los países por problemas específicos que la cooperación para el desarrollo busca apoyar o superar. Cuando el problema está bien definido y las medidas de apoyo son específicamente diseñadas para enfrentarlo, las limitaciones que afectan a las categorías comprehensivas de países (como los PRM) como formas de asignación de la ayuda, podrían ser evitadas (Alonso, Cortez y

Klasen, 2014).

La clave es, por tanto, identificar un indicador objetivo (o un grupo de indicadores) que ayuden a definir el proceso de asignación en relación con los problemas identificados. A partir del análisis de trampas y brechas presentado en la sección 2, se podría desarrollar una clasificación basada en problemas útil para la cooperación para el desarrollo. A modo de ejemplo, sugerimos tres problemas que podrían dar lugar a diferentes subgrupos de países dentro de los PRM.

CUADRO 2

PRM SELECCIONADOS Y CALIFICACIONES DE CRÉDITO Y TIPOS DE INTERÉS SOBRE LOS BONOS DEL ESTADOS A 10 AÑOS

	ODA/GNI	RATINGS		
	-2011	S&P (2013)/	MOODY'S (2011)	TIPO DE INTERÉS SOBRE BONOS GUBERNAMENTALES A DIEZ AÑOS
China	0	AA-	Aa3	4.1
Indonesia	0.1	BB+	Baa3	8.2
Lesotho	0.2	BBB-	Baa3	8.7
Sri Lanka	0.8	BB-	-	13.2
Bhutan	1	B+	B1	n/a
India	1.6	B-	Caa1	11.5
Vietnam	3.1	BB-	B1	8.8
Ghana	4.7	B	-	n/a
Sudán	9.1	BB-*	-	n/a

SOURCES: DATOS PROCESADOS DEL BANCO MUNDIAL (2013), ECONOMIST (2013) Y STANDARD AND POOR (2013) Y TRADING ECONOMICS (DERIVADOS DE LAS AUTORIDADES MONETARIAS DE CADA PAÍS).

NOTES * = FITCH RATING EQUIVALENT TO S & P RATING OF "B". BHUTAN AND LAO NO CALIFICAN. SUDAN FUE CALIFICADA C POR BY DAGONG UNA AGENCIA DE RATING LOCALIZADA EN CHINA.

Opción A: Restricción en el acceso al crédito

Con frecuencia, la superación de la línea que define a los PRM

es vista como señal de que el país ha mejorado en su acceso al capital privado. Sin embargo, tal acceso se hace a un coste. Aunque la mayor parte de los PRM tienen en principio calificación de crédito y acceso a los mercados de capital, sus calificaciones son a menudo las más bajas para la inversión no especulativa (para Standard & Poor y Moody's "BBB-" y "Baa3" son los grados más bajos no especulativos, véase el cuadro 2) y, por tanto, los préstamos concesionales de los donantes pueden seguir siendo importantes, particularmente para la financiación de desarrollo de largo plazo. Por ejemplo, los tipos de interés de los bonos del Estado a diez años en la Euro Zona fueron del 1,5% y del 2,7% para Estados Unidos (octubre de 2013). En contraste, los tipos de interés sobre los bonos del Estado a diez años estaban cerca del 10% incluso para algunos PRM de rápido crecimiento, tales como India, Nigeria o Indonesia. Es más, algunos tesoros han emitido bonos, pero no a 10 años de plazo (por ejemplo, Sri Lanka, Lesoto o Ghana). Y el banco central de Sudan no emitió bonos debido a la Sharia. Préstamos concesionales, de largo plazo, podrían, por tanto, seguir siendo útiles como una alternativa a los altos tipos de interés a los que acceden estos países. Una clasificación basada en problemas podría considerar las calificaciones de crédito y los tipos de interés sobre los bonos del tesoro a diez años como un modo de diferenciar entre los PRM.

Opcion B: Espacio para las políticas redistributivas (y tamaño de la población imponible)

Los PRM tienen muy diferente espacio para una fiscalidad de la

que obtener financiación para sus políticas redistributivas, frente a la desigualdad y la pobreza. Un modo de aproximar este aspecto es analizando la transferencia de renta del quinto quintil (el más rico) que se requiere para situar por encima de la línea de pobreza a la población pobre (lo que depende de la distribución de la renta, el porcentaje de población pobre y el gap de pobreza). Los sistemas fiscales básicamente descansan sobre ese quintil, así que cuanto más alta sea la ratio, más improbable será que el país pueda eliminar la pobreza basado en su propio esfuerzo fiscal. En promedio, los PRB muestran los más elevados ratios. Pero, a su vez, los PRM muestran ratios muy diferentes y no necesariamente ligados con sus respectivos PNB per cápita (véase el cuadro 3). De forma más precisa, hay un grupo de PRM (principalmente PRMB) que también presentan ratios muy elevadas. En estos casos, la cooperación para el desarrollo puede complementar los recursos locales en la lucha contra la pobreza. Una clasificación basada en problemas podría usar un indicador del espacio fiscal nacional para identificar diferentes subgrupos dentro de los PRM.

Opción C: Vulnerabilidad ambiental

Dentro del grupo de los PRM hay países que sufren severas amenazas ambientales. Tal es el caso de las pequeñas islas o países costeros con grandes partes de su territorio a escasa altura sobre el nivel del mar, países frecuentemente afectados por desastres naturales (inundaciones, sequías, terremotos) o países altamente dependientes de la producción agraria que pueden ser afectados por repentinos shocks (precios

internacionales, condiciones climáticas). Un modo de aproximar estas amenazas es a través del Índice de Vulnerabilidad Económica, que es un indicador usado en la definición de los PMA. La cooperación para el desarrollo podría tomar en cuenta este indicador para identificar aquellos países más severamente afectados por las vulnerabilidades ambientales (incluyendo los efectos del cambio climático). Hay también muchos PRM que ofrecen oportunidades para invertir en crecimiento compatible con el medio ambiente. Tales oportunidades y riesgos deberían ser identificados, para poder asignar los fondos públicos (parte de las finanzas relacionadas con el cambio climático de los primeros años se han dedicado a este tipo de intervenciones).

CUADRO 3
EJEMPLOS DE PRMB CON ALTOS Y BAJOS RATIOS (RENTA REQUERIDA PARA SACAR DE LA POBREZA DE 2 DÓLARES SOBRE LA RENTA DEL QUINTO QUINTIL)

PAÍS	ALTA RATIO (%)	PAÍS	BAJA RATIO (%)
Zambia	46	Albania	0,01
Ghana	13,25	Egypt	0,15
Lao PDR	12,16	Morocco	0,18
Congo Rep.	11,73	Paraguay	0,2
India	8,78	El Salvador	0,29

FUENTE: DATOS PROCESADOS DEL WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2013 (BANCO MUNDIAL)

5.2 EFICACIA

En los años recientes, y particularmente desde la puesta en marcha de la Agenda de París para la Eficacia de la Ayuda, en

2005, se ha fusionado (de forma correcta) el análisis de las necesidades con el análisis de eficacia de la ayuda; la pulsión por “más” ayuda debe ser acompañada por la demanda de “mejor” ayuda. La Agenda de París orientó la atención de los donantes sobre los ahora bien conocidos cinco principios: apropiación; alineamiento; armonización; gestión por resultados; y mutua rendición de cuentas.

A pesar del fuerte respaldo que ese proceso, y los principios derivados, recibieron de una amplia relación de actores del desarrollo, ha habido también preocupación porque la dinámica de esos acuerdos haya estado enfocada preferentemente hacia las relaciones “tradicionales” entre los donantes occidentales, por una parte, y los países de bajo ingreso, y generalmente dependientes de la ayuda, por la otra. De esta forma, las preocupaciones de los PRM, que continúan siendo receptores y, al tiempo, donantes emergentes (o reemergentes, en algunos casos, véase Mawdsley, 2012), pueden no haber recibido suficiente atención.

5.2.1 Avanzar hacia la inclusión

En la medida en que el proceso de París se transformó en la Asociación Global para una Cooperación Eficaz para el Desarrollo, en Busan, en 2011, hubo un claro intento de dilatar el enfoque del proceso más allá de la dinámica “tradicional” país rico/país pobre e incluir las estimulantes innovaciones que habían tenido lugar en (y entre) los PRM. Mientras el núcleo de los principios ha permanecido en gran medida intacto, ha habido

cambios de algunos de los indicadores (siete de los 12 originales permanecen). El cuadro 4 presenta un análisis sumario de lo que permanece y de lo que ha sido eliminado en los indicadores de Busan respecto a los definidos en París.

CUADRO 4
CÓMO LOS INDICADORES DE EFICACIA DE LA AYUDA DE PARÍS EVOLUCIONARON HACIA BUSAN EN 2011

EN LOS DOS, PARÍS Y BUSAN	INTRODUCIDOS EN BUSAN	EN PARÍS PERO ELIMINADOS EN BUSAN
Predictibilidad anual	Un entorno favorable para el sector privado	Cooperación técnica coordinada
La ayuda en el presupuesto	Predictibilidad en el medio plazo	Unidades paralelas de aplicación de proyectos
Mutua rendición de cuentas (con un énfasis más fuerte en enfoques incluyentes)	Aplicación de estándares de transparencia a la ayuda	Uso de los enfoques programáticos
Fortalecimiento de los sistemas de gestión de las finanzas públicas	Equidad de género en el gasto público	Misiones y análisis compartidos
Uso de los sistemas nacionales para la provisión de ayuda		
Ayuda desligada		

Fuente: Glennie et al, (2012).

La inclusión de nuevos indicadores demuestra dos claras enseñanzas de los primeros cinco años de la Agenda de París:

1. Que el desarrollo requiere la colaboración de un amplio espectro de actores, así como también de un gobierno eficaz y fuerte. Así debe entenderse el énfasis en el papel de la sociedad civil y del sector privado y también la insistencia en el enfoque en los resultados, que implica un modo de pensar aplicable a todos los casos.

2. Que se requiere la promoción de usos más flexibles de la ayuda, en lugar de enfoques verticales y cerrados, lo que se ilustra por el menor énfasis que se le otorga a ciertos indicadores (por ejemplo, el uso de enfoques programáticos, unidades independientes de proyectos y el enfoque en la cooperación técnica) en favor de aspectos más amplios y generales, como la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas.

Ambos aspectos suponen un progreso hacia una comprensión más rica de la eficacia, pero hay todavía aspectos que necesitan ser trabajados en el seno del Foro de Cooperación para el Desarrollo, de Naciones Unidas, y de la AGCED si los PRM quieren ver el proceso como más adaptado a sus condiciones.

5.2.2 Aspectos específicos de los PRM en torno a la eficacia

Los cinco principios de París/Busan son altamente relevantes para cualquier cooperación. Toda cooperación debería alinearse con las estrategias nacionales del modo que complemente el trabajo de otros actores externos, estar orientada hacia resultados concretos y promover la rendición de cuentas respecto a los supuestos beneficiarios. En cierta forma, la CSS tiene todavía camino que recorrer para mejorar la evaluación de resultados y la rendición de cuentas, mientras puede superar a la ayuda tradicional en lo que respecta a la apropiación. En teoría, por tanto, los fundamentos de París/Busan están bien definidos para un útil debate y aprendizaje entre las prácticas tradicionales

y las emergentes.

Sin embargo, hay algunos puntos de reserva que hacen que ciertos principios de Busan sean menos aplicables a la realidad de los PRM. Con relación a los PRM como receptores, a medida que la capacidad financiera relativa de un país se acrecienta no son solo las prioridades de desarrollo las que cambian. También lo hacen, generalmente, dos factores críticos que influyen en el éxito de la cooperación externa: el poder político en las negociaciones con los actores externos; y la capacidad institucional para poner en marcha los programas de desarrollo. Por ejemplo, el “uso de los sistemas nacionales”, uno de los principales soportes del proceso París-Accra-Busan, podría ser enfocado de una manera más flexible en estos casos, porque se trata de un principio que quizá se adapte menos a la realidad de países que reciben limitadas cantidades de ayuda. Esto significa que otras modalidades pueden convertirse en más apropiadas para alcanzar los resultados apetecidos tan eficazmente como sea posible. En algunos países, por ejemplo, podría ser preferible el enfoque de proyectos, dado que es un enfoque que requiere menor complejidad administrativa, y puede operar más fácilmente como un mecanismo de incentivos desde fuera del sistema[44]. En particular, la presión por el apoyo a los presupuestos, que permite la máxima flexibilidad del receptor acerca de cómo gastar la ayuda, puede ser menos útil en contextos de países de baja ayuda, donde se deben orientar los fondos hacia metas precisas. En países grandes en los que parte de sus regiones son especialmente pobres, un mayor foco en el desarrollo regional y urbano puede ser lo apropiado.

Con relación a los PRM como contribuyentes, el concepto de ayuda desligada, un elemento clave del acuerdo de París y un factor importante para mejorar la eficacia de la ayuda, es inapropiado en la mayor parte de la CSS, que está construida sobre la visión del mutuo beneficio. La ayuda desligada o los diversos instrumentos de ayuda programática parece que van en contra de alguna de las ventajas que los nuevos socios pueden traer al sistema de ayuda: particularmente, la provisión de su propia experiencia de desarrollo de un modo directo y rápido (principalmente a través de asistencia técnica). El principal argumento de la ayuda desligada, referido a que incrementa el valor del dinero ofrecido, es también menos relevante cuando los servicios ligados (o a veces los bienes) vienen de países donde los costes laborales son más reducidos.

5.2.3 Un proceso negociado

De forma más general, va contra el instinto de muchos países que no son miembros de la OCDE, que disfrutan de su creciente influencia en los asuntos internacionales, integrarse en un proyecto que lleva el rótulo de la OCDE, aunque sea válido en muchos de sus aspectos. Es probable que se requiera mucho trabajo para abrir de nuevo el proceso con el propósito de definir nuevos consensos sobre la gestión de la ayuda que implique a estos nuevos actores, sin renunciar a la experiencia acumulada por los donantes tradicionales.

Será difícil para la AGCED mantener su fuerza originaria como herramienta en manos de los países receptores demandando

mejoras, mientras al mismo tiempo abre su visión a un más amplio grupo de contribuyentes y receptores y formas de hacer en materia de cooperación. Esto solo se puede conseguir a través de la negociación. Todo sugiere que será necesaria una cierta redefinición de los indicadores, esta vez elaborados de modo plenamente incluyentes (lo que probablemente signifique poner en marcha un proceso formal en el seno de la Naciones Unidas), si se quiere que los PRM se sientan plenamente identificados con el proceso (algo distinto a la mera firma de un documento sin la intención de que se impliquen).

Es vital que los receptores de ayuda y cooperación, particularmente los PRB, adelanten sus posiciones de forma clara, como han hecho en el pasado, para definir los principios acordados a los que también deban estar sujetos los proveedores de cooperación que no son OCDE, aunque estos principios sean distintos de los acordados en Busan. Si no se presiona por el logro de unos principios incluyentes, simplemente no surgirán, ya que los países de la OCDE tienen poca capacidad de persuasión política en este ámbito.

La mayor parte de los PRM receptores están adaptando los indicadores de Busan a sus específicas circunstancias. Si las negociaciones se abren hacia indicadores más apropiados, es posible que algunos sean idénticos a los de Busan, pero otros serán diferentes. Por ello, cabría definir una escala gradual de indicadores, con algunas prioridades sobre la eficacia de la ayuda más apropiadas en algunos contextos que en otros. Tal proceso podría poner en marcha una cooperación de tipo más horizontal, más selectiva, basada en incentivos, integrada por

múltiples actores y usando diversos instrumentos que van más allá de la AOD, lo que, hasta cierto punto, anticipa lo que va a ser la cooperación para el desarrollo del futuro. Esta es la discusión que los implicados en la eficacia de la ayuda deberían estar teniendo ahora: lo que requerirá una revisión sustancial no solo de los procesos, sino también de los contenidos de los debates.

6. CONCLUSIÓN

Los PRM enfrentan todavía considerables déficit estructurales y vulnerabilidades que afectan a sus procesos de desarrollo. No solo los PRM necesitan apoyo de la comunidad internacional; la comunidad internacional necesita también que los PRM tengan éxito, si se quiere que los objetivos de desarrollo sean alcanzados. En conclusión, reiteraríamos cinco puntos como ideas centrales de lo defendido páginas atrás:

Primero, a pesar de la diversidad de la categoría de los PRM, pueden ser hechas algunas útiles observaciones sobre los desafíos que enfrentan los países a medida que su renta per cápita crece. Usamos el término “trampas de renta media” para referirnos a las restricciones al progreso que resultan de un conjunto de factores bloqueantes que mutuamente se refuerzan. Por “brechas de renta media” entendemos, por su parte, aquellas restricciones que requieren importantes inversiones financieras para ser superadas.

Segundo, a medida que los países ascienden en la escala de la renta y (en la mayor parte de los casos) tienen disponibles

más fondos procedentes tanto de fuentes domésticas como de financiación privada, los países dependerán menos de la financiación pública externa en forma de ayuda. Pero el hecho de que los países puedan no necesitar tanta ayuda como antes no significa que la ayuda no pueda todavía hacer una importante contribución al desarrollo. La cooperación para el desarrollo debería estar orientada a complementar y estimular las capacidades de los PRM.

Tercero, la cooperación para el desarrollo no debería solo apoyar a los PRM para que estos superen aquellas restricciones que afectan a sus propios procesos de desarrollo, sino también para respaldar el esfuerzo que esos países hacen para participar más intensamente en la agenda de desarrollo, tanto regional como global.

Cuarto, el umbral de renta per cápita al que los PRB se gradúan como PRM es insuficiente y arbitrario. Una alternativa es identificar a los países por problemas específicos que la cooperación para el desarrollo está buscando apoyar o afrontar. Cuando el problema está bien definido y las medidas de apoyo bien diseñadas, las limitaciones que afectan a las categorías comprehensivas (como los PRM) podrían ser evitadas.

Quinto, la apertura del debate sobre la eficacia de la ayuda para una mayor inclusión de los PRM es bienvenida, pero es necesario un mayor trabajo para configurar un tipo de cooperación más horizontal. Esto requerirá una sustancial revisión de los procesos, y también de los contenidos de las discusiones.

Pese a los problemas de desarrollo de los PRM, muchos

donantes internacionales están en un proceso de reducir su apoyo financiero a este tipo de países. Esto es preocupante. Nada sucede automáticamente cuando un país cruza un umbral de renta per cápita. Mientras es verdad que la coherencia de políticas es probable que sea más importante para los PRM que las transferencias financieras, de ello no se sigue que tales transferencias carezcan de relevancia. Al contrario, continúan siendo una parte crucial del esfuerzo global para alcanzar un sostenible y equitativo crecimiento. Por tanto, urgimos a la comunidad internacional a reconsiderar las tendencias actuales y los futuros planes de reducción de la financiación pública dirigida a los países de renta media.

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Lectura 3

Governance of the aid system and the role of the EU[45]

Owen Barder, Mikaela Gavas, Simon Maxwell and Deborah Johnson

INTRODUCTION

This paper is about governance of the aid system, with specific reference to the European Union. The EU makes a good case study, because all the global questions about governance of international aid also apply at the level of the EU. Is this a coherent and planned system, or more random and chaotic in nature? Is it capable of being governed and planned? Should it be governed and planned in its entirety? And assuming governance or architectural interventions are possible, should the aim be consolidation into fewer entities or cooperation among many?

Within the world of official aid, two views currently dominate the debate. The first celebrates diversity and concentrates on the coordination of collaborative networks. It focuses attention on shared goals, harmonisation of approaches, and better coordination of who does what. It finds its highest expression in the UN's work on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and in the aid effectiveness initiatives of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. In the European Union, the key instruments are the European Consensus on Development of 2005[46] and the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour[47], agreed in 2007.

The second view seeks reform of the aid "architecture" in order to reduce the number of actors and rationalise the supply of aid. It focuses on the allocation of aid between institutions, transactions costs, multilateral effectiveness, and issues like governance reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Its ideal is

captured in the phrase “don’t just harmonise, multilateralise”. In the European Union, a key issue is the share of EU aid channelled through the European Commission, currently only just over 20%[48].

Outside the official world, some have taken the idea of collaboration further, advocating market or network approaches, within a largely self-organising framework.

We begin (Section 2) by reviewing different concepts of governance and “good governance” and by providing a framework within which to assess the governance of the aid system as it currently stands. We focus on five criteria of good governance: effectiveness; efficiency; legitimacy; accountability; and adaptability.

In Section 3, we describe the aid system as it currently exists: growing and diversifying, variously governed, and often described as an aid “non-system”.

In Section 4, we assess the governance of aid, finding that none of the DAC, UNDCF, High Level Forums, ad-hoc country-level coordination or multilateralism achieve full marks on our score-card (though multilateralism comes close and will score higher as a result of recent reform of Bretton Woods governance).

In Section 5, we turn to the EU. We summarise the role of the EU in global context and assess the current governance of EU aid, with special reference to the European Consensus on Development and the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour. The European Commission (EC) scores reasonably well on governance, not least because of the accountability mechanisms

built into the Cotonou Convention with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Finally, we conclude with two paradoxes and four recommendations specifically for the European Union and the European Commission. The first paradox is that that although the system as a whole would work better if most aid was given through multilateral institutions, there are coordination failures which leave many countries preferring a large bilateral programme. The second paradox is that there is a familiar trade-off between effectiveness and accountability with regard to some aspects of aid governance: the DAC, for example, scores highly for its work on statistics and reporting, but remains essentially a rich country club and, partly as a consequence, is largely ineffective in driving change rather than merely keeping score.

Multilateral space is competitive. The EU and the EC can boost their position by: maintaining the mutual accountability provisions of the Cotonou Convention, and widening their geographical reach; increasing transparency; Member States holding each other to account for existing and more demanding targets related to the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour; introducing new instruments, like the Vulnerability Flex (V-FLEX) and the Food Facility; continuing to strengthen collaboration in international fora like the UN, G8, G20 and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC).

1. WHAT IS MEANT BY ‘GOVERNANCE’?

In the case of nation states, there are different views of what

constitutes good governance, but a number of common themes emerge—and these can be applied to the governance of aid[49]. A typical summary is given by Julius Court and Goran Hyden:

"The *Making Sense of Governance* book identifies six core principles that are widely accepted by researchers and governance stakeholders in developing and transitional societies around the world:

a) Participation: the degree of involvement by affected stakeholders.

b) Fairness: the degree to which rules apply equally to everyone in society.

c) Decency: the degree to which the formation and stewardship of the rules is undertaken without humiliating or harming people.

d) Accountability: the extent to which political actors are responsible to society for what they say and do.

e) Transparency: the degree of clarity and openness with which decisions are made.

f) Efficiency: the extent to which limited human and financial resources are Applied without unnecessary waste, delay or corruption"[50].

Governance of the international aid system is not exactly the same as governance of a nation, but many of these principles translate well into desirable characteristics of a governance system for international aid. Drawing from the governance literature, we suggest the following five dimensions against which a governance system should be assessed:

a) Effective: The governance of the aid system should improve the effectiveness of the aid system as a whole. This means it has

to address issues which improve collective outcomes, while leaving to the discretion of developing countries and their development partners those questions which are best resolved individually.

b) Efficient: The governance arrangements should be efficient as well as effective, avoiding unnecessary cost for donors or recipients.

c) Legitimate, fair and decent: The governance system must be legitimate, representing all affected stakeholders, setting rules that apply equally to everyone, treating every stakeholder with respect. It should respect the rights of nation states, both as recipients and donors, while achieving better collective outcomes than could be achieved without governance.

d) Transparent and accountable: Good governance must be transparent and accountable to stakeholders. These qualities underpin effectiveness and legitimacy, as well as the ability of the system to adapt.

e) Adaptive:Finally, the governance of aid must not only address the world as it finds it today, but also ensure that it is fit for purpose in the future. As the environment continues to change, so the aid system should evolve with it. The aid system has been handicapped by institutional arrangements that have been hard to change. The response to rapid changes in context —most notably the arrival of new kinds of donors—has been to add complexity rather than to simplify and evolve. The aid system must be organized in a way that allows, and indeed forces, it to adapt more quickly as circumstances change.

These qualities correspond closely to commonly used

frameworks for government—for example, the UK Department for International Development refers to governments which are "capable, accountable and responsive"[51].

2. AID - WHERE HAVE WE COME FROM, WHERE ARE WE, AND WHERE ARE WE LIKELY TO GO?

The system of development assistance has its origins in the end of the Second World War, with the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions. These institutional structures have remained largely unchanged despite very substantial changes in the context in which they operate.

Since the Second World War, the political environment for foreign assistance has changed considerably:

- The Marshall Plan, in which the United States contributed to the rebuilding of post-war Europe, gave respectability to the idea that rich nations could, in the interests of peace and trade, contribute to economic development. The perceived success of the Marshall Plan became a major impetus behind the emergence of aid programmes to developing countries.
- Decolonisation was accompanied in western countries by a growing sense of obligation to their former colonies, and so conventional foreign assistance programmes began in the 1960s, partly modeled on the Marshall Plan.
- The Cold War played out in the developing world as well

as in Europe, with the great powers using development assistance in pursuit of their global strategic interests. Huge amounts of aid were given to regimes like those of Mobuto in Zaire and Mengistu in Ethiopia, with the aim of shoring up allies and with little regard to the effects on poverty.

- The first oil shock in the 1970s led to the recycling of surpluses to developing countries, many of whom needed additional funds to cope with rising oil prices; this recycling of surpluses laid the foundation for the subsequent debt crises, and eventually large-scale debt relief in the 1990s.
- From the collapse of the Berlin Wall to the fall of the Twin Towers, donors were able to move away from using aid for geopolitical purposes; and at the same time, the shift in industrialized countries to floating exchange rates reduced their obsession with the balance of payments, allowing development policy-makers to focus on longer-term and broader objectives of reducing poverty and global inequality. It is not a coincidence that this was the period when the International Development Targets, later the MDGs, were established.
- Since 9/11, and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, donors have used more of their development assistance in support of shorter-term political and security objectives, and in support of post-conflict reconstruction and not only on acute poverty. The threat of terrorism has both created a heightened sense of

global interdependency, and focused attention on the need to create the conditions in which violent extremism is less likely to be perpetuated.

- Increasing environmental insecurity is becoming a new driver of a changing development relationship. Developing countries face the greatest costs of global warming, despite having contributed little to the problem. In the short term, the challenge is to reach an agreement on addressing global warming that does not slow down development and which compensates developing countries for the damage caused to them by industrialized nations; in the longer run, developing countries may benefit from changes in economic systems which put a higher value on natural resources, so reflecting part of the wealth of developing nations that is undervalued in today's markets.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Against the backdrop of broad geopolitical changes, there has also been an evolution in perceptions about the role of foreign assistance. Following the Second World War, it was argued that long-run welfare depended on capital investment, and that helping countries raise savings through a "Big Push"[52] would launch them into self-sustaining growth or take-off. As a result, donors funded infrastructure, such as dams and roads. However, by the 1980s the development community had concluded that

capital accumulation and technological progress depended not only on the level of investment, but also on a better economic policy environment. The combination of policies that were thought desirable was subsequently dubbed *The Washington Consensus*. By the 1990s, this approach too was in doubt, and it was argued that these policies could only have the impact intended if they were accompanied by more fundamental institutional reforms. A decade later, attention has shifted to even more fundamental causes of poverty such as conflict, rivalry between different social and economic groups, competition for scarce natural resources, and lack of political accountability. We can characterise this evolution as a search for the underlying causes of poverty. In part this has been motivated by an insistence that aid must be purely temporary, creating the imperative to find a way to catalyze permanent changes in developing countries. This evolution in thinking about the role of aid has inevitably changed the nature of the aid relationship, as it has placed the politics and institutions of developing countries centre stage. As the objective of aid has increasingly been redefined as nothing short of social and political transformation, so it has been increasingly difficult to relate aid to the ambitions held for it.

AID VOLUMES

The target for rich countries to give aid of 0.7% of national income was first formulated by the Pearson Commission in their report of 1969, although it had its origins in the first meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD) in 1964. Reflecting its time, the target was based on an estimate of the amount of capital from abroad that would be needed to increase investment and so accelerate growth in developing countries, though subsequent estimates of the amount of money needed to meet the MDGs have arrived at broadly the same orders of magnitude.

Until 2005, each industrialised country was committed to “exert its best efforts to reach”[53] the target of 0.7% of GNI. Five nations met it: Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, and two futher countries (Belgium and France) were committed to doing so. In 2005, all EU-15 countries committed themselves to reaching the 0.7% of GNI target by 2015[54].

Since the pledges in 2005 to increase it, aid has increased sharply, by 35 percent in real terms from 2004 to 2009. While substantial, this increase falls considerably short of what was promised in 2005. Over 60% of the increase from 2004-2009 has been from EU countries.

FIGURE 1

AID AS % OF GNI



SOURCE: OECD-DAC DATA 1960 2008.

NEW ACTORS IN THE AID SYSTEM

Despite these significant changes over time in the purposes and ideology in development assistance, there was, until the 1990s, very little change in the organisation of the development system. About 70% of aid is given bilaterally, and 30% through multilateral channels, and this has remained broadly constant.

Over time, the EU has become a more important donor, rising from a third of official aid in the 1960s to 56% in 2009[55]. Although a growing proportion of official aid is given by European donors, they are not becoming dominant actors in the development system. Instead, they are faced with a rapidly proliferating environment of new donors and new agencies. The main characteristics of these changes are:

- The number of government donors, and donor agencies, has increased. The DAC now includes 23 nations plus the European Commission, which have between them more than 120 bilateral agencies providing aid to developing countries.
- There are now more countries which give official aid outside the DAC than within it, including China, Turkey, Russia, Brazil, India, Venezuela and South Africa. These countries mainly operate in their spheres of influence. The oil-producing states also give large amounts of aid, mainly to Islamic states. These donors typically do not attach much value to the standards and norms set by the DAC, and because they do not report to the DAC, we do not know exactly how much aid is being given. Estimates

suggest that China is giving perhaps US$5 billion a year[56], a little less than the Gates Foundation; and about as much again is given by the other non-DAC government donors.

- There are more than 260 multilateral aid organisations, ranging in size from the World Bank to The Schistosomiasis Control Initiative. Although the overall share of aid going through the multilateral system has remained constant, at about 30% of ODA, for the last 30 years, within that the share going through the UN system has fallen and multilateral spending is now spent through a much larger number of smaller multilateral agencies.
- International philanthropy has taken off over the last decade. This is a predominantly American phenomenon. The Gates Foundation is in a class of its own in terms of size, but the most spectacular growth is among large numbers of smaller foundations.
- International NGOs, like World Vision, Oxfam and CARE have also grown rapidly, and are increasingly funded by private individuals rather than governments. International NGOs raise more money for development assistance than the entire UN system.
- Total private development assistance—including foundations, NGOs, educational organizations, churches and private companies—comes to about US$60 billion a year, about half of official development assistance[57]. This exceeds aid through the multilateral system, and may soon overtake bilateral aid.

- The private sector is increasingly involved in development, not only through (relatively modest) giving under the banner of corporate social responsibility, but more fundamentally by changing business models to take account of their customers' growing preference for more ethical and sustainable behaviour.

FIGURE 2
PROPORTION OF AID THROUGH DIFFERENT CHANNELS



SOURCE: OECD-DAC DATA 2009.

Total aid to developing countries was about US$200 billion in 2009 (this is an estimate with a wide margin of error, given the difficulty of establishing precise numbers for private giving and giving by non-DAC donors).

COMPETITION AND DIVERSITY: GOOD NEWS OR BAD?

The growing array of development actors, and the diversity of their approaches, represents both a challenge and an opportunity. They bring new money and ways of working which could make a substantial contribution to development.

New philanthropic donors bring more money to development,

but more importantly they bring new attitudes and ways of working. Large foundations are less dependent on public support for future funding, so they may be willing to support unpopular or un-photogenic causes (e.g. supporting statistical systems in developing countries). Foundations are frequently founded by successful entrepreneurs, so they may be more inclined to operate along business principles, such as making decisions based on evidence, tightly controlling overheads, adopting new technologies, and focusing more sharply on results. They may be willing to take more risks and accept more failures in return for bigger success. They tend to select projects according to the characteristics of the project rather than the country. Foundations may be more able and inclined to work closely with the private sector, which plays a key role in development, but with which official agencies have not found it easy to work.

The rise of new official donors, in particular China, has caused concern among traditional donors, who worry that their implicit cartel is undermined by a donor that is less concerned about governance and human rights, and that is prepared to be more open about its desire for access to raw materials and minerals. China has not been stuck with the DAC development model, and in many ways developing countries prefer China's approach. They rarely poach skilled staff; they provide turnkey infrastructure projects that do not overstretch developing country governments with meetings, reports and workshops. They appear more genuine in respecting local ownership, they operate very differently in different countries, and they seem to be genuinely interested in learning about what works. They are willing to invest

in infrastructure, irrigation and university scholarships—all sectors that DAC donors have moved away from. They avoid embezzlement and corruption by rarely using cash: there is almost no budget support or policy loans, as aid is disbursed to Chinese companies who do the projects.

Private aid through charities tends to focus on supporting communities and individuals rather than developing countries. It tends to be more opportunistic and closer to the ground. People who give money this way value the sense that they can work with local civil society organisations rather than governments, which can bring about results more directly although it is harder to bring about systemic change this way.

Specialised multilateral global organizations are growing in number. They can bring apply skills and expertise, they can learn more systematically and spread knowledge more quickly, they can bring together a number of different donors, the public and the private sector to work in a more joined-up way on a particular issue, and they can raise money from the public because they can be more specific about what they do.

On the one hand, this diversity of development actors could be a growing strength of international aid. Foundations could act like venture capitalists: taking bigger risks but leaving long-term financing of scaled up successes to official aid donors. Private aid could focus on achieving community and individual level results. Specialised global organizations could provide particular expertise not available through generalist support. The diversity of official donors could provide innovation rather than a monoculture of ideas. Official aid agencies could focus on long

term funding and resource transfer, and support for institutional change. If these actors could all focus on their strengths, and if the aid system enables them to work together well, the changing development landscape might substantially improve the effectiveness of development assistance.

On the other hand, this proliferation can present huge challenges for everyone involved. Developing countries are forced to deal with a vast, growing number of partners, each with separate agendas, priorities, and requirements. Meetings, reports, milestones and systems multiply. Skilled staff are hired away to serve in local agency offices or NGOs. Funding is fragmented and unpredictable, with developing countries unable to bring together the scale of long-term, predictable finance needed to undertake significant institutional reform and service delivery. Donors lose leverage and influence, because they undermine each other; and yet developing countries are not able to keep track of, let alone exercise sufficient ownership and control over, an increasingly fragmented system of aid delivery. Public accountability is impossible, since nobody has a clear view of what resources are being used, by whom, or for what purpose. Long-term strategy has to be sacrificed to short-term, measurable outputs to meet the immediate needs of individual stakeholders. Donors face rising costs, as administrative costs multiply when agencies proliferate, and the costs of coordination and harmonization rise exponentially with the number of aid agencies. Donor missions, offices and staff proliferate and duplicate.

According to the 2008 survey monitoring the Paris Indicators,

More than 14,000 donor missions were fielded to the 54 countries that took part in this survey (Indicator 10a). In Vietnam alone, this amounted to 752 donor missions in 2007—more than three missions per working day! Of these missions, less than one in five was cocoordinated with another donor[58].

The effects of this proliferation and lack of coordination substantially reduce the value of aid. A recent study by the European Commission[59] finds that:

- EU Member States have designated a total of 400-500 priority country partners. Increased consolidation of programmes and projects, use of joint financing arrangements, an agreed division of labour and delegated cooperation would save €200-500 million a year;
- EU Member States accounted for 40-50,000 entries in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database, an increase from 30,000 in 2003. About 22,000 new commitments were made in 2007 alone by EU countries, with an average budget of €0.7-1 million. The total costs of preparing these projects are estimated at between €2-3 billion per year;
- Increased predictability of EU bilateral aid commitments could increase the value of country programmable aid by between €2 and €4 billion a year.

In Vietnam, it took 18 months and the involvement of 150 government workers to purchase five vehicles for a donor-funded project, because of differences in procurement policies among

aid agencies.

It is not just official aid agencies that have to be better coordinated:

In the aftermath of the tsunami disaster a local doctor in Banda Aceh, one of the most affected areas, wrote: “In February, in Riga (close to Calang) we had a case of measles, a little girl. Immediately, all epidemiologists of Banda Aceh came in, because they were afraid of a propagation of measles among displaced people, but the little girl recovered very fast. Then, we realized that this was not a normal case of measles and we discovered that this girl has received the same vaccine three times, from three different organizations. The measles symptoms were a result of the three vaccines she received[60].

Although the costs of proliferation are well known, and donors have committed themselves to coordinate, harmonise, and to make more use of country systems, in fact the number of projects is continuing to rise and the average project size is continuing to fall.

FIGURE 3
THE PROLIFERATION OF AID PROJECTS



SOURCE: AIDDATA HTTP://WWW.AIDDATA.ORG/HOME/INDEX.

FIGURE 4
THE DECREASING SIZE OF AID



SOURCE: AIDDATA HTTP://WWW.AIDDATA.ORG/HOME/INDEX.

3. THE GOVERNANCE OF AID

WHY DO WE NEED ANY SORT OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF AID?

What determines whether the benefits of diversity are secured, and the challenges of proliferation avoided? Success and failure are divided by a knife edge. If diverse actors can each play their

part, and the parts link together well, then this diverse, competitive, noisy development system can be a coherent whole, greater than the sum of its parts. This requires different actors to pursue their interests within shared rules of the game, with appropriate mechanisms to limit negative spill-overs and ensure the collective provision of public goods within the system. But if the governance of the system fails, the result will be that developing countries bear many of the costs of proliferation, but with many fewer benefits.

Sometimes, the lightest governance is all that is needed. One of the most transformative social changes of our generation has been the spread of the internet, and the enormous range of uses to which it has been put. This revolution has occurred in the presence of very light governance arrangements. The internet is largely self-governing and self-correcting. Where it has thrown up problems—such as email spam—it has also found ways to work around those problems. (Interestingly, the philosophy of working round problems is so much part of the internet culture that it is built in a fundamental way into the technical specifications of the internet: if the shortest possible path for data to move is blocked, the system automatically looks for another path.)

The thought leaders of the internet have generally taken the view that the internet is better off without government interference: it can solve its own problems, while retaining the freedom and individualism that enables it to innovate, adapt and grow[61].

Analogously, it is reasonable to ask why the international aid system needs any sort of governance. As with the internet, there

is a danger that any sort of governance arrangements will slow innovation and stifle change and add to costs. Given that aid consists of arrangements freely entered into between sovereign nation states, and between consenting adults, what is the case for any kind of governance arrangements?

Aid needs governance arrangements for the same reasons that intervention is warranted in other sectors: there are some results that can only be achieved collectively, and individuals will tend to underinvest in these public goods; the actions of some individuals can have negative impacts on others, which need either to regulated or at least priced. Suitable governance arrangements can, in these circumstances, make the aid system more effective. For the money that is spent on development, better outcomes can be achieved if these public goods are provided and spillover effects are properly managed.

Working from the principles of good governance laid out in Section 2, it is possible to imagine ten ways in which a system of collective governance could make the aid system more effective. These are described below and summarised in Box 1.

a) Encouraging positive spillovers. There is strong evidence of positive synergies between aid activities: one donor's investment in agriculture is more productive as a result of another donor's investment in feeder roads. Millennium Villages are an example of efforts to bring about many different changes at the same time. Some development assistance is inherently collective—such as designing and implementing a reform programme, or filling a financing gap—and requires donors to work towards a shared

goal.

b) Reducing negative spillovers. The activities of on aid agency can adversely affect the impact of another. An aid agency that recruits a specialist from a government department undermines the efforts of another agency to build capacity. Aid agencies that require meetings with Ministers, or monitoring and review meetings with officials, slow down broader progress (this is analogous to a form of “aid pollution”). The prices of scarce resources needed by aid agencies—offices, houses, and vehicles—can be driven up by the presence of multiple aid agencies. Incentives created by one aid agency can dull the carefully constructed incentives created by another.

BOX 1: BENEFITS OF BETTER GOVERNANCE OF THE AID SYSTEM
Encourage positive spillovers
Reduce negative spillovers
Coordination
Prevent free-riding
Information sharing and learning
Division of labour and cost-effectiveness
Secure investment in public goods
Align incentives to development objectives
Protect long term goals from short term pressures
Voice and accountability

c) Coordination. The optimal behaviour for one agency may depend on the behaviour of others. A clear example is aid allocation, in which the optimal choice by one donor of where to work, and on what, depends directly on the choices being made by other donors. This is necessary in order to avoid some countries becoming “aid orphans” or “donor darlings”, for example. Optimal decisions about the allocation of research

funding similarly depend on what other donors are doing. Complex institutional change programmes requiring sequenced reforms will work best if donors are making their contribution to a coordinated overall programme.

d) Preventing free-riding. Everyone benefits from a more just, safer world, with prosperous trading partners. But some countries may be tempted to “free-ride” on the generosity of others. For example, a country could give relatively little aid, in the expectation that others will give more, so benefitting from economic development without paying for it. A country may benefit from the fact that other donors “untie” their aid, so its firms can compete for other donors’ contracts, while choosing not to untie their own aid. One of the original motivations for establishing the OECD-DAC was to monitor volumes of aid given by each donor. Countries that have provided debt relief are concerned by the possibility that this has opened the way for other countries to take advantage of this by making new loans to those countries in return for mineral concessions. If these fears are realised, it will reduce their willingness to give debt relief in future.

e) Information sharing and learning. Aid agencies increasingly see themselves as organisations whose value is not *administration* but *knowledge.* Project administration is important, but it is also fairly straightforward; more complicated is learning what works, adapting it to different circumstances, influencing policies, sharing ideas, building capacity and shared

commitment. This learning and knowledge sharing is needed across aid agencies as well as within them. The DAC networks (eg. GovNet) and the peer review mechanism are examples of this kind of role. Aid agencies also need a way to share basic aid information, which they do through in-country aid management systems, the two DAC databases, and the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. All of this contributes to reduced information asymmetries and a lower risk of principal-agent problems in administering aid.

f) Division of labour. The overall effectiveness of the aid system is increased if organisations focus on the activities in which they have a comparative advantage. In market-based systems, concentration of comparative advantage is a *result* of profit maximising behavior, rather than a *mechanism* for making choices. Firms are driven towards the activities in which they can make the most profit: the forces of price, supply and demand help to ensure an optimal use of resources. In the absence of a market mechanism, some kind of mechanism is needed to push aid agencies into concentrating on the countries and activities where their opportunity cost is lowest, sometimes in the face of countervailing political pressures to spread themselves more thinly.

g) Investing in public goods. Public goods tend to attract too little investment because, by definition, the benefits are widespread, so individual countries and agencies do not have a strong incentive to spend money on them. For example, the knowledge

created by research and development is a public good, with benefits that spread far beyond the country that paid for it. There is significant global under-investment in development public goods such as reducing climate change, financial stability, norms and standards, evaluation, and knowledge. Nation states address the need for investment in public goods by a combination of government spending and regulation; there is no equivalent of either in the development system.

h) Keep incentives aligned to development objectives (prisoners' dilemma). Donors invest in foreign assistance for a variety of reasons. Some of these are shared global objectives: for example, reducing absolute poverty is a shared moral endeavour. All nations benefit when the world is less unequal, when world trade increases, and the risks of conflict, organised crime, drugs and disease are reduced by economic advancement. But donors are also willing to invest in foreign assistance in pursuit of their own national interest to the disadvantage of other countries: for example, to win commercial contracts, gain geopolitical strategic advantage over rivals, or to stake a claim to oil or mineral resources. The aid system is more effective at reducing poverty to the extent that the shared goals are pursued in preference to the competitive interests of donors. This is a prisoners' dilemma problem—everyone is better off when aid is untied from commercial interests, for example; but each individual agency has an incentive to tie their own aid. A system of coordination among donors is needed to ensure that their actions are aligned with their collective interest in poverty reduction, and that this is

not undermined by pursuit of individual national interests.

i) Protecting long-term goals from short-term pressures Most democracies have evolved governance institutions to protect the nation's long-term interests from immediate political pressures. Examples include written constitutions, an independent judiciary and independent central banks. In development, long-term interests are frequently sacrificed to short-term expediency. For example, imported food aid may reduce hunger immediately, but at the expense of undermining domestic agriculture production in the long run. Donor-managed projects may provide services to the poor with lower risk of corruption and theft, but at the expense of undermining the capacity of the country's institutions to manage their own services. A good system of governance ensures that long-term needs are not ignored in the interests of short-term pressures.

j) Voice and accountability. Finally, governance mechanisms are required to assure voice and accountability for all stakeholders in aid, including especially developing countries themselves.

These themes constitute a compelling case for effective governance of the aid system. They demonstrate why it is not sufficient simply for donors each to pursue their own immediate interests; because the result will be lack of investment in public goods, failures of coordination and behaviors which have negative spillover effects on others. There are examples in the aid system of all the reasons why nation states establish their own governance arrangements.

WHAT KINDS OF GOVERNANCE DO WE ALREADY HAVE?

The aid system already has some types of governance in place. The main components are:

a) The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. A “donor club” of 24 donors[62]. It collects comparable information from donors, shares information and ideas through regular meetings of officials, sets implicit standards, and reviews them through peer review. The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, technically a committee of the DAC, has broader representation than the DAC, but fewer instruments at its disposal.

b) The UN Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF). A multi-stakeholder forum hosted by the UN, including donors, recipient governments and civil society. So far mainly a talk-shop, but with aspirations to do more.

c) In country cooperation. Many of the issues of coordination are addressed in developing countries through donor cooperation forums, with the recipient government sometimes playing a leading role. So far these have tended to focus on information sharing and some harmonization of donor efforts.

d) High Level Forums (Rome Paris, Accra and Seoul). These meetings every two to three years have brought together developing countries and donors, together with largely token representation by civil society, in an effort to set and enforce new rules of the game.

e) Multilateral organisations. Multilateralism can be viewed as

an effort to overcome some of the challenges above: by giving aid through international organisations, aid can be put more at arm's length from the political pressures of the donor, and aid from many donors can be coordinated into a single operation. Multilateral organizations have also played an important role in improving lesson learning and information sharing.

HOW WELL GOVERNED IS THE AID SYSTEM TODAY?

The aid industry stands accused of being ineffective and wasteful. The problems are serious and real: unnecessary proliferation of aid agencies without adequate division of labour, rising transactions and administration costs, short-termism and unpredictability, risk aversion, undermining of local systems of service delivery and accountability, inability to stop failing projects or organisations, ineffective provision of technical assistance, lack of mechanisms to take success to scale, underinvestment in public goods, lack of evidence of impact and results, inadequate learning, distortion of aid for national interests, and poor aid allocation.

TABLE 1
ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AGAINST CRITERIA OF GOOD GOVERNMENT

EFFECTIVE	EFFICIENT	LEGITIMATE FAIR	TRANSPARENT &AND ACCOUNTABLE	ADAPTIVE

	EFFECTIVE	EFFICIENT	LEGITIMATE & FAIR	TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE	ADAPTIVE
OECD DAC	Effective at information sharing among donors; some lesson learning. Not good at preventing spillovers, investing in public goods, improving division of labour, aligning incentives, or promoting long-term development interests.	Very high transactions costs for donors and recipient countries	The DAC is a committee of 23 rich countries.	The DAC collects and publishes statistics about aid outflows from its members; and it publishes peer reviews. But decisionmaking by consensus limits its ability to criticize members and accountability is weak.	The DAC has almost completely failed to respond to a changing context. DAC donors lack transparency.
UN DCF	So far the UN DCF has been a talking shop and has little to show for its meetings.	Expensive for few results.	Under the auspices of the UN, the DCF is representative.	The DCF is a fairly transparent and participative process.	Early days, but the process seems unlikely to be responsive to changing circumstances.
In country cooperation	Some country-led processes have made progress towards harmonisation. But many of the challenges cannot be solved at country level – eg. investment in global public goods, division of labour. In practice it is difficult for recipient countries to change donor incentives to purse their national interests. In-country processes have not engaged new actors such as foundations.	Coordination processes can be labour intensive, with few results	Developing countries can, in principle, exercise leadership over development activities in their country.	In country cooperation happens behind closed doors, with very little involvement of either local or international civil society. Taxpayers from donor nations have no access to these forums.	Decsion-making close to the ground is most likely to be informed by the effects of those choices. The process lacks local transparency.

	EFFECTIVE	EFFICIENT	LEGITIMATE & FAIR	TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE	ADAPTIVE
High Level Forums	Declarations have been modest in ambition, reflecting lowestcommon denominator agreements, and poorly implemented or enforced. Many issues have not been addressed at all.	Very expensive processes leading up to summits; very expensive implementation and monitoring.	Led by the DAC and World Bank, with rather token representation ofhandpicked developing countries and little place for civil society.	The HLF declaration is negotiated in a smokefilled room from which civil society is excluded. The microphones were removed from the desks of civil society delegates in the plenary sessions at Accra.	These processes feel as if they were designed in the 1970s, with little recognition of the changing landscape.
Multilaterals	Providing money through multilaterals is easier and more effective than harmonising. Multilaterals have been less susceptible to political second guessing. But theycontinue to underinvest in public goods, and multilateral proliferation is becoming a problem.	Some multilaterals– especially UN agencies –have high overheads. Proliferation adds to costs.	Many stakeholders are underrepresented in decision making – for example on the World Bank board. But UN bodies are legitimate.	Multilaterals are generally more transparent than bilateral aid. The World Bank, in particular, has advanced hugely in this regard.	Multilaterals seem to adapt more quickly to changing needs, partly because of the need to raise money from donors.

Arguably all these challenges are the direct consequence of failures of collective governance.

This failure of governance is encapsulated nicely by the process of agreeing the MDGs. The declaration by world leaders was a historic event, setting a clear agenda for development for the following fifteen years. But there was no organisation to translate strategic objectives into specific milestones and to monitor progress. There was no allocation of responsibilities; and no accountability of donors or developing countries for their

contribution to the agreed goals. In short, the Millennium Summit willed the ends but not the means.

This does not imply that the aid system necessarily needs a single governance mechanism, such as an overarching council or committee. But, as we have set out here, there are real issues of collective action that have to be addressed if the aid system is to be effective, which are currently not being addressed in a sufficiently effective way.

Table 1 below sets out our subjective judgments of existing governance mechanisms in international development against the five dimensions of our governance model: effective, efficient, legitimate, accountable and adaptive. We find that none scores the highest marks available on the score-card. Multilateral options score relatively well, however.

REFORM PROPOSALS AND TIMETABLES

There are currently a number of proposals for reform of the aid system and individual institutions within it. In aggregate, these should improve performance across the indicators on the score-card.

a) Following the recommendation of the OECD Council's In-Depth Evaluation in 2007, the DAC has recently undertaken a Strategic Reflection Exercise, to review its role, structure, functioning and composition. The outcomes of the Exercise are to form the basis for reform of the DAC mandate, expected to be renewed by the Council in 2011 for five years. The report

concluded that the DAC needed to adapt its core activities - sharpening its principal tools and working methods and taking an active role in the process of reforming the global governance framework. Amongst other recommendations, the report outlined the need for the DAC to: re-articulate its role in a changing development landscape in its mandate; to extend and deepen inclusion of key development stakeholders in all areas of its work; to help the wider process of reforming and strengthening the multilateral development system; and, to adapt its internal structures and processes[63]. Presently, the DAC is working on the detail of implementing the recommendations and is expected to submit a draft revised mandate to the Council in mid-2010.

b) In light of both the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, the DAC's Working Party on Aid Effectiveness recently underwent structural changes (principally by expanding its membership) and formulated a revised workplan, to establish itself as the international partnership on aid effectiveness.

c) The biennial Development Cooperation Forum, hosted by the UN's ECOSOC, was launched in 2007, with the first Forum meeting taking place in 2008. The second Forum meeting is currently being prepared for 29-30 June 2010. Structured around three themes -mutual accountability and aid transparency; South-South and triangular cooperation; aid policy coherence, in order to move to more long-term sources of development financing -the objective of the 2010 DCF will be to produce agreement on priority issues for action that are based on practical outcomes.

d) The reform of the governance of the World Bank and the IMF has been the subject of debate for many years. Whilst both donors and recipients are member states and shareholders in the two institutions, voting power on the Governing Boards is determined primarily by financial contribution. Most recently, however, at meetings in April 2010, the Development Committee approved a proposed voting reform for the Bank. In summary, these changes would instigate:

- An increase in the voting power of Developing and Transition countries (DTCs) at IBRD, bringing them to 47.19 percent.
- An increase in the voting power of Developing and Transition Countries at IFC to 39.48 percent.
- An agreement to review IBRD and IFC shareholdings every five years with a commitment to equitable voting power between developed countries and DTCs over time.

Proposals to increase aid effectiveness, such as the declarations made in Paris (2005) and Accra (2008), have worked to mitigate the problems of the aid system in ways which add layers of complexity. Harmonisation and alignment have, in practice, been translated on the ground into donor coordination committees, with lead donors and sectoral plans. At their best, these have helped to reduce transaction costs and harmonise donor approaches; at their worst, they have led to very little real change in behaviour. At its most positive, the agreement of clear

standards—particularly in the Paris Declaration (2005)—has emboldened some recipient countries to be clear about their expectations of donors. But addressing the symptoms without addressing the underlying causes results in new problems: to the extent that the expectations of recipient countries conflict with the underlying political and strategic interests of the donors, the long-term consequence is sometimes a reluctance of donors to give aid to those countries. Aid effectiveness declarations describe a better way of giving development assistance, but they do not address the underlying reasons why donors have given aid in less effective ways for the last forty years. If barriers to good aid are political, not technical, then technocratic agreements cannot overcome them.

4. THE EU IN THE GLOBAL AID CONTEXT

The EU is the world's leading exporter of goods, largest trader of services and biggest donor of both development and humanitarian aid, the second largest foreign investor and the second destination for foreign migrants (behind the USA). As a model of multilateral cooperation itself, the EU is a frontrunner in the pursuit of value-based multilateralism and its commitment to effective multilateralism in all fields is a defining principle of its external policy. As noted in the European Commission Communication on "The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism",

"Taking international co-operation as a precondition for meeting numerous global challenges, the EU has a clear interest in

supporting the continuous evolution and improvement of the tools of global governance"[64]*.*

Although the EU is a major player in official aid and in private flows, critics have argued that it is (a) falling behind on its aid pledges, (b) lagging behind on its commitments to improving aid effectiveness and cost efficiency, (c) lacking in strategic focus of its aid, and (d) undecided about what role EC managed aid should play in the future. In 2010, the big challenge for the EU will be to demonstrate that it is able to live up to its commitments in the run-up to the UN MDG Review Summit in September. Other important decisions on the horizon include the EU Budget Review in 2010 and the launch of the negotiations for the next EU Financial Perspectives in 2011.

FIGURE 5
EU AID AS A SHARE OF TOTAL ODA



SOURCE: OECD-DAC DATA.

As the world's largest donor to developing countries, collectively the EU provides 56% of global development aid flows (around €50 billion of the €90 billion total given in aid)[65] and in 2009, the EU provided 0.44% of its GNI. According to the OECD's analysis, eight EU Member States are going to surpass

their individual targets of 0.51% of GNI for aid: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Spain will meet its target of 0.51%. In 2009, France increased disbursements by 16.9%, as did the UK, by 14.6%. Yet, there were substantial aid cuts in: Austria -31.2%, Italy -31.1% and Ireland -18.9%. Six EU Member States have underperformed: Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Portugal. The greatest absolute decrease in ODA has been Germany's—almost €1.5 billion less in 2009 than in the previous year. While in Italy and Ireland, decreases were caused by actual cuts to aid budget, in Germany and Austria ODA shrank because no major debt relief was given. Figure 6 shows the ODA percentage of GNI for the EU 15 in 2008 and 2009, the forecast for 2010 and the 0.7% target by 2015.

As a consequence, total EU ODA is projected to amount to 0.48% of GNI in 2010 rather than the pledged 0.56%. At the same time, as the economic downturn continues to have a negative effect on growth in many developed countries, GNI is likely to fall. Therefore, even if the EU continued to meet the percentage targets for aid expenditure, the actual *amount* derived from that percentage is less than would have been predicted when the 0.7% target was set. The EC has time and again encouraged all Member States to set out rolling multi-annual indicative timetables showing how they will reach agreed ODA/GNI targets. However, most Member States have yet to produce a timetable, citing legal restrictions related to their national budget cycle.

Almost all of the EU-12 -the newer Member States, which have

a common interim target of 0.17% by 2010 -will decrease or stagnate around existing aid levels.

At present, the share of EU aid channelled through the EC is currently around 20%[66]. In 2009, the EC's ODA increased by 4.4% in real terms, down from the 17.5% increase in 2008[67].

FIGURE 6



SOURCE: OECD-DAC FIGURES FOR 2009.

HOW DOES THE GOVERNANCE OF THE EU COMPARE?

Effective

A decade ago, the UK Secretary of State for International Development at the time, Clare Short, characterised the Commission as the "worst development agency in the world"[68]. At the time, the EC suffered from a variety of ailments: the distinctive added-value of EC aid was unclear; it largely failed to adopt a coherent approach to managing its external assistance;

its policies were guided by individual instruments rather than by clearly defined development objectives per country, region or sector; its aid system was fragmented in terms of small, ad-hoc instruments, too many procedures and opaque institutional mechanisms; and its organisational set-up was outdated and incoherent. As a result, long delays built up in different parts of the system and bureaucratisation and centralisation were rampant.

A decade ago began the reforms of the EC which addressed strategy and management. Since 2000, there have been substantial improvements to the effectiveness of EU external assistance, designed to restore the credibility, effectiveness and legitimacy of EC aid, and also to articulate common values and principles.

Adopted in 2005 by the EC, the Council and the European Parliament, and building on the initial “EC Development Policy Statement” the European Consensus on Development[69] sets out the common vision of values, objectives, principles and means to development shared by all Member States and the EC. It emphasises poverty reduction as the central goal and asserts the priority of assistance to Low Income Countries (LICs). Administratively, it professes a shift from project aid to general budget support and to performance-based assessment. Conditionality is expressed in a “contract” with the partner country, recognising that aid effectiveness can only be achieved through “national ownership” of aid programmes by the developing country. It defines the comparative advantage and priorities of the collective development effort implemented by the

EC.

The European Consensus was hard-won. However, it has not been adopted as the visionary policy statement beyond its founders, the Development Commissioner and DG Development, let alone by the EU Member States. In spite of the fact that the European Consensus calls for concentration of aid in LICs, EC aid retains ambition of almost universal coverage. It is present in 120 developing countries. In 2007, 44% of EC aid was allocated to LICs. The DAC average for all donors was 63% and the average for the EU was 65%. In 2008, EC aid to LDCs fell to 42%. The 2007 OECD DAC Peer Review of EC Aid[70] attributes this to the EC's limited ability to influence the EDF (determined by Member States) and the Community budget (determined by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament). The DAC points out that the EU attaches particular importance to its neighbouring states, particularly in the context of their prospective membership of the EU. Turkey's status as the main recipient of EC aid for the past years is a case in point. Furthermore, while the European Consensus emphasises the need for the EC to concentrate upon its areas of comparative advantage, these are broadly defined, with the number of priority areas for EC action increasing from six in the original Development Policy Statement to nine in the European Consensus—water and energy provision, and social cohesion and development have been added to trade and regional integration, the environment, infrastructure and transport, rural development, governance, conflict prevention and fragile states, and human development.

The Consensus also proposes to enhance EU coordination through greater emphasis upon a division of labour, exploiting individual partners' comparative advantage. In particular, it emphasises the potential for co-financing, either with Member States providing additional funding for EC-led programmes or the EC supplementing Member State-led programmes.

In May 2007, the Council approved the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy[71] and joint financing approaches that include common EU funds, co-financing agreements, mutual recognition and delegation. The Code of Conduct addresses the division of labour amongst the Member States and the EC, across developing countries and across sectors within each developing country. In particular, all donors should restrict themselves to a maximum of three sectors per country and either redeploy out of other sectors or work as a silent partner, allowing another EU donor to take the lead. A further constraint is that there should be only three to five donors per sector. But, it remains voluntary and it wills ends rather than means.

In April 2008, the EC issued a Communication on "The EU. A global partner for development: Speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals"[72] in which it proposed actions to encourage Member States to increase the volume and the effectiveness of aid, as well as areas where EU policies could be better coordinated to meet the MDGs. And in April 2009, the EC produced a Communication on "Supporting developing countries in coping with the crisis"[73] in which it analysed progress on aid effectiveness, on the EU's own Code of Conduct on

Complementarity and Division of Labour and on aid volumes, and offered 28 concrete proposals covering the volume of aid and other finance; aid effectiveness; social protection; sustaining economic activity; revitalising agriculture; investing in green growth; stimulating trade and private investment; economic governance; trade; and global institutions.

Following the adoption of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, there are now, in addition to the 12 indicators agreed to in the Paris Declaration, 48 new or strengthened commitments for the development community as a whole, 34 of which are for donors to implement. The EU has four additional targets from 2005, confirmed in the European Consensus on Development and now partly reflected in the AAA:

1. Providingall capacity-building assistance through coordinated programmes, increasingly through multi-donor arrangements;
2. Channelling 50% of government-to-government assistance through country systems, including by increasing the aid we provide through budget support or sector-wide approaches;
3. Avoiding setting up any new project implementation units; and
4. Reducing by 50% the number of uncoordinated missions.

To date, coordination between Member States has proved to be an uphill task. Dilemmas about the current and future roles of the EC in driving division of labour continue to persist:

- European codes versus global decision-making, with the EU Code of Conduct focused on EU donor sectoral specialisation and the Accra Agenda for Action focused on global aid effectiveness, involving partner countries in the discussions on division of labour.
- European versus country-led comparative advantages, with the EU Code of Conduct defining the EC's comparative advantage based on "amount of money", "experience", "staff/expertise", "history of engagement", and so on, whereas most of the country-led criteria relate to alignment and harmonisation, as well as dialogue skills, risk-taking, innovation and credibility.
- Brussels leadership versus stagnation on the ground, with the EU Code of Conduct lacking leadership both at Headquarters and country levels and the need for clarity as to the mandate of the EC in promoting division of labour.

Efficient

According to the EC study "Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach"[74], the financial costs of donors failing to ensure aid effectiveness could be between €25 and €30 billion from now until 2015, or €5 to €7 billion per year. This amounts to around 10% of total aid spending. It is worth noting that throughout the study, the authors seemed to struggle to obtain the accurate data needed to calculate the real cost savings of implementing the current aid effectiveness agenda. Even the

most basic data on office costs or staff time was either unavailable or undisclosed by Member States. For the EC, while input and output of EC aid are documented quite well, efforts to analyse outcomes and impact are rare.

Table 2 gives the EU's performance on some of the key targets in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). Progress on aid effectiveness has been slow, in particular on:

• Division of labour, due to, among other things, Member States' wish to remain engaged in politically attractive sectors, the lack of visibility when cooperation is delegated, the perception that coordination is time-consuming and not cost-effective for some interventions, the lack of overview on what different donors are doing in a given country or region, and in some cases hesitations by recipient countries that fear losing aid for particular sectors. The EC itself is the biggest culprit because of its presence in 120 countries. Only 33% of EU donors' and the EC's missions are coordinated[75]. The EU target is 66%.

• Use of country systems, because of lack of trust in the use of recipient country systems and legal impediments in the Member States. Another major impediment is the mode in which aid is delivered. Only five EU Member States now say budget support is their preferred way to scale up aid to Africa and to promote ownership, compared with ten in 2008. Budget support, granted for a three-year period, is the EC's "preferred aid modality where conditions allow"[76]. Proponents of budget support argue that it boosts ownership and raises the effectiveness, efficiency and significance of development contributions. Others point to the risks arguing its potential to permit misuse and misappropriation

of development funds; to concentrate power in finance ministries at the expense of key line ministries, thereby marginalising them from policy debates; and to intensify conditionality by giving donors a seat at the table in fundamental discussions on issues such as civil service reform and budget formulation. Under EDF 10, the EC aims to increase budget support, both general and sectoral, to 44% of programmable funds, 25% of all funding.

• Conditionality, with most Member States claiming the irrelevance of it. Irrelevant possibly as a result of conditionality imposed by intermediaries such as the World Bank and the IMF, or because recipients accept them just to receive aid. Only five Member States told the Commission that they are actively reducing the number of conditionalities, while thirteen are not, and no result is recorded for the remaining nine. Fourteen Member States still do not make their conditions public, although this was one of the commitments in the AAA that was supposed to take instant effect.

• Predictability of aid, due to legal constraints in Member States and annual budget cycles. The consequences of short-term aid include conservative budgeting practises by recipient governments, poor resource allocation, investments in capital expenditure to the detriment of recurrent costs and even macro economic instability. In 2008, the EC launched the “MDG Contract”, an innovative spin-off of budget support. It provides General Budget Support (GBS) for six years instead of three, including one mid-term review rather than annual assessments and a minimum guaranteed aid level (70% of total commitment). MDG Contracts, which are subject to the provisions of the

Cotonou Partnership Agreement, have been rolled out in eight African countries (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia). Collectively, these account for €1.8 billion, or 50% of all GBS commitments in EDF 10 national programmes, and some 14% of all EDF 10 national programmes. There has, however, been little forthcoming support from Member States to co-finance these contracts; only Belgium has, contributing €12 million to the MDG Contract with Mozambique.

Tied aid, because of inadequate procurement regulations and capacities in developing countries or risk aversion at donor headquarters level. At present around 10% of EU aid is still tied. While most DAC members have made commitments to untie aid in the future, this is the one Paris Declaration commitment to which a quantitative target has not been attached.

TABLE 2

MONITORING THE PARIS DECLARATION: EU STATE ON SOME KEY TARGETS

PARIS INDICATORS	EU (MEMBER STATES AND EC)	EC 2010 TARGET
Aid flows are recorded in countries' budgets	44%	57%85%
Technical assistance is aligned and coordinated	53%	43%EU target: 100% (Paris target is 50%)
Donors use country systems for public financial management	47%	50-80% (EU and now Accra global target is 50%. Targets for each individual partner 35%country depends on performance)
Donors use country procurement systems	54%	50-80% (EU and now Accra global target is 50%. Targets for each individual partner 34%country depends on performance)
Aid is more predictable	43%	53%71%

PARIS INDICATORS	EU (MEMBER STATES AND EC)	EC 2010 TARGET
Aid is untied	94%	NA Indicative: 100%
Donors use coordinated mechanisms for aid delivery (through programme-based approaches)	46%	44%66%
Donors coordinate their missions	33%	33%EU target: 66% (Paris target is 40%)
Donors coordinate their (country) studies and analytical work	62%	72%66%

SOURCE: EC STAFF WORKING PAPER: “AID EFFECTIVENESS AFTER ACCRA: WHERE DOES THE EU STAND AND WHAT MORE DO WE NEED TO DO”, COM (2009) 160 FINAL.

Legitimate and fair

The EU does not consistently “speak with one voice” as a global actor, but its representation varies from the EC, to the rotating EU presidency, to the national positions of the Member States. For instance, the EC represents the EU on trade issues in the World Trade Organisation (WTO); the rotating EU presidency negotiates on behalf of the EU (for example, in the climate change negotiations); and the Member States are dispersed over several voting groups that also include third countries in the complicated structures of the Bretton Woods institutions. Since the early 1990s there have been increasing calls for a strengthening of the EU’s external representation in international fora and for the Union “to speak more with a single voice”[77]. This continuing fragmentation impairs the coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s policies and undermines its commitment to multilateralism and global governance. As Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry argue, “the

current arrangements involve significant deficiencies that weaken the European position in international negotiations and thus involve welfare costs”[78].

BOX 2: THE EU AND THE UN

The EC channels a considerable and increasing portion of its aid through UN funds, programmes and agencies. However, it does so on the basis of non-membership, and consequently, voluntary contributions. The idea that EC contributions to the UN system should, in some way, be translated into visibility and, ultimately, impact runs like a thread through most relevant official EU documents. And there is consensus about the fact that neither the visibility nor the impact of the EU is sufficient. The representational issue points to a fundamental problem -the ill-defined role of the EC in EU-UN relations, and, more specifically, in EU Development Policy. There are two options:

a) The EC, as an actor in its own right, the 28th donor of the EU, clearly visible in donor charts, annual reports and, through the European logo, on EC-funded vehicles, equipment and major supplies, becomes a full member, and it is helped by being a discernible actor whose financial contributions are translated into greater visibility amongst the broader public;

b) In the absence of being a sovereign state, the EC focuses on less formal ways of exerting influence that fit the EU’s specific nature. It adopts a “front-runner” approach to the negotiation and implementation of UN initiatives and takes a more proactive approach to the development of international instruments and specific EU implementing actions. Visibility is primarily defined by the EU’s capacity to ensure coherence and co-ordination and complementarity.

SOURCE: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIESOF THE UNION,VISIBILITY AND IMPACT OF EU ACTIVITY IN THE UN AND ITS VARIOUS PROGRAMMES, FUNDS AND AGENCIES, FEBRUARY 2006.

A combination of legal competences, institutional factors and the EU Member States’ constellation of interests and collective identity (or lack of it) prevent the EU from having its voice heard. From a legal perspective, development cooperation is a shared competence between the EU and the Member States. Its governance model is a mix of supervised delegation to the EC and coordination. Externally, EU development cooperation is

represented both by the EC and the Member States. In the World Bank, for example, European representatives (plus the EC as an observer) meet at least once a week to exchange information and to reach coordinated or joint statements that are prepared by the EU Presidency. At the biannual meetings of the Joint IMF/World Bank Development Committee, where the EC holds observer status, the Commissioner for Development submits a speech on behalf of the Community. However, the EC and the Member States may have different donor interests. In addition, several ministries may be responsible for World Bank matters at national level, and coordination may be difficult both between and within ministries. The creation of an EU-level committee for World Bank issues has therefore lacked consensus so far. Finally, the lack of a collective EU identity may also prevent a joint external representation. A shared belief would have to be constructed about the appropriateness of a single EU seat or EU membership.

The Lisbon Treaty provides the EU with a full-time president of the European Council and a *de facto* Foreign Minister (High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS). However, it has not put an end to this patchwork of international representation. The EU now has four important players dealing with external policy and representation—the President of the European Council, the rotating Presidency, the President of the European Commission and the High Representative. The question, however, remains as to how the High Representative's role will be balanced with the other Presidencies. A declaration to the

Final Act of the Lisbon Treaty calls for the choice of the three positions (High Representative and the respective Presidents of the European Council and the Commission) to “respect the geographical and demographic diversity of the Union and its Member States”[79], which could give rise to the familiar jockeying between the Member States. This may, in turn, influence relations between the three positions.

Transparent and Accountable

The EC is not accountable in the way that bilateral donors are. On the one hand, this peculiar status insulates it from the direct political pressures experienced by bilateral programmes, reflected in practices such as tied aid. On the other, this potentially reduces scrutiny and responsiveness. Although not explicitly mentioned in the European Consensus on Development, the EC is accountable to a variety of stakeholders:

a) To the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.
b) To the European tax payers.
c) To the legislative and executive powers in recipient countries.
d) To citizens of the recipient countries.

Accountability at home

Institutional rigidity has been commonly used to describe the EC. Part of the problem, however, lies in its accountability framework determined by the treaties, the basic and financial regulations,

which includes College collective responsibility, Member States comitology and European Parliament scrutiny. For example, the EC's multi-annual/strategic programming phase, including approval and barring the occurrence of any unforeseen events, takes 42 weeks. Although the time span is comparable with other donors, the EC has the longest approval period (20 weeks) in order to accommodate the comitology[80] and parliamentary scrutiny procedures. Furthermore, approval of programmes happens at the political level in the EC as opposed to the administrative or field levels. And finally, EU Delegations do not have the authority to modify financing agreements.

The general sense amongst the development community is that the EC needs to go beyond providing financial data by demonstrating results and value for money. The problem is that its prescriptive and complex management system tends to emphasise adherence to procedures rather than outputs. Furthermore, the excessive focus on fiduciary risk demanded by the European Parliament and the Member States could be seen to be at the expense of impact evaluation.

Accountability abroad

The European Consensus on Development recognises the role of the EU in a "share(d) responsibility and accountability for their joint efforts in partnerships"[81] with developing countries whose ownership over development policies is to be respected and fostered. The EU's Cotonou Agreement is the most advanced form of partnership based on a contractual framework of political,

trade and development cooperation with the 79 countries gathered under the umbrella of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) region. It includes mutual accountability provisions as well as joint institutions and arbitration procedures.

In 2006, the EC issued a Communication on Governance[82] reaffirming its commitment to basic principles set out in the European Consensus on Development. It asserted that governance should be a home-grown process as it cannot be imposed from the outside; that the EC and the Member States should work together to provide complementary and harmonised support to developing countries' governance efforts; and that responsibility lies both with donors and recipients to improve governance, emphasising the notion of mutual accountability. The EC also introduced an incentive-based approach to programming within EDF 10. When preparing new strategies with the ACP, the EC grants additional financial support—an incentive tranche—to encourage ambitious, credible measures and reforms in governance. Access to these incentives is based on the outcome of an enhanced dialogue between the EC and the recipient country, facilitated by governance profiles. Action plans are then put forward by the government of the recipient country. No mention has been made of any methodology for monitoring the implementation of the action plans or the precise way performance in implementation will affect the country allocations.

The main criticism of the governance incentive tranche is that it leaves little room for ownership. The profiles and the priorities are defined by the EC and the action plans are expected to fit the priority issues identified in the governance profiles. If the recipient

government accepts the EC's priorities and promises the corresponding reforms, it receives access to a higher tranche. The fact that there is only a five to ten percent differentiation between the tranches, means that countries are not really motivated to expend time and effort. Furthermore, by submitting a governance action plan, the country automatically qualifies for a 10% tranche, whether the action plan is ambitious or not.

Adaptive

The financial crisis provides an interesting lens to look at the adaptiveness of the EU in response to changing global situations. Following the meeting of the G20 in April 2009, the EU came out with a support package for helping developing countries to cope with the crisis. In its Communication on "Supporting developing countries in coping with the crisis", the EC proposed actions that would frontload €8.8 billion[83]. How this has affected the medium/long term predictability of funding remains to be seen. It set up two new finance mechanisms:

• The Vulnerability FLEX (V-FLEX): an ad hoc and rapid, counter-cyclical financing instrument to mitigate the social consequences of the economic downturn in the worst hit countries. It is limited to the ACP. The fund will dispense a maximum of €500 million in 2009 and 2010, and the money will be set aside from the reserves of the national and regional indicative programmes under the EDF 10. Given that the Member States decided against increasing the contribution ceilings, frontloading will be managed by shifting payment priorities for programmes in less vulnerable

countries to the most vulnerable countries. Some have criticised the V-FLEX on the basis that donors need to allocate new resources to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis, rather than just bring forward available funds. The problem is that most of the funding (almost 99%) comes from pre-existing commitments. Furthermore, its responsiveness has also been questioned. The proposal was launched in April, the country application deadline was the end of July and the EC approved the package in December for a total of €215 million. However, when the Democratic Republic of Congo's reserves fell to two days worth of imports, the V-FLEX was not fast enough and the IMF came to the rescue.

• The Food Facility: an instrument providing grants of €1 billion in unused European farm subsidies to farmers in the 23 developing countries most impacted by the crisis over seeds, fertiliser and other agricultural projects. Following difficult negotiations between finance ministers of Member States, Members of the European Parliament and the EC, an agreement was finally reached on where the money would come from. Although the initial proposal recommended the use of €1 billion of surplus funds, only €760 million was agreed as additional funding. Furthermore, although the Food Facility was intended to be programmed over three years (2008-2010) by the end of 2009, over €800 million will have been disbursed. Criticism of the Food Facility has rested on the fact that the EC transferred the funds to other multilateral institutions to disburse instead of primarily using existing European bilateral modalities.

The 10th EDF regulation provides for Additional Voluntary

Contributions (AVCs). However, these AVCs are very restrictive in terms of their use and focus. In the past, AVCs have been used to co-finance the Africa Peace Facility (around €40 million from Member States together with the €400 million from the 9th EDF). Generally, most Member States are reluctant to provide AVCs.

The new EU arrangements post-Lisbon

Vague mandates of the new top jobs, willingness of the Member States to allow the posts and people to represent Europe and turf wars have all come to the fore as the dust tries to settle on the new arrangements following the approval of the Lisbon Treaty. In all of this, it remains to be seen how prominent development will be in the new set-up, and whether the EU's external relations structures will be simplified and development will have more leverage over other areas than before, so as to ensure real development effectiveness rather than just aid effectiveness.

How the new EEAS is designed and operates will carry direct implications for how effectively EU Member States and the EU as a whole are able to influence the world beyond their borders. Over the coming months, as EU policy-makers finalise the arrangements for the functioning of the EEAS, their choices will have an indirect but no less important effect on the EU's ability to live up to its potential as a constructive proactive and effective actor on the international stage. Even the largest EU Member States are no longer in a position on their own to shape international events or the world we all live in. Acting together in the EU they have shaped the international trade agenda. They

have been much less successful in foreign policy for a combination of reasons, largely lack of will and poor arrangements.

The Lisbon Treaty is thin on detail about the EEAS: little more than that it is to assist the High Representative and be composed of officials from the EC, Council and the Member States. It is to be established by the Council on a proposal from the new High Representative in agreement with the EC and after consulting the European Parliament. Setting up the EEAS with so little guidance from the Treaty has been contentious. The EU institutions, the Member States and the European Parliament have been embroiled in a quarrel about control, accountability and budgetary responsibility.

From a development perspective, three points stand out:

1. The High Representative will have a role to play in delivering coherent and joined-up policy to achieve the MDGs. The Development Commissioner will need to be given the space and authority to work with the EEAS to develop new ideas, team up in international diplomacy, and stop initiatives which do not conform to development principles. The College of Commissioners will be the guarantor of this arrangement. Although the High Representative is “double-hatted”, reporting directly to Member States, as well as being a member of the EC, it is the collegiality of the college that will be tested.

2. As the EEAS will have significant responsibilities both in conducting political dialogue with developing countries and in

allocation and programming of development funds, the EEAS will need expertise on development. Given that the EEAS will be bound by political and bureaucratic imperatives, it is unlikely to allow for staff recruitment based on technical expertise in development only, not least because of rotation requirements. Seconded national experts could fill this capacity gap to a certain extent, as has been the case in the EC and in the Council in the past.

3. The development work of the EEAS will need to be accountable to the European Parliament's Development Committee. It might seem obvious that this should be the case, but the double-hatted nature of the High Representative's role leaves scope for some ambiguity.

It is likely that the creation of the EEAS will raise some significant problems with EU representation in multilateral institutions. For example, in the UN, the EU is represented by the EC as an observer, with no right to vote and limited rights to speak. But preponderantly it is the Presidency, exercising its right as a nation-state that speaks for the EU. The Presidency is also responsible for internal coordination among the EU Member States, the preparation and negotiation with others of draft resolutions etc., and the delivery on behalf of the EU of statements, explanations of vote and so on. With the new arrangements, there will be a real problem over how the EU makes its voice heard formally in meetings. There are a series of options:

1. Negotiation of a special status for the EU, giving it the rights of a state.But it would be very difficult or maybe impossible to achieve in view of the likely resistance of many other UN members, including many with their own collective observer observations, for instance, the African Union or the Arab Leagues.
2. Seek to establish conventions rather than rules, for instance by exploiting openings such as the rules which have allowed the Development Commissioner to make a speech on behalf of the EU or the former High Representative Javier Solana to address the Security Council.
3. The EU Member States invite the General Assembly to adopt a resolution that effectively gives the EU participation and speaking (but not voting) rights.

The future of the EU in global governance

The future role of the EU in global governance will depend on two sets of conditions, internal and external. Political developments in the EU will determine whether it has more or less assertive international presence. Internal factors include:

a) The design of the EEAS, its role in development cooperation and the coherence and efficiency of the EU's institutional setting in Brussels and between Brussels and EU delegations in country.

b) The relationships of governments and leaders in the EU capitals, and whether they can reach a common vision of EU development cooperation.

c) Arrangements towards a more or less permanent “division of labour” in development cooperation between Member States and the EU

d) The capabilities given to the EU institutions to carry out their tasks.

e) A significant increase in the budget for EU external action and investments in strategic partnerships.

f) The size of the EU.

TABLE 3
ASSESSMENT OF EU GOOD GOVERNANCE

	EFFECTIVE	EFFICIENT	LEGITIMATE & FAIR	TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE	ADAPTIVE
EU	Strong policy statements based on values and principles, but not adopted by Member States at national level; Provides a forum for information sharing among Member States; Good coordination of studies and analytical work with some lesson learning; Slow progress in division of labour, aligning incentives, or promoting long-term development interests.	High transaction costs spread over 120 countries; Only 33% of missions coordinated; Budget support not widely used.	Legitimate, although not able to “speak with one voice” in interna-tional fora. Transparent and accountable to the Member States, the European Parliament and partner countries through “mutual accountability” clauses in partnership agreement. Attempts to adapt more quickly to changing needs but constrained by accountabilit y and decision-making procedures.		

Along with internal factors, the EU’s global role will also be defined by external factors:

a) The degree to which it is able to cope with and mitigate the negative effects of the global financial crisis and other crises,

man-made and natural catastrophes.

b) Thelevel of success it has in demonstrating that it is able to live up to its aid commitments in the run-up to and at the MDG Summit in September 2010.

c) Thelevel of unity and ambition it portrays in the continuing climate change negotiations, in particular in June 2010 in Bonn and in November 2010 in Mexico.

d) Political developmentsand the foreign policy of the US and emerging powers, in particular China and India.

e) The situation in the EU's neighbourhood.

The future success of the EU will depend on its ability to meet the challenges of globalisation and of a world in which the weight of individual European countries has been declining steadily and will decline further as countries such as China, India and Brazil gain in economic and political weight. The only hope for European countries to maintain global influence is to act together in the EU.

5. CONCLUSION

Two paradoxes begin to emerge from the analysis.

First, good governance of the aid system obviously matters: it cuts transactions costs, reduces market failure and assures accountability. Multilateral channels offer a fast-track to good governance, especially when the channels in question are characterised by high levels of accountability to recipients, as is the case for the UN, to a significant degree for the EU (at least for ACP countries) and increasingly for the Bretton Woods

Institutions. At least, the multilaterals out-perform the other governance mechanisms. Yet—and here is the first paradox—donors (and sometimes recipients) seem reluctant to follow the logic. In the case of the EU, only 20% or so of all oda is channelled through the EC. This is a classic case of prisoners' dilemma: every country is better off if the multilateral channels are strengthened, but they each have strong incentives to use bilateral channels themselves.

Indeed, donors have multiple objectives in distributing aid, related to foreign policy, commercial interests and domestic politics, as well as the purely humanitarian. Some also believe strongly in the value of a multiplicity of channels, to encourage innovation and provide a degree of contestability. In this case, they need the non-multilateral aspects of governance to perform more effectively than they do.

In this endeavour, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD is the obvious market-leader, with a long history, an institutional depth, and a range of services which make it an indispensable tool for keeping score. It does, however, have restricted membership, as a rich-country club, it has been ineffective in driving substantial change, and it has a deficit in terms of accountability to recipient countries. This remains true, however many new donors, developing country governments and civil society representatives are invited to Paris. The UN-led process of the Development Cooperation Forum does not suffer from these handicaps. However, it is new and under-resourced, and should not replicate the technical functions of the DAC. No doubt, also, decision-making in the DAC is likely to be more

efficient than that in the DCF, at least if general UN cultures prevail. This, then, is the second paradox, and one familiar in other aspects of development cooperation: the least ineffective organisation (in this case the DAC) can never be the most legitimate and accountable.

It is not surprising that all stakeholders are struggling with these paradoxes. The reform agenda is full whichever way one turns. Perhaps this is also a sign of good governance of the system as a whole. In an ideal world, a kind of race might be underway: whoever improves governance fastest wins the prize.

If the DCF manages to improve effectiveness quickly, well, it could take over the statistical and reporting functions of the DAC. Conversely, if the DAC's Working Party on Aid Effectiveness can rapidly demonstrate that it provides a mechanism by which developing countries can hold donors to account, then the DCF might lose its appeal.

In terms of funding, if the BWI governance reform can be completed, then the World Bank might win funds that would otherwise have gone to the EC. Or if the UN can improve its effectiveness, then it might see its funding increased.

Of course, it is fanciful to think that the players of the aid game will be quite so instrumental in their decision-making. Nevertheless, Ministers do make choices in multilateral space, and good governance is one of the criteria they will use. Institutions and agencies would be well-advised not to be left behind.

For the European Union, this last conclusion has particular resonance. There will be major changes to the governance of EU

development cooperation in 2010, resulting from the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the consequent reorganisation of Commission and Council structures, including the creation of the EEAS. In 2010 also, negotiations will also begin for the new Financial Perspectives, to run from 2014 to 2020. Decisions will also be made about how to allocate fast start climate funding and eventually much larger financial flows for climate change mitigation and adaptation. If the EC is to retain and increase its share of global and European aid, then continued improvements specifically to governance will be required. Four priorities might be suggested.

First, the Cotonou Convention contains strong provisions for mutual accountability between developed and developing countries, especially as regards the administration of the European Development Fund. These will be at risk is the EDF is “budgetised”, that is taken into the framework of the Financial Perspectives. In any case, it applies only to aid supplied to countries of the ACP and not to other regions or to climate funding. It should be a condition of financial re-engineering that the partnership principles of Cotonou be preserved and generalised.

Second, the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour needs to be taken more seriously, both within countries and between countries. Greater transparency, especially of unit costs, would drive donors towards greater specialisation. New targets should be set for greater coherence in EU aid, for which the EU Council should agree to be accountable.

Third, the EC will want to continue finding was to respond

quickly to emerging crises, as with Vulnerability Flex and the Food Facility.

Fourth, the EU as a whole can do better in working together in international fora, including the BWI, but also the UN, the G8, the G20 and the UNFCCC. A single seat is too ambitious for now, but further investment in better coordination ma eventually lead in that direction.

The EU should lead the way in greater transparency and accountability of aid, and for looking for ways to increase accountability to stakeholders in developing countries. Greater responsiveness to these stakeholders is the most important way, in the long run, of improving performance.

This list does not exhaust the EU aid reform agenda. For example, a greater focus on low income countries in EC aid would be desirable. However, improved governance would be a strong further asset as the EC shapes its future role.

Lectura 4

Accountability for Development Cooperation

José Antonio Ocampo and Natalie Gómez Arteaga

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Based on the studies on national governance, this study defines three major dimensions of accountability: 1) *answerability*, the obligation to inform, explain and justify decisions and actions; 2) *enforcement*, the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on public sector officials who violate their duties; and 3)

a clear delimitation of responsibility, the requirement that all actors should have clearly defined duties and performance standards. It also defines three modalities of accountability: 1) *vertical*, based on a principal-agent relation (elections being the most important one); 2) *horizontal*, which encompasses the checks and balances in the exercise of state power and that exercised by specific oversight institutions; and 3) *social*, the control exercised by multiple civil society organization and independent media on public sector officials.

The application of these concepts to the international level has several limitations and challenges. First, vertical accountability is absent at the international level and horizontal accountability can only adopt limited modalities. Second, enforcement cannot be exercised. Third, at the international level most commitments are only voluntary and thus non-binding. Finally, who is responsible for what is not always clear; therefore, explicit efforts to define responsibility are essential. The only form of accountability that is fully operational at the international level—and, in fact, has been thriving—is social accountability.

An overview of the modalities of accountability at the international level highlights four main challenges. First, it is essential to move from monitoring/surveillance—with a clear "institutional home"—to stronger modalities of horizontal accountability—peer reviews and mutual accountability—and, at least in some cases, to strict compliance mechanisms. Second, given the limitations of international accountability, the *domestic* counterparts of such accountability exercises are essential, which calls for strengthening government capacities in partner countries

and placing national parliaments at the center of national accountability exercises. Third, monitoring and surveillance must be “even-handed” to balance intrinsic power asymmetries among member states, which, in turn, requires strong, autonomous and impartial Secretariats of international organizations. Fourth, given the limitations of all modalities of horizontal accountability and the lack of vertical accountability at the international level, even greater emphasis must be placed on the central role of social accountability, perhaps even relatively more so than at the national level.

For development cooperation “in the narrow sense” (technical assistance and concessional finance), the study proposes *a triangular, multi-layered accountability architecture* that includes three main components, North-South, South-South and non-governmental, and different layers, global, national and possibly regional. The point of departure in all cases should be *explicit agreements* on principles, commitments and standards of development cooperation, without which no accountability exercise can take place.

Accountability in North-South cooperation should be based on Mutual Accountability. The main challenges in this regard are to guarantee ownership of development process by partner countries and symmetry in the accountability exercises. The main existing process, the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, is still weak in both regards. In particular, changing donors’ behavior has proven to be difficult and there remains lack of credible incentives for them to comply or strong Secretariats able to balance existing asymmetries.

Developed countries should also make an explicit commitment to the UN targets on development cooperation, which several still do not recognize as a commitment.

The principles and accountability frameworks for South-South Cooperation are still in design. Existing frameworks are still too broad and clear responsibilities to define accountability of whom over what are missing. A clear separation of the economic activities that are undertaken as part of normal economic relations from technical cooperation and concessional lending or transfers is also important. A peer review mechanism in SSC could have positive results.

Non-state actors should also be guided by the same principles of donor countries in relation to partner countries. The challenge remains on how to align principles and standards of non-governmental actors, especially private firms, with wider development results, and with explicit responsibilities to make them accountable.

The triangular global architecture for accountability in development cooperation should build upon the existing frameworks, and enhance their linkages and complementarities. It should also enhance the communication among existing processes and avoid duplicating efforts. A unique global accountability report should be developed, and coordination of global cooperation, and associated global accountability, should have a clear “institutional home”, which should be ECOSOC’s Development Cooperation Forum. It bears repeating that, in a multi-layered designed, national counterparts are essential. In this regard, national parliaments play a crucial role, as the formal

institution in charge of making governments accountable for international commitments.

The accountability mechanism should aim at creating credible incentives. This would always be a challenge given the inherently weak nature of international accountability. The OECD-DAC peer review is the best mechanism in place, in which incentives to comply are generated by peer-pressure and strong surveillance, and should be the benchmark to design the global framework. But even in this case, it has failed to fully take into account the Paris and Busan commitments, and in redressing the asymmetric character of the Busan Partnership.

Accountability also demands academic and policy-oriented research with a focus on what forms of development cooperation deliver better results. Such analyses should, in turn, feed back into the accountability exercises. A “data revolution” is necessary. However, the priority should be quality information about public sector spending and services, and basic data on economic and social indicators from national statistical offices of the developing countries that lack them. In this regard, there must be a major effort to raise the standards of the statistical offices of the developing countries that have lagged behind in this area.

This study highlights that up until now most of accountability mechanisms of development cooperation focus on accountability over the process or “way to manage” cooperation rather than accountability over delivered *results*. This relates to the lack of a clear definition of “responsibility” at the international level of different actors for wider development results. Creating credible incentives also requires going beyond common principles and

goals. A base document delimiting the responsibilities of different actors, with explicit tasks and commitments, is an essential complement to explicit agreements on principles and standards of development cooperation, and an essential catalyst to foster higher accountability. In this sense, it should not be forgotten that accountability is also an instrument, not an objective in itself. So, its purpose is not so much to improve the cooperation process as to deliver results.

Finally, although the proposals presented in this report refer to development cooperation “in the narrow sense”, there are other dimensions of the Global Partnership for Development, that relate to the rules and governance of global trade and finance and trade, but also issues of technology generation and transfer, as well as migration, investment, taxation and other areas. For these dimensions of development cooperation “in the broader sense”, accountability frameworks should also be put in place in the design of the post-2015 development agenda. Furthermore, a clear link between both mechanisms of accountability, in the narrow and broader sense, should be created. The best way forward would be the design of a strong follow-up mechanism of the Monterrey Consensus and related agreements since that that would replace the extremely weak one that was put in place over the past long decade.

I. INTRODUCTION

This study is a contribution to the Development Cooperation Forum’s (DCF) dialogue on the objectives, principles and

features of development cooperation. It analyzes how to enhance the accountability for development cooperation in the framework of a Global Partnership for Development, which is, in turn, an essential component of the post-2015 development agenda currently under discussion.

The challenges are, of course, immense. First of all, there is still difference of opinion on the nature and scope of development cooperation, how it should change to support a post-2015 development agenda and how a renewed global partnership for development should be designed and work in practice. These issues were the subject of attention in the previous two rounds of this dialogue, which took place in Addis Ababa and Montreux in 2013[84]. Second, the development cooperation agenda is increasingly mixed with that associated with the challenges generated by global interdependence—also referred to as the provision of "global public goods"—; these two forms of cooperation are crucial but should be clearly separated, even if we recognize their mutual interactions. Third, in relation to financial and technical assistance, the issues on which this study concentrates, the system has been for some time under the stringent—and, somewhat conflicting—demands for strong ownership by partner (recipient) countries, on the one hand, and for development effectiveness by the domestic constituencies of donor countries, on the other. Fourth, in these areas, the number of development actors has significantly increased, with no effective coordination and a very incomplete information system. Fifth, fiscal constraints have become more stringent in donor countries, and have already been reflected in a reduction of

official development assistance in recent years. Sixth, although there have been some advances in “mutual accountability”, the concept that has been enshrined in the field of development cooperation after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and multiple “social accountability” mechanisms have spread, this progress has taken place in the context of a history of very limited accountability for international commitments in general and for those made in the United Nations in particular.

The study is divided in five parts. As a bridge to the previous rounds of these debates, the first presents some reflections on the scope of the Global Partnership for Development and development cooperation. The second looks at the concept of accountability in domestic governance and explores how it can be applied to international commitments in general and to development cooperation in particular. The third takes a closer look at several accountability experiences which can be considered more closely relevant to development cooperation. The fourth part takes a closer look at the three elements of what we will call the “triangular architecture” of development cooperation: 1) “mutual accountability” in the context of North-South cooperation, 2) South-South cooperation, 3) and cooperation by non-governmental actors. This is a bridge to some proposals made in the last section on how to design a better system of accountability. In addition, several proposals on specific issues are presented throughout the paper.

Development cooperation involves much more than financial and technical assistance. However, given the focus of the DCF consultations for which this study is prepared, we concentrate

here on this set of cooperation instruments, for which the term “development cooperation” is generally used. This is what we will refer to in part I as development cooperation “in the narrow sense”. In the last section, we will briefly come back to some issues of accountability for development cooperation “in the broader sense”.

II. THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT AND THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The concept of the “Global Partnership” has a long history in the United Nations and in global debates[85]. The 2005 summit defined it when stating that: “We reaffirm our commitment to the global partnership for development set out in the Millennium Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation”[86]. In turn, the DCF Ethiopia High-Level Symposium concluded that: “The principles of the Millennium Declaration remain highly relevant for the global partnership for development in the post-2015 era. They range from solidarity and non-interference to common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities, and the right to development and greater distributive justice”[87].

This means that the Global Partnership involves a broad set of commitments, which are essentially aimed at reducing *international* inequalities among countries and, particularly, the asymmetries that characterize the international economic system[88]. In terms of the post-2015 development agenda, these

inequalities and asymmetries constrain the capacity of developing countries to achieve the sustainable development goals. So, the Partnership is not only about technical cooperation and financial flows—and concessional financial flows in particular —, but also about the *rules* that govern global finance, trade, and technology generation and transfer, among others. Using a terminology that is also usual in these debates, these rules refer to ensuring an "enabling environment" for development.

This view was particularly captured in the Monterrey Consensus, which included the commitment of all countries to develop "an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial system", as well as to "broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in international economic decision-making and norm-setting"[89]. The High-Level Panel's report on the post-2015 development agenda suggested an even broader scope of cooperation under a "new" Global Partnership for Development, adding climate change, tax evasion and hidden ownership of assets[90]. Still others could be added, including, in particular, international migration.

This broad framework contrasts with the limited scope of the Global Partnership for Development as defined in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MDG-8 has been severely critized (correctly in our view) for the fairly ad-hoc character of the targets and indicators chosen (see below), as well as from the focus on quantity rather than on the quality of official assistance—or, in the terminology that became used after the 2005 Paris Declaration, the lack of attention to aid effectiveness.

Given the diverse levels of development, the Global Partnership should obviously have different objectives for different types of countries. So, while official development assistance (ODA) to eliminate extreme poverty and guarantee access to essential social services and infrastructure is particularly critical for low-income countries, counter-cyclical financing and technological upgrading, which is critical to avoid the “middle-income trap”, may be particularly important for middle-income countries[91]. Land-locked and small island development states also have their special needs, as recognized in a series of UN conferences. Technical cooperation and institution building are essential for all, but the challenges are varied and create broad opportunities for North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation as well as that of non-governmental actors.

Seen in this light, the multi-stakeholder partnerships with civil society, foundations, academia and the private sector for the achievement specific development goals is, of course, an essential component of the Global Partnership, but it cannot substitute for *inter-governmental* cooperation, which is essential in policy-making, norm-setting and global governance. In fact, multi-stakeholder partnerships should be coordinated through inter-governmental processes at the international level, and by partner governments at the national level. This is a corollary of a principle that is widely accepted in relation to social service provision in developed countries: that multiple agents can participate, but such efforts are supported and/or regulated by national governments.

The conception of the Global Partnership is closely linked to different views about what “development cooperation” means. One view, which we will call “development cooperation in a narrow sense”, defines it as technical and financial assistance—in the latter case, concessional financial assistance in particular. This is, for example, the definition adopted by the background paper for the Montreux Symposium: “a specific transfer of resources to support development in another country or region”, which can be financial, technical cooperation or a technical transfer offered in kind[92]. A broader concept of development cooperation also includes the rules to counteract the asymmetries of the international economic system (the enabling environment for development). We will focus here on accountability for development cooperation in the narrow sense, returning to accountability in the broader sense in the last part of this study.

III. THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND ITS FEATURES IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

1. NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The concept of accountability has been essentially developed in the context of the analysis of national governance, to refer to the oversight over the fulfillment of responsibilities of public sector officials and the checks and balances on the exercise of political power. It has also been subject of attention in relation to non-

profit and private sector (corporate) governance. Although we will come back later to the accountability of non-governmental actors, it is better to focus here on how this concept has been discussed in relation to national governance.

For national governance, Schedler[93] has argued that accountability involves two interrelated dimensions (or constituent elements). The first is *answerability*, which can be understood as the obligation of public officials to inform, explain and justify their decisions and actions. This assumes a relation between accountable and accounting actors and the public debates in which they engage. It is thus closely tied to transparency and may involve formal mechanisms of monitoring and oversight.

The second dimension is *enforceability*, which is the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on public sector officials who violate their duties. This second dimension implies that officials are subject to the rule of law and the threat of sanctions if they violate it. Enforcement is exercised both through the classical mutual control among the different branches of power (executive, legislative, judicial) but also, and in fact increasingly, by independent agencies specialized in public sector oversight (comptrollers, attorney generals, ombudsmen, etc.).

A third dimension, according to other analysts, is a clear *delimitation of responsibility*—i.e., the requirement that all positions of authority should have clearly defined duties and performance standards, which would enable their behaviour to be assessed transparently and objectively[94]. This may be seen as a prerequisite for both answerability and enforceability, as it would

be difficult to demand these two other dimensions of accountability without a clear definition of whom and over what a particular official is responsible.

In the light of these dimensions, accountability can be defined as the mean to oblige those in authority “to take responsibility for their actions, to answer for them by explaining and justifying them to those affected, and to be subject to some form of enforceable sanction if their conduct or explanation for it is found wanting”[95].

Some analysts argue that the link between wrong actions with possible sanctions is the crucial dimension of accountability[96]. However, there are cases in which responsibility and answerability are not accompanied by enforcement or sanctions. This is, for example, the case of most public debates on whether governments are fulfilling their campaign programs, but also in the accountability of central banks to parliaments, none of which involves possible sanctions (except in the case of a handful of central banks). It is even the case of truth commissions, where sanctions are many times just confined to the public exposition of criminal actions and the social stigma that may be derived from it. There may also be cases in which sanctions may come without answerability or even clarity about whether responsibility applies, particularly when governments are forced to resign as a result of popular mobilizations.

The three dimensions of accountability relate in turn to its modalities. Following O’Donnell[97], who has provided the most lucid analysis of this issue, we can differentiate three modalities. The first is vertical accountability, which may be understood as a principal-agent issue, the most important of which is elections,

when the principals (voters) put the agents (governments) to account. The second is *horizontal* accountability, which is closely linked to enforcement, and is thus exercised through the network of institutions which, as already noted, includes both the traditional mutual control among the different branches of power and independent institutions specialized in oversight. The third is *social* accountability, which refers to the control exercised by multiple civil society organizations and independent media on public sector officials[98]. This form of accountability, and particularly its capacity to "name and shame", creating social stigma and generating public pressure may be important in itself. Ultimately, however, it depends on its capacity to influence the other modalities—that is, how people vote, and whether the public debates initiated by civil society induce actions by the institutions of horizontal accountability. The power of accountability as answerability and responsibility may, therefore, depend, in the end, on enforcement.

2. THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

In light of these conceptual debates, accountability at the international level has significantly more limitations than in national governance. Four issues are crucial in this regard. The first one is that inter-governmental organizations lack both both vertical as well as the national modalities of horizontal accountability: there is no room to remove governments (in fact, in inter-governmental organs the principals and the agents are

one and the same), and the institutions of horizontal accountability (checks and balances among different branches of power, and independent oversight over the actions of member states, except on a limited set of issues) do not exist[99].

This is related to a second issue: with a few exceptions, the ultimate force of accountability, enforcement, is generally absent at the international level. The major exception is Security Council resolutions to maintain international peace and security (use of military force or sanctions) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Yet, only in the (rare) case of military interventions are officials removed. States who have signed the relevant conventions or treaties are also bound by the decisions of international human rights and criminal courts, and to the dispute-settlement mechanisms in trade and investment treaties. However, it is not infrequent for states to ignore associated “enforcement” decisions, notably when their own national rule of law and independent judiciary powers are not strong enough. If countries fail to fulfill some commitments in the treaties that create international organizations, there is also the possibility of removing their voting power—an option also rarely used.

The third issue is that, at the international level, most commitments by member states are only voluntary and thus non-binding; in a way, there is nothing to enforce. This is true in development cooperation. For example, several developed countries still fail to recognize the oldest commitment in development cooperation: to allocate 0.7% of their Gross National Product (GNP) as Official Development Assistance (ODA). The same is true of the more recent target of allocating

ODA of at least 0.15-0.20% of GNP for LDCs. “Special and differential treatment” for developing countries in trade negotiations, also an old commitment, has an equally weak record in terms of implementation[100]. On behalf of developing countries, there are similar cases of poor record of implementation of voluntary commitments, such as that to adopt national sustainable development strategies.

This issue relates, in turn, to a fourth: contrary to national governance where responsibilities of different actors are clear, at the international level, who is responsible for what is not always clear. Unless the international community takes steps to apply the third dimension of accountability—a clear delimitation of responsibility—, accountability cannot apply. In this sense, defining global goals for development cooperation both in the narrow or broader sense is not sufficient; a special effort has to be made to define the specific commitments and associated responsibilities of all actors (i.e., national governments, international organizations, civil society, private firms). This will not only help improve answerability but also, up to a point, give credible incentives to comply.

In this regard, it is essential to remember that accountability is not an end in itself, but a means for effective cooperation and thus for effective development results. Equally, accountability is not about the process (how to manage aid), the way it has been generally managed, but over the results. There must therefore be a direct link between expected results and actors (responsibility) to hold them accountable.

So, of the three dimensions of accountability, only one is fully

operational at the international level, answerability, but progress has to be made to implement the third, responsibility, without which accountability is inoperable. In turn, of the different forms of accountability defined by O'Donnell, the only one fully functional at the international level is social accountability. Indeed, with the development of communication technologies, such accountability has flourished. Nevertheless, its capacity to affect international cooperation is reduced by the fact that horizontal accountability is also limited and, in particular, that there are no international mechanisms of enforcement that it can unleash.

Given these limitations, it is important to think on the best forms accountability can take in the international system—a "second best" scenario. *Strong monitoring* of commitments is the minimum standard. To serve as an appropriate accountability mechanism, monitoring should have a certain level of independence, basically by giving the responsibility to strong Secretariats of international organizations—the term that, following UN jargon, we will give here to the elected officials and the international civil service that administer the organizations. Obviously, monitoring requires adequate information systems. When monitoring involves binding commitments by member states, *surveillance* is the term generally used, and so it can be considered a superior form of monitoring. In both cases, it is essential that monitoring and surveillance feed into the first dimensions of accountability—answerability—,leading governments to explain and justify their performance in fulfilling or not their international commitments, both at the international

level but, even more so, in their own national contexts (see below).

In turn, the best forms of horizontal accountability at the international level are peer reviews, peer pressure, and advice and pressure by Secretariats. In the first two cases, it is important that the process be *symmetric*. In the case of monitoring, surveillance and pressure by Secretariats, it is also essential that it be “even-handed”, to use a term employed in International Monetary Fund (IMF) debates to refer to the fact that they should be exercised with equal strength (or, we could even argue, more strongly) vis-à-vis the most powerful member states.

“Mutual accountability” (MA), a term that has come to be widely used in relation to development cooperation, belongs to this family of mechanisms of horizontal international accountability. It was defined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as shared responsibility among both donors and recipient countries for the effectiveness and quality of development cooperation, and relies on trust and partnership around shared agendas, and on encouraging changes in the policies and actions needed to meet commitments rather than on any sanction for non-compliance[101]. But to underscore a point made in the previous paragraph, to function effectively, MA requires, aside from shared objectives, a certain level of *symmetry* in the relationship. This is not easy, because the donor-recipient relation involves an inherent power imbalance. As we will argue below, one of the basic problems of MA is still its lack of symmetry in the relationships to which it is meant to apply.

The capacities, relative autonomy and impartiality/even-

handedness of the Secretariats of international organizations are crucial. Furthermore, Secretariats play essential roles vis-à-vis weaker member states of organizations, providing information to all members on an equal basis, and at least partially balancing out power imbalances by presenting analyses that respond to the needs and take into account the views of less powerful members. They also provide these members neutral technical support in a myriad of areas. Furthermore, Secretariats frequently go beyond these functions to advance novel initiatives, help mediate disputes and identify the common ground on which global agreements might be forged. To be relevant, however, the monitoring and surveillance reports prepared by Secretariats must be given prominence in the inter-governmental processes—i.e., an "institutional home," where governments discuss the conclusions of those evaluations and their recommendations. To support even-handedness by international organizations, overseeing whether Secretariats are fulfilling their responsibility to be impartial should be one of the major functions of the independent evaluation offices of these organizations[102].

In all cases, the *national* counterpart of international accountability plays an essential role, because national accountability is essentially stronger. Herein lays the importance of developing strong domestic counterparts of the international accountability processes involved. In the case of development cooperation, robust government capacities in partner countries are essential, but also the relevance given to this issue in the state structures of donor countries. Furthermore, since allocating public sector resources and making governments accountable for

fulfilling or not their international commitments are essential functions of parliaments, it is essential to have them strongly involved in the international accountability exercises. Civil society organizations should also be very active, as drivers of social accountability.

3. AN INITIAL VIEW OF THE MODALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

A brief initial look at the international system of governance in the economic, social and environmental fields shows the significant constraints that it faces in guaranteeing effective accountability and, even more, compliance with international commitments. The best developed is, no doubt, dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has created an international judicial body to guarantee compliance and allows countries to retaliate against those who do not fulfill their obligations. Similar mechanisms are in place in other trade agreements and in investment agreements, including in the latter case a specific organization of the World Bank group, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. All these mechanisms have been criticized, however, for not being symmetric[103].

International conventions, many of them associated with economic and social rights, are an intermediate case. The best examples are core International Labor Organization (ILO) and human rights conventions. When they have become national law, the domestic judicial system is in charge of guaranteeing their implementation—a principle that operates, however, in an

imperfect way in many national settings. Beyond that, reporting to and monitoring through the treaty bodies (committees) create a mechanism to check compliance with the conventions' provisions. The pressure exercised by these bodies may have some effects but they only exercise moral sanctions, whose effectiveness has proven to be weak. An additional and perhaps more effective mechanism may be the pressure exercised by international and national civil society on governments to comply with the conventions—i.e., international social accountability.

Peer reviews and associated peer pressure constitute another intermediate framework. It is extensively practiced by OECD and has been introduced by the African Union and the Human Rights Council. It was also proposed after the 2005 World Summit for the follow-up by ECOSOC of global summits and conferences, but it was only accepted in a diluted version (as "voluntary presentations"). Two experiences associated with development cooperation—OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and African Union peer reviews—are analyzed in greater detail in the next part of this study. As already indicated, "mutual accountability" is a similar mechanism, but it is not exercised among partners that are strictly peers and may thus be subject to significant asymmetries.

Well-developed surveillance mechanisms include IMF Article IV consultations and WTO's *Trade Policy Reviews*, both of which are mandatory under the respective international agreements, but their recommendations are again non-binding. As a result of the criticism that IMF's Article IV consultations exercise only limited influence on the most powerful countries, there has been an

attempt to increase their profile and make them more “candid” since the global financial crisis and to develop a stronger system of multilateral surveillance[104]. As a result of these mechanisms and the Group of 20’s Mutual Assessment Process, the world probably has today the most elaborate system of surveillance and macroeconomic policy cooperation. But it continues to rely essentially on a mix of stronger surveillance and peer pressure, which have proven to be weak forces.

In the United Nations, the follow up to the MDGs was a significant innovation in terms of monitoring. This included not only a well-developed statistical information system, supported by a network of international organizations, and regular global UN evaluations of progress made in achieving the MDGs, complemented by the World Bank’s *Global Monitoring Reports*, ECOSOC’s Annual Ministerial Review, and high-profile national evaluations supported by the UN teams in several countries. However, in this context, the monitoring of MDG-8 was comparatively weak, as addressed in the next part. In any case, the monitoring of the MDGs should be the starting point both for monitoring development cooperation and, more broadly, the post-2015 development agenda.

To all these mechanisms, we should add the active social accountability exercised by multiple civil society organizations at the international level, the only modality that is strictly similar to national accountability.

Borrowing in part from a previous analysis of this issue[105], an interesting way to summarize the modalities of international accountability is by differentiating five categories, the first of

which relate to social accountability and the remaining four to different international forms of horizontal accountability:

- “Spotlights”, which are non-official mechanisms that seek to provide independent information and highlight issues like donor and partner performance.
- Monitoring and surveillance by Secretariats, which are the “official spotlights” and the minimum form of horizontal accountability
- “Mirrors” (peer reviews): this is accountability made by peers, holding up a “mirror” to one another. Some examples are analyzed in the next part of this report.
- “Two-way mirrors” is a mechanism that allows for donors and partners to oversee one another’s performance in the context of “mutual” agreements and shared responsibilities. The best cases are the Busan Partnership and UN’s DCF.
- Strict, but generally imperfect compliance mechanisms, which at the end operate in many cases on the basis of pressure by peers or by Secretariats of international organizations.

This analysis leads to four conclusions we want to underscore at this stage. First, it is essential to move from monitoring/surveillance—and, in this case, with high-level debates of the associated reports by inter-governmental organs, i.e., a clear “institutional home”—to stronger modalities of horizontal accountability—mirrors and two-way mirrors—and, at least in some cases, to strict compliance mechanisms. Second,

given the limitations that international accountability faces, the domestic counterparts of such accountability exercises are essential, including strong government capacities in partner countries and ensuring that national parliaments play a central role in accountability exercises. Third, strong, autonomous and impartial Secretariats of international organizations are essential to guarantee the success of the accountability exercises. Last but not least, given the limitations of all modalities of horizontal accountability and the lack of vertical accountability at the international level, social accountability plays a central role, perhaps even more important than at the national level.

IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS RELEVANT FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The global development community has seen in recent years a proliferation of accountability mechanisms at the national, regional and global levels. Each mechanism has different characteristics and serves different contexts, participants and purposes. Understanding the contribution of each, their differences, and complementarities, will help design a better accountability architecture for development cooperation. Table 1 summarizes major features of the experiences studied involving government actors. In all cases, we analyze the challenges each experience faces and propose some recommendations.

TABLE 1
EXISTING INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MECHANISMS

	GLOBAL MONITORING OF MDG8	BUSAN PARTNERSHIP (GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION)	PEER-REVIEW PROCESS IN OECD-DAC	AFRICAN UNION PEER REVIEWS
Type of mechanism and accountability	Global monitoring. Global reports	“Two-way Mirrors” global Monitoring	“Donor - Mirror” Monitoring developed countries	“Partner - Mirror” Monitoring African union members
Type of architecture	One level architecture: ECOSOC	Three level architecture: 1) national governments; 2) steering committee; 3) secretariat (OECD and UNDP)	Two Level architecture 1) national government and 2) Directorate	Three level architecture: 1) national governments 2) high panel 3) secretariat
Main level in charge of the process of monitoring, reporting or surveillance	ECOSOC team elaborates report	National governments of recipient countries	OECD secretariat is in charge of the review process with the help of two peer “examiners” countries	Self-monitoring of national governments, and a peerreview made by secretariat team
Focused on results (outcomes) or process (managing) of cooperation for development	Global report on achievements made of the MDG 8 (results)	Monitoring of conditions for an effective cooperation for development. (Process)	Monitoring of conditions for an effective cooperation for development. (Process)	Monitoring conditions for better regional governance and achievements (process and results)
Guide with shared principles, standards and indicators	Global indicators for MDG	Busan Declaration and 10 guiding principles for effective development cooperation	Paris Declaration and AAA for effective development cooperation.	Regional New Partnership for African Development
Fosters mutual accountability	No	Yes, includes inputs from donor countries	Yes, includes inputs from program countries	Yes, is complemented with OECD-DAC inputs
Binding and enforcement recommendations	No	No	No	No

1. NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY[106]

The MDG Gap Task Force was created in 2007, by the UN Secretary-General to improve monitoring of global commitments contained in MDG-8. The main purpose of the Task Force is to systematically track advances in meeting existing international commitments and to identify gaps and obstacles in the fulfillment in each of the five areas of MDG-8: official development assistance, market access (trade), debt sustainability, and access to essential medicines and new technologies.

Starting in 2008, annual global reports highlight the degree of compliance to the commitments made both by developed and developing countries. The reports are prepared by the UN Secretariat (the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN-DESA) and are part of the monitoring system of the MDGs supported by over 30 UN and other international agencies. They are now complemented by the Reports of the Secretary-General to the biennial DCF and the *International Development Cooperation Report*, also presented to the DCF and prepared by UN-DESA (the first in 2010 and the second currently under preparation).

The report of the MDG Gap Task Force is a traditional monitoring mechanism of a global character. Although its conclusion and recommendations are not binding, they serve as an alert mechanism and a call upon the international community to fill those gaps. For example, the 2012 report warned that no significant advances had been made in any of the five objectives of MDG-8 since the previous one, while the 2013 report, warned of mixed progress and, in particular, about the falling levels of ODA[107]. The major deficiencies of these reports are the fairly ad-

hoc character of the targets and indicators chosen for MDG-8 and, although they are a reference for discussions in ECOSOC and the DCF in particular, they lack a specific intergovernmental forum where it is given a high-profile debate—an "institutional home" as we call it here. They also lack articulation with other processes and are not subject to regional and national debates to mobilize social accountability.

2. GLOBAL MONITORING FRAMEWORK OF THE BUSAN PARTNERSHIP (GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION)[108]

On the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, Republic of Korea, November 29*th*-December 1*st*, 2011) a new partnership for global development cooperation was forged built upon the previous principles and commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (2008). The Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) sets out shared principles, common goals and differential commitments for improving the effectiveness of international development cooperation (Table 2). It brings together a framework for all new stakeholders, private sector, civil society, donors and recipients, to uphold accountability based on shared principles and differential commitments. It is a two-way mirror mechanism.

Following the Paris Declaration, the Busan Partnership attempted to correct previous imbalances on the donor-recipient

relationships, by applying the principle that partner countries should be in control of their development process and thus, of cooperation. However, as with all international processes of its kind, the GPEDC and its predecessors do not take the form of a binding agreement and therefore do not give rise to legal obligations. It is rather a statement of consensus among a wide range of governments and organizations.

TABLE 2
THE 5 PRINCIPLES OF THE PARIS DECLARATION AND THE AGREED 10 GLOBAL OBJECTIVES OF THE BUSAN PARTNERSHIP

Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness	1. Ownership: Developing countries set their own development strategies and national aid policy 2. Alignment: Donor countries align their development cooperation with these objectives and use local systems. 3. Harmonization: Donor countries coordinate and share information to avoid duplication in cooperation and foster complementarities. 4. Results: cooperation for development shift focus to development results and results get measured. 5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results.
Busan Partnership Agreement	1. Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries' priorities. 2. Civil society operates within an environment which maximizes its engagement in and contribution to development 3. Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development 4. Transparency: information on development co-operation is publicly available 5. Development co-operation is more predictable 6. Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny 7. Mutual accountability among development co-operation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews 8. Gender equality and women's empowerment 9. Effective institutions: developing countries' systems are strengthened and used 10. Aid is untied

The Busan agreement also established an elaborate system to support and ensure accountability for implementing the commitments at the country and international level, facilitate sharing the lessons learned and maintain and strengthen the

political momentum for more effective development cooperation. The Busan architecture is based on a three-tier governance structure[109]:

- Each national government is responsible for implementing the agreement, and every 18-24 months a ministerial-level meeting serves as the main political forum.
- A Steering Committee supports the ministerial level platform, providing the strategic leadership, coordination and oversight.
- Secretariat: The OECD and UNDP fulfill secretariat functions, drawing on their existing structures.

Within this framework, and applying the principle of ownership, developing (partner) countries have the leading role in the monitoring process. They are encouraged to define their shared agenda with different donors and stakeholders and define goals and targets. This is an innovative twist to fight the usually imbalanced relation between donors and recipients.

At the global level, the process monitors ten objectives, based on the principles agreed from Paris to Busan (see again Table 2). Although each objective has a global indicator to allow monitoring, this does not prevent stakeholders for agreeing on different targets at the country level[110]. Global monitoring is informed through the ministerial-level dialogue. Aside from serving as an accountability device, it stimulates broad-based dialogue on good practices across countries at both the country and international levels.

Up until now, 161 Governments and 54 organizations have endorsed the Busan agreement. The first Busan Global Partnership high-level meeting is to be held in Mexico on 15th and 16th April 2014. The main focus is going to be the linkages between development cooperation and the post-2015 development agenda.

The Busan partnership managed, therefore, to shift the notion of development cooperation from donor centric to holistic framework, based on: 1) ownership and control by developing countries; 2) a focus on results and priorities of developing countries; 3) inclusive development partnerships; and 4) transparency and mutual accountability.

However, it also faces important challenges. First, it does not monitor development outcomes, which are addressed through other international frameworks, such as the MDGs. Secondly, even though it gives developing countries higher responsibility and ownership of development cooperation, this alone does not guarantee that there exist credible incentives or mechanisms for donor countries to comply with commitments or for developing countries to be able to enforce them. Third, despite broad-based participation, an important group of countries does not participate: major Southern partners; this has to do with the origin of what was essentially an OECD initiative. Finally, it has faced problems in maintaining its focus on transparency and mutual accountability, as only 40 some countries participate in the global monitoring exercise.

3. PEER-REVIEW PROCESS IN OECD-DAC[111]

The peer review process of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) is a unique mechanism for accountability on the effectiveness and quality of development cooperation from a donor perspective. It is, of course, part of the broader family of OECD peer reviews and is conceptualized as a mirror-type accountability mechanism among DAC members.

The peer reviews cover the full range of issues, from policy to delivery. Nevertheless, it is mainly a mechanism to monitor the process of "delivering aid" focusing on the principles, conditions and best practices to manage aid for a better quality and effectiveness rather than on development results. It tries to improve management of aid programs, accountability, coordination, sharing best practices and learning in development cooperation[112].

All DAC members are obliged to undergo peer reviews and to serve as "examiners" in the review of other members. The Review, Evaluation and Engagement Division of the Development Cooperation Directorate act as the Secretariat and is responsible for conducting the review process[113]. The process involves five stages: 1) preparation and planning; 2) fact-finding, analysis and report writing; 3) the peer review meeting; 4) approval and publication; and 5) follow-up. The peer review process also consults a wide variety of stakeholders and questions to partner countries are an important part of the process (in particular for dimensions related to development cooperation delivery, partnerships, results, and development finance). In this sense, it is also partly a tool of mutual

accountability.

The DAC peer review reference guide is the analytical framework for reviewing performance of DAC members. It sets the components and indicators, in the light of internationally agreed benchmarks and principles, DAC good practice papers and guidelines, criteria for the admission of new DAC members and nationally selected reference points. However, while the reference guide provides benchmarks, each peer review is situated in its own context and recommendations are adjusted to each specific situation. The review makes recommendations for improvement and a follow up process ensures that lessons are translated into policies, programmes, and practices of the DAC member.

The peer review is, however, only a soft tool of accountability with no enforcement or binding recommendations. There is, nevertheless, strong follow-up from the Secretariat to comply with agreed global principles and standards. Indeed, this is perhaps the best case among those analyzed in which we can talk of this process being surveillance rather than just monitoring. It is also the only accountability mechanisms in place where donors have credible incentives, by peer-pressure and surveillance, to comply with agreed commitments and standards[114]. The public character of the process contributes also to this result.

Linking the OECD-DAC peer reviews with the other (existing or new) mechanisms in a global accountability framework could increase the incentives for donor countries to comply with commitments and help developing countries enforce them even if they have a different origin. For this, it must be clear how an

integrated architecture would work and how these mechanisms can complement and reinforce each other.

4. AFRICAN UNION PEER REVIEW MECHANISM[115]

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was established in 2003 by the African Union as part of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The APRM is a self-monitoring tool. Participation is voluntary, but it has been broadly accepted by members of the African Union. By 2013, 33 states were members and 17 had undergone peer reviews.

Its objectives are primarily to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration. These broad objectives are reflected in the four thematic areas for measuring performance and progress: 1) democracy and political governance; 2) economic governance; 3) corporate governance; and 4) socio-economic development. As with other peer review processes, it also provides opportunities for sharing and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing requirements for capacity building.

The review process provides a national space for dialogue on governance and socio-economic indicators for Member States. The National Programme of Action (NPA) prepared at the end of the first phase defines the road map agreed upon by all

stakeholders in an inclusive and participatory manner. This is the base document for discussion in further peer reviews, for improvement and accountability. The NPA must have time-bounded objectives and must be linked to national budget to guide all stakeholders (local government, private sector, civil society). The short-, medium-and long-term goals that it sets are monitored on a continuous basis, either by the National Commission/Governing Council, or a smaller representative body including state and non-governmental actors, which prepares a six-monthly progress report and an annual progress report for the APR Forum.

At the regional level, the APRM architecture[116] includes three main bodies:

- APR Forum: the committee of participating Heads of States and Government of the members.
- APR Panel of Experts, which exercises oversight of the APRM process to ensure its independence, professionalism and credibility.
- APR Secretariat, which provides technical, coordinating and administrative support services.

The Forum also collaborates with other regional institutions, namely: the African Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA) and the Regional Bureau for Africa of the United Nations Development Programme.

At the national level, countries put in place relevant structures to facilitate the effective implementation of the APRM. These

structures may vary from designated focal points, national commissions for strategic policy implementation or national secretariats for technical and administrative support.

The APRM starts with a base review, carried out within 18 months of a country's joining it Periodic reviews take place every two to four years. Additional reviews can be requested, and alternative reviews can be commissioned based on signs of impending political and economic crisis. The participating countries have agreed to adopt specific objectives, standards, criteria and indicators for assessing and monitoring progress in the key areas in accordance with the APRM Base Document and the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.

The major success of the APRM has been well summarized by UN-ECA: "A major and significant contribution of the APRM to institutionalizing a culture of accountability has been bringing about a domestic accountability mechanism, reinforced by a continental accountability mechanism to replace externally, i.e., extra-African, imposed ones"[117]. It has also served as a framework to share best practice for effective cooperation for development. More importantly, it has empowered and given more legitimacy to African Union members to be in control of development cooperation.

There are, however, some challenges. Among them how to mobilize and sustain citizen participation in its country and continental structures and processes in order to prevent "APRM-fatigue". Robust, accurate and time-appropriate data for informed decision-making has also been a challenge. Finally, as an

accountability mechanism for internal national and regional priorities, it is difficult to see how it can be used as part of a global accountability mechanism within the system of development cooperation—or, even whether it should be used as such.

5. SOME CONCLUSIONS

The above review of these mechanisms points to at least four core elements that should be in place in every mechanism for an effective global framework for accountability in development cooperation: 1) A document with explicit guiding principles and, whenever possible, with specific responsibilities and associated targets and indicators, is needed, with a focus on results. This “road-map” is the answer to the need to define responsibility —“accountability over what”. A shared agenda is necessary but clearly not enough. 2) A multi-layered structure, with specific actors and purposes at each level seems to be the most efficient architecture. The best model in this regard is the APRM. This guarantees complementarities between domestic, regional and global accountability mechanisms and gives flexibility to respond to different demands. 3) “Spotlight” or “official spotlights” at each level, but aligned within a complete framework, can have positive results. 4) Data on the impact, effectiveness and results are mandatory for an accountability focus on the results of development cooperation.

V. THE “TRIANGULAR ARCHITECTURE” OF

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND ITS ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

Today's development cooperation (in the narrow sense) has developed a "triangular architecture", with three major components: North-South, South-South and non-governmental. The non-governmental could be divided, in turn, between civil society and philanthropic cooperation, on the one hand, and strict private-sector cooperation, on the other. Each form of cooperation has its own history and features and must be analyzed separately, but they should interact and in multiple ways for the proper functioning of the Global Partnership for Development. The global accountability system must build upon those used by each one of these mechanisms, but also look at the interaction and coherence among them.

1. MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

As already pointed out, in relation to the first of these forms of cooperation, the concept that has become increasingly used is "mutual accountability" (MA), which is set as one of the five principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The new concept was formulated in contrast to the tradition of development cooperation as "donor-guided", both in terms of assignment and implementation[118]. A change in behavior was needed for parties to understand that they were both accountable for the use of development resources and for development results, that partner countries should be in full control of their development processes and that it was thus essential to the

counteract the power imbalance between donors and aid recipients[119].

MA is defined as “accountability between the providers and recipients of development cooperation, for the effectiveness of that cooperation in producing development results. It promotes an equal partnership between programme countries and providers of development cooperation, and should be a key means of ensuring compliance with MDG-8 commitments, including those agreed in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation”[120]. MA fosters accountability by having concrete commitments and goals, differentiated by actor, which can be monitored and assessed. It relies on trust and partnership around shared agendas rather than on “hard” sanctions for non-compliance. However, in the development of this practice, tensions naturally arise for both donors and partner countries between the requirements of their domestic accountability mechanisms and their mutual commitments, and because of the inherent power imbalance in the donor-partner relationship.

Mutual Accountability is supposed to work through five necessary elements that need to be applied at the country level: 1) clear national policies; 2) a shared agenda (aligned with key element i); 3) specific targets and commitments for both donor and partners; 4) clear ways to monitor and reviewing mutual commitments in time-specific basis; and 5) a space for dialogue and negotiation. Several of these coincide with the lessons from existing accountability mechanisms, as summarized at the end of part III of this report. In partner countries, this requires strong go-

vernment, parliamentary and civil society leadership, and independent analytical input from non-governmental stakeholders, as well as comprehensive databases that cover aid quality issues[121].

The application of these elements and the success of MA has proven to be a hard process. The 2009 DCF Global Accountability survey on the application of MA revealed that most recipient countries had no aid policy, and that virtually none had targets for individual providers. Furthermore most policies focused on recipient performance and on monitoring of recipient's commitments and goals, thus not balancing the existing relation. Only eight partner countries had major progress on national mutual accountability, though there was some progress in 22 others and a lot of work continuing[122]. The 2011 survey showed more encouraging results. An increasing number of recipient countries have designed national aid policies and specific targets for providers. Nonetheless, when in place, strong national-level MA has had a major quantifiable positive impact on changing providers, and (specially) partner countries' behavior: improved results-based planning; systematic monitoring and evaluation; higher quality of national development strategies; better prioritization of spending needs and management of development finance resources; and more comprehensive reporting on aid and results data. It has also encouraged providers to increase alignment with country systems and harmonization of efforts[123].

The DCF has made mutual accountability and transparency a major focus for the assessment of development cooperation. The 2012 session focused on the lessons learned from, and the way

forward for mutual accountability. It concluded that MA frameworks with performance targets for individual providers and partner countries, coupled with regular high-level reviews, have resulted in better development results, but that still many development partnerships remain imbalanced. It called, therefore, for “inclusive mutual accountability” complemented with high domestic accountability[124].

More broadly, despite some successes and despite the proliferation of mechanisms at the international level to assess MA, progress has been disappointing and mutual accountability has been referred to as the Paris Declaration’s “orphan pillar”. Three main deficiencies have been identified in the practical application of the concept of MA.

First, MA has proven more successful in changing partner than donor countries’ behavior. Donor countries have not fully committed to specific targeted goals, and there are few national aid coordination forums that serve as accountability mechanism for those countries. According to the 2010 UN’s *International Development Cooperation Report*, this poor provider performance reflects eight systemic gaps in the global level mechanisms that should reinforce national level accountability: 1) providers are virtually the only sources of data and analysis; 2) partner governments and other stakeholders are woefully underrepresented; 3) the content of assessments is dominated by providers’ concerns; 4) most assessments cover only DAC donors and major multilaterals; 5) virtually none publish analysis on the performance of individual providers in individual recipient countries; 6) cooperation among mechanisms is weak though

growing; 7) few are used to provoke change at national level; and 8) few have much impact on providers' behavior. These gaps are also related with the next deficiency.

Second, incentives to comply with MA are still imbalanced. Although donors can ultimately sanction their partners by cutting aid flows, sanctions for non-compliance by donors are entirely lacking[125]. According to the 2011 survey on MA only three recipient countries monitor targets for individual providers, perhaps because they still do not see how it could bring upon positive changes. As discussed in the previous part of this document, OECD-DAC peer reviews have positive impacts on making donor countries accountable for their commitments and quality of cooperation for development. However, although this mechanism exercises peer pressure and presents credible recommendations, the latter are only soft and non-binding. Some analysts have thus proposed a high-level agreement that would establishment a mechanism through which partner countries can collectively hold donors accountable.

Third, partner government coherence (ownership) is still weak. There are still some gaps on the incentives for a strong government leadership that clearly establishes a clear national "road map" and involves parliaments and civil society. The participation of parliaments, civil society and private actors is essential to complement domestic and mutual accountability.

At the international level, mutual accountability may be seen as part of a family of rather soft-type, "collaborative" mechanisms based on reporting and monitoring, high-level meetings or other platforms for shared experiences, complemented by social

accountability. Most UN mechanisms accountability mechanisms are of this family, as is the Busan partnership. A 2008 Oxford Policy Management (OPM) study provided detailed analysis of some of the existing mechanisms and its impact at the international level[126]. The study correctly stated that the challenge of MA is to promote change in behavior in the absence of legally binding enforcement mechanisms, and against a backdrop of power imbalances. So, their success is about creating and sustaining a "logic of participation" rather than a "logic of compliance". Along the analysis in part II, in the face of nonexistent enforcement mechanisms other credible incentives, pressure from different stakeholders (social accountability) and direct linkages with domestic accountability become even more important. To succeed, three key elements must be present: 1) credible, time-appropriate and high-quality information to monitor and assess commitments (evidence); 2) legitimate commitments backed up by domestic accountability mechanisms (ownership); and 3) both formal and informal spaces for debates that inform high-level discussion.

The OPM 2008 report also concluded that, despite the proliferation of mechanisms to monitor MA, most of them are working in isolation with no clear system and links among them. Potential synergies are yet to be exploited. In this regard, they presented two important recommendations. The first is to *build a genuine, mutually reinforcing, system*. This involves building synergies between individual accountability mechanisms, both official and non-official, and harnessing their complementary strengths, particularly in terms of "ownership" and "evidence".

This may imply scaling up but also eliminating some mechanisms in place. The second recommendation is to *strengthen the evidence base available* through greater quality, independence and transparency of information from donors and partner countries and support for enhanced monitoring by non-government sources. There are few monitoring mechanisms that assess donor performance at the individual basis and, as already noted, providers are virtually the only source used by global MA mechanisms.

In conclusion, the concept of MA has to evolve to guarantee ownership at the national level and symmetry at the international level. At the national level, where coherence is still weak, MA needs to establish real links between development cooperation and development goals and plans of partner countries, with clear targets and indicators for both donor and partner countries. This should be done in close interaction with other stakeholders. Parliaments are particularly important and essential, not only for democratic decision-making but also for higher levels of accountability. At the international level, balancing the inherent power asymmetries is mandatory for a MA to be an effective mechanisms for horizontal accountability. This requires a stronger voice for partner countries to overcome the imbalances in the aid relationship, strong surveillance of commitments by independent Secretariats, as well as high-profile political debates. High quality regular monitoring of individual donor performance is crucial, which could be linked to the existing peer review process of OECD-DAC since peer pressure in this mechanism has proven to be effective. It is also important to exploit the

complementarities between existing accountability mechanism at the national and international level and foster possible synergies. This is the basis for the triangular, multi-layered architecture proposed in this report.

Finally, it is important to highlight again, as the UN 2010 *International Development Cooperation Report* does, that MA is a means and not an end in itself. Until now, MA at the international level has focused more on the "how" to manage and deliver development cooperation—i.e., an assessment of donors' efforts to comply with their commitments to those principles that experience suggests lead to effective aid (the Paris and Busan principles). It has been accountability on the process of cooperation for development rather than on its impacts on development outcomes. This gap is especially important when talking of a global development agenda. A clear mechanism to hold *all* countries accountable for the wide international development results is missing with direct responsibilities and expected outcomes of cooperation for development.

2. SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

The concept of South-South cooperation (SSC) refers to the processes, institutions and arrangements designed to promote political, economic and technical cooperation among developing countries in pursuit of common development goals[127]. SSC is regarded by developing countries as an alternative type of cooperation and, unlike North-South cooperation, is seen as cooperation *among equals*, rooted in solidarity. For this reason,

developing countries have repeatedly pointed out that SSC is not governed by the same rules as traditional aid and has its own modalities: “South-South cooperation is a common endeavour of peoples and countries of the South, born out of shared experiences and sympathies, based on their common objectives and solidarity, and guided by, inter alia, the principles of respect for national sovereignty and ownership, free from any conditionalities. SSC should not be seen as official development assistance. It is a partnership among equals based on solidarity”[128]. These views are also captured in the principles agreed by G-77 and China (see Table 3).

TABLE 3
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

1. South-South cooperation is a common endeavour of peoples and countries of the South and must be pursued as an expression of South-South solidarity and a strategy for economic independence and self-reliance of the South based on their common objectives and solidarity;
2. South-South cooperation and its agenda must be driven by the countries of the South;
3. South-South cooperation must not be seen as a replacement for North-South cooperation. Strengthening South
4. South cooperation must not be a measure of coping with the receding interest of the developed world in assisting developing countries;
5. Cooperation between countries of the South must not be analysed and evaluated using the same standards as those used for North-South relations;
6. Financial contributions from other developing countries should not be seen as Official Development Assistance from these countries to other countries of the South. These are merely expressions of solidarity and cooperation borne out of shared experiences and sympathies;
7. South-South cooperation is a development agenda based on premises, conditions and objectives that are specific to the historic and political context of developing countries and to their needs and expectations. South-South cooperation deserves its own separate and independent promotion;
8. South-South cooperation is based on a strong, genuine, broad-based partnership and solidarity;
9. South-South cooperation is based on complete equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit;
10. South-South cooperation respects national sovereignty in the context of shared responsibility;
11. South-South cooperation strives for strengthened multilateralism in the promotion of an action-oriented approach to development challenges;

12. South-South cooperation promotes the exchange of best practices and support among developing countries in the common pursuit of their broad development objectives (encompassing all aspects of international relations and not just in the traditional economic and technical areas);

13. South-South cooperation is based on the collective self-reliance of developing countries;

14. South-South cooperation seeks to enable developing countries to play a more active role in international policy and decision-making processes, in support of their efforts to achieve sustainable development;

15. The modalities and mechanisms for promoting South-South cooperation are based on bilateral, subregional, regional and interregional cooperation and integration as well as multilateral cooperation.

SOURCE: SOUTH CENTRE, SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION PRINCIPLES: AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 2009, AVAILABLE AT: HTTP://WWW.SOUTHCENTRE.INT/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/2013/09/SOUTH-SOUTH-COOPERATION-PRINCIPLES_EN.PDF

SSC obviously broadens the availability of development cooperation, both in terms of donors and contents. It is as an opportunity to gain greater independence from a limited number of donors. This is particular important now, when North-South cooperation is decreasing. It also includes cooperation in fields that have not been in the priorities of developed country donors in recent decades, such as infrastructure. The principles that underlie SSC may also facilitate higher alignment with national priorities, and it character as cooperation among equals can also generate positive synergies[129].

In any case, understanding its comparative advantages as well as its limitations is necessary to fully reap its potential. Furthermore, although it is a complement rather than a substitute for North-South cooperation, there are possible synergies between the two that can be exploited through “triangular cooperation”—i.e., the partnerships between DAC donors and “pivotal countries” (providers of SSC) to implement development cooperation programmes/projects in beneficiary countries[130].

Among the challenges that it faces, the first is the absence of a

clear definition of what separates SSC cooperation in general from development cooperation in particular—or, in the terms of this report, what separates SSC in a broad and in a narrow sense. This means that it is essential to clearly separate the economic activities that are regulated by trade, investment, financial and economic integration agreements from non-profit making mutual exchange and solidarity activities as such—i.e., knowledge sharing, technical cooperation and concessional lending or transfers. The second is a lack of clear shared principles and guidelines for an effective SSC. As all areas of international cooperation, accountability should be introduced, but this requires a shared set of principles that go beyond the correct but very broad principles that have been adopted. Beyond that, and as stated throughout this study, agreement on objectives, priorities and targets is essential, and is the point of departure for any form of accountability—i.e., the dimension of "responsibility".

Despite its potential, deficient information on SSC makes transparency, accountability and analysis of its impact on development more difficult. However recent trends and application of best practices has had major improvements in the degree to which SSC partners are reporting recent, current and intended disbursements to partner country authorities for inclusion in national databases on development cooperation, as well as in national budgets. There are strong and accelerating trends towards more publication and transparency among virtually all providers.

There has been some progress in several of these areas in a

series of meetings on SSC. Thus, in the last informal exchange under the auspices of the DCF among Directors-General of Southern Partners in Addis Ababa in June 2013, one of the understandings was over the need to define how the SSC principles apply and operate in practice and specific measures and indicators to assess its impact[131]. In the earlier “Conference of Southern Providers on South-South Cooperation: Issues and Emerging Challenges”, organized jointly by the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) and UN-DESA in New Delhi in April 2013, important recommendations were made over the way forward for SSC[132].

These recommendations, which should be subject to further debate and action, include:

- Strengthening systematic collection as well as evidence-based research and studies on the effectiveness and impact of SSC.
- Equally, strengthen evaluations of SSC programmes and projects, which are essential for peer learning, transparency and institution building.
- Continue the process of establishing Southern providers’ own development cooperation agencies or specialized divisions across respective Ministries.
- Establishing credible and inclusive platforms to address issues of common interest. There is agreement, in this regard, that existing institutions, including OECD/DAC, the IBSA (India/Brazil/South Africa) Dialogue Forum and BRICS, lack either credibility or inclusiveness. It has also been cautioned that the concept of a “Southern DAC”

risks repeating the mistakes of the North in reaffirming a “give and take” relationship”.

- Strengthening multilateral and regional support.
- Cultivating coherent response to the Post-Busan and other global processes. In this regard, partners agreed that the South should shift from a reactive mood to a proactive approach to global processes, which would allow the South to have an increasing voice in the field of development cooperation.

With respect to a global accountability framework, the creation of special agencies or offices in charge of development cooperation can have important implications, as they can be important actors in the development cooperation debate, demanding and promoting accountability both at the national and international levels. A three level architecture like the APRM could be replicated for SSC, and built upon these new agencies to link cooperation for development both with national priorities and accountability mechanisms as well as with wider development goals at the international level.

It is still unclear how SSC cooperation should be included in a global architecture of accountability for an effective cooperation for development in a UN framework. However, if we distinguish economic exchange from mutual support and solidarity, they must have separate spaces for accountability.

3. ACCOUNTABILITY OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS IN DEVELOPMENT

COOPERATION

The concepts of cooperation and the global partnerships for development have changed in order to include new forms of cooperation and new actors. Nowadays it is widely agreed that global partnerships or issue-based alliances for action must be multi-stakeholder, and include the business sector, non-profit organizations and civil society, as well as the communities themselves[133]. In the discussion of proper accountability mechanisms, it is essential, however, to differentiate between those that would apply to the business sector and those that should for non-profit non-governmental cooperation.

The debate on the role of private business has primarily focused on determining the specific areas where the private sector can best be involved in development cooperation. The High-Level Panel and other studies, like a recent paper of Brookings Institution[134], give important directions in this regard. They include environmental sustainability, innovation and technology, and employment creation. Less attention has been given to how to make the private sector accountable for the commitments and development results.

Up until now, such accountability has been realized by “spotlights” mechanisms like NGO rankings and reports, which monitor private firms in different dimensions, based on common and shared principles. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)[135], for example, monitors the sustainability performance of private firms according to some sector guidelines and principles. An increasing number of private firms have joined the GRI. Systematic sustainability reporting can help organizations measure,

understand and communicate their economic, environmental, social and governance performance, and build trust in organizations.

The GRI Guidelines are used in combination with other initiatives in order to foster possible complementarities and synergies. GRI has global strategic partnerships with the OECD, UNDP and the United Nations Global Compact. Its Framework enjoys synergies with the guidance of the International Finance Corporation, the International Organization for Standardization's ISO 26000, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Earth Charter Initiative. Commitments of private actors toward a global development agenda could be built upon the experience of the GRI.

There is another mechanism through which civil society, in this case consumers, are making private firms accountable. As consumer's awareness on development goals has expanded, their demand for "green" of "socially-equitable" products has increased. As a result, private firms have become more accountable differentiating their products with formal certifications like the green-or fair-trade tags, such as the Rain Forest seal[136]. Furthermore, in contrast to inter-governmental accountability mechanisms, which may lack credible incentives or binding tools, consumers do have ways to "reward" or "punish" private firms, such as by paying more for products that meet certain standards, stopping consumption or even organizing an international boycott on a product or firm that does not meet such standards.

A challenge remains on how different forms of accountability of the business sector could be integrated with other global

reporting and accountability mechanisms on global development goals. In any case, such accountability has to go beyond the usual concept of Corporate Social Responsibility and gradually include an evaluation of how *core* business practices contribute to development—and not only through the social and environmental footprint. This is particularly urgent in those (growing number of) cases where development assistance is being received to catalyze private sector investment. In this case, business engagement should be seen as a tool through which both donors and partner national governments can better achieve their existing objectives, rather than separate programs[137]. Again, at the country level, alignment with national development plans is essential. At the international level, the UN Global Compact could play this role in this regard, but under the umbrella of DCF.

A report of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) made three specific proposals in this area[138].

- Propose a separate accountability framework for businesses, harmonizing different frameworks and identifying core indicators based on existing frameworks, such as the GRI.
- Step up work on human and natural capital accounting methodologies to make it possible to put a value on the non-financial impacts of the private sector on development.
- Under a transparency/governance goal, recommend that governments set mandatory reporting for large businesses as a listing requirement.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are, of course, a quite different and itself a diverse set of non-governmental actors, which play an increasing role in the development field, both through their exercise of social accountability and the specific development programs they undertake. In the 2010 Open Forum on Global Assembly in Istanbul, eight guiding principles were agreed for CSOs be effective actors for development[139]. These are: 1) respect and promote human rights and social justice; 2) embody gender equality and equity while promoting women and girls' rights; 3) focus on people's empowerment, democratic ownership and participation; 4) promote environmental sustainability; 5) practice transparency and accountability; 6) pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity; 7) create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning; and 8) commit to realizing positive sustainable change. The Second Forum in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in 2011, advanced on the agreement of these principles and the explicit objectives for their implementation, with indicators to monitor advance and a definition of a role for social accountability. On this last point one the objectives of the forum was to define how to "advocate to governments for a more enabling environment for CSOs to operate"[140].

We should emphasize that CSOs should also align their efforts with wider development processes, both at the national and international levels. In the area of our concern, this means that their social accountability function must have a clear link with other accountability mechanism, particularly with those of national parliaments at the country level and MA frameworks at the international level. Equally, as actors of development, CSO

cooperation should be aligned with national priorities and development strategies and with wider development goals, and should interact actively with other development actors. An interesting example is the Equator Initiative[141], which promotes partnerships in concrete projects for local sustainable development, bringing together the United Nations, governments, civil society, businesses and grassroots organizations.

There have also been attempts to define shared principles and guidelines for private donors to comply with their responsibility as development actors and be more accountable for their actions. The study of the Council on Foundations and the European Foundation Centre, for example, proposes principles that should guide international philanthropy for higher effectiveness and better accountability[142]. In turn, an important initiative is the INGO Accountability Charter which defines itself as a global, comprehensive cross-sectoral accountability framework for NGOs driven by NGOs[143].

Finally, we want to emphasize that all non-governmental actors should also be guided by the same principles in relation to partner countries that have been defined by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This is particularly important in those cases in which non-governmental actors are being used by donors as channels for their cooperation, including, as noted, those in which development assistance is being used to catalyze private sector investment. In this sense, a shared agenda with specific responsibilities of non-governmental actors, should be part of the global cooperation architecture.

VI. DESIGNING A BETTER ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Accountability mechanisms at the international level are constrained by several characteristics of global governance. Enforcement mechanisms are absent, except for a subset of areas that are not relevant for issues discussed in this report. In the area of development cooperation, limitations are furthermore associated with the voluntary and non-binding character of commitments. Accountability is thus limited to answerability and its necessary counterpart, responsibility. The latter requires a clear definition of the commitments of each actor as well as the indicators and targets that determine whether commitments are being met.

Also, and compared to similar mechanisms at the national level, vertical accountability is absent at the international level, and horizontal accountability is constrained by the nature of inter-governmental governance. Only social accountability has a similar space as in national debates.

The best forms of horizontal accountability in international development cooperation are peer reviews/pressure and strong surveillance by the Secretariats of international organizations; we consciously use the word “surveillance” here, even if the term should be used only when commitments are binding. In our analysis of different forms of cooperation, the surveillance mechanisms that rank best are the peer review process in OECD-DAC and the African Union. The basic advantage of peer reviews is that they foster accountability through stronger peer

pressure, which in turn generates more credible incentives to comply. Mutual accountability ranks next, but it continues to be plagued by the asymmetries between donor and partner countries that characterized the older forms of cooperation it was supposed to replace. In particular, it has proven more successful in changing partner than donor countries' behavior. In our view, the weakest form of accountability has been the monitoring of MDG-8, which is itself a fairly ad-hoc set of targets and indicators that for most analysts are inadequate in view of what the Global Partnership for Development means.

Aside from OECD-DAC, peer reviews could also be used in South-South cooperation. Indeed, since peer reviews are a mechanism to be developed in relations among "equals", it has a broad scope in South-South cooperation and in regional cooperation among developing countries. Mutual accountability in the context of the Busan Partnership should continue to be strengthened, particularly by making it more symmetric. For the rest, strong monitoring and surveillance mechanisms have to be put in place with a clear "institutional home"—i.e., an intergovernmental process where the associated reports are subject to high profile debates.

In the absence of vertical accountability and enforcement mechanisms, this system of international horizontal accountability uses peer-pressure and strong monitoring/surveillance as a way to generate incentives to meet commitments. But, given its inherent limitations compared to horizontal accountability at the national level, it is essential that this system should be strongly tied to national accountability exercises and supported by very

active international and national social accountability. Of course, and beyond its links with international horizontal accountability, national accountability is important in itself.

Given their differential history, characteristics, forums and decision-making bodies, a strong *triangular accountability* architecture has to be put in place, which would include the three elements of development cooperation: North-South, South-South and non-governmental.

The basic point of departure in all cases should be explicit agreements on principles, commitments and standards of development cooperation, without which no accountability exercise can take place. This practice applies today only to North-South cooperation, through the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Busan Partnership. Even in this case, however, many developed countries do not recognize as commitments the half-century old target to provide ODA equivalent of 0.7% of GNP, and the more recent to allocate 0.15-0.20% for LDCs. In turn, the principles of South-South cooperation that have been agreed lack explicit standards and commitments upon which to base an accountability exercise, and no principles have been agreed on development cooperation by non-governmental organizations.

The building of a better accountability architecture for development cooperation should thus start by overcoming these fundamental problems. This means that OECD-DAC should adopt an explicit commitment to the UN targets of development cooperation, as the European Union did in the run up to the 2005 UN Summit—a commitment that, nonetheless, only a few

countries have met or are strongly committed to meet. In turn, the relevant forums from the South should adopt explicit standards for South-South cooperation. This should include a clear separation of the economic activities that are undertaken as part of normal economic relations from South-South development cooperation in the narrow sense (knowledge sharing, technical cooperation and concessional lending or transfers). In the case of civil society/philanthropic organizations and the business sector, explicit standards should also be set, building upon existing frameworks already mentioned in the previous part of this report, which could be mainstreamed into the global accountability architecture[144].

As pointed out in several parts of this report, it should not be forgotten that accountability is an *instrument*, not an objective in itself. So, the purpose is not so much to manage the cooperation process as *to deliver* results. Also, the system that is put in place should provide a platform for learning and sharing good practices and, more broadly, to promote development progress at the global level. Thus, the accountability exercises should avoid indictment and focus on building better practices.

The triangular accountability architecture should build upon the existing frameworks, and enhance their linkages and complementarities. It should also enhance the communication among existing processes and avoid duplicating efforts. A unique global accountability report should be developed at the global level, which would include the current *MDG Gap Report* and the *International Development Cooperation Report*. Coordination of global cooperation, and the associated global accountability,

should have a clear “institutional home”, which should be ECOSOC’s Development Cooperation Forum.

The accountability mechanism should aim at creating credible incentives. This would always be a challenge given the inherently weak nature of international accountability frameworks. Currently, the OECD-DAC peer review is the only accountability mechanisms in place were donors have, through peer-pressure and strong surveillance, credible incentives to comply with agreed commitments and standards. It should be the benchmark to design the global framework. But even in this case, it has failed to fully take into account the Paris and Busan commitments, as reflected in the asymmetric character of the Busan Partnership. Linking the OECD-DAC peer reviews with the existing mechanisms in a global accountability framework could increase the incentives for donor countries to comply with these commitments.

As highlighted in several parts of this report, creating credible incentives also requires, going beyond common principles and goals. A base document delimiting the responsibilities of different actors, with explicit tasks and commitments, is an essential complement to explicit agreements on principles and standards of development cooperation, and an essential catalyst to foster higher accountability.

The triangular architecture should also be *multi-layered*. So, aside from global processes, regional ones could be put in place, including peer-review processes, which could be coordinated by the UN regional commissions. But, even most important, given the inherently weak nature of international accountability, *national*

counterparts are essential. In this area, we want to underscore the *crucial role of national parliaments*, as the formal institution in charge of making governments accountable for international commitments. As OECD-DAC is the most advanced standard in terms of accountability, the architecture of the African Peer Review Mechanism is the best standard in terms of a multi-layered architecture. Linking national with international social accountability is also essential; this is an area where there is already advance. Also, to improve on their accountability dimensions, the global accountability report must go beyond monitoring to mobilize social accountability in regional and national debates.

A multi-layered architecture with strong domestic counterparts —governments, parliaments, civil society—requires capacity building at the national level in partner countries and strong autonomous and impartial Secretariats of international organizations, in this case of the offices of the United Nations in charge of global monitoring, surveillance and coordinating the development cooperation architecture—i.e., UN-DESA, supported by UNDP, UNCTAD and the World Bank.

Accountability also demands academic and policy-oriented research with a focus on what forms of cooperation deliver better results. Such analyses should, in turn, feed back into the accountability exercises. As already highlighted, a focus on results, and thus specific indicators and targets that link development cooperation with expected results, are also essential.

Using the terminology of High-Level Panel's report, both

research and results-oriented actions require a “data revolution”. But it should be clear that, even more than sophisticated data for policy analysis (e.g., innovative composite indicators or the experimental surveys en vogue in economics), the priority should be quality information about public sector spending and services, and basic data on economic and social indicators from national statistical offices of the developing countries that lack them. It does not make sense to increase the sophistication of the information available on living standards when countries cannot produce high-quality data on the quantity and quality of basic social services, employment, poverty and inequality—or even on production and GNP—, and therefore international organizations have to “guess” the data of those countries for global monitoring.

So, even more than a data revolution, what is essential is a major effort to raise the standards of the statistical offices of the developing countries to produce quality basic social and economic indicators. This is the most urgent “data revolution” that is needed and an area that should be itself a major focus of development cooperation. Triangular cooperation can be particularly useful in this case, as it would be a return to the era in which the UN Statistical Division played a crucial role both in developing better comparable national data as well as providing technical cooperation to national statistical offices to develop such data. In the case of development cooperation data, strengthening the capacities of the relevant office at the national level is also essential.

Finally, it must be remembered that the proposals presented in this report refer to development cooperation “in the narrow

sense”—i.e., primarily technical assistance and concessional finance. There are other dimensions of the Global Partnership for Development, as encapsulated in particular in the Monterrey Consensus, that relate to the rules and governance of global trade and finance and trade, but also issues of technology generation and transfer, as well as migration, investment, taxation and other areas. For these dimensions of development cooperation “in the broader sense”, accountability frameworks should also be put in place of the design of the post-2015 agenda. Furthermore, a clear link between both mechanisms of accountability, in the narrow and broader sense, should be created.

The best way forward would be the design of a strong follow-up mechanism of the Monterrey Consensus and related agreements that would replace the extremely weak one that was put in place over the past long decade. This issue should be at the center of the forthcoming follow-up Conference on Financing for Development to be held in 2015 or 2016. UNCTAD could also be called to fulfill some of the tasks of monitoring elements of this broader agenda, as it in fact has been doing through its history. However, given the specific scope of the DCF consultations under way, these dimensions of the broader accountability for development cooperation are beyond the objectives of this background report.

NOTAS

1. José Antonio Alonso es catedrático de Economía Aplicada en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Doctor en Ciencias Económicas, es vocal experto del Consejo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo y miembro del Committee for Development Policy de ECOSOC, de las Naciones Unidas.

2. Center for Global Development. Working Paper nº 67, march 2009. http://www.cgdev.org/files/1421419_file_End_of_ODA_FINAL.pdf

3. Jean-Michel Severino is the Managing Director of the Agence Française de Développement and a former Vice President of the World Bank; Olivier Ray is his advisor in charge of research. We would like to thank Cyrille Bellier, Nancy Birdsall, Kemal Dervis, Laurent Duriez, Francis Frey, Emmanuel Guérin, Pierre Jacquet, Homi Kharas, Olivier Lafourcade, Mélanie Langen, Ayah Mahgoub, Serge Michaïlof, Fred Ottavy, Mead Over, François Pacquement, Caroline Rozières and Cécile Valadier for their insightful reactions and comments. The views expressed in this paper, however, are the responsibility of the authors alone.

4. The term “international public policies” is used in this article to describe international actions that serve broadly agreed public ends. One of the theses of the paper is that international development assistance forms a kind of global public policy dealing with North/South relations, which has come to incorporate three different subsets of objectives: the economic convergence of developing nations, the provision of basic services to all human beings and the protection of global public goods.

5. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Free Press, New York, 1992.

6. OECD-CAD statistics, ODA net disbursements expressed in 2006 USD.

7. A similar shift had taken place in the 1970’s when the World Bank’s President Robert McNamara decided to centre the Bank’s activities on basic human needs and poverty reduction. However this emphasis on microeconomic projects changed again the in 1980’s, when the focus shifted to concerns of macroeconomic stability.

8. Zimet and Chervalier, “American Philanthropic Foundations: Emerging Actors of Globalization and Pillars of the Transatlantic Dialog”, *German Marshall Fund* policy paper. January 2006.

9. Michael Klein, *The Market for Aid*, World Bank 2005.

10. The number of US philanthropic foundations alone jumped from 32,000 to 56,000 between 1990 and 2008. An increasing share of them engages in international development activities.

11. Homi Kharas, *The New Reality of Aid*. Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings, 2007, p. 10.

12. *Aid Architecture: An Overview of the Main Trends in Official Development Assistance Flows*, IDA May 2008.

13. *Trends and Issues in Development Aid,* Homi Kharas, Wolfensohn Center for Development Working Papers, November 2007.

14. "The proliferators: transactions costs and the value of aid" by Arnab Acharya, Ana Fuzzo de Lima and Mick Moore, Working Paper 214, *Institute of Development Studies*, January 2004.

15. Burall, Simon, Simon Maxwell with Alina Rocha Menocal (2006), "Reforming the international aid architecture: Options and ways forward", ODI, Working paper 278.

16. Jean-Michel Severino and Olivier Charnoz, "De l'ordre global à la justice globale: vers une politique mondiale de régulation", *En Temps Réels* Volume II, 2008.

17. We shall come back to this point in the second part of this paper, suggesting a more appropriate term. For now we will stick to the commonly used term of "innovative development finance".

18. This gave rise to the "recurrent cost problem", i.e. the risk that available resources may be constrained in the years following the completion of a project, thus limiting the capacity of future budgets to finance the recurrent costs implied. We refer to the writings of Peter Heller (1974, 1975, 1979), Mead Over (1981), Club du Sahel (1980), and A. Jennings (1983).

19. Jean-Michel Severino, www.ideas4development.org/millennium-development-goals-looking-beyond-2015/en/

20. *Aid Architecture: An Overview of the Main Trends in Official Development Assistance Flows*, IDA May 2008.

21. The Global Environment Facility, for example, received $831 million from member states to help developing countries finance projects and programs that protect the global environment.

22. Josette Sheeran 2008, http://www.ideas4development.org/food-for-the-hungry-the-case-for-buying-locally/en/

23. In most countries where this tax break on donations exists some form of ex ante or ex post control of eligible charities is provided for (by a

Congress committee in the United States, by the Cour des Comptes in France). However this case-by-case control rarely takes place in practice, and when it does it generally keeps to controls on the use of the funds rather than the choice of the policy.

24. One Untied States Democratic congressman notes that the tax break costs the US treasury about $44 billion per year. Another congressman described it as one of "the least accountable tax breaks". *Cf.* http://philanthropy.com/free/articles/v20/i22/22000601.htm

25. Michael A. Clemens and Todd J. Moss (2007), "The ghost of 0.7%: Origins and relevance of the international aid target", *International Journal of Development Issues* 6(1): 3-25.

26. *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization*: Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceicao, Katell Le Goulven and Ronald U. Mendoza (eds.); Oxford University Press, 2003.

27. Raj M. Desai, "The California Consensus: Can Private Aid End Global Poverty?", *Survival*, vol. 50, nº 4 (August-September 2008).

28. *Trends and Issues in Development Aid,* Homi Kharas, Wolfensohn Center for Development Working Papers, November 2007.

29. It would not be fair not to mention recent progress on this front. The OECD's DAC has introduced "Country Programmable Assistance" data, which measures the share of aid that can directly be programmed by recipient states for their development and public investment policies. The *Center for Global Development* also devised a composite policy-coherence benchmark called "Commitment to development index".

30. Raj M. Desai, "The California Consensus: Can Private Aid End Global Poverty?", *Survival*, vol. 50, nº 4 (August-September 2008)

31. We use this term as understood in the Brundtland report (1979), i.e. economic and social development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

32. Willam D. Savedoff, Ruth Levine, Nancy Birdsall, *When Will We Ever Learn? Improving Lives Through Impact Evaluation*. CGDev, May 2006.

33. This is obviously no easy task, as different actors involved in this peculiar field of public policy have different understandings of what "efficiency" consists in and how to bring it about. *Cf.* Jean-Michel Severino and Olivier Ray, "Global Governance: Illusory Quest for the Levithan?", in *La Gouvernance Démocratique, Un nouveau paradigme pour le développement ?*, Bellina, Magro and de Villemeur, Karthala 2008.

34. ONU, DESA Working Papers nº 136, julio de 2014. http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2014/wp135_2014s.pdf

35 35. José Antonio Alonso es catedrático de Economía Aplicada en la Universidad Complutense y miembro del Comité de Política para el Desarrollo de UN-ECOSOC.

Jonathan Gleenie es investigador asociado al Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

Andy Sumner es codirector del King's International Development Institute, en el King's College de Londres.

Correspondencia a: j.alonso@ccee.ucm.es, j.glennie@odi.org and andrew.sumner@kcl.ac.uk

Nota de los autores: en interés de tener un documento breve y fácilmente legible, se ha tendido a evitar la reiteración de elementos de contexto y evidencias que pueden encontrarse tanto en nuestros trabajos previos como en los de otros analistas. Lo que se ha pretendido es elaborar un documento preferentemente orientado a la argumentación de políticas. Por ello, se han mantenido las referencias bibliográficas al mínimo. Queremos agradecer al Department for International Development (DFID), del Reino Unido, a la Secretaría General de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (SGCID), del Reino de España, y a la UN Foundation por su apoyo a este estudio y por sus útiles sugerencias, al tiempo que agradecemos los comentarios recibidos por parte de Nancy Birdsall, Shoayb Casoo, Christian Freres y Daniel Titelman. Ninguna de las instituciones ni de las personas nombradas es responsable de las opiniones, carencias o errores que el documento pueda contener, que son de exclusiva responsabilidad de los autores.

36. De acuerdo a la lista de la OCDE.

37. Este enfoque es diferente del que se plantea en CEPAL (2012).

38. Un conocido académico ha señalado recientemente la necesidad de que los 100.000 millones de dólares reclamados en Copenhague fuesen financiados exclusivamente por fondos públicos, dadas las escasas posibilidades de beneficio en las inversiones relacionadas con la adaptación al cambio climático. http://www.developmentprogress.org/blog/2014/02/04/can-private-sector-finance-support-adaptation

39. Los países latinoamericanos han puesto en marcha un proceso prometedor con la Secretaría General Iberoamericana (SEGIB), estableciendo una plataforma regional de información y de seguimiento de sus iniciativas en materia de CSS.

40. Algunas experiencias en este campo muestran que pueden alcanzarse resultados significativos con recursos limitados. Por ejemplo, es el caso de CYTED, un programa de cooperación científica y tecnológica basado en apoyar a grupos de investigación desplegados en el área Iberoamericana

(España, Portugal y los países de América Latina), que apoya el intercambio de investigadores y la creación de redes tecnológicas.

41. La Corporación Andina de Fomento se ha convertido en la institución financiera de desarrollo más importante de América Latina y ha alcanzado un *rating* de inversión más elevado que el que alcanzan a nivel individual cada uno de sus miembros fundadores.

42. La Unión Europea ha definido una metodología interesante para el seguimiento de la coherencia de políticas para el desarrollo, que podría ser replicado por los PRM en otras áreas.

43. Actualmente no hay un proceso de revisión formal en el seno de Comité de Ayuda al Desarrollo de la OCDE. Sin embargo, es probable que se convierta en un punto focal de debate entre los donantes, dadas las discusiones existentes sobre la financiación del desarrollo.

44. Comunicación personal a los autores.

45. En José Antonio Alonso y José Antonio Ocampo (eds.) (2011): *Cooperación internacional para el desarrollo en tiempo de crisis*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Madrid.

46. See: http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/consensus_en.cfm

47. See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r13003_en.htm

48. OECD-DAC data for 2009.

49. These are helpfully summarized in Table 1, p.14 of Merilee Grindle's paper (2005), 'Good Enough Governance'. See: http://www.odi.org.uk/events/states_06/29thMar/Grindle%20Paper%20gegredux2005.pdf

50. Hyden, G., Court, J. & Mease, K. (2004), *Making Sense of Governance: Empirical Evidence from 16 Developing Countries,* London: Lynne Rienner.

51. See, for example: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Global-Issues/How-we-fight-Poverty/Government/

52. The idea of the "Big Push" first came to prominence in Paul Rosenstein Rodan's article "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-eastern Europe" (1943). The concept of "take-off" was popularised by Walt Rostow in *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1960).

53. See: http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/costs_benefits2.htm

54. http://www.entwicklung.at/uploads/media/European_Consensus_01.pdf

55. OECD-DAC data for 2009.

56. Kharas, H. (2009), *Development Assistance in the 21*st *Century.* See: http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/11_development_aid_kharas.aspx

57. *Ibid*.

58. OECD (2008), *Better Aid: 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, Making Aid More Effective by 2015*, p.15. See: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/41/41202121.pdf

59. European Commission (2010), *Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach.* See: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf

60. El Pais, April 13, 2005, p.2. Quoted in Djankov, S., J. García Montalvo & M. Reynal Querol (2009), "Aid with multiple personalities", *Journal of Comparative Economics* 37(2), p.217-229.

61. See, for example: Perry Barlow, J. (2006), *A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.*

62. The EU-15 and the European Commission, plus Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States.

63. DAC Reflection Exercise (2009), Investing in Development: A Common Cause in a Changing World, p. 4.

64. European Commission (2003), "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament", *The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism*, COM(2003) 526 final, Brussels, 10 September 2003, p. 3

65. OECD-DAC data for 2009.

66. OECD-DAC data for 2009.

67. *Ibid*.

68. See: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmintdev/669/66904.htm

69. See: http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/consensus_en.cfm

70. See: http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2649_34603_38897408_1_1_1_1,00.html

71. See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r13003_en.htm

72. EC Communication (2008), "The EU—a global partner for development: Speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals", COM (2008) 177 final, 9 April 2008.

73. EC Communication (2009), "Supporting developing countries in coping with the crisis", COM (2009) 160/4, 8 April 2009.

74. Carisson, B. T., Schubert C. B., Robinson S. (2009), "The Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach". Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf

75. EC Staff Working Paper (2009), "Aid Effectiveness after Accra: Where does the EU stand and what more do we need to do", COM (2009) 160 final.

76. Official Journal of the European Union: Joint Statement by the Council, the European Parliament and the EC on European Union Development Policy: "The European Consensus" (2006/C 46/01), par. 113.

77. European Commission (2001), *European Governance: A White Paper*, COM(2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25 July 2001, p.27.

78. Coeuré, B. and Pisani-Ferry, J. (2003), "One Market, One Voice? European Arrangements in International Economic Relations", Paper prepared for the conference on "New Institutions for a New Europe", Vienna, 10-11 October 2003, p. 19.

79. Official Journal of the European Union (2007), "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community", (2007/C 306/01), A. Declarations concerning provisions of the Treaties, para. 6.

80. The committee system which oversees the delegated acts implemented by the EC.

81. See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r12544_en.htm

82. European Commission (2006), "Governance in the European consensus on development: towards a harmonised approach within the European Union*" Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions COM(2006)421*, Brussels, European Commission.

83. EC Communication (2009), “Supporting developing countries in coping with the crisis”, COM(2009) 160/4, 8 April 2009, pp. 6 -12.

84. See ECOSOC, Official Summary Reports of the Ethiopia Symposium on “A renewed partnership for development for a post-2015 era”, June 5-7, 2013, and of the Montreux Symposium on “Development cooperation in a post-2015 era: Sustainable development for all”, October 23-25, 2013.

85. See Barry Herman, “Towards a New Global Partnership for Development: Looking Back to Look Forward”, *Background document prepared for the DCF Ethiopia High-Level Symposium*, May 23, 2013.

86. General Assembly, *World Summit Outcome*, Document A/RES/60/1, October 24, 2005, paragraph 20.

87. DCF Ethiopia High-Level Symposium, *Official Summary Report*, p. 2, bullet iii.

88. The global agenda also includes commitments for collective action to address challenges associated with global interdependence, as well as the spread of social standards. This is the typology suggested by José Antonio Ocampo, “Rethinking Global Economic and Social Governance, *Journal of Globalization and Development*, 2010, Vol. 1, Issue 1, and used by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Economic and Social Survey 2010: Retooling Global Development*, chapter VI.

89. *Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development*, paragraphs 26 and 62.

90. *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development*, Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, New York: United Nations, May 2013 [Quoted in this study simply as High-Level Panel report].

91. On middle-income countries, see, for example, the documents presented to the Special Conference on Development Cooperation with Middle Income Countries, held in Madrid on March 1-2, 2007, available at: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/events/2007mic/

92. Jonathan Glennie and Andrew Rogerson, “Cooperation for Sustainable Development: Critical Challenges for Development Cooperation in a post-2015 World”, *Background Study for the DCF Switzerland High-Level Symposium*, London: Overseas Development Institute, October 2013, p. 11. The authors also included in the definition the transfer of resources for support of global public goods, which, as pointed out in the introduction, belongs to a different realm of cooperation.

93. Andreas Schedler, “Conceptualizing Accountability”, in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1999, chapter 2.

94. See Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) and Center for Economic and Social Rights CESR), *Who Would be Accountable? Human Rights and the Post-2015 Development Agenda*, New York and Geneva, 2013, chapter I.

95. *Ibid*., p. 9.

96. See for example, the introduction to Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernand Manin to *Democracy, Accountability and Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) who refer to accountability as the relation between outcomes and sanctions (p. 8).

97. Guillermo O’Donnell, *Dissonances: Democratic Critiques of Democracy*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007, chapters 2-4. See also his essays on “Delegative Democracy” and “Illusions and Consolidation” in *Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999, particularly pp.164-6 and 184-7.

98. On social accountability, see also Catalina Smulovitz and Enrique Peruzzotti, “Societal Accountability in Latin America”, *Journal of Democracy*, 11:4, October 2000.

99. The European Parliament is a partial exception in this regard. There are also agencies that oversee the international civil service, but this is a different issue, not discussed here.

100. On the history of these commitments, see John Toye and Richard Toye, *The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance and Development*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004.The ODA targets were most recently restated in the *Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development*, paragraph 42.

101. See the 2005 *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, paragraphs 47-50.

102. See an excellent example in the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office, *IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis: IMF Surveillance in 2004-07*, Washington D. C., 2011.

103. 20 WTO dispute settlement is limited by the high costs of using the mechanism and the unequal capacity to retaliate that different countries have. Investment treaties have been criticized for constraining the policy space to regulate financial flows, and its .dispute settlement mechanism for being too investor-friendly.

104. This system includes the “Consolidated Multilateral Surveillance Report”, the “spillover reports” for the “systemic 5” (U.S., U.K., Eurozone, Japan and China), the “External Sector Reports”, and the obligation of 25 jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors to undertake Financial Sector Assessments Programs.

105. Liesbet Steer, Cecilie Wathne, Ruth Driscoll, *Mutual Accountability at the Country Level: A Concept and Emerging Good Practice*, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008. We mix, however, their concept of spotlights, mirrors and two way mirrors, with other categories previously analyzed.

106. 23 The MDG Gap Task Force reports, mandate and other related information can be found online at the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ (UN-DESA) Development Policy and Analysis Division (http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/mdg_gap_archive.shtml).

107. See The Global Partnership for Development: Making Rhetoric a Reality, New York: United Nations, 2012, and The Global Partnership for Development: The Challenge We Face, New York: United Nations, 2013.

108. For information on the Busan Partnership, see *The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation*, Final Document of the 4th high-level forum on aid effectiveness, Busan, Korea, December 2011, and Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, *Guide to the Monitoring Framework of the Global Partnership,* final version, 2013.

109. OECD, *Proposal for the mandate of the Global Partnership for effective development Cooperation,* Document prepared by the Working party on aid effectiveness, Paris, 2012.

110. The standard indicators and definitions set out at Busan enable countries to collect data and feed these to inform global monitoring efforts without the need to administer stand-alone questionnaires as was previously the case with the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration.

111. For information on the OECD-DAC peer review, see the official website http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/ and related documents: OECD-DAC, Peer review reference guide, Paris, May 2013; OECD, The OECD Peer Review Process: a tool for co-operation and change, Paris, 2012; and OECD-DAC. Effective Aid Management: Twelve Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews, Paris, April 2008.

112. Fabrizio Pagani, “Peer Review as a tool for co-operation and change: an analysis of the OECD working method”, *African Security Review*, 11: 4, 2002.

113. Each year, the Secretariat designates five countries to be reviewed, and

each peer review relies upon two DAC members as examiners for each review.

114. 32 On the APRM see NEPAD, Objectives, standards, criteria and indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism, South Africa, 2003, and Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA), African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Best Practices and Lessons Learned, Addis Ababa, 2011.

115. ECOSOC/DCF, Mutual accountability for development cooperation results: where next?, New York: United Nations, 2012.

116. African Peer Review, http://aprm-au.org/

117. UN-ECA, *op. cit.,* p. 10.

118. James Droop, Paul Isenman and Baki Mlalazi, *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Study of existing mechanisms to promote mutual accountability between donors and partner countries at the international level*. London: Oxford Policy Management, March 2008.

119. Stephen Jones and Clara Picanyol, *Mutual Accountability: Progress since Accra and Issues for Busan*, London: Oxford Policy Management, July 2011.

120. ECOSOC/DCF, *Mutual accountability for development cooperation results: where next?, op. cit.*, p. 1.

121. Droop *et al.*, *op. cit*.

122. UN-DESA, International *Development Cooperation Report: Development Cooperation for the MDGs: Maximizing Results*, New York, 2010.

123. ECOSOC-DCF, *Mutual accountability for development cooperation results: where next?*, New York, 2012.

124. ECOSOC, *Report of the 2012 Development Cooperation Forum*, New York, 2012.

125. Jones and Picanyol, *op. cit.*

126. Droop *et al., op. cit.*

127. South Centre, *South-South Cooperation Principles: An Essential Element of South-South Cooperation*, Geneva, November 2009, and United Nations, *Evaluation of UNDP contribution to south-south and triangular cooperation* (2008-2011), New York, 2013.

128. United Nations, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: Nairobi Outcome Document of the High-Level United Nations Conference on

South-South Cooperation (A/RES/64/222), February 2010.

129. See UN-DESA, *International Development Cooperation Report 2014*, draft chapter on South-South cooperation.

130. Talita Yamashiro Fordelone, "Triangular Cooperation and Aid Effectiveness", Paper prepared by OECD for the Policy Dialogue on Development Cooperation (Mexico City, 28-29 September 2009), p. 4.

131. UN-DESA, *Report on the Meeting of Directors-General of Southern Partners*, Addis Ababa, June 7th. 2013.

132. UN-DESA and RIS, Conference of Southern Providers, South-*South Cooperation: Issues and Emerging Challenges*, Conference Report, New Delhi. April 15th-16th, 2013.

133. See in this regard the High-Level Panel report, *op. cit.*, Executive Summary, bullet 5.

134. Homi Kharas, "Reimagining the role of the private sector in development", *Brookings Blum Roundtable Policy Brief*, Brookings Institution, September 2013.

135. See https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx

136. http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/certification-verification

137. William Smith, *How donors engage with business*, Overseas Development Institute, London, July 2013.

138. Paula Lucci, *Business and a post-2015 development framework: Where next?*, Overseas Development Institute, London, March 2013.

139. http://cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/bt-cdt_may_30_final_version_3_framework_for_cso_dev_eff_doc.pdf

140. http://cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/international_framework_open_forum.pdf

141. See http://www.equatorinitiative.org/index.php?lang=en

142. European Foundation Centre, *Principles of accountability for international philanthropy*, developed by the joint working group of the Council on Foundations and the European Foundation Centre, April 2007.

143. See http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/

144. In the case of the private sector, they could also use the UN Global Compact, and in this as well as CSO, the future UN Partnership Facility, if it is created.

CAPÍTULO 6

LA COOPERACIÓN SUR-SUR Y TRIANGULAR EN EL SISTEMA DE COOPERACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO

TAHINA OJEDA MEDINA[1]

Tras la lectura de los capítulos anteriores es evidente que el mapa geopolítico mundial y el mapa de la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo (CID) se encuentra en un momento de redefiniciones en donde los países del Sur cobran un especial protagonismo. Es una realidad que ni las relaciones ni la cooperación entre países del Sur son nuevas, pues llevan una trayectoria vinculada a los procesos de descolonización y de resistencias frente a unas relaciones internacionales (políticas y económicas) con un marcado carácter etnocéntrico y claramente hegemonizadas por el mundo anglosajón y las grandes potencias; frente a lo cual, diversos actores del Sur han articulado esfuerzos para conseguir posicionar sus demandas en el concierto internacional.

Ese trabajo se inició cuando el entonces llamado Tercer Mundo unió esfuerzos en torno al Grupo de los 77 y el Movimiento de los No Alineados para conseguir la creación de un Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional (NOEI), pero en su momento no alcanzó sus objetivos. Obviamente, el contexto no

es el mismo, pero las demandas actuales del Sur[2] siguen teniendo elementos coincidentes con aquel momento, sobre todo, porque se retoman muchas de sus reivindicaciones en el campo político y económico, y emplean con mayor interés la cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS) como un instrumento de autoafirmación y de desarrollo.

En este sentido, analizaremos cuestiones fundamentales para comprender la cooperación que ejecutan los actores del Sur y su lógica vinculación con la búsqueda incesante del desarrollo.

APUNTES CONCEPTUALES SOBRE LA COOPERACIÓN SUR-SUR

No existe una definición única de CSS, y en los esfuerzos por conceptualizarla se han adoptado diversos enfoques, dependiendo, fundamentalmente, del lugar del que emane la definición. Por ejemplo:

a) En el campo académico, algunos autores conceptualizan a la CSS como una construcción política por parte de los países del Sur para reforzar sus capacidades, individuales y colectivas, para incidir en los espacios de toma de decisión global o como una forma de independencia de los centros de poder internacional (Lechini, 2009; Kabunda, 2010; Baquero, 2011; Echart, *et al.*, 2013). Otros la definen como un esfuerzo más en la lucha contra la pobreza y la obtención de la autosuficiencia regional y el desarrollo (Herrera, 1977; Joy-Ogwu, 1982; Colacrai *et al.*, 2009; Sotillo, 2007; Lengyel y Malacalza, 2010).

b) En el marco de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas las

definiciones giran en torno al eje del desarrollo o al tipo de desarrollo que se promueve desde dicha organización. Como “un marco amplio de colaboración entre países del Sur en el ámbito político, económico, social, cultural, ambiental y tecnológico que involucra a dos o más países en desarrollo y que puede tomar la forma de cooperación bilateral, regional, subregional o interregional” (www.ssc.undp.org).

c) En los foros del Sur se intercalan las dimensiones política, técnica y económica tanto del desarrollo como de la relación entre los actores. Según la Comisión del Sur (1991: 26), “[…] puede proporcionar nuevas e importantes posibilidades de crecimiento económico basadas en las posibilidades geográficas, la semejanza de la demanda y de los gustos, la importancia de las respectivas experiencias de desarrollo, conocimientos y capacidades, y la disponibilidad de recursos complementarios naturales y financieros, así como de la capacidad técnica y de gestión”.

El Plan de Acción de Buenos Aires[3] (1978: párrafo 5) la define como “una fuerza decisiva para iniciar, diseñar, organizar y fomentar la cooperación entre los países en desarrollo a fin de que puedan crear, adaptar, transferir y compartir conocimientos y experiencias en beneficio mutuo, y para lograr la autosuficiencia nacional y colectiva, lo cual es esencial para su desarrollo social económico”.

En el documento de Posición sobre la CSS en el Marco de la CID ante el IV Foro de Alto Nivel de Busan (PIFCSS, 2011: párrafos 7-8), se expresa que “la CSS se fundamenta en la asociación horizontal entre actores, como principio central de

actuación, evitando así una relación vertical y/o asistencialista. […] deriva de acuerdos entre países que enfrentan desafíos de desarrollo similares a nivel nacional y global, lo cual facilita la adecuación de las actividades a necesidades y perspectivas comunes, así como el respeto por los aportes locales al desarrollo. […] alienta una relación entre socios en condiciones de reciprocidad y permite el aprendizaje mutuo, al compartir modelos de gestión ya implementados por los países del Sur".

En nuestra interpretación, la CSS puede ser definida como: un entramado de relaciones de intercambio cooperativo y complementario entre actores del Sur que se fundamenta en la identificación de una(s) necesidad(es) que conlleva(n) a la formulación de una serie de objetivos determinados y consensuados por las partes que establecen esa relación. Ahora bien, esas relaciones de intercambio cooperativo y complementario pueden establecerse para diversos fines vinculados al desarrollo, dependiendo de cuál sea la concepción de desarrollo que se asuma. Las áreas o sectores objeto de CSS serán tantas como las partes que establecen la relación así lo requieran y acuerden, aunque tendrán prioridad aquellos sectores en los que, al menos, una de las partes haya adquirido alguna capacidad o tenido alguna experiencia que haya resultado de utilidad en un contexto similar y que esté en capacidad de compartir.

Este entramado de relaciones es posible tanto en el ámbito bilateral como multilateral y regional. Sirve de base para el reimpulso de la cooperación intrarregional y entre regiones ya que es una forma de producir relaciones de confianza que

favorecen los procesos de regionalización e integración.

APUNTES CONCEPTUALES SOBRE LA COOPERACIÓN TRIANGULAR

Sobre la cooperación triangular (CTR) hay un poco más de consenso porque está siendo definida[4] como una asociación entre tres partes que colaboran para abordar situaciones concretas de desarrollo, en donde los donantes tradicionales, aquellos agrupados en el Comité de Ayuda al Desarrollo (CAD) de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), juegan un papel importante; presentando como característica fundamental el número de las partes que conforman dicha asociación (tres) y la procedencia de los mismos (pueden ser dos actores del Sur y uno del Norte o tres actores del Sur). Veamos, dependiendo del lugar de dónde emana la definición, cómo se está conceptualizando la CTR hasta ahora:

a) En el campo académico, algunos autores la conceptualizan como un partenariado entre tres partes donde se observa un donante y un país de renta media (PRM), que actúan como socios oferentes, y un país de renta menor que actúa como socio receptor (Gómez, Ayllón y Albarrán, 2011) o como “aquella configurada a partir de la participación de un país desarrollado y dos países en desarrollo” (Alonso, Aguirre y Santander, 2011: 11).

b) En el marco de los organismos internacionales las definiciones giran también en torno al número de las partes

involucradas y la finalidad que persiguen (el desarrollo y apoyo a la CSS), haciendo especial énfasis en que es una cooperación de tipo técnica y financiera (Oficina de las Naciones Unidas para la Cooperación Sur-Sur; OIT, 2012; ECOSOC, 2010; SEGIB, 2010).

c) Para las agencias de CID la definición coincide con las anteriores pero haciendo énfasis en el intercambio de experiencias y conocimientos para generar soluciones eficaces a problemas de desarrollo y su financiación (GIZ, s. f.; APC, 2011; APCI, 2012).

Es evidente que la CTR está siendo conceptualizada como una modalidad de cooperación, una especie de puente entre las formas de trabajo del Norte y del Sur, con énfasis en la actividad de los Estados, no obstante, queda mucho camino por recorrer en este campo porque se observan algunas zonas grises donde los socios del Norte y del Sur tendrán que conseguir puntos de encuentro. Nos referimos, por ejemplo, a dos aspectos concretos: la financiación y la función de la CTR. Y es que no hay claridad todavía sobre cómo responder a las siguientes preguntas: ¿la participación de los donantes del CAD-OCDE debe ser exclusivamente financiera o no? ¿Es la CTR una forma de articulación entre modalidades de cooperación o es un instrumento útil para cualquiera de ellas? ¿Es una fórmula de apoyo a la CSS o es una modalidad propia? ¿Los socios deben seguir qué procedimientos: los de la CNS (cooperación Norte-Sur), los de la CSS o generar otros específicos para la CTR? ¿Estamos hablando de una modalidad real de cooperación o de una sinergia entre pares?

Por tanto, consideramos que habrá que seguir estudiando a la CTR, pero con una mirada más amplia, desde la que podamos aprovechar las ventajas reales que nos ofrece, sobre todo en la concertación de objetivos comunes más adecuados a los tiempos que corren. La reflexión que aquí dejamos abierta para el debate es que la CTR es una forma de trabajo que emerge en el contexto de la CID del siglo XXI con grandes potencialidades pero que, más allá de limitarse a ser una asociación de tres partes o un apoyo de la CNS a la CSS, representa más una posibilidad de articulación de objetivos comunes y menos una articulación de modalidades de cooperación; es decir, podría funcionar más como un instrumento de cooperación que como una modalidad en sí misma, por lo menos mientras que el sistema de cooperación no muestre signos reales de cambio y adaptación a las nuevas realidades.

EL CAMINO RECORRIDO

La CSS comenzó como una práctica de colaboración entre Estados y fue generando una relación de intercambios de experiencias, hasta configurarse como una modalidad de cooperación propia del Sur. Pero no surgió de una base teórica ni contó desde el inicio con una metodología especial y homogénea que determinara cómo debía llevarse a cabo y cómo debía cuantificarse y medirse. Es fruto de la puesta en marcha de acciones concretas para intentar dar soluciones a los problemas de desarrollo de los países del Sur, creando lógicas y modos de acción y de operación diferenciados de la CNS.

Desde sus inicios, las CSS fue presentada como una práctica no sustitutiva de la CNS y, en consecuencia, su desempeño y evolución estuvo prácticamente al margen del sistema "formal" de cooperación, que giraba en torno a la CNS. Se la consideraba como una forma de trabajo concreta entre los países del Sur pero no como una modalidad de CID dentro del sistema. Por tanto, no se incluyó desde sus inicios en las líneas de trabajo de la OCDE, fue prácticamente irrelevante en las investigaciones académicas sobre CID y en sus principales debates, y no se tomaba en cuenta como un aporte para el desarrollo en los foros de los países donantes del Norte (tan solo en el seno de las Naciones Unidas consiguió hacerse eco). No obstante, esta situación cambió con la llegada del siglo XXI, gracias a los cambios que se han ido observando en las relaciones internacionales y al fortalecimiento de los vínculos Sur-Sur por parte de los actores políticos y sociales del Sur. En estos últimos 15 años, la CSS ha conseguido posicionarse como una modalidad más de CID y cuenta con el reconocimiento de más de cinco décadas de experiencias acumuladas, en donde "[…] las acciones realizadas han pasado de ser meras experiencias testimoniales para formar parte de las estrategias de cooperación que muchos países han adoptado para avanzar en su proceso de desarrollo" (SEGIB, 2008: 6).

El camino para que la CSS haya sido reconocida como modalidad de CID ha sido dilatado. En primer lugar, porque la estructura del sistema internacional, tanto en la teoría como en la práctica, ha sentado las bases de las relaciones Norte-Sur, ubicando al Norte en las categorías de desarrollado /

industrializado / centro / primer mundo y, al Sur, en las categorías de subdesarrollado / en desarrollo / Tercer Mundo / periférico. Tales etiquetas de clasificación han acentuado la diferenciación entre dos conceptos, el Norte y el Sur, que se ha traducido en la práctica política, económica e institucional de las relaciones internacionales en desigualdad. En medio convive la CID que, en su modalidad Norte-Sur, aplica una serie de conceptos y formas de trabajo con una visión que responde a la lógica con la que se ha diseñado el sistema, desde el Norte hacia al Sur, en donde el Norte ofrece y el Sur recibe.

En segundo lugar, porque las prácticas de la CSS resultaron irrelevantes para los donantes del CAD-OCDE hasta la llegada del siglo XXI. La CNS sentó las bases de una arquitectura de la ayuda que no tomaba en consideración la cooperación entre los países del Sur y a lo largo de su evolución se reafirmó en una visión vertical en la que el Sur estaba ubicado en la posición de receptor de esa ayuda y objeto de la cooperación.

Pero la situación tomó otro rostro cuando, entre otras razones, la crisis económica de inicios de siglo puso en jaque a los sistemas financieros y económicos de los países con mayores niveles de desarrollo del mundo y, en consecuencia, a los principales donantes. La crisis dio fuerza a una narrativa que favorecía concentración geográfica y sectorial de la CID en aquellas zonas geográficas que presentan mayores dificultades económicas y en los sectores considerados “básicos” para el desarrollo, manteniendo el criterio de la renta nacional como clave para elegir a los destinatarios de la cooperación. Esta narrativa, materializada en una agenda de desarrollo única

enfocada en la reducción de la pobreza pero no en la reducción de las desigualdades, ocasionó un desajuste entre la oferta y la demanda de la CID, ya que no contempló las diferentes realidades existentes en el Sur y el panorama de cambio político y económico que estaba emergiendo, sobre todo en América Latina y el Caribe. Dicho lo cual, los PRM del Sur fueron desplazados en la lista de receptores de la ayuda en favor de los países de renta baja (PRB), y las necesidades de aquellos no se vieron reflejadas en la agenda de desarrollo.

En suma, el contexto en el que opera el reimpulso de la CSS y que explica por qué esta modalidad de cooperación se presenta como una opción atractiva, práctica y viable para muchos países del Sur, podríamos sintetizarlo así:

1. Reducción de los flujos de AOD destinados a los PRM (principales actores de la CSS actual).
2. Crecimiento económico relativo por parte de los PRM latinoamericanos.
3. Heterogeneidad en las realidades e intereses en los países del Sur.
4. Cuestionamiento y críticas al modelo de desarrollo impulsado por la agenda de los donantes.
5. Incorporación del eje Sur-Sur en buena parte de las políticas exteriores de los países del Sur.
6. Creciente interés de los países del Sur por fortalecer los vínculos políticos y económicos Sur-Sur como estrategia de diversificación de espacios políticos de concertación y ampliación de mercados comerciales.
7. Alianzas estratégicas con socios extrarregionales no

convencionales (como China, Rusia, Bielorrusia, Vietnam, Irán y Sudáfrica, por ejemplo) que reportan una cooperación más pragmática y con objetivos políticos aparentemente coincidentes con sus socios del Sur.

Es desde América Latina, sobre todo en la primera década del siglo XXI, donde se observan los principales avances conceptuales, políticos y operativos en la materia; aunque también hay aportes significativos en Asia y África. Los países latinoamericanos están uniendo sus esfuerzos económicos, políticos y diplomáticos para organizar estrategias, bilaterales y regionales, que le permitan obtener mayor reconocimiento en los foros de decisión internacional y procurar una mayor integración y regionalización entre sus Estados. Esta revitalización del eje Sur-Sur está influyendo en las relaciones de cooperación entre los países del Sur, tanto en la dimensión técnica como política, en la diversificación de los instrumentos de cooperación, la ampliación de los sectores de actuación, la inversión económica y el acercamiento en el diálogo político.

Por otra parte, también es cierto que surgen innumerables dudas sobre el camino definitivo que tomará la CSS y el valor real de su fuerza renovadora. Por un lado, despierta expectativas de cambio y exalta la solidaridad de los pueblos y, por otro, es criticada por su carácter político, la heterogeneidad de visiones de sus actores y una estructura institucional y jurídica aún sin consolidar; sin dejar de lado que corre el riesgo de repetir las malas prácticas que critica de la CNS y de ser erosionada por las fuerzas del sistema internacional vigente. Con lo cual todo cambiaría para que no cambie nada, una vez más.

LA COOPERACIÓN SUR-SUR Y EL DESARROLLO

La evolución práctica y conceptual de la CSS en sus diferentes etapas han estado en sintonía con la evolución del concepto de desarrollo (Colacrai *et al.*, 2009). Entre las décadas de 1960 y 1970 la propuesta de creación de un NOEI estaba destinada a conseguir, entre otras cosas, una mayor independencia política y unas reglas de comercio más ajustadas a las realidades y a las necesidades de los países del Sur. El enfoque era claramente económico y su estrategia era fundamentalmente política (materializada en la cooperación entre los países el Sur) puesto que se concebía que para poder conseguir el desarrollo (económico) se debía apostar por un incremento en los ingresos nacionales (y su acumulación) provenientes de las exportaciones y con una clara intención de influir en el precio de las materias primas que producían.

En el contexto latinoamericano, se asumió que el desarrollo era la última etapa de una serie de pasos necesarios, que implicaban la modernización y la especialización en la producción. Se empleó una amalgama del paradigma de la modernización con un matiz derivado de la escuela de la dependencia y el estructuralismo y se apostó, en el caso de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), por la estrategia de la modernización e industrialización nacional con un fuerte apoyo del Estado para abastecer el mercado nacional con producción local, para luego incursionar en los mercados internacionales con exportaciones más competitivas. En este periodo, tanto la CNS como la CSS se concentraban en

apoyar dichos procesos de modernización productiva, la primera, mayoritariamente en la dimensión económica y la segunda en la dimensión técnica con intercambio de expertos y técnicos industriales.

En los años ochenta, tras el desmoronamiento de las propuestas provenientes del estructuralismo cepaliano y las consecuentes políticas de la apertura económica y de ajuste estructural, los países del Sur tuvieron que hacer frente a grandes dificultades económicas, ocasionadas por la crisis de la deuda externa contraída con las instituciones financieras internacionales, manteniendo aún como premisa que el desarrollo económico era fundamental para superar la etapa de subdesarrollo, aun cuando se tomaban en consideración otros factores no económicos. En esta década, se avanzó tímidamente en el establecimiento de las bases de la cooperación económica entre los países del Sur aunque, claro está, las duras condiciones económicas limitaban la posibilidad de crecimiento económico. Lo que en principio podía parecer un terreno fértil para la CSS se diluyó en la búsqueda de salidas individuales a la crisis.

Posteriormente, en los noventa, tras el fin de la guerra fría, las secuelas de la crisis de la deuda y los intentos fallidos por conseguir una mayor autonomía económica bajo la tutela del Estado, la CSS dio un vuelco en relación a su concepción original de independencia política y NOEI. Ante la influencia de las corrientes teóricas de corte liberal, la idea de insertarse en la globalización y la liberalización económica cobraban cada vez más fuerza. “Durante esta década, la cooperación entre países

en desarrollo no se definió como un elemento de cambio en el orden mundial, sino como un vehículo más de adaptación al orden económico neoliberal que se imponía como modelo triunfante tras las caída de la URSS" (Colacrai *et al.*, 2009: 15). Lo que motivó, entre otras cosas, el incremento de los esquemas de integración económica, siguiendo la línea de "regionalismo abierto" que parecía tener éxito en los países del Norte, y dando más énfasis a la cooperación económica con el apoyo de actores privados no estatales.

En la primera década del siglo XXI, se pone énfasis en el enfoque de construcción de capacidades propias y la vuelta a algunas visiones de corte desarrollista. Los debates sobre el desarrollo se ven influenciados por algunas teorías críticas (por ejemplo, el postdesarrollo, el pensamiento postcolonial y el paradigma del "Buen Vivir", que se estudian con detalle en el capítulo 8 de este libro) y consiguen permear en el debate sobre la CSS. No obstante, a pesar de los avances en el campo político, en la práctica el desarrollo económico sigue siendo un elemento fundamental en las políticas de CSS, esto a pesar de que el abanico de temas se ha ampliado a un sinnúmero de aspectos en las dimensiones técnica, económica, política y social. Todavía queda mucho trabajo para definir cuál será el camino a seguir de aquí en adelante.

La persistencia de esas visiones económicas sobre el desarrollo (aunque no son las únicas existentes) para definir el camino que debe seguir la CSS nos hace recordar la crítica de Jain Manish (1995) sobre el paradigma de la modernización y sobre la necesidad de un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo para

los países del Sur y para la CSS. Él expresaba que la CSS no ha tenido el efecto deseado para erradicar el sufrimiento y la disparidad del mundo porque sus fundamentos ideológicos han estado basados en un paradigma erróneo de desarrollo, resultando irónico que haya quedado sumergida en el mismo paradigma que se suponía iba a desafiar. El autor está convencido de que la influencia del "paradigma de la modernización" ha hecho mucho daño a los países del Sur en su camino al desarrollo y ha dificultado la creación de un paradigma propio de desarrollo dentro de la CSS. Y, a día de hoy, sigue siendo una tarea pendiente de concretar.

COMENTARIO FINAL

Consideramos que es el momento propicio para reprensar el sistema que gobierna la CID y contemplar la posibilidad de que se coopere más allá de los paradigmas de desarrollo dominantes y de los límites geográficos y económicos que han marcado las agendas de la CID a lo largo de su historia. Con lo cual, cualquier región del mundo podría ser partícipe y beneficiaria de procesos cooperativos que se adecúen a sus necesidades, no solo para resolver problemas sino también para fortalecer capacidades e intercambiar experiencias. Ahora bien, esta idea plantea un desafío para el sistema de cooperación para el desarrollo, ya que el mapa de la cooperación ha cambiado, existen múltiples políticas de cooperación que no computan como AOD, cada vez más actores se involucran en las dinámicas de la CID y las agendas necesitan ser más

diversificadas. Lo que, desde nuestro punto de vista, lejos de ser un problema ofrece la oportunidad de reconstruir un escenario muy interesante, y por qué no decirlo, positivo en la vida internacional, ya que la democratiza y la diversifica.

En adelante, tendremos que estar muy atentos a la evolución de los acontecimientos y a la capacidad que tengan los actores de la CID para dar un vuelco a los paradigmas dominantes y responder eficazmente a las demandas de desarrollo del mundo actual.

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Lectura 1

Una nueva dimensión de la Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo[5]

El 12 de septiembre de 1978, en Buenos Aires, capital de la Argentina, las delegaciones de 138 Estados adoptaron por consenso un Plan de Acción para Promover y Realizar la Cooperación Técnica entre los Países en Desarrollo (CTPD), y le dieron el nombre de la ciudad que había servido de huésped para la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre la CTPD. La adopción por consenso del Plan de Acción de Buenos Aires completó el éxito de la Conferencia, a la que todavía se seguían rindiendo homenajes en las Naciones Unidas cuando, en diciembre de 1978, la Asamblea General resolvió hacer suyo el Plan e instar a todos los gobiernos y los elementos del sistema de las Naciones Unidas a aplicar sus recomendaciones.

EL EMBLEMA DE LA CONFERENCIA

Se adoptó como emblema de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cooperación Técnica entre los Países en Desarrollo un puente simbólico que une a los países y pueblos

del hemisferio Sur.

El centro del emblema de la Conferencia en que se unen las cuatro partes del mundo, septentrional, meridional, oriental y occidental, simboliza el objetivo último de la CTPD y de la Conferencia de 1978, la consecución de una verdadera asociación mundial para el desarrollo.

El Plan de Acción bien puede ser el más exhaustivo y el más detenidamente debatido de todos los documentos de su tipo. Se dedicaron a la redacción del Plan cinco largos años de análisis y exámenes detallados y cada vez más amplios de la necesidad y las posibilidades de la cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo —a nivel nacional y regional, en grupos de expertos y en reuniones intergubernamentales, en la sede del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo y en otros organismos y organizaciones del sistema de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo—. En la propia Conferencia de Buenos Aires, cientos de especialistas gubernamentales en aspectos del desarrollo provenientes de todo el mundo, entre ellos 45 ministros de Estado, 41 viceministros y 81 jefes de departamentos de planificación y cooperación para el desarrollo, estudiaron y debatieron cada línea del proyecto con particular dedicación, a menudo hasta altas horas de la noche.

El documento resultante es un plan detallado para introducir profundos cambios en los criterios respecto de la asistencia para el desarrollo y para dar un relieve considerablemente mayor a la capacidad nacional y colectiva de los países en desarrollo para valerse de medios propios, como fundamentos de un nuevo orden económico internacional.

El Plan no es un documento que pueda ser leído una vez y luego guardado. Es preciso leerlo una y otra vez para identificar, en el lenguaje necesariamente comprimido de cada Objetivo y Recomendación, los problemas concretos y urgentes del desarrollo que procuran superar. Toda institución nacional e internacional que intervenga en alguna medida en el desarrollo llegará a usarlo continuamente como lista de verificación de los factores que deben considerarse en la elaboración de programas y proyectos, la selección de recursos y la evaluación.

Las medidas individualizadas ofrecerán orientación para esos fines durante el próximo decenio o aún más. Constituyen recetas de nuevos medios, de capacidades fortalecidas o recién descubiertas, que pueden dar un gran impulso adicional a la lucha contra la pobreza mundial y el subdesarrollo y al establecimiento de un nuevo orden económico internacional. Con objeto de ofrecer a los trabajadores del desarrollo en todas partes acceso constante a este nuevo y vital instrumento, el PNUD se complace en publicar el texto completo y exacto del Plan en esta forma más duradera, junto con la resolución en que la Asamblea General lo hace suyo. Se dispone de ejemplares adicionales en la Dependencia Especial para la Cooperación Técnica entre Países en Desarrollo, Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, Oficina FF-1216, 304 E. 45th Street, Nueva York, N.Y. 10017.

PLAN DE ACCIÓN DE BUENOS AIRES PARA PROMOVER Y REALIZAR LA COOPERACIÓN TÉCNICA ENTRE LOS PAÍSES EN

DESARROLLO

La Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cooperación Técnica entre los Países en Desarrollo habiéndose reunido en Buenos Aires del 30 de agosto al 12 de septiembre de 1978 en cumplimiento de las resoluciones de la Asamblea General 311179, de 21 de diciembre de 1976, y 321183, de 19 de diciembre de 1977, relativas a la cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo:

1. Aprueba el siguiente Plan de Acción para Promover y Realizar la Cooperación Técnica entre los Países en Desarrollo.
2. Decide que dicho plan sea conocido como “Plan de Acción de Buenos Aires”.
3. Insta a todos los gobiernos a todo el sistema de las Naciones Unidas para el desarrollo y a la comunidad internacional en conjunto a tomar medidas efectivas para su aplicación.

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

1. La Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cooperación Técnica entre los Países en Desarrollo se realiza en un momento crítico de la evolución de las relaciones de los países en desarrollo entre sí y con los países desarrollados.

2. Se están produciendo cambios profundos en las relaciones políticas y económicas internacionales. Cuando se echaron las

bases de las instituciones principales del actual sistema internacional, los asuntos del mundo estaban dominados por un grupo de países industrializados. Sin embargo, el proceso histórico de la descolonización hace posible ahora que numerosos Estados, que representan a la enorme mayoría de la población del mundo, participen en los asuntos internacionales. Se producen cambios considerables a nivel mundial; además, en el control y distribución de los recursos y en las capacidades y necesidades de las naciones. Como consecuencia de esos cambios y de otros acontecimientos internacionales, la expansión de las relaciones y la cooperación internacionales y la interdependencia de las naciones aumenta progresivamente. Esa interdependencia, sin embargo, exige una participación igual y soberana en la conducción de las relaciones internacionales y una distribución equitativa de los beneficios.

3. El sistema internacional se encuentra en estado de efervescencia. Los conceptos, las actitudes políticas y económicas, las instituciones y las relaciones deben ajustarse a las nuevas realidades y a concepciones cambiantes. Es con esa perspectiva que los países del mundo han formulado su exhortación del nuevo orden económico internacional como expresión de su voluntad política y de su determinación, basadas en los principios de la autosuficiencia nacional y colectiva, de pugnar por un nuevo modelo de relaciones internacionales más adecuado a las circunstancias reales y que refleje plenamente los intereses de la comunidad mundial en su conjunto.

4. Existe un reconocimiento cada vez mayor de la urgencia y magnitud de los problemas que la comunidad mundial enfrenta y habrá de enfrentar cada vez más en el futuro. Los problemas del desarrollo —social y económico, nacional e internacional— exigen esfuerzos concertados y mucho mayores de los países en desarrollo y de los países desarrollados para que pueda convertirse en realidad el nuevo orden económico internacional. Si bien el progreso de los países en desarrollo depende en primer lugar de sus propios esfuerzos, ese progreso sufre también la influencia de la política y de la actuación de los países desarrollados. Al mismo tiempo es evidente que, como consecuencia de la creciente relación, cooperación internacional e interdependencia en muchas esferas, el progreso de los países desarrollados es afectado actualmente, y lo será cada vez más en el futuro, por la política y la actuación de los países en desarrollo.

5. En esta histórica nueva etapa de la marcha hacia el logro del nuevo orden económico internacional, la cooperación entre los países en desarrollo (CTPD) adquiere una dimensión de importancia crítica. Es un medio para crear la comunicación y fomentar una cooperación más amplia y efectiva entre los países en desarrollo. Es una fuerza decisiva para iniciar, diseñar, organizar y fomentar la cooperación entre los países en desarrollo a fin de que puedan crear, adquirir, adaptar, transferir y compartir conocimientos y experiencias en beneficio mutuo, y para lograr la autosuficiencia nacional y colectiva, lo cual es esencial para su desarrollo social y económico.

6. Esta forma de cooperación no es nueva. Son muchas las actividades de cooperación que se han llevado a cabo entre países en desarrollo en el transcurso de los años, y muchas se encuentran actualmente en curso. Lo que sí es nuevo es que la cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo es considerada ahora por esos países como un elemento cada vez más importante para la promoción de un desarrollo firme en el contexto actual del mundo. Además, las dificultades con que tropieza actualmente la economía mundial hacen aún más necesario que los países en desarrollo elaboren estrategias basadas en una mayor confianza en sí mismos, nacional y colectiva para lo cual la CTPD es un instrumento importante. Eso no reduce en absoluto la responsabilidad de los países desarrollados de adoptar las medidas políticas necesarias, en particular el aumento de la asistencia al desarrollo para acelerar el adelanto de los países en desarrollo.

7. La CTPD es un proceso multidimensional. Su alcance puede ser bilateral o multilateral y su carácter, subregional, regional o interregional. Debe estar organizada por los gobiernos entre sí, los cuales pueden promover con tal fin la participación de organizaciones públicas y, en el marco de las políticas establecidas por los gobiernos, la de organizaciones privadas y de particulares. Puede basarse en enfoques, métodos y tecnologías innovadores, particularmente adaptados a las necesidades locales y, al mismo tiempo, utilizar las modalidades corrientes principales de cooperación técnica que se prevén

tendrían lugar entre dos o más países en desarrollo, el apoyo de los países desarrollados y de las instituciones regionales e interregionales puede ser necesario.

8. La CTPD no es un fin en sí misma, ni tampoco un sustituto de la cooperación técnica con los países desarrollados. El aumento de la cooperación técnica proveniente de los países desarrollados es necesario para la transferencia de tecnologías apropiadas, así como para la transferencia de tecnologías avanzadas y otras formas de pericia en las que esos países tienen clara ventaja. Se requieren nuevas contribuciones de los países desarrollados para acrecentar la capacidad técnica de los países en desarrollo mediante el apoyo a las instituciones pertinentes de dichos países. La CTPD puede servir para aumentar la capacidad de las instituciones de los países en desarrollo de adaptarse y de absorber insumos adecuados procedentes de los países desarrollados.

9. La importancia de la cooperación entre los países en desarrollo en general, y de la cooperación técnica en particular, ha sido reconocida en diversas declaraciones, resoluciones y decisiones de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas y de otros organismos. La Asamblea General, en su más reciente resolución referente a la Conferencia (resolución 321183 de 19 de diciembre de 1977), recordando sus resoluciones anteriores 3201 (S-VI) y 3202 (S-VI) de 1 de mayo de 1974 que contenían la Declaración y el Programa de Acción sobre el establecimiento de un Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional. 3281 (XXIX) de 12

de diciembre de 1974 que contenía la Carta de los Derechos y Deberes Económicos de los Estados, y 3362 (S-VII) de 16 de septiembre de 1975 sobre desarrollo y cooperación económica internacional, reconoció que los objetivos básicos de la cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo eran la promoción de la capacidad nacional y colectiva de los países en desarrollo para valerse de medios propios y el aumento de la capacidad creadora de esos países para resolver esos problemas de desarrollo. Los mismos objetivos, en un contexto más amplio, habían sido decididamente apoyados en la Quinta Conferencia de Jefes de Estado o de Gobierno de los Países no Alineados, celebrada en Colombo del 16 al 19 de agosto de 1976, en la Conferencia sobre Cooperación Económica entre Países en Desarrollo, celebrada en la Ciudad de México del 13 al 22 de septiembre de 1976, en la Declaración de El Cairo de marzo de 1977 sobre cooperación afroárabe, en la primera Conferencia de Ministros de Trabajo de los Estados no Alineados y de otros países en desarrollo celebrada en Túnez del 24 al 26 de abril de 1978, en que se aprobó un programa de acción y cooperación en las esferas del empleo y el desarrollo de los recursos humanos, y últimamente en la Declaración y Programa de Acción para la Cooperación Económica, que aprobó la Conferencia de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de los Países no Alineados celebrada en Belgrado en julio de 1978.

10. La Asamblea General, mediante su resolución 321182 de 19 de diciembre de 1978, hizo suyas las recomendaciones del Grupo de Trabajo sobre Cooperación Técnica entre los Países

en Desarrollo, en su forma modificada por las decisiones pertinentes sobre cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo aprobadas en los periodos de sesiones 18, 23 y 24 del Consejo de Administración del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, reconociendo así que dichas recomendaciones representaban una contribución sustancial para el desarrollo de la CTPD, en especial dentro del sistema de las Naciones Unidas para el desarrollo y por dicho sistema.

11. La Declaración de Kuwait sobre Cooperación Técnica entre los Países en Desarrollo del 5 de junio de 1977, que siguió a cuatro reuniones intergubernamentales regionales celebradas sobre el tema, establece que “la cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo es un imperativo histórico dimanante de la necesidad de un nuevo orden internacional. Es un proceso consciente, sistemático y políticamente motivado elaborado con objeto de crear una estructura de vínculos múltiples entre los países en desarrollo”. La Declaración de Kuwait fue reconocida en la resolución CMIRes.560 (XXIX) aprobada por el Consejo de Ministros de la Organización de la Unidad Africana en su 29 periodo ordinario de sesiones celebrado en Libreville del 23 de junio de 1977. Fue además apoyada por la Asamblea de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la Organización de la Unidad Africana en su 14 periodo ordinario de sesiones, celebrado en Libreville del 23 de junio al 5 de julio de 19778 y por el Consejo de Ministros de la Organización de la Unidad Africana, en su 31 periodo ordinario de sesiones, celebrado en Khartum del 7 al 18 de julio de 1978.

12. La cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo ha surgido como una nueva dimensión de la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo, que expresa la determinación del mundo en desarrollo de alcanzar la capacidad nacional y colectiva de valerse de sus propios medios, y la necesidad de crear el nuevo orden económico internacional. Su surgimiento y su fundamento deben verse, por lo tanto, con esa perspectiva global, a la luz de la experiencia obtenida de la asistencia técnica internacional y de las conclusiones a que llegaron las conferencias mundiales anteriores de las Naciones Unidas relativas al desarrollo y la cooperación.

13. La CTPD, así como otras formas de cooperación entre todos los países, debe basarse en el estricto respeto de la soberanía nacional, la independencia económica, la igualdad de derechos y la no injerencia en los asuntos internos de las naciones, cualquiera que sea su dimensión, su nivel de desarrollo y su sistema social y económico.

14. El fortalecimiento de la CTPD debe constituir un elemento importante de toda estrategia futura que trate de acelerar el desarrollo, de acrecentar la dignidad humana y el progreso, y de mejorar el funcionamiento del conjunto de la economía mundial

II. OBJETIVOS

15. Los objetivos básicos de la CTPD, que son interdependientes

y se apoyan entre sí, contribuyen a los objetivos más amplios de la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo y refuerzan los de otras formas estrechamente relacionadas de cooperación, incluso la cooperación económica entre los países en desarrollo, para la cual la CTPD es un instrumento fundamental. Los objetivos son:

a. Fomentar la capacidad de los países en desarrollo para valerse de medios propios mediante el aumento de su capacidad creadora para encontrar soluciones a los problemas de desarrollo en consonancia con sus propios valores, aspiraciones y necesidades especiales.
b. Promover y reforzar entre los países en desarrollo la capacidad colectiva para valerse de medios propios intercambiando experiencias, compartiendo y utilizando sus recursos técnicos en forma combinada y desarrollando capacidades complementarias.
c. Fortalecer la capacidad de los países en desarrollo para identificar y analizar colectivamente los principales problemas con que tropiezan en su desarrollo y para formular las estrategias necesarias para dirigir sus relaciones económicas internacionales, mediante la mancomunidad de los conocimientos de que se dispone en esos países y mediante estudios conjuntos realizados por las instituciones existentes, con miras a establecer el nuevo orden económico internacional.
d. Aumentar el volumen y mejorar la calidad de la cooperación internacional y aumentar la eficacia de los recursos dedicados a la cooperación técnica general

mediante la mancomunidad de capacidades.

e. Fortalecer la capacidad técnica existente en los países en desarrollo incluido el sector tradicional, aumentar la eficacia con que se utiliza esa capacidad y crear nuevas capacidades y posibilidades, y en este contexto promover la transferencia de tecnología y pericia apropiadas para los recursos de que disponen esos países y para su potencial de desarrollo, de modo que se afiance su confianza individual y colectiva en sus propias capacidades.
f. Aumentar y perfeccionar las comunicaciones entre los países en desarrollo que lleven a una conciencia más elevada de los problemas comunes y a un acceso mayor a los conocimientos y experiencias disponibles así como a la creación de nuevos conocimientos para enfrentarse con los problemas del desarrollo.
g. Perfeccionar la capacidad de los países en desarrollo para absorber y adaptar la tecnología y la pericia requeridas para satisfacer sus necesidades específicas de desarrollo.
h. Reconocer y solucionar los problemas y necesidades de los países en desarrollo menos adelantados, sin litoral, insulares y más seriamente afectados.
i. Hacer que los países en desarrollo estén en condiciones de lograr un mayor grado de participación en las actividades económicas internacionales y ampliar la cooperación internacional.

16. Es evidente que la CTPD sirve también a muchos otros fines,

tales como la superación de las barreras de actitudes, el aumento de la confianza mutua de los países en desarrollo en su capacidad técnica y la intensificación del proceso de armonización de sus intereses, a fin de aprovechar plenamente, dentro del contexto del concepto fundamental de solidaridad, sus características concretas subregionales, regionales e interregionales, particularmente identificando prioridades en esferas tales como los transportes y las comunicaciones, el empleo, desarrollo e intercambio de recursos humanos, así como la agricultura y la industria.

III. MEDIDAS QUE DEBEN ADOPTARSE

17. Las recomendaciones que se formulan a continuación han de robustecer y respaldar la cooperación entre los países en desarrollo; por ejemplo, y sin implicar una indicación de prioridad, mediante la realización de actividades y programas de acción decididos por los países en desarrollo, en esferas como las del empleo y el desarrollo de los recursos humanos, la pesca, la alimentación y la agricultura, la salud, la industrialización, la información, la incorporación de la mujer a las actividades de desarrollo, la cooperación monetaria y financiera, las materias primas, la ciencia y la tecnología, la cooperación técnica y los servicios consultivos, las telecomunicaciones, el turismo, el comercio y el transporte y las comunicaciones. Estas recomendaciones facilitarán también la formulación de programas de cooperación en otros sectores.

A. Medidas a nivel nacional

18. Los objetivos principales de las siguientes recomendaciones relativas a la acción a nivel nacional son: aumentar la conciencia de cada país en desarrollo con respecto a su propia capacidad, conocimientos y experiencia, y los existentes en otros países en desarrollo; crear y fortalecer los necesarios arreglos de apoyo —instituciones información, recursos humanos y de otro tipo— sobre los cuales debe basarse firmemente la CTPD; identificar las oportunidades concretas para la CTPD, y aumentar la capacidad de los países en desarrollo para organizar y ejecutar rápida y eficazmente proyectos con una dimensión de CTPD. Aunque es claro que corresponde a cada país en desarrollo emprender tales acciones, el apoyo de otros países en desarrollo, países desarrollados y organizaciones internacionales, cuando se solicite, puede aportar importantes contribuciones. Cabe esperar que, al llevar a cabo las recomendaciones expuestas a continuación, el sistema de desarrollo de las Naciones Unidas responderá a las solicitudes de los gobiernos ofreciendo su apoyo más amplio posible.

19. La cooperación bilateral entre países en desarrollo constituye una importante forma de CTPD y un instrumento para crear vínculos entre la confianza nacional en sus propias capacidades y la colectiva. En consecuencia, el objetivo principal de las recomendaciones concernientes a la cooperación bilateral es estimularla, intensificarla y mejorarla en su fondo, forma y mecanismos.

Recomendación 1. Programación nacional para cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo.

20. Al formular su plan o programa nacional de desarrollo, cada país en desarrollo debe esforzarse por identificar su potencial de CTPD. Tal proceso debe contener una evaluación de su experiencia en los sectores pertinentes de desarrollo económico y social que puedan tener relación con las necesidades de otros países en desarrollo. Sobre esta base, el gobierno puede examinar las necesidades nacionales en materia de investigación. tecnología, capacidades técnicas, servicios de consultoría y facilidades de capacitación, así como estrategias de empleo que puedan atenderse con máxima eficacia mediante la cooperación con otros países en desarrollo, así como las contribuciones que pueda aportar en estas materias a otros países en desarrollo.

Recomendación 2. Adopción de políticas y normas favorables a cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo.

21. Los países en desarrollo deben estudiar la adopción de políticas favorables a la CTPD y la elaboración del marco jurídico y administrativo apropiado a la cooperación eficaz y equitativa, teniendo en cuenta las prácticas ya establecidas sobre la base de convenciones oficiales, logrando así la mayor aplicabilidad y aceptación posible. El marco debe incluir los arreglos administrativos y jurídicos relativos a la entrada, empleo, obligaciones, prerrogativas e inmunidades de expertos y

consultores, los arreglos relativos a becas, el uso de los servicios de contratistas y otros especialistas, la entrada de equipo y suministros, los regímenes fiscales y monetarios favorables a la CTPD y los arreglos financieros encaminados a lograr una distribución equitativa de los costos. Debe también incluir arreglos administrativos y jurídicos que comprendan, entre otras cosas, arreglos para facilitar el envío de personal profesional y técnico al extranjero sin comprometer las condiciones y perspectivas de su empleo ordinario a su regreso, así como la previsión de prestación de servicios de consultoría, el suministro de equipo y la concesión de becas y realización de cursos de aprendizaje.

Recomendación 3. Mecanismos nacionales para fomentar cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo.

22. Todos los países en desarrollo deben, en la medida apropiada, organizar mecanismos flexibles, o fortalecerlos cuando ya existan, para fomentar la CTPD, facilitar la coordinación de las actividades de CTPD a nivel nacional y su incorporación en los programas nacionales de desarrollo. Tales mecanismos pueden incluir la participación de representantes de los sectores público y privado para permitir una interacción más estrecha con los órganos gubernamentales y otras organizaciones sectoriales.

Recomendación 4. Fortalecimiento de los sistemas nacionales de información en materia de cooperación técnica entre países en desarrollo.

23. Todos los países en desarrollo deben tomar medidas apropiadas para mejorar la reunión, el tratamiento y la difusión de información sobre la existencia de la necesaria capacidad, conocimientos y experiencias nacionales necesarias para la aplicación y uso en la CTPD, con el apoyo de los sistemas de información del sistema de las Naciones Unidas para el desarrollo, y en particular del Sistema de Remisión Informativa (SRI) del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), y de fuentes oficiales profesionales y de otro tipo. Se recomienda a los gobiernos de los países en desarrollo que intensifiquen su cooperación con los órganos apropiados al nivel regional, interregional y mundial para la reunión de dicha información a fin de facilitar la información sobre la existencia de tales recursos y oportunidades en materia de CTPD a otros países en desarrollo. Esos organismos deben obtener de los gobiernos y de las entidades oficialmente designadas por ellos la información necesaria para la CTPD y difundirla por las vías establecidas con ese propósito por los gobiernos.

Recomendación 5. Mejora de las instituciones existentes.

24. Considerando que una base institucional firme es fundamental para la viabilidad de la CTPD, los países en desarrollo deben identificar y evaluar individualmente la eficiencia y el potencial de las instituciones nacionales correspondientes y adoptar medidas, en caso necesario, para mejorar su eficiencia y aumentar su potencial. Las organizaciones nacionales de los países en desarrollo que

trabajan en problemas comunes pueden aportar valiosas contribuciones a la expansión de la CTPD. Tales organizaciones podrían estructurar una colaboración operativa de modo tal que se forjara una reciprocidad de relaciones. Esa colaboración reforzaría sus propias capacidades. al compartir su trabajo y su experiencia con otras dedicadas a resolver los mismos problemas con diversos grados de complejidad y en distintos ambientes, y también, cuando fuese factible, al compartir sus responsabilidades en la ejecución de actividades de capacitación en común.

Recomendación 6. Fomento de centros nacionales de investigación y capacitación del alcance multinacional.

25. Los países en desarrollo deben alentar a los actuales centros nacionales de investigación y capacitación a ampliar el alcance de sus actividades de modo que incluyan programas y proyectos que sean de interés para varios países a nivel subregional, regional e interregional. Si bien los centros nacionales existentes deben utilizarse con este propósito en la mayor medida posible, siempre que sea necesario pueden crearse nuevos centros con el mismo fin.

Recomendación 7. Fomento de una mayor capacidad tecnológica para valerse de medios propios.

26. Los países en desarrollo deben hacer todos los esfuerzos posibles para fortalecer su capacidad científica y tecnológica

atendiendo a sus necesidades, valores y recursos, formulando, cuando sea necesario, planes tecnológicos como parte integrante de su plan nacional de desarrollo; estableciendo bancos de datos científicos y tecnológicos, estimulando las actividades autóctonas de investigación y desarrollo para el logro de sus objetivos de desarrollo, combinando esfuerzos de investigación y compartiendo entre sí sus resultados mediante acuerdos sobre cooperación científica y técnica, fortaleciendo los servicios nacionales de diseño, los laboratorios nacionales, los centros de investigación y las instituciones científicas y de otro tipo; y vinculando en la medida apropiada sus instituciones nacionales de investigación y desarrollo a las de otros países en desarrollo, inclusive por conducto de centros regionales para la transmisión y el desarrollo de la tecnología. Los países en desarrollo deben realizar esfuerzos especiales para fortalecer sus posibilidades nacionales en materia de servicios de ingeniería y consultoría, mejorando los niveles profesionales organizando la capacitación y la investigación. El intercambio amplio de experiencias en esta esfera entre los países en desarrollo es un componente indispensable de la confianza nacional y colectiva en sus propias capacidades.

Recomendación 8. Formulación, orientación e intercambio de experiencias de política con respecto a la ciencia y la tecnología.

27. En vista del importante papel de la ciencia y la tecnología en el adelanto de los países en desarrollo y teniendo presente la satisfactoria experiencia de varios países al aplicar la ciencia y la

tecnología en su proceso de desarrollo, los países en desarrollo deben, siempre que sea posible, intercambiar sus experiencias sobre formulación y aplicación de sus planes y políticas para la orientación de la ciencia y la transmisión y el desarrollo de la tecnología, hacia sus propios objetivos, necesidades y capacidad de desarrollo.

Recomendación 9. Fomento de una mayor capacidad para valerse de los propios medios en las esferas económica y social.

28. Los gobiernos de los países en desarrollo deben intensificar sus esfuerzos para fomentar la capacidad nacional y colectiva fortaleciendo sus contactos y comunicaciones, intercambiando experiencias y emprendiendo programas y proyectos, incluso de carácter conjunto, en esferas de mutuo interés en los sectores económico y social.

Recomendación 10. Cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo en la esfera cultural.

29. Los gobiernos de los países en desarrollo, a fin de afirmar la identidad cultural de sus respectivos pueblos y de enriquecer y fortalecer su capacidad colectiva con una mayor conciencia de la cultura y el patrimonio de otros países en desarrollo, deben emplear en forma creciente los mecanismos de CTPD para promover los vínculos culturales y educacionales y fortalecer el conocimiento mutuo, estimulando los intercambios en la esfera de las ciencias sociales, la educación y la cultura.

Recomendación 11. Estímulo de la cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo por conducto de las organizaciones profesionales técnicas.

30. Los gobiernos de los países en desarrollo deben alentar y facilitar la cooperación entre las organizaciones profesionales y técnicas en las actividades de CTDP en sus propios países y en otros países en desarrollo.

Recomendación 12. Expansión de la CTPD por conducto de las empresas e instituciones nacionales públicas y privadas.

31. Teniendo en cuenta la importante y creciente contribución aportada por las empresas e instituciones del sector público al desarrollo nacional de los países en desarrollo y el rico fondo de experiencia adquirido por ellas a lo largo de los años, los gobiernos de los países en desarrollo deben esforzarse por establecer o fortalecer arreglos apropiados encaminados a estimular y mantener la cooperación y la comunicación entre las empresas e instituciones públicas de sus propios países y las de otros países en desarrollo, con vistas en particular a fomentar una más estrecha colaboración. De modo análogo, los gobiernos de los países en desarrollo deben estimular la concertación de arreglos comparables con respecto a las empresas e instituciones nacionales privadas.

Recomendación 13. Programas de información y de educación

en apoyo de la cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo.

32. Los gobiernos y las organizaciones no gubernamentales de los países en desarrollo deben emprender programas de información y de educación a largo plazo a fin de fortalecer su propia identidad cultural, alentar una mayor conciencia de sus problemas y oportunidades de desarrollo comunes, movilizar el apoyo público en favor de sus capacidades individuales y conjuntas y romper con barreras de actitudes que estorban la expansión de la CTPD. El sistema de las Naciones Unidas debe prestar intenso apoyo a tales programas, y buscar recursos adicionales especiales con ese propósito.

Recomendación 14. Expansión de vínculos técnicos bilaterales.

33. A fin de facilitar la cooperación técnica constante y creciente entre los países en desarrollo y dado que los arreglos bilaterales constituyen uno de los aspectos fundamentales de esta cooperación, los gobiernos de los países en desarrollo deben esforzarse por ampliar los arreglos bilaterales para fomentar la CTPD mediante mecanismos tales como acuerdos y programas cooperativos, comisiones conjuntas, intercambio regular de información y experiencia y apoyo de las iniciativas en los sectores público y privado. A este respecto, los países en desarrollo deben realizar esfuerzos especiales para intensificar la CTPD mediante programas y proyectos a largo plazo, realzando la programación y adoptando medidas especiales para realizar

satisfactoriamente esos programas, y también estableciendo vínculos directos entre instituciones análogas

B. Medidas a nivel subregional y regional

34. La CTPD debe ser realizada por cada Estado, y a nivel subregional y regional conjuntamente por todos los interesados. Las siguientes recomendaciones de acción subregional y regional deben tener en cuenta, entre otras, las siguientes necesidades:

a. Fortalecer las instituciones y organizaciones subregionales y regionales existentes y con ello su capacidad para prestar un mejor servicio a las necesidades de cada gobierno interesado en sus esfuerzos para cooperar con otros.
b. Desarrollar y fortalecer los vínculos entre las instituciones en esferas sustantivas importantes y de alta prioridad, como las que se determinaron en las reuniones regionales intergubernamentales preparatorias de la Conferencia, destinadas a aprovechar las capacidades y experiencias disponibles en la región.
c. Fortalecer la capacidad disponible para la recopilación y el análisis de datos con miras a suministrar una información sistemática y actualizada a los dirigentes a nivel nacional, subregional y regional.
d. Mejorar los sistemas regionales de información para la CTPD, particularmente los vinculados con las

necesidades de cooperación técnica que no siempre pueden expresarse en los términos tradicionales de necesidades de conocimientos técnicos, equipos y formación profesional.

Recomendación 15. Fortalecimiento de las instituciones y organizaciones subregionales y regionales.

35. Todos los gobiernos deben esforzarse por aumentar la capacidad de las organizaciones subregionales y regionales para ejecutar actividades y proyectos de CTPD. A ese respecto, el sistema de las Naciones Unidas para el desarrollo debe apoyar esas tareas, particularmente por medio de las comisiones regionales en estrecha colaboración con las oficinas regionales del PNUD y con otros Órganos del sistema de las Naciones Unidas para el desarrollo que tengan estructuras o divisiones regionales.

Recomendación 16. Identificación, desarrollo y aplicación de las iniciativas de cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo.

36. Las organizaciones intergubernamentales subregionales y regionales apropiadas deben emprender, a solicitud de los países interesados y en estrecha colaboración con ellos, y con el apoyo de las comisiones regionales y otras organizaciones de las Naciones Unidas, análisis completos de las necesidades y capacidades en materia de cooperación técnica dentro de las subregiones o regiones respectivas, para prestar asistencia a los gobiernos de los países en desarrollo en la identificación,

desarrollo y aplicación de las iniciativas de CTPD en esferas prioritarias acordadas.

Recomendación 17. Aumento de la contribución de las organizaciones profesionales y técnicas.

37. Las organizaciones intergubernamentales subregionales y regionales apropiadas a petición de los países interesados y en estrecha colaboración con ellos y con el apoyo de las comisiones regionales y otras organizaciones de las Naciones Unidas, deben efectuar estudios apropiados, a solicitud de los gobiernos interesados, y recomendar a éstos programas de acción destinados a incrementar la contribución de las organizaciones profesionales y técnicas interesadas, para el apoyo a la CTPD.

Recomendación 18. Creación de nuevos vínculos para la cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo en esferas sustantivas importantes.

38. Las organizaciones intergubernamentales subregionales y regionales apropiadas, con inclusión de las comisiones regionales, o con su apoyo, deben, a solicitud de los países interesados y en permanente consulta con ellos, formular y apoyar actividades y proyectos en materia de CTPD a nivel subregional y regional en las esferas de especial interés que los gobiernos puedan determinar individual o conjuntamente. Esas actividades y proyectos de CTPD deberán facilitar y fortalecer los vínculos entre las organizaciones nacionales que trabajan para la

solución de los problemas del desarrollo y las que se ocupan de la investigación y el desarrollo y adaptación de tecnología.

Recomendación 19. Promoción de la complementariedad en proyectos industriales y agrícolas a nivel subregional y regional.

39. En vista del potencial para la complementariedad, las organizaciones intergubernamentales subregionales y regionales apropiadas deben promover la realización de proyectos mancomunados en el terreno de la industria y la agricultura, en los cuales las partes interesadas se especialicen en sus respectivas esferas de complementariedad en los productos que habrán de tener acceso preferencial a los mercados de las partes interesadas de la subregión o región.

Recomendación 20. Mejoramiento de la información para la cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo.

40. Las organizaciones intergubernamentales subregionales y regionales apropiadas, con inclusión de las comisiones regionales de las Naciones Unidas y con su apoyo, a petición de los países interesados y en estrecha colaboración con ellos, y con el apoyo de otras organizaciones de las Naciones Unidas, deben:

1. Contribuir al mejoramiento de los aspectos tanto cualitativos como cuantitativos del Sistema de Remisión Informativa (SRI) y demás sistemas similares que están siendo elaborados por otros integrantes del sistema de

las Naciones Unidas para el desarrollo en esferas técnicas especializadas para ampliar su alcance y el aprovechamiento de la información sobre la cooperación técnica entre los países en desarrollo.

2. Asegurar la rápida. eficaz y económica reunión y difusión de la información relativa a las necesidades y capacidades en materia de cooperación técnica de los países en desarrollo dentro de cada región, utilizando, entre otros, diversos mecanismos posibles, como las redes institucionales y los periódicos profesionales, y procurando superar asimismo las barreras lingüísticas.
3. Preparar o armonizar, en caso necesario, normas subregionales y regionales relativas a la corriente de informaciones sobre la CTPD.

Recomendación 21. Apoyo a los centros nacionales de investigación y capacitación de alcance multinacional.

41. Las organizaciones intergubernamentales subregionales y regionales apropiadas con el apoyo del sistema de las Naciones Unidas para el desarrollo, deberán proporcionar, a solicitud de los países en desarrollo interesados, el apoyo necesario para permitir el funcionamiento eficaz de centros nacionales de investigación y capacitación de alcance multinacional para promover la CTPD.

Posición sobre la cooperación Sur-Sur en el marco de la Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo ante el IV Foro de Alto Nivel de Busan[6]

En el marco de la XXI Cumbre Iberoamericana, y en relación con el IV Foro de Alto Nivel de Busan, los y las Responsables de Cooperación de: Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, España, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, Portugal, Principado de Andorra, República Dominicana, Uruguay.

Considerando que los países iberoamericanos arriba firmantes han desarrollado a lo largo de los últimos 5 años una reflexión común sobre la cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS), reflejada anualmente en el Informe de la CSS que coordina la SEGIB, en el que se recogen datos y análisis sobre esta actividad de cooperación entre países miembros y que el establecimiento del Programa Iberoamericano de Fortalecimiento de la Cooperación Sur-Sur, también ha contribuido a este esfuerzo de fomento de una CSS que se impulsa en el marco de una comunidad de intereses y vínculos comunes.

Reconociendo que la cooperación, en el marco de la Conferencia Iberoamericana, conforma un espacio en el que países con diferentes tradiciones de cooperación se integran y aportan sus experiencias y capacidades al tiempo que participan en procesos colectivos de reflexión sobre la cooperación internacional.

Considerando que el diálogo y mutuo entendimiento que existe

entre países donantes tradicionales y cooperantes del Sur, evidencian el compromiso que prevalece entre los países Iberoamericanos para fortalecer las relaciones de cooperación, con vistas a avanzar en el desarrollo, y enfrentar de manera efectiva las causas estructurales de la pobreza.

Asumiendo que los países Iberoamericanos arriba firmantes, se aproximan al Foro de Alto Nivel de Busan, y en general, al proceso de Eficacia de la Ayuda, desde una diversidad de posiciones, aunque con una base y principios comunes, que se exponen en este documento, y que emergen de la práctica cooperante de estos países y de la política de cooperación de los mismos.

Reconociendo que, fruto de esta diversidad, los países Iberoamericanos han producido otros documentos y posiciones para el Foro de Alto Nivel de Busan, y que en este sentido cabe mencionar el documento acordado entre los países Centroamericanos y la República Dominicana.

Manifiestan que:

1. La cooperación internacional está cambiando, al igual que los retos que el mundo enfrenta, y las oportunidades que existen para continuar avanzando hacia el desarrollo. Principios y paradigmas que eran válidos hace años deben ser hoy revisados y ampliados.

2. El fortalecimiento de la CSS, cuya actividad se inició hace décadas, refleja en buena medida estos cambios, al sumar una diversidad de alternativas, soluciones e instrumentos a los

esquemas tradicionales de cooperación.

3. La CSS no sustituye a la tradicional Norte-Sur, tampoco es subsidiaria ni un instrumento de esta, es valiosa por sí misma y se engrandece en combinación con otras modalidades. Ambas modalidades son ampliamente compatibles y es una aspiración colectiva aprovechar las fortalezas que ofrece la diversidad de socios del desarrollo para promover una mejor articulación y colaboración entre los mismos, con las miras puestas en lograr los mejores resultados de forma eficiente y solidaria.

4. La significación de la CSS y sus aportaciones conceptuales y prácticas al desarrollo, alientan la necesidad de reconfigurar, ampliar y democratizar las estructuras y mecanismos de la Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, haciéndolos más abiertos e incluyentes, comprometidos con la promoción de asociaciones innovadoras para el desarrollo, construidas a largo plazo y basadas en la confianza y el aprendizaje conjunto.

5. La mayor parte de los países Iberoamericanos reflejan de manera creciente el rol dual de ser cooperantes hacia otros países en desarrollo, en proyectos e iniciativas de CSS, al tiempo que siguen demandando el acompañamiento de la cooperación tradicional para apoyar sus sectores estratégicos y coadyuvar de ese modo a la estabilidad y desarrollo sustentable del mundo.

6. La importancia de que los países clasificados como de Renta

Media (PRM) sigan recibiendo cooperación tradicional, se debe a que aún enfrentan desafíos importantes, tales como altos niveles de desigualdad y de vulnerabilidad a *shocks* externos, así como importantes retos institucionales que requieren de recursos y cooperación técnica provenientes de la cooperación al desarrollo. Además, de no ser así, se dejaría fuera del alcance de la cooperación al 80 por ciento de la población pobre del mundo.

Manifiestan que en el marco de la Conferencia Iberoamericana, se han identificado un conjunto de principios y criterios para la CSS que desarrollan los países miembros.

Consideran que los siguientes principios son relevantes para los debates que tendrán lugar de manera previa a la Reunión de Busan, así como para dicho Foro:

7. La CSS se fundamenta en la asociación horizontal entre actores, como principio central de actuación, evitando así una relación vertical y/o asistencialista. La opción por esta forma de trabajo y la experiencia adquirida en la práctica de alianzas horizontales a largo plazo son elementos constitutivos de la CSS.

8. Esta cooperación deriva de acuerdos entre países que enfrentan desafíos de desarrollo similares a nivel nacional y global, lo cual facilita la adecuación de las actividades a necesidades y perspectivas comunes, así como el respeto por los aportes locales al desarrollo. Este hecho favorece el entendimiento, alienta una relación entre socios en condiciones de reciprocidad y permite el aprendizaje mutuo, al compartir

modelos de gestión ya implementados por los países del Sur.

9. La CSS desarrolla su acción en múltiples sectores y modalidades, teniendo una de sus principales fortalezas, en el intercambio de conocimientos, estrategias y prácticas, así como en la mejora de capacidades, que permiten a su vez, el fortalecimiento institucional y de la sociedad. La generación y transferencia de conocimientos para el desarrollo son de la mayor relevancia en la CSS.

10. La CSS apuesta por la eficiencia y eficacia en el uso de los recursos, de cualquier tipo, con los que cuenta, compartiendo y disminuyendo costos, intercambiando experiencias contrastadas, haciendo un uso racional, solidario y adaptado a cada situación de los recursos humanos, tecnológicos, financieros o de otra naturaleza, y promoviendo la estrecha relación entre socios, y el fortalecimiento de las capacidades de gestión de los procesos de la Cooperación Internacional en los países en desarrollo.

11. Esta modalidad de cooperar consolida las relaciones entre países de una misma región, promoviendo el desarrollo regional y la integración, así como la relación con otras regiones y la preservación de bienes públicos regionales y globales.

Manifiestan, de cara al Foro de Alto Nivel de Busan, que:

12. Dada la existencia de nuevos desafíos, es necesario avanzar hacia una estructura, gobernanza y agenda de la Cooperación

Internacional, que reflejen el hecho de que las alternativas y propuestas para enfrentar los desafíos del desarrollo, pueden llegar desde muchos lugares y actores, siendo los países en desarrollo uno de los orígenes más significativos. En este contexto, se hace necesario reconocer el papel activo que desempeñan estos países, y diseñar estrategias que promuevan su inclusión frente a retos globales como el medio ambiente, la seguridad alimentaria, la erradicación de la pobreza, el desarrollo económico y las migraciones.

13. La generación de modelos de asociación y cooperación horizontal basados en condiciones de equidad, beneficio mutuo, confianza y relaciones de largo plazo, debe ser reconocida y valorada como un aporte de la CSS a la política y la práctica de cooperación internacional. Los resultados de la Reunión de Busan deben apuntar a compromisos concretos para la promoción de asociaciones horizontales de cooperación, aplicables por los actores de la Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, conforme a sus disponibilidades y capacidades, respetando sus particularidades y enfoques propios.

14. El intercambio de estrategias, conocimientos y experiencias constituye una vía privilegiada para avanzar en el desarrollo, así como para promover la activa participación de los países en desarrollo en la agenda global de la Cooperación. Los países Iberoamericanos arriba firmantes, continuarán profundizando en el esfuerzo por desarrollar conceptos y estrategias propias para la CSS, así como en la tarea de sistematizar experiencias y

lecciones aprendidas, apoyándose, entre otras, en las herramientas que se están desarrollando en el marco del Programa de Fortalecimiento de la CSS y de las que da cuenta el Informe de la CSS en Iberoamérica que, anualmente, realiza la SEGIB.

15. Es necesario mantener el apoyo de la cooperación internacional a los países de renta media, de cara a fortalecer su capacidad para enfrentar los desafíos de su propio desarrollo y sostener los avances logrados, reconociendo su rol dual, evitando penalizar sus logros en materia de desarrollo y reconociendo su valor para el sostenimiento de la estabilidad, tanto regional como mundial.

16. Es positivo reconocer, promover y apoyar la CSS, a través de mecanismos de fortalecimiento institucional y desarrollo de capacidades organizativas y humanas que permitan aprovechar al máximo su valor agregado.

17. Es necesario impulsar la Cooperación Triangular que promueve asociaciones horizontales, basadas en la reciprocidad y orientadas a superar la tradicional relación donante-receptor, reconociendo la capacidad de los países en desarrollo de contribuir al intercambio de conocimientos, no solo Sur-Sur, sino también Norte-Sur y Sur-Norte. La Cooperación Triangular se debe potenciar como una modalidad que favorece el establecimiento de puentes con la Cooperación Norte-Sur, especialmente, si se basa en el liderazgo de los países

solicitantes y si se aprovechan las especificidades y ventajas que ofrecen las diferentes modalidades y tradiciones, a la hora de definir responsabilidades.

Manifiestan que los países Iberoamericanos arriba firmantes, continuarán promoviendo la reflexión sobre la cooperación internacional, en especial sobre las prácticas y metodologías de la CSS, y el fortalecimiento de los mecanismos y sistemas nacionales que permitan una cooperación más solidaria, soberana, coordinada, eficaz y sustentable.

Lectura 3

Conveniencia de transferir poder a las localidades y determinar el ámbito geográfico de este: la cooperación Sur-Sur en un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo[7]

Manish Jain[8]

> Los pueblos del Sur deben liberarse por sus propios medios de la pobreza, el subdesarrollo y la dependencia y obtener el control de su economía y política. La historia ha demostrado que el dominio nunca se entrega voluntariamente, sino que los dominados tienen que ponerle fin por medios autónomos[9]

En los últimos 40 años, se ha escuchado la consigna de la libre determinación en todos los círculos de elite del desarrollo en el

Sur. Si bien la retórica empleada en el pasaje citado es convincente y atractiva, cuando se extrae del paradigma de desarrollo de la modernidad (definida en forma amplia como las relaciones complejas que surgen de la intersección de las ideologías del capitalismo occidental, el individualismo darwinista, la ciencia y la racionalidad de occidente, el patriarcado occidental y el proceso de "modernización"), plantea diversas cuestiones acerca de cómo se ha formulado y aplicado la ideología de la cooperación Sur-Sur. Para entender plenamente las consecuencias del párrafo anterior, debemos desprender las capas de clichés apasionados preguntando en forma crítica: 1) ¿quiénes son los "pueblos"; 2) ¿quién es el "Sur"?; 3) ¿qué significa "obtener el control de su economía y política"?; 4) ¿quiénes son los "dominadores" y los "dominados"?; 5) ¿qué "medios autónomos" se necesitan para liberar a los pueblos de "la pobreza, el subdesarrollo y la dependencia"?

En las respuestas (o la falta de respuestas) a estas preguntas destacan las notorias deficiencias del actual modelo de la cooperación Sur-Sur. Sirven para recordarnos que, hasta la fecha, los principales beneficiarios de la cooperación Sur-Sur no han sido las millones de personas que viven en condiciones de hambre y pobreza en el mundo, sino las elites y, en creciente medida, la clase media del Norte y del Sur. También nos recuerdan que gran parte de la población mundial está obligada a vivir en un entorno de estancamiento intelectual, creativo y cultural que limita no solo las oportunidades para su crecimiento individual y colectivo, sino para la supervivencia y el avance de la

civilización humana.

En este ensayo se presenta la opinión de que la cooperación Sur-Sur no ha tenido efecto sobre el enorme sufrimiento y la disparidad del mundo porque sus fundamentos ideológicos están basados en un paradigma erróneo de desarrollo, no deja de ser irónico que haya quedado sumergida en el propio paradigma que inicialmente iba a desafiar y deconstruir. El Mesías ideológico Sur-Sur que iba a rectificar las injusticias del mundo moderno se ha asimilado tanto que se ha coludido con el paradigma de la modernidad para aumentar la diferencia entre los “ricos” y los “pobres”. Aún más perturbador es que esta ideología tenía por objetivo fomentar el entendimiento mutuo entre los pueblos y culturas del Sur, pero en cambio ha conspirado con el paradigma de la modernidad para construir diferencias aparentemente irreparables y devaluar las tradiciones y culturas del Sur embelleciendo al mismo tiempo la cultura de consumo occidental.

El pasaje anterior supone que será necesaria una lucha violenta para derrocar las relaciones parasitarias de poder que dominan a los pueblos del Sur. Los modernos intérpretes de la civilización, en el marco del paradigma dominante, han formulado y analizado esas luchas y aparentes “victorias” o “pérdidas” como un fenómeno puramente físico. No han reflexionado sobre los conflictos ideológicos que inspiran e impulsan esas luchas y, en último término, influyen sobre quien realmente ejerce el control. Como con- secuencia de ello, los pueblos tanto del Sur como del Norte comprenden muy poco qué medidas suponen una “lucha violenta” y qué resultados tienen la

“libertad” o la “conquista”. Pocos pensadores han podido formular los niveles intelectuales, psicológicos, emocionales y culturales en que se produce la lucha y luego vincularlos a su interpretación de los resultados. Para que termine verdaderamente la dominación de los pueblos del Sur, resulta decisivo que el centro de la lucha contra este dominio pase de la violencia física a la violencia ideológica. Los pueblos del Sur no deben ya buscar el poder de los rifles *AK-47*, sino que deben desarrollar las bases e instrumentos necesarios para destruir por la fuerza las ideologías e instituciones vinculadas al paradigma dominante de desarrollo. La base de este cambio se está produciendo a medida que los pueblos del Sur lentamente se dan cuenta de que la actual trayectoria de desarrollo no puede aliviar la pobreza, el hambre, la enfermedad, el analfabetismo, la violencia, la degradación ambiental, el aislamiento humano y la decadencia moral y espiritual que paraliza al mundo moderno. Sin embargo, hay que seguir prestando mucha atención a la reflexión y la expresión clara del nuevo paradigma de desarrollo con su propio conjunto de múltiples ideologías e instituciones interconectadas de orden político, económico, social y cultural basado no en los principios del repugnante individualismo y el dólar darwinista, sino en el respeto mutuo, la compasión, la confianza y el sacrificio.

En segundo lugar, se afirma en este ensayo que el modelo de cooperación Sur-Sur que se ha aplicado es impotente porque carece del dinamismo y de la capacidad de respuesta necesarios para incorporar la complejidad creada por las relaciones que surgen de la interacción dialéctica entre lo moderno y lo

tradicional y lo local y mundial, así como para reaccionar ante ella y aprovecharla. Este modelo no ha podido desarrollar un marco de la cooperación Sur-Sur que pueda responder a la rápida evolución de las condiciones, las normas y los actores en el medio mundial. Perturba especialmente su naturaleza estática porque no solo no ha podido prender la chispa necesaria para generar un nuevo paradigma, sino porque ha servido para paralizar psicológicamente la creatividad e imaginación de los pueblos del Sur al dejar la responsabilidad, las expectativas y los instrumentos de ataque ideológico y la reconstrucción solamente en manos de la elite intelectual. Christian Comeliau afirma que "actualmente cabe lamentar que con su excepcional fuerza intelectual la Comisión Sur no haya podido elaborar una visión más crítica de la naturaleza de este sistema, sus ventajas y costos, las posibilidades de adaptarlo o incluso transformarlo, con miras, por ejemplo, a promover un mundo más equitativo o un desarrollo sostenible"[10]. Si bien la crítica de Comeliau de la incapacidad de la Comisión Sur para formular las bases de un nuevo paradigma es acertada, lamentablemente no pone en duda lo que es un problema aún más fundamental, es decir, la expectativa elitista de que la Comisión Sur debe elaborar y proteger el nuevo paradigma.

En este documento se opina que no debería ser función de la Comisión Sur ni de ningún grupo de intelectuales de elite o semielite formular y expresar claramente una nueva visión para el desarrollo. La función de la Comisión Sur y otras instituciones e individuos debería ser de "coordinadores" que alienten la generación y el intercambio de nuevos conocimientos e ideas y

no de expertos que mantengan y transmitan los conocimientos e ideas. Es necesario otro criterio para la cooperación Sur-Sur que se concentre más en “los procesos” y “los actores”. El proceso de crear un nuevo paradigma debe ser diferente de intentos anteriores y debe efectuarse a nivel popular, con una variedad de participantes y extenderse simultáneamente a nivel horizontal y vertical en todo el sistema mundial.

UN CAMBIO IDEOLÓGICO EQUIVOCADO

Las bases ideológicas de la cooperación Sur-Sur deben estar fundadas en la cuestión de por qué los países del Sur deben cooperar entre sí y cómo deben hacerlo.

El concepto moderno de cooperación Sur-Sur surgió como una reacción a las desigualdades mundiales creadas y apoyadas por la cooperación Norte-Norte y la explotación Norte-Sur. El proceso postcolonialista de desarrollo había comenzado a vacilar y diversos países económicamente desfavorecidos habían empezado a preocuparse cada vez más por los motivos de un desarrollo de explotación y las tácticas intimidatorias de los países del Norte, así como por su incapacidad de atender las necesidades básicas de sus ciudadanos. Las experiencias históricas y culturales del colonialismo, la revolución industrial, la guerra fría y la cristiandad habían unido estrechamente a los países del Norte hasta el punto en que se entrelazaron sus programas económicos y políticos. El concepto del “Sur”, un vínculo entre los países de América Latina, Asia y África, surgió como la respuesta a estos bien organizados y coordinados

opresores. Se deseaba crear un vínculo similar entre los políticos e intelectuales de los países en desarrollo por que se estimaba que un Sur unificado podría dar a esos países suficiente fuerza e influencia para tener éxito en el mundo dominado por el Norte. Las bases de la cooperación entre esos países se enmarcaban en sus experiencias históricas comunes con el colonialismo, sus luchas con el neocolonialismo y su deseo incongruente de lograr una visión compartida de desarrollo. Lamentablemente, el resultado parecía más una grotesca parodia de un anuncio comercial con Michael Jordan, la estrella del básquetbol, en que muchos de los dirigentes e intelectuales del Sur esperaban "parecerse a Mike".

La obsesión de crear un Sur parecido al Norte tuvo una gran influencia en las bases de la cooperación Sur-Sur. Las condiciones de la cooperación entre los países en desarrollo que se formularon inicialmente se concentraban en los problemas del desarrollo vinculado a normas y actores y no al paradigma más amplio de desarrollo. En otras palabras, los dirigentes de elite de los países en desarrollo creían que era posible trabajar dentro del paradigma de desarrollo de la modernidad y simplemente tratar de modificarlo o ajustarlo para resolver los problemas de sus naciones. Si bien se hicieron efectivamente llamamientos para establecer nuevos órdenes internacionales, esos movimientos estaban también basados en el paradigma de la modernidad y se contentaban con tratar de modificar las reglas del juego en lugar de tratar el problema más amplio de cambiar el propio juego. Immanuel Wallerstein escribe un obituario adecuado de esos movimientos cuando dice que "cree

francamente que hay que dejar a un lado las ilusiones del ‘desarrollismo’, es decir, la ilusión de que, en el marco de una economía mundial capitalista, desaparezca alguna vez como concepto el Sur subdesarrollado. Los movimientos más serios contra el sistema en los últimos 100 años al final han sido un fracaso, y un rotundo fracaso precisamente porque nunca dejaron atrás esa ilusión”[11].

En el paradigma de la modernidad, los principios básicos de aumentar la eficiencia económica y técnica surgieron como la razón básica de por qué y cómo los países del Sur debían trabajar juntos. Una fe incondicional en el crecimiento económico como el tónico milagroso para todas las deficiencias de los países en desarrollo fue aceptada y difundida por políticos, intelectuales y donantes internacionales bien intencionados pero miopes. Esta fue la continuación de una tradición de la teoría del goteo que ha ido en círculo, al caer en desgracia, ser reciclada y volver a surgir luego en diversas encamaciones. Aun la Comisión Sur tuvo la culpa de presentar una mutación bien disimulada de este mito que surge directamente del paradigma de la modernidad: “El crecimiento económico rápido y sostenido es indispensable para el desarrollo del Sur. No se pueden superar el hambre, las enfermedades y la ignorancia a menos que aumente enormemente la producción de bienes y servicios”[12]. Solo recientemente se ha llegado a comprender mejor que el concepto de “desarrollo” para los países de Sur debe significar algo diferente de lo que ha significado para los países del Norte. Grupos reducidos de personas en el Sur comienzan a comprender que seguir el tan cacareado modelo de desarrollo

impulsado por el crecimiento económico: 1) no solo no ha proporcionado a toda la población lo necesario para atender a sus necesidades básicas y una mínima calidad de vida, sino que ha aumentado los niveles de pobreza absoluta y la diferencia entre los ricos y los pobres, y 2) ha creado un conjunto diferente de dilemas sociales en los países del Norte y en los centros urbanos "modernizados" del Sur, entre ellos, la decadencia de los programas de seguridad de la familia y la comunidad, un individualismo autogratificante y un amargo aislacionismo, un desempleo deshumanizante, el uso indebido y escapista de las drogas y el alcohol, una violencia bárbara, la degradación ambiental, la falta de hogar, la polarización racial y el sexismo. Esta comprensión se basa en el conocimiento más profundo de que los valores culturales y sociales que tienen su origen en los principios de la economía de mercado (por ejemplo, conceptos de propiedad privada y derecho empresarial) son fundamentalmente incompatibles y a menudo chocan con los sistemas de creencias de muchas culturas del Sur.

El paradigma de la modernidad no solo no ha inspirado a los pueblos y las culturas del Sur, sino que ha tenido dos consecuencias negativas directas sobre la cooperación Sur-Sur. En primer lugar, las relaciones Sur-Sur (a todo nivel, del individual al institucional) se definen principalmente en términos económicos. Lo que se considera cooperación "racional" entre los países se define por la religión del "poderoso dólar" en que se forman alianzas únicamente cuando resultan "rentables". Las normas que definen estas relaciones son darwinistas —el fuerte debe sobrevivir y el débil merece perecer; cada actor intenta así

sobrevivir en este mundo de suma cero maximizando sus ganancias. Las interacciones de pueblos y países son frías y calculadas, impulsadas por fantasías de una eficiencia de tipo Federal Express. Las relaciones humanas se realizan como transacciones y todo tiene un precio. Las personas se rigen por el credo tácito de “te haré este favor solo a cambio de esto otro”. Aunque este tipo de relación pueda parecer duro, representa una realidad que ya no se puede pasar por alto. En el paradigma de la modernidad, los vínculos entre los países del Sur siguen siendo sumamente frágiles —en realidad, algunos afirmarían que hasta se han deteriorado con el tiempo—. Comeliau se pregunta: “Surge la cuestión de cómo estas relaciones económicas —que se sabe son débiles, comparadas con los vínculos de dependencia con el Norte— pueden llevar a una solidaridad política suficiente como para movilizar las fuerzas de países muy diversos al servicio de un interés general en el Sur”[13]. Al definir las relaciones fundamentalmente en términos económicos (las condiciones mecánicas que impone la modernidad), el modelo de la cooperación Sur-Sur se ha elaborado de tal manera que puede romperse fácilmente con la estrategia de dividir y conquistar de la modernidad. Ejemplo de ello es la crisis del Golfo aún presente, en que la escasa solidaridad que existía entre los países del Sur quedó destruida por riñas debido al petróleo.

La segunda consecuencia de la modernidad ha sido la yuxtaposición del Sur contra el Norte. Ahmed Ben Salah señala que “se sigue reconociendo hoy en día que, a nivel mundial, los indicadores económicos, políticos y militares siguen confirmando

que las fuerzas del Norte están en un constante estado de confrontación con el Sur. Persisten en erigir en el Sur toda clase de barreras para impedir el desarrollo de los pueblos, las culturas y las economías del Sur”[14]. Pese a este reconocimiento, no se ha producido una confrontación en gran escala con el Norte. La verdadera cuestión es si esta falta de reacción se debe a la ignorancia, al temor o algo mucho más profundo e insidioso. El paradigma de la modernidad ha creado un sistema mundial interconectado y, sin embargo, fuera de contexto que comprende lo que Michael Watts llama “el poder sin ámbito geográfico y localidades sin poder”[15]. Como consecuencia de ello, los pueblos del Sur no solo carecen del poder para luchar, sino que ni siquiera saben contra quién luchar.

La hegemonía de la modernidad se puede atribuir en parte a su capacidad para desvincular a los pueblos, las tradiciones y las experiencias del Sur. Hay muchas dimensiones en esta desvinculación. Un ejemplo, es la moderna formación del concepto del Estado-nación, que ha dividido de manera poco natural a muchos pueblos del Sur y provocado heridas profundas entre los pueblos con respecto a límites artificiales. Además de este doloroso aislacionismo, se ha intentado mutilar completamente las instituciones y las personas del Sur, que es continuación de una modalidad de conquista psicológica que comenzó con el colonialismo. Para mantener su inviolabilidad ideológica, la ciencia y la racionalidad occidentales han intentado devaluar brutalmente todas las formas no occidentales de conocimiento y suprimir las tradiciones e historias de los pueblos del Sur. Esta estrategia se ha aplicado en forma consciente y

metódica con pleno conocimiento de que un requisito previo para que una sociedad se desarrolle fuera de las barreras de la modernidad debe ser la confianza en sus propias tradiciones culturales y el respeto de otras tradiciones. Los medios de difusión (controlados también por el Norte) y diversos donantes (mediante proyectos de desarrollo) han reforzado este implacable ataque ideológico calificando a los pueblos y culturas del Sur con adjetivos tan desmoralizadores como "subdesarrollado", "atrasado", "irracional" o "haragán". La inseguridad consiguiente no solo ha provocado un sentimiento de impotencia respecto del Norte, sino que ha creado un sentimiento de competencia y división entre diversas razas, grupos étnicos y religiosos en el Sur a medida que cada uno compite por lograr una posición en el altar de la superioridad intelectual y cultural.

Como una maniobra defensiva para complementar su estrategia ofensiva, la modernidad ha hecho difícil aislar e identificar las fuentes en que se origina su poder. Ha podido protegerse de los ataques de sus oponentes mediante el "soborno" de muchos aliados impíos en el Norte y en el Sur, uniéndolos en una compleja red de relaciones de dependencia mutua de tipo camaleón. No hay ya un enemigo fácilmente identificable contra quien aunar fuerzas; la última de esas ideologías contra la que pudieron unirse los pueblos del Sur fue el dinosaurio estático del apartheid y hasta esa resultó difícil de desmantelar. Una hebra de esta red que ahora ha quedado bastante al descubierto ha sido la "traición" de las elites del Sur. Rajni Kothari señala que "la concentración excesiva en las

relaciones Norte-Sur ha proporcionado un camino de escape para las elites del Tercer Mundo que se ponen elocuentes en los foros internacionales pero en sus países de origen tienen un historial de explotación y represión... En el Tercer Mundo, esas elites, psicológicamente dominadas por el efecto de demostración de la vida y consumo suntuario de Occidente, se han apartado de sus sociedades y pasado a formar parte de la clase media mundial, es esto lo que en realidad significa la 'globalización'?"[16].

Se están formando vínculos menos obvios pero más insidiosos entre las clases medias del Sur que ahora aspiran en forma desenfrenada a la misma categoría y a los placeres materiales de que han gozado las elites. Aún más, cabe afirmar que, en todo el mundo, prácticamente todas las instituciones, de grupos religiosos a familias y a organizaciones multinacionales, participan en la modernidad, y, como consecuencia directa, tienen un incentivo para apoyar este paradigma a algún nivel. Immanuel Wallerstein describe la impotencia total resultante de este fenómeno de un poder sin ámbito geográfico y localidades sin poder: "Lo que quiere la Comisión Sur es una transformación revolucionaria de toda la estructura del sistema mundial, y lo pide muy cortésmente, casi con timidez"[17].

Para que algunas veces se cumplan en el Sur los dos objetivos de atender las necesidades humanas básicas y alentar el desarrollo más amplio de la civilización, es necesario redefinir los lazos básicos que dan forma a las relaciones entre los pueblos del Sur. Ello debe comenzar con la modificación fundamental de las condiciones básicas de la cooperación Sur-

Sur. La razón básica de esta cooperación debe llegar a ser algo que supere una ideología reaccionaria contra el Norte. La Comisión Sur señala: “Lo que los países del Sur tienen en común trasciende sus diferencias, les da una identidad compartida y una razón para colaborar en pos de objetivos comunes. El lazo fundamental que vincula a los países y pueblos del Sur es su deseo de escapar de la pobreza y el subdesarrollo y lograr una vida mejor para sus ciudadanos”[18]. Si bien la Comisión Sur tiene razón en su evaluación de que los países del Sur tienen mucho en común, identifica erróneamente el lazo fundamental que vincula los países y pueblos del Sur (debido una vez más a un deseo de lograr el crecimiento económico y la modernización occidentales). Los lazos que vinculan a los países del Sur son más profundos y fuertes, están basados en antiguas conexiones espirituales, culturales y de civilización, las luchas colonialistas y las experiencias post colonialistas. Estos vínculos transcienden al mundo moderno obsesionado con la relación costo-beneficio para formar una razón moral y ética para la cooperación, y si bien puede ser fácil enterrar esos vínculos bajo montones de dólares, no es posible cortarlos fácilmente.

En este contexto, comienza a tener sentido la pregunta de Tamas Szentes: “¿Tenemos el derecho a beneficiarnos de un orden mundial que excluye a millones de seres humanos de cualquier beneficio?”. Cuando se examina desde la perspectiva sin conciencia de la modernidad, se podría rechazar la pregunta como un galimatías idealista (algunos hasta dirían “socialista”); sin embargo, cuando se examina a través de un paradigma diferente de desarrollo, basado en principios de respeto,

compasión y sacrificio mutuo, llega a ser un dilema moral que no es posible pasar por alto.

Se reconoce cada vez en mayor medida que el “negocio del desarrollo” formulado en el paradigma de la modernidad no se preocupa realmente de resolver las crisis, que aumentan rápidamente, de los pueblos del Sur y que mientras el modelo de la cooperación Sur-Sur se base en este paradigma, seguirá siendo marginado e inútil. Por ello, debemos alentar la formación de un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo. La diferencia clave entre este y anteriores enfoques será que la ideología de la cooperación Sur-Sur simplemente no se definirá por el paradigma actual, sino más bien procurará definir un nuevo paradigma.

UN MODELO ANTICUADO

Hasta ahora se ha afirmado que la cooperación Sur-Sur no ha estado a la altura del bombo publicitario que ha recibido porque la ideología se basa en un paradigma erróneo de desarrollo. Ahora afirmaré que el modelo de cooperación Sur-Sur que se ha aplicado es estéril. Hay una conexión entre ambos argumentos puesto que la ideología (es decir, el conjunto básico de metas, objetivos y valores) ha definido tradicionalmente el modelo (es decir, la estrategia aplicada para lograr ese conjunto de metas, objetivos y valores). El modelo no solo no ha aprovechado la enorme energía que se crea en las conexiones entre los pueblos y las culturas del Sur, sino que también ha impedido la formación de conexiones válidas. Le faltan en especial cuatro aspectos.

En primer lugar, el modelo de cooperación Sur-Sur se elaboró expresamente en un molde estático y poco imaginativo para impedir la formación de un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo. Se basa en una rígida tradición occidental expresamente dedicada a preservar el statu quo. Esta tradición utiliza un concepto lineal y monocrónico del tiempo en lugar de reconocer que diferentes sociedades tienen su propio reloj interno y pueden pasar de la etapa A a la etapa E sin tener que pasar necesariamente por las etapas B, C y D. Además, mediante conceptos artificiales como el “ejercicio económico”, ha obligado a que en las actividades de desarrollo se exija a los pueblos y las culturas avanzar a un ritmo poco natural y adoptar medidas difíciles. La tradición occidental hace también que el modelo concentre su atención únicamente en lo que se puede cuantificar y calcular, lo utilitario y previsible. La consecuencia es que el modelo está impulsado principalmente por los resultados y no por el proceso y orientado a perspectivas cronológicas de más corto plazo. Se ha prestado muy poca atención a facilitar los procesos de flexibilidad, experimentación y aprendizaje social indispensables para el desarrollo. Sin estos tres elementos, el modelo carece del dinamismo y la capacidad de respuesta necesarios para incorporar la compleja evolución del entorno a nivel mundial y local, reaccionar ante ella y aprovecharla. Ello ha producido un modelo que no solo es mecánico, sino que se resiste activamente al cambio. El proceso de cambio se considera una fuerza negativa que hay que evitar y no algo natural, positivo e inevitable. Una manifestación de esto ha sido la difusión de un concepto de “preservación” intelectual y cultural como un medio

de defender de la modernidad la trama social y cultural del Sur. Lamentablemente, este enfoque no solo no protege las tradiciones e ideologías del Sur, sino que contribuye sin querer a su desmantelamiento, limitando su capacidad de resistir y de desarrollar opciones que desafíen la modernidad.

Esto lleva a una segunda deficiencia en el modelo de la cooperación Sur-Sur. El modelo se ha quedado “pegado” en una definición del Norte y el Sur de los años setenta, de la guerra fría, de un postcolonialismo naciente. No reconoce los factores internos y externos que han cambiado y siguen cambiando toda la dimensión de la cooperación Sur-Sur. El Sur se define de manera estática como un órgano homogéneo y no se reconocen factores pro- blemáticos como las crecientes tensiones étnicas y religiosas en los países del Sur. No existen África, Asia o América Latina unificadas, ni hay tampoco pueblos absolutamente unificados en ninguno de los países del Sur. Recientes acontecimientos en Ruanda, México y el subcontinente indio son dolorosos recordatorios de esta solidaridad. Además, si bien sigue existiendo un Norte opresor, hay también opresores en el Sur, y si bien hay oprimidos en el Sur, también hay oprimidos en el Norte. Por ejemplo, ¿por qué un afronorteamericano de la ciudad de Nueva York tiene una esperanza de vida menor que la de muchos de los pueblos del Sur? Las categorías generales del “Norte” y el “Sur” ya no tienen sentido. Por último, el modelo no reconoce que han cambiado los actores y las funciones en el paisaje Sur-Sur. En el Sur han surgido nuevas “fuentes de energía”, como China, la India y los países islámicos; sin embargo, esos países están desarrollando

diversas relaciones nuevas con el Norte, en particular con los Estados Unidos, que está tratando de definir su función posterior a la guerra fría en la arena mundial. Lamentablemente, la mayor parte de estas relaciones se orienta a seguir al Norte y no a dirigir el Sur. El modelo tampoco reconoce que han surgido otras importantes e influyentes fuerzas, como el creciente efecto de la tecnología y la facilidad de acceso a esta, la globalización de la información, los movimientos hacia la privatización y el surgimiento en masa de las ONG. “Se ha organizado una red de relaciones entre entidades privadas —bancos, empresas de inversión, empresas transnacionales— en los principales países en desarrollo, lo que ha servido para reforzar la influencia que tienen las decisiones adoptadas por órganos privados sobre la actividad económica mundial y, hasta ese punto, limitan la eficacia de las decisiones gubernamentales.”[19]

Al tiempo que ha aumentado la influencia de donantes multilaterales y bilaterales (en particular el Banco Mundial y el FMI), ha disminuido el poder de las estructuras institucionales colectivas que tienen por objetivo promover los intereses del Sur, como el Grupo de los 77, el Movimiento de los Países no Alineados, la OPEP y algunas formaciones regionales inspiradas en las ideas del nuevo orden económico internacional. Hasta las Naciones Unidas han pasado a ser sospechosas si se considera en beneficio de quién actúan[20].

La tercera crítica del modelo se refiere a los pocos actores y a las actividades apoyadas en la cooperación Sur-Sur. Básicamente dicha cooperación ha sido un eufemismo para las reuniones de los burócratas y los tecnócratas del Sur.

Lamentablemente, la mayor parte de esa elite se ha educado en el paradigma de la modernidad. A menudo están más de acuerdo con los dirigentes del Norte que con los pueblos del Sur. Comeliau escribe que “no es la personalidad de los miembros de esos grupos ni su competencia técnica, por no mencionar su integridad intelectual, lo que está en discusión. Sin embargo, la mayor parte de ellos ha adquirido su experiencia en el aparato estatal, su capacitación y experiencia en organizaciones multilaterales han forjado en muchos de ellos un enfoque respecto del desarrollo y las relaciones internacionales que es occidentalizado, economicista y está mar- cado por los modos intelectuales y diplomáticos de este medio tan especial; así pues, la lista de cuestiones que se tratan se asemeja extrañamente, en fin, al índice de todos los informes que precedieron al presente?”[21]. Además, el modelo se presta a que la interacción entre los países del Sur esté controlada por el Norte y por lo general con un representante del Norte como intermediario. Las actividades patrocinadas por el Norte habitualmente se concentran mucho en cuestiones económicas o técnicas y son formalistas. Lo que figura en el programa y cuándo y cómo se examina se fiscaliza detenidamente y se desalientan los temas de índole ideológica. La interacción es por lo general un intento que se hace por una sola vez con poca oportunidad para entablar un diálogo continuo, que no se considera rentable.

En el pasado, se ha criticado la participación de más personal de categoría superior en la cooperación Sur-Sur, ya que impide a los pueblos del Sur establecer fuertes vínculos a nivel popular. En la modernidad, se ha pasado por alto en gran medida que los

vínculos (a todo nivel de arriba hacia abajo) han sido, y continúan siendo, fabricados con fíbras sintéticas de orden económico y técnico. Hay poca oportunidad para realizar actividades que estudien y promuevan las conexiones históricas y culturales naturales en el Sur. Esas conexiones, como lo demuestran las sólidas relaciones dentro de Europa, y entre Europa y los Estados Unidos, son indispensables para reconstruir la confianza y visión básicas que faltan actualmente entre los pueblos del Sur.

La última deficiencia del actual modelo de la cooperación Sur-Sur es que sigue sin ver el control que la modernidad tiene al darle forma y limitarlo. El modelo se contenta con estar situado como una reacción a una idea anticuada del Norte. Sigue con la fijación en la idea de que puede arreglar el paradigma dominante modificándolo. La cooperación Sur-Sur se ha concentrado en la gestión de crisis y en soluciones de parche. El modelo está paralizado por un engorroso conjunto de instrumentos y marcos ideológicos que le impiden reflexionar sobre la modernidad y romper con ella. Si bien el modelo puede comenzar el proyecto de deconstruir las ideologías y relaciones que comprende y que se basan en la modernidad, es incapaz de hacer la transición decisiva de la deconstrucción a la reconstrucción. Al igual que un virus que se puede mutar en cepas más complicadas, la modernidad ha demostrado ser bastante resistente. La única forma de desafiarla es proponer otro conjunto de ideologías y sistemas contrapuestos —un nuevo paradigma—. Lamentablemente, el actual modelo de la cooperación Sur-Sur no ha podido reforzar y desarrollar las ideologías “tradicionales”

ni encender y estimular la producción intelectual y cultural de las nuevas ideologías que son necesarias para generar un nuevo paradigma.

HACIA UN NUEVO PARADIGMA

Es preciso volver a enfocar con urgencia la orientación de la cooperación Sur-Sur. Esta cooperación debe estar basada en una ideología que contribuya activamente a la visión que inspira un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo y no en una formada por una idea pasada. En esta sección final se indican algunos elementos básicos y parámetros para crear una ideología orientada hacia el futuro de la cooperación Sur-Sur para llegar a formular un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo. Estas normas se concentran principalmente en los cambios del modelo, ya que se sostiene que los modelos no solo son indispensables para aplicar determinadas ideologías, sino medios decisivos de generar espontáneamente nuevas ideologías. Además, un enfoque más estratégico y dinámico del desarrollo imposibilita la formulación aislada de teorías y planes estáticos de largo plazo. Las nuevas ideologías que se elaboran solamente a nivel superior (en círculos académicos tradicionales) han terminado en un fracaso porque carecen de la “dirección” generalizada y del dinamismo interno para sobrevivir. Será importante establecer una relación dialéctica entre la ideología y el modelo de cooperación Sur-Sur de manera que puedan interactuar y alimentarse mutuamente a medida que evolucionan y crecen. Ello difiere de los modelos tradicionales en los que por lo general se ha producido una

corriente en un solo sentido, de la ideología al modelo. Se puede formar un nuevo paradigma para desafiar a la modernidad solo cuando se desarrolla una masa crítica de diversas ideologías dinámicas de ese tipo que se puedan vincular. Sin embargo, el paradigma de la modernidad es muy poderoso, ya que puede aplastar o asimilar otras ideologías que intenten desafiar su conjunto básico de ideologías. Al mismo tiempo, es extremadamente escurridizo y difícil de ubicar debido a la complejidad de las relaciones que surgen de él. M. Mitchell Waldrop sitúa la posición desde donde la cooperación Sur-Sur y otras contraideologías deben confrontar este monstruo: “Todos los sistemas complejos han adquirido de alguna manera la capacidad de equilibrar en forma especial el orden y el caos. Este punto de equilibrio, a menudo denominado el borde del caos, es donde los componentes de un sistema nunca quedan completamente en su lugar y, sin embargo, nunca se disuelven en la turbulencia. El borde del caos es donde las nuevas ideas y los genotipos innovadores están siempre desgastando los bordes del statu quo, y donde terminará por ser derrocada la vieja guardia más inamovible”[22]. Waldrop reconoce sagazmente que cuando los movimientos contraideológicos intentan funcionar en la corriente central, son absorbidos por los tenebrosos torbellinos de la modernidad. Para mantener su pureza ideológica, la cooperación Sur-Sur debe funcionar desde el borde de este caos. Esto significa una estrategia dual que se concentra en: 1) atacar la modernidad identificando el poder sin ámbito geográfico y traspasando el poder a las localidades que no lo tienen, y 2) proteger a las nuevas contraideologías de la

asimilación ideológica. Esto supone continuar la deconstrucción de la modernidad y al mismo tiempo llevar a cabo la reconstrucción.

M. C. Doeser indica una nueva manera de enfrentar esta tarea: “Tal vez debemos comenzar al revés: no estableciendo objetivos para el desarrollo a largo plazo, sino buscando una ética compartida de cooperación para crear posibilidades que permitan llegar a descubrir nuevas orientaciones para el desarrollo”[23]. No solo debemos comenzar con la ética compartida, debemos construirla de abajo arriba y no imponerla desde arriba, lo que supone volver a pensar acerca de los actores y procesos que forman la base de la cooperación Sur-Sur, así como la razón fundamental, los instrumentos e incentivos que motivan a esos actores y procesos y que influyen sobre ellos.

Volver a pensar en los actores en el modelo de cooperación Sur-Sur debe hacerse en dos niveles simultáneamente. El primer nivel se relaciona con la pregunta de quién o qué es el “Sur”. ¿Se relaciona la definición del Sur con un grupo de países en el hemisferio Sur que fueron separados artificialmente por cartógrafos colonialistas o con los pueblos del mundo que están obligados a vivir en determinadas condiciones que ofrecen un conjunto de oportunidades y posibilidades? Si es esta última, el concepto tradicional de la entidad geográfica denominada el Sur resulta entonces discutible, pues hay millones de personas del Sur que ahora viven en el Norte. La formación del concepto del Sur debe ampliarse de alguna manera para que incluya los pueblos que viven en el Sur y sus hermanos en el Norte.

Además, el nuevo modelo de la cooperación Sur-Sur debe tratar de ampliar la variedad de participantes más allá de los políticos, burócratas y tecnócratas de la elite y semielite. Los intereses de estos grupos se orientan al paradigma actual, están vinculados para mantener el statu quo. Hay que concentrarse más en la participación de individuos y comunidades locales, grupos que han sobrevivido al margen de la modernidad pero siguen estando en el centro de sus culturas. Además, determinadas fuerzas institucionales como los medios de difusión, la tecnología y la educación deberían considerarse actores puesto que no solo se pueden utilizar para unir a diferentes actores a través del Sur, sino que ellos mismos tienen una enorme influencia en el desarrollo del Sur, es decir, la homogenización. Hay que tratar de volver a formular las bases ideológicas de esas fuerzas institucionales para integrarlas más estrechamente en el modelo de la cooperación Sur-Sur.

El segundo nivel se relaciona con la pregunta de lo que constituye la “participación” entre esos actores. Reunirlos simplemente una vez al año para hablar acerca de un tema restringido y sintomático no constituye participación. Se debe prestar más atención a la calidad de la participación, lo que supone oportunidades de más interacciones continuas en torno a temas variados y también “igualar las condiciones”. Con frecuencia, participantes que tradicionalmente han estado marginados llegan a un foro poco familiar u hostil durante algunas horas y se les pide “participar”. A menudo, no dan a conocer sus opiniones debido a la inexperiencia con el discurso occidental, al temor de repercusiones políticas, sociales o

económicas o a diversas otras razones. Tratar este enfoque maquinal podría comprender la creación de capacidad y una mayor preparación de los participantes, realizando reuniones en ambientes más cómodos (por ejemplo, en lugar de traer aldeanos a la ciudad para una conversación, realizar la conversación en la aldea) y dando más tiempo para pensar y reflexionar. Si bien la mayor parte de los servicios de desarrollo aparenta estar de acuerdo con estas ideas, su aplicación se ve a menudo limitada por estrictos conceptos de eficiencia y conveniencia.

Este debate lleva directamente a conceptos sobre el cambio del proceso de la cooperación Sur-Sur. La transformación de este proceso es fundamental para crear una nueva base ideológica de la cooperación Sur-Sur, así como para establecer un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo. Aquí es donde se forman los vínculos de la ética compartida. El proceso es absolutamente decisivo porque, al determinar las condiciones de la cooperación, no solo vincula a los actores en actividades válidas, sino que tiene influencia en el hecho de que el modelo Sur-Sur sea reaccionario u orientado hacia el futuro. Edgar Pisani destaca la función del proceso: “La democracia no se importa, se gana y se inventa al mismo tiempo... El Sur debe saber que puede optar entre dos caminos: la imitación, que significa la pérdida de la cultura y la sumisión, y la invención, que es el control de sí mismo y una rebelión contenida contra los problemas del mundo”[24]. El hecho de concentrarse en el proceso permitirá que el Sur deje meramente de resistir o reciclar proyectos fracasados de desarrollo formulados en el paradigma de la modernidad y se

ocupe de crear y difundir sus propias ideas y sueños.

En un nivel, el proceso comprende actividades que sirven de marco y guía a la interacción entre los diversos actores. Debe estudiarse detenidamente la definición y ejecución de actividades que no estén formuladas de manera demasiado limitada o que se concentren solamente en alguna cuestión económica o técnica. Rajni Kothari sugiere una actividad que debe inspirar a todas las demás: “El diálogo que ni siquiera ha empezado y que debió hacerse hace mucho tiempo es el diálogo con el pueblo y luego el diálogo entre los diversos pueblos, primero en el Sur y después en el Sur y en el Norte”[25]. El diálogo inicial debería estudiar lo que significa “desarrollo” en el mundo moderno. ¿Es simplemente sobre la Coca-Cola y las zapatillas Nike o hay algo más? En lo que se refiere al “desarrollo sostenible”, ¿qué tratamos de sostener y para quién? ¿Si los pueblos del Sur efectivamente ansían tomar Coca-Cola, se debe a su naturaleza humana innata o a una ostentosa campaña de comercialización sumada a una falta de opciones viables? El ritmo de la competencia inexorable y de la vida “llevada al extremo” impiden a las personas “pensar” en estos tipos de preguntas pues están preocupadas con la “supervivencia”.

La modernidad crea un mundo amoral de contento que permite a las personas pasar por alto las disparidades actuales y las consecuencias futuras. Nuestra función como coordinadores del desarrollo debería ser: 1) seguir denunciando los vínculos que comprende la modernidad y las perniciosas consecuencias sociales y culturales que surgen de ella; 2) desafiar la felicidad ignorante, la inmoralidad racionalizada y el egoísmo inmoderado

de los pueblos en todo el mundo, y 3) colaborar con los pueblos del Sur para formular y plantear estas preguntas difíciles y crear sus propias respuestas, así como reflexionar al respecto.

SOLUCIONES DE LA MODERNIDAD

¿Cómo debemos apoyar este proceso de inventar nuevas soluciones a la modernidad? En lugar de que alguna dinámica empresa de comercialización de Madison Avenue o un intelectual de Harvard definan las carencias y necesidades de los pueblos del Sur, hay que alentar la organización de foros creadores que ayuden a facilitar entre esos pueblos un diálogo sobre las aspiraciones que tienen para ellos, sus hijos, sus comunidades, sus países y el planeta. Sus aspiraciones deben constituir la base de la ética compartida. Las formas que adopten esos foros deben ser muy diferente en diversos contextos sociales, políticos y culturales, y en momentos diferentes, a medida que los pueblos del Sur conciban y organicen sus propios foros. Hay que evitar la reproducción en masa de un foro prefabricado. Sin embargo, todos los foros deben tratar de facilitar la conexión humana y ser un espacio para estudiar y reconstruir los lazos naturales, históricos y culturales, negociar diferencias, elaborar bases morales y éticas y crear alternativas de desarrollo. El diálogo debe estar basado en la reconstrucción de los principios de confianza, respeto mutuo y sacrificio entre los seres humanos, alentando la formación de relaciones simbióticas (y no ultraindividualistas). Para que la cooperación Sur-Sur refuerce las conexiones humanas y culturales entre los

pueblos del Sur, amplíe su imaginación y destaque la confianza y una ética compartida, debe apoyar decididamente actividades como la música, la literatura y el cine. La economía y la falta de educación (no la educación oficial, sino una educación que permita abrirse a nuevas ideas y apreciar y tolerar las diferencias) son obstáculos. Ya que las situaciones cambian constantemente, superar estas barreras requiere un modelo más dinámico que apoye la comunicación, la creación y la experimentación constantes, lo que supone proporcionar mucho tiempo y recursos, tanto materiales como intelectuales. Ese enfoque significa que hay que renunciar a los conceptos modernos de eficiencia y de arreglos de compensación puesto que el proceso de construir lazos genuinos entre los pueblos es prolongado, arduo y costoso.

Cambiar el proceso también supone una autorreflexión crítica y modificaciones en forma constante. También será importante evaluar quién formula o define las actividades, así como la orientación ideológica en general, y, al mismo tiempo, seguir tratando de entender la modernidad. Los marcos e instrumentos que existen para este proceso son muy difíciles de manejar y puede que obliguen a formular un conjunto de prioridades y resultados predeterminados. Por ejemplo, los marcos ideológicos de la raza, el sexo y la clase, que mantiene en sus manos la elite intelectual, proporcionan una perspectiva muy estrecha respecto de vínculos mucho más complicados. Otro ejemplo es la importancia que se asigna a indicadores cuantitativos (cuya exactitud siempre suscita sospechas) que no solo no captan los matices de determinadas relaciones, sino que ahogan la

creatividad y la visión limitando el análisis y el debate a lo que se puede cuantificar histórica o actualmente. Además, los instrumentos existentes no facilitan la utilización de las amplias redes de información y comunicaciones de que se dispone actualmente. La información se interpreta y envasa previamente antes de ser distribuida, y abruma y desvincula a las personas en vez de ayudarlas a conectarse y de estimularlas. En consecuencia, el proceso debe también orientarse a producir un conjunto de instrumentos y marcos analíticos, complejos y dinámicos que se pongan a disposición de los pueblos del Sur.

Para concluir, la modernidad es un paradigma extremadamente seductor. Como un hábil vendedor, ha desarrollado un enorme poder para hechizar a las personas de todo el mundo y hacerlas creer que no solo desean una vida materialista, sino que la necesitan, aun cuando sepan en su interior que es moralmente erróneo debido a su efecto destructivo en las relaciones humanas, la creatividad intelectual y cultural, el medio ambiente, y la lista sigue y sigue. Si volvemos a las preguntas del primer párrafo, vemos que la cooperación Sur-Sur no solo no ha aclarado estas relaciones, sino que inconscientemente las ha apoyado. Tanto la ideología como el modelo no han contribuido a la creación de alternativas viables de desarrollo. Además, ahora constituyen un obstáculo que se opone a la creación de un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo. Ha llegado el momento de reconocer la necesidad de nuevos enfoques para la cooperación Sur-Sur. Aunque la tarea que nos espera parece abrumadora, no debemos dejarnos paralizar por ella pues los instrumentos (la imaginación humana y la

tecnología) disponibles para llevarla a cabo son igualmente poderosos. Como asesores para el desarrollo y personas del Sur, no debemos resistir la experimentación por inseguridad, cinismo o temor al fracaso. En lugar de ello, debemos aceptarla y alimentarla por la promesa, la esperanza y la creencia que ofrece en la justicia del mundo y la bondad de los seres humanos. Si la historia nos ha enseñado algo, es que el cambio no solo es posible, sino que es inevitable.

Lectura 4

El surgimiento de la cooperación Sur-Sur. Hacia un nuevo ecosistema de cooperación para el desarrollo[26]

Joaquim Tres[27]

1. INTRODUCCIÓN

La cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS) ha surgido con gran ímpetu en los últimos cinco años e iniciado su consolidación en América Latina y el Caribe (ALC), contribuyendo al aumento del número de actores, de instrumentos de intercambio de conocimiento y experiencias de desarrollo y a la diversificación de enfoques, aspectos todos ellos de un ecosistema emergente de cooperación. Más recientemente, el proceso de preparación del IV Foro de Eficacia de la Ayuda de Busan (noviembre, 2011) contribuyó a aumentar la institucionalidad de la cooperación iberoamericana en este nuevo ecosistema emergente y también

su status y visibilidad dentro de las políticas públicas de un notable número de los países de la región. Ante este contexto, muchos analistas se preguntan por qué surgió la CSS en estos momentos y qué implicaciones puede tener para la arquitectura global de la cooperación. Este capítulo responde a estas preguntas a partir de una revisión primero de los cambios producidos en la última década que han transformado la posición global de ALC y han impulsado la CSS, para luego analizar de qué manera estos cambios han afectado a los donantes.

2. LOS CAMBIOS ECONÓMICOS DE AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE QUE SUSTENTAN LA CSS

Aunque sea frecuente una referencia colectiva a América Latina y el Caribe, es necesario insistir en que existe una gran diversidad entre los países de la región para evitar diagnósticos equivocados y propuestas inadecuadas de la cooperación. Esta diversidad se manifiesta en numerosos aspectos del desarrollo de los países de la región pero un ejemplo cercano ilustra con claridad este punto: el desempeño económico en esta última década (2001-2011), tanto antes, durante y después de la crisis iniciada en 2008. Por un lado, los países de Mesoamérica (Centroamérica y México) y el Caribe han crecido a un ritmo modesto al estar más integrados a la economía estadounidense, cuyo crecimiento ha sido débil, a través de exportaciones de manufacturas y de servicios, y de las remesas de sus emigrantes, mientras que las economías de Sudamérica, ricas en productos básicos, han crecido a mayor ritmo alimentadas por

la creciente demanda de sus exportaciones por parte de Asía y muy especialmente de China, lo que permitió una mayor reducción de la pobreza[28]. Esta diversidad, sin embargo, no impide identificar algunas tendencias comunes entre los países de la región y una de ellas es una crecimiento superior al promedio mundial, la reducción de la pobreza, el aumento del comercio y la inversión directa extranjera y la práctica de la CSS y triangular que se está produciendo en ALC. Este capítulo, se inicia con una revisión de los cambios económicos acontecidos en la última década, que han transformado la posición global de la región y que explican el surgimiento de la CSS.

En primer lugar, es importante destacar que la región, con sus diferencias, ha logrado las tasas de crecimiento económico mayores en toda una generación (25 años) con un promedio superior al 4% anual, lo que ha permitido una reducción de la pobreza del 22% en 2002 al 12% en 2008 a través de la generación de empleos y de la capacidad fiscal para financiar programas sociales para los pobres, que han contribuido también a la reducción de la desigualdad en 13 de 17 países[29]. Este crecimiento y la reducción de la pobreza han sido superiores en Sudamérica que en el resto de la región. Este desplazamiento del crecimiento hacia las economías emergentes, especialmente hacia a Asia generando un sistema internacional de carácter multipolar, aspecto que explica un nuevo equilibrio en el *ecosistema* emergente de la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo, cuya característica principal es el surgimiento de la CSS.

El segundo elemento a destacar entre estos cambios ha sido

la capacidad de la mayoría de países de la región de recuperarse rápidamente de la crisis de 2008 y retomar pronto la senda del crecimiento de sus economías a diferencia de las crisis del pasado, normalmente endógenas y que lastraban el crecimiento durante años. En parte, esta recuperación ha sido posible por una gestión macroeconómica prudente iniciada en numerosos países en la década de 1990 y sostenida hasta el presente, unos niveles inauditos de reservas internacionales, instituciones de regulación financiera más sólidas y espacio fiscal suficiente para llevar a cabo programas anticíclicos en tiempos de crisis, manteniendo un nivel aceptable de gasto público y enfocándolo, en muchos casos, en los segmentos de población más vulnerables. Estos avances positivos, sin embargo, contrastan con una inversión insuficiente en infraestructura, que se ha convertido en un cuello de botella para el crecimiento y mantenido por debajo de los niveles esperados en función de los PIB per cápita nacionales de la región.

En este avance del desarrollo de ALC es necesario subrayar, en tercer lugar, el papel de los programas sociales focalizados como los de transferencias condicionadas. Algunos programas destacados son Oportunidades (México), Bolsa Familia (Brasil), Red de Protección Social (Nicaragua), Familias en Acción (Colombia), etc., pero existen otros, convirtiéndose en instrumentos para reducir la pobreza extrema e intentar impedir su transmisión intergeneracional, gracias a las transferencias financieras a las familias para asegurar que sus hijos e hijas asistan a la escuela, estén vacunados y bien alimentados.

En cuarto lugar, el panorama del comercio internacional ha

cambiado sustancialmente en la región por la irrupción del comercio Sur-Sur con Asia, especialmente con China, y por el aumento de los acuerdos comerciales Sur-Sur entre países de ALC y de esta con Asia. Aunque el peso del comercio de ALC en el mundo no ha cambiado prácticamente en los últimos cincuenta años (sigue representando aproximadamente un 6%), es de destacar que el valor de las exportaciones de ALC a China se han multiplicado por 25 en esta década, en contraste con las exportaciones de la región al resto del mundo o incluso las mismas exportaciones de China. Fundamentalmente, este crecimiento obedece a las exportaciones de materias primas minerales y energéticas de Sudamérica como el acero y el cobre, necesarias para la inversión en capital físico en China por un lado y, por otro, de exportaciones de alimentos, necesarios para una población cuyo ingreso mejora y con ello su dieta[30].

En la última década se ha transformado radicalmente la arquitectura comercial de la región con un aumento sustancial del número de acuerdos. Hasta hace diez años los acuerdos comerciales de los países de ALC eran Norte-Sur, especialmente con Canadá, EE UU y la UE. En diez años, el número de acuerdos se multiplicó por 6 hasta llegar a 60 y el mayor número son de naturaleza Sur-Sur, tanto entre países de ALC y de estos con Asia-Pacífico, constituyendo el entramado de relaciones comerciales conocido como *spaghetti bowl*[31].

En quinto lugar, el crecimiento, las reformas y las buenas perspectivas económicas se han convertido a su vez en imanes potentes para la inversión directa extranjera (IED) en ALC, especialmente la proveniente también de otros países del Sur.

Esta panorama ha resultado en que las agencias calificadoras otorgaran grado de inversión a ocho países de la región, por encima de la calificación de numerosas economías europeas[32]. Otros países sin esta calificación como Bolivia, por ejemplo, han emitido bonos recientemente en los mercados internacionales con un éxito sin precedentes[33]. La importancia creciente de la inversión Sur-Sur es un fenómeno que se acentuó drásticamente en la última década y representa ya un tercio de los flujos mundiales de inversión. Una parte importante de estos flujos de IED hacia ALC provienen de China y está vinculada a la explotación y exportaciones de productos básicos.

El sexto y último fenómeno a destacar es la creciente descentralización de la financiación para el desarrollo en la región, no solo en el número de actores, sino también de instrumentos y de enfoques de cooperación, per permiten el intercambio de conocimiento y experiencias debido a retos de desarrollo más similares. Como se ha señalado anteriormente, los países de la región pueden acceder a fuentes propias de financiamiento, a financiación privada y, lógicamente, también a recursos de la banca multilateral como el BID y el Banco Mundial, a los de la banca subregional como el Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económico (BCIE), el Banco de Desarrollo del Caribe (CDB, por sus siglas en inglés) y la Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF). En esta década, la región ha accedido también a financiamiento del banco brasileño de desarrollo, BNDES, para proyectos vinculados empresarialmente a Brasil[34].

Sin embargo, la fuente de financiamiento más destacable es la

espectacular irrupción de la financiación de China, que estuvo precedida anteriormente por intercambios comerciales señalados anteriormente y, luego a mediados de la década, de IED (BID, 2012b). El aumento de la financiación de China alcanzó los US$ 37.000 millones en 2010, fundamentalmente proveniente del instrumento concesional del China Exim Bank y del China Development Bank, que concede préstamos a intereses de mercado, pero en condiciones financieras muy estrictas y ligadas a importaciones de maquinaria y equipos chinos y, a menudo, al empleo de trabajadores chinos.

Esta diversidad de actores implica también una diversidad de instrumentos y una pluralidad de enfoques, que a su vez dificulta que las diversas fuentes de financiación mencionadas en esta sección puedan ser estrictamente comparables entre sí porque ofrecen productos manifiestamente diferentes. Por ejemplo, el BID (y también el BM) puede ofrecer financiación concesional muy atractiva gracias a tener la más alta calificación AAA, combinada con altos estándares de salvaguardias ambientales y sociales en sus proyectos, con productos de conocimiento y cooperaciones técnicas asociadas, pero con tiempos de preparación a menudo superiores a las de otras fuentes, mientras que el resto de fuentes ofrecen tasas más elevadas con otro tipo de estándares técnicos y productos de conocimiento más limitados o incluso inexistentes. Sin embargo, esta diversidad ofrece un menú de fuentes de financiamiento a los países de la región que antes no existían y que complementa los esfuerzos nacionales de financiación para el desarrollo, que representan la fuente principal de la inversión pública a través de

los presupuestos nacionales y planes anuales de inversión.

Los cambios presentados en esta sección ponen en evidencia un surgimiento de relaciones y de CSS que son la confirmación definitiva de un mundo multipolar, que se consolida a partir de la crisis de 2008 y las diferentes estrategias de salida de la misma. Este nuevo mundo multipolar altera las tradicionales relaciones de cooperación Norte-Sur, surgidas después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, consolidadas en las décadas subsiguientes y marcadas por una asimetría de poder entre donantes y receptores en el marco de la denominada “agenda de desarrollo”. Este mundo multipolar parece encaminarse más hacia una “agenda global” más compartida con una mayor simetría entre actores que actúan por interés propio (N. Birdsall, 2012)[35]. En este sentido, la CSS se destaca por ofrecer innumerables plataformas de intercambio de conocimiento y experiencias por interés mutuo y en el que los flujos financieros de ayuda juegan, en muchos casos, un papel relativamente secundario.

La CSS ofrece nuevas oportunidades, pero también desafíos a los países de ALC y por supuesto a los donantes tradicionales tanto bilaterales como multilaterales. Los donantes tradicionales ya se están adaptando a este nuevo contexto caracterizado por unas reglas de juego más incluyentes y con fuerte presencia de la CSS, como se demostró en Busan.

2.1. IMPLICACIONES DE LOS CAMBIOS EN LA ÚLTIMA DÉCADA Y LA CONFIGURACIÓN DEL ‘ECOSISTEMA’ DE COOPERACIÓN

El surgimiento de la CSS implica que emerja un *ecosistema* de cooperación más complejo que la anterior arquitectura marcada por la "agenda de desarrollo". Este *ecosistema* se entiende como un conjunto complejo de relaciones interdependientes entre actores, públicos bilaterales y multilaterales, globales, regionales y subregionales; privados; de la sociedad civil nacional e internacional; universidades y centros de pensamiento; recursos y productos financieros y de conocimiento de muy diversa naturaleza; instrumentos y enfoques diferentes de hacer cooperación. La clasificación de países en esta diversidad de actores resulta incluso imprecisa en la dimensión Norte-Sur, ¿es Corea, por ejemplo, un donante del Norte o del Sur? Este concepto de *ecosistema* parece útil para comprender el actual panorama en el régimen internacional de la ayuda e incluso cabe en el planteamiento más específico del *ecosistema de las empresas*, incluidos sus estadios evolutivos, especialmente en los referentes a los desafíos de cooperación del nacimiento, la expansión, el liderazgo y la autorrenovación de las empresas (J. Moore, 1993)[36].

Este ecosistema, fruto de una evolución a partir de lecciones aprendidas, pero también de modelos de cooperación agotados, está emergiendo con fuerza y el foro de Busan representó la galvanización del mismo, pero es previsible que evolucione más rápidamente aún para establecer los nuevos objetivos de desarrollo sostenible post-2015. La complejidad de este nuevo ecosistema dificultará lograr acuerdos globales nítidos, pero también es previsible que sea más participativo e incluyente que los acuerdos cooperación promovidos exclusivamente desde

algunos donantes tradicionales con adhesiones posteriores de países en desarrollo. Acostumbrarse a navegar en este nuevo ecosistema será un desafío para todos los actores, si quieren aumentar la inclusión, pero cabe decir que los donantes tradicionales han evolucionado rápidamente en este sentido desde la Declaración de París.

Estos cambios e interactuar en este ecosistema implican también un cambio de relaciones e incluso de contenidos de la cooperación. Un aspecto que parece quedar al margen en este nuevo ecosistema es la condicionalidad aplicada en la década de los 1990 y años posteriores, vinculada al conocido Consenso de Washington. En este cambio de relaciones, emerge con fuerza la cooperación triangular, cuya consolidación en el espacio iberoamericano se está produciendo aceleradamente por voluntad política de los actores, similitudes en los desafíos de desarrollo, surgimiento de la CSS, pero también por una institucionalidad internacional de la cooperación sólida en Iberoamérica, aunque aún en consolidación dentro de las políticas públicas nacionales. Las más de dos décadas invertidas en cooperación iberoamericana representan ahora un gran activo de la cooperación internacional en el mundo en la búsqueda de nuevas relaciones y contenidos, como muestra el Programa Iberoamericano de Fortalecimiento Cooperación Sur-Sur, que incluye la participación de España[37]. De manera gradual, los organismos de este *ecosistema* deberán, como las especies biológicas interdependientes, adaptarse a sus exigencias los que representa implicaciones importantes.

La primera implicación puede ser que en un escenario post-

2015 el enfoque de la cooperación sea más amplio que el enfoque en pobreza. El éxito en la reducción de la pobreza en un gran número de países de renta media (PRM) puede desplazar el enfoque de la cooperación hacia nuevos temas y en un enfoque renovado, de vuelta, a los países menos adelantados (PMA)[38], vulnerables y frágiles, localizados fundamentalmente en África Subsahariana (Kharas y Rogerson, 2012)[39]. Este estudio establece su argumento a partir de la extrapolación al 2025 de las proyecciones de crecimiento del FMI para 2015 y consideran que habrá tres ejes de cooperación centrados alrededor de i) el *bienestar social*; ii) el *interés propio y mutuo de los países cooperantes*, y iii) la *provisión de bienes públicos globales* que, respectivamente, tendrán tres impulsores: a) el alto impacto de la filantropía y la sociedad civil, b) la CSS y la mezcla de cooperación privada y pública, y c) el financiamiento del cambio climático.

Esta prospectiva puede ser un estímulo para los decisores de la CSS en Iberoamérica en su proceso de consolidación y de participación en el debate global sobre los objetivos de desarrollo sostenible post-2015. Esta prospectiva implica un mayor esfuerzo en la coordinación en el nexo ente políticas nacionales y la de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo. Este nexo, frecuentemente débil, olvidado o poco factible en un notable número de donantes tradicionales, puede verse reforzado en un contexto en el que el *interés propio y mutuo* goza de mayor legitimidad internacional que el pasado entre donantes tradicionales y PRM y éstos a partir de la CSS, que ha logrado una gran aceptación entre los receptores por la similitud de

desafíos de desarrollo que comparten.

La segunda implicación es que es previsible que los donantes tradicionales deban profundizar y consolidar un diálogo más incluyente con el resto de actores para consensuar las diferentes plataformas que constituirán el *ecosistema* de la cooperación post-2015 y la Declaración de Busan es una primera muestra del camino más incluyente, pero para algunos más "imperfecto"[40].

En el pasado no muy lejano, los donantes del G-7 tenían una influencia casi única para que el Comité de Ayuda al Desarrollo de la OCDE (CAD) adoptara buenas prácticas y recomendaciones, que contribuyeron, sin ninguna duda, a mejorar la eficacia de la cooperación y a aumentar su calidad respecto de décadas anteriores de la cooperación de la Guerra Fría y ligada a las compras de los donantes. Estas buenas prácticas contribuyeron al enfoque actual en la reducción de la pobreza de los donantes tradicionales y que eventualmente desembocaron en el proceso de la Declaración de París de la Eficacia de la Ayuda (2005). Aunque en este proceso participaron algunos países en desarrollo aportando buenas prácticas, la Declaración de París la desarrollaron fundamentalmente los países del CAD, que buscaron posteriormente adhesiones de los receptores de su cooperación[41]. La cooperación también actuaba como un instrumento difusor de los principios de la Declaración y facilitador de acuerdos globales. El mundo multipolar actual puesto en escena en Busan ha sido sustancialmente diferente y más bien muestra el camino de cómo se va a construir la futura arquitectura de la cooperación y configurar el nuevo *ecosistema*

en el que, de momento, el mayor número de países cuya articulación es más diversa implica que la acción colectiva sea más difícil de lograr.

La tercera implicación es la descentralización del sistema de financiamiento del desarrollo desde el punto de vista del número de actores, la variedad de instrumentos y la diversidad de enfoques. Aunque una parte del panorama actual es fruto de la evolución del régimen de cooperación internacional que surgió de la Segunda Postguerra Mundial y de Bretton Woods, cada vez tiene menos relación con él. Ciertamente, el número de Estados en el mundo también ha crecido, especialmente en la década de 1960 con la oleada de las independencias en África, Asia-Pacífico y Oriente Medio, con países que lograron un rápido crecimiento económico, surgieron como donantes y crearon instituciones multilaterales propias. Sin ánimo de ser totalmente exhaustivo, la evolución en este proceso descentralizador pasa desde una arquitectura de la cooperación relativamente simple en 1945, pasando por la década de 1960, con la creación de la banca regional multilateral, hasta el *ecosistema* actual de cooperación caracterizado por esta multiplicidad de actores, la consiguiente complejidad de instrumentos y enfoques de cooperación, en el que ya destaca los flujos de CSS[42].

3. EFECTO DE LOS CAMBIOS EN LOS DONANTES TRADICIONALES Y A SU RELACIÓN CON LOS PAÍSES DE ALC: EL CASO DEL BID

Estos cambios y sus implicaciones también inciden en la labor del BID. El avance de las economías de la región implica que tienen acceso a fuentes diversas de financiamiento, como ya se expuso anteriormente y, sobre todo, que tienen mayores recursos propios para la inversión en desarrollo. Esto ha implicado que el BID recalibrara su oferta a los países de la región, acercándose mejor a las necesidades y prioridades de desarrollo de sus clientes, agregando mayor valor en sus préstamos, especialmente con productos de conocimiento y prácticas de última generación, más allá de la financiación concesional tradicional. A pesar de haberse reducido el tiempo de preparación de operaciones, se ha incrementado el rigor en el desarrollo y aplicación de medidas de efectividad del desarrollo, estándares y salvaguardias ambientales y sociales de última generación y marcos más sólidos de integridad y transparencia. Este conjunto de medidas le diferencian con claridad de otras fuentes de financiación a las que ahora pueden acceder los países de ALC.

Para poder seguir siendo relevante ante estos cambios, el BID paralelamente amplió su capital, dado que las economías de la región habían doblado su tamaño desde la última en 1994 y llevó a cabo una serie de reformas institucionales para adaptarse a las mejores prácticas de ética y transparencia. Esta ampliación, le permite al BID poder prestar de manera sostenible $US 12.000 millones anuales con una mayor concentración temática entorno a cinco prioridades sectoriales: 1) infraestructura para la competitividad y el bienestar social; 2) políticas sociales favorables a la igualdad y a la productividad; 3) instituciones para

el crecimiento y el bienestar social; 4) integración competitiva regional y global, y 5) protección del medio ambiente, respuesta al cambio climático, promoción de la energía renovable y la seguridad alimentaria. Para enfocar la inversión en estas cinco prioridades, el Banco se dotó de una estrategia institucional y cinco estrategias sectoriales a través de un amplio proceso de consulta dentro y fuera de la región tanto con los gobiernos, la sociedad civil, expertos e instituciones similares[43]. El BID también ha incrementado su apoyo al desarrollo a través del sector privado con préstamos sin garantía soberana, que se han venido incrementando en los últimos cinco años. En 2012, el BID aprobó préstamos al sector privado por valor de $US 1.500 millones de un total de $US 11.500 millones.

Un signo claro de adaptación a estos cambios es el mayor enfoque en la efectividad del desarrollo de las acciones del Banco y la eventual mejor evaluabilidad de sus operaciones con marcos de resultados más rigurosos. Entre muchas otras virtudes vinculadas a la calidad en todo el ciclo del proyecto, la adopción de marcos de resultados sólidos tienen poder de atracción hacia el BID de donantes bilaterales, interesados en contribuir a sus fondos fiduciarios. Si por un lado, los donantes tradicionales han tendido a “graduar” a los países de ALC de su cooperación, por otro, algunos de ellos se han sentido atraídos por los temas estratégicos de inversión en desarrollo como la integración regional y global de ALC y por la demostración de la efectividad de las acciones emprendidas[44]. La lección principal de este proceso es que mantener la relevancia con la cercanía a las prioridades de desarrollo de los clientes, la investigación en

temas de desarrollo de última generación demostrando el costo y el beneficio y el rigor en el ciclo del proyecto, enfocado en el impacto de las intervenciones, contribuye a reducir el éxodo de donantes tradicionales en temas específicos en una región dominada por PRM, además de que logra atraer a donantes emergentes.

Un aspecto innovador del BID frente a estos cambios es la incorporación de la CSS con Asia para ayudar a los países de la región a desencadenar procesos de cooperación conjuntos que permitan aprovechar mejor las importantes relaciones comerciales y financieras existentes. Desde 2011, el BID intensificó su relación con el Asian Development Bank (ADB) con el que ha desarrollado un programa de cooperación e investigación conjunta con los clientes de ambos, que incluye temas de interés mutuo como la cooperación aduanera para reducir los costos logísticos del comercio, aumentar la conectividad en banda ancha para cerrar la brecha digital, corredores sostenibles de integración, desarrollo a través del sector privado a partir de negocios en la base de la pirámide, ciudades sostenibles y programas de transferencias condicionadas. Se trata de una apuesta singular y estratégica, dadas las relaciones emergentes entre los países de ambos continentes, muy dominadas aún por el comercio, la inversión y el financiamiento con China, Corea y Japón, especialmente con el primero, como se vio anteriormente.

4. LOS RETOS A MEDIO PLAZO DE LA COOPERACIÓN IBEROAMERICANA EN EL

ECOSISTEMA EMERGENTE DE LA COOPERACIÓN

Los retos de la cooperación a medio plazo son múltiples, pero esta sección se centrará en seis retos principales.

El primer reto es identificar los bienes públicos regionales estratégicos y de alto impacto de desarrollo en la región. Ciertamente, la mayoría de países de ALC han avanzado de forma notable, pero la región tiene grandes desafíos de desarrollo tanto en términos absolutos como relativos a otras regiones como el Este y Sudeste Asiáticos, que han crecido y reducido la pobreza a un ritmo mayor que ALC. La cooperación iberoamericana puede ser funcional a los grandes retos de desarrollo de la región, identificando las oportunidades que ofrecen los retos compartidos para afrontarlos con acciones colectivas de carácter regional, produciendo los bienes públicos regionales necesarios para facilitar un mejor funcionamiento de los mercados y aumentar el bienestar de la población de la región. Ejemplos de estos bienes públicos regionales pueden ser estándares de competencia adecuados, intercambios comerciales más eficientes gracias a marcos aduaneros comunes, mercados laborales más eficientes teniendo en cuenta los flujos migratorios regionales, regulación financiera regional para reducir riesgos de contagio, adaptación al cambio climático, salud pública para afrontar amenazas transnacionales como las epidemias de gripe, educación de calidad y seguridad ciudadana, todos ellos con dimensiones transnacionales y, por supuesto, trasatlánticas debido a la integración existente entre empresas y personas en el espacio iberoamericano. Al ser Iberoamérica un

espacio articulado, la generación de estos bienes públicos regionales es factible y constituye una gran oportunidad para unas relaciones de cooperación con una mayor simetría.

El segundo reto, es la relevancia y calidad de la cooperación orientada a la obtención de resultados. En ausencia de recursos abundantes para la cooperación, es necesario encontrar nichos relevantes, que permitan obtener resultados visibles, que puedan ser replicados a partir de la inversión de presupuestos nacionales. Afrontar este reto con éxito, representará también un fortalecimiento a los mecanismos de cooperación (agencias, etc.) al interior de los gobiernos del espacio iberoamericano.

El tercer reto es operativizar la Declaración de Busan porque Iberoamérica tiene unas ventajas comparativas únicas respecto a otros espacios geopolíticos del mundo al tener culturas compartidas, idiomas fácilmente compatibles y relaciones políticas muy fluidas. Busan es el estándar actual de las relaciones de cooperación y, en muchas regiones del mundo, muy complejo de llevar a la práctica, mientras que puede resultar más asequible hacerlo en Iberoamérica y crear buenas prácticas para el resto del mundo. Una de las ventajas comparativas que ya se está llevando a la práctica en Iberoamérica, y que puede tener un gran interés en otras regiones del mundo, se plasma en el Informe de la Cooperación Sur-Sur en Iberoamérica, que se publica anualmente desde 2007 y cuya metodología y resultados es compartido por todos los miembros de la Comunidad Iberoamericana, lo que incluye donantes tradicionales, emergentes miembros del G-20 y PRM[45]. El tema del reconocimiento de la metodología y la contabilidad de la CSS es

controvertido a nivel global y algunos de los actores de la CSS no aceptan los datos generados con el CAD de la OCDE. El reto de la cooperación iberoamericana es compartir eficazmente esta buena práctica para que paulatinamente pueda ser incorporada por otros actores y se puedan tener indicadores más fiables de las diferentes dimensiones de la CSS.

El cuarto es que Iberoamérica pueda articular su cooperación de manera eficiente para influir de forma decisiva en la formulación de los objetivos de desarrollo sostenible o post-2015. La región está en condiciones de ofrecer importantes fortalezas y experiencias de desarrollo, muy necesarias en otras regiones del mundo. Influir en este proceso, implica estar presente en los contenidos en aquellos aspectos relevantes para el desarrollo de la región. La capacidad de investigación política, social y económica en la mayoría de los países de la región es de calidad y relevante, pero podría articularse mejor con la cooperación, como ya ocurre en otras regiones del mundo entre algunos donantes tradicionales, por ejemplo, y centros de investigación de África Subsahariana.

El quinto reto es consolidar la CSS y Triangular al interior de los países de la región con mecanismos de oferta de cooperación relativamente recientes. Se trata no solo de afrontar retos aparentemente simples como transferencias financieras a otros países, pero altamente complejos al interior de las administraciones públicas, sino también de lograr un status y espacio dentro de las estructuras gubernamentales, entre las fundaciones del sector privado, el sector privado mismo y los entes subnacionales y municipales.

Y, finalmente, atraer a donantes tradicionales demostrando las necesidades de desarrollo y las ventajas mutuas de invertir en el desarrollo de la región. El porcentaje de Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD) hacia ALC ha descendido del 10% de los flujos totales en 2000/2001 a 8% en 2010-2011, debido a niveles de pobreza inferiores y a un ingreso per cápita superior al de otras regiones de Asia y África Subsahariana, que han atraído la AOD en las últimas décadas. Sin embargo, las limitaciones del PIB per cápita como medida de desarrollo son ampliamente conocidas al dividir solamente la riqueza de un país por el número de sus habitantes. La academia y la comunidad internacional han sido conscientes de estas limitaciones desde hace décadas (D. Seers, 1969 y muchos otros más) y así se explica el nacimiento, perfeccionamiento y consolidación del Índice de Desarrollo Humano (1990) bajo el marco del PNUD. En este esfuerzo para evitar la “graduación” de los países de la región, la cooperación iberoamericana puede inspirarse en formas innovadoras de agrupar los países a partir de otras dimensiones de desarrollo más completas que el PIB per cápita. A. Summer y S. Tezanos (2012) proponen cinco grupos de países en desarrollo con resultados sorprendentes a partir de una metodología innovadora, teniendo en cuenta cuatro marcos conceptuales de desarrollo como: la transformación estructural, el desarrollo humano, la participación democrática y buen gobierno, y la sostenibilidad[46]. Los países de ALC quedan distribuidos en los tres grupos de “mayor desarrollo” de los cinco grupos establecidos. Esta distribución puede resultar útil para demostrar a los donantes tradicionales que quedan desafíos importantes en

la agenda de desarrollo y que el apoyo de la cooperación puede tener un efecto catalizador para afrontarlos. Asimismo, en un contexto post-2015 es previsible que un escenario de la cooperación más centrado en el *interés propio y mutuo de los países cooperantes* gane tracción, con lo cual Iberoamérica puede representar una oportunidad para los donantes tradicionales.

5. CONCLUSIONES

La CSS ha surgido gracias al crecimiento sostenido y a la reducción de la pobreza en las economías emergentes y PRM, al aumento del comercio, IED y flujos de financiamiento Sur-Sur y a la necesidad de intercambiar conocimiento y experiencias de desarrollo, que han resultado en un mundo multipolar consolidado después de la crisis de 2008. La arquitectura de la ayuda surgida y modulada después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial está mutando rápidamente hacia un ecosistema más complejo constituido por un mayor número de actores y una diversidad de instrumentos y enfoques que interactúan entre sí. Este ecosistema es más incluyente, pero implica que los donantes tradicionales se hayan tenido que adaptar a él y aceptar criterios diferentes provenientes del Sur en un mundo claramente multipolar.

El nuevo ecosistema implica que se redefinan los focos de atención de la cooperación y que el enfoque en la reducción de la pobreza, en el largo plazo, se centre en los PMA y se anticipe una cooperación basada más en el interés mutuo que goce de

mayor legitimidad que en el pasado y que siga creciendo la descentralización del financiamiento para el desarrollo en un contexto que los países de la región tienen acceso a los mercados internacionales de bonos, mayor capacidad propia y una diversidad de fuentes de financiamiento, entre las que destaca China y emerge la banca multilateral subregional. En este contexto, el BID dobló su capacidad financiera para poder prestar hasta US$ 12.000 millones anualmente enfocándose en cinco prioridades institucionales, adoptó altos estándares de transparencia y empezó a aplicar estándares ambientales y sociales y de evaluabilidad que le distinguen de otras fuentes a las que puede acceder la región. Casi paralelamente, y ante el crecimiento de las relaciones económicas de ALC con Asia, especialmente del Este y del Sudeste, el BID ha formado una alianza de cooperación estratégica con el ADB para que los países de ambas regiones aprovechen al máximo esta relación económica Sur-Sur.

Los retos de la cooperación iberoamericana consisten en 1) articularse de manera eficiente para identificar y generar bienes públicos regionales estratégicos que permitan una mejor operación de los mercados y una mayor efectividad de las políticas públicas; 2) ser relevante a los desafíos del desarrollo y enfocarse en la calidad para que las acciones puedan ser replicables; 3) operativizar la Declaración de Busan, dadas las ventajas comparativas de la región basadas en culturas compartidas, compatibilidad lingüística y relaciones políticas muy fluidas; 4) influir de manera decisiva en la configuración de la “agenda global” para que los objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

post-2015 reflejen las prioridades de la región; 5) consolidar la CSS y Triangular al interior de los países, y 6) lograr atraer a donantes tradicionales mostrando los beneficios de cooperar con ALC e influyendo para que se tengan en cuenta parámetros más completos de desarrollo que el PIB per cápita antes de que los donantes tradicionales "gradúen" a la región por ser más elevado que el de otras regionales del mundo.

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Lectura 5

La cooperación Sur-Sur en África: el caso de los países emergentes[47]

Mbuyi Kabunda

INTRODUCCIÓN

El presente análisis, al tiempo que sirve de capítulo introductorio a esta obra con el consiguiente acercamiento global a las iniciativas que se desarrollan a nivel Sur-Sur, se centra en el caso específico de la cooperación de los países emergentes en África como parte integrante de la cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS), siendo el objetivo averiguar en qué puede contribuir a la reducción de las desigualdades entre el Norte y el Sur, y en la mejora de los aspectos políticos, socioeconómicos, culturales, humanos y de seguridad en África. Dicho con otras palabras, en qué medida la cooperación o presencia de los países emergentes contribuye a la promoción del crecimiento económico y del desarrollo duradero del continente.

Estos países, que han sacado provecho del debilitamiento de la ideología neoliberal y del fin del unilateralismo norteamericano a favor de la multipolaridad actual, fundamentan casi todos su cooperación con África, que ha pasado de los discursos políticos de las décadas anteriores a los aspectos económicos concretos y actuales en los principios siguientes: el respeto de la soberanía de cada Estado, de igualdad y de no injerencia en sus asuntos

internos, de respeto y beneficio mutuos.

Los llamados BASIC (Brasil, Sudáfrica, India y China o IBSA+China), en su objetivo de promover el desarrollo, la paz y la seguridad en el Sur en general, y en África en particular, crearon con tales propósitos el Fondo destinado a luchar contra la pobreza, financiar los proyectos de desarrollo en los países menos avanzados y promover la CSS. El objetivo es poner de manifiesto las ventajas (económicas, comerciales, financieras, tecnológicas) o el modelo de desarrollo alternativo que África podría conseguir con esta cooperación.

La realidad es que África, con estos nuevos actores, no suscita la compasión, sino que sigue generando interés por sus recursos naturales y por el acceso a sus mercados. Ello a pesar, según subraya Qobo (2011: 29), de su ayuda al desarrollo, la construcción de infraestructuras y la capacitación de oportunidades comerciales. Para Kaplinsky y Farooki (citado en el informe de la CNUCED, 2010: 1), que abundan en el mismo sentido, los socios africanos del Sur, al mismo tiempo que expresan su voluntad común de contribuir al desarrollo africano, adoptan en la práctica diferentes posturas dictadas por sus intereses y estrategias en la región. Por lo tanto, Brasil, China e India (a los que se han sumado en menor medida los dragones del sureste asiático, las monarquías del Golfo Pérsico, Venezuela, Rusia y Turquía) ven ante todo a África como una importante reserva de materias primas y un mercado para la exportación de sus productos. El objetivo es satisfacer sus necesidades de crecimiento interno y conseguir los objetivos globales. Por su parte, un país como Turquía se interesa por

África más para ampliar mercados para sus productos que con el fin de conseguir los recursos naturales africanos y los objetivos globales. Su comercio con África ha pasado de 1,5 billones de dólares en 2001 a 20 billones en 2011, celebrando una cumbre de cooperación turcoafricana en 2008 en Estambul (Perrier, 2011: 16). El objetivo declarado es la contribución al desarrollo de África a través de la Agencia nacional turca para el desarrollo (TIKA), con proyectos en 37 países africanos, y a la formación de estudiantes africanos.

Estos países, con importantes necesidades de materias primas para sus industrias y atraídos por el mercado africano, integrado por unos 1.000 millones de consumidores, han instaurado una dinámica cooperación comercial con los países africanos, superando por primera vez el comercio entre África y la Unión Europea (UE), hasta hace poco su principal socio. Además, los países del Sur han incrementado su ayuda al desarrollo y la transferencia de tecnologías en las infraestructuras y los sectores productivos, favoreciendo la creación del tejido industrial, la diversificación de las fuentes de financiación y la reducción de la dependencia externa de África. Sin embargo, según el informe de la CNUCED de junio de 2010 que recalca aquellos aspectos positivos, es preciso lamentar los aspectos negativos siguientes: la concentración de las intervenciones de estos nuevos socios en las actividades extractivas de las materias primas o en el sector extractivo, la carencia de tecnologías para su transformación local, la competencia de sus productos baratos a los bienes producidos por las pequeñas y medianas empresas locales, y la falta de una

estrategia conjunta de los países africanos y de una identificación clara de sus intereses frente a las políticas de cooperación coherentes de estos nuevos socios[48]. De este modo, se han producido importantes desequilibrios entre los países africanos y estos países, que salen beneficiados de estos nuevos intercambios, al igual que el Norte en sus relaciones con África.

Es verdad que los países asiáticos, en particular China e India (rivales directos o indirectos en África para acceder a los recursos naturales fundamentales para su modernización e industrialización)[49], son mercados importantes para los productos africanos, al mismo tiempo son rivales potenciales en algunos sectores como la industria textil o la exportación de ropas, más baratas que las de producción local. Lo más urgente para los gobiernos africanos es aprovechar su presencia en el continente para tener acceso a sus tecnologías[50] —en particular las de la fábrica de medicinas genéricas para reducir su precio en los países africanos—, a la formación del capital humano y el acceso a los mercados mundiales, y no limitarse al papel de suministradores de productos básicos. Dicho de otra manera, y siguiendo a Goldstein *et al.* (2006), deben aprovecharse de la fuerte demanda de materias primas por parte de estos países para promover los sectores creadores de empleos, diversificar sus economías, desarrollar las industrias básicas y fortalecer las capacidades en la agricultura, y fundamentalmente para luchar contra la pobreza.

En definitiva, según el informe del Banco Mundial de 2008, con el título significativo de *Construir puentes: el creciente papel de*

China como financiero del África Subsahariana, la proliferación de infraestructuras contribuye al desarrollo de África y obedece no solo a la creciente demanda de petróleo y otras materias primas por China e India, sino que está animada por un sólido crecimiento económico en la región y un mejor clima comercial.

La novedad es que la inserción de estos nuevos actores en África, sobre todo de China, no solo ha cambiado el sistema internacional de la postguerra fría, sino que además ha sacado provecho de las reformas neoliberales impuestas décadas anteriores a las economías africanas (eliminación de barreras aduaneras, privatizaciones…), junto a la reducción de las inversiones occidentales en el continente, para desafiar a Europa y EE UU en una zona considerada tradicionalmente como su patio trasero, para convertirla en su principal fuente de energías (Alden, Large y Soares de Oliveira, 2008). La buena noticia, según Cheru y Obi (2010: 1), es que África puede tener otras opciones de desarrollo al margen del Consenso de Washington o "único modelo de desarrollo". Es decir, una posibilidad de alternativa ofrecida a África por la cooperación de los países emergentes tras ser sometida al orden bipolar de la guerra fría y al fundamentalismo de mercado que lo ha sucedido.

La preocupación esta vez, y de acuerdo con Antil (2007), se genera por el hecho de que el interés de los países emergentes por los recursos naturales africanos está colocando al continente en el centro de tensiones políticas y geopolíticas y de rivalidades, que podrían desestabilizar a los más frágiles de los Estados africanos.

El caso de la cooperación de las grandes potencias, limitada a

EE UU y Francia, ya fue abordado en otro espacio (Kabunda, 2007), para limitarse aquí al caso de la de los países emergentes con referencia especial a los IBSA, integrados por países con importantes denominadores comunes: son grandes democracias con economías en desarrollo; aspiran a ser potencias económicas[51]; son sociedades multirraciales y multiculturales[52]; tienen importante peso en sus continentes respectivos; abogan por el multilateralismo y el regionalismo; son portavoces del Sur ante el G-8 y pretenden ocupar un asiento permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. La redinamización de las actividades económicas en el continente, antes de la actual crisis económica y financiera, según puntualiza Obi (2010: 192), se explica en lo esencial por sus importaciones de materias primas africanas, y en particular por las inversiones y las demandas de China e India.

LA COOPERACIÓN SUR-SUR: CONCEPTO Y ESTADO DE LA CUESTIÓN

La CSS o la “cooperación horizontal” (entre dos grupos de socios en vías de desarrollo) nació en la década de los cincuenta y sesenta, o en plena guerra fría, por la necesidad de seguridad, de búsqueda y fortalecimiento de la independencia, de desarrollo económico y social por parte de los países en desarrollo con el objetivo de transformar el sistema internacional. Por lo tanto, ha sido marcada por la ideología de liberación nacional contra el colonialismo, del no alineamiento y del desarrollo, dando prioridad a las alianzas o coaliciones y a la integración regional

para conseguir los cambios estructurales en las relaciones Norte-Sur y el desarrollo económico de sus países mediante la eliminación de las asimetrías con el Norte y la instauración de economías autocentradas.

Se define, pues, la CSS como un proceso destinado a "promover la cooperación técnica, económica y política entre los países en desarrollo en la realización de sus objetivos comunes de desarrollo", con dimensiones bilateral, intrarregional, interregional y multilateral, para conseguir su integración en la economía mundial (CNUCED, 2010).

Se trata, al igual que el propio Sur, de un concepto difuso que, en opinión de Lechini (2009a: 67; 2009b: 99-100), se refiere en su forma actual a una cooperación política entre países periféricos "que apunta a reforzar las relaciones bilaterales y/o a formar coaliciones en los foros multilaterales para obtener mayor poder de negociación conjunto, en defensa de sus intereses. Se basa en el supuesto de que es posible crear una conciencia cooperativa que les permita a los países del Sur reforzar su capacidad de negociación con el Norte, a través de la adquisición de mayores márgenes de maniobra internacional, para afrontar y resolver los problemas comunes. Es una construcción política que por su propia naturaleza requiere de ciertos supuestos básicos comunes".

En definitiva, según Tejasvi, citado en el informe mencionado de la CNUCED, la CSS se refiere al "trabajo conjunto de los países en desarrollo para encontrar soluciones comunes a los desafíos del desarrollo".

Además, en el caso de África (Founou-Tchuigoua, 1995), los

proyectos nacionalistas de las dos primeras décadas de las independencias[53] —en las que se dieron como principales objetivos la modernización y el enriquecimiento de la sociedad mediante la industrialización o “el capitalismo sin capitalistas” a manos del Estado y sus tecnócratas, adoptado tanto por los regímenes “socialistas” como por los “moderados”, en sustitución de las burguesías nacionales inexistentes— fracasaron, convirtiendo la cooperación horizontal en una de las alternativas al único modelo de desarrollo impuesto tras la caída del muro de Berlín, en torno a la globalización.

El “fin del mundo único”, dominado por una sola superpotencia y del que habla Bertrand Badie, y la emergencia de la multipolaridad[54], junto a las consecuencias actuales de la crisis económica y financiera internacional en el Sur, en general, y en África[55], en particular, abogan por la CSS[56], que es preciso redefinir para darle un nuevo impulso insistiendo en los aspectos culturales y sociales. En el mismo sentido, Jean-Luc Gréau (2005) considera que para un continente ampliamente naufragado como África, ninguno de los países que lo integran dispone de mercado interno suficiente para crear las bases de las relaciones económicas a partir de las cuales puedan conseguir el desarrollo económico. Por lo tanto, se les impone la apertura hacia los países vecinos y al tiempo la protección de los productores locales de algunas importaciones procedentes de los países del Norte, que podrían impedir la emergencia de los productos autóctonos similares y la creación de economías locales coherentes.

África, prosigue el autor mencionado, no podría salir de su

retraso incorporándose a la competencia mundial o mendigando algunos mercados protegidos para sus productos básicos para ofrecerlos a precio de saldo en los mercados internacionales, sino creando con paciencia los mercados internos destinados a la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas de sus poblaciones antes de pretender ir a la conquista de los mercados exteriores. Ello es posible solo mediante la integración regional (analizada en uno de los capítulos de la presente obra) y la CSS, que Demba Moussa Dembelé (2010) recomienda como una prioridad para los países africanos en todos los campos, en su opinión para acabar con las humillaciones del neocolonialismo encarnadas por la *Franciáfrica* y el Franco CFA.

En el mismo orden de ideas, Khan (2009) pide acabar con el neocapitalismo o la "deshumanización neoliberal" en su pretensión de encarnar la sociedad final y el objetivo alcanzado o insuperable, y que en realidad ha conducido por su lógica irracional, perversa e inmoral a la catástrofe final. Ello mediante un nuevo contrato social basado en la mutación-recomposición de las sociedades, para colocar al hombre en el centro del desarrollo.

Hoy existen importantes complementariedades, favorables a los intercambios Sur-Sur, entre los países africanos productores de materias, los países agrícolas latinoamericanos y los nuevos países industrializados asiáticos. Sin embargo, según subraya Coussy (2008), estas complementariedades dan lugar a los conflictos entre los países emergentes fundamentalmente sobre los términos de intercambio y las transferencias de tecnologías, e incluso a la competencia entre ellos para atraerse las inversiones

privadas.

LOS PAÍSES EMERGENTES: CARACTERÍSTICAS, POTENCIALIDADES Y LIMITACIONES

Los países emergentes[57], cuyas fuerzas y debilidades pasamos a analizar a continuación tras poner de manifiesto sus principales características, compiten para conquistar el continente africano, aún ampliamente inexplotado, y convertido en una reserva de hidrocarburos, minerales y un gigantesco mercado de sus productos.

Se trata fundamentalmente de los mencionados BASIC o IBSA —el trío creado en junio de 2003 y que constituye la punta de lanza del G-20, grupo de presión de los países del Sur para defender posiciones comunes durante las negociaciones comerciales multilaterales o para conseguir la anulación de las subvenciones de EE UU y de la UE a sus agricultores—, a los que se puede sumar México, excesivamente dependiente de la economía y de los mercados estadounidenses. Formaban parte, hasta hace poco, del llamado Tercer Mundo. En la actualidad, se han convertido en grandes potencias a escala mundial por su adhesión a la economía de mercado o la liberalización económica desde la década de los ochenta; es decir, que salieron del subdesarrollo por la intensificación de las exportaciones y la participación en el sistema mundial o la globalización[58]. A pesar de la crisis económica y financiera mundial, siguen manteniendo importantes tasas de crecimiento y

representan la quinta parte de las riquezas mundiales. Según aclaran Bulard y Dion (2009), tienen una importante influencia en sus regiones respectivas, ambiciones reconocidas a nivel mundial junto a la cooperación entre ellos para influir en los organismos internacionales.

Estos países presentan las siguientes características (Santander, 2010): el acceso al desarrollo en el periodo de la postguerra fría tras conseguir importantes tasas de crecimiento (5 al 10%) y la diversificación de sus economías; disponen de importantes recursos naturales, junto a una activa participación en el comercio internacional; son receptores y exportadores a la vez de capitales, tanto en sus regiones respectivas como en los países en desarrollo y en los países ricos; tienen multinacionales que compiten con las del Norte; expresan ambiciones de potencia y exigen el reparto equilibrado del poder mundial; disponen de importantes iniciativas diplomáticas en lo político, económico y comercial, a nivel bilateral y multilateral, tanto con los países del Sur como con los del Norte; quieren convertirse en potencias de sus regiones respectivas; militan por el cambio de las estructuras políticas y económicas mundiales para adaptarlas a las realidades del siglo XXI, en particular por el reparto equitativo del poder en las instituciones internacionales para conseguir un mundo menos occidental; apuestan por la multipolaridad y el multilateralismo mediante la descentralización del poder mundial, exigiendo algunos de ellos un asiento permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad; se han dotado de una importante base económica, pero siguen siendo vulnerables a las crisis por su fuerte dependencia del comercio exterior, por la

propia interdependencia de la globalización y por las desigualdades sociales internas; a pesar de tener un protagonismo a nivel internacional, aún no consiguen conciliar la defensa de sus intereses individuales inmediatos con las responsabilidades internacionales a largo plazo.

Nos referiremos en el presente análisis a Brasil, China, India y Sudáfrica, que han instaurado alianzas entre ellos para conseguir un nuevo orden internacional de la postguerra fría, basado en la CSS. Estos países no apuestan por la reactivación del no alineamiento, sino por la "teoría china de los tres mundos", adaptada a las circunstancias actuales (Kourliandsky, 2005: 78). Es decir, frente al tándem EE UU-Unión Europea, se ha iniciado un proceso de concertación o unificación del Sur encabezado por Brasil (en representación de Latinoamérica), China e India (en representación de Asia) y Sudáfrica (en representación de África). El objetivo es crear nuevas relaciones de fuerzas en un mundo multipolar mediante coaliciones esporádicas para conseguir los objetivos comunes entre latinoamericanos, asiáticos y africanos. Ello, pese al hecho de asumir este papel paradójico, según Hugon (2005), de tener intereses divergentes con los países más pobres al tiempo que se encargan de la defensa de sus intereses en los foros internacionales.

En definitiva, se trata de países convertidos, siguiendo a Ben Hammouda (2010c), en verdaderos competidores de las tradicionales potencias económicas mundiales, y se han impuesto como nuevos protagonistas en el escenario internacional con la creación y el fortalecimiento de las redes de intercambios Sur-Sur[59], que sustituyen cada vez más en los

últimos años las tradicionales redes Norte-Sur y la clara diferencia que presentan sus proezas macroeconómicas en relación con el estancamiento en el que se encuentran los países desarrollados.

BRASIL Y EL TERCERMUNDISMO PRAGMÁTICO

Con miras a las metas arriba expuestas, Brasil, décima potencia industrial mundial, apuesta claramente por el fortalecimiento de las cooperaciones entre los gobiernos, tanto latinoamericanos (encabezando el MERCOSUR como alternativa al modelo de integración liderado por EE UU) como del Sur (la “diplomacia Sur-Sur”, según el término de Ignacio Ramonet). El objetivo es la concreción de los proyectos compartidos, en particular el fomento de las complementariedades, para conseguir el desarrollo y una cierta presencia en el sistema internacional, junto a una política de conquista de nuevos mercados y cooperación con los demás emergentes (China, India, Sudáfrica o países del Oriente Medio). Por lo tanto, Brasil quiere liderar las coaliciones del Sur, en particular el G-20, en las negociaciones internacionales con los países industrializados (cuestiones de las subvenciones agrícolas) y conseguir, de este modo, el estatus de “actor en el mundo globalizado”.

Brasil está asumiendo un importante protagonismo, tanto a nivel latinoamericano como a nivel mundial. En el marco regional, ha convertido la integración regional en el principal eje de su política exterior con la “diplomacia de la generosidad” (De

Almeida, 2010: 71), encargándose no solo de la construcción de infraestructuras de conexión con los países vecinos, sino además de la financiación de los proyectos regionales, concediendo ventajas comerciales a los socios menores del MERCOSUR para reducir las asimetrías. Partidario de la resolución de los problemas de la región sin injerencias externas, Brasil, además de acercarse a Cuba, lideró militarmente la Misión de las Naciones Unidas para la Estabilización en Haití (MINUSTAH), en 2004, y criticó abiertamente la instalación de las bases estadounidenses en Colombia o la posición de EE UU en Honduras. A nivel mundial, además del fortalecimiento de las relaciones con los países emergentes, el acercamiento a los países africanos[60] y árabes, tradicionalmente excluidos o descuidados por la diplomacia brasileña (Oualalou, 2010), acercamiento ilustrado por la celebración en mayo de 2005 en Brasilia de la Cumbre América Latina-países árabes y la participación en 2006 en la Cumbre América Latina-África en Abuya (Nigeria).

De acuerdo con De Almeida (2010), los principales puntos flacos de Brasil, con importante prestigio e influencia internacionales, son fundamentalmente internos y se resumen en torno a la baja formación técnica y educativa de su población, la pesada burocracia, el deficiente sistema productivo y las insuficientes inversiones en I+D. Lo que le coloca a la cola de los BRIC en términos de crecimiento económico y de generación de bienestar, por su retraso científico y tecnológico y por la existencia de dos velocidades en lo interno o los “dos Brasil” de los que habla James Petras (2010): el Brasil que emerge y el

otro de los excluidos, integrado por los más de 60 millones de pobres (32 millones por debajo del umbral de pobreza absoluta), en su mayoría afrobrasileños (70 millones de personas) que viven en condiciones propias del Tercer Mundo, convirtiéndose de este modo Brasil en el país de Suramérica con más desigualdades estructurales (sociales y raciales). Ello pone en entredicho, en opinión de este autor, los logros de este país y su estatus de país emergente[61] por seguir dependiendo de las exportaciones agrícolas y minerales o de productos básicos, mientras que los restantes emergentes han conseguido, por ejemplo, la revolución informática (India) y el desarrollo industrial (China).

En definitiva, Brasil, para parafrasear a Renaud Lambert (2010b: 76), sigue siendo un "gigante dependiente" del capital financiero internacional y de las inversiones directas extranjeras (IDE), dependencia que explica la aplicación parcial por el presidente Lula de su programa económico o su pragmatismo económico. El país, en relación con los demás países emergentes, que crecen al ritmo del 8 al 9%, realiza una tasa de crecimiento per cápita bastante débil, en torno al 2%, y se enfrenta en la actualidad con el gobierno de la presidenta Dilma Rousseff a serios problemas macroeconómicos o estructurales que le pueden llevar a medio plazo a la recesión. Ello pone de manifiesto que estamos frente a una economía aún frágil a pesar de dar apariencias de ser fuerte (*The Economist*, 4 de junio de 2011: 14-16).

CHINA Y LA SUSTITUCIÓN DEL PODERÍO

IDEOLÓGICO POR LOS OBJETIVOS ECONÓMICOS

China, sin ambiciones ideológicas y geopolíticas —para atenerse solo a los aspectos económicos (el crecimiento económico puesto al servicio de la diplomacia económica) o los intereses "geoeconómicos" (Shaw, 2010: 14; Delage, 2011: 24), con miras a su desarrollo interno y para resolver sus problemas externos—, se presenta cada vez más como una potencia regional y mundial, que combina el capitalismo salvaje y el intervencionismo estatal, con un gran consumo de materias primas que le lleva a una inserción activa en África (el 31% de sus importaciones de petróleo) y Latinoamérica en el marco de la CSS, ofreciendo a cambio importantes posibilidades de crecimiento a la mayoría de las economías de estos continentes, que la consideran como una alternativa geopolítica o modelo de cooperación horizontal. China se ha convertido en la segunda potencia de la economía mundial, después de EE UU y antes que Japón y Alemania (octubre de 2010), con importantes inversiones en muchas regiones en desarrollo (África, América Latina y Asia) no solo en el sector minero para abastecerse de las materias primas que necesitan sus industrias, sino también en las infraestructuras, las industrias manufactureras y los servicios. Además, en la opinión de Bustelo (2011), contribuye al crecimiento global mediante sus crecientes importaciones y exportaciones (de productos baratos), sus importantes reservas en divisas, sus inversiones en el extranjero y el aumento del turismo externo de sus ciudadanos.

Según Serge Michel (2010), China ha elaborado el "Consenso

de Pekín”[62], que crea una verdadera atracción o seducción ante los dirigentes del Sur, y en particular africanos, que lo consideran positivo en relación con el Consenso de Washington, que les da lecciones morales y de buena gestión.

Pero este país ha de orientar su modelo de desarrollo hacia la reducción de la dependencia externa, dando prioridad al mercado interno para resolver los problemas generados por las desigualdades sociales mediante un reparto equitativo de los frutos del crecimiento (Ben Hammouda, 2010c). Por lo tanto, dicho modelo, además de acelerar la integración de China en la globalización, intenta controlar el mercado interno para impedir la invasión de importaciones procedentes de EE UU y Europa, animando a sus empresas a usar el yuan en detrimento del dólar en el comercio exterior (Giné Daví, 2011).

Baverez (2010; véase también García Fernández-Muro, 2009), que considera a China como un “país emergido”, ya no emergente, por convertirse en la segunda potencia económica mundial (lejos y detrás de EE UU, pero por delante de Japón), puntualiza que se enfrenta a importantes desequilibrios entre el capital y el trabajo, entre las regiones y entre las clases sociales, junto a tres importantes bloqueos: la excesiva necesidad y dependencia de energías (petróleo, carbón, gas, electricidad), la abrumadora presencia estatal en el sector industrial con el consiguiente personal pletórico y baja productividad, y el abandono del mundo rural y del campesinado (Tellenne, 2007). Dicho con otras palabras, ha adoptado un modelo de “desarrollo económico dual” o asimétrico desde el punto de vista territorial y social (Xiaohe, 2001: 132; Pastor, 2011: 15; Giné Daví, 2011: 62-

64), responsable de los desequilibrios estructurales entre el mundo urbano y el mundo rural y entre las zonas costeras del este y las zonas del centro y oeste del país, además de no acompañarse el crecimiento industrial con la productividad agrícola.

En el país han surgido unos 300.000 nuevos millonarios, un centenar de millones de personas ricas que constituyen la clase media, 200 millones de personas que viven bajo el umbral de pobreza absoluta y 100 millones de personas sin acceso a los cuidados médicos ni a la electricidad. Es decir, la miseria del mundo rural. A ello es preciso añadir el deterioro del medio ambiente (6,5 millones de hectáreas de tierras fértiles han sido destruidas desde la década de los noventa), la corrupción, el envejecimiento de la población, el mantenimiento del autoritarismo con el control de Internet y el no respeto de la propiedad intelectual (Naím, 2005), convirtiéndose en el centro de la piratería o de la falsificación de productos informáticos, CD/DVD, farmacéuticos, de cigarrillos o ropas de marca, etc.

China se caracteriza en lo interno por importantes disparidades regionales o territoriales, de ingresos entre las ciudades y las zonas rurales y dentro de estas. Es decir, por deficiencias de servicios sociales, graves deterioros medioambientales y “desigualdades interterritoriales e interpersonales” con características propias de los países en desarrollo, creando una verdadera lógica de centro/periferias: el centro integrado por la clase de privilegiados del régimen y los nuevos ricos allegados al poder, y las periferias integradas por los excluidos sociales y los campesinos. Todo ello conduce a

Tellenne (2007: 315) a hablar de la existencia de “tres Chinas en una”: la China costera rica con nivel de desarrollo cercano a los dragones asiáticos, las provincias del interior con un nivel de desarrollo económico y social medio, y el “Tercer Mundo de China”, integrado por los pobres del mundo rural. Es decir, de 100 a 150 millones de chinos están incorporados en la economía mundial, mientras que 850 millones que viven en las zonas rurales tienen un ingreso inferior a 200 dólares per cápita; y entre 100 y 150 millones más conocen el éxodo rural y malviven en la economía informal (Boniface, 2003). China se sitúa en el puesto 187 de los 191 Estados en cuanto al acceso a los cuidados médicos, y el número de los analfabetos ha pasado de 30 millones de personas en 2000 a 120 millones en 2006. Sin embargo, intenta ofrecer al mundo una imagen de “potencia responsable”, presionando al gobierno sudanés para una salida negociada en el conflicto de Darfur u ofreciendo su ayuda a Japón durante el sismo, el tsunami y la catástrofe nuclear que han afectado a este país en marzo de 2011.

En definitiva, China, que debe su extraordinario crecimiento actual, según subraya Amin (2001) —aspecto que no se suele evidenciar—, a las previas bases económicas, políticas y sociales creadas por el maoísmo dispone de una base productiva, una importante reserva de recursos naturales y una mano de obra abundante, formada y barata. Es decir, de un potencial mercado interno. Por su parte, Pastor (2011: 14; véase también Fanjul, 2011: 44) atribuye las impresionantes tasas de crecimiento de China a las reformas de Deng Xiaoping basadas en el modelo de crecimiento abierto y al desarrollo paulatino de

las fuerzas del mercado, al subrayar que “el éxito económico chino tiene sus raíces en el modelo de desarrollo de finales de los años sesenta, el denominado modelo asiático, adoptado antes por Japón y Corea del Sur, y que consiste en confiar la modernización de la economía al desarrollo del sector exportador […] con la ayuda del Estado, bajo forma de aranceles y otras barreras a la importación de productos que pudieran hacer la competencia a los nacionales”.

INDIA O LA POTENCIA MÁS REGIONAL QUE INTERNACIONAL

Con una importante tasa de crecimiento económico y un peso demográfico que avecinan los de China (constituyendo este último un hándicap por tener 336 hab./km^2 y una extrema pobreza de masas), India es una potencia emergente más a nivel regional que internacional, tanto a nivel tecnológico como militar. Ello se explica por las debilidades estructurales de su economía y las insuficientes inversiones de desarrollo, a pesar de jugar un papel fundamental en la denuncia, en nombre de los países del Sur, de las subvenciones concedidas por los países industrializados a sus agricultores y de fomentar las relaciones con Brasil y Sudáfrica como núcleo de la CSS.

India, presentada como el “elefante asiático” o “la oficina del mundo” —además de haber liderado el Movimiento de los No Alineados (MNOAL) durante la guerra fría y de abogar hoy por la igualdad entre países ricos y países pobres, rechazando el derecho de injerencia—, se enfrenta a los acuciantes problemas

siguientes: el hambre, la electricidad, la educación, la salud y el empleo. Los ideales de antaño (honor, libertad personal, verdad, justicia social, relaciones comunitarias tradicionales, buena y justa vida…) han sido sustituidos por las leyes de mercado, que excluyen del desarrollo económico a la mayoría que vive en el mundo rural, proyectándose más hacia el exterior que en el interior[63]. Por lo tanto, se trata de un modelo de desarrollo, según el autor mencionado, que conduce a la catástrofe por fundamentarse en las industrias de transformación y las tecnologías de la información en detrimento de la agricultura, que utiliza el 60% de la mano de obra y que se fundamenta en los cultivos comerciales y no de autoconsumo. Se ha perdido de vista que India es fundamentalmente un país agrícola (Lokku, 2007).

Por eso, Sorman (2000) afirma que India se encuentra en una situación parecida a la de la Rusia postsoviética: el cambio de discursos no se ha acompañado con el cambio de las estructuras de la “potencia pobre” por mantenerse en los círculos del poder los responsables del fracasado sistema anterior, basado en el mal desarrollo, y que se aprovechan de la liberalización para enriquecerse y convertirse en una cleptocracia local. Su pluralismo lingüístico y confesional constituye a la vez su fuerza y talón de Aquiles.

La persistencia de la extrema pobreza[64], a pesar del extraordinario crecimiento del sector tecnológico que crea pocos empleos, ha dado lugar a una extrema bipolarización socioeconómica entre el desarrollo de una minoría y la miseria de la mayoría de la población. Es decir, la existencia de “dos

Indias": una rica e incorporada en la mundialización, y la otra pobre y marginada.

India ha desarrollado una verdadera "diplomacia del tsunami", según el término de Pielberg (2007: 332) —alusión a la ayuda suministrada a los países vecinos afectados por el tsunami, y por extrapolación para convertirse en potencia marítima en el Índico —, mediante el acercamiento con los países del sureste asiático, de Asia central y del golfo Pérsico no solo para fortalecer las relaciones comerciales y las inversiones, sino además para tener acceso a los hidrocarburos necesarios para su desarrollo económico. El principal objetivo es fortalecer su estatus de potencia regional con la meta final de convertirse en un importante actor en el sistema mundial.

SUDÁFRICA O LA COEXISTENCIA DEL PRIMER MUNDO Y DEL TERCER MUNDO

Sudáfrica es el único país africano con poderío y ambiciones tanto a nivel regional como a escala mundial (Porteilla, 2010). Sin embargo, este país aún no ha superado los graves problemas económicos y sociales heredados del *apartheid*, en particular el carácter dual de la sociedad, las profundas desigualdades sociales entre las distintas categorías de la población, que, junto a la persistencia de la criminalidad, la ha convertido, en la opinión de Cling (2000: 8), en el país más violento del mundo.

Sudáfrica es un país de contrastes, caracterizado por el multiculturalismo o la sociedad multirracial ("el mundo en un solo

país”). Tiene esta peculiaridad de ser receptora de la ayuda al desarrollo —por tener importantes capas de pobreza interna y por su pertenencia o adhesión a los acuerdos de Lomé-Cotonú— y donante de la misma a los países de África Subsahariana, por su acumulación del capital y por superar la economía rentista, y fundamentalmente para luchar o reducir la inmigración masiva procedente de estos países. Ejerce sobre los países subsaharianos, y especialmente sobre los de la Comunidad de Desarrollo del África Austral (SADC), una cierta hegemonía de tipo centro-periferia. Por otro lado, privilegia las relaciones comerciales con Europa, EE UU y Asia (China y Japón).

Sudáfrica es una democracia sólida, pero pendiente de importantes medidas económicas y sociales para mejorar las condiciones de vida de la población (creación de puestos de trabajo para la juventud, reforma agraria, justicia social…), cambios casi imposibles de realizar a corto plazo por la adhesión a las reglas de la globalización neoliberal. Por eso, el Congreso Nacional Africano (ANC, por sus siglas en inglés), con el apoyo del partido comunista y del sindicato (SACP y COSATU), sus aliados de gobierno, optó en 2009 por Jacob Gedyihlekisa Zuma, en detrimento de Thabo Mbeki, para liderar el país.

Se considera a Zuma populista como candidato de los pobres al poner la lucha contra la pobreza en el centro de su acción de gobierno. Sin embargo, según subraya Porteilla (2010), el nuevo mandatario sigue con el conformismo económico (ortodoxia presupuestaria) y la falta de ambiciones sociales, que crean dudas en cuanto a la voluntad de Sudáfrica de sumarse al grupo de países a favor de las rupturas y el cambio a escala mundial,

pues en este país al *apartheid* racial se ha sustituido por el *apartheid* económico y social.

Potencia política y militar africana, en particular en el marco de la Unión Africana (UA), del Nuevo Partenariado para el Desarrollo de África (NEPAD) y de la SADC, y primera inversora en África Subsahariana —a pesar de la competencia de China e India en este campo—, Sudáfrica tiende a sustituir a las antiguas potencias coloniales en el continente sin conseguir un verdadero estatus de país emergente por el peso de las herencias históricas en las estructuras socioeconómicas, el débil crecimiento económico, junto a los efectos devastadores del VIH-SIDA sobre el capital humano, social y económico. Lidera, junto a Brasil e India, el G20, para concertar posiciones comunes sobre los problemas económicos y financieros en el seno de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC).

LA COOPERACIÓN DE LOS PAÍSES EMERGENTES EN ÁFRICA

BRASIL EN ÁFRICA

“País rico y país de pobres”, como se le suele tachar, Brasil, con importantes relaciones históricas y culturales con África (población de origen africano) y condiciones geográficas y climáticas parecidas, desarrolla una intensa cooperación con este continente. Tras unas décadas de casi indiferencia, Brasil ha vuelto a tener relaciones de cooperación con África, basadas en tres ejes: bilateral, multilateral y triangular, en particular con

los países de lengua portuguesa (Comunidad de los Países de Lengua Portuguesa, CPLP), siendo el objetivo declarado la contribución al desarrollo de este continente, en su estrategia de inserción en el mundo mediante el fortalecimiento de la CSS.

Esta cooperación, fundamentalmente basada en la asistencia técnica horizontal (económica, científica y educacional) y analizada en profundidad por el capítulo de Jairo Baquero, en la presente obra, o por Lechini (2006: 103-137), se centra en los sectores como los de la agricultura, la educación, la salud, los transportes, las minas y la energía, en los países de la CPLP, como queda subrayado, para extenderse después a otros países del continente.

Sin embargo, en los últimos años, Brasil concentra su interés en el petróleo africano a través de las actividades de su empresa pública, Petrobras, presente en el Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea Ecuatorial, Tanzania, Argelia, Egipto y Libia, con importantes inversiones petroleras en Angola y Nigeria, además de ofrecer una cooperación tecnológica a los países africanos, no petroleros, para la producción de biocombustibles o el etanol, siendo el primer exportador y segundo productor del petróleo verde o del bioetanol después de EE UU, a pesar de importar grandes cantidades de biodiésel en un país como Sudáfrica, en el marco de la cooperación de los IBSA. Es preciso subrayar que Brasil e India, que son importantes cultivadores de la caña de azúcar, están promoviendo los biocarburantes en África para generar empleos. Brasil ha decidido invertir en los diez próximos años, en el propio país, unos 51.000 millones de dólares en la producción del etanol para satisfacer la demanda energética de

sus industrias, sin generar la deforestación y sin afectar la producción alimentaria, las dos críticas formuladas contra los biocarburantes.

La oportunidad le fue brindada por la creación, en 2006, de la Asociación Panafricana de los Países No Productores de Petróleo (PANPP, por sus siglas en inglés) o la “OPEP verde”, para ofrecer a los países africanos la posibilidad de desarrollar sus potencialidades en biocombustibles como una nueva forma de energía más barata y limpia, a partir de la caña de azúcar. Es lo que se viene llamando la “diplomacia del etanol”, que el entonces presidente Lula —que contó con el apoyo de los países africanos para tener un asiento permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas para su país— ofreció a los africanos para resolver los problemas de pobreza y desarrollo en África, pues esta fuente de energía generará empleos e ingresos para los pueblos africanos y divisas para los Estados.

La estrategia fue muy criticada, por considerar que plantea un problema de ética al constituir una amenaza para las tierras africanas, que deben ser dedicadas a la producción de alimentos para la población y no para las máquinas; es decir, una amenaza a la seguridad alimentaria. Otros puntos de vista consideran que África puede conseguir el bioetanol, con la tecnología brasileña, a partir de la *jatropha*, cultivable en las zonas áridas tropicales y sin necesidad de mucha agua.

Brasil, además de realizar una verdadera revolución industrial, está experimentando una espectacular revolución agrícola, ocupando el primer lugar en la producción mundial de jugo de naranja (82%), azúcar (30%), carne de pollo (30%), carne de

vaca (20%), café (30%), tabaco (25%) y soja (40%), y sigue siendo el principal suministrador de materias primas, lo que le hace ocupar un lugar privilegiado entre los países emergentes. Fuerte de estas potencialidades, que le convierte en una referencia para los países africanos, Brasil busca desarrollar relaciones con algunos de estos países con los que tiene relaciones históricas, como Nigeria y Angola (Gervaise, 2007).

Según puntualiza Lafargue (2008), Brasil quiere ayudar a los países africanos no productores de petróleo a reducir sus gastos petroleros, desarrollando los biocarburantes a partir de la caña de azúcar[65], de la que es el primer productor mundial. Brasil es aún un país dependiente, "con una política más desarrollista que verde", y la propia industria del etanol está en manos de los capitales de las multinacionales agroalimentarias (Revelli, 2010) y tiene importantes capas de la población que viven por debajo del umbral de pobreza en las favelas, y solo puede contribuir a aliviar algunos de los problemas coyunturales a los que están enfrentados los países africanos, defendiendo sobre todo sus intereses en los foros internacionales, donde se impone cada vez más como una potencia del futuro.

Su presencia en África se limita a la cooperación científica y tecnológica en el sector de la "revolución de los biocarburantes" y en la investigación en la agricultura y los productos farmacéuticos. Y últimamente, Brasil, a través de su empresa minera, Metorex, se interesa por las minas de cobre y de cobalto de la RDC (minas de Ruashi, Kinsenda y Lubembe) y de Zambia (mina de Chibuluma) (Vollgraaff, 2011: 1), aprovechando el auge del precio de estos metales en los mercados internacionales y

compitiendo con China.

En definitiva, Brasil, al que Lula consideró que debe asumir los desafíos y el destino de África por ser un país con la segunda población negra a nivel mundial, y por lo tanto con relaciones históricas y culturales, da prioridad a África en los programas de CSS de su agencia de cooperación al desarrollo. Además de abrir una docena de nuevas embajadas, Brasil financia proyectos agroecológicos y agroalimentarios en países como Malí, Kenia, Tanzania, Ghana, formando técnicos africanos en estos aspectos y en particular en la agricultura de conservación, para contrarrestar los efectos negativos de las subvenciones de los países del Norte a sus agricultores. Se da como principal objetivo convertirse en uno de los mayores socios de África y en el portavoz de sus intereses en los foros internacionales. Sin embargo, según recuerdan Severino y Ray (2010), las aportaciones brasileñas hacia África, aunque en aumento desde 2003, están por debajo de los demás países emergentes.

CHINA EN ÁFRICA

Para competir en África en igualdad con los países occidentales que disponen de importantes marcos institucionales de cooperación con los países africanos[66], China, que ha pasado de la “economía de mercado socialista” al “socialismo de mercado” (Massonnet, 2008: 153) o una especie de “keynesianismo a lo chino”, se dotó, en el año 2000, con el “Foro de Cooperación China-África” (FOCAC, por sus siglas en inglés), destinado a incrementar el comercio bilateral, definir un marco de

cooperación y planes de acción entre ambos socios, cuyas economías presentan importantes complementariedades: el excedente de capitales, la producción de bienes manufacturados y la necesidad de materias primas para China (Richer, 2008: 89)[67]; la escasez de capitales, la necesidad de bienes de equipo y los enormes recursos naturales para África, dando paso a lo que se viene llamando la “Chináfrica”.

De este modo, China ha pasado, según Morin-Allory (2005), del militantismo político tercermundista de la década de los setenta —para contrarrestar la influencia de los dos bloques en África mediante una ayuda desinteresada a los recién creados Estados africanos[68], fundamentalmente en las infraestructuras de carretera y ferrocarril—, al activismo económico, ilustrado por 720 proyectos clave en 49 países africanos[69] y la importación de 39 millones de toneladas del petróleo africano en 2005.

Los objetivos de la cooperación de China en África son hoy claramente más económicos que políticos[70]: la construcción de infraestructuras de interés público[71] en países como la RDC, el Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Kenia, Mozambique, Botsuana, Namibia, Angola, Zambia; el acceso a las materias primas del continente y el monopolio en los sectores clave de la economía de los países africanos (comercio, construcción, transportes, telecomunicaciones, etc.), ofreciendo también productos adaptados a las demandas y los poderes adquisitivos locales. Un aspecto que hace falta subrayar, y que fue descuidado durante mucho tiempo por los socios occidentales, es la concentración de la mencionada cooperación en las infraestructuras o los pequeños proyectos de inversión,

destinados a la mejora del bienestar o de las condiciones de vida de la población y fundamentales para el crecimiento: carreteras, escuelas, hospitales, viviendas sociales, pozos de agua potable realizados por la mano de obra importada china[72], con sueldos irrisorios y en un tiempo récord.

Otra característica de la cooperación china es su orientación hacia los países ricos en recursos naturales y en hidrocarburos (Cabestan, 2008: 18) como Sudáfrica, Angola, el golfo de Guinea y Sudán, constituyendo Nigeria y Sudáfrica los países que más concentran los intercambios comerciales entre China y África —y los hidrocarburos el 72% de las importaciones chinas en África —, mientras que países como Malí, Níger y Burkina Faso se han convertido en los principales exportadores del algodón hacia China.

El gigante asiático se ha convertido en el segundo socio comercial de África después de EE UU, antes que Francia y Reino Unido, pasando el comercio entre China y África de 10.000 millones dólares en 2000 a 73.300 millones de dólares en 2007.

Se denuncian globalmente la invasión de los mercados locales por los productos *made in China* y la competencia desleal contra la economía popular, sobre todo de los productos textiles, consiguiendo en Benín, según denuncia Lafargue (2005: 12), el cierre de las actividades en diciembre de 2004 de la Sitex (Société des Industries Textiles), hasta entonces una de las empresas florecientes de este país. En otro registro, la escasez de tierras fértiles en China para fomentar la producción nacional constituye una seria amenaza para las tierras agrícolas y las

selvas africanas, compradas por las empresas públicas chinas y las petromonarquías del Golfo[73] a cambio de la ayuda financiera y militar.

A pesar de las críticas formuladas contra la cooperación china en África, unas expuestas en el presente capítulo y otras en el capítulo de Iraxis Bello o de una manera radical por Guy Sorman[74] , organismos como el Banco Mundial, la OCDE e incluso un país como Francia reconocen cada vez más la contribución de China al desarrollo económico de África a través de su ayuda técnica y logística (Lafargue, 2008), una contribución que, a través de la ayuda a la agricultura en este continente, podría permitir alcanzar los objetivos siguientes: la autosuficiencia alimentaria, la reducción de los gastos petroleros de los países no productores de petróleo con el desarrollo de los biocombustibles a partir de la caña de azúcar, el fortalecimiento de las bases del desarrollo con la estabilización de los ingresos de los campesinos, el desarrollo de una agricultura competitiva capaz de conquistar los mercados europeos, las industrias de transformación de los productos agrícolas para el autoconsumo, además de convertirse China en el principal mercado de productos africanos como el té, el café, el algodón, las flores y los frutos del mar.

Además, para ser más completo este enfoque de CSS, que se desmarca del Consenso de Washington[75] para conseguir el desarrollo, debe implicarse más en las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz (OMP)[76] para promover la seguridad regional o contribuir a la resolución de crisis regionales y a la

democratización del continente, junto al acceso de los productos africanos a los mercados chinos, preocupación que ya manifestó el entonces presidente de Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, al manifestar en 2003, que "África consume desde hace tiempo productos *made in China*. Ahora, lo que necesitamos, es un acceso al mercado chino para vender nuestros productos".

Sin embargo, según subrayan algunos especialistas de la región (Morin-Allory, 2005), la determinación tanto de EE UU como de China de diversificar sus fuentes de aprovisionamiento en hidrocarburos y reducir su dependencia del Oriente Medio podría convertir a África en una zona de enfrentamiento entre ambos de aquí a 2020[77]. De momento, en la opinión de Delage (2009: 157), Pekín, con una diplomacia multilateral inteligente y conciliante, evita cualquier tipo de confrontación o conflicto internacional —en particular con EE UU y con los países vecinos (Nougayrède, 2011: 6)— para sacar provecho de la estabilidad del sistema internacional con el fin de promover su modernización y desarrollo interno y conseguir el estatus de superpotencia a nivel internacional. Por lo tanto, según subraya Ikenberry (2008), se ha adherido al orden internacional liberal o al sistema capitalista global. Con ello, está dentro y no fuera del orden occidental. Es decir, saca importantes ventajas de las reglas y principios del sistema o de las oportunidades brindadas por el comercio multilateral de la OMC, en particular el protegerse de la discriminación y del proteccionismo de los que suelen ser víctimas los países emergentes.

La cooperación de China, que se considera el "portavoz del Tercer Mundo"[78], se presenta según los responsables de la

diplomacia de este país como mejor adaptada a las necesidades de los africanos que la de la Unión Europea. Esta cooperación podría contribuir al desarrollo del continente no participando en el fortalecimiento de las economías rentistas africanas (dependencia de las materias primas y de la ayuda internacional), sino, según puntualiza Lafargue (2008), mediante la creación de un verdadero partenariado basado en la transferencia de tecnologías o de *know-how* (saber hacer), la formación de la mano de obra local, para pasar así de "predador" a un verdadero socio para el desarrollo.

Sin embargo, el *Katanga Business*, la película del belga Thierry Michel, demuestra lo contrario y pone de manifiesto un verdadero "imperialismo chino" o "el neocolonialismo económico chino", ilustrado por prácticas poco ortodoxas de las empresas chinas en esta provincia minera de la RDC, prácticas que se pueden extrapolar al conjunto del continente y que van desde la corrupción, la explotación de la mano de obra local sin contratos y con salarios irrisorios, y el caso omiso de consideraciones medioambientales.

Para hacer frente a las críticas de su cooperación en África, el primer ministro chino ofreció en la cuarta Cumbre del FOCAC, celebrada en noviembre de 2009, unos 10.000 millones de dólares de créditos a los países subsaharianos en mejores condiciones que las del mercado, para el periodo 2010-2012, con proyectos en la agricultura, la educación y sobre todo la salud[79] (Chaponnière, 2010). Todo ello sin condicionalidades políticas, sociales o medioambientales, salvo el no reconocimiento de Taiwán. Sin embargo, no se puede pasar por alto las virulentas

críticas suscitadas por la ayuda china a los gobiernos considerados como autoritarios e inestables (Kleine-Ahlbrandt y Small, 2008): 3.000 millones de dólares a Angola desde 2004; 5.000 millones de dólares a la RDC en 2006 o el contrato de unos 23.000 millones de dólares firmado el 14 de mayo de 2010 entre la Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) y la China State Construction Engineering Corporation Limited para la construcción de tres refinerías y una fábrica petroquímica, junto a las importantes inversiones en el sector del petróleo en Chad y en Guinea Ecuatorial.

Ha llegado quizás la hora de dejar de considerar la cooperación china como rival a la de los países del Norte en África, países que no suelen cumplir con sus promesas[80], sino como complementaria, sin perder de vista que la cooperación de los países del Sur dispone de una clara ventaja en relación con los del Norte por imponer nulas o menos condicionalidades en su cooperación y por compartir parecidas estructuras económicas o agrícolas con las africanas.

El éxito de modelo chino, y de su experiencia de desarrollo, suscita admiración en muchos países del Sur, y africanos en particular, por realizarse, según puntualiza Leonard (2008), sin la ayuda económica de Occidente (al contrario de los *tigres* asiáticos) y al margen de los dictados del Banco Mundial y del FMI (o "gobiernos de sustitución"), que han sustituido en estos países a las antiguas potencias coloniales. Les brinda la posibilidad de definir su propio modelo de desarrollo independiente o crecimiento alternativo del que siempre habían soñado (la vía no occidental de desarrollo), basado en la

combinación de las reformas económicas progresivas bajo el control del Estado y las prioridades sociales según su propia concepción. Es decir, la consagración el capitalismo de Estado o el “capitalismo reformado”, que combina la liberalización paulatina de la economía, el mantenimiento del monopolio del Estado y del autoritarismo, modelo que ha proporcionado impresionantes resultados y que suscita admiración en los países en desarrollo por desafiar la tesis del “fin de la historia”, anunciada en 1989 por Francis Fukuyama.

En opinión de González Richardson (2010), nos encontramos ante una nueva forma de cooperación, positiva para ambas partes al permitir a China tener acceso a los recursos naturales fundamentales para su crecimiento interno, a África disponer de infraestructuras determinantes para su desarrollo económico y no depender exclusivamente de la ayuda occidental que ha mostrado sus límites. Para este continente, siguiendo a este autor, la cooperación china le permite alcanzar varios objetivos: recuperar un cierto protagonismo internacional después de la guerra fría con el auge del precio de las materias por la fuerte demanda china, la construcción y reconstrucción de infraestructuras en los países destruidos por varios años de guerra como Angola y la RDC, el acceso a una cooperación alternativa y más generosa y a un modelo de crecimiento alternativo que quita a Occidente el monopolio en estos campos, el no depender exclusivamente de materias primas con la construcción de áreas económicas especiales, o zonas industriales, que crean las bases de la industrialización y del comercio.

Sin embargo, para ser más completa, esta cooperación debe asociar a los africanos en la realización de sus proyectos y el equilibrio de intereses en los contratos firmados, evitar la destrucción de las economías africanas con sus bienes baratos, no favorecer el "síndrome holandés" confinando el continente al único papel de reserva de recursos naturales y, sobre todo, lo más difícil, apostando por el buen gobierno político y económico para que los fondos así liberados no caigan en los bolsillos de las nomenclaturas locales corruptas, para que no se vuelva a criticar a China con hipocresía (Keet, 2010: 21) de apoyar regímenes corruptos y represivos[81] y de minar los esfuerzos occidentales (Banco Mundial y Unión Europea) para la instauración de la transparencia y la democracia en este continente.

Se trata de evitar lo que Vibe Christense (2010: 3) considera como riesgos potenciales que conlleva su cooperación: "riesgos políticos" (retroceso en los avances democráticos, de fortalecimiento de instituciones y de Estados de derecho y de lucha contra la corrupción conseguidos en los países africanos en las últimas décadas bajo las presiones occidentales); "riesgos económicos" (abandono de las disciplinas fiscales y monetarias realizadas por los países africanos a partir de las reformas macroeconómicas) y "riesgos de pérdida de la reputación" (que afecta a la propia imagen internacional de China por el no respeto de los derechos laborales y por las consecuencias medioambientales de su proyecto, además de generar un nuevo ciclo de endeudamiento del continente).

Es la única manera de disipar la sospecha de unas relaciones,

que algunos autores consideran como algo planificado a largo plazo por fundamentarse en la alianza de “oídos sordos y ojos vendados” (Thompson, 2005): unos, las dictaduras africanas, para no asumir sus obligaciones internas de construcción de infraestructuras básicas; otros, los chinos, para seguir exigiendo la no injerencia en sus asuntos internos, para mantener la dictadura doméstica y conseguir el apoyo necesario con miras a ser el portavoz del Sur, contrarrestar la entrada de Japón en el Consejo de Seguridad y el no reconocimiento de Taiwán por los países africanos, y conseguir el estatus de potencia a nivel global. O, según Brookes (2006) —véase también Alden, Large y Soares de Oliveira (2008)—, para permitir a China extender su modelo de cooperación con un importante valor energético y estratégico, pues este modelo no persigue a largo plazo el desarrollo económico de los africanos, y conseguir recursos naturales o materias primas que necesita su industria, probar la competitividad de sus empresas utilizando a África como terreno de experimentación de sus bienes manufacturados, ganar importantes mercados africanos y globales en detrimento de los intereses occidentales.

En los últimos años, China ha modificado considerablemente su apoyo a los “Estados parias” mediante acciones positivas como el apoyo al despliegue de una fuerza conjunta ONU-UA en el Darfur, los contactos con el gobierno de sur de Sudán, la reducción de la ayuda económica a Zimbabwe para limitarla solo a la ayuda humanitaria y la participación en las OMP, estando hoy presente en siete de las nueve misiones de la ONU en África (Kleine-Ahlbrandt y Small, 2008), asumiendo de este modo sus

responsabilidades internacionales como gran potencia en detrimento del apoyo incondicional al mundo en desarrollo.

De acuerdo con Massonnet (2008), es temprano para saber si China está saqueando a África o si está contribuyendo a ayudarla a salir del subdesarrollo crónico. Eso lo irá dando el tiempo. De momento, el lado negativo de esta cooperación, de la que esperan mucho los africanos, es el apoyo a las dictaduras corruptas y su contribución a lo que Severino y Ray (2010) califican de peor enemigo de África: la corrupción. Su lado positivo: la apuesta por el capital humano y la UA, recibiendo en el primer caso a 21.000 estudiantes africanos, en 2007, becados por el gobierno chino, y en el segundo la construcción de la nueva sede de la UA, en Addis Abeba, un edificio ultramoderno de 25 plantas y 500 oficinas, y estimado en unos 150 millones de dólares, seduciendo de este modo la sensibilidad y el corazón de los africanos.

En resumen, la política africana de China, que ha pasado de los aspectos ideológicos de la guerra fría a la competencia económica, no exenta de objetivos políticos, se fundamenta en los siguientes ejes (Vibe Christense, 2010; Alden, Large y Soares de Oliveira, 2008; Aning, 2010):

- La realización de su desarrollo interno y el aumento de su peso en el comercio mundial mediante el acceso a los recursos naturales y a los mercados del continente, utilizado como terreno para experimentar la competitividad de sus empresas y bienes, en su objetivo de conquistar los mercados internacionales.
- La ayuda, no ligada y sin condicionalidades, que se

fundamenta en los principios de la coexistencia pacífica, la igualad, la reciprocidad, la coordinación y el desarrollo común. El objetivo es conseguir el no reconocimiento por los países africanos de Taiwán (reconocimiento de una "única China") y no apoyar con sus votos la candidatura de Japón para ocupar un asiento en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.

- La ayuda, dirigida a todos los países y no a un grupo de países, se inspira en la cooperación económica "ganador-ganador" (beneficios mutuos), y está concentrada en las infraestructuras[82], en las que China tiene las capacidades y los africanos las necesidades.
- El uso por parte de China del pasado no colonial y de una experiencia parecida de país en desarrollo para acercarse a los gobiernos africanos. Por ello, orienta también su cooperación en los aspectos abandonados por la cooperación occidental, privilegiando los instrumentos siguientes: la construcción de infraestructuras públicas y de zonas económicas especiales y la asistencia técnica en los aspectos tales como la lucha contra el paludismo, la formación del capital humano, en particular en la educación y la agricultura, en el marco global de la lucha contra la pobreza. Es decir, la exportación hacia África de su modelo de desarrollo y de su experiencia de lucha contra la pobreza.

Para conseguir todos estos objetivos, según puntualizan Alden, Large y Soares de Oliveira (2008), China combina la

diplomacia agresiva, las facilidades financieras y el bajo coste de sus proyectos y bienes, aprovechando la predisposición de los africanos a cambiar con facilidad sus socios externos.

INDIA EN ÁFRICA

Inicialmente interesada por el África Oriental y Austral —donde viven importantes diásporas o comunidades hindúes y donde las potencias tradicionales como Inglaterra y Portugal han perdido cualquier forma de influencia—, India, con tradicionales relaciones comerciales con los países africanos, casi desapareció del continente durante varias décadas. Varias razones explican esta situación, en particular la fuerte implicación de las dos superpotencias en este continente durante la guerra fría, el aumento de sus problemas internos debido a la desaparición del aliado soviético y del fracaso de su modelo de desarrollo (Lafargue, 2008), limitándose a la cooperación técnica, lingüística y cultural con los países africanos en el marco de la Commonwealth, en los programas de educación y de desarrollo en particular.

Hoy, como líder del “grupo de los 77” o de los no-alineados, en la línea de la solidaridad afroasiática de los sesenta, India extiende su cooperación en todo el continente para ampliar sus mercados y acceder a los hidrocarburos, junto a la resurrección del espíritu de Bandung para asentar su influencia internacional, y sobre todo para ofrecer una alternativa a la cooperación de China, su rival, y conseguir el desarrollo de África.

India, a través de sus empresas, invierte en los fosfatos, las

telecomunicaciones y las tecnologías punta, y en particular en el sector petrolero, en muchos países africanos que se han beneficiado de créditos de los bancos y del gobierno indios para los proyectos económicos, sociales y de infraestructuras a cambio de contratos para la explotación del petróleo y el acceso a los recursos naturales. Los intercambios comerciales entre India y África se han quintuplicado en cinco años para alcanzar unos 30.000 millones de dólares en 2007, además de proceder a la transferencia de tecnologías. Sus relaciones con África son menos estratégicas que las de China (Hugon, 2009), con la que intenta rivalizar con la celebración del primer Foro India-África, que tuvo lugar en abril de 2008, sin buscar la confrontación directa.

Su fuerte dependencia de petróleo le lleva a establecer relaciones estrechas con países como Nigeria, del que procede el 15% de sus importaciones, y Sudán. Su carácter multiconfesional y multiétnico, al igual que los países africanos, además de ser “la mayor democracia del mundo” y la más sólida de las economías de los BRIC, junto a su legado del espíritu de Bandung, atenuarán sus ambiciones neoimperiales en África. Es decir, parafraseando a Hugo Restall (citado por Smith, 2007: 177), la diferencia está marcada por el contraste entre la democracia india, inspirada en los valores occidentales, y el autoritarismo chino.

Para contrarrestar la influencia de China en África, Nueva Delhi, con medios financieros y políticos limitados y con importantes “debilidades internas y externas que pueden mermar su proyección global” (Mato Bouzas, 2009: 352; Banerji

Bhattacharya, 2010: 72), intenta favorecer en el continente otro modelo de relaciones, basado en la calidad y el fomento de la integración regional para conseguir el desarrollo africano[83]. Se trata de un modelo que se basa en la cooperación comercial, la cooperación energética y la cooperación política, insistiendo en los aspectos descuidados por los países occidentales y emergentes (Lafargue, 2008). Por lo tanto, África, sobre todo en su parte austral y oriental, recibió el 20% de la IDE india y la construcción de industrias textiles, farmacéuticas, de montaje de vehículos, agroalimentarias, de telecomunicaciones y transportes, a través de sus diásporas allí instaladas desde hace varias décadas o de sus empresas como el grupo Tata[84], siendo el objetivo reducir la dependencia de los países africanos en estos aspectos.

Esta cooperación se ha extendido también a los países del África Occidental y Central (Burkina Faso, Costa de Marfil, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea Ecuatorial, Malí, Senegal, Chad) a los que India concedió créditos estimados en unos 500 millones de dólares, bajo la forma de bienes de equipo y de transferencia de tecnologías en el marco del Team-9 (Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement) o programa de cooperación entre India y ocho países africanos. Asimismo, India otorgó unos 200 millones de dólares al NEPAD para la financiación de los proyectos regionales, contribuyendo de este modo a la promoción de la integración regional en África junto a los 1.000 millones de dólares invertidos en colaboración con la UA en la creación de un e-Network panafricano o satélite destinado a proporcionar las tecnologías indias a los 53 países

africanos a través de la telemedicina y la teleeducación, junto a la cancelación de la deuda de cinco países africanos (Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana y Uganda), que forman parte de países pobres altamente endeudados —HIPC, por sus siglas en inglés— (Naidu, 2010; Kumar Sinha, 2010).

En el ámbito exclusivamente petrolero, además de los aspectos arriba subrayados, India intenta diversificar sus fuentes de aprovisionamiento en hidrocarburos, interesándose en África, de la que procede el 25% de sus importaciones, en particular en Libia, Sudán y el golfo de Guinea, extendiendo las prospecciones *off shore* en países como Costa de Marfil, Ghana y Guinea-Bissau. De la misma manera que China, la explotación del petróleo africano por India se hace a cambio de la construcción de infraestructuras, en particular de la transferencia de las nuevas tecnologías de la información y de telecomunicación (informática), en la agricultura (revolución verde) y la salud. Es decir, en los aspectos industriales en los que India tiene una ventaja competitiva a nivel mundial.

Es preciso también subrayar que, al contrario que China, interesada fundamentalmente en los hidrocarburos, India centra cada vez más su interés en los minerales, que necesita para su desarrollo industrial: el 61% de sus importaciones en 2003, procedentes en lo esencial de Sudáfrica, y exporta productos manufacturados a los países subsaharianos como la ropa o los medicamentos.

En lo estrictamente político, India sigue fundamentando su política africana en la filosofía del MNOAL[85], del que forma parte con muchos países africanos, cuyo apoyo intenta reunir para

conseguir un puesto de miembro permanente en la eventual reforma del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Además, India contribuye en muchas OMP en el continente, suministrando el grueso de cascos azules en países como Sudán, Eritrea, la RDC, o en el conflicto entre Etiopía y Somalia, junto a la formación de ejércitos de algunos países africanos en la lucha antiterrorista, fortaleciendo de este modo su imagen internacional.

Al igual que en el caso de China, la cooperación india, a pesar de sus buenas intenciones, sigue favoreciendo la economía rentista de los países africanos, es decir, su dependencia de los recursos minerales y agrícolas sin conseguir fortalecer la competitividad industrial africana a nivel internacional. Se limita a resolver algunos problemas internos puntuales de dichos países, como el montaje de los vehículos por el grupo Tata Motors.

En el aspecto en el que India puede interesar a los países africanos es en sus tecnologías de industrias agroalimentarias, que le han convertido en el mayor productor mundial de carne, leche, caña de azúcar, nuez de coco y especias, y el segundo de arroz, trigo, frutas y legumbres, para permitir a los africanos conseguir la soberanía alimentaria.

En definitiva, la política africana de India, concentrada en los países africanos de la costa del Índico, persigue los objetivos siguientes (Kragelund: 2010: 1-6):

- Atraerse los votos africanos necesarios para conseguir un asiento permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.
- Mejorar su imagen en el mundo pasando de receptor a

donante de la ayuda, en particular en la lucha contra las enfermedades en el continente, aprovechando su ventaja competitiva en las industrias farmacéuticas.

- Competir con China en el acceso a los recursos naturales y los mercados del continente, dando una cierta especificidad a su cooperación concentrada en la formación, el fortalecimiento de las capacidades africanas de mantenimiento de la paz y la asistencia humanitaria.
- El fomento del desarrollo en África en el marco del diálogo Sur-Sur y entre socios iguales.

En definitiva, siguiendo a Naidu (2010: 35), de igual modo que China puede prevalerse de no tener un pasado esclavista, colonialista e imperialista en África para ofrecer su cooperación en África, India puede también pretender tener la misma moral. Además, según aclara Obi (2000: 188), India se presenta como “un verdadero socio y viejo amigo de África”, dispuesta a contribuir a su desarrollo sobre la base también de relaciones ganador-ganador, recordando al respecto su contribución a la solidaridad afroasiática en Bandung en 1955, que creó una comunidad de intereses entre ambos. De momento, intenta fortalecer su cooperación política y económica con África con créditos. Su política africana intenta coordinar las estrategias y los existentes intereses comunes hacia la instauración de un nuevo orden internacional justo.

SUDÁFRICA Y EL RENACIMIENTO AFRICANO

Primera potencia económica y militar del continente, Sudáfrica actúa en África por mediación de la UA y del NEPAD, en el marco de la filosofía del “renacimiento africano” o de las “soluciones africanas a los problemas africanos”, sustituyendo a las antiguas potencias coloniales, sobre todo en el África Austral[86], donde su dominio económico es abrumador (80% del PIB) dentro de la Unión Aduanera del África Austral (SACU) y de la SADC, particularmente en los países BSLN (Botsuana, Suazilandia, Lesoto, Namibia), integrados en su sistema económico, militar y monetario.

Con 14.000 millones de dólares invertidos en el continente entre 1995 y 2005, Sudáfrica es el primer inversor en África Subsahariana, antes que EE UU (10.000 millones), Francia (6.000 millones) o Gran Bretaña (4.500 millones). Se ha convertido en el principal destino de las exportaciones o mercados de esta región después de Europa, que sigue siendo su principal socio comercial. Las exportaciones hacia los países africanos están integradas en lo esencial por bienes manufacturados e incluso por armas, junto a la asistencia técnica en las industrias petroleras en los países del golfo de Guinea —Nigeria, Gabón y Angola— (Onana, 2005).

La política africana de Sudáfrica tiene como prioridades: el fortalecimiento de la cooperación con los países africanos, la difusión de principios democráticos, la consolidación de las bases del desarrollo social, político y económico de África a partir de la mencionada filosofía del “renacimiento africano”, y la participación en las operaciones de prevención y resolución de los conflictos, la implicación diplomática o las mediaciones en la

búsqueda de compromisos entre las partes en los problemas políticos en los países africanos (RDC, Burundi, Costa de Marfil, etc.). A ello es preciso añadir la incorporación del continente a la economía mundial para reducir las diferencias con los países desarrollados, además de un papel activo en la creación del NEPAD y en la transformación de la OUA en UA.

Es preciso subrayar la colaboración con Nigeria, la otra potencia africana —después de los primeros años de discrepancias a mediados de la década de los noventa—, para encontrar soluciones concertadas en los problemas de desarrollo del continente o para oponerse a la instauración del mando militar estadounidense en África o el "United States Africa Command" (AFRICOM), creado en octubre de 2007. Ambos países han instaurado una cooperación comercial, bastante asimétrica, al aumentar en dimensiones desproporcionadas las exportaciones sudafricanas hacia Nigeria, el mayor mercado africano, que no tiene nada que exportar hacia Sudáfrica al margen del petróleo, que constituye el 98% de las importaciones sudafricanas.

Sin embargo, contra la hegemonía sudafricana, algunos países como Angola, Nigeria (dependientes ampliamente del petróleo) y Zimbabwe (hundido en el caos), y sin gran peso en las relaciones de fuerza, manifiestan de vez en cuando ciertas discrepancias o declaraciones de autonomía.

Otro aspecto es que siendo la economía sudafricana, aunque diversificada, fundamentalmente minera, no solo le lleva a competir con las demás economías africanas que le sirven al tiempo de reserva de materias primas para sus industrias

pesadas, sino que además no le permite resistir a la competencia financiera de los países asiáticos, como China e India, en su propia zona de influencia o en países como Zimbabwe, Angola o Nigeria. Prueba de ello es la rehabilitación por estas dos potencias del ferrocarril de Beira (Mozambique) y la vinculación de la red de ferrocarriles de Angola con los puertos de Mozambique, pasando por la RDC, Zambia y Zimbabwe, para fomentar el comercio regional y evitar la larga trayectoria de la ruta del Cabo[87], además de convertir a Sudáfrica en fuente de materias primas y en mercado para sus productos industriales, farmacéuticos e informáticos, procedentes sobre todo de India.

La persistencia de fracturas sociales heredadas del *apartheid*, y que afectan negativamente a la mayoría negra (79% de la población activa) que le hace ocupar el 121 lugar de los 177 países en el *ranking* de los índices de desarrollo humano, lleva a Sudáfrica a ocuparse un poco más de los problemas internos —con políticas como las de “Affirmative Action” (PHD), que privilegia el acceso al empleo de los negros, y de “Black Economic Empowerment” (BEE), destinada a incentivar a los inversores negros—, en detrimento del resto del continente. La lentitud de cambios realizados desde 1994, en relación con aquellos objetivos, explica cómo queda aludido el cese de Thabo Mbeki a favor de Jacob Zuma, apoyado por los decepcionados de la esperanza creada por el fin del *apartheid*. Esta decepción, a la que es preciso sumar el pobre rendimiento del ANC en los gobiernos locales y las deficiencias en el suministro de los servicios básicos a la población, explica la amplia victoria en Ciudad del Cabo (la segunda ciudad del país) de la señora Helen

Zille, de la Alianza Democrática, en las últimas elecciones municipales con el apoyo del electorado negro. Y ello a pesar del discurso con tintes racistas utilizado contra ella por los miembros del ANC durante la campaña electoral (*The Economist*, 4 de junio de 2011: 54).

En definitiva, el problema fundamental, que impide a Sudáfrica asumir plenamente el papel de gran potencia es lo que Le Gouriellec (2010) llama la coexistencia permanente en un mismo país de "tres mundos": el Primer Mundo (desarrollado), el Tercer Mundo y el Cuarto Mundo. Ello no le impide asumir, según Hugon (2005), el papel de potencia de sustitución a las antiguas potencias coloniales en el continente, sobre todo en el África Austral.

Es verdad que los dirigentes del ANC, partido de liberación y de gobierno, integrados por los antiguos exiliados en los países africanos, han apostado por una diplomacia a favor de la ayuda a los países de la zona. Sin embargo, están enfrentados a importantes problemas internos (De Villepin y Thual, 2009; Lafargue, 2007): el auge de la violencia y de la pobreza que afecta ampliamente a la población negra, la alta tasa de desempleo (40%) y de la mortandad infantil, la corrupción, la emigración de la población blanca (20.000 a 40.000 personas al año), que huyen de la violencia y de la discriminación positiva a favor de los negros, junto a la persistencia de las desigualdades sociales heredadas del *apartheid*. Todo debilita a Sudáfrica como potencia emergente en el continente y sus aspiraciones de encabezar el "renacimiento africano", limitándose a alianzas de tipo G-3 (con Brasil e India, en el marco del G-20), para

presionar a los países industrializados para que reduzcan sus subvenciones agrícolas por perjudicar a las economías africanas.

CONSIDERACIONES FINALES Y PERSPECTIVAS

Las debilidades del Sur en general, y de África en particular, con las consiguientes implicaciones en la cooperación entre los países en desarrollo, pueden resumirse en torno a los factores siguientes: la falta de Estados fuertes; la ausencia de importantes mercados internos; las divergencias de intereses entre ellos, que convierten en inoperantes sus sindicatos o coaliciones de productores de bienes básicos; la competencia o rivalidad entre ellos para asegurarse un lugar en la economía mundializada, haciendo difícil la creación de un frente de reivindicaciones comunes, y la proliferación de los conflictos fronterizos y de las guerras intraestatales (Badia-Lloveras, 1997), como en los casos de India/Pakistán, Etiopía/ Somalia, la región de los Grandes Lagos (RDC, Ruanda, Burundi, Uganda), Darfur, El Salvador, Perú, Chiapas, Irak, Afganistán, etc.

En suma, los llamados países del Sur (subsaharianos, magrebíes, medioorientales, asiáticos y latinoamericanos) se caracterizan por la nula o débil diversificación de las economías, la dependencia de la fluctuación de los precios en el mercado internacional, las debilidades del Estado-nación y la proliferación de los conflictos armados. Ello complica la posibilidad de construcción de estrategias comunes, políticas, diplomáticas, comerciales y económicas convergentes, y de tener un peso en

las negociaciones con el Norte en estos campos. En las dos últimas décadas, las estrategias comunes del Sur han sido aniquiladas o debilitadas, según Lechini (2009b), por el fin de la guerra fría, la crisis de la deuda, la ofensiva de las políticas neoliberales o del Consenso de Washington, impidiendo cualquier posibilidad de una política de desarrollo alternativo y la agudización de los problemas de desarrollo en los países en desarrollo.

Se impone ahora, aprovechando las fallas y la crisis estructural del sistema, la búsqueda de otro modelo de desarrollo y la instauración de una triple triangulación: político-diplomática, económico-comercial y científico-académica, según la acertada recomendación de Maguemati (2007). El objetivo es poner en común las complementariedades y las ventajas competitivas en estos aspectos, y conseguir en las relaciones con el Norte la reforma de las instituciones financieras internacionales redefiniendo su papel, organización y mecanismos del reparto del poder, con la finalidad de permitir a los países del Sur poner el comercio internacional al servicio de su desarrollo (Carroué, 2009). Se trata, en definitiva, de aprovechar la crisis actual del modelo capitalista, que ha quitado cualquier credibilidad a los países ricos para pretender definir un nuevo sistema económico por ser responsables del “desastre actual”, que han afectado negativamente a los países del Sur, y por sus “indecencias”, que han llevado al movimiento del 15M o de “los indignados”, acampados en la Puerta del Sol en Madrid (y en 70 ciudades españolas) y en la Place de la Bastille en París, para protestar contra los partidos políticos y las clases gobernantes por su

alianza con el capital financiero en detrimento de los más desfavorecidos, condenados al paro, a la precariedad o a “trabajar más para ganar menos” (Borrillo y Gutierrez Castillo, 2011: 21). Esta tarea de realizar cambios incumbe, según recomienda Ramonet (2009: 16), a las potencias del Sur como China, India, Brasil, Argentina, México y Sudáfrica —en colaboración con los excluidos o los “indignados” del Norte—, que deben concebir y concretar aquel sistema en el marco de la ONU, y al margen del G-8 y del G-20.

Independientemente del Foro IBSA, que dio un paso de gigante en la CSS en los aspectos político-diplomáticos, en los campos estrictamente académicos y científicos, en la línea de las tesis expuestas por Alejandra Doria en su capítulo, Jean-Loup Amselle (2008: 114-115) recuerda importantes avances con la existencia de acuerdos trilaterales entre el Conseil pour le Développement de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales en Afrique (CODESRIA), el Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLASCO) y la Asian Political & International Studies Association (APISA), con divisiones de tareas: el primero se encarga de la reflexión sobre la redefinición del desarrollo; el segundo se centra en el análisis de la geopolítica de las relaciones internacionales, mientras que la tercera estudia las relaciones entre la democracia y la gobernanza. Estos organismos suelen insistir en la inadaptación de las teorías y metodologías importadas del Norte y la necesidad de modelos alternativos, capaces de contrarrestar la dominación de las IFI (FMI y BM) mediante la definición de una estrategia altermundialista próxima a la defendida en los foros sociales

mundiales y en la línea de las teorías de la dependencia de los setenta.

En fin, siguiendo el informe de la CNUCED sobre la cooperación Sur-Sur, se puede considerar que la cooperación de los países en desarrollo, o del Sur, contribuye al crecimiento de África, a la reducción de la pobreza en el continente y ofrece nuevas posibilidades para la transformación de las economías africanas. Sin embargo, para ser más eficiente y duradero, debe enfrentarse a una serie de desafíos, que son al mismo tiempo críticas, que nos parecen acertados (UNCTAD, 2010: 26-28).

Los socios del sur de África suelen tener una estrategia coherente y claramente definida a nivel regional. Lo que no sucede con los países africanos, sin ningún enfoque regional o estrategia concertada[88]. Por lo tanto, asistimos a un claro desequilibrio en cuanto a la maximización de beneficios entre ambos grupos de socios, e incluso a la profundización de desigualdades entre los países africanos. Además, aquellos socios suelen realizar sus proyectos a nivel de cada país africano, y raras veces a nivel regional o en relación con las prioridades regionales, tal y como están definidas, por ejemplo, por el NEPAD, obstaculizando de este modo el proceso de integración regional.

Estos proyectos de los socios del Sur suelen concentrarse en los países ricos en recursos naturales y geopolíticamente estratégicos[89], lo que impide que los beneficios sean iguales para ambas partes o estén desequilibrados. Por lo tanto, no hay una clara coincidencia entre los intereses estratégicos de los socios del Sur con las necesidades de desarrollo de los países

africanos.

Estos socios deben identificar las áreas en las que tienen una ventaja competitiva, para concentrar en ella su cooperación por tener la capacidad de competencia internacional en estos aspectos. Por ejemplo, China debería concentrase en la construcción de infraestructuras regionales, y Brasil en el desarrollo de la agricultura tropical, en concertación con los programas del NEPAD que se refieren a estos aspectos.

La implicación del sector privado, de la sociedad civil y de los Parlamentos en la concepción y ejecución de los proyectos, al objeto de evitar la opacidad y conseguir su reapropiación por los pueblos.

La falta de información sobre las actividades de los socios del Sur hace difícil cualquier análisis del impacto concreto de dichas actividades en la región. Se impone, por lo tanto, la transparencia y la instauración de unas relaciones duraderas y viables entre ambos grupos de socios.

Los países africanos deben elaborar mecanismos y estrategias comunes a nivel de la UA, o de los organismos especializados, para poner dicha cooperación al servicio de sus intereses, tanto nacionales como regionales, y para conseguir sus objetivos de desarrollo, además de concebir la CSS como un complemento y no un sustituto de la cooperación tradicional o Norte-Sur. Es decir, la instauración de una cooperación triangular. Esta triangulación, en la opinión de Santiso (2011), ha permitido a los países latinoamericanos —que han instaurado relaciones comerciales, industriales y financieras con los países asiáticos, y en particular con China, sin romper con EE UU y

Europa— resistir a la actual crisis económica y financiera internacional. Es preciso también subrayar que el fortalecimiento de las relaciones entre los países de América Latina ha sido otro factor clave en dicha resistencia.

En definitiva, el informe recomienda a los países africanos concentrar estas nuevas aportaciones de los países emergentes en su desarrollo y el fortalecimiento de la autodependencia: vincular estas inversiones con las economías locales, centrarlas en el fomento de la integración regional y orientarlas hacia la creación de empresas conjuntas o mixtas, para permitir a los empresarios locales tener acceso a los conocimientos y contribuir a la transformación de las economías locales.

Por nuestra parte, en la línea de las tesis de Dot Keet (2006), se impone una serie de actuaciones, que han de partir de la adopción de una verdadera "agenda Sur-Sur", inspirada en planteamientos políticos y económicos de autoorganización a todos los niveles y en todos los aspectos, cuyos puntos esenciales son: el apoyo a las iniciativas y los desafíos de las organizaciones populares no gubernamentales de los IBSA en su lucha contra el imperialismo y las multinacionales; la erradicación de la dependencia en todas sus formas; el rechazo de las intervenciones externas en el regionalismo bajo la forma de áreas de libre comercio, de APE o de las políticas neoliberales del Banco Mundial y de la OMC, destinadas a la incorporación de los países del Sur a la economía global para servir a los intereses de los más poderosos y de sus empresas[90]; la adopción de otro enfoque de integración regional global y multisectorial basado en el *self reliance*, y no librecambista

(inadecuado entre socios con desiguales niveles de desarrollo), dando prioridad a los aspectos sociales y destinado a reducir las desigualdades dentro de un mismo país y entre los países, favoreciendo las complementariedades productivas y comerciales; la reducción de la dependencia, la dominación y las vulnerabilidades externas, junto a la resolución de las tensiones políticas y económicas internas. Es decir, en la opinión de Robert (2006: 174), una agenda propia inspirada en las dinámicas de las sociedades del Sur o africanas, y fundamentalmente "antiimperialista, anticapitalista y antidesarrollo".

Si quieren ayudar efectivamente a los Estados africanos, los países emergentes deben contribuir a la industrialización y diversificación de las economías de este continente —ello es también válido, según subraya Santiso (2011: 97), para los países latinoamericanos cuyas relaciones con China están dominadas por las materias primas—. De lo contrario, o al limitarse a la explotación de recursos naturales, estarían contribuyendo al fortalecimiento de las economías rentistas o al papel de África como reserva de materias primas, función a la que el Banco Mundial y el FMI la han confinado con sus políticas de liberalización y desindustrialización, esta vez a su favor (Keet, 2010: 27).

Para los países africanos se trata de adoptar, como prioridad, un nuevo enfoque de integración regional basado en los ejes siguientes (Asante, 2007): la integración de las infraestructuras físicas (para vincular el desarrollo nacional y el desarrollo regional, creando las adecuadas infraestructuras de transportes y comunicaciones); la integración de las estructuras productivas

(para crear efectivas estructuras nacionales de integración y complementariedades entre la agricultura y la industria y para reducir la excesiva dependencia externa); la liberalización de los intercambios con un trato diferencial a los Estados miembros menos avanzados (para compensar la pérdida de sus derechos aduaneros e incentivarlos) y la integración monetaria (para fomentar el comercio entre los Estados miembros). Este último aspecto es fundamental para los países francófonos del África Occidental y Central, desvincularse del franco CFA[91] para crear una moneda africana y su propio sistema bancario, y apostar un poco más por la horizontalidad o, según el profesor Joseph Ki-Zerbo, por el desarrollo endógeno, pues en su opinión “no se desarrolla uno si no se desarrolla a sí mismo”. Más que nunca ha llegado la hora de recuperar los principales fundamentos del Plan de Acción de Lagos (PAL): la autosuficiencia colectiva nacional y regional (integración regional horizontal), la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas y la construcción de las infraestructuras esenciales, la erradicación de la pobreza.

En la opinión de Tandon (2010), al igual que Latinoamérica debe neutralizar el poder de EE UU, África ha de oponerse a la Unión Europea mediante una serie de actuaciones: la recuperación y fortalecimiento del panafricanismo o de la unidad africana a partir de la integración regional, el fin de la mentalidad de víctima[92] y mendigo, el control sobre sus capitales humanos, naturales y medioambientales, el dominio de la ciencia y la tecnología, la implicación en la reestructuración de las instituciones internacionales y de Bretton Woods controladas por las antiguas potencias y coloniales; objetivos que se pueden

conseguir solo mediante lo que venimos llamando la emergencia de una nueva clase de dirigentes africanos, un poco más nacionalistas y más panafricanistas al servicio de los pueblos y en defensa de sus intereses. El primer paso, según Ngoie Tshibambe (2008), consiste en acabar con unos Estados concebidos y mantenidos contra el desarrollo y la constitución de un gobierno federal africano.

En suma, y de acuerdo con el profesor Fantu Cheru (2010: 228-236), se impone una serie de actuaciones a nivel nacional y regional o continental, para hacer frente al "imperialismo" de China e India en África o a su penetración en las economías africanas, y por extrapolación a la de los demás países emergentes. Se trata, en lo esencial, en el primer aspecto de la adopción de políticas de desarrollo nacionales basadas en el Estado, alejadas de la globalización neoliberal o del Consenso de Washington, y concertadas con los actores de la sociedad civil o de un modelo a favor de los pobres, socialmente justo y ecológicamente sostenible, que ha de crear complementariedades entre la economía oficial y la economía popular, dando prioridad a los aspectos de desarrollo humano; es decir, la opción de "más Estado que menos Estado". En el segundo, es preciso el abandono o la transformación de muchos aspectos defendidos por el NEPAD, de corte neoliberal y con planteamientos extrovertidos, mediante la armonización de las políticas macroeconómicas y de las políticas de inversión regionales a través de la integración o coordinación de los planes y presupuestos nacionales; la armonización de los proyectos regionales de desarrollo en la construcción de las

infraestructuras; la creación de un marco regional para la promoción de las inversiones y los intercambios comerciales; la elaboración de instituciones sólidas y de burocracias eficientes para la lucha contra la corrupción; la instauración de negociaciones y acuerdos comerciales más regionales que bilaterales; la adopción de plataformas de investigación y de desarrollo de recursos humanos e incluso de análisis de las políticas nacionales y exteriores y de las economías de estos nuevos socios, para contrarrestar su tendencias "imperialistas". Es decir, pasar en las estrategias de integración regional de la defensiva a la ofensiva, mediante lo que Herrera (2010: 93) califica de "integración alternativa" o de "versión africana del Alba", una integración basada en la mejora de las condiciones sociales de los pueblos y en el fomento de los intercambios Sur-Sur.

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Xiaohe, Z. (2001): "L'inégalité croissante des revenus en Chine et ses causes", en AA.VV., *Socialisme et marché: Chine, Vietnam, Cuba*, Centre Tricontinental-L'Harmattan, Lovaina la Nueva-París.
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NOTAS

1. Tahina Ojeda Medina es doctora en Ciencias Políticas, máster en Estudios Contemporáneos de América Latina y magíster en Cooperación Internacional. Licenciada en Estudios Internacionales y abogada. Investigadora y docente adscrita al Instituto Universitario de Desarrollo y Cooperación de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

2. Ese Sur al que, desde la cooperación internacional, se le ha caracterizado como: “insuficientemente desarrollado”, “subdesarrollado”, “en desarrollo”, “periférico”, “pobre”, “tercermundista”, “empobrecido”, etc.

3. El Plan de Acción para Promover y Realizar la Cooperación Técnica entre los Países en Desarrollo, conocido como Plan de Acción de Buenos Aires, fue el producto de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Cooperación Técnica entre Países en Desarrollo celebrada en Buenos Aires en 1978.

4. Aunque hay un poco más de acuerdo sobre el concepto de cooperación triangular, su definición sigue estando en proceso de conceptualización, ya que es una práctica novedosa en la que las partes están intentando conseguir la mejor forma de articulación entre la CSS y la CNS.

5. Plan de Acción de Buenos Aires 1978.

6. En Cooperación Sur-Sur, Programa Internacional para el Fortalecimiento de la Cooperación Sur-Sur.

7. En *Revista Cooperación Sur*, PNUD, julio de 1995, pp. 34-40.

8. Manish Jain es consultor en cuestiones de desarrollo con experiencia en África oriental, Asia meridional y la ex Unión Soviética. Sus esferas de interés t participación incluyen ahora el sector de la educación y el uso de la tecnología de los medios de difusión en el desarrollo. Tiene experiencia en la industria bancaria y ha trabajado como consultor en diversas organizaciones de desarrollo, entre ellas, UNICEF y la USAID.

9. South Centre (1990): *The Challenge to the South: Report of the South Commission,* Nueva York, Oxford University Press, p. 8.

10. The South Centre (1993): *Facing the Challenge: Responses to the Report of the South Commission,* Londres, Zed Books, p. 71.

11. *Facing the Challenge*, p. 120.

12. *The Challenge of the South*, p. 12.

13. *Facing the Challenge*, p. 70.

14. *Facing the Challenge*, p. 64.

15. Michael Watts (1993): .

16. *Facing the Challenge*, pp. 87-88.

17. *Facing the Challenge*, p. 118.

18. The Challenge of the South, p. 1.

19. *Facing the Challenge*, p. 5.

20. Para un análisis más detallado, véase South Centre (1992): "The United Nations at a Critical Crossroad: Time for the South to Act".

21. *Facing the Challenge*, p. 68.

22. M. Mitchell Waldrop (1992): *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of the Order and Chaos,* Nueva York, Touchstone Books, p. 12.

23. C. A. Van Peursen y M. C. Doeser (eds.) (1985): *Development and its Rationalities: Philosophical and Cultural Aspects of the Concept of Development*, Ámsterdam: Free University Press, p. 29.

24. *Facing the Challenge*, pp. 98-99.

25. *Facing the Challenge*, p. 90.

26. En Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, marzo de 2013.

27. Especialista líder en integración y comercio del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo en Washington DC. Posee un MPhil en economía del desarrollo del Institute of Development Studies-Sussex (www.ids.ac.uk), del que ha sido miembro de su Board of Trustees. También ha sido miembro de los patronatos de CIDOB (www.cidob.org) e IBEI (www.ibei.org). Fue coordinador general de la Cooperación Española en México, Bolivia, Guatemala y Belice entre 1993 y 2006 (www.aecid.org), analista económico en la UNCTAD (1992-1993) (www.unctad.org) y cooperante de la AECID en Perú en 1988-1989. La información y opiniones vertidas en este capítulo son exclusivamente del autor y no expresan ni implican el aval del BID, de su Directorio Ejecutivo ni de ninguno de sus países miembros. El autor agradece a Antoni Estevadeordal, gerente del Sector de Integración y Comercio del BID, por los comentarios, y a su colega Matthew Shearer por la revisión y sus comentarios.

28. Esta clasificación en dos *clusters* de los países de la región proviene de

Alejandro Izquierdo y Ernesto Talvi (2011): *One Region Two Speeds? Challenges of the New Global Economic Order for Latin America and the Caribbean*, BID-Washington.

29. Crecimiento del PIB es a precios constantes y el umbral de pobreza fijado a US$ 2 por día. Nora Lustig *et al.* (2012): *Declining Inequality in Latin America in the 2000s: The Cases of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico*, CGD Working Paper 307.

30. A pesar del estancamiento de las exportaciones de ALC desde mediados de 2011, que se debilitaron en 2012, creciendo solamente un 1,5%, cifra que contrasta con el crecimiento vigoroso del 26% anual en el periodo en 2010 y 2011 (BID, 2012a), en http://www.iadb.org/es/noticias/comunicados-de-prensa/2012-12-17/desaceleran-exportaciones-de-latinoamerica,10267.html

31. El eslabón faltante más importante de esta arquitectura comercial es un hipotético acuerdo entre Brasil y México que, en la actual coyuntura, es difícil prever cuándo se iniciarían negociaciones.

32. Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, México, Panamá, Perú y Uruguay son los países con grado de inversión según la calificación de Standard & Poor's, Fitch y Moody's. Esta calificación implica acceder a los mercados de capital en condiciones más favorables y poder atraer a los inversores internacionales con políticas más cautas.

33. Bolivia emitió bonos a 10 años por valor US$500 millones en octubre de 2012 al 4,875% (con una prima de riesgo de 306 puntos básicos sobre los bonos del Tesoro de EE UU), retornando a los mercados internacionales después de más de 90 años y sorprendiendo con una demanda ocho veces mayor a pesar de las nacionalizaciones en diferentes sectores y gracias a políticas macroeconómicas prudentes, precios elevados de productos básicos, reservas de US$ 14.000 millones (US$ 1.700 millones en 2005) y una deuda pública de 31% del PIB (Reuters.com, http://lta.reuters.com/article/topNews/idLTASIE89M06A20121023).

34. El BNDES tiene mandato para llevar a cabo financiación internacional, apoyando el despliegue exterior de empresas brasileñas. El BNDES realizó desembolsos por US$ 83.000 millones en 2011, de los cuales US$ 6.800 fueron al exterior a través de líneas de financiamiento a la exportación.

35. Nancy Birdsall, *The Global Financial Crisis: The Beginning of the End of the "Development Agenda?" CGD Policy Paper 003*, Washington DC, 2012, en http://www.cgdev.org/files/1426133_file_Birdsall_financial_crisis_FINAL.pdf

36. James F. Moore: *Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition, Harvard Business Review May-June 1993*, Cambridge, Mass, 1993, en

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/jim/files/2010/04/Predators-and-Prey.pdf

37. http://www.cooperacionsursur.org/portal/

38. Las Naciones Unidas califican cada tres años a los PMA a partir de tres criterios: bajos ingresos, recursos humanos endebles y bajo nivel de diversificación económica.

39. Homi Kharas y Andrew Rogertson: *Horizon 2025. Creative Destruction in the Aid Industry, ODI Report,* Londres, 2012, en http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7723.pdf

40. Véase un ejemplo de la opinión crítica sobre los resultados de Busan en http://www.socialwatch.org/node/13932

41. Entre las destacadas figura el esfuerzo de Bolivia y su Comunidad donante que resultó en el *Nuevo Marco de Relacionamiento Gobierno (de Bolivia) y la Cooperación Internacional*, liderado por el Viceministerio de Inversión Pública y Financiamiento Externo (VIPFE), adscrito actualmente al Ministerio de Planificación y Desarrollo. Los países adheridos a la Declaración de París son 136 (www.oecd.org).

42. Por ejemplo, la flecha de ALC hacia África muestra, entre otros, el importante flujo de cooperación de Brasil a países de África Subsahariana, especialmente en innovación y tecnología agrícola llevada a cabo por EMBRAPA y otras instituciones brasileñas y africanas y la experiencia innovadora del Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace, que en sí, ya es una muestra de la complejidad, pero al mismo tiempo de la cooperación más incluyente del *ecosistema* actual, ya que participan donantes emergentes y receptores bilaterales, donantes tradicionales (DFID del Reino Unido, filantropía-Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, e instituciones multilaterales, como el BM e IFAD).

43. Para mayores detalles se puede consultar el http://www.iadb.org/es/aumento-de-capital/noveno-aumento-de-capitalbid-9,1874.html

44. A raíz de la aprobación de la estrategia sectorial de integración regional y global del BID se creó un fondo de múltiples donantes, que es un ejemplo de esta lógica y que logró atraer por primera vez en el BID a donantes tradicionales como Canadá, España y EE UU con donantes de la región como Colombia y México. http://www.iadb.org/es/noticias/anuncios/2012-10-30/integracion-de-la-infraestructura-regional,10183.html

45. SEGIB: *Informe de la Cooperación Sur-Sur*, Madrid, en http://segib.org/programas/informe/

46. Andy Summer y Sergio Tezanos: *Beyond Low and Middle Income Countries: What if There Were Five Clusters of Developing Countries, IDS Working Paper Volume 2012 No 404,* Sussex, 2012, en http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp404.pdf

47. En Mbuyi Kabunda (coord.) (2011): *La cooperación con el Sur desde el Sur*, Los Libros de la Catarata, Madrid, pp. 19-72.

48. En esta línea, el profesor Moustapha Kassé, de la Universidad Cheikh Anta Diop, recomienda la adopción por los países africanos de una visión estratégica y un plan de acción para la gestión eficaz de sus recursos naturales y con miras a promover su crecimiento económico y su desarrollo duradero, junto a la creación de un fondo a favor de las generaciones futuras.

49. En las rivalidades entre ambas potencias asiáticas en África, China dispone de una clara ventaja por ser muchas de las empresas chinas públicas y financiadas por el gobierno con una mano de obra barata, mientras que las empresas indias son privadas y no disponen de las mismas ventajas (Banerji Battacharya, 2010: 74). Bustelo (2010: 109) matiza este punto de vista al considerar que dicha competición, en los mercados externos e internos, ha disminuido en los últimos años por la complementariedad en sus estructuras económicas y por especializarse cada uno en distintas áreas (India se especializa cada vez más en la venta de productos textiles y medicamentos, y China en los productos electrónicos e informáticos).

50. Sí es verdad que estos países contribuyen a resolver el déficit de infraestructuras en el continente; sin embargo, transfieren pocas tecnologías a África: China, el 3,9% e India, el 3,1%, en 2008. El problema es que en su cooperación con otros países en desarrollo, las exportaciones africanas están dominadas por los productos básicos a cambio de escasa transferencia de tecnologías (CNUCED, 2010: 38).

51. No se les puede considerar como potencias o países desarrollados, sino como poderes emergentes, por tener los tres, a pesar de asumir un importante liderazgo a nivel de sus regiones respectivas, importantes problemas o “deficiencias sociales internas” y una cierta inestabilidad política (Giaccaglia, 2010).

52. India, Brasil y Sudáfrica, los tres integrantes del Foro IBSA, en la opinión de Amorim Celso (2010), el entonces ministro de Exteriores del gobierno de Lula, son las tres mayores democracias multiétnicas y multirraciales del mundo, que tienen mucho que enseñar al resto del mundo en lo que se refiere a los valores de tolerancia, reconciliación y del desarrollo conciliado con la democracia, además de poner de manifiesto que la ayuda a los países pobres no es el monopolio de los países ricos.

53. Se trata del modelo agroexportador basado en los cultivos comerciales o

de exportación; el modelo minero dominado por la exportación de materias primas minerales; el modelo de la renta petrolera concentrado en la exportación de los hidrocarburos en detrimento de la agricultura y del mundo rural y el modelo de la industrialización basado en la sustitución de las importaciones mediante la creación de industrias de autoconsumo, fundamentalmente alimenticias, destinadas a las poblaciones urbanas. Estos modelos nacidos del proyecto de Bandung han fracasado por las razones siguientes: la dependencia de los precios en los mercados internacionales, la competencia en dichos mercados de los países del Tercer Mundo, los productos de sustitución de los países capitalistas desarrollados, el bloqueo de acumulación interna por la fuerte dependencia externa (de los mercados europeos), la falta de complementariedad entre la agricultura y la industria, el excesivo endeudamiento externo, el mantenimiento de las estructuras coloniales y los casi nulos intentos de endogénesis, etc. (Founou-Tchuigoua, 1995).

54. En el mismo sentido, Boniface (2003) afirma que el mundo evoluciona desde el unilateralismo norteamericano hacia la multipolaridad. Existe hoy una clara tendencia a la coexistencia de varios polos de potencia, manifestando con ello la democratización de las relaciones internacionales, la diversidad del mundo y la posibilidad de cada país de elegir su propia vía de desarrollo.

55. En este continente, según subraya acertadamente Jean Ziegler (2010), siguen casi intactos el pacto colonial y la dependencia de la antigua metrópoli y de las instituciones financieras internacionales, con soberanías nacionales ficticias. Esta crisis ha aniquilado completamente los avances conseguidos en los últimos años en el continente, además de tornar en imposible la consecución de los ODM, en particular la reducción a la mitad de la pobreza y de la malnutrición en 2015 (53 millones más de pobres por la crisis), por la extrema dependencia y debilidad estructural de los países africanos y al pasar la tasa decrecimiento promedia de África del 6% al 2% como consecuencia de la crisis, mientras que se necesitaba una tasa de crecimiento ininterrumpido del 7% durante diez años para alcanzar dichos objetivos. Fundamentalmente, no se conseguirán aquellos objetivos, en la opinión de Ben Hammouda (2010a), por la falta en los países en desarrollo de bases para un crecimiento fuerte y duradero, por la ausencia de diversificación de sus economías, por la escasa cooperación y solidaridad internacionales y por las consecuencias de la crisis financiera internacional desde 2008, en particular la caída de ingresos de exportación a corto y medio plazo. Son los países más integrados en la globalización, exportadores de petróleo o dependientes en más del 80% de los recursos naturales para sus exportaciones (Sudáfrica, Botsuana, Egipto, Marruecos, Argelia, Libia, Nigeria, Angola, Gabón, Guinea Ecuatorial, Chad, Sudán y Zambia), los que se han llevado la peor parte, mientras que los que se encuentran con las economías diversificadas o débilmente integrados en la economía y el sistema financiero globales (escapando de sus crisis financieras), como los países menos avanzados (PMA), han podido

sobrevivir o mantener su crecimiento de antes de la crisis. La lección que se puede sacar es que se ha dado, según Bernard (2010), un verdadero varapalo al enfoque impuesto desde hace más de dos décadas por las IFI, el del desarrollo por el mercado o la máxima apertura externa, dando a los Estados la oportunidad de tomar las riendas en la definición de las políticas económicas, que deben centrase en adelante en el fortalecimiento de la cooperación regional y la diversificación o transformación de las estructuras de las economías nacionales para romper con la dependencia de las materias primas, y como base para la conquista de los mercados externos (Ben Hammouda, 2010c).

56. En el mismo registro, se puede también mencionar las consecuencias que podrían traer los acuerdos de partenariado económico (APE), que en el marcode los acuerdos de Cotonú entre la Unión Europea y los países ACP (África-Caribe-Pacífico) pueden obstaculizar el desarrollo socioeconómico de estos últimos por confinarlos al papel de granero de materias primas, conforme a las reglas de librecambio de la OMC, además de perder sus derechos aduaneros, y por lo tanto el abandono de la financiación de los aspectos de desarrollo humano (educación, salud, la retirada del apoyo o de las inversiones en la agricultura local, a la diversificación económica y a la creación de bases económicas adecuadas para el desarrollo; es decir, la desindustrialización de África). Los APE no solo favorecen la integración de los ACP en la economía mundial en detrimento de la integración regional, sino que además llevan los países africanos a abrirse a las privatizaciones y al liberalismo “mortíferos” y a abandonar sus últimos derechos aduaneros (De Schutter, 2010; Ziegler, 2010).

57. La expresión “países emergentes”, vulgarizada más tarde con la denominación de BRIC, fue utilizada por primera vez por el banco norteamericano Goldman Sachs para designar la llegada en el escenario mundial de nuevos actores económicos (Brasil, Rusia, India y China), con capacidades de producción de riquezas mundiales. Se ha dado paso a los BRICS (BRIC + Sudáfrica) con la entrada en este club de Sudáfrica el 14 de abril de 2011 en Sanya (China), en representación del continente africano. Ello, a pesar de algunas debilidades económicas de este país en relación con sus nuevos socios. De este modo, el BRIC se afirma como un “club político de países emergentes” (Hervieu, 2011: 16). Esta incorporación de Sudáfrica en los BRIC se explica fundamentalmente por el hecho de ser la puerta de entrada o acceso a los mercados del continente, y por tener una economía fuerte y un sistema de gobierno conforme con las normas occidentales (Marais, 2011: 5).

58. Este punto de vista defendido por algunos autores como Sorman (2007) o Michailof y Bonnel (2010), —en contra de las tesis dependentistas de la década de los sesenta y setenta, y hoy defendidas por los altermundistas (ruptura de la dependencia con los países ricos), que según estos autores explican los fracasos económicos de países con sociedades cerradas

como Cuba o Corea del Sur—, no es del todo compartido por otros como Atodevi (2010) y Houtart (1995), que atribuyen dicho éxito al papel del Estado, los importantes capitales euronorteamericanos recibidos en la lucha contra el comunismo de la época de la guerra fría y el rechazo por estos países de las recetas letales del Banco Mundial y del FMI, como en el caso de los "dragones" y "tigres" asiáticos, recetas que, en lugar de favorecer la recuperación de las economías africanas, las hundieron.

59. China se ha convertido en el primer socio comercial de África y el comercio entre ambas ha aumentado, en ocho años, en un 750%, junto a la fuerte presencia de empresas chinas en los países en desarrollo. En cuanto a Brasil, su comercio con los países árabes ha aumentado en un 200%, y con los países africanos en un 400%.

60. Lula reconoció la deuda histórica contraída por Brasil hacia África por su pasado esclavista (Oualalou, 2010), y hoy Brasil instaura una intensa cooperación con los países africanos de habla portuguesa.

61. En el sentido opuesto, Fleury (2010) opina que la clase media ha aumentado considerablemente en Brasil (la mitad de la población activa), consiguiendo en este país, con diez años de antelación, los ODM, en particular la reducción a la mitad de la pobreza. Por lo tanto, Lula sacó de la pobreza a unos 20 millones de brasileños sin cambiar las estructuras desigualitarias del país (Lambert, 2010a). Esto lo corrobora Pierre Salama (citado por Rocha, 2010: 96), que considera que si es verdad que el número de pobres ha disminuido y que más de un tercio de brasileños ha visto aumentar sus ingresos, no es menos cierto que para una minoría de la población el aumento de los ingresos ha sido aún mayor. En fin, la mejora de la situación económica y de la población de este país se explica más por el aumento del precio de las materias primas que por la política social de Lula.

62. Este consenso, no claramente definido, puede interpretarse en torno a los ejes siguientes: la fuerte presencia del Estado en los mercados nacionales; la preferencia dada a las reformas políticas antes que a la liberalización política (el desarrollo económico debe preceder la democracia y los derechos humanos, que no son prioridades); la inversión y la financiación de las infraestructuras a cambio de las materias primas y modelo de cooperación basado en los intereses mutuos o la forma de relación "ganador-ganador" y sin condicionalidades. El objetivo es, según David (2010), apartar a los países del Sur del "Consenso de Washington" y de la influencia norteamericana.

63. En esta línea, Testard (2006: 66-68), que considera a India como "un gran elefante frágil", destaca en el aspecto de la educación básica la persistencia de los siguientes problemas: la mala formación y poca motivación de los maestros, el deterioro de las infraestructuras escolares en las zonas rurales, la "hinduización" o "safranización" hasta hace poco

de la educación (mediante la insistencia en la India milenaria hindú eliminando todas las herencias extranjeras en los libros de texto), con importantes desigualdades sociales, de sexo y regionales. Este punto de vista lo sostiene también Borreguero (2009: 407), para quien, a pesar de sus notables logros económicos, India sigue teniendo importantes obstáculos internos, en particular las crecientes desigualdades sociales y la pobreza, que la alejan del estatus de una verdadera superpotencia.

64. Unos 360 millones de personas, sobre los 1.100 millones de habitantes, sobreviven con menos de 8 euros al mes.

65. Las principales críticas pueden formularse contra los biocarburantes: su producción es competitiva solo en el caso del auge del precio de petróleo (encima de 80 dólares el barril); influye en el aumento del precio de los cereales; emiten menos dióxido de carbono (CO2), pero liberan otros gases nefastos para el medio ambiente tales como el monóxido de azote, el dióxido de azote y el óxido de azufre; en el caso de llevarse a partir de la agricultura intensiva implican también el uso de abonos y de pesticidas con la consiguiente polución que aniquila sus efectos positivos, y se les dedican más tierras cultivables.

66. Es el caso de las Cumbres Francia-África, de los Foros Unión Europea-África, del African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), con EE UU, y del Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) con Japón.

67. En el mismo sentido, Vivien Foster (véase también Qobo, 2011: 27-28), economista jefe del Banco Mundial, considera que esta cooperación Sur-Sur se fundamenta en las complementariedades económicas entre China y África: “La creciente demanda de China en recursos naturales se relaciona con las reservas petroleras y minerales de África, que son enormes y a menudo sin explotar. La urgente necesidad africana de infraestructuras encuentra una industria china de la construcción muy competitiva a nivel internacional”.

68. Según el presidente Hu Jintao, manifestando esta cooperación desinteresadaen la cumbre China-África de noviembre de 2006: “China será siempre unamigo, un socio y un hermano de África”.

69. China prevé la construcción de una red de “zonas económicas especiales”, vinculadas con carreteras, ferrocarriles y por vía marítima en el continente: enZambia, Mauricio, Tanzania y en el África Occidental, junto a la rehabilitación del Tanzam o Tazara Railway (entre Zambia y Tanzania) y del ferrocarril de Benguela (entre Angola, Zambia y la RDC), es decir infraestructuras industriales que vinculan las distintas regiones del continente (Leonard, 2008).

70. En la década de los sesenta, China respaldó la lucha anticolonial de países africanos, y en la de los setenta apoyó militarmente a varios

movimientos de liberación del África Austral, y en la actualidad suministra el apoyo diplomático, político e incluso militar a sus aliados africanos (Sudán, Zimbabwe o Guinea Ecuatorial). Además, ha conseguido que solo cuatro Estados africanos mantengan sus relaciones diplomáticas con Taiwán: Burkina Faso, Gambia, Santo Tomé y Príncipe, y Suazilandia. Es decir, en la opinión de Lafargue (2005: 20), países sin peso económico y con una influencia limitada.

71. La opacidad con la que se llevan a cabo muchas de estas infraestructuras (puentes, carreteras, presas, ferrocarriles, aeropuertos…), hace sospechar que se realizan en las condiciones del mercado y no de la ayuda (Chaponnière, 2010).

72. Se estima en un millón el número de chinos en todo el continente (750.000, según la Agencia China nueva), que realizan estas obras: ingenieros, obreros, con material y logística traídos desde China, además de vivir en guetos.

73. Algunas empresas asiáticas y del Oriente Medio, con escasez de tierras, se dedican a la compra o alquiler de las tierras africanas en países como Madagascar, Sudán, Tanzania, RDC, Etiopía, Congo-Brazzaville, para la producción de alimentos que necesitan sus poblaciones (Hugueux, 2010).

74. Este autor, que tacha el Estado chino de “salvaje”, refiriéndose a los planteamientos de Amartya Sen, que vincula el desarrollo económico con las libertades o la dimensión ética en el concepto de desarrollo, descalifica todo el proceso de transformación de China o el modelo chino que, además de depender de las inversiones extranjeras, se fundamenta en el mercado y la tasa de crecimiento o las ganancias rápidas, descuidando los aspectos de desarrollo humano, los derechos sociales, el medio ambiente, la democracia o los valores no económicos y no cuantificables (culturales y espirituales), la distribución desigual de los ingresos, antes de concluir que China se enriquece , pero no se desarrolla por descuidar el factor humano (Sorman, 2007), por la excesiva obsesión por el desarrollo económico. Una cosa es cierta, el liberalismo económico chino permite al Partido Comunista y a las dictaduras africanas, a las que se ofrece un modelo de desarrollo al margen de la democracia occidental, mantenerse en el poder (Massonnet, 2008: 267).

75. Contrariamente a la terapia de choque y a las condicionalidades del Banco Mundial y del FMI, que imponen a los países africanos cambios radicales, China no les exige el respeto de derechos humanos, de principios democráticos o reformas económicas, sino reformas graduales, a su ritmo y a partir de las instituciones existentes (González Richardson, 2010).

76. Se recrimina a China ser el principal exportador de armas hacia el continente (Cabestan, 2008: 20), en particular para apoyar a los regímenes autoritarios, lo que contradice su participación en las OMP o en

las operaciones humanitarias.

77. En la opinión de Ríos (2009), para EE UU China es a la vez un importante socio económico, por su enorme mercado interno y mayores reservas de divisas del mundo, y al tiempo una seria amenaza para su hegemonía global o liderazgo por su apuesta por el multilateralismo —apoyándose en la ONU y en las agrupaciones regionales—, su insaciable búsqueda de materias primas y recursos energéticos, y por la competencia a algunos de sus productos en los mercados internacionales.

78. Manifestó claramente esta intención con su participación en la 12ª cumbre de los 77, que reunió en junio de 2008, en Yamoussoukro (Costa de Marfil), a unos 130 países en desarrollo con el objetivo de reactivar el Comité de Seguimiento y de Coordinación de la Cooperación Sur-Sur (CISC), creado en 1981 para el seguimiento y la puesta en marcha de las relaciones Sur-Sur.

79. Es lo que Thompson (2005) llama la "diplomacia de la salud", que consiste en la asistencia técnica en la salud y la formación del personal médico africano.

80. Prueba de ello es el incumplimiento por los países del G-8 de su promesa pública de duplicar la ayuda al desarrollo entre 2005 y 2010, mientras que China ha duplicado su ayuda a los países africanos entre 2006 y 2009, suministrando a la RDC unos 8.000 millones de dólares para la construcción y reconstrucción de este país destruido por varios años de guerra, o el equivalente del PIB congoleño.

81. Se pasa por alto en estas críticas el apoyo financiero y militar de EE UU y Francia a los regímenes autoritarios y corruptos africanos, mantenidos al poder en contra de la voluntad popular, además de alimentar conflictos.

82. A menudo, el intercambio entre recursos naturales e infraestructuras se realiza en la opacidad total y favorece las prácticas de corrupción por mezclarse ayuda, créditos e inversiones, y entre el Estado, las empresas públicas y las instituciones financieras (Vibe Christense, 2010: 10).

83. En el primer Foro India-África, celebrado en Nueva Delhi del 8 al 9 de abril de 2008, ambas partes acordaron centrar su cooperación, además de los aspectos económicos y políticos, en la ciencia, investigación y tecnología; el desarrollo social y la capacitación; el turismo; la investigación, energía y medio ambiente, y en los medios de comunicación. Lo más novedoso, y que distingue la cooperación de India de la de los demás socios, es el énfasis puesto en el fortalecimiento del proceso de integración regional, comprometiéndose India a apoyar los programas regionales de la Unión Africana y de las comunidades económicas regionales y la implantación de aquellas metas, definidas en la cumbre de Nueva Delhi, tanto a nivel continental como a nivel regional.

84. El grupo Tata está presente en países como Zambia (desde 1977), Mozambique (1991), Sudáfrica y Uganda (1994), Tanzania (1995), Ghana (1998), Kenia (2006), Nigeria (2007), y tiene asegurado los mercados de Sudáfrica, Nigeria y Kenia para la comercialización del minicoche en los próximos años.

85. Su política exterior sigue teniendo como principales ejes: el no alineamiento adaptado a la situación de la postguerra fría mediante una política exterior independiente, el multilateralismo en defensa de los intereses de los países del Sur y en coalición con los demás países emergentes, la política de defensa creíble para disuadir cualquier ataque externo en un entorno inestable, y la diplomacia del desarrollo dictada por sus condiciones de país en desarrollo (Mato Bouzas, 2009).

86. Sudáfrica establece con los países de la región unas relaciones asimétricas de centro-periferias, por su abrumador peso económico en la zona, que le hace objeto de recriminación por parte de sus socios regionales por practicar un “nuevo imperialismo”.

87. La consecuencia inmediata de la construcción de estas infraestructuras ferroviarias será la pérdida para Sudáfrica de importantes ingresos comerciales procedentes de la RDC y de Zambia (Lafargue, 2007: 260).

88. La falta de una política china por parte de la UA la debilita, junto a sus Estados miembros, en las negociaciones con el gigante asiático. Ello se explica en parte por la preferencia dada por los países africanos a las relaciones bilaterales más que a las multilaterales (Aning, 2010: 149-151). Esta situación es flagrante tanto en las relaciones con China como en las mantenidas con India (Obi, 2010: 192). Por eso, Qobo (2011: 32) considera que “los líderes africanos deben determinar cuáles son sus principales intereses de futuro en estas alianzas emergentes. Deberían superar la retórica y tomar conciencia de que el mundo actual es extremadamente mercantilista, y que su relación con China y otros países es, esencialmente, comercial”.

89. El 70% de las inversiones chinas en África se concentra en Angola, Nigeria, Etiopía, Sudán, Sudáfrica, Argelia y RDC.

90. Según la puntualización de Keet (2006), los países africanos, en particular, y del G-90, en general, están sometidos a la política de divide y vencerás de los gobiernos del Norte, en el marco de la OMC, gobiernos que imponen sus decisiones a las élites gobernantes de estos países, utilizando la ayuda al desarrollo y aprovechando sus múltiples dependencias y vulnerabilidades externas para presionarles. En opinión de este autor, las tentativas de la reforma de la OMC por las nuevas alianzas y coaliciones de los países en desarrollo son muy limitadas fundamentalmente por su adhesión al reformismo y por no cuestionar los paradigmas comerciales neoliberales. No solo su adhesión a la OMC, según Walden Bello (2006; véanse también Bertrand y Kalafatides, 2002;

MBaye, 2009), significa el abandono por los gobiernos del Sur de todos los esfuerzos de desarrollo nacional independiente, planteamiento en vigor en la década de los setenta, cuestionando el intercambio desigual o el deterioro de los términos de intercambio, sino además la sumisión a los intereses de las multinacionales (por defender principios contradictorios de librecambio y de monopolio de las grandes empresas) y de la hegemonía comercial de EE UU, en detrimento del desarrollo interno, de la protección social y del medio ambiente de los países del Sur. Esta organización, junto a las instituciones gemelas de Bretton Woods (BM y FMI), con sus PAE, entra en las estrategias del Norte para luchar contra el comunismo y erradicar la presencia del Estado en la economía (el "capitalismo asistido por el Estado" adoptado como modelo de desarrollo por varios países del Sur en décadas anteriores) y para la sumisión de las economías del Sur a los mercados mundiales dominados por el Norte.

91. Esta moneda, de origen colonial, no solo permite a Francia controlar la economía de sus antiguas colonias africanas, sino que además favorece la fuga de capitales por su convertibilidad (MBaye, 2009: 47) e impide la integración con otros países de la zona.

92. Es preciso acabar con la conciencia de víctima nacida de un pasado doloroso para enfrentarse a los desafíos del presente y del futuro (Lado, 2008: 484-485).

CAPÍTULO 7

MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES, DESARROLLO Y EMANCIPACIÓN

BRENO BRINGEL Y ENARA ECHART MUÑOZ[1]

INTRODUCCIÓN. LA ESTRECHA RELACIÓN HISTÓRICA ENTRE MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES Y DESARROLLO

Los movimientos sociales son actores muy activos en el debate sobre el desarrollo, contribuyendo para su construcción teórica y práctica, tanto en el terreno académico como político. No obstante, los estudios sobre desarrollo habitualmente tratan los movimientos sociales y los sujetos colectivos de manera limitada. Suelen centrarse en la parte instrumental, subrayando el papel gestor de las organizaciones sociales en la implementación de proyectos de desarrollo, o, a lo sumo, en su participación institucional para definir los términos de la agenda que guiaría, en diferentes momentos, las acciones de la cooperación. En estas visiones, se restringe el papel de los movimientos sociales a la dimensión de la incidencia, la gestión y la participación institucionalizada. Este capítulo pretende ir más allá de estas miradas, situando los movimientos sociales y el desarrollo como

fenómenos históricamente imbricados. Esto, a su vez, permite acercarnos al papel de los sujetos en los debates (y contestaciones) sobre modelos de desarrollo, así como a la agencia de la ciudadanía en la definición y concreción de esos modelos. El foco central será América Latina, aunque se buscarán conexiones con procesos globales y con dinámicas de otras regiones del mundo, especialmente las periféricas.

Tanto los movimientos sociales como el desarrollo pueden ser entendidos como grandes promesas de emancipación de la modernidad. El punto de partida común a ambos es el cambio del sistema productivo derivado de la revolución industrial, que llevó a la formación de un proyecto modernizador con vocación universalista en occidente, así como a la emergencia de los "movimientos sociales clásicos", los obreros, que contestaron las contradicciones del modo de producción capitalista. En un mundo dividido en Estados-nación, y a pesar de las tentativas de solidaridad internacionalista (a través, entre otras experiencias, de las sucesivas internacionales), en ese momento la vinculación entre movimientos sociales y desarrollo mantuvo una clara dimensión nacional. Sin embargo, como demostraron los teóricos de los "sistemas-mundo" (Wallerstein, 1978), lo que se desarrolla no es tanto un país, y sí un patrón de poder; y, como reivindicaron, de manera complementar, los teóricos de la dependencia (Cardoso y Falleto, 1969; Marini, 1973), ese patrón de poder dominante en el mundo —el capitalismo— se expresa globalmente de manera desigual, asimétrica y heterogénea, en el espacio y en el tiempo.

Esas relaciones de desigualdad, dominación y dependencia

centrarán los discursos de los movimientos sociales en los inicios del siglo XX. En términos globales, el post-Segunda Guerra Mundial fue un momento central a partir del cual las teorías y las prácticas del desarrollo ganaron un nuevo imaginario geopolítico que encuadró discursos, intervenciones, acciones colectivas y prácticas contestatarias en buena parte de los países periféricos. Fue en ese momento cuando se definió la realidad de la mayoría de los países del mundo como "subdesarrollada" (en el *Four Point Speech* del presidente estadounidense Harry S. Truman, en 1949), pero también cuando emergió una geografía moral de las relaciones Norte-Sur y/o centro-periferia que marcó tanto los sentidos del desarrollo (y las concepciones sobre el subdesarrollo), como las prácticas de muchos movimientos sociales, constituyéndose como una segunda inflexión histórica para el desarrollo, para los movimientos sociales modernos y para sus interrelaciones. En ese contexto se diseñará también la arquitectura del sistema internacional de cooperación para el desarrollo, con poca o nula participación de unos movimientos sociales que centraban sus acciones en la solidaridad internacionalista clásica, con fuerte carga política e ideológica, y con una crítica a la ayuda como una nueva forma de dependencia.

Las luchas emergentes a partir de la década de 1950 contra el imperialismo, por la liberación y por el desarrollo "nacional", son buenos ejemplos de la búsqueda de proyectos de "desarrollo autónomo" o "socialistas" en la periferia mundial. En ese periodo, tanto en los procesos de desarrollo capitalista (como el caso brasileño) o revolucionario, de ruptura con la dependencia (el

ejemplo de Cuba), como en las luchas contra la colonización que recorrieron los territorios de África y Asia, el Estado se tornó un actor central, configurándose como objetivo, interlocutor y horizonte de los movimientos sociales en su lucha emancipatoria. Por un lado, el carácter nacional-popular caracteriza una forma ambigua de relación entre Estado y sociedad, que se apoya en la movilización de sectores sociales para impulsar los procesos de desarrollo, tratando de "incorporarlos" a la vida política. Por otro, el Estado se convirtió en prestador de servicios a las clases subalternas pero también en espacio a conquistar para, a partir de ahí, buscar nuevos modelos de desarrollo. Esto será así al menos hasta la extensión de las dictaduras en América Latina y la deriva de algunos regímenes de partido único en África y Asia, cuando se convirtieron en enemigos frontales.

LOS 'NUEVOS MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES' Y LA CRÍTICA A LA VISIÓN MODERNIZANTE DEL DESARROLLO

La proliferación de los denominados "nuevos movimientos sociales" y las luchas contra las dictaduras latinoamericanas, en la década de 1970, marcaron una ruptura con una concepción totalizante de las clases sociales y de las formas de transformación social. El desarrollo se había orientado según una concepción teleológica y lineal de progreso, y hasta entonces muchos proyectos de transformación revolucionaria mantenían también esa visión etapista y universalizante del

cambio y del desarrollo histórico. Las alteraciones en el carácter de los movimientos sociales (pluralización de las identidades colectivas; nuevos repertorios de acción y formas de organización; incorporación, en las luchas materiales, de demandas más simbólicas y culturales, etc.) fueron acompañadas, así, de un cambio en la propia forma a partir de la cual tanto los principales actores políticos y económicos como los actores sociales concebían el desarrollo. La visión modernizante del desarrollo como sinónimo de evolución, crecimiento y progreso, fue, en el terreno político y hegemónico, paulatinamente dislocada por una visión globalizante, pero a la vez más localizada, de los procesos y proyectos de desarrollo.

En el campo de los movimientos sociales, la apuesta por una "política del cotidiano" renovó la premisa de autonomía, con la idea de que los movimientos sociales también pueden ser comprendidos como "espacios de exterioridad" de la sociedad, creando e implementando proyectos (inclusive de desarrollo) que cuestionan los modelos hegemónicos. De hecho, si la crisis de los años ochenta en América Latina fue interpretada por varios autores como una crisis del modelo de desarrollo, muchos movimientos sociales entendieron que, en sus propios espacios de actuación, podrían construir horizontes de posibilidades y de ruptura, forjando alternativas a los modelos de desarrollo en sus círculos de socialización, producción y politización.

Un ejemplo paradigmático en este sentido es el feminismo, como movimiento social y político con una propuesta concreta de cambio a partir de la visibilización y lucha contra unas estructuras patriarcales que están en la base de los modelos de

desarrollo imperantes (Lagarde, 1996). Más allá de los análisis del papel de las mujeres en el desarrollo, tratan de construir visiones relacionales del género en el desarrollo (Tickner, 2001; Marchand, 1996), en las cuales el empoderamiento, en su doble dimensión individual y colectiva, se convierte en una estrategia central para ampliar el acceso y el control de los recursos materiales y simbólicos, así como la participación y la autonomía política, económica y social de las mujeres (Kabeer, 2012). A partir de ese enfoque de género, buscan la transformación de las prácticas políticas, económicas y sociales que han marcado las relaciones de poder y de dominación en las sociedades, identificando las causas y los mecanismos de perpetuación de la subordinación de las mujeres en ese proceso. La politización de lo cotidiano y de lo personal, la superación de las dicotomías que estructuran los grandes proyectos de desarrollo (público/privado, productivo/reproductivo), y la incorporación con ello de actores y temáticas hasta entonces excluidos del debate, ofrecen nuevas formas de pensar la agencia y los horizontes de las luchas sociales. También los movimientos ecologistas hacen aportaciones interesantes en este sentido, incorporando nuevos temas, sujetos, escalas y temporalidades, a partir de la crítica a la explotación de la naturaleza y la visión del crecimiento en las que se basa la concepción dominante del desarrollo capitalista (Fernández Durán, 2011).

LAS DENUNCIAS DE LA GLOBALIZACIÓN NEOLIBERAL: ADJETIVANDO EL DESARROLLO

Los procesos de democratización y redemocratización en los países del Sur se produjeron de manera paralela a la conformación de una hegemonía del neoliberalismo, que se erigía como imbatible e inevitable. Ese escenario genera, inicialmente, repertorios de acción colectiva más reactivos que proactivos en el seno de los movimientos sociales (lucha contra los planes de ajuste estructural, huelgas del hambre, por ejemplo). Sin embargo, el avance de las políticas neoliberales —como la tentativa de lanzamiento por parte del gobierno de los Estados Unidos de una área continental de libre comercio (ALCA)— que consolidarían ese modelo de desarrollo, generó diversas articulaciones y redes transnacionales (Bringel y Falero, 2008; Echart, 2008). La revitalización de las banderas antiimperialistas contribuyó para una renovación del entendimiento del desarrollo como una construcción exógena, como una invención occidental. Ante eso, proyectos de desarrollo y de integración regional ganaron peso en un momento de profundas reconfiguraciones globales.

Un punto de partida para las movilizaciones de aquel momento fue, sin duda, la convocatoria del Primer Encuentro Intergaláctico en Defensa de la Humanidad y Contra el Neoliberalismo en 1996 por el Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN)[2], que dos años antes había llenado el zócalo de Ciudad de México en protesta contra el ALCA. Esa “internacional de la esperanza” inspiró a los movimientos sociales de diversos lugares del mundo con un discurso que unía lo local (las montañas del sureste mexicano) y lo global (la humanidad), bajo la idea de construir “un mundo donde quepan muchos mundos”, y con una forma

renovada de entender la política (“mandar obedeciendo” como premisa del buen gobierno). Con base en esa experiencia se multiplicaron las redes y experiencias transnacionales críticas con la globalización neoliberal, como la Acción Global de los Pueblos, creada en 1998 para denunciar las políticas de liberalización comercial que estaban siendo negociadas en la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC), con un rechazo frontal a las estructuras de poder y a los sistemas de dominación del capitalismo[3]. A partir de las protestas contra el encuentro de la OMC en Seattle, en 1999, esas articulaciones conformaron el Movimiento Antiglobalización, una red de denuncia de las consecuencias de la globalización neoliberal que unió diversos movimientos sociales (ecologistas, feministas, indígenas, laborales, de derechos humanos, etc.), con una visión que vincula lo local y lo global (Echart, 2008). En sus sucesivas convocatorias, estos movimientos van creando espacios propios para la construcción de prácticas y agendas de trabajo conjuntas.

Esta sería una tercera inflexión histórica para entender los movimientos sociales y el desarrollo en la actual fase de la modernidad (Bringel y Domingues, 2015). A pesar de los límites inherentes a las periodizaciones rígidas, la década de 1990 marca un nuevo momento global para el debate sobre los movimientos sociales y el desarrollo. La “compresión espacio-temporal”, la amplia profundización de la transnacionalización económica, las reconfiguraciones geopolíticas de las relaciones de poder y de (inter) dependencia entre centro y periferia, la emergencia de las nuevas tecnologías de información y

comunicación y las incertezas vinculadas a las múltiples crisis ecológicas, sociales, políticas e ideológicas en el mundo post-caída del muro de Berlín son solo algunos elementos generales que inciden en la reconfiguración de los movimientos sociales y del desarrollo.

En el caso de los movimientos sociales, nuevas prácticas sociales, más reticulares y descentradas, parecen radicalizar las perspectivas ya iniciadas en décadas anteriores con los “nuevos” movimientos sociales que contestan patrones establecidos para entender la política y la acción colectiva. En el caso del desarrollo, junto a una denuncia del modelo neoliberal impuesto desde los organismos internacionales, se comienza a exigir una adjetivación: pasamos a hablar de “desarrollo humano” o de “desarrollo sostenible”. En el primer caso, el objetivo es localizar al “ser humano” en el centro del desarrollo; el segundo sitúa ahí a la naturaleza. Diversos actores sociales estuvieron envueltos en esa disputa por dotar al desarrollo de un sentido más humano y ecológico, usando la desobediencia civil, estrategias de *advocacy*, diálogos con instituciones y participaciones en espacios transnacionales de convergencia (Echart, 2008).

Esta época marcará también una ruptura en las formas de participación en los debates globales sobre los modelos de desarrollo ante los estragos de la globalización. Si hasta inicios de los años noventa las organizaciones sociales habían decidido participar en eventos paralelos a las grandes cumbres de las Naciones Unidas, en las que se debatía la Agenda de Desarrollo (destacándose el Foro Global, evento paralelo a la Cumbre oficial de la Tierra, Rio-92, con fuerte participación de

organizaciones sociales, disputó la definición del término desarrollo sostenible)[4], posteriormente, y como denuncia a las tentativas de cooptación y apropiación discursiva de las exigencias sociales, varios movimientos sociales optaron por una estrategia más disruptiva, convocando contracumbres de protesta frente a los encuentros y las políticas de los grandes organismos financieros, estrategia simbolizada en la convocatoria de Seattle de 1999. Posteriormente, y tras una fuerte campaña de represión y criminalización de la protesta que tuvo su auge en Génova, con el asesinato de Carlo Giuliano durante la Cumbre del G-8 en 2001, decidirán dar más peso a sus propios espacios de encuentro, en los que las agendas sean definidas por ellos mismos al margen de las convocatorias oficiales, organizando el Foro Social Mundial (FSM), en Puerto Alegre en 2001 (Bringel y Echart, 2010; Echart, 2005). Autodefinido como un espacio de debates, de intercambio de experiencias y de articulación de las propuestas de la ciudadanía planetaria, el FSM, con su lema *"Otro Mundo é Posible"* supuso una ruptura con el discurso globalófilo del *there is no alternative* y contribuyó a la construcción discursiva y política de varios sentidos de "otro desarrollo posible" (FSM, 2001).

Este es un importante aspecto de la relación entre movimientos sociales y desarrollo en la contemporaneidad: la lucha por la construcción y revelación de significados crecientemente complejos. La hegemonía neoliberal llevó a la emergencia de diversos "proyectos capitalistas con rostro humano", cuyas imbricaciones entre lo económico, lo político y lo social deben ser cuidadosamente analizadas. Por ejemplo, las

apropiaciones y usos diversos y perversos de discursos ecologistas o feministas son muy habituales entre actores y plataformas que, buscando una renovación de sus nichos de mercado, aprovechan una estructura de oportunidades favorable por el creciente encuadramiento verde o de género global. Ese es un gran desafío para los movimientos sociales que denuncian constantemente ese tipo de prácticas asociadas al denominado "capitalismo verde", que asume demandas sociales, pero vaciándolas de su significado original más reivindicativo mediante una estrategia de reapropiación semántica y política[5].

Svampa (2008) llama la atención sobre esa apropiación de lo "sustentable" hasta adaptarse a los intereses de los Estados o de las empresas responsables de la degradación medioambiental (a través de la responsabilidad social corporativa o del discurso de la gobernanza, entre otros), pero también de las ONG que ven posible un desarrollo sostenible a partir de la acción responsable de los diversos actores públicos y privados para remediar la degradación medioambiental, pero sin cuestionar el modelo. Frente a esas visiones los discursos de los movimientos sociales se centran en la justicia ambiental o la ecología popular (Martínez, 2004) insistiendo en el carácter estructural de los conflictos medioambientales, "causados por la reproducción globalizada del capital, la nueva división internacional y territorial del trabajo y la desigualdad social" (Svampa, 2008).

También en el campo de las luchas feministas esa apropiación ha sido importante, con una incorporación del enfoque de género en los programas de desarrollo que no siempre es fiel a la visión estructural, colectiva y emancipatoria (Kabeer, 2012). Así, el foco

en la dimensión más individual del empoderamiento, confundido a menudo con capacidad de emprendimiento (habitual en los proyectos de microcréditos), obvia que existen limitaciones estructurales derivadas del patriarcado que restringen la capacidad de acción y de elección, naturalizando las desigualdades. Las aportaciones de los feminismos del Sur, que ganan fuerza a partir de los años noventa, renuevan el debate exigiendo una visión situada, adaptada a contextos diferentes, del feminismo, la construcción de la ciudadanía y la justicia de género. Para Kabeer, es necesario superar la definición liberal e individual de la ciudadanía, para entenderla no como un estatus sino como una práctica que se construye y reconstruye en los diferentes lugares a partir de las diversas luchas, situando la agenda de las mujeres en el centro del proceso. La visión del género en el desarrollo, desde esta perspectiva, va unida a la práctica de los movimientos sociales: es la dimensión colectiva la que permite, a través de la interacción social y de la creación de espacios de disidencia y resistencia, cambios relacionales que acompañen las transformaciones en las identidades de género. La justicia de género va unida, por tanto, al compromiso con el cambio social, y no puede limitarse a una provisión despolitizada de recursos.

MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES, EMANCIPACIÓN Y ALTERNATIVAS AL DESARROLLO EN EL SIGLO XXI

En paralelo a ese escenario, muchos movimientos avanzan en

discursos y prácticas que no solo pretenden construir una alternativa *de* desarrollo, sino una alternativa *al* desarrollo. Se trata de una ardua tarea teniendo en cuenta el modo en que el desarrollo aún impregna (y ciertamente continuará impregnando) políticas, imaginarios y acciones. Sin embargo, se observan algunos esfuerzos en esa dirección dentro de las redes y movimientos que se expandieron al inicio de este siglo. La crítica al eurocentrismo aparece como un punto de partida conceptual y político: a pesar de que existen múltiples definiciones tanto de la noción de movimientos sociales como de la de desarrollo, en casi todas ellas hay una concepción occidental y muchas veces occidentalocéntrica (Escobar, 1996; Rist, 2002).

La región andina ha sido el escenario privilegiado de construcción de alternativas *al* desarrollo. El caso del "Buen Vivir" es emblemático, pues no busca generar un "desarrollo alternativo" sino un nuevo marco conceptual de las relaciones entre el ser humano, la economía y la naturaleza que transciendan el desarrollo. En términos abstractos, ha implicado una crítica a la ideología del desarrollo y a la modernidad. En términos prácticos, movimientos indígenas, gobiernos progresistas y otros actores afines han generado articulaciones y políticas específicas para avanzar en una alternativa convivencial y profundamente ecológica. En este caso, la dimensión ético-política no existe sin la dimensión de la experiencia y de la práctica, retroalimentándose mutuamente.

Escobar (1992) resalta la fuerza de esa agencia de los movimientos sociales para encontrar alternativas al desarrollo que transformen, tanto en la teoría como en la práctica, las

nociones de desarrollo, modernidad y economía. Si el desarrollo es el aparato que vincula formas de conocimiento sobre el Tercer Mundo —visto como incompleto, incapaz, subdesarrollado— con el despliegue de formas de poder e intervención —a través de la creación de toda una red institucional internacional cuyas políticas, estrategias y programas definen qué se debe entender por desarrollo y cómo se debe lograr—, entonces la alternativa tiene que romper con sus premisas, con la naturalización de ese discurso y con los estragos que ha generado en las sociedades del Sur. La alternativa se convierte en una práctica política que, a partir de la acción colectiva, la experiencia local y la autonomía de las comunidades, transforme las instituciones y las relaciones sociales, abriéndose a las varias formas de conocimiento, de construcción de identidades y de hacer política. En este proceso, un paso importante es disminuir las mediaciones, es decir, la capacidad autoproclamada de los expertos de traducir las demandas sociales en objetivos concretos y medibles, tecnificándolas y despolitizándolas. Esto implica, para los movimientos sociales, lograr mayor autonomía del Estado, pero también de aquellas instituciones internacionales e incluso ONG gestoras que, a partir del aparato del desarrollo, intervienen en la interpretación y satisfacción de las “necesidades básicas”, eludiendo que se trata de un área de disputa política entre los diversos actores involucrados.

A pesar de varios problemas conceptuales asociados a los intelectuales “postdesarrollistas”, lo que interesa aquí es demarcar la acción de los movimientos sociales en la generación de esos nuevos imaginarios, narrativas y relaciones con la

naturaleza y el territorio. Ese es un punto importante, pues engendra demandas aglutinadoras y une movimientos sociales en varios lugares, incluso aunque no tengan una afinidad directa con los postulados del paradigma del “Buen Vivir” —muy enraizado en el indigenismo—, y estén guiados por otras perspectivas, como la del neodesarrollismo, el neoextractivismo progresista, el ecodesarrollo, el feminismo, etc.

A partir de la crítica a la visión del desarrollo propia del paradigma productivista de la modernización, y recogiendo las voces postdesarrollistas, Svampa (2008) analiza el retorno de las grandes ideas del “desarrollo” y la “emancipación” en el imaginario latinoamericano actual, aunque con algunas transformaciones importantes, que pueden convertirlas en claramente antagónicas. Para mostrar esas tensiones, analiza los sentidos que para los movimientos sociales (en contraposición con otros actores involucrados en el desarrollo) adquieren no solo el desarrollo sustentable, sino también el territorio (como hábitat y locus de vida, y no a partir de la noción de eficiencia y rentabilidad que permea los discursos desarrollistas de Estados y empresas extractivas), la democracia (como práctica basada en la participación, el asamblearismo y la horizontalidad, y por tanto alejada de la idea liberal de gobernanza presente en la cooperación, que obvia los antagonismos y las relaciones de poder asimétricas) o la autonomía (entendida en términos organizativos, estratégicos e identitarios, deriva precisamente de una desconfianza hacia las estructuras representativas tradicionales, partidarias o sindicales, pero también hacia la cooptación por parte de algunas ONG de

las demandas de los movimientos sociales)[6], entre otros. La dimensión profundamente territorializada de las luchas sociales permite no solo visualizar los conflictos y sus locus de enunciación, sino también localizar disputas entre territorialidades antagónicas, con sus respectivas implicaciones materiales y simbólicas[7]. Avanzar alternativas en este escenario exige tener en cuenta las múltiples escalas de los conflictos que genera el proyecto de desarrollo, que permea de lo local a lo global, con todas sus asimetrías y con un peso diferenciado de los actores económicos, políticos y sociales en cada una de esas escalas.

En definitiva, sea por la crítica a los modelos capitalistas hegemónicos, por las tentativas de humanización de algunas concepciones economicistas, por los disputados significados de los horizontes emancipatorios, por la generación de nuevos cuadros interpretativos, o por prácticas sociopolíticas que se sitúan en los límites de ruptura de compatibilidad sistémica, movimientos sociales y desarrollo se relacionan de diversas maneras. El desarrollo y, con él, las políticas de desarrollo siempre se situaron dentro de un campo de tensiones (de actores y proyectos) por el control y el uso de recursos, en el cual los movimientos sociales pueden ser considerados una de las principales voces de contestación: contribuyen a politizar el debate sobre el desarrollo, desconstruyendo visiones supuestamente neutras, apolíticas o técnicas, y articulando otras perspectivas, ideologías y otros horizontes.

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Lectura 1

Imagining a Post-Development era? Critical Thought, Development and Social Movements[8]

Arturo Escobar

INTRODUCTION: THE DEMISE OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROBLEMATIZATION OF PROTEST

For some time now, it has been difficult—at times even impossible—to talk about development, protest or revolution with the same confidence and encompassing scope with which intellectuals and activists spoke about these vital matters in our most recent paste It is as if the elegant discourses of the 1960s—the high decade of both Development and Revolution—had been suspended, caught in mid air as they strove toward their zenith, and, like fragile bubbles, exploded, leaving a scrambled trace of their glorious path behind. Hesitantly perhaps, but with a persistance that has to be taken seriously, a new discourse has set in. Where one spoke of Development—or its flip side, Revolution—one is now allowed to speak a very different language: that of the “crisis” of development, on the one hand, and “new social actors” and “new social movements”, on the

other. In fact, many scholars seem to be proposing a radical reinterpretation of social and political reality based on a new set of categories such as “alternative development”, new identities, radical pluralism, historicity and hegemony.

In the previous period, from the early post-War years to the end of the 1970s, the relation between truth and reality that characterized political discourse was relatively clear and direct. Development was chiefly a matter of capital, technology, and education and the appropriate policy and planning mechanisms to successfully combine these elements. Resistance, on the other hand, was primarily a class issue and a question of imperialism. Nowadays, this transparency has been muddled, and even imperialism and class are thought to be the object of innumerable mediations. But while research and inquiry into the nature of resistance and political practice have been quite alive and growing, the same is not true for the area of development. A new problematization of the nature of popular resistance and mobilization, and of intellectuals’ understanding of them, has resulted in new ways of thinking these issues, especially in relation to social movements. The theory of social movements has become, particularly in Western Europe and Latin America, but also increasingly in other parts of the Third World, one of the key arenas for social science and critical thought (Calderón, Piscitelli and Reyna, 1992), and studies of social movements have proliferated during the past ten years[9].

The same vitality does not characterize the second key arena with which this paper is concerned, that of “development”. While many actors consider development dead, and that it has failed

miserably, few viable alternative conceptualizations and designs for social change are offered in its place. And yet, despite the recognition of its demise, the imaginary of development—still without viable alternatives although somewhat weakened by the recent crisis—continues to hold sway. If at the level of social movement theory new social orders are clearly imaginable, in the arena of development—which to a great extent determines the economic and political practices necessary to bring about new orders—the picture is blurred, adumbrating a future society where only "basic needs" are met, that is, a "developed" or quasi-developed society. But to arrive at this society (assuming that it were possible) would entail that all the fuss about plurality, difference and autonomy—notions central to social movement discourse, as is argued below—would have been in vain.

This crisis in developmentalist discourse can be seen in at least two ways: on the one hand, the inability of critical thought and most social forces to imagine a new domain which finally leaves behind the imaginary of development, and which transcends development's dependence on Western modernity and historicity; and, on the other, the emergence of a powerful social movement discourse which, although still unclear about its possible directions, has quickly become a privileged arena for intellectual inquiry and political action. The first aspect of this crisis elicits such questions as: Why has the imaginary of development proven so resistant to radical critique? What kinds of critical thought and social practice might lead to thinking about Third World reality differently? Can the hegemonic epistemological space of development—inscribed in multiple

forms of knowledge, political technologies and social relations—be significantly modified? The second leads one to ask: How do popular actions become objects of knowledge in social movement discourse? If new discourses and practices are appearing that contribute to shaping the reality to which they refer (Foucault, 1985), what is the domain that this discourse makes visible? Who can “know”, according to what rules, and what are the pertinent objects? What criteria of politics does it put into effect, with what consequences for popular actors? Finally, what is the relationship between the demise of development and the emergence of social movements?

The aim of this essay is to bridge these two insights by putting in question the presuppositions of the systems of inquiry that circumbscribe the two domains. The argument can be summarized in three propositions:

Most critiques of development, articulated within the epistemological and cultural space it defines, have reached an impasse. Thus, the present crisis does not call for a “better” way of doing development, not even for “another development”. A critique of the discourse and practice of development, however, can help clear the ground for a more radical collective imagining of alternative futures.

Development, according to this critique, has to be seen as an invention and strategy produced by the “First World” about the “underdevelopment” of the “Third World”, and not only as an instrument of economic control over the physical and social reality of much of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Development has been the primary mechanism through which these parts of

the world have been produced and have produced themselves, thus marginalizing or precluding other ways of seeing and doing. The problem is complicated by the fact that the post-World War II discourse of development is firmly entrenched in Western modernity and economy.

To think about “alternatives to development” thus requires a theoretico-practical transformation of the notions of development, modernity and the economy. This transformation can be best achieved by building upon the practices of social movements, especially those in the Third World that have emerged in response to post-World War II hegemonic social orders. These movements are essential for the creation of alternative visions of democracy, economy and society.

The task of critical thought is “to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently” (Foucault, 1985: 9)[10]. Consequently, the product of critical thought should be a history of our present, of those discourses and practices that have made us what we are, shaped what we think, determined what we see and feel, a history, in short, which clears the way so we may help bring into being, through our reflection, those things that have never been thought or imagined. As Haraway (1988: 580) puts it, “we need the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and bodies get made, not in order to deny meanings and bodies, but in order to build meanings and bodies that have a chance for life. This is not something that the intellectual is in a position to define by him or herself, but something that has to be invented and practiced collectively, by social movements, for example. In

what follows I give, first, an account of how the Third World “has been made”, and then go on to discuss social movement theory.

THE HEGEMONY OF DEVELOPMENT

The question of the making of the Third World through development discourses and practices has to be seen in relation to the larger history of Western modernity, of which development seems to be one of the last and most insidious chapters. Development is most clearly anchored in the Western economy, with its ensemble of systems of production, power and signification (Polanyi, 1957; Braudel, 1977; Dumont, 1977; Foucault, 1973; Baudrillard, 1975). Indeed, development provides a particularly privileged space for exploring the interconnection of practices and symbols of reason, the economy, representation, society and modernity. Modernity can be understood as that period in European history inaugurated at the end of the eighteenth century, when “Man” (sic) turned the apparatuses of knowledge upon himself in a distancing, self-objectifying fashion, thus originating the forms of inquiry and rationality that characterize today’s sciences (Foucault, 1970). Politically, “the fundamental characteristic of modernity is the advent of the democratic revolution” (Mouffe, 1988: 33). This characterization of the modern practices of Reason, rationality and even democracy, although already naturalized through the universalization of European history, implies an anthropological critique: as a peculiar, historically locatable set of practices (Rabinow, 1986, 1988). A critical study of development would

thus situate itself within this anthropology of reason and modernity, showing the constructed and even exotic character of many of our most “rational” practices.

Modernity has also been understood as the attempt to provide a foundation for the social, one that is grounded in reason and a project of global emancipation. One cannot look at the bright side of modernity, however, without looking at its dark side of domination. “The ‘Enlightment’, which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines” (Foucault, 1979: 222). Consequently, modernity’s inventions must be seen for what they are: Janus-faced relations between forms of knowledge made possible by reason and the systems of power created in the process of building a rational society, including the processes of “emancipation” (Nandy, 1989)[11]. From this critical perspective, development can be described as an apparatus *(dispositif)* that links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies. In other words, development is what constructs the contemporary Third World, silently, without our noticing it. By means of this discourse, individuals, governments and communities are seen as “underdeveloped” (or placed under conditions in which they tend to see themselves as such), and are treated accordingly. “It took twenty years for two billion people to define themselves as underdeveloped”—Ivan Illich is quoted as saying (Trinh, 1982, 1985). Problematic as this statement might be (who are the “they” who define themselves as such?), it captures the tenor of this hegemonic discourse.

Needless to say, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America did not always see themselves in terms of “development”. The history of development is relatively recent: it goes back only as far as the early post-World War II period, when the apparatuses of knowledge production and intervention (the World Bank, the United Nations, bilateral development agencies, planning offices in the Third World, etc.) were established and when a whole new political economy of truth—different from that of the colonial or pre-war period—was set into place. The history and political economy of this process are too complex to recount here: this has been done elsewhere (Sachs, ed. 1992; Escobar, 1984, 1988). To examine development as discourse requires understanding why so many countries started to see themselves as underdeveloped, that is, how “to develop” became for them a fundamental problem, and how, finally, it was made real through the deployment of myriad strategies and programs. Development as discourse shares structural features with other colonizing discourses, such as Orientalism, which Said argues

> can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient-dealing with it by making statements about it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient… My contention is that without examining orientalism as a discourse we cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightment period [1979: 3].

Likewise, development has functioned as an all-powerful mechanism for the production and management of the Third World in the post-World War II period. A complete reorganization of knowledge production systems, for example, took place in Latin America after 1950 (Fuenzalida, 1983, 1987; Escobar, 1989). The previous model, organized in the nineteenth century around the European classical professions and centered on education and training, was replaced by a new one patterned after North American institutions and styles. This transformation took place to suit the demands of the new development order, which relied heavily on research and knowledge that could provide a reliable picture of a country's social and economic problems. Everything that was deemed important became the object of knowledge: this was achieved through the proliferation of development disciplines and sub-disciplines (development economics, agricultural sciences, health, nutrition and educational sciences, demography, city and regional planning, etc). Once Third World countries became the target of new mechanisms of power—embodied in endless programs and "strategies"—their economies, societies and cultures were offered up as new objects of knowledge that, in turn, created new possibilities of power.

It was the creation of a vast institutional network (from international organizations and universities to local development agencies) that insured the efficient functioning of this apparatus. Once consolidated, this system determined what could be said, thought, imagined; in short, it defined a perceptual domain, the space of development. Industrialization, family planning, the

“Green Revolution”, macroeconomic policy, “integrated rural development” and the like, all exist within the same space, all repeat the same basic truth, namely, that development is about paving the way for the achievement of those conditions that characterize rich societies: industrialization, agricultural modernization, and urbanization. Until recently, it seemed impossible to get away from this imaginary of development. Everywhere one looked, what one found was the busy, repetitive reality of development: governments designing ambitious development plans, institutions carrying out development programs in cities and countryside alike, experts studying development problems and producing theories *ad nauseam*, foreign experts all over the place, multinational corporations brought into the country in the name of development. In sum, development colonized reality, became reality, and no matter how sharp an instrument we used to pierce it, to break through it, we seemed to be left embarrassingly empty handed.

This critique of development as discourse has begun to coalesce in recent years (Mueller, 1987, 1991; Ferguson, 1990; Apffel Marglin and Marglin, 1991; Sachs, 1992). As in V. Y. Mudimbe’s study of Africanism (1988), the aim of these critiques is to examine the foundations of an order of knowledge about the Third World, the ways in which the Third World is constituted in and through representation. Third World reality is inscribed with precision and persistence by the discourses and practices of economists, planners, nutritionists, demographers, and the like, making it difficult for people to define their own interests in their own terms—in many cases actually disabling them to do so

(Illich, 1977). Development proceeded by creating abnormalities ("the poor", "the malnourished", "the illiterate", "pregnant women", "the landless") which it would then treat or reform. Seeking to eradicate all problems, it actually ended up multiplying them to infinity. Embodied in a multiplicity of practices, institutions and structures, it has had a profound effect on the Third World: social relations, ways of thinking, visions of the future are all indelibly marked and shaped by this ubiquitous operator.

This view of development as discourse is certainly different from analyses carried out from the perspective of political economy, modernization, or even "alternative development". Such analyses have generated proposals to modify the current regime of development: ways to improve upon this or that aspect, revised theories or conceptualizations, even its redeployment within a new rationality (for instance, socialist, anti-imperialist, or ecological). These modifications, however, do not constitute a radical positioning in relation to the discourse: they are instead a reflection of how difficult it is to imagine a truly different domain. Critical thought should help recognize the pervasive character and functioning of development as a paradigm of self-definition. But can it go further and contribute to the transformation or dismantling of the discourse?

First one must ask whether such a domain can be imagined. Philosophers have made us aware that we cannot describe exhaustively the period in which we happen to live, since it is from within its rules that we speak and think, and since it provides the basis for our descriptions and our own history (Benjamin, 1969: 253-264; Foucault, 1972: 130, 131; Guha, 1989: 215-

223)[12]. We may be aware of regions or fragments of our era, but only a certain distance from it will enable us to attempt the critical description of its totality as an era which has ceased to be ours. We may be approaching this point in relation to the post-War order of development. The critiques of development by dependency theorists, for instance, still functioned within the same discursive space of development, even if seeking to attach it to a different international and class rationality. We may now be approaching the point at which we can delimit more clearly the past era, capture it in its otherness, and make it discontinuous with its discursive practice. Are we not beginning to inhabit a gap between the discursive practice of development and a new one, which is slowly and painfully coming into existence, but which will establish us as different from the previous bankrupt order, so that we will not be obliged to speak the same truths, the same language, and prescribe the same strategies?

However, care must be taken to safeguard this new discourse from the attempt by dominant forces to salvage development—through fashionable notions such as “sustainable development”, “grassroots development”, “women and development”, “market-friendly development”[13], and the like—or to restructure social realities in the Third World in line with the symbolic and material requirements of a new international division of labor based on high technology (Castells, 1986; López Maya, ed., 1991; Harvey, 1989; Amin, 1990). Critical thought can rouse social awareness and amplify it, especially among social movements—about the power that the past, as far as development is concerned, still has in our present[14]. The archaeology of development and studies of

specific development practices can help in this regard. Above all, it will help in visualizing some possible paths along which communities can move away from development into a different domain, yet unknown, in which the “natural” need to develop is finally suspended, and in which they can experiment with different ways of organizing societies and economies and of dealing with the ravages of four decades of development.

There are already some clues about how this process might be taking place. Esteva has perhaps best summarized the new mood towards a radical move away from development:

> By now, “we” are ready to present a very good case against development. In addition to our own experience, “we” can use the extensive documentation and literature produced by expert establishments around the world, including the United Nations and other international institutions. These materials, however, do not derive any coherent and pertinent conclusions from the facts they document and examine. For years, the literature arrived at the analytical conclusion that a missing factor or tool, or the perverse, corrupt, or inefficient use of something, could explain the damage done by development to people and their environment. These “analyses” have come to a dead end. They move in a vicious circle, like a do g chasing its tail. The conclusions of some studies are the premises of others and so on. Every development “strategy” or “approach” has been tested, again and again, under widely different conditions but with the same frustrating results. When “we” talk about the archaeology of the development myth, assuming that its cycles and promises are over, “we” are just offering a different insight about known facts, in the context of our own shared experience. We are now using our own eyes and noses, not those of the experts (Esteva, 1987: 136).

The number of scholars in the Third World who agree with this prescription is growing. Rather than searching for development alternatives, they speak about “alternatives *to* development”, that is, a rejection of the entire paradigm. They see this reformulation as a historical possibility already underway in innovative grassroots movements and experiments. In their assessment, these authors share a number of features: a critical stance with respect to established scientific knowledge; an interest in local autonomy, culture and knowledge: and the defense of localized, pluralistic grassroots movements, with which some of them have worked intimately, (see especially Esteva 1987; Shet, 1987; Rahnema, 1988a, 1988b; Shiva, 1989; Nandy, 1987, 1989; Fals Borda, 1988; Kothari, 1987; Parajuli, 1991; Sachs, 1992). For these authors, as the links between development—which articulates the state with profits, patriarchy, and objectifying science and technology—on the one hand, and the marginalization of people’s life and knowledge, on the other, become more evident, the search for alternatives also deepens. The imaginary of development and “catching up” with the West is drained from its appeal as violent and recurring crises (economic, ecological, political) become the order of the day. Financial crisis, on the other hand, entails the withdrawal of states in the Third World from some of their development activities. In sum, these authors see new spaces opening up in the vacuum left by the colonizing mechanisms of development, either through innovation or the survival and resistance of popular practices.

These grassroots initiatives, although still clearly limited, are

nevertheless significant. They provide the means for an "alternative [to] development as political practice" (Shet, 1987). Generally speaking, what matters for a strategy of change is the formation of nuclei (Deleuze, 1987; Esteva, 1986) or transformations around "neuralgic knots" (López Maya, ed. 1991) through which a new discursive formation may slowly be articulated[15]. For Esteva, the challenge consists in fostering changes in both discourse and institutions through "the autonomization of cultural nuclei interconnected in reticular fashion… in favor of a plurality of options" (Esteva, 1986: 31). The challenge, he adds, is "to co-move", not to change, develop, or create awareness: in other words, "to intensify the processes of construction of direct democracy" (p. 33). This is not a process that can be described in terms of "the whole of society" but rather as something that concerns first and foremost local and regional communities, perhaps the construction of unforeseeable reticular structures through cooperation among groups. It is not a teleological project (moving people towards a pre-determined direction) but one which recognizes people's agency and learns how to foster and co-move with them. About this process, Esteva observes, peasants (and, one may add, indigenous peoples and women) have much to say.

It may be said that what is at stake is the transformation of the political, economic and institutional regime of truth production that has defined the era of development. This in turn requires changes in institutions and social relations, openness to various forms of knowledge and cultural manifestations, new styles of participation, greater community autonomy over the production of

norms and discourses. Whether or not the formation of nuclei or nodal points around specific social relations or problems leads to significant transformations in the prevailing regime remains to be seen. The future cannot be predicted in this respect, nor can an explicit strategy be proposed. However, the new linkages effected by social movements may very well lead in this direction, perhaps resulting in political economies of truth. Social movements constitute an analytical and political terrain in which the weakening of development and the displacement of certain categories of modernity (for example, progress and the economy), can be defined and explored. It is in terms of social movement discourse that the immediacy of “development”, and its foundational role in the constitution of the “Third World” and the post-World War II international economic order, can be most pertinently put to test.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT ORDER

It would not serve much purpose to speculate in the abstract about a post-development era. Moreover, if we accept that any form of critical thought must also be a situated one (Haraway, 1988; Fraser, 1989), then theoretically informed alternatives should be practice-oriented, especially from the point of view of engaging with the politicized claims and actions of oppositional movements. In the long run, it is the work of these movements which would largely determine the scope and character of any

possible transformation. Hence the importance of linking the proposals for the transformation of development with the ongoing work of social movements.

Elaborating upon Marx's definition of critique as "the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age", Nancy Fraser conceptualizes the relationship between critical theory and political practice as follows:

> first, it [Marx's definition] valorizes historically specific, conjunctural struggles as the agenda setters for critical theory; second, it posits social movements as the subjects of critique; and third, it implies that it is in the crucible of political practice that critical theories meet the ultimate test of viability [1989: 2].

It is the recognition of this centrality of social movements for critical inquiry that has guided recent work in this area, especially in Latin America and Western Europe. Although there is disagreement about the nature and extent of today's social movements, it is clear to most analysts that "regardless of which perspective you adopt, it is impossible not to recognize that there has begun a change in the structure of collective action. The fact is there, redefining a new space for theory and social action, the contours of which we are beginning to visualize, even if we cannot yet fully explain them" (Calderón and Reyna, 1990: 19). For many it is in relation to social movements that questions about daily life, democracy, the state, political practice, and the redefition of development can be most fruitfully pursued. Writing in Argentina, Elizabeth Jelin has captured this situation in a succinct and insightful manner:

> If we study the meaning of political practices in daily life, the construction of

identities and discourses, we do not do it assuming that these are determinant —or necessary—of practices at the institutional level. Neither do we assume the autonomy of democracy on the political plane in relation to people's everyday practices. The relationships between one and the other level are complex and mediated. Our intention is to point *to a field of construction of democracy* that, in the first place, is important in itself: the *social relations of daily life* (as Chilean feminists say: democracy in the home and democracy in the State)… For a model of participatory democracy, the question is how and where systems of social and cultural relations are articulated with mechanisms of power and what are the mechanisms of intermediation. *We believe that daily life and social movements are privileged spaces in which to study these processes of mediation*, since social movements are situated, al least in theory, in the intermediate space between individualized, familiar, habitual, micro-climactic daily life, on the one hand, and socio-political processes *writ* large, of the State and the solemn and higher institutions, on the other [1987: 11, emphasis added, my translation].

Jelin's argument raises many questions. How are social movement practices to be studied? According to what represention of practices? How is social science to make visible the domain of popular practices and the intersubjective meanings (backgrounds of understanding) that underlie them? How can we account for the self-interpretation of agents? What is the field of meanings in which popular actions are inscribed and how has this field been generated by processes of domination and resistance, strategies and tactics, scientific knowledges and popular knowledges and traditions? What are the relations between cultural definitions of social life and political culture?

How do collective actors build collective identities, and how do they create new cultural models?

The importance of daily life and its practices for the study of social movements is increasingly appreciated in Latin America. To problematize everyday life is to provide the conditions for a different social theory and interpretive framework. Everyday life involves a collective act of creation, a collective signification, a culture. Reflection on daily life has to be located at the intersection of micro-processes of meaning production, on the one hand, and macro-processes of domination, on the other. Inquiry into social movements from this perspective seeks to restore the centrality of popular practices, *without reducing the movements to something else:* the logic of domination or capital accumulation, the struggle of the working class or the labor of parties. Thus oriented, such an inquiry vindicates the value of the practices of the majority in producing the world in which we live; for if is true that the majority have to live within structures of domination that are not of their own making, it is also true that, in relation to those structures and strategies, they effect a veritable process of creation, by adapting, resisting, transforming or subverting those forms through manifold tactics (De Certeau, 1984; Scott, 1985; Fiske, 1989; Willis, 1990). It is out of this type of inquiry that a new understanding of social practice in the Third World may emerge.

Although the centrality of these questions was recognized early in current social movement theory in Latin America *(Nueva Sociedad*, 1983; Slater, 1985)[16], the examination of those that focused on the articulation of everyday life and social movements

can be said to be just beginning: other aspects have been given greater importance. This peculiarity in Latin American social movement theory should, therefore, be subject to examination.

Critics have, in this regard, pointed to a lack of precision and systematicity. “Studies of social movements in Latin America are the result of a very specific intellectual and political conjuncture”—states Ruth Cardoso in the opening paragraph of her critical review of social movements literature. “There exist”—she continues—“significant differences and lack of precision regarding the demarcation of the subject of study” (1987: 27, 28). Fernando Calderón has also observed that “theoretical analysis of social movements is limited at present: it might be said to be under construction” (1986: 331). If we look back at the construction of social movements and new social movements discourse, we can see that its emergence and evolution throughout the decade has been very much determined by a fourfold dynamic , which has greatly shaped and limited the inquiry: the construction of the old as a way to specify the new; a theory of crisis and transformation from one regime to another; a series of empirical studies done in the region; and a number of theories and categories used to conceptualize the movements.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ‘OLD’ AS A WAY TO SPECIFY THE ‘NEW’

Much of the recent literature on social movements and new social movements takes for granted the fact that a significant transformation has taken place, perhaps the coming of a new

period altogether[17]. The “old” is often yoked to analyses of modernization or dependency: to politics centered around traditional actors like parties, vanguards, and the working class who struggle for the control of the State: and to a view of society as composed of more or less immutable structures and class relations that only great changes (i.e., massive development schemes or revolutionary upheavals) can alter in a significant way. The “new”, by contrast, is invoked in: analyses based not on structures but on social actors; the promotion of democratic, egalitarian and participatory styles of politics; and the search not for grand structural transformations but rather for the construction of identities and greater autonomy through modifications in everyday practices and beliefs.

Social movement discourse is thus divided into two orders—the old and the new—characterized by specific historical features. In the process, the many continuities between the two regimes—as well as the ways in which, for instance, old styles of politics are still pervasive among the new movements—are overlooked. Equally important, the past is endowed with features that are not completely accurate (for instance, the claim that all styles of politics in the past were clientilistic and non-participatory). To acknowledge the continuities existing between the two periods—both at the level of theories of politics, development, the economy, etc., and that of popular practices—is important, as a few researchers have pointed out (Mires, 1987; Cardoso, 1987; Alvarez, 1989)[18]. In sum, a more rigorous characterization of the nature of the change that is taking place is needed.

A THEORY OF CRISIS OR TRANSFORMATION FROM OLD TO NEW

The demise of old models is arguably brought about by the failure of the developmentalist state to bring about lasting improvements, and of political mechanisms, on either Left or Right, to deal with that failure. Moreover, the untenability of the old models is reflected in the present crisis. This dual crisis of paradigms and economies is forcing a new situation, a "social reconfiguration", as Mires (1987) has aptly put it. For most observers, the crisis of the post-World War II models, centered around the agency of the modernizing bourgeoisie and the working class, necessarily entails the dissolution of the political discourses of these social actors, thus paving the way for new voices and political manifestations. Beyond these general assertions, however, most talk about the crisis is imprecise at best. It is conceptualized mostly in economic and political terms, but many questions remain: for instance, what are the inherent contradictions of today's models? What specific problems of system control seem to be critical? What structures are being strained? How are legitimation, fiscal and economic crises interrelated in specific Latin American countries?[19]

Other questions are raised by the premise that culture and ideology are embedded in production and political processes in complex ways. What cultural features seem to pose limits to accumulation? To the persistence of old political forms? Is the loosening of economic and political structures leading to new traditions and identities? What specific institutions are disintegrating? What groups of people feel their identity

particularly threatened, and in what ways? If the post-War systems that define group identity are losing their power of integration, what are the new systems for identity formation? What new goals and values are being formulated? What new discourses are being put in circulation as the usual mechanisms for social and cultural discourse production are upset? These problems do not emerge simply in relation to a concept of crisis that takes at face value the very real and dramatic dislocations that Latin America suffers today: to understand them, it is necessary to probe deeper into the shifts and fluctuations in institutional arrangements, the meanings and practices that are also occurring, in part, as a result of the crisis. Recent studies are beginning to tackle these issues.

EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The number and quality of studies of social movements in Latin America has grown steadily since the early 1980s. Although urban popular movements have figured prominently among those studied, Christian based communities, peasant mobilizations, new types of workers' organizations and novel forms of popular protest (for basic needs and local autonomy, for example) have also been the subject of significant research. Increasing attention is being paid to women's and ethnic movements and grassroots movements of various kinds; on the other hand, few studies exist of the gay (McRae, 1990, 1992) and ecology movements (Viola, 1986; García, 1992). Human rights and defense of life issues, as well as youth forms of protest, have been important in a few

countries. Civic movements of various kinds and regional movements complete the list of the most visible movements as they have appeared until today in Latin American scholarly and political literature.

The most complete study of recent social movements to this date is the ten country study carried out by the Latin American Social Science Council (CLACSO) under the general direction of Fernando Calderón (Calderón, 1986)[20]. Although not intended as a rigorous comparative study, it did provide an insightful view of the most important movements in each country. The study examines the relationships among crisis, movements and democracy, and the possible contribution of the movements "to construct[ing] new social orders, propitiat[ing] new models of development and promot[ing] the emergence of new utopias" (p. 12). The exploration of the existence of new tendencies towards greater autonomy and pluralism, less dependence on the state, and new values of solidarity and participation are also part of the agenda. In sum, the study purports to seek in the movements "evidence of a profound transformation of the social logic… a new form of doing politics and a new form of sociality… more importantly, a new form of relating the political and the social, the public and the private, in such a way that everyday practices can be included side by side with the politico-institutional" (Jelin, 1986: 21).

One question that arises immediately regarding this provocative statement is how this "profound transformation" will be conceptualized. Here we find again a tautological proposition, since social movements are defined precisely in terms of what

they supposedly bring about: new forms of politics and sociality whose definition in turn is left unproblematized. The “new forms of doing politics”—as characterized in most of the literature—comprise not a new conception of politics but an expansion of the political domain such that it encompasses everyday practices. Even the future of the movements is seen in relatively conventional terms: small organizations will branch out vertically and horizontally, non-party formations will give way to parties, short-term protest to long-term efforts. Similarly, social scientists see social movements as pursuing goals that look very much like conventional development objectives (chiefly, the satisfaction of basic needs), thus revealing that the more radical questions of the redefinition of the political and the dismantling of development are overlooked. This is compounded by the fact that there is no agreement as to what counts as a “movement” or as “new”, a point to be discussed in the next section of the essay.

Despite these difficulties, studies of social movements have been successful in clarifying a number of macro issues. The relationships among crisis, social movements and democracy have been broadly defined: causes for the emergence of new actors have been identified, ranging from the exclusionary character of development, increased fragmentation and precarious urbanization to general social decomposition and violence, the growth of the informal sector, loss of confidence in the government and political parties, breakdown of cultural mechanisms, and so forth. It is argued, moreover, that the concomitant displacement of spaces and identities (from the working class to new actors, from the factory to the city, from the

public sphere to the household, from the plaza to the neighbourhood, etc.) accounts for the new movements. Some of these are seen as achieving a transition “from the micro to the macro, and from protest to proposal”, as they connect with each other in the building of coalitions and political movements, such as the Workers’ Party in Brazil, the M-19 Democractic Alliance in Colombia, and the Cardenista movement in Mexico (Fals Borda, 1992).

The CLACSO project also offers a set of basic features to characterize social movements: their structures of participation; their temporality, including synchronic and diachronic aspects; their multiple and heterogeneous spread within a geographical space; their relation to the crisis and to other social forces; their effect on social relations; and their self-image and conception of their everyday life. Finally, studies have also identified a series of criteria for the realization of the democratizing potential of the movements: the extent to which they undermine prevalent authoritarian practices; the extent of their pluralizing and diversifying effects on dominant, homogenizing and reductionist forces; the relative weight of autonomy versus clientilism and dependence on the State and conventional political institutions, the possibility of bringing about new economic forms which transcend the rationality of the market; and the possible role played by Latin America within the international division of labor currently in the making (Calderón, 1986).

THEORIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

These new intellectual and political challenges have provoked a significant renewal in social science activities, such as the reappraisal of civil society (although accompanied by renewed violence and factionalism, and in part as a response to these latter), the importance of the micro-sociology and politics of everyday life, the possibility for new types of pluralist democracies and alternative ways of satisfying basic needs. For Calderón, Piseitelli and Reyna (1992), the new research is being conducted in at least five major areas: theories of social movements; new types of elass analysis, especially in the Central American case; community studies originating in reinvigorated communitarian traditions in urban areas (for instance, popular kitchens formed on the basis of relations of solidarity) and rural areas (peasant movements); the transformation of the catholic church; and new social movements proper (women's, gay, ecology and culturally based movements).

There is, then, a sort of "thematic renewal" which, despite conflicting demands and the existence of conservative tendencies, such as neo-liberalism and greater normalization of research in some cases, is having a great impact on the social sciences (López Maya, ed. 1991). European and North American theories, to be sure, continue to be important, and this is particularly true of social movement research. In this area, post-structuralism, post-Marxism and postmodernism have shaped European efforts and significantly influenced Latin American thought. But just as important a line of research is the question of "whether in spite of the richness of these foreign analyses there may not be something present in the social movements of the

region impervious to the analytical categories provided by European theorists" (Calderón, Piscirelly and Reyna, 1992: 21). Moreover, these authors conclude, it is Latin American researchers who are leading the way in the reformulation of social movement theory and methodology through continuous reflection on the practice of the movements. In sum, the production of theory in one place and its application in another is no longer an acceptable practice. There are multiple sites of production and multiple mediations in the generation and production of theory. Social movement work provides a good example of "traveling" theories and theorists in the post-colonial world[21].

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY: HISTORICITY AND HEGEMONY

Jean Cohen (1985) has introduced a useful distinction between those social movements primarily concerned with strategy, organization, resources, interests, conflict and the like, and which predominate in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and those which emphasize the process by which social actors struggle to constitute new identities as a means to open democratic spaces for more autonomous action. Theories based on the latter have furnished the most important set of categories used implicitly or explicitly in Latin American research. However, as Alvarez (1989) has remarked, disregard for the resource mobilization paradigm has had a high cost in Latin America. In fact, many types of popular actions have been crudely characterized in terms of

groups “reclaiming their identity” or searching for “new ways of doing politics”, leaving unexplained complex issues that impinge on the movements, such as organizational and institutional development, the role of external factors, constraints and opportunities vis-à-vis local or national politics, and so on. Some authors (Alvarez, 1989; Tarrow, 1988) argue that both paradigms should be combined for a more realistic portrayal of social movements in Latin America and elsewhere.

The focus of the identity-centered paradigm is primarily on social actors and collective action. This is true of the three most influential European conceptualizations of social movements in Latin America, those of Alain Touraine, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and Alberto Melucci. Even a brief presentation and critical review of the complex work of these authors is clearly beyond the scope of the present essay (see Escobar, 1992); it may be useful, however, to review briefly those notions that seem to have found special resonance in the Latin American literature, and to venture a critical assessment of their application in this context.

HISTORICITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

For Touraine (post-industrial) society, for the first time in history, produces itself by a complex set of actions performed upon itself. Social action can no longer be seen as the result of some metasocial principle God, Reason, Evolution, the Economy or the State. Society today is the result of a set of systems of action characterized by the presence of actors who may have conflictual

interests but who share certain cultural orientations. On this view, social movements are not “dramatic events” but rather “the work that society performs upon itself” (1981: 29). This work has as its goal the control of *historicity*, that is, “the set of cultural models that rule social practices” (Touraine, 1988a: 8). Such control is, for Touraine, embodied in the epistemic, economic and ethical models that are always at stake. What, then, is a social movement?

> A social movement is the action, both culturally oriented and socially conflictual, of a social class defined by its position of domination or dependency in the mode of appropriation of historicity, and by the cultural models of investment, knowledge and morality toward which the social movement itself is oriented [1988b: 68].

The essential feature of this definition is that actors recognize the stakes in terms of a cultural project: in other words, what is at stake in a social movement is historicity itself, not merely organizational forms, services, means of production and the like. This leads Touraine to conclude that most forms of social mobilization observed today in Latin America are not social movements proper, but rather struggles or socio-historical movements which involve not the self-production of society so much as the process of historical change and development. They are, in a sense, modernizing orientations. This is so because, in the Latin American “dependent” case, the central relation is given by the interaction of modernization, social actors, and the state: the state intervenes in all aspects of life so that actors are above

all actors in the development process, a process which is often led by exogenous forces. At stake, then, is not historicity but greater participation in the political system. This contrasts sharply with post-industrial society, where change is endogenous, actors are classes, actions are social movements, and socio-economic and political categories largely correspond to one another. In sum, what in one case can be described as an excess of the social, in the Latin American case becomes an excess of the political, given the centrality of the state as an all powerful actor in steering the process of development and change (Touraine, 1987, 1988b).

Touraine's conceptualization is open to at least two major criticisms. First, his inquiry is determined at the outset by his choice of theoretical horizon—the Western European experience: it is al so informed by post-World War II political discourse (e.g., his characterization of the "Latin American system of action" [1987, 1988b] still bears the marks of CEPAL, dependency and modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s), and by adherence to a compartmentalized view of reality that envisions the social, political, economic and cultural as autonomous spheres. The practices of today's social movements, however, make it clear that the categories and conditions (dependence on the State, reliance on exogenous agents of change, hyperpoliticization of the public sphere, and the centrality of development) by which Latin America has been construed, and that Touraine takes for granted, are precisely what they pretend to put in question.

A second questionable aspect of Touraine's work is his notion

of “levels of historicity”, according to which only post-industrial society has achieved the “highest level of historicity”, namely, that of self-production. Traditional societies, on the contrary, still *“lie within history”* (1981*:* 105) and their ability to produce the cultural models by which they function is more limited since the distance that historicity requires (from God, oneself and the world as object) has not been achieved. This distancing would require the destruction of community by a group that becomes a ruling class. On this view, Latin America can only achieve this highest level through industrialization and development. As in other eurocentric discourses (including, as we will see, that of Laclau and Mouffe), the Third World is represented as lacking historical agency or, in the best of cases, as only having a diminished form of agency if compared with the European case.

But why, one may ask, would this type of objectifying distancing which, as we know, is the essential feature of modernity—be the only route to historicity? For if it is true that the modern West has been the first society to turn the apparatus of its objectifying knowledge upon itself (Foucault, 1970), it is also true that this kind of self-reflection is only one possibility among many. Recent anthropological studies focus, for instance, on the sophisticated historical consciousness of the Saramakas of Surinam (Price, 1983, 1990), eighteenth century Hawaiians (Sahlins, 1985), the Ilongot of the Philippines (Rosaldo, 1980), or today’s Colombian peasants (Fals Borda, 1986). These studies also register the manifold forms of resistance—with varying degrees of self-reflective consciousness—practiced as an affirmation and defense of a way of life by non-Western peoples

under conditions of colonialism (Taussig, 1980; Guha, 1983; Fals Borda, 1984; Scott, 1985; Comaroff, 1985; Ong, 1987). And finally, they emphasize the weighty presence of myth in real life and history and, in general, the powerful effects of seemingly unconscious constructions of meaning on reality (Taussig, 1987). Touraine, by comparison, seems stuck within a philosophy of history governed by teleology and rationalism, as evidenced by the features he imputes to social movements.

Nevertheless, Touraine's insight that conflict cannot be separated from culture is of paramount importance. In the past, cultural orientations were not given due importance. Yet many questions remain regarding the relation between social movements and culture. Historicity originates in a background of cultural meanings, according to a dynamic that includes the interaction of tradition and modernity, domination and resistance, as well as the discursive articulation of cultural contents, the establishment of orders and social relations, and struggles around all of these issues. These processes—and the effect of social movements on them—are not yet well understood. The effect of social movements on intersubjective meanings has remained largely intractable, and so have related issues like the self-interpretation of movements, their interpretation of dominant identities, and their consolidation of contestatory positions on the basis of those interpretations. Moreover, one may ask, how is a "political culture" carved out of a domain of background cultural practices in a given society? What in this background, and through what process, is articulated in a political discourse? How does Western style democracy as a practice that depends on a

particular historical and cultural experience—fare in other socio-cultural contexts?

NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE HEGEMONIC FORM OF POLITICS

The work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1985, 1988; Mouffe, 1984, 1988), situated within post-structuralist and post-Marxist theorizing of the past two decades, represents a significant departure from dominant political theories regarding the agent of social change, the structuring of political spaces, and the nature of historical transformation. In the first place, social practice is for them fundamentally discursive: it is a process in which the meaning of human action is constructed. Secondly, meaning cannot be permanently fixed; it is always changing such that even the very recognition of identity relies on an ongoing process of articulation of meanings. Dominant hegemonic practices tend toward closure of the social (that is, to project a "society"; for instance, the New World Order); in the process of so doing, however, antagonisms emerge, which in turn make possible the emergence of new actors and discourses. In post-industrial society, the main antagonisms took form within the hegemonic formation that arose after World War II. Characterized by pervasive processes of commodification, bureaucratization and massification of life, it is the spawning ground for the contradictions expressed by the new social movements.

This new political situation takes shape in the wake of the

“decline of a form of politics for which the division of the social into two antagonistic camps [the bourgeoisie and the working class] is an original and immutable datum, prior to all hegemonic construction” (1985: 151). In the new situation there is no privileged political subject, but a political space defined by a plurality of collective actors each struggling within their own sphere (workers, women, students, ecology activists…). The new politics emphasizes the *process* by which each actor or social movement articulates a position for itself and with other movements. This is also the means for identity-formation and, in the long run, for a counter-hegemonic formation achieved through the articulation of various movements. This process takes different forms at the center and at the periphery of the capitalist world economy:

> In the [advanced] countries, the proliferation of points of antagonism permits the multiplication of democratic struggles, but these struggles, given their diversity, do not tend to constitute a ‘people’, that is… to divide the political space into two antagonistic fields. On the contrary, in the countries of the Third World, imperialist exploitation and the predominance of brutal and centralized forms of domination tend from the beginning to endow the popular struggle with a center, with a single and clearly defined element. Here the division of the political space into two fields is present from the outset, but the diversity of democratic struggles is more reduced… We will therefore speak of *democratic* struggles where these imply a plurality of political spaces [the center], and of *popular* struggles where certain discourses *tendentially* construct the division of a single political space into two opposed fields [the Third World] [Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 131, 137].

Like Touraine, Laclau and Mouffe draw a sharp distinction between the “advanced” countries and the “Third World”[22]. The “hegemonic form of politics”, based on the articulation of a plurality of positions and movements, only exists “in societies in which the democratic revolution has crossed a certain threshold” (1985: 166). This form of politics opens the way for a “radical pluralist democracy”, one in which the gains of the democratic imaginary are extended to ever deeper domains through the maximum autonomization of spheres. But can we not argue that the post-War hegemonic formation of development has also resulted, in the Third World, in a multiplicity of antagonisms and identities—peasants, “urban marginals”, “those belonging to the informal sector”, “women bypassed by development”, the “illiterate”, “indigenous peoples who do not modernize”, etc.—, that is, all those victims of development who are the subjects of recent forms of protest?

Laclau and Mouffe’s eurocentric, post-industrial bias is subject to another emendation: the notion of “threshold” implies some sort of evolution, at the same time that it leaves unproblematized a dominant notion of democracy, that which was inaugurated with the French Revolution and the “Rights of Man”. It remains to be seen to what extent *Homo Aequalis*, and its close companion, *Homo Oeconomicus*, represent all cultures, genders and races. Contemporary social movements in the Third World cast a dark shadow on this powerful universal of modernity. It would thus seem more appropriate to say that Latin America oscillates between two logics, two forms of politics: a logic of popular

struggles in a relatively ("tendentially") unified political space (against oligarchies, imperialism and developmentalist states); and a logic of "democratic" struggles (how else are we to name this emerging movement?) in a plural space. Both have to be the result of articulations, given the precarious and extremely unstable, open character of the social. Perhaps only by working out a politics through these two logics will Latin America arrive at a more autonomous and satisfactory political practice and social order.

Laclau and Mouffe's notion of politics as an articulatory process, like Touraine's notion of the self-production of society, highlights the production of social life by social actors in changing and conflictual fields of meaning and social practices. Alberto Melucci (1980, 1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1989) emphasizes another important aspect for understanding many contemporary social movements (such as the women's, ecology and peace movements, but many others as well): their symbolic character. For Melucci and his co-workers, social movements "announce to society that a fundamental problem exists in a given area. They have a growing symbolic function; one can probably speak of a *prophetic function*, they are a kind of *new media"* (Melucci, 1985: 797). Contemporary collective action, moreover,

> assumes the form of networks submerged in everyday life. Within these networks there is an experimentation with and direct practice of alternative frameworks of sense, as a result of a personal commitment which is submerged and almost invisible… The 'movements' emerge only in limited areas, for limited phases and by means of moments of mobilization which are

the other, complementary phase of the submerged networks… What nourishes [collective action] is the daily production of alternative frameworks of meaning, on which the networks themselves are founded and live from day to day… This is because conflict takes place principally on symbolic grounds, by challenging and upsetting the dominant codes upon which social relationships are founded in high density informational systems. The mere existence of a symbolic challenge is in itself a method of unmasking the dominant codes, a different way of perceiving and naming the world (Melucci, 1988a: 248).

Movements, then, cannot be understood independently of the "submerged" cultural background out of which they emerge. This also suggests that it would be more appropriate to speak of *movement networks* or *movement areas*, in which the movement itself would be included along with the "users" of the cultural goods and services produced by the movement. "The normal situation of today's 'movements'"—Melucci concludes (1985: 800)—"is a network of small groups submerged in everyday life that requires a personal involvement in experiencing and practicing cultural innovation". In the Third World, of course, movements have to practice cultural innovation and techniques of survival and of social and economic transformation. This, however, does not diminish the importance of the cultural. In Latin America, social movements are economic, political, *and* cultural struggles, that is, struggles over meanings, from the nature of national development to everyday practices (Escobar, 1992). Interpreting Venezuelan social movements, for instance, Uribe and Lander (1988) find that some of the movements elicit changes in the cultural-symbolic framework that result in new

modes of construction of the political. Given the growing importance of mass media, the construction of political facts increasingly relies on the symbolic effectiveness of the movements. Social movements, in sum, bring about social practices which operate in part through the constitution of spaces for the creation of meaning. To the extent that they are also inevitably concerned with matters of economic and social transformation, they link together economic, social and political problematics within an overarching cultural field.

Inquiry into everyday life and social movements is also at the center of debates around the question of modernity and postmodernity which, although of recent origin, have become quite lively in Latin America. While it is recognized that modernity has left an indelible mark in the continent, most scholars also stress the uneven and heterogenous character of modernization projects. Heterogenous too are the cultural matrices of Latin American societies, many of them (indigenous, African and hybrid forms) not originating in European modernity, and as such providing reservoirs of alternative rationalities. Pre-modern (or non-modern), modern and postmodern forms coexist in complex configurations in the continent. There is also a very real sense in which modernity is also in crisis in Latin America. The crises of global capital and globalizing narratives—especially that of development—have intensified debate on culture and society in Latin America perhaps more than elsewhere. At stake are not only politics and democracy, but a whole civilizational design based on modern reason.

The emergence of new practices and new social actors is

recognized by many as the most striking and hopeful sign of these crises. This is why postmodernism is at once welcomed and resisted in Latin America. It is welcomed as a new intellectual horizon but resisted to the extent that it does not lead clearly to the formulation of alternative social projects. Many Latin American scholars insist that for postmodernism to be of use, the questions it poses have to be reworked in keeping with the local interests of Latin American peoples. Generally speaking, the task ahead is the construction of collective imaginaries capable of orienting social and political action. Epistemologically, it is necessary to appeal to non-reductionistic and non-teleological notions of politics and development; politically, the task is to foster the democratizing potential of the new social subjects. The transition to some sort of postmodernity, however, cannot be conceived as a higher stage of humanity from the perspective of the Center. Postmodernism's toppling of the illusion of modernity has to be accompanied in Latin America by the resignification of social reality, and this entails posing again the questions of social justice and of the constitution of social orders[23].

OTHER ISSUES IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH: KNOWLEDGE, POLITICS AND NEEDS

What follows is a brief presentation of a few issues in social movement theory, not included in the well known theories reviewed above, but which might be of certain relevance in future discussions. They are presented in the manner of preliminary

hypotheses concerning the existence of a subaltern domain of politics, the relation of social movements to the State, the autopoietic character of social movements, and the centrality of needs interpretation for collective action.

A SUBALTERN DOMAIN OF POLITICS

The recent work of the *Subaltern Studies* Group of Indian historians provides rich insights for thinking "the political" in a new manner[24]. According to this group, even in the most progressive historical accounts of popular actions, the rebels' acts are either seen as "pre-political'' or "spontaneous", or incorporated as elements of another history with another subject: the Raj, nationalism, the People, socialism. In the last instance, this amounts to a negation of the subject's history by the historian. Historical discourse, "even of a radical kind… has still to go a long way before it can prove that the insurgent can rely on its performance to recover his place in history" (Guha, 1988a: 84). This is largely due to the fact that conventional views of politics, of the Right or the Left (even Gandhi), are indelibly shaped by the institutions of colonialism (British colonialism in the Indian case), thus overlooking the existence of a whole different political domain:

> For parallel to the domain of elite politics there existed throughout the colonial period another domain of Indian politics in which the principal actors were not the dominant groups of the indigenous societies or the colonial authorities but the subaltern classes and groups… This was an autonomous

domain, for it neither originated from elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter… The experience of exploitation and labour endowed this politics with many idioms, norms and values which put it in a category apart from elite politics [Guha, 1988b: 40].

The recognition of the existence of the subaltern domain of politics is the basis, according to Guha, for developing alternative conceptions of popular consciousness and mobilization in their own right, that is, independent of conventional politics. For instance, in the case of peasant resistance in colonial India, mobilization was achieved not through vertical but horizontal integration; it relied on traditional forms, such as kinship and territoriality; it sometimes grew out of outrage, even crime, to insurgency and uprisings; it was collective and often destructive and total; and it practiced various styles of class, ethnic and religious solidarity. Nationalist leaders, on the other hand, tried to make the masses conform to a conventional politics with recognizable organizations and strategies (Guha, 1983).

Much of the discussion of social movements in Latin America assumes a single political domain. It can be argued, on the one hand, that popular struggles sometimes resemble Guha's notion of subalternity and that, on the other, one of the effects of bourgeois hegemony has been the belief in a single political domain. Most analysts, in trying to get at the "new forms of doing politics" or the "new political culture", still seem to be observing the movements from the conventional point of view. In other words, much of the discussion of social movements still relies on and shelters the political (and economic) culture of the West.

With few exceptions, the hypothesis of the existence of a subaltern domain has been overlooked in Latin America precisely as theorists try to recuperate popular resistance for a theoretico-practical discussion of political practice and process. To be sure, the conventional view of politics has produced a pre—understanding which shapes any "normal" understanding of the political, entrenched as it is in structures and everyday practices (including the state, interests groups, parties, forms of rationality and behavior such as strikes, visible mobilizations, etc.). A redefinition of this situation cannot be achieved without changing political discourse. This is why in Latin America the question of the location of meaning is an essentially political question that has to be answered in the terrains of history, politics and dominant representations. Only by rethinking politics in this way will another space of history that registers popular experience be opened up (Lechner, 1988; Quijano, 1988).

THE EXTERIORITY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN RELATION TO THE STATE

A critical reflection on the politics of knowledge and of the State is also crucial for transforming our understanding of social movements and development. Although social movements are usually thought of in connection with the State, they bear a relation of exteriority to the State apparatus. In the first place, relations of power extend well beyond the State, implicating a whole network of other relations (at the level of knowledge, the family, etc.) (Foucault, 1980a, 1980b). Social movements may

actually make difficult the consolidation of extra-social bodies such as the State. If the State implies an arborescent structure (i.e., unity, hierarchy, order), that of new social movements might be rhizomic: assuming diverse forms, establishing unexpected connections, adopting flexible structures, moving in various dimensions (the family, the neighborhood, the region… Social movements are defined more in terms of change and becoming than as fixed states, structures, and programs. They might even be considered “nomadic” forms which, although in perpetual interaction with the State and other megaforms like multinational corporations, are nevertheless irreducible to them[25].

A similar situation is found in the field of knowledge: two types of science, State science and “nomad” science, coexist, the former always trying to appropriate the contents of the latter, State science proceeds by territorializing, creating boundaries and hierarchies, producing certainties and theorems, identities. Nomad (or popular) knowledge has a very different form of operation, opposed to that of the State and the economy, with its division of the social space into rulers and governed, intellectual and manual labor. Nomad science stays closer to the everyday, seeking not to extract constants but to follow life and matter in itineraries that shift according to changing variables. While State science reproduces the world according to a fixed point of view, nomad science follows events and solves problems by means of real life operations, not by summoning the power of a conceptual apparatus or a pre-established form of intervention (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)[26].

The exteriority of new social movements in relation to the

State, as well as the existence of a domain of popular knowledge, are hinted at in some of the social movement literature. Fals Borda (1992), for instance, sees Latin American social movements as fostering "parallel networks of power" and a kind of "neo-anarchism" resulting from the movements' search for greater autonomy from the State and conventional political parties. Some see many of today's social movements as "nomad forms" which, although expanding the cultural and political terrain, may or may not coalesce into larger networks of action (Arditi, 1988). Similarly, other systems of knowledge are invoked in the literature on alternatives (Apffel Marglin and Marglin, eds. 1990) to development, which as a State order, bypasses people's experience; new types of knowledge are thus needed which do not enact this violent abstraction. Such alternative forms of knowledge are practiced in the popular domain, particularly among women (Shiva, 1989) and indigenous people. Research on participatory action is based on this belief, focusing on the encounter between modern and popular forms of knowledge (Fals Borda, 1988; Fals Borda and Rahman, eds. 1991).

THE AUTOPOIETIC CHARACTER OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

As self-producing and self-organizing entities, social movements can be characterized as *autopoietic*. Through their own action they establish a distinct presence in their social and cultural environment. They produce themselves and the larger social order through their own organizing processes (sets of relations or

articulations among key elements). They create a social phenomenology, so to speak, in the very social forms they produce as autonomous entities. It is necessary, then, to examine both the internal organization of these units and the history of their interaction with their environment. Our knowledge of this history, of course, can only be fragmentary and dependent on our own systems of interpretation. The interactions, too, may trigger important structural changes within a movement or even its destruction (when the basic organization is dissolved). But movements also trigger changes in the environment ("society").

As observers, we characterize these interactions between movements and environment in terms of "politics", "economic conditions", and the like. (In a sense we as observers do not "see" social movements but rather experience our field of categories through our observations and theorizations). Moreover, we tend to think that it is these latter categories that determine what happens inside the movement, which is only partly true, for it is the movement's organization that largely determines its structural changes, even if triggered by its coupling with its environment. The result of this history of interactions is the creation of life worlds and social orders. Thus, movements would not merely be a reflection of the current crisis or any other principle, but would have to be understood in terms of their own rationality and the organization they themselves produce. Like hypotheses of the existence of subaltern domains of politics and knowledge, this concept points us in the direction of greater awareness of the mediations that inevitably condition our perceptions of people's histories[27].

THE CENTRALITY OF THE POLITICS OF NEEDS INTERPRETATION FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

The question of needs implies the politics of knowledge and of the State: the knowledge of experts that certify “needs”, and the institutionalization of “social services” by the State. Needs discourses elaborated by development experts, universities, social welfare agents, and all kinds of professionals can be seen as “bridge discourses, which mediate the relations between social movements and the state… expert discourses play this mediating role by translating the politicized needs claimed by oppositional movements into potential objects of state administration” (Fraser, 1989: 11). Most often, the interpretation of people’s needs is taken as unproblematic, although it can easily be shown to be otherwise. There is an officially recognized idiom in which needs can be expressed: means of needs satisfaction position people as “clients” in relation to the State, and models of needs satisfaction are stratified along class, gender and ethnic lines. In other words, needs discourses constitute veritable “acts of intervention” (166) to the extent that the political status of a given need is an arena of struggle that is mediated by its interpretation.

Social movements necessarily operate within dominant systems of need interpretation and satisfaction, but they tend to politicize interpretations; that is, they refuse to see needs as just “economic” or “domestic.” This contributes to the consolidation of social identities on the part of subaltern groups, especially if they

manage to invent new forms of discourse for interpreting needs. “In oppositional discourses, needs talk is a moment in the self-constitution of new collective agents or social movements” (Fraser, 1989: 171). (Of course, this process does not go unchallenged: witness the proliferation of “reprivatization” discourses in the U.S. and elsewhere, not to mention the “austerity measures” in Latin America and Eastern Europe). It is a problematic “moment”, since it usually entails the involvement of the State and the mediation by those who have expert knowledge. (In the Third World, with the State in crisis, however, non-governmental organizations increasingly fulfill this role, thus creating interesting opportunities for action in some cases). Whereas expert discourses (such as those of the agents of development) reposition groups as “cases” for the State and the development apparatus, thus depoliticizing needs, popular actors challenge expert interpretations with varying degrees of success: for instance, rural development programs may spawn movements for the recuperation of land.

It is clear that in the Third World the process of needs interpretation and satisfaction is inextricably linked to the development apparatus. The “basic human needs” strategy, pushed by the World Bank and adopted by most international agencies, has played a crucial role in this regard (see, for instance, World Bank 1975; Leipziger and Streeten 1981). This strategy, however, is based on a liberal human rights discourse and on the rational, scientific assessment and measurement of “needs’’; lacking a significant link to people’s everyday experience, “basic human needs” discourse does not foster

greater political participation. This is why the struggle over needs interpretation is a key political arena of struggle for new social actors involved in redirecting the apparatuses of development and the State[28].The challenge for social movements—and the "experts" who work with them—is to come up with new ways of talking about needs and of demanding their satisfaction in ways that bypass the rationality of development with its "basic needs" discourse. The "struggle over needs'' must be practiced in a way conducive to redefining development and the nature of the political. Finally, the language of "needs" itself must be reinterpreted as one of the most devastating legacies of modernity and development, as Ivan Illich (1992) argues. These are open challenges that remain to be explored[29].

CONCLUSION

The possibility for redefining development, this paper argues, rests largely with the action of social movements. Development is understood here as a particular set of discursive power relations that construct a representation of the Third World, whose critical analysis lays bare the processes by which Latin America and the rest of the Third World have been produced as "underdeveloped." Such a critique also contributes to devising means of liberating Third World societies from the imaginary of development and for lessening the Third World's dependence on the episteme of modernity. While this critical understanding of development is crucial for those working within social movements, awareness of the actions of the latter is equally essential for those seeking to

transform development.

As regards social movement research, significant ambiguities and confusions still exist. An examination of certain notions provides some clues for clarification. A critical view of modernity, for instance, emphasizes the need to resist post-Enlightment universals (such as those of economy, development, politics and liberation); a reflection on historicity allows us to foreground the cultural aspects of the new movements; the discussion of meaning and background cultural practices provides a way to study the connection between cultural norms, definitions of social life and movement organization; this discussion also provides a conceptual tool for exploring the more profound effects of social movements, namely, those that operate at the level of life's basic norms.

In a similar vein, the notion of autopoiesis suggests that social movements are not merely a reflection of the crisis, but have to be understood in terms of the organization they themselves produce. They are, in important ways, self-producing, self-referential systems, even if their effects disseminate across large networks or areas of economic, social and cultural life. In conceptualizing social movements as autopoietic entities, conventional definitions of the political, of knowledge, and of the relation between social movements and the State need to be subjected to scrutiny. Even if popular knowledge and politics are in continuous relation to the State, they nevertheless may have their own rationality and rules of operation. All politics, finally, can be said to be articulatory, although the specific nature of the societies in question may dictate the more or less fragmented

character of political space. If in the Latin American case the issues and forms are different from other cases, the search for autonomy and the control of historicity are also pressing issues for the movements.

To conclude, we may postulate the existence of three major discourses in Latin America with the potential to articulate—and are actually articulating in many cases—forms of struggle:

1. The discourse of the fulfillment of the democratic imaginary (including "needs", economic and social justice, human rights, class, gender and ethnic equality, etc.). This first possibility originates in the egalitarian discourses of the West, although it does not necessarily have to follow the West's experience. This first discourse offers the possibility for material and institutional gains and the radicalization of democracy towards more pluralist societies.

2. The discourse of difference, including cultural difference, alterity, autonomy and the right of each society to self-determination. This second possibility originates in a variety of sources: anti-imperialist struggles, those of ethnic groups and women, the challenge to European ethnocentrism and conventional epistemologies, revisions of history, etc. The potential here is for the strategic release and furthering of some of these struggles.

3. Anti-development discourses proper, which originate in the current crisis of development and the work of grassroots groups. The potential here is for more radical transformations of the modern capitalist order and the search for alternative ways of organizing societies and economies, of satisfying needs, of healing and living.

It should be clear by now that struggles in the Third World cannot be merely extensions of the “democratic revolution” or for the consolidation of modernity, although some of this must obviously happen in order to weather with the precariousness of life conditions and democratize social and economic life. The recent struggles in the Third World go well beyond the principles of equality, relations of production and democracy; moreover, they constitute arenas for redefining and recovering these terms. Even the possibility of building a “counter-hegemonic formation” through articulation, as Laclau and Mouffe suggest, seems to be contrary to the movements’ practices and would evince a type of rationality that popular movements may not share. This does not mean that alliances may not take place. They certainly do and must. In fact, networks of popular movements are appearing in several countries and internationally (in the case of indigenous peoples and women). But social movements are not ruled by the logic of all or nothing: they must consider the contradictory and multiple voices present in such experiences without reducing them to a unitary logic. Postmodern discussions of the nature of the political space, the fragmentation of identities, the de-totalization of certain narratives (including “development”) lead, in Latin America, to new criteria for the creation of collective orders. Rather than resulting in political ambiguity and a loss of sense of history, postmodern insights bring about a demand for new historical directions that foster democratization and the healing of violence. If the decentered character of social life is admitted, the need for certain structuration and the invention of more fluid

narratives is also recognized and welcomed.

In the long run, it is a matter of generating new ways of seeing, of renewing social and cultural self-descriptions by displacing the categories with which Third World groups have been constructed by dominant forces, and by producing views of reality which make visible the numerous loci of power of those forces; a matter of "regenerating people's spaces" or creating new ones, with those who have actually survived the age of modernity and development by resisting it or by insinuating themselves creatively in the circuits of capital and modernization. As Ashis Nandy put it, "the recovery of the other selves of cultures and communities, selves not defined by the dominant global consciousness, may turn out to be the first task of social criticism and political activism and the first responsibility of intellectual stock-taking in the first decades of the coming century" (1989: 265). Perhaps social movements, as symbols of resistance to the dominant politics of knowledge and organization of the world, provide some paths in the direction of this calling, that is, for the re-imagining of the "Third World" and a post-development era.

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Lectura 2

Carta de principios del Foro Social Mundial[30]

El Comité de entidades brasileñas que organizó el primer Foro Social Mundial, realizado en Porto Alegre del 25 al 30 de enero de 2001, considera necesario y legítimo, después de analizar los resultados de dicho Foro y las expectativas por él creadas, establecer una Carta de Principios que oriente la continuidad de esa iniciativa. Los principios que constan en la Carta —que deberán ser respetados por todos los que desearen participar del proceso y por aquellos que sean miembros de la organización de las nuevas ediciones del Foro Social Mundial— consolidan las decisiones que presidieron al Foro de Porto Alegre, que garantizaron su éxito y ampliaron su alcance, definiendo orientaciones que parten de la lógica de esas decisiones.

1. El Foro Social Mundial es un espacio abierto de encuentro para: intensificar la reflexión, realizar un debate democrático de ideas, elaborar propuestas, establecer un libre intercambio de experiencias y articular acciones eficaces por parte de las entidades y los movimientos de la sociedad civil que se opongan al neoliberalismo y al dominio del mundo por el capital o por cualquier forma de imperialismo y, también, empeñados en la

construcción de una sociedad planetaria orientada hacia una relación fecunda entre los seres humanos y de estos con la Tierra.

2. El Foro Social Mundial de Porto Alegre fue una realización colocada dentro de su tiempo y espacio. A partir de ahora, basándose en la proclamación que surgió en Porto Alegre que “otro mundo es posible”, el Foro se convierte en un proceso permanente de búsqueda y construcción de alternativas, no limitándose exclusivamente a los eventos que le den apoyo.

3. El Foro Social Mundial es un proceso de carácter mundial. Todos los eventos que se realicen como parte de este proceso tendrán una dimensión internacional.

4. Las alternativas propuestas en el Foro Social Mundial se contraponen a un proceso de globalización, comandado por las grandes corporaciones multinacionales y por los gobiernos e instituciones que sirven a sus intereses, con la complicidad de los gobiernos nacionales. Estas alternativas surgidas en el seno del Foro tienen como meta consolidar una globalización solidaria que, como una nueva etapa en la historia del mundo, respete a los derechos humanos universales, a todos los ciudadanos y ciudadanas de todas las naciones y al medio ambiente, apoyándose en sistemas e instituciones internacionales democráticos que estén al servicio de la justicia social, de la igualdad y de la soberanía de los pueblos.

5. El Foro Social Mundial reúne y articula a entidades y movimientos de la sociedad civil de todos los países del mundo, pero no pretende ser una instancia de representación de la sociedad civil mundial.

6. Las reuniones del Foro Social Mundial no tienen un carácter deliberativo. O sea, nadie estará autorizado a manifestar, en nombre del Foro y en cualquiera de sus encuentros, posiciones que fueran atribuidas a todos sus participantes. Los participantes no deben ser llamados a tomar decisiones, por voto o aclamación —como conjunto de participantes del Foro— sobre declaraciones o propuestas de acción que incluyan a todos o a su mayoría y que se propongan a ser decisiones del Foro como tal.

7. Por consiguiente, debe asegurarse que las entidades participantes de los encuentros del Foro tengan la libertad de deliberar —durante la realización de las reuniones— sobre declaraciones y acciones que decidan desarrollar, aisladamente o de forma articulada con otros participantes. El Foro Social Mundial se compromete a difundir ampliamente esas decisiones, por los medios a su alcance, sin direccionamientos, jerarquizaciones, censuras o restricciones, aclarando que son deliberaciones de las propias entidades.

8. El Foro Social Mundial es un espacio plural y diversificado, no confesional, no gubernamental y no partidario, que articula de manera descentralizada y en red a entidades y movimientos que

estén involucrados en acciones concretas por la construcción de un mundo diferente, local o internacional.

9. El Foro Social Mundial siempre será un espacio abierto a la pluralidad y a la diversidad de actuación de las entidades y movimientos que quieran participar, además de abierto a la diversidad de géneros, etnias, culturas, generaciones y capacidades físicas, desde que sea respetada la Carta de Principios. No deben participar del Foro representaciones partidarias ni organizaciones militares. Podrán ser invitados a participar, en carácter personal, gobernantes y parlamentares que asuman los compromisos de esta Carta.

10. El Foro Social Mundial se opone a toda visión totalitaria y reduccionista de la economía, del desarrollo y de la historia y al uso de violencia como medio de control social por parte del Estado. Propugna el respeto a los Derechos Humanos, la práctica de una democracia verdadera y participativa, las relaciones igualitarias, solidarias y pacificas entre las personas, etnias, géneros y pueblos, condenando a todas las formas de dominación o de sumisión de un ser humano a otro.

11. El Foro Social Mundial, como espacio de debates, es un movimiento de ideas que estimula la reflexión y la divulgación transparente de los resultados de esa reflexión sobre los mecanismos e instrumentos de dominio del capital, sobre los medios y las acciones de resistencia y de superación de ese dominio, sobre las alternativas propuestas para solucionar los

problemas de exclusión y desigualdad social que están siendo creados, tanto internacionalmente como en el interior de los países, por el proceso de globalización capitalista, con sus dimensiones racistas, sexistas y destructivas del medio ambiente.

12. El Foro Social Mundial, como espacio de intercambio de experiencias, estimula el mutuo conocimiento y el reconocimiento por parte de las entidades y movimientos participantes, valorando el intercambio, en especial de aquello que la sociedad construye para centrar la actividad económica y la acción política en la atención a las necesidades del ser humano y el respeto por la naturaleza, tanto para la generación actual como para las futuras.

13. El Foro Social Mundial, como espacio de articulación, busca fortalecer y crear nuevas articulaciones nacionales e internacionales, entre entidades y movimientos de la sociedad, que aumenten, tanto en la esfera pública como la privada, la capacidad de resistencia social no violenta al proceso de deshumanización que vive el mundo y a la violencia utilizada por el Estado, además de fortalecer aquellas iniciativas de humanización que están en curso a través de la acción de esos movimientos y entidades.

14. El Foro Social Mundial es un proceso que estimula a las entidades y movimientos participantes a que coloquen sus acciones locales y nacionales junto a las instancias

internacionales, como cuestiones de ciudadanía planetaria, introduciendo en la agenda global las prácticas transformadoras que estén vivenciando para la construcción de un nuevo mundo más solidario.

Lectura 3

La disputa por el desarrollo: territorio, movimientos de carácter socio-ambiental y discursos dominantes[31]

Maristella Svampa[32]

> No sé si hay un ecologismo infantil, pero sí creo que hay un desarrollismo senil.
>
> J. Martínez Allier (2008)

En el presente artículo nos proponemos abordar algunos aspectos de la compleja trama en la cual se inserta la disputa por el desarrollo en América Latina, a través de diferentes vías analíticas. En primer lugar, haremos una introducción en la temática, con el objeto de situar desde una perspectiva histórica el debate acerca del “desarrollo”. En segundo lugar, daremos cuenta de la asociación entre ecología popular, nuevo lenguaje de valoración y movimientos de carácter socioambiental. Asimismo, proponemos una revisión de las diferentes concepciones que implícitamente recorren el discurso dominante acerca del territorio. En tercer lugar, realizaremos una reflexión acerca de las dimensiones generales (compartidas con otros

movimientos sociales) y específicas (las consecuencias de la territorialización y la multiescalaridad de los conflictos) de los movimientos de carácter socioambiental. En cuarto lugar, proponemos una revisión de algunos de los conceptos que atraviesan explícitamente el discurso hegemónico en el proceso de reconfiguración de los territorios, sobre todo a través de los conceptos de “desarrollo sustentable”, “responsabilidad social empresarial” y “gobernanza”. Por último, abordaremos uno de los dilemas que hoy recorre el espacio político latinoamericano y repercute sobre las posibilidades de acción de los movimientos de carácter socioambiental, de cara a la reactivación y acoplamiento entre tradición nacional-popular e imaginario desarrollista.

EL RETORNO DE LA IDEA DE DESARROLLO

La cuestión del desarrollo ha sido una temática recurrente y fundadora del pensamiento social latinoamericano. Desde la CEPAL en adelante, intelectuales como Raúl Prebisch o Celso Furtado[33], entre tantos otros, realizaron valiosas contribuciones acerca del carácter estructural del subdesarrollo latinoamericano, así como apuntaron a diseñar estrategias de desarrollo “hacia adentro”. Sin embargo, el paradigma del desarrollo postulado en los años cincuenta por la CEPAL, e ilustrado por las experiencias nacionaldesarrollistas entre los años cincuenta y setenta, que colocaban al Estado como un actor central (en términos de productor y regulador de las relaciones sociales), fue ampliamente criticado, desde diferentes vertientes y

posicionamientos político-ideológicos: desde el marxismo, tanto la corriente de la dependencia como los teóricos de la marginalidad, no solo cuestionaron el carácter reformista de dichos modelos sino los límites de su capacidad de integración, al tiempo que señalaban como horizonte o como "concepto límite"[34] la alternativa revolucionaria. Así, por encima de las diferencias político-ideológicas, se tratase de la perspectiva desarrollista o de la izquierda revolucionaria, al volver sobre aquellos tiempos es posible rescatar la disposición a pensar modelos de desarrollo, concebidos en términos de *proyectos alternativos de sociedad*.

En las últimas décadas el escenario regional y global cambió ostensiblemente. En nuevos contextos y debates internacionales, se fue ampliando el arco temático y se fueron incorporando otras dimensiones ligadas al desarrollo, como el tema ambiental, la cultura, la dimensión humana y social, entre otras. Por un lado, la crisis de la idea de modernización (y por ende, del desarrollo como progreso industrial), en su versión hegemónica, abrió un nuevo espacio en el cual se fue cristalizando el rechazo y la revisión del paradigma del progreso y la sociedad industrial de consumo. En esta óptica, y pese a la fuerte desconfianza de las izquierdas clásicas, los movimientos ecologistas que se desarrollaron a partir de los años sesenta, especialmente en Europa y Estados Unidos, lograron alcanzar un carácter altamente precursor y ejemplar, desarrollando una respetable influencia en sus sociedades. Las críticas de estos movimientos no solo ponían en entredicho algunos de los pilares del pensamiento de Marx, claro heredero de la Modernidad, sino que

para gran parte de las izquierdas latinoamericanas, salvo excepciones, la problemática ambiental era considerada también como una preocupación importada de la agenda de los países ricos, vinculada directamente con el grado de desarrollo alcanzado. Paralelamente, en América Latina, las críticas indigenistas respecto del carácter lineal, monocultural de las teorías dominantes del desarrollo (y la Modernidad) fueron horadando su solidez simbólica, haciendo lugar al disenso y al reconocimiento de su dimensión excluyente.

Recordemos que hasta bien entrado el siglo XX, no existía lugar político e ideológico desde el cual oponerse al irresistible credo del progreso, ya que se desconocían —o bien, se desestimaban— las consecuencias destructivas que podía generar una modernización sin freno. En rigor, había un único paradigma de la modernización, al cual adherían incluso las diferentes corrientes del marxismo, cuya visión productivista y homogeneizadora del progreso fue puesta a prueba en varias oportunidades y contextos históricos. En este sentido, América Latina no fue una excepción, pues esta visión fue sostenida tanto por los Estados desarrollistas como por las diferentes experiencias nacional-popular. Quizá mucho más que en otras latitudes, las izquierdas —ya sea en su matriz anticapitalista como nacional-popular— se mostraron sumamente refractarias a las corrientes indigenistas y ecologistas que se iban pergeñando a la luz de las diferentes críticas del paradigma productivista.

Por otro lado, la crisis del ideario emancipatorio (fracasos de las izquierdas y dictaduras militares mediante) y el posterior desmantelamiento del Estado nacional-desarrollista, produjeron

un eclipse de esta línea del pensamiento social latinoamericano. Ciertamente, entre los años ochenta y noventa estas temáticas desaparecieron por completo de la agenda política, tanto en nuestras sociedades latinoamericanas, como en otras latitudes. Para el caso del desarrollo, en las últimas décadas hemos asistido al ocaso de una visión macrosocial, que enfatizaba enfoques y planificaciones más centralizadas, hacia una concepción más microsocial, que sitúan la cuestión del desarrollo en una escala local, territorial y regional. Asimismo, en América Latina comenzaron a forjarse otros conceptos, de inspiración postestructuralista, como el de "post-desarrollo", una vertiente que propone la deconstrucción del desarrollo hegemónico, así como la revaloración de las culturas vernáculas y el conocimiento local no experto y destaca, además, la importancia de los movimientos sociales y movilizaciones de base como modo de acercarse a una era del "post-desarrollo" (Escobar, 2005).

En los últimos años, la emergencia de un nuevo escenario económico, político y social en América Latina parece haber impulsado una vuelta hacia las "grandes preguntas", particularmente visible en el retorno de aquellos "conceptos límites" que alguna vez trazaron las líneas directrices del pensamiento crítico latinoamericano. Parecería ser que tanto la idea de "Desarrollo" como aquella de "Emancipación" —sucesora, en gran medida, de la idea de "Revolución"— han vuelto a integrar el vocabulario político, y paulatinamente inician un nuevo periplo en la política y las ciencias sociales latinoamericanas. Ninguno de estos conceptos límites ha

retornado intacto o simplemente como fantasma del pasado; antes bien, sobre ellos se van operando trastocamientos y resignificaciones mayores, ligadas tanto a la nueva dinámica del poder como a la acción contestataria de los movimientos sociales contemporáneos. En realidad, en América Latina, el escenario en el cual retorna la cuestión acerca del "desarrollo" y se perfilan los debates acerca de la "emancipación", va diseñando una trama muy compleja y conflictiva, atravesada por no pocos dilemas y posicionamientos irreconciliables.

No hay que olvidar que en nuestros países el impulso del capitalismo neoliberal posdictaduras conoce diferentes etapas: un primer momento, en los noventa, marcado por la desregulación económica, el ajuste fiscal, la política de privatizaciones (de los servicios públicos y de los hidrocarburos), como por la introducción generalizada de los agronegocios (los cultivos de transgénicos a través de la siembra directa). Como afirma Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007: 37) estas transformaciones confirmaron el carácter metarregulador del Estado, esto es un Estado que emerge como "entidad responsable de crear el espacio para la legitimidad de los reguladores no estatales". Esto implicó la generación de nuevas normas jurídicas, que favorecieron no solo la implantación de capitales extranjeros, sino que garantizaron la institucionalización de los derechos de las grandes corporaciones así como la aceptación de la normativa creada en los espacios transnacionales[35]. Asimismo, el proceso de mercantilización de los bienes públicos tuvo como consecuencia la profundización de un Estado patrimonialista, frente a la fuerte imbricación entre los

Gobiernos, en sus diferentes niveles, con los grupos económicos privados.

En la actualidad, gran parte de los países de América Latina atraviesan un segundo momento, caracterizado por la generalización de un modelo extractivo-exportador, que apunta a consolidar y ampliar aún más las brechas sociales entre los países del norte y del sur, basado en la extracción de recursos naturales no renovables, la extensión del monocultivo, la contaminación y la pérdida de biodiversidad. El modelo de agronegocios, la megaminería a cielo abierto, la construcción de grandes represas, los proyectos previstos por el IIRSA[36] y prontamente los agrocombustibles (etanol), ilustran a cabalidad esta nueva división territorial y global del trabajo en el contexto del capitalismo actual.

En términos de D. Harvey (2004), la actual etapa de expansión del capital puede ser caracterizada como de “acumulación por desposesión”[37], proceso que ha producido nuevos giros y desplazamientos, colocando en el centro de disputa la cuestión acerca del territorio y el medioambiente. La nueva etapa también aparece asociada a nuevos mecanismos de desposesión, como la biopiratería o la apropiación de formas culturales y cultivos tradicionales pertenecientes a los pueblos indígenas y campesinos.

No es casualidad, entonces, que en este escenario de reprimarización de la economía[38], caracterizado por la presencia desmesurada de grandes empresas transnacionales, se hayan potenciado las luchas ancestrales por la tierra, de la mano de los movimientos indígenas y campesinos, al tiempo que han surgido

nuevas formas de movilización y participación ciudadana, centradas en la defensa de los recursos naturales (definidos como “bienes comunes”), la biodiversidad y el medio ambiente; todo lo cual va diseñando una nueva cartografía de las resistencias, al tiempo que coloca en el centro de la agenda política la disputa por lo que se entiende como “desarrollo sustentable”.

ECOLOGÍA, LENGUAJES DE VALORACIÓN Y TERRITORIALIDADES EN PUGNA

En su libro *El ecologismo de los pobres*, el reconocido ecologista catalán, Joan Martínez Allier (2004), propone distinguir entre tres corrientes del ecologismo: el culto de la vida silvestre, el credo ecoeficientista y el movimiento de justicia ambiental. La primera corriente se preocupa por la preservación de la naturaleza silvestre; es indiferente u opuesta al crecimiento económico, valora negativamente el crecimiento poblacional y busca respaldo científico en la biología de la conservación. De ahí que su accionar se encamine a crear reservas y parques naturales en aquellos lugares donde existen especies amenazadas o sitios caracterizados por la biodiversidad. Grandes internacionales conservacionistas, muchas veces poco respetuosas de las poblaciones nativas, se instalan en este registro biocéntrico. Su expresión más extrema es la “ecología profunda”, ilustrada por el millonario Douglas Tompkins, quien compró enormes extensiones de tierra en la Patagonia chilena y argentina, así como en los Esteros del Iberá (debajo del cual se encuentra el

acuífero guaraní), y sueña con crear un paraíso, despojado de fronteras nacionales y de seres humanos.

La segunda corriente y quizá la dominante dentro del universo de las ONG y ciertos gobiernos del Primer Mundo, es el ecoeficientismo, que postula el eficiente uso de los recursos naturales y el control de la contaminación. Sus conceptos clave son “modernización ecológica”, “desarrollo sustentable” y, de manera más reciente, “industrias limpias”, entre otras. El “desarrollo sustentable”, acuñado en los 80, fue una noción introducida en la agenda global a partir de la publicación del documento “Nuestro futuro en común” (1987) y luego de la Cumbre de Río (en 1992). La misma subraya la preocupación por el cuidado del medio ambiente y la búsqueda de un estilo de desarrollo que no comprometa el porvenir de las futuras generaciones. Dicho concepto trajo consigo otros que luego fueron puestos en discusión, como el de “responsabilidad compartida, pero diferenciada; el principio ‘el que contamina, paga’ y el principio precautorio” (Guimaraes, 2006), que fueron tratados en la Cumbre de Johannesburgo, en 2002. Sin embargo, pese a la puesta en agenda de la problemática ambiental y las diferentes discusiones acerca de lo que se entiende por desarrollo sostenible o “durable”, los veinte años que pasaron entre una cumbre y otra pusieron de manifiesto el fracaso de aquellas visiones que consideran la posibilidad de un estilo de desarrollo sustentable a partir del solo avance de la tecnología. En la base de esta concepción, subyace la idea de que “las nuevas tecnologías y la internalización de las externalidades son instrumentos decisivos de la modernización

ecológica. Esta tendría dos piernas; una económica, ecoimpuestos y mercados de permisos de emisiones; otra, tecnológica, apoyo a los cambios que lleven al ahorro de energía y materiales. […] Desde esta perspectiva, la ecología deviene así la ciencia que sirve para remediar la degradación causada por la industrialización." (M. Allier, ibídem: 21-31). Así las cosas, los males producidos por la tecnología se resolverían tanto a partir de la aplicación de mayor tecnología, al tiempo que implicarían la promoción de una "acción socialmente responsable" tanto de los Estados como de las empresas.

Esta posición hoy aparece reflejada en diferentes gobiernos de países desarrollados y en el discurso de los funcionarios de no pocos ministerios y/o secretarías medioambientales de nuestras latitudes. Como lo muestra de manera extrema la minería a cielo abierto, por lo general, en función del "desarrollo sustentable", el ecoeficientismo gubernamental dice plantear debates que luego elude hábilmente, y en nombre de una visión democratizante, actúa con pragmatismo o se funde con los poderosos intereses económicos en juego.

La tercera posición es la que representa el movimiento de justicia ambiental, o lo que Martínez Allier bautizó como "ecología popular". Con esto nos referimos a una corriente que crece en importancia y coloca el acento en los conflictos ambientales, que en diversos niveles (local, nacional, global), son causados por la reproducción globalizada del capital, la nueva división internacional y territorial del trabajo y la desigualdad social. Dicha corriente subraya también el desplazamiento geográfico de las fuentes de recursos y de los

desechos. En este sentido, queda claro que la demanda cada vez mayor de los países desarrollados hacia los países dependientes, en términos de materias primas o de bienes de consumo, ha conllevado una peligrosa expansión de las fronteras: del petróleo, del gas, de la minería, de las plantaciones celulósicas, de la soja transgénica; expansión que genera transformaciones mayores, reorientando completamente la economía de pueblos enteros y amenazando en el mediano plazo, la sustentabilidad ecológica. Esta desigual división del trabajo, que repercute en la distribución de los conflictos ambientales, perjudica sobre todo a las poblaciones pobres y que presentan mayor vulnerabilidad. Un ejemplo de ello es la situación de los pueblos indígenas y campesinos, que pujan por la defensa de sus derechos territoriales, reconocidos por tantas constituciones latinoamericanas, ante el avance de la frontera forestal, las grandes represas, la privatización de las tierras o el boom de la soja transgénica.

Uno de los núcleos centrales de la ecología popular es la activación de un lenguaje de valoración divergente, en oposición a la concepción binaria que desarrollan las grandes empresas, en alianza con los diferentes Gobiernos (nacional y provincial), respecto de la territorialidad. En este sentido, el desarrollo de la minería metalífera a gran escala, puede pensarse como un ejemplo paradigmático en el cual una visión de la territorialidad se presenta como excluyente de las existentes (o potencialmente existentes), generando una “tensión de territorialidades” (Porto Gonçalvez, 2001). En efecto, el discurso (no siempre explícito) de las empresas transnacionales y los gobiernos, suele

desplegar una concepción binaria del territorio, sobre la base de la división viable/inviable, que desemboca en dos ideas mayores: por un lado, la de “territorio eficiente”; por otro, la de “territorio vaciable” o en última instancia, “sacrificable”.

Estos conceptos conocen una temporalidad diferente. En primer lugar, en el marco de la transformación neoliberal llevada a cabo durante los noventa, los Gobiernos instrumentaron la idea de “territorio eficiente” para traducir una manera diferente de concebir el espacio geográfico nacional, desplazando así la idea de un modelo global de territorio subsidiado desde el Estado. Esto significó, en muchos casos, el desmantelamiento de la red de regulaciones que garantizaban un lugar a las economías regionales en las economías nacionales. Como consecuencia de ello, la viabilidad o inviabilidad de las economías regionales pasó a medirse en función de la tasa de rentabilidad. Así, por ejemplo, en Argentina, la política de apertura económica de los noventa mantuvo las asimetrías regionales preexistentes, al tiempo que conllevó la crisis y la desaparición de actores asociados al anterior modelo (economías regionales ligadas a empresas estatales, pymes, minifundios) y en muchos casos condujo a la reprimarización de la economía, a través de la expansión de enclaves de exportación. Esto se vio reflejado de manera paradigmática en el caso de YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales), que desde su creación en 1922 hasta su privatización y reestructuración setenta años más tarde, fue el motor de desarrollo de varias economías regionales. No por casualidad, los enclaves petroleros, luego de las desastrosas consecuencias de la privatización, fueron la cuna de los movimientos de

desocupados (Svampa y Pereyra, 2003).

En segundo lugar, de manera más reciente, la expansión de nuevos emprendimientos productivos fue instalando la idea de que existen territorios vacíos o “socialmente vaciables”, con el fin de poner bajo el control de las grandes empresas una porción de los bienes naturales presentes en dichos territorios. En términos de R. Sack (1986), esto se produce cuando el territorio carece de artefactos u objetos valiosos desde el punto de vista social o económico, con los cual estos aparecen como “sacrificables” dentro de la lógica del capital. La eficacia política de estas visiones aparece asociada al carácter de los territorios en los cuales, por lo general, tienden a implantarse la industria extractiva: zonas relativamente aisladas, empobrecidas o caracterizadas por una escasa densidad poblacional, todo lo cual construye escenarios de fuerte asimetría social entre los actores en pugna. Así, las comunidades allí asentadas son negadas e impulsadas al desplazamiento o desaparición, en nombre de la expansión de las “fronteras”.

En un país como la Argentina, el concepto de “territorio vacío” aparece también asociado a la idea de “desierto”, imagen de fuerte carga histórica y simbólica que fue empleada para justificar la expansión de la frontera en la Patagonia, eliminando a las poblaciones indígenas e imponiendo un modelo de Estado-nación, bajo el discurso de un progreso homogeneizador y la integración socioeconómica al mercado internacional. En la actualidad, parecería ser que hay un retorno de dicha estrategia en la medida en que la resignificación del concepto de “desierto” y la valorización de esos territorios caracterizados por sus

paisajes primarios y sus grandes extensiones, permitiría justificar la construcción de una territorialidad que excluye a las otras existentes. Funcionarios del Gobierno nacional y provincial utilizan esta “metáfora” tan arraigada en el imaginario político y cultural argentino para plantear, incluso, la minería a gran escala como única alternativa productiva, en regiones donde impera el “desierto de piedra” (la expresión corresponde a Jorge Mayoral, secretario de Minería de la Nación). Esta misma estrategia también es utilizada hoy para justificar la venta de extensos territorios en la Patagonia argentina a empresas y propietarios extranjeros, que incluyen, en algunos casos, pueblos enteros así como el acceso exclusivo a ríos y lagos.

De modo más reciente, otra de las estrategias encaradas por gobiernos y empresas ha sido el reordenamiento territorial. Así, en Argentina, la llamada propuesta de “zonificación” de los territorios, esto es, la definición de patrones de uso de suelo, apuntaría a definir qué territorios serían eximidos de la actividad extractiva, mientras que otros estarían disponibles para su recepción, todo lo cual remite claramente a la idea de “territorio sacrificables” o “áreas de sacrificio”.

En resumen, de diversas maneras, la afirmación de que existen regiones marcadas históricamente por la pobreza y la vulnerabilidad social, con una densidad poblacional baja, que cuentan con grandes extensiones de territorios “improductivos” y/o “vacíos”, facilita la instalación de un discurso productivista y excluyente, al tiempo que constituye el punto de partida de la conformación de otros “lenguajes de valoración” en torno al territorio, por parte de las comunidades afectadas. La definición

de lo que es el territorio, más que nunca, se convierte así en el *locus* del conflicto.

LAS VÍAS DE LA ECOLOGÍA POPULAR: DIMENSIONES COMUNES Y ESPECÍFICAS

Las diferentes movilizaciones que se multiplican hoy en América Latina, al compás de la explosión de los conflictos socioambientales, van configurando progresivamente movimientos sociales, que poseen una dinámica organizacional y confrontacional propia, con capacidad para sostener sus demandas en el tiempo, más allá de una innegable vulnerabilidad vinculada, entre otras, a una situación de gran asimetría social.

En este sentido, uno de los hechos más notorios del período ha sido el surgimiento y expansión de movimientos en contra de la minería a gran escala y a cielo abierto[39]. Desde 1999, sobre todo en la larga franja que ocupa la cordillera de los Andes, desde Guatemala y Ecuador, pasando por Perú, hasta Chile y Argentina[40], se han originado una multiplicidad de resistencias, movilizaciones campesinas y asambleas de autoconvocados que ponen de relieve las nuevas fronteras de la exclusión, frente a grandes proyectos mineros que amenazan con afectar severamente las condiciones y calidad de vida de las poblaciones.

En realidad, dichos movimientos se nutren de otros preexistentes, al tiempo que comparten aquellos rasgos y dimensiones que hoy atraviesan a la mayor parte de los

movimientos sociales latinoamericanos, entre ellos, la territorialidad, la combinación de la acción directa con la acción institucional, la democracia asamblearia y una tendencia a la autonomía. Sin embargo, las actuales movilizaciones indígenas y los movimientos socioambientales urbanos dan cuenta de manera paradigmática de la multiescalaridad del conflicto. Veamos, brevemente, cada uno de estos rasgos o dimensiones, a fin de señalar tanto el carácter general como específico de los actuales movimientos socioambientales.

En primer lugar y en un sentido amplio, tanto en los movimientos urbanos como rurales, el territorio ha sido un espacio de resistencia y también, progresivamente, un lugar de resignificación y creación de nuevas relaciones sociales. Así, desde fines de los ochenta, *el territorio* se fue erigiendo en el lugar privilegiado de disputa, a partir de la implementación de las nuevas políticas sociales, de carácter focalizado, diseñadas desde el poder con vistas al control y la contención de la pobreza[41]. Sin embargo, de manera más reciente, a partir de las nuevas modalidades que ha adoptado la lógica de acumulación del capital, asistimos a una nueva inflexión a partir de la cual el territorio, en un sentido más amplio, esto es, concebido doblemente como hábitat y comunidad de vida, aparece en el centro de los reclamos de las movilizaciones y movimientos campesinos, indígenas y socioambientales. Las acciones de dichos movimientos, orientadas tanto contra el Estado como contra sectores privados (grandes empresas transnacionales), generalmente se inician con reclamos puntuales, aunque en la misma dinámica de lucha tienden a ampliar y radicalizar su

plataforma representativa y discursiva, incorporando otros temas, tales como el cuestionamiento a un modelo de desarrollo monocultural y destructivo, y la exigencia de desmercantilización de los llamados “bienes comunes”. Estos procesos de movilización conducen a una concepción de la territorialidad, que se oponen radicalmente al discurso ecoeficientista y la visión desarrollista, propia de la narrativa dominante.

Sin ánimo de ontologización alguna, la potenciación de un *lenguaje de valoración*[42] divergente sobre la territorialidad pareciera ser más inmediata para el caso de las organizaciones indígenas y campesinas, debido tanto a la estrecha relación que éstas plantean entre tierra y territorio, en términos de comunidad de vida, como a la notoria reactivación de la matriz comunitaria indígena acaecida en las últimas décadas. Este parece ser el caso de Perú, en donde en 1999 surgió la Coordinadora Nacional de las Comunidades del Perú Afectados por la Minería (CONACAMI), que articula comunidades y organizaciones de nueve regiones del país. En los últimos años, en un contexto de endurecimiento de la represión y judicialización del conflicto, la CONACAMI ha ido realizando el pasaje de un lenguaje “ambientalista”, crítico del modelo de desarrollo, a la reafirmación de una identidad indígena y la defensa de los derechos culturales y territoriales. Como afirman R. Hoetmer *et al.* (2008).

“Los contactos transnacionales y los intercambios de experiencias con la CONAIE-Ecuarunari del Ecuador, el Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Marcas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), y otras organizaciones indígenas de América Latina, jugaron un papel importante en el desarrollo y la consolidación de una identidad y

un discurso indígena en CONACAMI. El proceso de “caminar juntos” de estas organizaciones, culminó en 2006 en la fundación de la Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas (CAOI), que asume la afirmación de la identidad como pueblos y nacionalidades originarios, como fundamento de la lucha por un mundo mejor. Aparte de CONACAMI, la Confederación Campesina del Perú y la Confederación Nacional Agraria, también integran al CAOI en el Perú, lo cual indica una reelaboración de la identidad clasista del campesino, que primó durante décadas en estas organizaciones”.

Otro parece ser el caso de las organizaciones urbanas. Así, por ejemplo en Argentina, las más de setenta asambleas de autoconvocados en contra de la megaminería a cielo abierto que se desarrollan en pequeñas y medianas localidades del país y hoy convergen en la UAC (Unión de Asambleas Ciudadanas), poseen otro registro a partir del cual (re)construir mediaciones que conduzcan a la idea de “comunidad de vida y territorio”, en función de la defensa de un estilo de vida (más elegido que heredado) que subraya un vínculo estrecho entre paisaje, historia larga de la región, defensa del medio ambiente y oportunidades de vida. Sin embargo, vale la pena agregar que, para el caso argentino, este proceso de construcción de la territorialidad (o de reterritorialización), en clave de comunidad de vida y de defensa de los bienes comunes, exhibe de manera progresiva una afinidad electiva con la cosmovisión de los movimientos campesinos e indígenas, históricamente invisibilizados y relegados al margen de la sociedad.

La segunda dimensión fundamental de este tipo de

movimientos ligados a la ecología popular, es que adoptan la *acción directa* no convencional y disruptiva, como herramienta de lucha, acompañada de la acción institucional. Así, los movimientos que se oponen a la megaminería a cielo abierto, utilizan como recurso de acción los bloqueos o cortes de rutas y de acceso a los campamentos mineros. Las demandas institucionales van desde la presentación de peticiones para la derogación y anulación de las leyes nacionales de minería, la prohibición de la minería realizada a cielo abierto con sustancias tóxicas, hasta la activación de otros mecanismos y figuras institucionales, ligados a la democracia directa, entre ellos, la realización de consultas o plebiscitos a nivel local y provincial, que funcionarían así a la manera de "licencia social".

La lucha contra la megaminería a cielo abierto se inició en 1997, en Cotacachi, en Ecuador, lo cual hizo que éste se convirtiera en el primer "cantón ecológico", por ordenanza municipal. Luego, le siguieron mediante la vía de la consulta popular, Tambo Grande, en Perú, (2002, el primer plebiscito por este tema en América Latina) y Esquel, en Argentina (2003). En años recientes, se han realizado dos consultas más en Perú, Piura y Cajamarca (ambos en 2007); y tres en Guatemala, Sipacapa (2005), Huehuetenango (2006) y Ixtahuacan (2007).

Por su parte, en Argentina, el "efecto Esquel"[43] tuvo un arrastre multiplicador, despertando a otras regiones del país donde se organizaron asambleas de autoconvocados. Frente a la resistencia de la población, siete provincias argentinas sancionaron en los últimos tiempos leyes que prohíben la minería con uso de sustancias tóxicas, aunque ninguna de ellas

habilitó la posibilidad de realizar una consulta popular, prevista por la Constitución, reformada en 1994. Sin embargo, en muchos casos estas leyes no han detenido los proyectos de exploración ni el avance de las inversiones mineras. En otras provincias argentinas, la situación es muy inquietante, dado el avance de los proyectos de megaminería, así como al conjunto de medidas desarrolladas por los Gobiernos y las empresas, que apuntan a acallar a la población (sobre todo, a través del hostigamiento y judicialización de la protesta ambiental)[44].

La tercera dimensión presente en estos movimientos de carácter socioambiental es el desarrollo de formas y espacios de deliberación vinculadas a la *democracia directa*. En líneas generales, la emergencia de nuevas estructuras de participación que tienen un fuerte carácter asambleario, se refleja en la tendencia a crear estructuras flexibles, no jerárquicas, proclives al horizontalismo y la profundización de la democracia interna. En el marco de esas movilizaciones cobró centralidad la forma *asamblea*, como nuevo paradigma de la política desde abajo.

Pero la forma asamblea está lejos de ser simple: en realidad es muy compleja, supone un lento aprendizaje y está lejos de ser unívoca. Es compleja: en tanto espacio de democracia deliberativa, suele conjugar democracia directa, acción directa y desobediencia civil. Como señala acertadamente Ariel Colombo (2006: 101-102), “la Asamblea implica una ruptura del orden existente, en la medida en que es disruptiva, es autónoma (no se inscribe en un espacio político preexistente) y es recursiva (en la deliberación directa, no alcanza con que esté moralmente motivada; tiene que vincularse con el mismo tipo de reglas que le

exige al sistema)".

Precisamente es el carácter recursivo el que requiere un aprendizaje mayor, y va signando avances y retrocesos en las dinámicas: en el medio de ella, los ciudadanos involucrados en una construcción política novedosa se preguntan sobre los alcances de la horizontalidad, sobre la democracia por consenso o la votación, sobre la fiabilidad de la democracia (participativa, representativa, directa), sobre la posibilidad de construir articulaciones políticas, en fin, sobre la manera encarar el vínculos con el Estado y la lucha política más amplia, de cara a la necesidad de permanecer fieles a un mandato basista y asambleario.

Por otro lado, la forma asamblea, tal como la entendemos, no es unívoca. Hay toda una tipología de las asambleas realmente existentes que hoy atraviesan los movimientos sociales y las acciones colectivas en América Latina. Así, hay expresiones ordinarias (en el sentido de la cotidianeidad, esto es, asociadas a los diferentes niveles y espacios de decisión de una organización o movimiento; se trate de una fábrica, un movimiento territorial consolidado o socioambiental); hay expresiones extraordinarias (la insurrección, la pueblada), en las cuales la Asamblea deviene una institución en sí misma, esto es, esto es, autosuficiente y soberana, una totalidad procedimental y a la vez identitaria.

A su vez, la dinámica política —y por ende, sus limitaciones— no es la misma si éstas se insertan en un espacio multiorganizacional (como es el caso de las más de setenta asambleas contra la minería a cielo abierto en Argentina, o el de la Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca, que reúne a un

conglomerado de organizaciones de base); o tienden a desarrollar una estrategia que enfatiza el carácter único y específico de la asamblea (como es el caso de la Asamblea Ambiental de Gualeguaychú, en Argentina).

Por otra parte, la expansión de la forma asamblea no está vinculada necesariamente con una definición “sustancial” de la democracia, o para decirlo en términos más contemporáneos, con un proyecto de corte emancipatorio. La idea de que la “forma” hace al “contenido” debe entenderse como una condición necesaria, aunque no suficiente. Desde esta perspectiva, en algunos casos estamos lejos de aquellas experiencias ligadas al ideario revolucionario (la Comuna, el consejismo obrero), cuya discusión pueblan bibliotecas enteras del pensamiento de las izquierdas. Así, podría afirmarse que las potencialidades contrahegemónicas de una Asamblea aparecen cuando ésta está asociada un horizonte político radical e instituyente. Para el caso de ciertos movimientos campesino-indígenas, esta dimensión instituyente suele asociarse a las demandas de autonomía, de los derechos colectivos y de creación de un Estado Plurinacional (como en México, para el primer caso, y Bolivia para ambos). Para el caso de los movimientos socioambientales urbanos, aparece ligado al cuestionamiento del modelo de desarrollo y la apropiación de un lenguaje de valoración contrahegemónico que apunta a la defensa de los derechos humanos, en nombre de la “soberanía alimentaria” y los “bienes comunes”.

Una cuarta dimensión que recorre a los movimientos sociales se refiere a la tendencia a la *autonomía*, también presente en los

movimientos de carácter socioambiental. En términos generales, la autonomía aparece no solo como un eje organizativo, sino también como un planteo estratégico, que remite a la "autodeterminación" (como diría Castoriadis, "dotarse de su propia ley"). Dicha demanda da cuenta de una transformación importante en el proceso global de construcción de las subjetividades políticas, como resultado de los cambios que ha habido en la sociedad contemporánea en las últimas décadas. Este *ethos* común (ya presente en los nuevos movimientos sociales de los años sesenta), afirma como imperativo la desburocratización y democratización de las organizaciones y se alimenta, por ende, de una gran desconfianza respecto de las estructuras partidarias y sindicales, así como de toda instancia articulatoria superior. En este sentido, la demanda de autonomía tiende a desplegarse en la tensión inscripta entre la afirmación de un *ethos* colectivo libertario (la autonomía como horizonte utópico) y el repliegue diferencialista-identitario (la autonomía como valor refugio) (Svampa, 2008b).

La importancia de narrativa autonomista en el lenguaje de los actores nos instala de lleno en la dinámica propia de los movimientos sociales actuales, que oscilan entre lo destituyente y lo instituyente. Así, por ejemplo, las asambleas socioambientales contra la minería de la Argentina, la autonomía aparece asociada al rechazo tanto de los partidos políticos como de los sindicatos, más allá de que en algunas oportunidades estos actores (sobre todo los legisladores provinciales de la oposición) se constituyan en "correas de transmisión" de las demandas. Sin embargo, hay que agregar que en muchos casos

la demanda de autonomía aparece más como un valor refugio, antes que como una dimensión positiva estratégica (a saber, un horizonte utópico que apunta a la necesidad de crear las propias leyes y por ende, a construir otros mundos).

En rigor, la demanda de autonomía se construye sobre tres ejes, que a menudo se superponen: uno, el de la *memoria larga*, que para el caso de los movimientos campesinos-indígenas, supone una vinculación con la cosmovisión de sus pueblos, en donde se articulan la idea de resistencia, derechos colectivos y poder comunal; dos, el de la *memoria mediana*, marcada por la crisis de representación política e ilustrada a cabalidad por la desconfianza hacia los representantes políticos locales y nacionales y el recuerdo reiterado de sus "traiciones"; tres, el de la *memoria corta*, asociada a la experiencia de los movimientos de carácter antineoliberal, que marcan el ciclo reciente de las luchas sociales en América Latina, iniciado en el año 2000 con la Guerra del Agua, en Cochabamba. Sobre esta triple base, sobrevuela el temor ante los intentos de cooptación, que hoy provienen tanto de las empresas transnacionales como de Gobiernos —en sus diferentes niveles y jurisdicciones—, e incluso ciertas poderosas ONG y fundaciones ecologistas.

Una quinta dimensión que caracteriza a los movimientos socioambientales es la *multiescalaridad*[45] del conflicto que tiene lugar en el marco de un entramado complejo, en el cual se encuentran involucrados actores sociales, económicos y políticos (actores locales, regionales y/o provinciales, estatales y globales). En la dinámica multiescalar "lo global" y "lo local" se presentan como un proceso en el que se cristalizan, por un lado,

alianzas entre empresas transnacionales y Estados que promueven un determinado modelo de desarrollo y, por otro lado, resistencias de las comunidades locales que no comparten tal modelo, ni los estilos de vida que este impone.

Cabe señalar que la multiescalaridad de los conflictos suele combinarse con la tipología del enclave, muy presente en la historia de América Latina, e inextricablemente ligadas al modelo extractivista. En este sentido, y más allá de las diferentes fases y situaciones que presenta el enclave en tanto forma, un tema no menor es que la industria extractiva suelen encontrar un terreno favorable en aquellas regiones marcadas por una matriz social muy jerárquica y poco diversificada desde el punto de vista económico, en donde imperan gobiernos provinciales y municipales de bajísima calidad institucional. En este contexto, las asimetrías propias de la dinámica entre lo local (movimientos campesinos, organizaciones indígenas y asambleas de autoconvocados) y lo global (empresas multinacionales) se exacerban: las grandes empresas tienden concentrar un número importante de actividades, reorientando la economía del lugar y conformando enclaves de exportación. Su peso económico es tal que no resulta extraño que los intereses mineros atraviesen y hasta sustituyan al Estado, menospreciando y violentando procesos de decisión ciudadana.

Por otro lado, la relación entre tipología de enclave y deterioro de los derechos civiles expresa la tendencia a la territorialización de los conflictos, a partir de los cuales estos quedan librados a la intervención de la justicia y los entes municipales y/o provinciales, cuyo grado de vulnerabilidad es mayor que el de

sus homólogos nacionales. La implementación del modelo tiende, por ende, a ser acompañada por políticas represivas y autoritarias que criminalizan la pobreza y la protesta social. En este sentido, la megaminería a cielo abierto termina configurándose como una figura extrema, un suerte de modelo descarnado, en el cual las más crudas lógicas de la expropiación económica y la depredación ambiental se combinan con escenarios grotescos, caracterizados por una gran asimetría de poderes, que parecen evocar la lucha desigual entre David y Goliat. El caso más dramático en América Latina lo constituye el Perú, donde las protestas de los comuneros contra los megaproyectos de minería, ya ha dejado un saldo de varios muertos, heridos y centenares de comuneros judicializados.

En suma, más allá de las ambivalencias, limitaciones y matices, los nuevos movimientos socioambientales se instalan en un campo de difícil disputa. Por un lado, deben enfrentar directamente la acción global de las grandes empresas transnacionales, provenientes del Norte desarrollado, quienes en esta nueva etapa de acumulación del capital se han constituido en los actores claramente hegemónicos del modelo extractivo-exportador. Por otro lado, en el plano local, deben confrontarse con las políticas y orientaciones generales de los Gobiernos —tanto a nivel provincial como nacional—, quienes consideran que en la actual coyuntura internacional las actividades extractivas constituyen la vía más rápida —si no la única— en esas regiones hacia un progreso y desarrollo, siempre trunco y tantas veces postergado en estas latitudes.

RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL Y GOBERNANZA

El proceso de reconfiguración de los territorios, se apoya también en otros conceptos que explícitamente forman parte del discurso global. Entre estos conceptos se destacan el de “desarrollo sustentable”, “responsabilidad social empresarial” y “gobernanza”. Como ya hemos aludido al primero, en lo siguiente veremos brevemente el uso de los dos últimos.

La noción de responsabilidad social empresarial (RSE) es un concepto reciente, de resonancias globales, que apunta a combinar la filantropía empresarial con una idea más general acerca de la responsabilidad de las empresas respecto del impacto social y ambiental que generan sus actividades. La importancia de tal concepto debe ser entendida en el marco de la nueva matriz neoliberal, en la cual se consolida el rol metarregulador del Estado y las empresas pasan a ser consideradas como el actor central y dinámico por excelencia. Este nuevo modelo de acción empresarial, que surgió del Foro Económico de Davos, en 1999, ha sido propuesto por y para las grandes empresas, que operan en contextos de gran diversidad, de fuerte competencia internacional y, sobre todo, de creciente exposición ante la opinión pública. No es casual que muchas de las grandes empresas que lideran internacionalmente el movimiento de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial, con fuertes campañas mediáticas y enormes presupuestos, sean responsables de daños ambientales, de explotación de trabajo infantil y subcontratación de trabajo esclavo, sobre todo en las regiones periféricas, donde los marcos regulatorios son siempre

más permisivos que en los países industrializados del centro. La RSE adquirió rango institucional a través del Pacto Global, en el año 2000, el cual es definido como “un Programa Interagencial, liderado por el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) y la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT), tendiente a aumentar la responsabilidad social empresarial en los campos de los derechos humanos, los estándares laborales y el medio ambiente” (www. rseonline.com.ar).

En Argentina, el mismo se instaló en la agenda luego de la crisis de 2001 y encontró un gran dinamismo en el campo de la actividad minera. Como ha analizado M. Antonelli (2007) es en 2002 que en este país se presenta el informe final del programa Mining Minerals & Sustainable Development (MMSD) y que tendría por objetivo “cargar de contenidos la responsabilidad empresarial”. Así, dicho concepto aparecía como una de las claves tendientes a producir “un cambio cultural respecto de la minería a gran escala, para ser concebida como factor de desarrollo sustentable”. Por otro lado, en la medida en que la Argentina no proviene de una economía minera a gran escala, el modelo minero presenta una particular producción sociodiscursiva y cultural a nivel de todos los actores involucrados. Por ello mismo, a diferencia de otros “modelos de desarrollo” que, más allá de sus transformaciones, se sitúan en la “continuidad imaginaria” (un país agrario), o en el “retorno de la normalidad” (la Argentina industrial), el modelo ligado a la mega minería a cielo abierto requiere no solo inscribirse en las significaciones del presente modelando visiones de futuro, sino

fundar un linaje, una genealogía honorable y mitos de origen, para volver deseable y razonable la “Argentina minera”. En función de ello, adquieren especial importancia “las estrategias narrativas, argumentativas, retóricas y dramatológicas (o de puestas en escena), mediante las cuales se construye, enuncia y visibiliza la legitimidad dominante del modelo minero y su autorización estatal en discursos público-mediáticos de actores hegemónicos” (Antonelli, en Svampa y Antonelli, 2009). Así, el discurso en torno a la responsabilidad social empresarial forma parte de un dispositivo más amplio, que apunta a instalar y legitimar el nuevo modelo extractivista.

Si hacia afuera, las empresas se orientan a desarrollar vínculos estrechos con instituciones, Universidades privadas y públicas, a partir de convenios y subsidios, al tiempo que desarrollan una intensa publicidad en los más diversos medios de comunicación, en el marco de un discurso que subraya la opción por una “minería responsable”, hacia adentro, en relación con las comunidades en las cuales se desarrolla la actividad extractiva, sus efectos son aún mayores, en la medida en que sus intervenciones focalizadas y el entramado que generan, introducen cambios sustantivos en el plano de la ciudadanía. Así, puede establecerse que en aquellos contextos en los que se implanta habitualmente la actividad minera (matrices sociopolíticas jerárquicas, pequeñas localidades, escasa diversificación económica, debilidad institucional), las grandes empresas tienden a convertirse en un *actor social total*.

En efecto, en primer lugar, tienden a reconfigurar bruscamente las economías locales preexistentes, reorientando la actividad

económica de la comunidad en función de la minería, y creando nuevos enclaves de exportación; en segundo lugar, producen un impacto negativo en términos ambientales y sanitarios, que repercute sobre las condiciones de vida de la población. En tercer y último lugar, a través de la llamada RSE, las empresas tienden a ampliar su esfera de acción, mediante una batería múltiple de acciones sociales, educativas y comunitarias, que apuntan tanto a la compra de voluntades como a influir en los procesos de socialización más básicos. Para el caso de la Argentina, un informe especial del Foco sobre las Empresas Transnacionales en ese país, firmado por Ricardo Ortiz (2007) consigna: “Las organizaciones sociales han constatado que las grandes mineras en Catamarca, Tucumán, San Juan y Chubut efectúan donaciones a escuelas y hospitales de esas provincias tratando de provocar la captación indirecta de voluntades y la limitación del ejercicio de la opinión de las comunidades. Esto ha sido corroborado por el defensor del pueblo de la Nación, quien manifestó su preocupación porque estas donaciones están acompañadas por una contrapartida publicitaria a favor del trabajo desarrollado por las empresas mineras, pudiendo este simple hecho llegar a inhibir toda posible crítica y, aún más, restringir la participación y el ejercicio de la población en la defensa de los derechos ambientales que consideren afectados”.

En fin, otro de los conceptos clave de esta reformulación y *aggiornamento* del paradigma neoliberal, que hoy recorre el lenguaje de organizaciones internacionales y de las ciencias sociales, es el de “gobernanza”, que puede ser definido como “una forma de gobierno que no pasa por la acción aislada de una

elite político-administrativa relativamente homogénea y centralizada, sino por la adopción de formas de coordinación a distintos niveles, y multiactoral, en cuanto incluye al sector público y al sector privado, a los actores de la sociedad civil y al mercado”[46]). Como sostiene Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007: 36), la gobernanza opera como una síntesis entre legitimidad y gobernabilidad. “La gobernanza busca, de hecho, armonizar las reivindicaciones a favor de de la participación y la inclusión, resultado de la interpretación de las crisis social que parte del concepto de legitimidad, con las exigencias de una mayor autonomía y autorregulación producto de la interpretación guiada por la idea de gobernabilidad. Sin embargo, es una falsa síntesis, puesto que opera totalmente dentro del marco de la gobernabilidad”.

De manera paradigmática, en la actualidad el modelo de la *gobernanza* está siendo aplicado hoy en América Latina en el marco de la extensión de un modelo extractivo-exportador. La concepción que subyace a este modelo es que, más allá de la opacidad de los sistemas de representación y de las nuevas incertidumbres, los antagonismos y las contradicciones pueden resolverse en una esfera de mediación y de entendimientos recíprocos, en las cuales el objetivo es tanto la consolidación de la gobernabilidad como la materialización del llamado “capital social” en términos de redes sociales y políticas. En este sentido, dicha visión apunta a diluir la idea de que los antagonismos pueden ser, en un punto, irreconciliables, de que estos están insertos en relaciones de poder asimétricas y que en definitiva enfrentan —o pueden enfrentar— proyectos de sociedad

diferentes y, en mucho, antagónicos (Rodríguez Garavito, 2005; Svampa, 2007).

Así, dado el actual escenario latinoamericano y la cartografías de resistencias existentes, el modelo de la gobernanza representa un intento una recomposición de la dinámica del capitalismo neoliberal, a través de ciertos dispositivos de intervención públicos y privados, que colocan el acento, por un lado, en la responsabilidad social empresarial y, por el otro, en la necesaria autolimitación de las demandas y reclamos de las poblaciones afectadas, frente a una realidad de "hechos consumados", esto es, la expansión "inevitable" del capitalismo transnacional en nuestras latitudes.

Hace unos años, de manera muy lúcida, nuestra colega brasileña Evelina Dagnino[47] señalaba los peligros de lo que ella denominaba "la confluencia perversa", denunciando la convergencia entre proyecto neoliberal y el proyecto democratizante-participativo. Así, daba cuenta de la utilización de varias nociones (entre ellas las de sociedad civil, participación, ciudadanía y democracia), que formaban parte del proyecto democratizador, pero que en los noventa también pasarían a formar parte del lenguaje de las elites y los funcionarios neoliberales. Dicha confluencia perversa tendía a establecer una homología del vocabulario que oscurecía las diferencias, diluía los matices, y por ende reducía los antagonismos existentes; en fin, una "reapropiación" que fue construyendo de manera más grosera o más sutil, según los contextos nacionales, los canales por donde avanzaron las concepciones neoliberales. A partir de esta reapropiación

conservadora, E. Dagnino ponía de manifiesto la crisis discursiva de los proyectos democráticos-participativos de corte emancipatorio, señalando la peligrosa emergencia de un campo minado, donde cualquier paso en falso nos podía llevar al campo del adversario.

En este sentido, el modelo de la gobernanza nos instala nuevamente en un espacio de confluencia perversa. Cierto es que la realidad nunca discurre por canales únicos o unidimensionales, pues si bien existe convergencia perversa, necesario es decir también que hay —o puede haber— disputa, reapropiaciones, resignificaciones. Volviendo a los noventa, hay que reconocer que lo que aparecía como "imperativo desde arriba", con claros objetivos de control social y de recomposición de la gobernabilidad, era también objeto de lucha y resistencia desde abajo. Así, en países como Argentina y Bolivia, esas redes territoriales que se constituyeron en el locus del conflicto, que aparecían como el espacio de control y dominación neoliberal, supieron convertirse también en el lugar de emergencia de movimientos socioterritoriales innovadores, con carácter autogestivo, con pretensiones autonómicas, que pusieron de manifiesto las relaciones de antagonismo y de poder existente, contribuyendo de manera decisiva en la generación de resistencias a la hegemonía neoliberal. En otros términos, el trabajo de resignificación que realizaron ciertos movimientos sociales en América Latina a partir y desde estos condicionamientos sociales y estructurales, nos muestra que la historia, con sus oscilaciones y dinámicas recursivas, está lejos de ser lineal. Si muchos fueron los sujetos y las organizaciones

que sucumbieron frente a esos riesgos propios del campo minado, otros supieron abrir brechas, resignificando y potenciando las luchas en el marco de una disputa asimétrica.

Sin embargo, la nueva inflexión, en un contexto de transición y de giros políticos, pareciera acrecentar la complejidad de los dilemas que afrontan los movimientos sociales, carácter socioambiental. Veamos, para cerrar, cuáles son esos algunos de ellos.

ENTRE LA ILUSIÓN DESARROLLISTA Y LA REACTIVACIÓN DE LA TRADICIÓN NACIONAL-POPULAR

El cambio de época registrado en los últimos años en la región, a partir de la desnaturalización de la relación entre globalización y neoliberalismo, ha configurado un escenario transicional en el cual dos de las notas mayores son, por un lado, la reactivación de la matriz nacional-popular, por otro, la vuelta a un modelo "desarrollista". Así, un primer elemento a considerar es el retorno de la tradición nacional-popular, ligada a la temática de la (re)construcción del Estado, en un contexto de crítica a las políticas neoliberales, cuyo resultado fuera tanto el vaciamiento de la capacidad reguladora del Estado, como la adopción de un carácter metaregulador. Cierto es, las situaciones nacionales no son homologables, antes bien, para cada escenario nacional la relación entre liderazgos políticos, sistema político-partidario, proceso de reformas y formas de autoorganización social presentan líneas de continuidad y de ruptura respecto de los

moldes de dominación de la década anterior. Sin embargo, con sus diferentes matices e inflexiones nacionales, son varios los gobiernos que dan cuenta de una reactivación de la matriz nacional-popular, una tradición que se inserta en la "memoria mediana" (las experiencias populistas de los años treinta, cuarenta y cincuenta), y tiende a sostenerse sobre el triple eje de la afirmación de la nación mediante un estado redistributivo y conciliador, el liderazgo carismático y, por último, las masas organizadas —el pueblo—.

En este contexto, lo novedoso no son las formas que adquieren las luchas antineoliberales, sino más bien la articulación que presenta la tradición nacional-popular con el modelo neodesarrollista, asentado en la reprimarización de la economía. En rigor, sería más preciso afirmar que la expansión vertiginosa del modelo extractivo-exportador y los grandes proyectos de infraestructura de la cartera del IIRSA, parecen haber traído consigo una cierta "ilusión desarrollista", habida cuenta que, a diferencia de los años noventa, las economías latinoamericanas se vieron enormemente favorecidas por los altos precios internacionales de los productos primarios (*commodities*), reflejado durante los últimos años en las balanzas comerciales y el superávit fiscal. El hecho no puede ser desestimado, muy especialmente luego del largo período de estancamiento y regresión económica de las últimas décadas. En esta coyuntura favorable (al menos, hasta antes de la actual crisis financiera mundial), no son pocos los gobiernos latinoamericanos que buscan relegado en un segundo plano o sencillamente escamotear las discusiones de fondo acerca de

los modelos de desarrollo posible, habilitando el retorno en fuerza de una visión productivista del desarrollo.

Por otro lado, no olvidemos que el nuevo despertar político de los pueblos indígenas y la relegitimación de la matriz comunitaria está vinculado al avance de la globalización neoliberal, expresado en la actualidad a través de la expansión de las fronteras del capital hacia los territorios antes considerados como improductivos. Ya hemos dado cuenta de cómo estas nuevas modalidades de dominación colisionan de lleno con los modos de vida de las poblaciones originarias y campesinas, y amenazan en su conjunto la preservación de los recursos básicos para la vida (tierra y territorio). Asimismo, también hemos afirmado que la explosión de los conflictos ambientales está en el origen de numerosos movimientos socioambientales urbanos, que hoy cuestionan la visión productivista del desarrollo, desarrollan un lenguaje en clave de "ecología popular" enfatizando no solo la noción de "saqueo" o expropiación económica (en manos de las transnacionales), sino también las consecuencias en términos de contaminación. En otros términos, los movimientos campesinos-indígenas y socioambientales impugnan aquellas políticas que en clave del "desarrollo nacional", minimizan los efectos de la contaminación, las externalidades, los pasivos ambientales, y/o el agotamiento de recursos hoy escasos. No es casual la unidad continental que se percibe en el modo en que se nombra la temática: defensa de la tierra y el territorio, de los bienes comunes.

Uno de los pocos países en los cuales se ha intentado llevar a cabo una discusión sobre el modelo extractivista exportador

(respecto del petróleo y de la minería a gran escala) es Ecuador, lo cual se vio reflejado inicialmente a través de la composición del gabinete, dividido entre “extractivistas” y “ecologistas”[48]. Sin embargo, el resultado no ha sido muy alentador. Ciertamente, luego de su asunción, el Gobierno de Correa elaboró y difundió un Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, que involucraba una concepción integral del mismo, esto es, no solo en términos de lógica productiva y social, sino también el desarrollo entendido como “la consecución del buen vivir en armonía con la naturaleza y la prolongación indefinida de las culturas humanas” (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007-2010: 55). La elaboración del Plan incluyó mesas de discusión en las que participaron diferentes sectores de la sociedad ecuatoriana, así como un proceso arduo de sistematización y consensos sobre sus componentes.

Asimismo, en mayo de 2007, Correa realizó una propuesta sin precedentes, que sacudió la comunidad ambientalista internacional: propuso no explotar el petróleo del parque nacional Yasuni (bloque 43), esto es, mantener el crudo en tierra, a cambio de una compensación de la comunidad internacional, “en nombre del principio de la responsabilidad ambiental diferenciada”. Vale aclarar que el Yasuni, situado en la Amazonía, al Este del Ecuador, es el bosque más biodiverso del planeta: “en una sola hectárea del bosque hay tantas especies de árboles como en todo EEUU y Canadá juntos.” El parque Nacional Yasuni es, además, hogar de los Huaorani y de algunos de los últimos pueblos indígenas que aún viven en aislamiento, sin contacto con otras culturas. En estas tierras se encuentran las reservas más grandes de petróleo ecuatoriano, en el bloque

Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) con 900 millones de barriles. Sin embargo, a fines de 2007, el Gobierno ecuatoriano concedió la licencia ambiental a Petrobrás, para la explotación de las reservas de petróleo que se encuentran en bloque 31, de Yasuni. Esta medida fue ampliamente rechazada por los sectores ambientalistas, que vieron en la misma el primer paso para la entrega del bloque Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini (ITT) a Petrobrás.

Dentro del Gobierno de Correa, las posiciones ecologistas eran reflejadas por el influyente Alberto Acosta, quien fuera primero ministro de Energía y luego presidente del la Asamblea Constituyente[49]. La propia Asamblea planteó, en un momento determinado, declarar el Ecuador "libre de minería contaminante". Los resultados, sin embargo, fueron otros: efectivamente la Asamblea Constituyente declaró en abril de 2008 la caducidad de miles de concesiones mineras presuntamente ilegales y puso en vilo millonarios proyectos extractivos, mientras se aprobaba un nuevo marco legal para ampliar el control estatal en la industria. En este sentido, como plantea Mario Unda (2008) "la reversión de las concesiones mineras debe entenderse como un mecanismo para obligar a las empresas mineras a renegociar bajo nuevas condiciones, dejando más recursos en el país, acogiendo reglamentaciones más claras y posiblemente una asociación con el Estado (para lo cual se plantea la creación de la Empresa Nacional de Minería)". Finalmente, la nueva ley minera, aprobada en enero de 2009, perpetúa el modelo extractivista, desconociendo el derecho a la oposición y consulta de las poblaciones afectadas por la

extracción de recursos naturales. Así, contrariando la expectativa de numerosas organizaciones sociales, el gobierno de Correa optó por un modelo neodesarrollista, minimizando el debate acerca de los gravosos efectos sociales y ambientales de las actividades extractivas[50].

Para el caso de Bolivia, la cuestión involucra explícitamente otros registros políticos, en un contexto de marcada polarización regional y social. A su arribo, en 2006, el MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) presentó un Proyecto Nacional de Desarrollo (aunque nunca fuera publicado), que incluye una crítica del concepto clásico o tradicional. Así, se afirma la visión monocultural del Estado, en sus diferentes momentos (sea que hablemos de la etapa oligárquica, desarrollista, como neoliberal), al tiempo que se apunta a incorporar una visión multidimensional del desarrollo, que involucra directamente la temática de los recursos naturales, la biodiversidad y el medioambiente.

Sin embargo, las tensiones y ambivalencias son claramente visibles, pues si resulta claro que la política de Evo Morales apunta al quiebre de una visión monocultural del Estado, por el otro, no es menos cierto que se ha reactivado un imaginario desarrollista, en clave nacionalista, alentado por la apertura de nuevas oportunidades económicas (en un país donde la contracara es precisamente un imaginario del despojo reiterado —de tierras y riquezas—). Como afirma Stefanoni (2007), el Gobierno “promueve la utilización de las reservas de hidrocarburos y minerales para “industrializar el país” y emanciparlo de la condena histórica del capitalismo mundial a ser un mero exportador de materias primas, y, al mismo tiempo,

deja entrever cierta nostalgia hacia un Estado de bienestar que para el caso boliviano fue extremadamente limitado[51].

Finalmente, para el caso argentino, las propuestas del matrimonio presidencial, los Kirchner, han sido de corte claramente continuista. En realidad, el gobierno argentino ha reactivado la retórica nacional-popular tardíamente (sobre todo luego del conflicto con los productores agrarios), al tiempo que ha venido promoviendo la continuidad del paradigma de los agronegocios, tanto como la del modelo extractivista, en todas sus modalidades. Pero la referencia a ambos modelos de desarrollo merece empero dos comentarios adicionales. El primero se refiere a que la expansión del modelo agroexportador se halla marcado por el auge de la producción de cultivos transgénicos (a través de la siembra directa), cuyo resultado ha sido la agriculturización y sojización del campo, la cual continúa expandiéndose en detrimento de otros cultivos, ocupando hoy una superficie de 18 millones de hectáreas. En este sentido, el modelo minero posee un rol “subordinado”, aun si su proceso de implementación presenta características vertiginosas y muy similares a las de otros países latinoamericanos. Sin embargo, pocos argentinos conocen que la actividad minera involucra directa e indirectamente nada menos que quince de las veinticuatro provincias, y que dichos proyectos cuentan con la resistencia explícita de una parte de las poblaciones afectadas, unas setenta asambleas de autoconvocados, reunidos en la Unión de Asambleas Ciudadanas (UAC). En realidad, la renuncia sistemática a abrir un debate público sobre el modelo minero, por parte de sectores políticos y empresariales, y garantizar así un

acceso a la información y la consulta a las comunidades afectadas, nos plantea interrogantes inquietantes sobre la cuestión de la democracia en Argentina

Con respecto al modelo de agronegocios, solo en el último año, a raíz del conflicto que enfrentó al Gobierno con los diferentes actores del sector agrario, se abrió por primera vez la posibilidad de una discusión, al menos, acerca de las consecuencias de la expansión del modelo sojero, cuestión hasta ahora reservada a unos pocos especialistas, ecologistas marginales y movimientos campesinos[52]. Para comprender el carácter de este conflicto que sacudió al país, es necesario tener en cuenta que la introducción del nuevo paradigma agrario, a mediados de los noventa, no solo benefició a los grandes propietarios y fue generando una poderosa cadena de actores intermediarios, sino también a los pequeños y medianos productores, quienes en medio de la aguda crisis del agro, se aferraron a éste como a una tabla de salvación en medio del naufragio. Así, los pequeños productores, muchos de ellos minirentistas, están lejos de cuestionar el paradigma productivo; antes bien, sus demandas se vinculan con una mejor inclusión dentro del mismo.

Quizá la mentada puja entre el “campo” y el “Gobierno” que se entabló en 2008, contribuya a generar un verdadero debate social sobre las implicaciones de un paradigma productivo y sus puntos ciegos (tendencia al monocultivo, a la concentración económica, desplazamiento de poblaciones campesinas, contaminación por el uso de agrotóxicos, riesgo de pérdida de soberanía alimentaria, entre otros), pues los problemas aludidos

engloban mucho más que a los productores agrícolas, superan la discusión acerca del tamaño de la unidad productiva o el porcentaje de retenciones que debe cobrar el Estado, y ponen en tela de juicio la actual visión productivista del desarrollo, que predomina tanto en el Gobierno como en el conjunto de los actores involucrados en el nuevo modelo.

Por otro lado, en Argentina, la experiencia que tuvo el mérito de colocar en la agenda pública la nueva cuestión socioambiental, a nivel nacional, fue Gualeguaychú, entre 2005 y 2006, a raíz del conflicto por la instalación de las pasteras, sobre el río Uruguay, que trajo como correlato un enfrentamiento entre el gobierno argentino y el de la república del Uruguay. Recordemos que este conflicto fue considerado por el entonces presidente Néstor Kirchner, en 2006, como una “causa nacional”; pese a que luego, el propio gobierno de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, impulsaría activamente el cuestionamiento y hasta la demonización de la Asamblea Ambientalista de Gualeguaychú, a inicios de 2009, con el objeto de que éstos levantaran el corte al puente internacional que une la Argentina con el Uruguay, luego de casi dos años de bloqueo[53]. Pero, por paradójico que pueda parecer, la instalación de la agenda socioambiental, capitalizada políticamente por los Kirchner, lejos estuvo de servir a la apertura de la discusión de otras causas socioambientales; antes bien, sirvió para el ocultamiento y la denegación de otros conflictos que ya comenzaban a recorrer a diferentes provincias argentinas, a raíz de la introducción del modelo minero. Por último, la intervención del ex presidente N. Kirchner, en apoyo a los asambleístas de Gualeguaychú, y la respuesta no menos

virulenta de su par uruguayo, Tabaré Vásquez, sirvieron para reactivar la vieja oposición entre “país grande” y “país pequeño”, que recorre la relación entre ambos países, instalando el conflicto en un registro de difícil solución: el de la exacerbación de las lógicas nacionalistas, antes que el de la discusión de los diferentes modelos de desarrollo.

Curiosa paradoja la que atraviesa gran parte de la región latinoamericana: la crisis del consenso neoliberal, la relegitimación de los discursos críticos, la emergencia y potenciación de diferentes movimientos sociales, en fin, la reactivación de la tradición nacional-popular, se insertan en una nueva fase de acumulación del capital, en la cual uno de sus núcleos centrales es la apropiación y expropiación de los recursos naturales, cada vez más escasos, en el marco de una lógica de depredación ambiental. En este escenario, movimientos campesinos e indígenas, movimientos socioambientales urbanos, son arrojados a un campo de doble clivaje y asimetría, en el cual se observa no solo un continuado acoplamiento entre neodesarrollismo y neoliberalismo, sino también, una vez más, entre neodesarrollismo y tradición nacional-popular.

En suma, si bien es cierto que en la actualidad asistimos al retorno de dos ideas, de dos “conceptos límites” del pensamiento social latinoamericano, *Emancipación y Desarrollo*, tal como están planteadas, o su debate en cierto modo escamoteado, las vías del desarrollo y las vías de la emancipación amenazan con ser claramente antagónicas.

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Lectura 4

Empowerment, Citizenship and Gender Justice: A Contribution to Locally Grounded Theories of Change in Women’s Lives[54]

Naila Kabeer[55]

INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with the relationship between empowerment, citizenship and gender justice. I see these as signposting distinct but interrelated pathways of social change in women’s lives which can, but do not necessarily, overlap. I

understand women's empowerment to have an irreducibly subjective component. Whatever else, it must entail changes in women's consciousness, in the way they perceive themselves and their relationships with others. It thus begins with individual change. Gender justice concerns the institutional arrangements that govern society including, but not only, its legal system—and the extent to which these promote the fair treatment of men and women. Struggles around gender justice are then struggles around notions of fairness at the institutional level. I will be arguing that ideas about citizenship offer an important bridge between these two processes of change because they help to mediate the translation of individual notions of selfhood into socially recognised identities.

In formal terms, gender justice refers to international norms and conventions relating to women's rights as well as various forms of national legislation seeking to promote gender equality. While there are various factors behind this emerging architecture of rights, a major driving force has undoubtedly been the efforts of feminist activists who see the formal recognition of women's rights as a critical pathway to substantive gender justice. However, legal gender equality has not necessarily translated into gender justice where it matters most: in the everyday life of millions of men and women, most of whom have not taken any part in these efforts and many of whom may not even know that they exist.

At the same time, various intended and unintended forces have been acting on some of the long-standing patriarchal constraints that limit women's agency in everyday life: these

include rising levels of education, increasing rates of labour force participation as well as a variety of development interventions, many targeted explicitly at women such as micro credit, cash transfers and reproductive health. Yet, as various studies have shown, women's individual empowerment has not translated everywhere into greater awareness of their rights or greater willingness to act on them.

This paper explores how interactions between women's empowerment, citizenship and struggles for gender justice play out in societies in which ideas about gender equality and women's rights have very shallow roots because individuality itself as a way of life has little or no place. I begin in the next section by discussing efforts to formulate these concepts in ways that take account of the challenges posed by such contexts, starting with my own effort to conceptualise women's empowerment.

EMPOWERMENT, CITIZENSHIP AND GENDER JUSTICE: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

My definition of empowerment takes choice as its central concept (Kabeer, 1999). I defined empowerment as the processes of change through which those who have been denied the capacity to exercise choice gain this capacity. However, I qualified the notion of choice in a number of ways to make it relevant to the analysis of empowerment. My first qualification related to the conditions in which women make their choices. For choice to be meaningful there have to be alternatives, the possibility of having

chosen otherwise. My concern here was with women's apparent compliance with, or at least failure to protest against, norms and values which assigned them an inferior status to men in their society. Such compliance can be variously interpreted. It may reflect an unquestioning acceptance of these norms and values, the belief that they represent a satisfactory, even valued, way of organising social relationships. It may reflect the material costs associated with protest. Where women are economically dependent on those with power and authority over them, attempts to question the status quo can undermine their primary source of survival and security in their society. Or there may be social costs. If there are strong pressures within society to conform to given norms and values, transgression risks harassment or ostracism.

There is also the question of perceived alternatives. To what extent is it possible for women to *conceive* of having chosen or acted differently? In societies where gender inequalities of personhood are so deeply embedded in the family and kinship relations, so intimately bound up with constructions of the self as gendered subjects, that to question them would be to question the meaning of one's existence, there is little scope for imagining other ways of organising social relations. This touches on Bourdieu's idea of doxa, aspects of traditions and norms that are so taken for granted that they take on a naturalised and unquestioned quality.

Two other qualifications related to the consequences of choice. The first concerned the distinction between trivial and significant choices, between the choices that we make on a mundane basis

every day of our lives and the more strategic life choices that have profound consequences for the quality and direction of the lives we are able to lead.

The second related to the consequences of choice for the broader structures of inequality that prevail within a society. To what extent do the choices in question undermine, and even transform, these structures, and to what extent do they merely reproduce them? Choices which embody the fundamental inequalities of society, which systematically devalue the self or undermine the capacity for choice of others, are not compatible with most feminist understandings of empowerment, however active the agency underlying these choices may appear.

Let me now turn to O'Neill's work (1990) for a conceptualisation of gender justice that attempts to take account of the kinds of patriarchal constraints that I am talking about. O'Neill seeks to steer a course between the idealised and relativist approaches which have dominated recent debates on this topic. Idealised approaches, exemplified by much of liberal theory, claim universalism by abstracting from the particularities of persons, such as gender or ethnicity, in favour of the abstract individual as bearer of rights and responsibilities. The problem with this conceptualisation of the individual is that it idealises a free-floating agency that is more easily exercised by men than women because it assumes away the relations of dependence and interdependence which are central to the lives available to most women in the real world.

Relativised approaches, exemplified by much of communitarian theory, explicitly acknowledge differences

between people and seek to ground ideas about justice in the discourse and traditions of actual communities. The objection here is that most communities relegate varying portions of women's lives to the domestic sphere. Not only do such approaches fail to take account of women's productive capacities and the practicalities of earning a living that many face but they also endorse the exclusion of women from precisely that "public sphere" where questions of justice are generally addressed (O'Neill, 1990: 440).

O'Neill believes that a more adequate account of justice requires abstract principles that are genuinely universal, that steer a course between abstractions that smuggle in idealised accounts of the human agent and context-sensitivity that ends up valorising culturally specific ideals about social relationships. The challenge is to articulate principles of justice that can adjudicate between the inevitably diverging views about desired or acceptable institutional arrangements that prevail in most societies. Justice requires that the basic principles for organising institutional arrangements in the face of such divergence must be ones that could be adopted by any plurality of these diverse actors. This would rule out deception, coercion or violence as the basis for organising social life since anything which promotes the agency of some groups at the expense of others cannot be universally acted on. The institutional arrangements that are adopted by all members of such pluralities on the basis of these principles then become the background conditions for their actions.

To illustrate the applicability of this approach to justice to

concrete situations, O'Neill considers the situation of poor women in poor communities. How do we judge whether existing social arrangements that isolate or exclude women or ensure their life-long vulnerability violate principles of justice? This is not a question about the kinds of arrangements that hypothesised rational and mutually independent individuals would consent to, the idealised approach, nor is it a question about the kinds of arrangements that people in potentially oppressive situations do consent to, the relativist approach. Instead, it is a question about the kinds of arrangements a plurality of interacting agents with finite capacities *could* consent to.

O'Neill suggests that one way to capture what is at issue is to ask: to what extent are the different aspects of any arrangements that structure the lives of oppressed groups ones that "could have been refused or renegotiated by those they actually constrain" (p. 455; author's emphasis)? Institutions can only be regarded as just if they allow those who are affected by them the ability to refuse or renegotiate different aspects of the tasks and roles assigned to them. However, O'Neill recognises that the capacity for dissent is not evenly distributed in an unjust society. Existing institutional arrangements frequently undermine women's agency by making disproportionate demands on them to meet the needs and defer to the wishes of others and by limiting their capacity to think and act outside given norms and values. We consequently cannot take their failure to protest against existing institutional arrangements as evidence that these arrangements are just. There is therefore a processual aspect to justice: it requires building the capacity of subordinate groups to play an equal part

in shaping the institutional arrangements that govern their lives, including their capacity for dissent.

Ideas about agency—the capacity for choice, consent, renegotiation as well as dissent—are thus central to the conceptualisations of empowerment and gender justice that inform this paper. But while empowerment takes the consciousness and capabilities of individual women as its starting point, gender justice is concerned with the quality of the institutional arrangements that govern social relationships. I would like to suggest that ideas about citizenship can provide an important conceptual bridge between individual and institutional change.

There are, of course, many different ways of conceptualising citizenship, not all of them equally compatible with the kinds of agency that we are talking about here. For instance, liberal conceptualisations of citizenship based on the equality of the rights of individuals as recognised by the state and protected by law suffer from the limitations that O'Neill discusses. They privilege individual rights but take no account of how particularities of identity and social position might differentiate the ability to realise rights. Communitarian understandings focus on the shared norms and values which underpin the mutual responsibilities of the members of a community in pursuit of the collective good. But they also lend themselves to the defence of long-standing hierarchies within communities which give little or no voice to subordinate groups in defining what constitutes the collective good.

My aim here is not to adjudicate between different approaches

but to draw on the conceptual resources they offer in order to propose the idea of citizenship in different contexts as *work in progress*, an ongoing project that evolves through struggles and contestations between different groups within a society. I want to explore these struggles and contestations through what Lister (1997) describes as the dialectical relationship between citizenship as status and citizenship as *practice*. Drawing on her distinction, I will be using the concept of "status" to refer to how the existing constitutional/legal arrangements in a society define the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, including its gender dimensions, while I will use "practice" to refer to the different ways in which members of a society seek to act on—and challenge—these collective definitions. While the status of citizenship spells out the possibilities and constraints that individuals and groups experience as members of a particular society, the practice of citizenship places the question of human agency, including the capacity to accept, to conform, to question or to dissent, at the heart of contesting views about citizenship.

CONTESTATIONS AROUND GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Let me turn next to some examples of communitarian perspectives on women's rights and gender justice to illustrate what I believe to be their limitations. My first example comes from Menon (2000) who uses her research on upper caste Brahmin women in urban Orissa to reject the universalist assumptions underlying feminist demands for "equality, individual rights and

personal choice" (p. 77). She suggests that the failure of (Westernised) Indian feminists to energise Hindu women to fight gender injustices, or even to protest against them, reflects the fact that such demands are rooted in "an ideology of individualism" which has no traction for women she researched.

According to her, the women in her study consider themselves complementary, not subordinate, to men. They gain their deepest sense of who they are through their ability to fulfil the destiny of marriage and motherhood laid out for women in Oriya Hindu culture. As a result, many of the practices that feminists have identified as manifestations of patriarchal control are actively embraced by these women in their efforts to live up to twin cultural ideals of self-denial and service to others which define their roles as mothers and wives.

Menon illustrates this claim with a discussion of the practice of female seclusion among the Hindu upper castes. She points out that Hindus believe the human body to be relatively unbounded and permeable and hence subject to continuous change and reconstitution through contacts with others. Upper caste Hindus therefore observe various daily practices and rituals through which they seek to "refine and regulate" themselves. Since women's bodies are considered more permeable than those of men—because they menstruate and reproduce— they are more concerned than men with regulating exchanges with others who could threaten this process of refinement (p. 81).

Consequently, the women in Menon's study choose to remain within the family compound, restricting their social interactions to family and kin and meticulously observing the prescribed daily

practices of ritual purification:

> Strange as it may sound to modern ears, Oriya Hindu women do not desire to move and interact with people indiscriminately. They value, positively, their lack of geographical mobility and their limited interaction with the outside world, interpreting these features as signs of their superiority over others, of their independence of the outside world… To shun contact, to maintain exclusivity, confers a mark of distinction on the person who shuns. (p. 88)

Barakat and Wardell (2002) also question the universality of individual rights, this time in the context of Afghanistan. They argue that those unfamiliar with Afghan culture tend to take women's absence from the public domain as evidence of their subordinate status but overlook the private domain of family and kinship where Afghan women find their primary source of security and status and exercise most influence. To look at Afghan society through a Western feminist prism fails to take account of the concepts and obligations that underpin women's power within the family and the role of patriarchy in providing them with shelter and security. The revered status of women inscribed in the local culture is upheld by Qu'ranic teachings and by Afghan women themselves. Regardless of differences of ethnicity, location and class, women's roles as wives and mothers are central to their identity: "No matter how vital a woman's economic contribution to her family's well-being, this remains of secondary importance to her position as wife and mother" (p. 918).

Both papers thus reject individualised notions of personhood. Both strongly emphasise women's association with the domestic

domain as well as the satisfaction and status they receive from it. Both, however, are flawed by their treatment of culture and community as seamless, timeless and internally coherent. Neither allows for the possibility that any of the women within these cultures might feel oppressed by the predetermined nature of their roles in society and seek to protest against, however silently, their lack of choice about the lives they lead.

A somewhat different perspective on communitarian constructions of identity and personhood is to be found in Joseph's analysis of kinship and family relations in Lebanon (1994, 1997). She notes that the rights of citizenship embodied in the Lebanese constitution played very little role in the lives of men and women in the working-class neighbourhoods of Beirut that she studied. Instead, both men and women experienced their rights as emerging from sets of relationships within which they were embedded as concrete persons rather than as abstract individuals. These "relational rights"—she borrows the term from Nedelsky (1993)—had a strong gender dimension. The relationships in question constructed gender identities through socialisation processes that stressed *interdependence* rather than separation as the basis of gender roles and responsibilities for both men and women. Consequently, they promoted connective notions of selfhood for both, "one that [saw] itself embeddedin others and foster[ed] relationality as a central charter of selfhood" (Joseph, 1997: 86). Notions of selfhood were thus constituted by claims and obligations generated through, and embedded within, the social relationships of kinship, family and community. Nor was this relational understanding of claims

and obligations confined to the domestic domain. Rather, they pervaded all domains of social interaction, rendering irrelevant the idea of an impersonal public sphere in which individual citizens enter as bearers of rights, equal in the eyes of the law.

But while Joseph also questions the relevance of liberal notions of individual rights in the context of her study, and emphasises the “relational” basis on which rights operate, she is clear that these relationships are rooted in, and reflective of, a highly patriarchal organisation of family, kinship and community. This clearly has problematic consequences for women—as individuals and as citizens. It means that in both the private and public spheres of life they must defer to patriarchal authority figures who mediate their access to valued private and public resources. We might also add that the near-dominance of kinship relations, idiom and morality in all spheres of life means that the only discourse available for the expression of dissent from the patriarchal norms and values of kinship is the discourse of kinship itself.

Despite variations in their recognition of power as an aspect of gender relations, all three papers underscore the conundrum that motivates this paper. How do struggles for women’s empowerment and gender justice take place within communities in which the patriarchal relationships of family and kinship not only define gender roles and identities within the domestic domain but also provide the dominant model of relationships in all spheres of society? It is not simply, as Kandiyoti (1988) suggests, that women in such contexts may actively resist individual rights if these are seen to undermine the traditional protections that

accompany their dependent status within the family. It may also be the case that they simply do not view these social arrangements as unjust. As Basu argues:

> The internalisation of norms over generations means that subjective perceptions about inequality and subordination need have no connection with an outsider's views on these matters. And nor is it clear that one view is more real than the other. (1996: 56)

Such views pose a major challenge for feminist concerns with women's empowerment and gender justice as conceptualised in this paper. Recognition of injustice must clearly precede struggles for justice, but if injustices are ingrained in the social relationships that construct women's sense of self and security within their communities then they are likely to be ingrained in women's gendered subjectivities. Is it possible for women to recognise and deal with the injustices embedded in the social relationships that define their identities and give meaning to their lives without at the same time negating or undermining these relationships?

One way out of this conundrum is provided by Benhabib (1992). She notes that a central insight of Habermas's theory of justice is precisely the importance of social relationships in the construction of identity and consciousness: "The 'I' becomes an 'I' only among a 'we' in a community of speech and action. Individuation does not precede association; rather it is the kinds of associations we inhabit that define the kind of individuals we become" (p. 71). However, she goes on to argue, acknowledging the value and significance of social relationships in people's lives

is very different from the uncritical and socially conformist acceptance of their ascribed “station and duties in life” that features in some of the communitarian literature.

However socially embedded women—and men—may be in the ascribed relationships of family, kin and community, it is in principle possible for them to attain a reflexive distance from these relationships, to become simultaneously observers of, and participants in, their own society. If it is through the “given” relationships of family and kinship that women gain their sense of identity and personhood, then it is through participation in other “chosen” forms of associational life that they may be able to acquire a reflexive vantage point from which to observe and evaluate these relationships.

What is appealing about this conceptualisation is that it implies a sense of self and identity that is not predetermined and fixed by cultural norms but shifting and fluid, in constant process of construction and reconstruction through the social interactions of everyday life. It is, of course, possible that the expansion of associational possibilities leads to the reinforcement of old orthodoxies or the rise of new ones, to the substitution of dependency within the home for exploitation at work. But equally, it is possible that it will strengthen women’s capacity to recognise and articulate what they consider to be unjust about their lives, to decide what action to take and through their actions come to formulate their vision of gender justice.

This offers a different route to “relational rights” to the communitarian version that Joseph describes in the context of Lebanon. If, as Nedelsky has suggested, the rights recognised by

a society reflect collective choices about the kinds of social relationships it seeks to foster, then the inclusion of previously marginalised groups in the processes of collective decision making may serve to recast the vision of community and redefine the collective good along very different lines to that embodied in the prevailing status quo.

In the remainder of this paper I will be drawing on the findings from two of my recent research projects to illuminate some of the ways in which expanding the sphere of women's social interactions can bring about positive changes in their lives, even in apparently oppressive circumstances, and to evaluate these changes through the conceptual framework outlined in this paper. The women interviewed in both contexts spoke of familial relationships in terms of a patriarchal contract rooted in religious beliefs and cultural traditions. Men were the family breadwinners and guardians of its honour while women were responsible for bearing children, caring for the family, looking after the household and upholding the family honour through their virtuous behaviour.

Development NGOs were the key form of "chosen" associations on which the research focused and both projects used women's accounts of their life histories to assess their experiences. The first project was based on interviews carried out in Kabul in 2009 with 12 Afghan women and their families (Kabeer *et al.*, 2011). They were all from the minority Hazara community and came from poor and lower middle-income households. The women were associated with two development NGOs which provided micro credit to women. Such NGOs are relatively new in Afghanistan and both had started operations in

Afghanistan within the previous five or six years.

The second project was based on interviews carried out in 2006 with 31 women drawn from low-income households in rural Bangladesh (Kabeer, 2011). These women were associated with four development NGOs, all committed to a lesser or greater extent to women's empowerment, with one providing micro credit and the other three using a savings-based approach. NGOs have had a long history in Bangladesh and many of these women had been members for 10-15 years.

WOMEN'S NARRATIVES OF CHANGE IN URBAN AFGHANISTAN

The Hazara women in our study were very explicit in articulating their views about the contractual basis of family life. They prioritised their duties to the family and looked to men to prioritise theirs. They remained within the vicinity of their own homes and were generally accompanied, sometimes by children, if they had to go further. The virtuous woman, in their view, complied with these norms and accepted her husband's right to beat her if she failed to do so. In return, she could expect to be provided for, protected from harm and represented in the public domain.

However, the lived reality that the women described rarely matched up to this idealised version. High levels of male unemployment in a war-disrupted economy made it difficult for men to live up to their obligations as primary breadwinners, leading them to vent their frustrations on their wives and children. Almost every woman in our sample had experienced violence,

usually at the hands of husbands. Their struggles to deal with the marked disjuncture between the normative model of the patriarchal contract and its concrete manifestations in their daily lives spelt out some of the forces of continuity and change that have characterised Afghan society in recent decades.

There were clearly a variety of pressures on women to put up with their situation, regardless of how they felt: the weight of tradition, their own adherence to its values, the authority exercised by dominant family members, pressures imposed by the wider community combined with their fear of losing their children in case of divorce, of being sent back in shame to their parents' home were all powerful forces in reinforcing the status quo.

Men too found the burden of breadwinning responsibility difficult to deal with. The stresses they faced could be glimpsed in their own descriptions of their struggles to earn a living and in women's frequent descriptions of husbands as "bad tempered", "moody", "anxious" and "tense", often combined with an understanding of their frustrations: "poor him, he has to work from morning till night"; "poor him, he lost his job".

However, husbands' behaviours were not only explained as individual aberrations but also as manifestations of a more generalised pattern of injustice that gave men a monopoly on rights and privileges. These women did not subscribe to some monolithic notion of Afghan values. They distanced themselves from the values of the Taliban, for instance, resenting the impositions that it had placed on men and women, particularly from the minority Hazara community. Nor were their expressions

of dissatisfaction confined to life under the Taliban. While they did not reject the norms and values of their own communities, they felt a keen sense of injustice that recurring violations of their contractual obligations by men went unnoticed, unpunished and even condoned.

This ability to take a critical stance towards their own society was in part a product of some of the changes that they had lived through in recent years. For some, time spent as refugees in Iran had provided an alternative vantage point, an “observer status”, from which to evaluate their own society. That it was also an Islamic state meant the comparison carried greater weight. One woman contrasted the treatment of women in Afghanistan to what she had observed in Iran: “Iran is really good from this point of view. You can’t put pressure on women. Here they look on women as a slave.”

For others, the experience of life under different kinds of regimes had helped to crystallise the importance of some of the freedoms that they had previously enjoyed and that had been suspended for a period of time, including some degree of mobility in the public domain, the ability to watch TV, to vote, to work, to visit their shrines and to send their daughters to school.

Along with the restoration of these freedoms by the present regime, there had been other changes. Key among these was the emergence of a new legalistic discourse around gender equality and women’s rights, actively promoted by the international community and by their own aid-dependent government. Both women and men learnt about this evolving discourse from their televisions, their forays into the public domain and their

interactions with each other. TV, in particular, had become an important vehicle for conveying competing discourses about women's place in Afghan society: the discourses of religious leaders combined with educational programmes about women's rights and Indian soap operas which opened a window into women's lives in countries not far away from their own.

There were conflicting views among the women in our sample with regard to this emerging discourse of rights. Some regarded the idea of equality with men as a direct contravention of their fundamental beliefs: how was it possible for women to go out of the house without their husband's permission? Others questioned men's monopoly of power within the "moral economy" of the community and the absence of any mechanism to restrain their misuse of their privileged position. They welcomed the emergence of alternative forms of jurisdiction, exemplified by constitutional and legal recognition of gender equality, as a means of holding men accountable for their actions and offering some redress to the inequalities of the patriarchal contract.

Given the turbulence of recent decades, it is not surprising that the changes associated with women's access to microfinance appeared relatively minor. In addition, the efforts made by the microfinance organisations to gain acceptance within the community, the absence of any forms of support apart from the provision of credit, and the failure to nurture stronger associational bonds among their members all curtailed their transformative potential.

Nevertheless, where households had made successful use of these loans not only did they experience improvements in their

standard of living but it was also possible to discern some of the less tangible gains associated with ideas about individual empowerment outlined above. As the main conduits through which this new resource entered their households, there were reports of greater voice and influence in their households as well as greater respect within their local community. Association with microfinance organisations also served to widen women's sphere of social interactions: through meeting with other women from their loan group, through visits to the NGO office or, in the case of the woman who had set up her own businesses, through daily interactions with their customers: "The hairdressers is the best place to have a chance to talk to other women like myself. Everybody has their problems especially because Afghan men are so cruel."

However, there was little evidence that access to microfinance had strengthened women's voice in the wider community or their capacity to act collectively against the injustices they spoke of so eloquently. This may change with the next generation. It was striking how many women in our small sample were using the meagre resources at their disposal to educate their daughters in the hope of carving out what we termed an "inter-generational pathway of empowerment" (Kabeer *et al.*, 2011).

WOMEN'S NARRATIVES OF CHANGE IN RURAL BANGLADESH

Bangladesh has a long history of development NGOs, dating back to the aftermath of independence in 1971. While many

began with a very radical analysis of the structural roots of poverty and focused on mobilising landless men and women, they have become gradually de-politicised over time, taking on an increasing service provision role, with many specialising in microfinance. The focus of our research was on four rural organisations that had retained a commitment to social change. Their strategies had a number of elements in common. They all stressed the importance of strengthening women's material position: through micro-credit in one case, group-based savings in the others. They emphasised the need for cognitive change through organised training and informal discussion. Also, they sought to build up relations of solidarity between group members in contrast to the instrumental "group liability" approach which motivated conventional microfinance organisations.

The women's narratives offered important insights into the processes through which individual empowerment translated into greater awareness of rights and greater willingness to struggle for them. They explained their past failure to act in terms of their fear of its consequences but also in terms of its inconceivability: "We did not protest even where there was lots of injustice and oppression in the village. We were afraid of the chairmen, village leaders and members. Moreover, we couldn't even see any reason to protest. After all they are our village leaders, we used to honour them." Or as another woman put it: "We did not realise that we were human beings as well."

The changes that have taken place since then occurred through a number of different routes. Women made a number of material gains through their savings, borrowing and training

activities. These were by no means sufficient to allow them to leave difficult relationships but they did expand their scope for renegotiating them. They were less dependent on male earnings, more able to contribute to the household income and no longer had to rely on patron-client relationships that had provided them with some measure of security in the past but on very demeaning terms.

Change also took cognitive forms. The organisations in question offered practical training on livelihoods as well as opportunities for reflection and analysis. The awareness that the women gained through their interactions was transformative in its impact. They learnt to recognise the value of their unpaid contributions to the family and to demand such recognition from others. They learnt about arbitration and conflict resolution which in turn strengthened their capacity to make reasoned judgements rather than relying on given norms. They learnt about their status as citizens and what it meant to be an active citizen.

In addition, the women spoke of the value they attached to the relationships that they had formed through their group activities: “One stick can be broken, a bundle of sticks cannot.” Group-based solidarity was purposively nurtured by the organisations through regular face-to-face interactions between group members, collective savings, periodic cultural events and participation in various forms of collective action to claim their rights and protest against injustice. In a society where women are expected to observe cultural norms of female seclusion, similar to those reported in Afghanistan, such public action represents a remarkable change.

Women used their newly developed capabilities to organise around a range of issues. Within the economic domain, they participated alongside men in struggles over unclaimed government land to which landless groups had legal entitlement but which had been forcibly occupied by powerful land owners. In the policy domain, they carried out the informal monitoring of government programmes for the poor, protesting against examples of corruption and unfair distribution. They had also become more active in the political domain, campaigning for pro-poor candidates during elections and, in some cases, contesting local elections.

When it came to injustices in the domestic domain, however, responses were more ambivalent. Women's groups took a strong stand against public forms of violence against women, including rape and acid attacks, and against a range of institutionalised practices, such as dowry and child marriage, which they regarded as the unacceptable face of patriarchy within the family. But in relation to actual instances of patriarchal injustice in their own lives or in the lives of women they knew, their approach was more conciliatory, marked by greater willingness to compromise.

One way to understand this disjuncture is in terms of the continued centrality of family in social life in Bangladesh and the near universality of marriage. Even if these women had managed to gain much more on the economic front, there is still very little social space in rural Bangladesh for them to set up their own independent households to escape abusive marriages. Most opted to remain within marriage, but renegotiate its terms.

DISCUSSION OF THE NARRATIVES

These narratives from Afghanistan and Bangladesh speak directly to the concerns of this paper. Firstly, they illustrate the variety of intended and unintended ways in which women's agency can be enhanced. The Afghan context offered striking examples of the unintended consequences for gender relations that have been generated by the rapid succession of regimes, with very contrasting views about women's place within society, as well as by the accompanying displacements from countryside into towns and neighbouring countries. Currently, purposive efforts on the part of state, donors and civil society to transform gender relations compete with the equally purposive efforts of conservative forces to resist such transformation. Such contestations had served to open women—and men—to the possibility of different ways of organising society and different models of gender relations.

In Bangladesh, a great deal of change has happened as a part of "normal" development efforts, not necessarily intended to empower women. Nevertheless, the promotion of family planning and girls' education as a part of government policy, the emergence of new economic opportunities for women in the export garment sector, the proliferation of NGOs targeting women for various forms of service provision and greater exposure to the media have all helped to expand the associational possibilities and life choices available to women.

Secondly, even within the small and relatively homogeneous samples of women that were studied in the two countries, there was considerable variation in how they viewed the institutional

arrangements that governed their lives, particularly the relations of family and kinship. Their views ranged from an unquestioning acceptance of the existing arrangements as “given” by religion and culture to qualified criticism based on the perceived abuse of men’s power to a more radical questioning of a system that gave men near-monopoly of power and decision making without holding them accountable in any meaningful way. While few of the women in the two studies came close to the full internalisation of cultural norms reported by Menon, neither did they turn their backs on the familial roles ascribed to them by their culture. What they sought instead was to renegotiate these roles in ways that respected their contribution to the family, gave them a voice in family affairs, expanded options beyond the family and challenged men’s arbitrary use of violence. The pathways of change they sought were, in other words, “path dependent”, not crafted in a historical vacuum but shaped in important ways by inherited norms, values and institutions.

And thirdly, the two studies demonstrate how the different ways in which ideas about citizenship are disseminated in different contexts can influence the extent to which processes of individual empowerment translate into the ability to recognise and act on structural injustice. While women in both contexts are seeking to exercise a greater degree of agency in their own lives, it was the very different routes through which they became aware about their status as citizens in the two contexts that shaped the politicisation of this agency.

Women in our Afghan sample learnt about citizenship in almost accidental ways, only tangentially related to their association with

development NGOs. Migration to Iran brought a number of them into contact with a very different kind of Muslim state, but it is worth noting that it was not differences in the practice of Islam in the two countries that featured most prominently in their narratives but differences in state effectiveness. Their time in Iran showed them what a functioning state looked like, its capacity to provide roads and electricity to its citizens and a police force that responded to women's complaints about domestic violence.

Within Afghanistan itself, while there were considerable restrictions on women's freedom of movement in the public domain, exposure to television and interactions with women beyond the confines of kinship through their economic activities and association with microfinance organisations had brought about a greater awareness about an emerging discourse of women's rights in the public domain. None of the women in our sample had ever sought to actually take their grievances to the newly established Independent Commission of Human Rights, but some viewed its presence as a restraint on men's misuse of their power.

The Bangladesh story was very different. Here women had acquired a greater say in their own lives and relationships as a result of the purposive strategy of organisations that also sought to transform them into active citizens. With the support of these organisations, women were able to use their knowledge of their rights as citizens to counter unfair verdicts issued by informal justice mechanisms within their communities, to bring to light the corrupt practices of government officials and to challenge the efforts of local elites to exploit their labour. Their successes on

these fronts in turn strengthened their sense of citizenship, making it more difficult for men in their families and local power holders to violate their rights with the kind of impunity they had enjoyed in the past.

CONCLUSION

While the varying efforts of women in Bangladesh and Afghanistan to renegotiate rather than reject the patriarchal structures that governed their lives raise important questions about the universality of values of individual rights and personal choice, they also throw doubt on ideas about justice that are grounded in some unchanging and internally coherent notion of "community". If liberal arguments for justice are premised on false universalism, the cultural relativist case rests on an equally false essentialism. Both accounts need to be historically grounded.

Liberal ideas about individual rights did not always exist in Western societies. They emerged in the course of their transition from communities based on custom and relational constructions of personhood to communities based on contract and individualised notions of personhood (Fraser and Gordon, 1994). While both Bangladesh and Afghanistan are societies in which family and kinship continue to play a dominant role in structuring social relations, they are also societies undergoing considerable change. In both contexts, we are seeing a gradual transition from doxa to discourse as some of the taken-for-granted aspects of social life are opened up to re-evaluation through the prism of alternative possibilities. In listening to the voices raised by

women to protest against the unfairness of patriarchal structures as they have experienced them, we do not have to choose between an authentic local voice and an imported Western feminism. These are voices of protest grounded in local experience and articulated in local idioms in societies which are not hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world.

In her measured responses to Western claims to “save” Afghan women from patriarchal oppression, first through invasion and then through development, Abu-Lughod (2002) raised the question that others cited have also raised: are emancipation, equality and rights part of some universal discourse of justice to which we must all subscribe? She suggests that there may be other values, such as closeness with family and cultivation of piety, to which women in different parts of the world may give greater priority: “they might be called to personhood, so to speak, in a different language” (p. 788). While her concerns are addressed to the neo-colonial attitudes to Muslim women she has encountered among many Western feminists, the research cited in this paper reminds us that Muslim societies are not internally homogeneous: different pathways to personhood can co-exist within them. Gender justice surely requires societies that can accommodate these multiple pathways, the pious and the secular, the individual and the collective, without necessarily privileging one or negating the other.

In any case, the search for gender justice cannot be divorced from the larger question of social justice. Gender is not the only source of injustice in a society. Oriya Brahmin constructions of gender and family life position the women in Menon’s sample as

the privileged caste in an oppressive caste hierarchy in which men and women occupying the lowest position are deemed “untouchable” because of the lowliness of their birth. The various practices that Oriya Brahmin men and women undertake to “refine” themselves by regulating their contact with the outside world also represent their efforts to protect themselves from polluting contact with the lower castes. Women’s active compliance with these practices serves to defend and reproduce both caste distinctions between the higher “twice born” castes and the unclean lower castes and gender distinctions that see women’s bodies as more polluted, and polluting, than those of men.

The fact that individualism in the ontological sense, the claim that a society is made up of atomised individuals and is no more than the sum of these individuals, has little traction in societies such as those discussed in this paper does not rule out the value of an *ethical* individualism, the recognition that certain basic rights and duties are defined in relation to the individual and rests on the equal humanity of all individuals (Robeyns, 2003). A commitment to the fundamental equality of all individuals on the grounds of their common humanity is perfectly compatible with a worldview that recognises the connections between people, the socially embedded nature of their identities and experiences. It must also be fundamental to any understanding of justice.

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NOTAS

1. Breno Bringel es profesor adjunto del Instituto de Estudios Sociales y Políticos de la Universidad del Estado de Río de Janeiro (Brasil). Doctor en Ciencias Políticas por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, donde fue profesor del Departamento de Ciencia Política III. Enara Echart Muñoz es profesora de la Universidad Federal del Estado de Río de Janeiro (Brasil), es doctora en Relaciones Internacionales e investigadora asociada al Instituto Universitario de Desarrollo y Cooperación de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

2. Esa convocatoria se puede encontrar en: http://palabra.ezln.org.mx/comunicados/1996/1996_06_09.htm

3. Los principios que guían esta Acción Global de los Pueblos se pueden consultar en: http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/es/pgainfos/hallmspa.htm

4. Esa fuerte presencia de la sociedad civil marcó un hito para el protagonismo social en los debates internacionales sobre desarrollo. La Declaración del Foro ilustra bien la tensión generada en torno a la apropiación discursiva de la sostenibilidad: “Rechazamos enérgicamente que el concepto de desarrollo sustentable sea transformado en mera categoría económica, restringido al empleo de nuevas tecnologías y subordinado a cada nuevo producto del mercado. Permitir esto significa garantizar la continuación de la pobreza y la riqueza estructurales, emergentes del modelo de civilización dominante que denunciamos”. La Declaración está disponible en http://www.eurosur.org/NGONET/tr924.htm

5. Este debate continúa con fuerza veinte años después de la Cumbre de Rio-92 (Svampa, 2008; Porto-Gonçalves, 2012; experiencias del Buen Vivir, etc.).

6. Cabe reconocer que las ONG más críticas están tratando de distanciarse del rol meramente gestor que el sistema de cooperación habitualmente les

otorga, para reclamar una agenda alternativa de cooperación internacional. Un ejemplo, en este sentido, en el ámbito español es el manifiesto *Movimientos sociales y cooperación crítica*, en el que se resalta la importancia del enfoque estructural, la agencia de los movimientos sociales y la búsqueda de la emancipación. Está disponible en http://mmssycooperacioncritica.wordpress.com/manifiesto-2/

7. La propia categoría de "afectados", que da nombre al Movimiento de Afectados por las Represas de Brasil (miembro de la más amplia Red Latinoamericana contra las Represas) o a la Articulación internacional de los Afectados por la Vale, muestra como la fractura desarrollista está directamente asociada al surgimiento de varios movimientos sociales contemporáneos y a su articulación identitaria.

8. In *Social Text*, nº 31/32, Third World and Post-Colonial Issues (1992), pp. 20-56, Duke University Press.

9. The literature reviewed in this paper refers primarily to Latin America. India is another important place of scholarly and political production on social movements and grassroots mobilization. See for instance Shet (1987), Kothari (1987), and Shiva (1989).

10. "There are times in life", Foucault goes on to say, "when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all" (1985: 8). The Third World seems to have reached this point in relation to development.

11. "The power of the [modem] language [of emancipation] has become so enormous that nearly all dissent within the modern world and the modernized Third World has to be cast in the language, to be heard or taken seriously.... Attempts to introduce the language of liberation to those who do not speak it, as a precondition for the latter qualifying for what the modems call liberation, is a travesty of even the normatives of the modem concept of liberation" (Nandy, 1989: 267, 268).

12. "To commit a discourse to speak from within a given consciousness is to disarm it insofar as its critical faculty is made inoperative thereby with regard to that particular consciousness. For no criticism can be fully activated unless its object is distanced from its agency... All this goes to show that no discourse can oppose a genuinely uncompromising critique to a ruling culture so long as its ideological parameters are the same as those of that very culture. Where then does criticism come from? *From outside the universe of dominance which provides the critique with its object*, *indeed from another and historically antagonistic universe* (Guha 1989: 215, 220). Although a purely antagonistic universe probably does not exist, Guha's comment should serve as a guide for cultural critique generally.

13. "Market-friendly development" is the new strategy launched by the World

Bank for the 1990s. See World Bank 1991.

14. "Reflection shows us that our image of happiness is thoroughly colored by the time to which the course of our own existence has assigned us… There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a *weak* Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply. Historical materialists are aware of that" (Benjamin 1969: 253-254).

15. "[T]he substitution of one formation by another is not necessarily carried out at the level of the most general or most easily formalized statements. Only a serial method, as used today by historians, allows us to construct a series around a single point and to seek out other series which might prolong this point in different directions, on the level of other points. There is always a point in space or time when series begin to diverge and become redistributed in a new space, and it is at this point that the break takes place...when a new formation appears, with new roles and series, it never comes all at once, in a single phrase or act of creation, but emerges like a series of 'building blocks', with gaps, traces and reactivations of former elements that survive under the new rule… One must pursue the different series, travel along the different levels, and cross all thresholds" (Deleuze, 1988: 20-21).

16. The analysis of social movements in this section refers primarily lo Latin America, where discussions on this topic took off with full force in the early 1980s. The 1983 special issue of *Nueva Sociedad* (1983) on "New Forms of Doing Politics" and David Slater's volume (1985) were very influential in the early discussions. Two of the essays in this last volume (those by Laclau and Evers) were widely read in Latin America in Spanish and Portuguese versions. The literature on social movements and new social movements produced since then is already too vast 10be listed here. For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Escobar and Alvarez, eds. 1992.

17. Although the term new social movements became a common concept in the 19808, many scholars now prefer to use simply "social movements", given the fact that many of so-called new social movements are not new any more. Some still prefer to refer to movements such as the ecology, gay and women's movements as new. For a critique of the concept of new social movements, see Melucci, 1988b. Melucci advocates abandoning the term.

18. Cardoso is emphatic in this respect: "It is easy to see that, in this construction, what is new is defined only by contrast with the old; thus, instead of providing definitions of both regimes we merely classify them as distinct and opposed to each other. This operation might make possible the construction of a mobilizing discourse, yet it limits our capacity for

explanation" (p. 28). This and other translations from the Spanish and Portuguese are my own.

19. For general theories of crises, see Habermas, 1973; O'Connor, 1987; Taylor, 1985. The political economy of crisis is studied by Amin *et al*. 1982; O'Connor 1984. For the Latin American case, see Rama, 1986; CLACSO, 1987.

20. Included in the study are Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Ecuador, Perú, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile and Paraguay. The most important movements studied in each country include human rights and youth movements; urban popular movements; women's movements; new workers' movements: student and ethnic movements; church and ecology movements; and regional, civic and neighbourhood movements.

21. One should also point out that it is still European theories (with their abstractness, systematicity and completeness) that are accorded greater prestige in the international division of intellectual labor in many circles. At this level (postmodern epistemological pluralism notwithstanding) the division of the world between epistemological centres and peripheries (as seen from the centre) still has some validity. Latin American production often does not have the "right" epistemological characteristics to be elevated to the rank of "grand theory". Social movement discourse is another case in point. But the same problem can be seen from the perspective of the politics of the location and travel of theories and theorists (Said, 1983; Clifford, 1989). The "scramble of locations" in contemporary theoretical production not only challenges the West's position as the "natural" home of theory, but also entails reshufflings of centers and peripheries; for instance, for Touraine, Laclau and Mouffe, and Castells, Latin America—where all of them have spent many years—has become a "center" of theories and insights. In this travel of theories and theorists in the post-colonial context, the West is partly reproduced as the site of enunciation, but also displaced and resisted. Yet in important ways Third World intellectuals, while trying to extricate themselves from the West, do remain bound to it in complex ways: they still share, to a greater or lesser extent, the theoretical imaginary of the West. Yet theoretical production today cannot be seen in simple terms, as produced in one part and applied in another, but rather as a process of multiple conversations in a discontinuous terrain (Mani, 1989).

22. Such a distinction is already evident in Laclau's preliminary application of his model to Latin America in the Slater volume (1985).

23. On the question of modernity and postmodernity, see the excellent collection by Calderón (Calderón, ed, 1988). See also Quijano, 1988; Lechner 1988; García Canclini, 1990; Sarlo, 1991; Yúdice, Franco & Flores, 1992. For a review of some of these works, see Montaldo, 1991.

24. Six volumes of *Subaltern Studies* have been published by Oxford

University Press (Delhi) under the general direction of Ranajit Guha. See also Guha and Spivak, eds., 1988; Guha, 1983.

25. The distinction between arborescent and rhizomic forms is made by Deleuze and Guattari (1987).

26. Examples of nomad sciences are, for instance, metallurgy (as opposed to material science or mechanical engineering), and alchemy (as opposed to chemistry, its "royal" counterpart). Philosophy and most other sciences are of the State type, although they may occasionally produce "nomad" forms (e.g., Nietzsche, Kleist).

27. On the notion of autopoiesis, see the work of the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980, 1987). On the notion of self-organization, see Jantsch (1980), Prigogine and Stengers (1984). Piscitelli (1988) has also suggested the significance of autopoiesis for understanding social movements.

28. A similar notion guides a recent analysis of the struggle over language needs by Latinos (Flores and Yúdice, 1990). It is in this terrain, these authors contend, that Latinos can be seen as constituting a social movement in the United States today.

29. The link between "needs" and ideologies of help and philantropy is explored by Gronemayer (1992). Here is a vignette from Gronemayer's article, which she quotes from Thoreau's *Walden:* "If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life...for fear that I should get some of his good done to me" (Thoreau, 1977: 328; quoted in Gronemayer, 1992: 53). The Alliance for Progress, aid and development as a whole are, of course, based on this ideology of "doing good" To others, the "needy" people of the Third World.

30. Aprobada y adoptada en São Paulo, el 9 de abril de 2001, por las entidades que constituyen el Comité de Organización del Foro Social Mundial. Aprobada con modificaciones por el Consejo Internacional del Foro Social Mundial el día 10 de junio de 2001.

31. El presente artículo es una versión ampliada y actualizada del texto presentado en el seminario "Interrogating the Civil Society Agenda" en la Universidad de Massachussets, Amhers, abril de 2008, publicado en el libro M. Svampa, *Cambio de época. Movimientos sociales y poder político*, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI, agosto de 2008, bajo el título, "La disputa por el desarrollo. Territorios y lenguajes de valoración".

32. Investigadora independiente del Conicet, Argentina.

33. Para una presentación véase Prébisch (1964), Furtado (1964). Para una crítica más general de la teoría del desarrollo, véase Bustelo (1999) y

Nahon *et al.* (2004).

34. Retomamos la idea de “concepto límite” desarrollado por M.A.Garretón, y que hace alusión a las problemáticas centrales que ha unificado el pensamiento (como la idea de desarrollo, revolución y democracia, entre otros). En la actualidad, Garretón señala la ausencia de una problemática central (esto es, de un concepto límite) en las ciencias sociales actuales. Véase “Las ciencias sociales en América Latina en una mirada comparativa”, G. de Sierra, Garretón, M., Miguel Murmis y H. Trindade.

35. El ejemplo más claro fue la creación del Centro Internacional para el Arreglo de Diferendos Relativos a Inversiones (CIADI), dependiente del Banco Mundial.

36. Cartera de proyectos de infraestructura de transporte, energía y comunicaciones consensuada por varios gobiernos latinoamericanos en el marco de la *Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana* (IIRSA). Para el tema, véase Aguilar, Ceceña y Motto (2007).

37. Para Harvey, el actual modelo de acumulación implica cada vez más la mercantilización y la depredación, entre otras cosas, de los bienes ambientales. La acumulación por desposesión (lo que Marx denominaba la “acumulación originaria”) ha desplazado en centralidad a la dinámica ligada a la “reproducción ampliada del capital”. “El nuevo imperialismo: Acumulación por desposesión”, *Socialist Register*, 2004, en bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/social/harvey.pdf

38. La reprimarización de la economía va de la mano con la coexistencia de otros modelos de desarrollo. Así, por ejemplo, nadie podría negar la importancia del modelo industrial, junto con el de agronegocios, en un país como Brasil. En menor escala, algo similar sucede en Argentina, con la reactivación de la industria, posterior a 2004 (y anterior a la crisis económica internacional).

39. Resulta importante aclarar a qué tipo de minería hacemos referencia cuando hablamos de nueva minería o minería a gran escala. Aún si las consecuencias económicas pueden ser homologadas, lejos estamos de aquella minería de socavón, propia de épocas anteriores, cuando los metales afluían en grandes vetas, desde el fondo de las galerías subterráneas. En la actualidad, los metales, cada vez más escasos, se encuentran en estado de diseminación, y solo pueden ser extraídos a través de nuevas tecnologías, luego de producir grandes voladuras de montañas por dinamitación, a partir de la utilización de sustancias químicas (cianuro, ácido sulfúrico, mercurio, entre otros) para disolver (lixiviar) los metales del mineral que los contiene. En suma, lo particular de este tipo de minería (a cielo abierto), diferente de la tradicional, es que implica niveles aún mayores de afectación del medio ambiente, generando cuantiosos pasivos ambientales, al tiempo que requiere tanto un uso

desmesurado de recursos, entre ellos el agua y la energía, ambos imprescindibles para sus operaciones, como asimismo, intervenir de manera violenta la geografía de los territorios para la explotación.

40. Como señala Bebbington (2007), ya en el período 1990-1997, mientras la inversión en exploración minera a nivel mundial creció un 90%, en América Latina, creció 400%. En consonancia con ello, durante los ´90, la mayor parte de los países latinoamericanos involucrados, llevó a cabo una profunda reforma del marco regulatorio, para conceder amplios beneficios a las grandes empresas transnacionales, que ya vienen operando a escala global. Dicha reforma fue respaldada por diferentes organismos internacionales (Banco Mundial, BID, entre otros), a fin de facilitar, promover y garantizar el auge regional de la nueva minería.

41. Esta dimensión material y simbólica, muchas veces comprendida como *autoorganización comunitaria*, aparece como uno de los rasgos constitutivos de los movimientos sociales en América Latina, tanto de los movimientos campesinos, muchos de ellos de corte étnico, como de los movimientos urbanos, que asocian su lucha a la defensa de la tierra y/o a la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas.

42. Tomamos la expresión de J. Martínez Allier (2004).

43. La consulta popular realizada en 2003 obtuvo el 81% de los votos en contra de la instalación del emprendimiento minero, y desembocó en la primera ley provincial de prohibición de este tipo de minería en Argentina.

44. Para el tema, véase Svampa, Sola Alvarez y Bottaro, “Los movimientos contra la minería a cielo abierto en Argentina. Entre el “efecto Esquel” y el “efecto La Alumbrera”, en Svampa, M y Antonelli, M. (eds.), *Minería Transnacional*, *narrativas del desarrollo y resistencias sociales*, Buenos Aires, Biblos-UNGS, 2009.

45. Sassen (2007) propone el concepto de “multiescalaridad” para hacer referencia a la reformulación de escalas en los diversos procesos de globalización.

46. Ruano de la Fuente (2002). Asimismo, ver De Sousa Santos (2007) y Antonelli (2007).

47. E. Dagnino, “Confluencia perversa, deslocamentos de sentido, crise discursiva”, en A. Grimson (comp.), *La cultura en las crisis latinoamericanas*, Buenos Aires, Clacso, 2007.

48. F. Ramírez y A. Minteguiaga, “El nuevo tiempo del Estado. La política posneoliberal del correísmo”, *Revista OSAL 22*, CLACSO, Buenos Aires, 2007.

49. Acosta presentó su renuncia a mediados de 2008, en razón de sus

desacuerdos con el presidente Correa.

50. En un caso inédito de censura, en marzo de 2009, el presidente Rafael Correa retiró la personería jurídica de Acción Ecológica, una ONG de larga trayectoria y sólidos trabajos en la defensa de los recursos naturales, con múltiples vínculos con movimientos campesinos-indígenas. Véase www.accionecologica.org

51. “Las tres fronteras del gobierno de Evo Morales”, en *Bolivia: Memoria*, *Insurgencia y Movimientos Sociales*. compilación realizada por M. Svampa y P. Stefanoni, Editorial El Colectivo-Osal (Clacso), 2007.

52. En un contexto de rentabilidad extraordinaria para el sector agrario, a fines de 2007, con un objetivo recaudatorio y fiscalista, la nueva presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007) aumentó las retenciones de las exportaciones de las mineras, hidrocarburos y productos agrícolas. En marzo de 2008, anunció un nuevo aumento de las retenciones al agro, elevándolo al 44%. Estas medidas generaron un enfrentamiento entre el Gobierno y los diferentes sectores organizados del campo, que agrupó de manera inédita tanto a las grandes organizaciones rurales como a aquellas representantes de los pequeños productores. Dicho conflicto —que reactualizó peligrosamente los viejos antagonismos binarios de orden clasista y racistas, implicó el bloqueo de numerosas rutas del país que paralizaron al país durante casi cuatro meses, dejando a las grandes ciudades al borde del desabastecimiento.

53. Para el tema, véase R.Gargarella y M.Svampa, “Disparen sobre Gualeguaychú”, *Página 12*, 22/01/2009, disponible en www.maristellasvampa.net/blog

54. In *Ethics and Social Welfare*, 6:3, pp. 216-232, doi: 10.1080/17496535.2012.704055

55. Naila Kabeer is Professor of Development Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. She has been involved in research, teaching and advisory work in the field of gender and development, with a special focus on poverty, livelihoods, labour markets, social exclusion and citizenship. Correspondence to: Naila Kabeer, SOAS, University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square London WC1H 0XG, UK; email: nk34@soas.ac.uk

CAPÍTULO 8

¿SUPERANDO EL DESARROLLO? POSTDESARROLLO, PARADIGMA DECOLONIAL Y BUEN VIVIR

NOÉ CORNAGO[1]

A comienzos de la década de 1990, los estudios de desarrollo se presentaban como un ámbito de formación e investigación internacional consolidado, en constante crecimiento y de creciente influencia en la agenda política internacional. El desmoronamiento del llamado socialismo real, una nueva oleada de transiciones a la democracia liberal y el ascenso de los nuevos países industrializados, trajo consigo, tras el inevitable periodo de desconcierto, un nuevo consenso. Auspiciado por el Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) e inmediatamente asumido por todas las agencias oficiales de desarrollo, así como por lo que se dio en llamar la “cooperación no gubernamental”, el llamado “enfoque desarrollo humano” se convirtió rápidamente en la nueva corriente principal. Ese nuevo consenso, apoyado en un nuevo enfoque de medición del desarrollo, que combinaba elementos descriptivos y prescriptivos de una manera atractiva e innovadora, reclamaba como nunca la atención de la opinión pública y parecía catalizar, tanto entre las

elites políticas como en el seno de nuevos movimientos de solidaridad internacional, una nueva determinación política para que cuestiones tales como la lucha contra la pobreza, la promoción de la igualdad de género, o la sostenibilidad medioambiental, se situaran en el centro de la nueva agenda política global.

Paradójicamente, justo cuando ese nuevo consenso parecía demostrar la madurez de los estudios de desarrollo, un conjunto de aportaciones inicialmente dispersas, y que bebían de fuentes muy dispares, vendrá a configurar un desafío inesperadamente radical. Nos referimos a un conjunto de aportaciones que fueron catalizando en lo que podemos agrupar como teorías del postdesarrollo (Rahnemna y Bawtree, 1997; Ziai, 2007). Aunque su nombre no siempre es asociado al surgimiento de este enfoque, fue seguramente el filósofo griego Cornelius Castoriadis el primero en denunciar, en el sentido que nos ocupa, lo que ya en 1977 llamaba el "mito del desarrollo". Anticipándose a los que casi dos décadas más tarde se conocerá como teorías del postdesarrollo, Castoriadis (1980) nos invitaba a "[…] denunciar y destruir la ideología racionalista, la ilusión de la omnipotencia, la supremacía del cálculo económico, el absurdo y la incoherencia de la organización racional de la nueva sociedad, la nueva religión de la ciencia, la idea del desarrollo por el desarrollo".

El planteamiento que representa Castoriadis, al igual que el de otros destacados pioneros como Fals Borda (1968), Mudimbe (1988) o Nandy (1983 y 1990), encontrará un fértil campo de cultivo en el ambiente intelectual particularmente receptivo a los

enfoques postestructuralistas, asociados a la obra de pensadores franceses como Foucault o Derrida, entre otros, que se extenderá rápidamente por los ámbitos más dispares del saber, y que alcanzarán una extraordinaria influencia, particularmente en el mundo anglosajón, tal y como se observa en el texto de Aran Ziai (2007). Ese conjunto de influencias acabará confluyendo en la adopción de un ángulo particularmente revelador en el estudio de los obstáculos a los que se enfrenta la comprensión de la problemática del desarrollo global: el ámbito de sus representaciones. La problemática del desarrollo, en efecto, como cualquier otra realidad social, apela a un conjunto de dimensiones de orden material que no podemos ignorar, en forma de condiciones ecológicas, organización social, instituciones políticas, estructura económica, movimientos de personas, acceso a la educación y la salud, y otros muchos aspectos que, aunque no siempre se muestran accesibles con carácter inmediato, no resulta difícil identificar. Sin embargo, y esto es lo que nos interesa subrayar aquí, la problemática del desarrollo, y las formas de su conocimiento a escala global, se configuran también, adquiriendo diversas formas específicas, a partir del conjunto de representaciones que, sobre las condiciones del mundo y sobre sus expectativas de transformación, nos ofrecen constantemente los medios de comunicación, la publicidad, la industria del entretenimiento, el discurso de las organizaciones internacionales, o las propias ciencias sociales. Todas esas representaciones subjetivas acaban configurando, objetivamente, los imaginarios sociales y, en definitiva, la forma en que la población percibe los problemas

del mundo, sus causas y las opciones disponibles para construir un mundo mejor. El estudio de la genealogía de esas representaciones (Arifin, 1997; Rist, 1997; Mbembe, 2000) y la crítica de su impacto en la propia realidad serán uno de los objetivos fundamentales de las teorías de postdesarrollo. Todo ello acabará dando forma a una mirada crítica que en su argumento principal no resulta difícil enunciar. La teoría del desarrollo, tal y como se había desarrollado durante la guerra fría y durante el proceso de descolonización, más que un campo de especialización propiamente dicho del mundo del saber, fue siempre más bien un instrumento de recolonización, cuyas complejas formulaciones teóricas fueron creadas no tanto para el debate teórico entre estudiantes y docentes como para emplearse con ellos en la mano, en una sorda disputa de poder. En otras palabras, que la teoría del desarrollo, antes incluso de que se plasmara en grandes o pequeños proyectos, y que sus expertos empezaran a trabajar sobre el terreno, fue siempre "práctica", en la medida en que su propio discurso, operando aseguraba a la vez un "hacer" (Escobar, 1995; Rist, 1997; Ziai, 2007).

El planteamiento anterior acabará produciendo una renovación muy notable en los estudios del desarrollo en un contexto en el que el rápido ascenso de la teoría postcolonial, y la difusión de la obra de otros destacados críticos de las formas de violencia asociadas a la expansión colonial de la modernidad occidental (Nandy, 1983), encontraron poco a poco un considerable eco internacional, inicialmente en el ámbito intelectual francés (Latouche, 1991; Rist *et al.*, 1992; Rist, 1996; Latouche, 1991),

pero también en Alemania (Sachs, 1992; Sontag, 1994), Reino Unido (Edwards, 1989; Slater, 1992), o Estados Unidos (Apffel y Apffel, 1990; Manzo, 1992; Hobart, 1993; Doty, 1996), lo que ofrece una idea de su rápida difusión. Todos ellos podrían suscribir el párrafo que reproducimos a continuación:

La civilización europea se entiende a sí misma como la más desarrollada y la superior, y este *ethos* de supremacía la induce a civilizar, elevar y educar las civilizaciones y culturas más primitivas, bárbaras y subdesarrolladas. La senda para alcanzar tal progreso y desarrollo debe ser la misma que siguió Europa […] y en aquellos casos donde el primitivo se opone al proceso civilizador, los portadores de la modernidad están justificados en última instancia si recurren a la violencia necesaria para remover cualquier obstáculo al desarrollo y la modernización. Esta violencia que produce víctimas puede tomar un carácter casi ritual, en el sentido de que el "héroe civilizatorio" confiere a sus víctimas el carácter de participantes en un proceso de sacrificio redentor. Por consiguiente, desde el punto de vista de la modernidad occidental, el primitivo o bárbaro está en un estado de culpa por resistirse al proceso civilizador; y esto le permite entonces a los portadores de la modernidad apresentarse a sí mismos como los emancipadores o redentores (Slater, 1996: 24).

Pero, sin lugar a dudas, es en América Latina donde una particular combinación de las influencias anteriores, con la importante tradición del pensamiento crítico latinoamericano y, poco después, una nueva atención a la relevancia de la

cosmovisión indígena ancestral para la comprensión de los problemas de tiempo presente, donde surgirán las formulaciones más acabadas y atractivas del postdesarrollo. En particular, junto a las contribuciones pioneras de Fals Borda (1968) o Esteva (1992), será el colombiano Escobar (1995) quien ofrecerá la contribución más relevante e influyente del enfoque del postdesarrollo en su obra *La invención del desarrollo*. En 2012, el propio Escobar resume el propósito último de su proyecto en los siguientes términos:

En general, el "postdesarrollo" surgió de una crítica postestructuralista, es decir, un análisis del desarrollo como conjunto de discursos y prácticas que tuvo un impacto profundo en la manera en que Asia, África y América Latina llegaron a ser consideradas como "subdesarrolladas" y tratadas como tales. En este contexto, el postdesarrollo estaba destinado a designar por lo menos tres cosas interrelacionadas: primero, la necesidad de descentrar el desarrollo, es decir, de desplazarlo de su posición central en las representaciones y discusiones sobre las condiciones en Asia, África y América Latina. Un corolario de esta primera meta era abrir el espacio discursivo a otras formas de describir esas condiciones, menos mediada por las premisas y las experiencias del "desarrollo". Segundo, en el desplazamiento de la centralidad del desarrollo en el imaginario discursivo, el postdesarrollo sugería que efectivamente era posible pensar en el fin del desarrollo. En otras palabras, identificaba alternativas al desarrollo, en lugar de alternativas de desarrollo, como una posibilidad concreta. Tercero, el

postdesarrollo enfatizó la importancia de la transformación de la "economía política de la verdad", es decir, del orden del conocimiento y poder experto del desarrollo. Con este fin, propone que las ideas más útiles acerca de las alternativas podrían ser obtenidas de los conocimientos y prácticas de los movimientos sociales (Escobar, 2012).

Aunque el propio Escobar se pregunta sin responder de manera plenamente conclusiva sobre el efecto que dicho proyecto pudo tener, resulta incuestionable que su obra tuvo el acierto de impulsar, en suma, una renovación radical del pensamiento y de la práctica del desarrollo, en la que la crítica del modelo de desarrollo occidental habrá de confluir una cierta reformulación latinoamericana de la teoría postcolonial, entendida no solo como crítica del discurso de la literatura, las artes o las narrativas de la historia, al modo en que por entonces se entendían en el mundo anglosajón (Ashcroft *et al.*, 1994), sino como esfuerzo activo por operar la descolonización de las formas del saber y del hacer. Ese impulso acabará encontrando, después, dos reformulaciones consecutivas; primero en la adopción de una cierta solución de compromiso entre la aproximación holística de la teoría de los sistemas-mundo y la recuperación y revalorización de la cosmovisión indígena, que acabará dando forma primero a la llamada teoría "decolonial" (Grosfoguel, 2004; Mignolo, 2007; Castro-Gómez y Grosfoguel, 2007). Más recientemente, de la mano de los procesos de transformación que habrán de registrarse en Bolivia y Ecuador, la sensibilidad postdesarrollista adopta un nuevo planteamiento

abiertamente práctico que será finalmente enunciado como “Buen Vivir” (Acosta y Martínez, 2010; Walsh, 2010; Gudynas y Acosta, 2011; Houtart, 2011). Esa orientación práctica es expresada por algunos de sus proponentes más notables en los siguientes términos:

El Buen Vivir es un concepto… todavía en construcción. Sus diferentes expresiones comparten una plataforma política común, basada en aspectos como el rechazo al desarrollismo, una ética propia (que reconoce por ejemplo los valores intrínsecos en la Naturaleza), una actitud decolonial, y la búsqueda de alternativas al desarrollo. El Buen Vivir, en tanto concepto plural y en construcción, discurre en el campo de los debates teóricos, pero también avanza en las prácticas, sea en aquella de los pueblos indígenas y en los movimientos sociales, como en la construcción política, dando sus primeros pasos en las recientes constituciones de Bolivia y Ecuador. Más allá de la diversidad de posturas al interior del Buen Vivir, aparecen elementos unificadores claves, tales como el cuestionamiento al desarrollo entendido como progreso o el reclamo de otra relación con la Naturaleza. El Buen Vivir no es, entonces, un desarrollo alternativo más dentro de una larga lista de opciones, sino que se presenta como una alternativa a todas esas posturas (Gudynas y Acosta, 2011: 72).

De este modo, a diferencia de los enfoques originales del postdesarrollo, incluso aquellos surgidos de la realidad de América Latina, los proponentes del Buen Vivir proclaman

orgullosos que el Estado ya no es necesariamente el enemigo de las clases populares. Que, por el contrario, cabe esperar de sus estructuras constitucionales y administrativas, y sobre todo del liderazgo de sus políticos, una nueva alianza con los mismos movimientos sociales que hace apenas unas décadas afirmaba la necesidad de su contestación radical (Dinerstein y Deneuilin, 2012). Surge así el aspecto más controvertido de la evolución teórico-práctica de la crítica del postdesarrollo, entendida como crítica a la racionalidad depredadora occidental. Un aspecto sobre el que el texto de Philipp Altman ofrece un balance particularmente interesante desde una sensibilidad próxima a lo que el Buen Vivir representa, que sin embargo evita adoptar el tono autocelebratorio del que los autores más representativos de este enfoque no siempre logran escapar (Altman, 2013).

El postdesarrollo por tanto, en sus diferentes y sucesivas enunciaciones, es un lugar de encuentro donde se alzan voces airadas que denuncian a la industria del desarrollo, como responsable de aquellas gigantescas inversiones y costosísimos proyectos que acabaron agravando durante décadas los mismos problemas que decían resolver, mediante el despliegue de la “máquina del desarrollo” (Ferguson, 1990), con su invariable despliegue de teóricos ensoberbecidos, expertos planificadores, turistas irresponsables, cooperantes inmaduros y empresarios ventajistas, que con sus discursos, libros e informes, postales y contratos, habrían inventado primero el “subdesarrollo”, imponiendo después, por doquier, como modelo para armar, una mala caricatura del modelo occidental. Así, se habría empezado por definir el subdesarrollo, como un problema cuya solución

dependía de la aplicación de un conocimiento “experto”, que, aplicado a la modificación de los modos de vivir, era también un instrumento de poder. Resulta incuestionable que, en esa lucha, la parte más débil se vio obligada por su parte a reaccionar, como antes debió hacerlo frente al colonizador, desarrollando diferentes tácticas de resistencia frente al poder, recurriendo, frente aquellos personajes, verdaderos comisarios del desarrollo, a diversas fórmulas retóricas y estrategias de supervivencia dirigidas a mantener su forma de vida y su dignidad. Moldeando la percepción de los problemas y asegurando su representación, la ideología del desarrollo habría moldeado las conciencias de los pueblos y condicionado sus formas de vida, tal y como el colonialismo lo hizo con anterioridad. Sin embargo, a frente a tan impresionantes y depredadores logros, no queda claro el potencial que el postdesarrollo, en sus diversas enunciaciones, pueda ofrecer (Masullo, 2012; Bennet, 2012; Andrews y Bawa, 2014). Bien al contrario, con su redescubrimiento del Estado como promotor del Buen Vivir, puede decirse que el postdesarrollo, apenas emprendía su camino, ha vuelto en cierto modo, y paradójicamente, a la posición inicial (Ziai, 2007; Frangie, 2011; Pieck, 2011).

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Lectura 1

Más allá del desarrollo: postdesarrollo y transiciones hacia el pluriverso[2]

Arturo Escobar

1. INTRODUCCIÓN

Han pasado más de quince años desde que este libro fue publicado por primera vez. Mis esperanzas e intenciones para escribirlo no han cambiado; por el contrario, se han fortalecido desde su publicación. El análisis crítico del desarrollo es tan oportuno y relevante hoy como lo era entonces. En muchas partes del mundo, el “desarrollo” sigue siendo una importante fuerza social y cultural a la cual enfrentar. Significativas batallas políticas se libran en su nombre, y la vida de muchos y los

medios de subsistencia de las personas todavía están en juego en estas batallas. Y decenas de profesionales, aunque quizá en menor número en 2010 en comparación con 1995, en particular en Estados Unidos, ganan su vida en el mundo del desarrollo y activamente debaten el tema en salas de juntas y reuniones del personal de los proyectos de desarrollo en los países donantes y receptores. Por último, pero no menos importante, de nuevo con un entusiasmo un tanto disminuido en los Estados Unidos, son todavía abundantes los académicos —antropólogos, entre ellos — que escriben tesis doctorales y presentan ponencias sobre tal o cual aspecto del desarrollo. Sobre todo, el ímpetu político que me movió a escribir sobre "la invención de desarrollo" y a imaginar una "era postdesarrollo" a finales de los ochenta y principios de los noventa todavía está muy presente: el hecho es que, como yo lo veo, el "desarrollo" sigue desempeñando un papel importante en las estrategias de dominación cultural y social, incluso si los académicos podrían tener hoy una visión más matizada de cómo estas estrategias operan, incluso de cómo la gente se apropia del desarrollo para sus propios fines. Por supuesto, mis propias opiniones sobre el tema han cambiado en aspectos importantes, como explicaré en detalle en las páginas que siguen.

La parte I de este capítulo analiza las transformaciones más significativas en la vida social a nivel global que tienen relación directa con el desarrollo. Estos incluyen cambios en el nivel de la economía política, así como el surgimiento de nuevos actores y ámbitos de acción. La parte II plantea la cuestión de la relevancia de la noción de "postdesarrollo". Esta idea, propuesta

inicialmente en la década del noventa, ¿sigue siendo útil, o incluso válida, para transmitir tanto el descentramiento del desarrollo como una reorientación de los imaginarios y prácticas hacia nuevas posibilidades concernientes a Asia, África y América Latina? Si no, ¿puede ser re-formulada?, ¿debería serlo?, ¿cómo? Esta parte examina brevemente las principales tendencias en los estudios críticos del desarrollo de los últimos quince años, incluyendo los novedosos enfoques etnográficos, de economía política y postestructuralistas. La parte III introduce la idea de "discursos de la transición". A raíz de las crisis combinadas de alimentos, energía, clima y pobreza, estos discursos de la transición —particularmente prominentes en las áreas de la ecología, la cultura y la espiritualidad— pueden ser concebidos como marcadores para el postdesarrollo, o como desafíos a la modernidad en general. La parte IV analiza brevemente algunas propuestas concretas en boga en América Latina, que podrían ser consideradas como una contribución a las prácticas y los discursos de la transición, tales como la lucha sin precedentes en torno a los derechos de la naturaleza y la definición del desarrollo en términos de *Buen Vivir* (bienestar integral y colectivo). Estas tendencias se ven unidas a cuestiones ontológicas y enactuando potencialmente la idea de avanzar hacia un pluriverso, en el sentido de crear las condiciones para la coexistencia de múltiples mundos interconectados. En esta sección se introduce la idea de pasar del mundo como universo al mundo como pluriverso. La conclusión aboga por el desarrollo de un campo de la transición y de los estudios pluriversales anclados en una visión de la

Tierra como un todo viviente siempre emergente. En vez de basarse en la llamada “globalización”, este campo fomentaría el descubrimiento y la imaginación de formas de planetarización en las cuales los seres humanos y otros seres vivos puedan existir en el planeta enriqueciéndose mutuamente.

2. IMPORTANTES TRANSFORMACIONES MUNDIALES

El mundo ha cambiado enormemente desde mediados de la década del noventa. Desde una perspectiva de los estudios del desarrollo, a mi manera de ver, los cuatro factores más relevantes en esta transformación han sido: primero, el enorme papel asumido por China —y en menor medida la India— en la economía global; segundo, los reajustes en la geopolítica mundial sucedidos a raíz de los ataques contra el World Trade Center en Nueva York del 11 de septiembre de 2001 y la posterior invasión de Irak en marzo de 2003; y tercero, el fin del llamado Consenso de Washington, es decir, el conjunto de ideas y prácticas institucionales que aparentemente gobernó la economía mundial desde la década del setenta, más comúnmente conocido como neoliberalismo. El desmantelamiento del socialismo realmente existente y de las economías de planificación centralizada puede ser citado como un cuarto factor, dado que, a pesar de que se inició en la década del ochenta, se convirtió en irreversible en la década del noventa. Estos factores están profundamente relacionados entre sí y están lejos de constituir una secuencia histórica. Primero, los

estudios del desarrollo surgieron en China como un campo académico, junto con las preocupaciones inherentes a la liberalización económica seguida por el país desde finales de los años setenta, tales como la desigualdad creciente, la destrucción del medio ambiente, y la exclusión rural, la marginación y la pobreza (véase, por ejemplo, Long, Jingzhong y Yihuan, 2010)[3]. La influencia de China en Asia, África y América Latina ha crecido en paralelo con su poderío económico, y tiene un efecto particularmente pronunciado en el desarrollo en África (Sahle, 2010). Mientras algunos consideran las reformas económicas de China —aunque orquestada por el Estado— como en sintonía con la ideología neoliberal del tipo Consenso de Washington, otros creen que la situación actual se caracteriza por una compleja mezcla de formas económicas, solo algunas de las cuales se puede caracterizar como liberales o neoliberales (Nonini, 2008; Yang, 1999).

En segundo lugar, el surgimiento de una nueva formación geopolítica después de 11 de Septiembre de 2001 es relativamente indiscutible. De importancia clave en este asunto, desde una perspectiva de los estudios del desarrollo, es lo que los académicos de la economía política internacional han llamado la seguralización del desarrollo, es decir, la fusión de las nociones de seguridad de la guerra contra el terrorismo y los marcos de la seguridad humana en el desarrollo, de formas que socavan y limitan el potencial de este último, incluidos en los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (Sahle, 2010). Tercero, el fin del Consenso de Washington ha sido más evidentemente reflejado en el “giro a la izquierda” en América Latina, es decir, la

ola de gobiernos de izquierda que barrió en la mayoría de los países de la región desde 1998, todos elegidos democráticamente sobre el rechazo explícito del dogma neo-liberal de décadas anteriores. Esta tendencia, y sus implicaciones para los estudios críticos del desarrollo, también se revisará en detalle en las páginas que siguen[4]. Por último, la desaparición del socialismo realmente existente ha tenido un efecto ambiguo sobre los debates del desarrollo. Mientras que, por un lado, con esta caída se ha demostrado que el modelo socialista comparte muchas de las premisas del desarrollo capitalista convencional, apoyando así la idea de postdesarrollo, por el otro, ha contribuido a consolidar el sentido de que “no hay alternativa”, debilitando entonces el debate sobre las alternativas al desarrollo.

Ha habido por supuesto muchos otros cambios importantes en la economía mundial, la geopolítica y la conciencia global, desde la década del noventa, algunos de los cuales se han hecho más visibles en años recientes. La explosión de la conectividad, habilitada por la información digital y las tecnologías de la comunicación —establecida firmemente como un tema académico por la trilogía de Castell sobre la “Sociedad de la Información”, publicada en la segunda mitad de la década del noventa (véase especialmente Castells, 1996)— se ha convertido en un punto de referencia obligatorio para muchos trabajos del desarrollo, a pesar de que la mayoría de la gente del mundo todavía carece de acceso a tales bienes y servicios (véase, por ejemplo, Harcourt, 1999). De enorme importancia para la creación de una conciencia global ha sido la crisis

ambiental, finalmente traída a la luz pública en los debates nacionales y mundiales por las conferencias sobre el cambio climático mundial y la convergencia científica en torno a los hallazgos del Panel Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático (IPCC). Como explicaré más adelante, solo la crisis ecológica tiene el potencial para desestabilizar cualquiera de los marcos de desarrollo existentes en la actualidad si se toma en serio. La crisis económica que comenzó en 2007 que causó el colapso de las instituciones financieras y la burbuja inmobiliaria y la recesión en las bolsas de valores, principalmente en el Norte, tuvo importantes consecuencias a nivel mundial en términos de desaceleración de la actividad económica, disponibilidad de crédito y comercio internacional. Muchos países en el Sur Global registraron un aumento significativo de la pobreza y el desempleo y la consiguiente disminución del crecimiento económico (los países de América Latina con gobiernos progresistas son una excepción parcial). Mientras que para algunos críticos la crisis anunciaba el final del capitalismo financiarizado[5], instituciones como el Banco Mundial se han involucrado en los debates para repensar la globalización después de la crisis, en gran parte basadas en estrategias convencionales para impulsar la competitividad de las exportaciones, en particular para el caso de África[6]. Está claro que las principales instituciones internacionales de crédito no tienen ideas nuevas para enfrentar los asuntos del desarrollo después de esta crisis. El aumento de los fundamentalismos religiosos en muchas regiones del mundo, incluyendo los Estados Unidos, también debe ser citado como una de las

transformaciones más relevantes; en algunos países supone la resistencia a las políticas post 11 de Septiembre y el rechazo de la modernidad al estilo occidental.

En 1995, el capítulo 5 de *Encountering Development* trataba sustancialmente sobre los campesinos, las mujeres y el medio ambiente. Mucho ha cambiado desde entonces en relación con estas tres cuestiones, y hoy existen otros actores que no recibieron suficiente atención en el libro, en especial los pueblos indígenas y otros grupos étnicos, tales como las poblaciones afrodescendientes. Incluso si los campesinos han dejado de ser tan centrales para el desarrollo como lo fueron en décadas anteriores, ha habido recientemente un renacimiento de los estudios campesinos y agrarios que incluye novedosas conceptualizaciones de la ruralidad (por ejemplo, evitando la dicotomía rural /urbano, tradicional/moderno); identidades campesinas (tomando en cuenta la influencia de, por ejemplo, las migraciones transnacionales, género y etnicidad); cuestiones previamente no estudiadas o poco estudiadas como los cultivos transgénicos, la conservación y la soberanía alimentaria, y los movimientos sociales campesinos, mucho más allá de la imagen de los años sesenta de los campesinos como sujetos revolucionarios radicales[7]. De ser un tema especial en el desarrollo, como en los discursos de las mujeres en el desarrollo y el desarrollo con orientación de género discutidos en el capítulo 5, las mujeres han pasado a ocupar un lugar central como sujeto, objeto y conceptualizadoras del desarrollo. Incluso si la mayoría de los trabajos de desarrollo dirigido a grupos de mujeres sigue concentrándose en importantes pero convencionales agendas

como el empoderamiento en la economía, la intersección de mujeres, género y desarrollo ha sido un espacio rico para el debate crítico e ideas nuevas sobre el desarrollo durante la última década[8]. El ámbito del medio ambiente tal vez haya visto los cambios más trascendentales sobre el desarrollo, algunos de los cuales se abordarán más adelante. Baste decir por ahora que el desarrollo se ha convertido en una preocupación central de la ecología política (por ejemplo, Biersack y Greenberg, 2006; Escobar, 2008a) y viceversa, es decir, que las cuestiones ambientales se han convertido cada vez más centrales para el desarrollo, por lo que se ha consolidado el estudio de la "naturaleza en el Sur global" (Greenough y Tsing, 2003).

La visibilidad de los pueblos indígenas y las minorías étnicas como sujetos, objetos y conceptualizadores del desarrollo también ha aumentado dramáticamente. Estos actores están a la vanguardia del trabajo crítico sobre el desarrollo en aspectos importantes, denunciando, por ejemplo, la irracionalidad del desarrollo y la incompatibilidad de muchos proyectos de desarrollo con las cosmovisiones indígenas (véanse Mander y Tauli-Corpuz, 2006; Blaser, Feit y McRae, 2004), o al señalar las limitaciones de la Euro-modernidad desde la perspectiva indígena (Blaser, 2010). Cuestiones de desarrollo, identidad, territorio y autonomía se han convertido en importantes para el caso de los pueblos indígenas (por ejemplo, De la Cadena y Starn, 2007; Blaser, Feit y McRae, 2010) y grupos afrodescendientes, especialmente en América Latina (Escobar, 2008a; Oslender, 2008; Asher, 2009; French, 2009). La experiencia de las mujeres indígenas en América Latina está

proporcionando la base para un “feminismo descolonial”, donde las críticas al etnocentrismo de los discursos feministas modernistas se unieron con el análisis de las formas patriarcales de la exclusión apuntalados por las apelaciones a la tradición o la diferencia cultural (por ejemplo, Hernández, 2008; Suárez Navaz y Hernández, 2008; Hernández, 2009; Lugones, 2010; Bidaseca, 2010; Escobar, 2010a; véase también Radcliffe, Laurie y Andolina, 2009 para una perspectiva feminista relacionada sobre los movimientos indígenas y el desarrollo en los Andes).

Un aspecto de la transformación de las condiciones de desarrollo en los últimos quince años, a menudo no reconocido, aunque de suma importancia, es que las mismas categorías y usos del conocimiento —cuál conocimiento cuenta en el desarrollo, producido por quiénes y con qué fines— han sido objeto de crecientes presiones de muchos lados. Esto afecta a la teoría social en general, en que la cohorte de los interesados en la producción de nuevas teorías se ha expandido mucho más allá de los sujetos habituales en las academias (en gran parte del Norte). Hoy en día un creciente número de investigadores, activistas e intelectuales fuera de la academia están prestando atención a la urgencia de ofrecer interpretaciones alternativas del mundo, incluidas las del desarrollo. En este sentido, las complejas conversaciones que se están dando entre muchos tipos de productores de conocimiento en todo el mundo son en sí mismas una condición esperanzadora para la teoría del desarrollo en la actualidad. Esta urgencia implica no solo la necesidad de transformar los lugares y el contenido de la teoría, sino su misma forma (Mignolo, 2000; Osterweil, 2005; Escobar,

2008a). Esta tendencia es particularmente aguda en el campo de estudios sobre movimientos sociales (y, como veremos más adelante, en los estudios de la transición), donde la propia investigación de los activistas y su producción de conocimiento se están volviendo centrales para entender lo que los movimientos son, por qué se movilizan y los tipos de mundos que desean constituir. Algunos de los énfasis provienen de enfoques antropológicos y geográficos, incluyendo la difuminación de la frontera entre los mundos y conocimientos académicos y activistas, y de una serie de conceptos y ámbitos de investigación como la etnografía en red, la cartografía de los saberes, la etnografía de las identidades y mundos figurados de los activistas, la investigación activista, partidista y militante; y así sucesivamente[9]. Los académicos en los estudios del desarrollo han estado algo en sintonía con el conocimiento producido por los beneficiarios de los proyectos de desarrollo, aunque en gran parte bajo la forma de “conocimiento local”, sin embargo, todavía no han incorporado estos conocimientos nuevos de manera significativa en su teoría, la toma de decisiones y el diseño de las intervenciones.

Hay un último aspecto de importancia en el libro que me gustaría mencionar antes de seguir adelante: la importancia del discurso económico para la empresa del desarrollo. Este problema, al cual se dedicó el capítulo 3, apenas fue mencionado en las críticas del libro publicadas entre 1996 y comienzos de la década de dos mil; de hecho, fue ignorado casi por completo. Considero esta ausencia de comentarios no tanto como un signo de la irrelevancia del asunto sino como un índice

de la hegemonía naturalizada de una determinada concepción económica del mundo —lo que en el capítulo 3 llamé “fabulas de crecimiento y capital”, heredada por la economía del desarrollo de la economía política clásica, y en otro lugar (Escobar, 2005) denominé como “la economía occidental”— un ensamblaje coherente de sistemas de producción, poder y significación que constituyen uno de los pilares más fundamentales de la modernidad. Bien podría ser el caso de que la economía del desarrollo esté casi muerta, y que la economía neoliberal haya sido sacudida hasta la médula por la crisis financiera, pero el imaginario económico en términos de individuos realizando transacciones en los mercados, de producción, crecimiento, capital, progreso, escasez y consumo, continúa sin trabas. Este discurso naturalizado socava muchas, si no la mayoría de las propuestas actuales para la sostenibilidad y para propender por una era post-carbono La desnaturalización de la economía es un área de trabajo crítico activo, por ejemplo en la imaginación de economías diversas y en las economías sociales y solidarias más allá de la capitalista o propuestas de *decroissance* (de-crecimiento). Por otra parte, se puede discernir que a nivel de base, como Esteva dijo provocativamente, “aquellos marginados por la sociedad económica en la era del desarrollo se dedican cada vez más a marginar a la economía” (2009: 20)[10].

3. EVALUACIÓN DEL POSTDESARROLLO

La idea de postdesarrollo, con la que la edición de 1995 de este libro terminaba (véanse también Escobar, 1992; Rahnema y

Bawtree, 1997), ha demostrado ser controvertida y es importante evaluar su validez en la actualidad. En general, el "postdesarrollo" surgió de una crítica postestructuralista, es decir, un análisis del desarrollo como conjunto de discursos y prácticas que tuvo un impacto profundo en la manera en que Asia, África y América Latina llegaron a ser consideradas como "subdesarrolladas" y tratadas como tales. En este contexto, el postdesarrollo estaba destinado a designar por lo menos tres cosas interrelacionadas: primero, la necesidad de descentrar el desarrollo, es decir, de desplazarlo de su posición central en las representaciones y discusiones sobre las condiciones en Asia, África y América Latina. Un corolario de esta primera meta era abrir el espacio discursivo a otras formas de describir esas condiciones, menos mediada por las premisas y las experiencias del "desarrollo". Segundo, en el desplazamiento de la centralidad del desarrollo en el imaginario discursivo, el postdesarrollo sugería que efectivamente era posible pensar en el fin del desarrollo. En otras palabras, identificaba alternativas *al* desarrollo, en lugar de alternativas de desarrollo, como una posibilidad concreta. Tercero, el postdesarrollo enfatizó la importancia de la transformación de la "economía política de la verdad", es decir, del orden del conocimiento y poder experto del desarrollo. Con este fin, propone que las ideas más útiles acerca de las alternativas podrían ser obtenidas de los conocimientos y prácticas de los movimientos sociales.

¿Siguen siendo válidas estas afirmaciones hoy en día? Ya hemos visto cómo ciertas transformaciones del mundo han referenciado ambiguamente al postdesarrollo. Por un lado, la

consolidación del neoliberalismo en muchas regiones del mundo en la década del noventa hizo la necesidad de las criticas más urgentes, así como lo hizo la creciente conciencia de los costos sociales y ecológicos del “socialismo de mercado” de China y de la decisión de la India de abrirse a la los mercados mundiales. Por otro lado, sin embargo, la desaparición del socialismo en Europa del Este y, paradójicamente, la llegada al poder de regímenes progresistas de América del Sur transmitió el sentido de que la necesidad del desarrollo era mayor que nunca. Cuestionar el desarrollo en este contexto se vuelve incómodo, aunque, como veremos, algunos movimientos sociales están haciendo exactamente eso, invocando la noción de postdesarrollo en sus críticas. Baste decir por ahora que dado el estado actual de las cosas, a pesar de las ambigüedades señaladas, aún tiene validez las críticas del desarrollo y la idea de imaginar una era del postdesarrollo. Es importante preguntarse, sin embargo, si la idea es válida tal como fue enunciada en la década del noventa, o si es necesario reformularla. Voy a tratar de dar una respuesta a esta pregunta al final de esta sección y, una vez más, al final de la parte IV. Permítanme examinar brevemente por ahora algunas de las respuestas al postdesarrollo.

3.1. RESPUESTAS AL POSTDESARROLLO

En su formulación más concisa, el postdesarrollo estaba destinado a transmitir el sentido de una época en que el desarrollo ya no sería un principio organizativo central de la vida

social. Esto no quiere decir que el postdesarrollo era considerado como un nuevo periodo histórico al que sus defensores creían que se había llegado, aunque muchos críticos lo vieron así. Sea como fuere, se produjo un rico debate que, paradójicamente, contribuyó a consolidar una posición del "postdesarrollo" al agrupar a un puñado de autores y libros que los críticos consideraron que, en términos generales, compartían la misma perspectiva[11]. Los análisis y las formas de abogar asociadas con el postdesarrollo se convirtieron en objeto de críticas punzantes y réplicas en la segunda mitad de la década del noventa. Había tres principales objeciones a la propuesta del postdesarrollo. Primero, que al centrarse en el discurso, los proponentes del postdesarrollo pasaban por alto la pobreza y el capitalismo, que son los problemas reales del desarrollo. Segundo, presentaban una visión esencialista del desarrollo, mientras que en realidad hay grandes diferencias entre las estrategias e instituciones de desarrollo, y no se daban cuenta de la impugnación al desarrollo en terreno. Tercero, romantizaban las tradiciones locales y los movimientos sociales, haciendo caso omiso de que lo local también está imbuido en relaciones de poder. Como era de esperar, los proponentes del postdesarrollo respondieron a sus críticos, sugiriendo que las críticas, a su vez, aunque razonables y útiles en muchos aspectos, eran en sí mismas problemáticas.

Para el primer conjunto de críticas, los proponentes postestructuralistas del post-desarrollo respondieron diciendo que este argumento equivale a una defensa ingenua de la realidad. En otras palabras, los críticos del postdesarrollo argumentaban que debido a su enfoque sobre el discurso y la

cultura, los postestructuralistas no veían la realidad de la pobreza, el capitalismo y similares. Para los postestructuralistas este argumento tenía validez limitada, ya que se basaba en la suposición (marxista o liberal) que el discurso no es material, desconociendo que la modernidad y el capitalismo son simultáneamente sistemas de discurso y práctica. La segunda crítica era problemática para los autores del postdesarrollo por razones epistemológicas. Parafraseando, los críticos del postdesarrollo decían algo así como: “Ustedes (los defensores del postdesarrollo) representan el desarrollo como homogéneo, mientras que en realidad es diverso. El desarrollo es heterogéneo, controvertido, impuro, híbrido”. En respuesta, los teóricos del postdesarrollo reconocen la validez de esta crítica, pero han señalado que su proyecto era diferente: el de analizar la realidad discursiva en general, y no cómo podría haber sido impugnada e hibridizada en el terreno. Se veían a sí mismos menos como “tratando de encontrar la verdad de las cosas” bajo el mandato de un realismo epistemológico que el postestructuralismo cuestiona, que como intelectuales políticos construyendo un objeto de crítica para el debate y la acción. Por último, los críticos del postdesarrollo cuestionaban a sus partidarios diciendo que idealizaban lo local y las bases. Para los post-estructuralistas y críticos culturales, este comentario era un reflejo del realismo crónico de muchos estudiosos que, invariablemente, etiquetan como romántica cualquier crítica radical de Occidente o cualquier defensa de lo local. Además, los autores postestructuralistas señalaron que la noción realista de cambio social no puede examinar sus propias visiones de lo

material, los medios de vida y las necesidades, entre otros (Escobar, 2000, 2007; Zai, 2007; McGregor, 2009).

En tanto avanzaba la primera década del nuevo siglo, el panorama de la teoría del desarrollo dio lugar a una amplia gama de posiciones y al diálogo interparadigmático con sus convergencias (Simon, 2007). Esto podría ser visto como un resultado positivo de los a veces acerbos debates de la década del noventa. Hay una mayor disposición por parte de muchos autores a adoptar constructivamente elementos de las diversas tendencias y paradigmas. Este es particularmente el caso en torno a una serie de cuestionamientos, incluyendo la impugnación del desarrollo, un nuevo acercamiento entre la economía política y análisis cultural sobre cuestiones de desarrollo y economía, el examen de la relación entre el desarrollo y la modernidad, y los nuevos enfoques etnográficos para las políticas y prácticas del desarrollo (abajo). Estas tendencias están produciendo una nueva comprensión de cómo opera el desarrollo y la forma en que se transforma.

3.2. LA NUEVA ETNOGRAFÍA DE DESARROLLO

Recientes enfoques etnográficos para el estudio de los proyectos de desarrollo han recibido especial atención en los debates sobre el desarrollo. Estos enfoques sugieren que la investigación etnográfica podría ser utilizada para arrojar nueva comprensión sobre cómo operan las políticas, y que este conocimiento podría ser utilizado para vincular de forma constructiva la política social, la política de la academia y las aspiraciones de los pobres. Como

el principal defensor de este enfoque lo planteó,

> Aquí la labor de la antropología consiste en centrarse en las relaciones sociales que sustentan el trabajo conceptual, para mostrar cómo las racionalidades del desarrollo nunca están libres de contextos sociales al viajar de un sitio a otro, cómo se inician en relaciones sociales, instituciones y comunidades de expertos, viajan con un equipaje no revelado, son transformadas medida que se despliega en otros mundos sociales/institucionales —tal vez a través del interés de colaboradores locales, contrapartes oficiales o mediadores— y es recolonizado por la política de manera que genera efectos complejos y no intencionales (Mosse, 2008: 120-121).

Estas investigaciones implican una especie de hiperetnografía que le permite al etnógrafo ver la totalidad de las redes del desarrollo, investigar en profundidad los principales sitios con sus respectivos actores, bagajes culturales, y la apropiación práctica de las intervenciones por los grupos locales. El resultado, según se argumenta, debe dar a los teóricos y practicantes una explicación más matizada de cómo opera el desarrollo en tanto un proceso multiescala que es constantemente transformado y desafiado. La esperanza es que, dada la realidad del desarrollo, el etnógrafo crítico podría aclarar las condiciones para proyectos más exitosos, tal vez incluso una más eficaz apropiación popular de los proyectos[12].

Al examinar más a fondo las redes de actores que componen los proyectos de desarrollo, esta tendencia ha contribuido a desesencializar el desarrollo y, por lo tanto, indirectamente, a la teorización del postdesarrollo. Al hacerlo, sin embargo, estos enfoques han solucionado algunos problemas, pero crean

nuevos rompecabezas. La cuestión de la agencia ha quedado indicada pero confusa (dado que todo tiene agencia, incluyendo objetos tales como textos, ¿cómo se puede diferenciar entre diferentes tipos de agencia?). De manera similar con la proliferación de la conectividad (todo está conectado con todo, pero ¿cómo las cosas están conectadas de manera diferente?, ¿qué tipo de conexiones son políticamente poderosas, o comprometidas?). Los asuntos de la diferencia, además, son a menudo puestos entre paréntesis, en el sentido de que no hay ninguna explicación clara de lo que ocurre con lo que es auténticamente emergente, o como entender esas experiencias que no se puede leer con las categorías del presente, incluidas las de las ciencias sociales modernas[13]. A menos que se traten estas preguntas de manera eficaz, a mi parecer, algunas de las posiciones adoptadas por las etnografías recientes del desarrollo y del Estado corren el riesgo de caer en lo que Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) ha llamado una "hermenéutica del cinismo", dado que nada de lo que ningún actor haga puede llegar a ser un reto importante para lo que existe o producir un pensamiento significativamente diferente. Por otra parte, se ha argumentado que estos trabajos evaden un compromiso serio con los deseos por el desarrollo y con las aspiraciones de los pobres (De Vries, 2008). De hecho, es el caso de que las etnografías del desarrollo han hecho mucho por visibilizar las comunidades transnacionales de expertos cuyas formaciones, intereses, gustos y objetivos económicos y políticos coinciden lo suficiente para mantener las actor-redes del desarrollo operando, a menudo bien aceitadas. Sin embargo, esta conciencia tiene

que ir acompañada de una urgencia renovada por una crítica del hecho de que “en cada etapa, los especialistas en nuevos campos son llamados a crear su propio papel en la historia de la aplicación global de la experticia” (Lohmann, 2006: 150). Estos expertos transnacionalizados de clase media, tanto del Norte global como del Sur global, difunden una racionalidad y sentido común normalizados, con importantes consecuencias culturales y políticas.

Hay otras líneas de respuesta a las nuevas etnografías derivadas de la economía política y de las perspectivas postestructuralistas. Una característica común de estos trabajos es un claro énfasis en el poder y la dominación en comparación con muchos de los enfoques de red. Mediante la combinación de los estudios críticos de administración y el postdesarrollo, por ejemplo, un grupo de autores argumentan que las aplicaciones de ideas de gerencia (*management*) al desarrollo despliega nuevas prácticas políticas, como la tendencia etnográfica que acabamos de examinar acertadamente subraya, pero que esto no quiere decir que estas prácticas dejen de funcionar como instrumentos de dominación (Dar y Cooke, 2008). Un punto de vista relacionado considera que el cambio en el discurso de la ayuda a la “buena gobernanza”, los “partnerships” (alianzas o colaboraciones) y el “apropiarse” de los proyectos no solo da expresión “a la voluntad profunda de civilizar, sino que reafirma los valores sagrados del campo de la ayuda al desarrollo: la modernidad, la racionalidad y la neutralidad política” (Gould, 2005: 69). Para parafrasear: escarbe en un sistema de administración, y encontrará una lucha cultural y de poder,

aunque sea expresada en términos de la acción racional. Como Rojas y Kindornay concluyeron en su análisis de las políticas de gobernar el desarrollo:

> Bajo el diseño global del desarrollo, la incapacidad para mejorar ha obligado al constante reenvasado de prescripciones y técnicas de gobierno en un intento de salvar las políticas y prácticas convencionales. A pesar de las críticas desde abajo y más de cincuenta años de éxitos menores y numerosos fracasos, la corriente convencional del desarrollo sigue siendo formulada a través de lenguajes y prácticas renovados; aunque nuevos paradigmas y modas surgen, el desarrollo sigue encarnando últimamente un imaginario global de modernización (de próxima publicación: 13).

Basándose en la teoría postcolonial, Sinha (2008) sitúa los esquemas del desarrollo dentro de regímenes transnacionales en ascenso, para el caso de la India, desde principios del siglo XX, unido a proyectos ético-políticos burgueses, el poder del Estado y la racionalidad moderna en una complejo geocultura del desarrollo en el que la subalternidad en sí es también redefinida. Esta visión resuena con la afirmación de Bebbington (2004), que los regímenes de desarrollo, incluidas las ONG, deben ser considerados como una contribución a la creación de geografías desiguales de la pobreza y subsistencia. Una de las pruebas más elocuentes de tal desigual geografía es el caso del total desmantelamiento de un sistema ancestral de riego y cultivo del arroz en Bali, en nombre del desarrollo moderno, a partir de la Revolución Verde en los años sesenta. Realizada desde la perspectiva de los sistemas complejos adaptativos, esta investigación etnográfica constituye una prueba convincente de la destrucción casi total de un sistema que había logrado un

“orden perfecto” funcional a través de siglos de auto-organización. Esta destrucción resultó en una profunda crisis social y ambiental para toda la población (Lansing, 2006). Estudios como este contribuyen a mostrar las limitaciones de las hiperetnografías del desarrollo mencionadas anteriormente.

Si bien los enfoques de red diversifican las preguntas de la agencia, a menudo su desventaja es la imposibilidad de imaginar implicaciones prácticas radicales. Este riesgo es mantenido a raya por trabajos que llevan a cabo la investigación desde la perspectiva de, y a menudo en colaboración con, comunidades particulares. Si bien estos enfoques pueden ser considerados como más convencionales en los juegos de verdad de la academia, esto no quiere decir que los análisis son menos matizados, por el contrario, ganan en profundidad y posicionamiento político. Al examinar las redefiniciones del desarrollo local por parte de grupos indígenas en el suroeste de Colombia, por ejemplo, Gow (2008) sostiene que estos grupos producen una especie de “contra-desarrollo” a través del cual los proyectos de planificación, de educación y de salud se reorientan hacia un distintivo proyecto cultural y político en un intento por crear una modernidad indígena, donde las preocupaciones por la diferencia cultural —y la autonomía para cambiar la cultura— se combinan con las de justicia social. Arce y Long (2000) también han esbozado útilmente un proyecto de pluralización de la modernidad, centrándose en la contra-labor desplegada en el desarrollo por grupos locales. La contra-labor puede desesencializar los productos occidentales de su poder superior, o contribuir al empoderamiento de la autodefinición de un grupo,

incluso a medida que cambia. La contra-labor y el contra-desarrollo, por lo tanto, pueden ser considerados como apuntando a formas de desarrollo alternativo, sino también como alimentando los puntos de vista del postdesarrollo. Esto no significa negar los deseos y esperanzas del desarrollo y la modernidad que muchas personas en el mundo han adoptado como resultado de su encuentro con el desarrollo y la modernidad. Como de Vries (2007) ha señalado estos deseos son reales, aunque banalizados y cada vez más difíciles de alcanzar por los proyectos de desarrollo. Ellos son ignorados por la mayoría de las críticas, incluidas la postestructuralista, y deben abordarse de frente en cualquier enfoque crítico de los estudios del desarrollo (de Vries, 2007; véase también Gow, 2008).

Una manera de salir de este aparente callejón sin salida es investigar la forma en que, por ejemplo, los pueblos indígenas se posicionan críticamente “en el camino del desarrollo”, la forma en que elaboran “planes de vida” que responden tanto a los procesos modernos/globales como a lógicas culturales basadas-en-lugar de larga data. Aunque los planes de vida pueden incorporar estratégicamente oportunidades ofrecidas por el desarrollo, socavan las pretensiones de universalización del desarrollo y pueden contribuir a luchas no-hegemónicas (Blaser, 2004). Esta dinámica se encuentra en juego en el campo del desarrollo energético en algunas naciones indígenas de América del Norte, donde las comunidades orientan sus decisiones entre tecnologías convencionales y emergentes de maneras que implican repensar significativamente las políticas culturales de

desarrollo energético (Powell, 2010). Una vez más, estos trabajos no plantean una simple posición vis a vis el desarrollo. Determinar lo que localmente se entiende por “desarrollo” es siempre una cuestión compleja. Esta cuestión es abordada por Medeiros (2005) en el marco latinoamericano de la colonialidad del poder y del conocimiento. Expresiones locales del deseo de desarrollo, como ella lo muestra en su análisis etnográfico de los proyectos de desarrollo rural en el altiplano boliviano financiado por la Agencia Alemana para el Desarrollo (GTZ), necesitan ser entendidas en el contexto de la compleja historia de varios cientos de años de discriminación, incluyendo la experiencia de las promesas hechas pero nunca cumplidas desde la independencia. En ausencia de este análisis, y a pesar de las buenas intenciones, los proyectos de desarrollo a menudo terminan reproduciendo viejas asimetrías de poder/conocimiento. Como Medeiros lo muestra, los campesinos indígenas tienen su propia comprensión situada del desarrollo, la cual articula su experiencia histórica de la modernidad y la colonialidad. La noción local de desarrollo incluye la adquisición de aquellas herramientas de los sistemas de conocimiento dominante que podrían darles la posibilidad de implementar un futuro viable. La discusión local sobre el desarrollo no es solo sobre el desarrollo en sí, sino sobre la historia y la cultura —sobre el Estado, la ciudadanía, la diferencia, el conocimiento y la explotación—. Se trata de la posición de las comunidades dentro del sistema mundo moderno colonial[14]. Esta dinámica se revela a menudo en los trabajos ubicados en la intersección entre las redes transnacionales del desarrollo y las luchas de los movimientos

sociales, particularmente en los Andes contemporáneos donde los asuntos de la historia, la cultura, la justicia y la diferencia, y las nunca demasiado simples interconexiones entre todos ellos, se acentúan (por ejemplo, Andolina, Laurie y Radcliffe, 2009).

Entonces, ¿qué podemos decir sobre la noción de postdesarrollo después de esta revisión quizá demasiado apresurada y parcial de las tendencias académicas? Una respuesta satisfactoria a esta pregunta habrá de esperar a la última sección de este capítulo. Hay algunas cuestiones que se pueden destacar por ahora, sin embargo, en relación con la utilidad de la noción en la actualidad. Creo que el núcleo de la noción sigue siendo válido, es decir, la necesidad de descentrar el desarrollo como un descriptor social, el cuestionamiento de las prácticas de conocimiento del desarrollo, y la crítica inmanente del postdesarrollo a las ideas de crecimiento, progreso y modernidad. Sin embargo, estos contenidos han sido cualificados y enriquecidos por los debates académicos en los últimos quince años. Las etnografías del desarrollo, por ejemplo, han dado una visión más detallada de cómo opera el aparato del desarrollo. Trabajos centrados en actores nuevos (por ejemplo, los pueblos indígenas, el ambiente) han resaltado cómo estos actores desafían los regímenes de verdad desarrollistas. Al hecho general de la dominación que la crítica discursiva de la década de los años noventa destacó, la economía política y análisis postestructuralistas han añadido una comprensión más compleja de cómo funciona la dominación a través de determinadas prácticas del capitalismo y del Estado.

Dicho esto, una de las principales consecuencias del

postdesarrollo queda aparentemente sin solución: la noción de alternativas *al* desarrollo. No solo el proyecto del desarrollo sigue viento en popa, sino que parece haberse vuelto más fuerte desde mediados de la década del noventa. Como Gustavo Esteva (2009: 1), uno de los críticos más lúcidos y persistentes del desarrollo, planteó en su análisis más reciente: “El desarrollo fracasó como un esfuerzo socio-económico, pero el discurso del desarrollo aún contamina la realidad social. La palabra permanece en el centro de una poderosa pero frágil constelación semántica”. A pesar de una serie de crisis, los discursos y los retos político-culturales concretos parecen jugar a favor de mantener vivo el imaginario de las alternativas al desarrollo. A esta posibilidad dedicaré el resto de este capítulo.

4. DISCURSOS DE LA TRANSICIÓN: TENDENCIAS EMERGENTES

Los argumentos sobre la necesidad de una profunda transición de época son un signo de los tiempos, reflejan la profundidad de la crisis contemporánea. Sin duda, hablar de la crisis y las transiciones tiene una larga genealogía en Occidente, ya sea en forma de “crisis de la civilización”, las transiciones hacia y desde el capitalismo, las visiones apocalípticas del fin del mundo, repentinas transformaciones religiosas o tecnológicas, o relatos de ciencia ficción. Este no es el lugar para analizar esta genealogía[15], sin embargo, me parece que es posible argumentar que los *discursos de la transición* (DsT) están apareciendo hoy con particular riqueza, diversidad e intensidad

hasta el punto de que un verificable campo de “estudios de la transición” puede ser planteado como un ámbito académico-político emergente. Estudios de la transición y el activismo de la transición son ahora un hecho de nuestro tiempo. Notablemente, como incluso un mapa superficial de los DsT sugiere, quienes escriben sobre el tema no se limitan a la academia; de hecho, los pensadores de los DsT más visionarios se encuentran fuera de ésta, aunque en la mayoría de los casos se enganchan con las corrientes críticas en la academia. Los DsT están apareciendo de una multiplicidad de sitios, principalmente de los movimientos sociales en todo el mundo, de algunas ONG de la sociedad civil, de algunos paradigmas científicos emergentes, y de los intelectuales con vínculos significativos con las luchas ambientales y culturales. Los DsT ocupan un lugar destacado en varios campos, incluidos los de la cultura, la ecología, la religión y la espiritualidad, la ciencia alternativa (por ejemplo, los sistemas vivos y la complejidad), la economía política, y las nuevas tecnologías digitales y biológicas. Solo los tres primeros se abordarán en lo que sigue. Pero antes realizaré una observación general sobre el concepto de transición.

Como ha señalado recientemente Mezzadra, “el problema de la transición re-surge en cada momento histórico cuando las condiciones de la traducción tienen que ser establecidas de nuevo” (2007: 4). Lo que quiere decir con la traducción es el proceso mediante el cual experiencias histórico-culturales diferentes, y a menudo contrastantes, se hacen mutuamente inteligibles y conmensurables; esto ha sucedido en la historia reciente a través de la imposición de los códigos culturales de la

modernidad capitalista en una escala cada vez más global. Este proceso, como Mezzadra sugiere, ya no es aceptable; al contrario se hace necesario un nuevo tipo de traducción heterolingüe en el cual las nuevas comunalidades se construyan precisamente a partir de diferencias inconmensurables. Como argumentaré aquí, hay algunas diferencias radicales en la actual ola de los DsT en comparación con las del pasado más reciente. Dos de estas diferencias, subrayadas por Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007), son que los procesos de transición/traducción no pueden ser orientados por una teoría general, de hecho, la única teoría general posible, como él dice para consternación de buena parte de la teorización de la izquierda, es la imposibilidad de una teoría general. El segundo, y relacionado, aspecto es que hoy en día está más claro que la traducción siempre implica complejos procesos epistemológicos —interculturales e interepistémicos—, que requieren a su vez un tipo de justicia cognitiva que no ha sido reconocido. Un tercer elemento se insinúa a sí mismo, y es que la transición/traducción implica ontologías múltiples; es decir, cuando es concebida radicalmente, la transición implica pasar de la comprensión moderna del mundo como universo al mundo como pluriverso (sin preexistentes universales) o, como voy a plantear a continuación, desplazarse de un paradigma de la "globalización" a uno de la "planetarización". Si el primero privilegia la integración económica y cultural y la homogeneización bajo una serie de principios universales (eurocéntricos), la última aboga por una comunicabilidad entre una multiplicidad de mundos culturales en la base de un entendimiento ecológico y político compartido (Santos, 2007).

Sucintamente, la transición hacia el pluriverso requiere un concepto más amplio de la traducción que incluye las dimensiones ontológica y epistémica.

Un sello de los DsT contemporáneos es el hecho de postular una transformación radical cultural e institucional: de hecho, *una transición a un mundo totalmente diferente*. Esto es diversamente conceptualizado en términos de un cambio de paradigma (por ejemplo, GTI, 2002), un cambio de modelo de civilización (por ejemplo, Shiva, 2008; los movimientos indígenas en América Latina, ver más abajo), la aparición de un nuevo orden, un salto cuántico (Laszlo, 2008), el surgimiento de una nueva cultura holística, o incluso de la llegada de una era completamente nueva más allá de la edad moderna dualista, (por ejemplo, Macy, 2007; Goodwin, 2007), reduccionista (por ejemplo, Kauffman, 2008) y económica (por ejemplo, Schafer, 2008). Este cambio es a menudo visto como inminente o como que ya está sucediendo, aunque la mayoría de los DsT advierten que los resultados no están de ninguna manera garantizados. Citemos unas pocas declaraciones sobre la transición:

> La transición global ha comenzado —una sociedad planetaria se configurará en las próximas décadas—. Pero el resultado está en cuestión… Dependiendo de cómo se resuelvan los conflictos ambientales y sociales, el desarrollo global puede bifurcarse en caminos radicalmente diferentes. En el lado oscuro, es muy fácil de imaginar un futuro sombrío de empobrecimiento de las personas, las culturas y la naturaleza. De hecho, para muchos esta posibilidad ominosa parece la más probable. Pero *no* es inevitable. La humanidad tiene el poder de prever, elegir y actuar. Aunque pueda parecer

improbable, una transición hacia un futuro de vidas enriquecidas, solidaridad humana y salud del planeta es posible (The Great Transition Initiative [Iniciativa de la Gran Transición], GTI 2002: ix).

La vida en nuestro planeta está en problemas. Es difícil ir a alguna parte sin ser confrontado por las heridas de nuestro mundo, la ruptura del tejido de la vida… Nuestro planeta nos está enviando señales de socorro, que son tan constantes que ahora parecen casi normales… Estas son las señales de advertencia de que vivimos en un mundo que puede llegar a su fin, al menos como un hogar de la vida consciente. Esto no quiere decir que *va* a terminar, sino que *puede* terminar. Esta misma posibilidad lo cambia todo para nosotros. … Esto está sucediendo ahora en formas que convergen para poner en cuestión el fundamento mismo y la dirección de nuestra civilización. Una revolución global está ocurriendo… Muchos la están llamando el Gran Giro (Macy, 2007: 17, 140).

Si aceptamos la muerte de nuestro propio cuerpo humano, tal vez podamos empezar a aceptar la eventual muerte de nuestra propia civilización… El calentamiento global es un síntoma temprano de la muerte de nuestra civilización actual… Se puede atenuar este proceso, deteniendo [el sobreconsumo] y estando alertas, pero la única manera de hacer esto es aceptar la muerte eventual de esta civilización (Hanh, 2008: 57).

Aunque lo que estos autores entienden por civilización no es necesariamente lo mismo, estos pronunciamientos en términos generales se refieren al modelo cultural que ha prevalecido en Occidente durante los últimos siglos: el modelo de “crecimiento industrial” (Macy, 2007), un modo de vida centrado en el

consumo (Hanh, 2008), con sus ideologías reinantes de materialismo, capitalismo de mercado y progreso (GTI). Y aunque resulta sorprendente encontrar un venerado maestro budista (Thich Nhat Hanh) que nos pide meditar sobre la muerte de la civilización actual, muchas de las visiones más seculares enfatizan una profunda transformación de los valores. De hecho, los DsT más imaginativos vinculan aspectos de la realidad que se habían mantenido separados en las imaginaciones anteriores de la transformación social: ontológicos, culturales, político-económicos, ecológicos y espirituales. Estos son reunidos por una profunda preocupación por el sufrimiento humano y el destino de la vida misma. Por "vida" me refiero al conjunto interminable de formas y entidades que componen el pluriverso —desde lo biofísico a lo humano y lo sobrenatural— y los procesos por los que vienen a ser. Esto va claramente más allá de una preocupación por la "naturaleza", aunque la mayoría de los DsT están atravesados por los temas ecológicos; no podía ser de otra manera, dado que son motivados por, y responden a, las crisis interrelacionadas de energía, alimentos, clima y pobreza.

Comunes a muchos de los discursos de la transición, y tal vez mejor ejemplificado por GTI, es que la humanidad está en un punto de bifurcación y entrando en una fase planetaria de la civilización, como resultado de la expansión acelerada de la era moderna de las últimas décadas, un sistema global tomando forma, fundamentalmente diferente de etapas históricas anteriores. El carácter de la transición dependerá de cual visión del mundo prevalece. La clave es anticiparse a los despliegues

de las crisis, imaginar futuros alternativos y tomar las decisiones adecuadas. El GTI distingue entre tres visiones del mundo o formas de pensar —evolucionaria, catastrófica y transformacional— con sus correspondientes escenarios globales: mundos convencionales, barbarización y la Gran Transición (GT)[16]. Solo la última promete soluciones duraderas a los desafíos de la sostenibilidad, pero requiere cambios fundamentales en los valores, así como nuevos arreglos socio-económicos e institucionales. El paradigma de la GT redefine el progreso en términos no-materiales de la realización humana. Enfatiza la interconectividad e imagina una producción desmaterializada, la disociación de bienestar del consumo y el cultivo de nuevos valores (por ejemplo, la solidaridad, la ética, la comunidad, el significado). Su objetivo es posibilitar una era de energía renovable. La GT implica, sobre todo, un cambio de valores dirigido hacia una visión global alternativa, que sustituye el "capitalismo industrial" con una "globalización civilizadora".

La noción de Thomas Berry (1999: 11) de La Gran Obra —una transición "de la época en que los humanos eran una fuerza perturbadora en el planeta Tierra al periodo en que los seres humanos se hacen presentes al planeta enriqueciéndose mutuamente"—, ha sido influyente en los DsT. Berry llama a la nueva era Ecozoica[17]. Para Berry, "la raíz más profunda de la actual devastación se encuentra en el modo de conciencia que ha establecido una discontinuidad radical entre los seres humanos y otros modos de ser y la concesión de todos los derechos a los seres humanos" (Ibíd: 4). La radical discontinuidad entre los ámbitos humanos y no humanos es la

base de muchas de las críticas. Junto con la idea de un yo separado (el “individuo” de la teoría liberal, separado de la comunidad), esta discontinuidad se ve como el rasgo más fundamental de la ontología moderna. La superación de estas dos divisiones se plantea como fundamental para la sanación de la sociedad y el planeta desde las visiones seculares y religiosas por igual —ya sea a través de las nociones de la interconectividad y la interdependencia de la ecología, la idea de interexistencia y coemergencia de todos los seres del budismo, o los marcos basados en la auto-organización y la complejidad para los cuales lo que importa es la comprensión de los sistemas de relaciones coemergentes. A las divisiones mencionadas anteriormente se agrega una tercera, entre los ámbitos humano y espiritual, o entre fe y razón, como se explica, de forma diciente, por parte de algunos científicos de sistemas y de la complejidad (por ejemplo, Laszlo, 2008; Kauffman, 2008). El enfatizar en la concepción de la Tierra como un sistema vivo donde todos los seres están profundamente interconectados, Macy (2007; Macy y Brown, 1998) habla de una revolución cognitiva y espiritual que implica la desaparición del yo moderno y su sustitución por un yo ecológico, no dualista, que se vuelve a conectar con todos los seres y recupera el sentido del tiempo evolutivo, borrado por el tiempo lineal de la modernidad capitalista; solo de esta manera podremos aprender de nuevo a estar “en asociación con los seres del futuro” (Macy, 2007: 191), “sanar a nuestra cultura fragmentada” (Goodwin, 2007), y avanzar por los caminos de la transición.

Muchos de los DsT están sintonizados con la necesidad de

desplazarse hacia economías post-carbono o post-combustibles fósiles. Vandana Shiva ha abogado por esto con una fuerza y perspicacia especial (véase especialmente 2005, 2008). Para Shiva, la clave de la transición "del petróleo al suelo" (*from oil to soil*) —de un paradigma mecánico-industrial centrado en los mercados globalizados a uno centrado en la gente y el planeta, que ella llama democracia de la tierra— se encuentra en las estrategias de re-localización, es decir, la construcción de sistemas descentralizados de energía y producción de alimentos orgánicos basados en la biovidersidad y apoyados en formas de democracia directa, el conocimiento basado-en-lugar, las economías locales, y la preservación de los suelos y la integridad ecológica. Los DsT de este tipo muestran una aguda conciencia de los derechos de las comunidades a sus territorios y recursos, de los patrones tremendamente desiguales del consumo mundial, el impacto ambiental y las estructuras de explotación mantenidas por el capitalismo, y de la consiguiente necesidad de justicia social y ambiental. Esta es la razón de su insistencia en que "el imperativo que cambiemos nuestra manera de vivir" si queremos "ir más allá del petróleo" esté acoplado con la visión de la "necesidad de reinventar la sociedad, la tecnología y la economía" (Shiva, 2008: 1). En otras palabras, las críticas al capitalismo, el cambio cultural (a veces incluyendo la espiritualidad), y la ecología son sistemáticamente conectadas unas con otras en el diagnóstico de los problemas y posibles caminos a seguir (véanse también, por ejemplo, Sachs y Santarius, 2007; Korten, 2006; Santos, 2007; Hathaway y Boff, 2009; Mooney *et al.,* 2006; Shafer, 2008). La propuesta de la

“ecología de la transformación” (Hathaway y Boff, 2009) se considera como la vía para contrarrestar los estragos del capitalismo global y para la construcción de comunidades sustentables. Para Boff y Hathaway, los principales componentes de la estrategia son la justicia ecológica, la diversidad biológica y cultural, el biorregionalismo, el arraigo al lugar, la autonomía y la transparencia, la democracia participativa y la auto-organización cooperativa. Esta ecología supone una “cosmología de la liberación” que está en sintonía con un tipo de espiritualidad adecuada a una era Ecozoica.

Una de las propuestas más concretas para una transición hacia una sociedad post-combustible fósil que responda adecuadamente a la crisis del petróleo y el cambio climático es el enfoque de la transición diseñado para poblados y comunidades con el objetivo de que creen sus propios discursos, escenarios y prácticas de transición: lo que se refiere como “iniciativa de transiciones locales”, ITL (*transition town initiative*; véanse Hopkins, 2008; Chamberlin, 2009). Esta convincente visión comprende tanto el esbozo de un escenario post-petróleo a largo plazo y una guía para los poblados y comunidades a avanzar en un marco temporal de la transición. Una vez más, la re-localización de alimentos, energía y de la toma de decisiones son elementos cruciales de las ITL. La ITL también contempla la revitalización de las comunidades para que sean más localizadas y autosuficientes, con menos infraestructuras de energía (“descenso energético” o “bajón de electricidad”), y, muy importante, las herramientas y procesos para la reconstrucción de la resiliencia de los ecosistemas y las comunidades

erosionada por siglos de sistemas económicos y políticos deslocalizados, dirigidos por expertos. La resiliencia es en realidad el enfoque alternativo de la transición a las nociones convencionales de sostenibilidad; este enfoque requiere "sembrar" las comunidades con diversidad, el aumento de la confianza social y ecológica en la auto-organización, el fortalecimiento de la capacidad de producir localmente lo que se puede producir localmente, y así sucesivamente. Tal como está planteada, sin embargo, la ITL, se encuentra más cerca al desarrollo alternativo que a las alternativas al desarrollo. Hay, pues, un puente importante que necesita ser construido entre la visión de la ITL y el postdesarrollo[18].

En conjunto, se puede decir que estos trabajos imaginan una ecología de la transición, la cual puede ser considerada como un subcampo del campo más amplio de los estudios de la transición con el cual comenzó esta sección. Esta ecología de la transición plantea una profunda transformación cultural, económica, científica y política de las instituciones y prácticas dominantes —una tarea difícil por cierto—. Al enfatizar la re-localización y la reconstrucción de las comunidades locales, va directamente en contra de la mayoría de los discursos y fuerzas de la globalización, apuesta al hecho de que lo "pequeño" no solo es posible sino tal vez inevitable (por ejemplo, Hopkins, 2008: 68-77; Estill, 2008). Al hacer visibles los dañinos efectos de las instituciones culturales del individuo y el mercado, dirigen nuestra atención a la necesidad de reconstruir la identidad y la economía, muchas veces en conjunto con las comunidades en las que los regímenes de la persona y el mercado todavía no se

han consolidado completamente en la vida socio-natural. Abogan por una economía diversa que tiene un fuerte fundamento en las comunidades, aunque, por supuesto, no está circunscrita a lo local (Gibson-Graham, 2006). El foco de muchos DsT sobre la espiritualidad es un recordatorio de la exclusión sistemática de este importante sector en nuestras academias seculares. Al enfatizar la continuidad entre naturaleza y cultura, en fin, los DsT resaltan uno de los imperativos fundamentales de nuestro tiempo: la necesidad de volver a conectarnos entre sí y con el mundo no humano Esta última es también una llamada para el posicionamiento del pluriverso, como veremos en la siguiente sección[19].

5. AMÉRICA LATINA: ¿HACIA UN PLURIVERSO?[20]

Algunos movimientos y debates intelectuales de América Latina intuyen medidas posibles para alejarse del “modelo civilizatorio” de la modernización y el desarrollo globalizado. Reunión tras reunión de pueblos indígenas, afrodescendientes, mujeres y campesinos, la crisis del modelo civilizatorio occidental es invocada como la causa más importante de la actual crisis global de energía/clima y pobreza. Un cambio hacia un nuevo paradigma cultural y económico es reconocido tanto como necesario y como activamente en construcción[21]. Si bien el énfasis en una transición a nivel de todo el modelo de la sociedad es más fuerte entre algunos movimientos indígenas, también se encuentra, por ejemplo, en redes agroecológicas

para las cuales solo un cambio hacia los sistemas agroecológicos de producción de alimentos localizados nos puede sacar de la crisis climática y alimentaria. Las propuestas agroecológicas resuenan con Shiva, y se les hacen eco parcialmente en la red global Vía Campesina, centrada en la soberanía alimentaria sobre la agricultura de base campesina. El significado de la transición y el postdesarrollo se puede vislumbrar con claridad en los debates más recientes sobre la definición del desarrollo y los derechos de la naturaleza que tienen lugar en países como Ecuador y Bolivia; y en una nueva ola de movimientos y luchas en estos países y en otras partes del continente que pueden ser interpretadas en términos de dos procesos interrelacionados, a saber, la activación de las ontologías relacionales y una redefinición de la autonomía política. Si bien estas tendencias son contradictorias y debatidas profundamente, apuntan hacia la importancia del postdesarrollo y hacen tangible la noción de órdenes sociales postliberales.

Las constituciones de Ecuador y Bolivia, sancionadas en 2008, han ganado una bien merecida atención internacional debido a sus tratamientos pioneros del desarrollo y, en el caso ecuatoriano, de los derechos de la naturaleza. Cabe destacar que estas constituciones son el resultado de complejas luchas sociales, culturales y políticas que se agudizaron en la década pasada. Las constituciones introdujeron una nueva noción de desarrollo centrada en el concepto de *sumak kawsay* (en quechua), *suma qamaña* (en aymara) o *buen vivir* (en español). Como Alberto Acosta, uno de los arquitectos más destacados de la constitución ecuatoriana, plantea el *sumak kawsay* supone

una ruptura conceptual con las concepciones de desarrollo de las últimas seis décadas. Más que una declaración constitucional, “el Buen Vivir constituye una oportunidad para construir colectivamente un nuevo régimen de desarrollo” (2009: 6). Aunque un número de fuentes se citan como la base de esta concepción —incluyendo análisis críticos del desarrollo y del postdesarrollo, así como perspectivas feministas, ecologistas, y enfoques de desarrollo humano— la mayor proporción del crédito la tienen las organizaciones indígenas. Para Catherine Walsh (2009: 5), “la visión integral y la condición básica del Buen Vivir que han sido la base de las cosmovisiones, filosofías de vida y las prácticas de los pueblos del *Abya Yala* y los descendientes de la diáspora africana desde hace siglos, son ahora re-aprehendidos como guías para la refundación del Estado y la sociedad boliviana y ecuatoriana”. En efecto, se puede decir que el *sumak kawsay* y *suma qamaña* nacen “de la periferia social de la periferia global”, como lo ha planteado el crítico del desarrollo español José María Tortosa (citado en Acosta, 2010). Para el sociólogo peruano Aníbal Quijano (2010), el Buen Vivir constituye un nuevo horizonte de sentido histórico, surgido de la larga historia de resistencia indígena contra el sistema mundo moderno/colonial eurocéntrico.

Muy sucintamente, y siguiendo a Acosta y a Gudynas[22], el Buen Vivir (BV) surgió de varias décadas de luchas indígenas, las cuales se articularon con agendas múltiples de cambios sociales de los campesinos, afrodescendientes, ambientalistas, estudiantes, mujeres y jóvenes. Cristalizado en 99 artículos de la Constitución (de un total de 444), el BV “se presenta como una

oportunidad para la construcción colectiva de una nueva forma de vida" (Acosta, 2010: 7). Antes que una intervención aislada, el BV debe considerarse en el contexto de toda una gama de innovaciones constitucionales pioneras, incluyendo el replanteamiento del Estado en términos de plurinacionalidad, de la sociedad en términos de interculturalidad, una noción amplia e integral de los derechos (incluidos los derechos a la naturaleza, abajo), y un modelo de desarrollo reformado, cuyo objetivo es precisamente la realización del BV. Todas estas innovaciones, además, deben ser consideradas como multiculturales, multiepistémicas, y en términos de procesos de construcción política profundamente negociados y a menudo contradictorios. Es claro, sin embargo, que el BV constituye un desafío a nociones de desarrollo de larga data.

Las ontologías o "cosmovisiones" indígenas no implican una noción lineal del desarrollo, ni un estado de "subdesarrollo" que hay que superar, ni están basadas en la "escasez" o la primacía de los bienes materiales. Haciendo eco de estos principios, el BV pretende introducir una filosofía de vida diferente en la visión de sociedad. Esto hace posible una ética del desarrollo que subordina los objetivos económicos a criterios ecológicos, a la dignidad humana y a la justicia social. El desarrollo como Buen Vivir busca articular la economía, el medio ambiente, la sociedad y la cultura en nuevas formas, llamando a las economías sociales y solidarias mixtas; introduce temas de justicia social e intergeneracional en los espacios de los principios del desarrollo; reconoce las diferencias culturales y de género, posicionando la interculturalidad como principio rector; y permite los nuevos

énfasis político-económicos, tales como la soberanía alimentaria, el control de los recursos naturales y un derecho humano al agua. Sería un error, sin embargo, considerar el BV como un proyecto cultural-político puramente andino, un punto que Acosta (2010) afirma rotundamente. Como ya se mencionó, el BV también está influenciado por las corrientes críticas del pensamiento occidental, y su objetivo es influir en los debates globales. Dicho esto, existe un amplio reconocimiento de que los conocimientos indígenas y afro han sido sometidos a procesos de marginación de larga data, o lo que en algunas de las perspectivas actuales de América Latina se conoce como "colonialidad". El BV, de esta manera, busca revertir la colonialidad del poder, del conocimiento y del ser que han caracterizado al sistema mundo moderno/colonial desde la conquista (Quijano, 2010). En algunos debates en los países andinos, esto se conoce como "descolonización epistémica".

Muchos de los argumentos acerca del BV también se pueden hacer con respecto a otra idea principal de la Constitución, la de los derechos de la naturaleza; de hecho, los dos aspectos están estrechamente relacionados entre sí. Para el ecologista social uruguayo Eduardo Gudynas (2009a, 2009b), los derechos de la naturaleza o la *Pachamama*, reconocidos en la nueva Constitución del Ecuador, representan un "giro biocentrico" sin precedentes, lejos del antropocentrismo de la modernidad. Para Gudynas, este movimiento resuena tanto con las cosmovisiones de los grupos étnicos como con los principios de la ecología. Dotar a la naturaleza de los derechos significa pasar de una concepción de la naturaleza como objeto para ser explotado a

una en la que la naturaleza es vista como sujeto; de hecho, en esta concepción la idea de los derechos de la naturaleza está íntimamente relacionada con el derecho a existir de los seres humanos. Este aspecto de la Constitución busca contrarrestar un supuesto ontológico central del sistema capitalista moderno/colonial, que está en la base de la destrucción sistemática de la existencia biofísica, es decir, la separación entre los seres humanos y no humanos. También implica una noción ecológica expandida del yo que, a diferencia de la noción liberal, considera al yo profundamente interconectado con todos los otros seres vivos y, en última instancia, con el planeta como un todo. Para Gudynas, esto equivale a una especie de "meta-ciudadanía eco-lógica", una forma plural de la ciudadanía que involucra dimensiones culturales y ecológicas, y que requiere tanto de la justicia ambiental como de la justicia ecológica para la protección de las personas y la naturaleza, respectivamente[23]. De este modo, el giro biocéntrico en la Constitución representa un ejemplo concreto de la transformación civilizacional imaginada por los discursos de la transición discutidos anteriormente.

El reconocimiento de los derechos de la naturaleza está estrechamente relacionado con el último aspecto de las transformaciones de América Latina que quiero discutir, aunque sea muy brevemente; esto es la noción y la práctica de la relacionalidad[24]. Hay una convergencia interesante entre ciertas narrativas filosóficas, biológicas y de los pueblos indígenas en la afirmación de que la vida implica la creación de la forma (la diferencia, la morfogénesis) a partir de la dinámica de la materia

y la energía[25]. En estas concepciones, el mundo es un pluriverso, en incesante movimiento, una red siempre cambiante de interrelaciones entre seres humanos y no humanos. Es importante señalar, sin embargo, que el pluriverso da lugar a coherencias y cristaliza en prácticas y estructuras a través de procesos que tienen mucho que ver con los significados y el poder; de esta manera esto se puede ver en términos de una multiplicidad de mundos. Con la ontología moderna, como ya se ha sugerido, ciertas construcciones y prácticas han llegado a ser prominentes. Estos supuestos incluyen la primacía ontológica de los seres humanos sobre los no-humanos (la separación de la naturaleza y la cultura) y de algunos seres humanos sobre otros (la brecha colonial entre el Occidente/ moderno y el resto/ no moderno); la separación del individuo autónomo de la comunidad; la creencia en el conocimiento objetivo, la razón y la ciencia como los únicos modos de conocimiento válido; y la construcción cultural de la "economía" como un reino independiente de la vida social, con el "mercado" como una entidad auto-regulada. Los mundos y saberes construidos sobre la base de estos compromisos ontológicos devinieron en "un universo". Este universo ha adquirido cierta coherencia en formas socio-naturales como el capitalismo, el Estado, el individuo, la agricultura industrial, proyectos de macro-desarrollo, y así sucesivamente[26].

Es precisamente este conjunto de supuestos que las discusiones sobre el BV y los derechos de la naturaleza perturban. A pesar de que no se puede discutir este punto aquí en detalle, perturbar las construcciones modernas apunta a la

existencia de órdenes sociales no-liberales o post-liberales[27]; estos son mundos que van más allá de las nociones liberales fundacionales del individuo, la propiedad privada y la democracia representativa. Dicho en términos antropológicos y filosóficos, estos mundos no-liberales están basados-en-lugar y pueden ser caracterizados como instancias de cosmovisiones u ontologías relacionales. Ontologías relacionales son aquellas que evitan la división entre naturaleza y cultura, entre individuo y comunidad, y entre nosotros y ellos que son fundamentales para la ontología moderna. Esto quiere decir que algunas de las luchas en Ecuador y en Bolivia (y en otras partes del continente, incluyendo las luchas por la autonomía en Chiapas y Oaxaca, así como las luchas indígenas y afro y otras luchas campesinas en Colombia, Perú, Guatemala, y otros países) pueden leerse como *luchas ontológica*s; tienen el potencial de desnaturalizar los dualismos hegemónicos en los que se funda el orden liberal (Blaser, 2010; De la Cadena 2010; Escobar, 2010a; Povinelli, 2001). La tendencia universal y homolingüe de la modernidad dicta que se debe tratar de dominar esos mundos diferentes, es decir, borrar el pluriverso. El visibilizar el pluriverso centrándose en los conflictos ontológicos —es decir, los conflictos que surgen del encuentro desigual entre dos mundos, como en tantos conflictos relacionados con la explotación de los recursos hoy en día— se puede decir que constituye un campo de estudio al que se refiere Blaser (2010) como ontología política[28].

La aparición de las ontologías relacionales desafía el fundamento epistémico de la política moderna. Que la identificación de la naturaleza con la *Pachamama*, y el hecho de

que está dotada de “derechos” va más allá de un ambientalismo políticamente correcto, dado que la *Pachamama* no puede encajar fácilmente en la estructura filosófica de la constitución moderna, en la cual la naturaleza es vista como un objeto inerte para que los seres humanos se la apropien. Su inclusión en la Constitución contribuye así a romper el espacio político y epistémico moderno ya que ocurre por fuera de dicho espacio (De la Cadena, 2010). Algo similar puede decirse de la noción del Buen Vivir. Ambos conceptos se basan en supuestos ontológicos en los que todos los seres existen siempre en relación, y no como “objetos” o individuos. Lo que está en juego en muchas movilizaciones político-culturales en América Latina en la actualidad, de esta manera, es la activación política de las ontologías relacionales; estas movilizaciones se refieren así a *una manera diferente de imaginar la vida*, a un otro modo de existencia (Quijano, 2010). Apuntan hacia el pluriverso; en la conocida fórmula de los zapatistas, el pluriverso puede ser descrito como “un mundo donde quepan muchos mundos”. Tal vez de manera más abstracta, el pluriverso indica las luchas por lograr “mundos y conocimientos de otro modo” —es decir, mundos y saberes construidos sobre la base de los diferentes compromisos ontológicos, configuraciones epistémicas y prácticas del ser, saber y hacer—.

Las nociones de prácticas no-liberales y no-capitalistas están siendo activamente desarrolladas en América Latina, particularmente en relación con las formas urbanas y rurales de la movilización popular en Oaxaca, Chiapas, Ecuador, Bolivia y el suroccidente de Colombia[29]. No se trata simplemente de

nociones teóricas, sino el resultado de los enraizados análisis políticos, particularmente en términos del desarrollo de las formas de autonomía que incluyen formas no estatales de poder derivadas de las prácticas comunitales culturales, económicas y políticas (Esteva, 1997, 2005, 2006; Patzi, 2004; Mamani, 2005, 2006; Zibechi, 2006; Gutiérrez, 2008). En algunos casos, como en las comunidades zapatistas de Chiapas o las comunidades indígenas de Oaxaca, las formas autónomas de gobierno comunal contemporáneas se consideran enraizadas en varios siglos de resistencia indígena. En otros casos, como las comunidades aymaras urbanas de El Alto, Bolivia, lo que ocurre es una creativa re-constitución de la lógica comunitaria sobre la base de nuevas formas de territorialidad. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los casos de organización autónoma implican ciertas prácticas clave, tales como las asambleas comunales, la rotación de las obligaciones y formas de poder horizontal y disperso. En las formas comunales, el poder no funciona sobre la base de la representación liberal, sino que se funda en formas alternativas de organización social. La autonomía es, pues, un proceso tanto cultural como político. Se trata de formas autónomas de existencia y organización política autónoma y de toma de decisiones. Como dicen los zapatistas, el objetivo de la autonomía no es tanto tomar el poder y cambiar el mundo sino crear uno nuevo.

La autonomía puede ser descrita en términos de democracia radical, autodeterminación cultural y autogobierno

Lo que surge de esta interpretación es una cuestión fundamental, la de “*ser capaz de estabilizar en el tiempo* un

modo de regulación fuera de, *contra y más allá* del orden social impuesto por la producción capitalista y el Estado liberal" (Gutiérrez, 2008: 46). Esta propuesta implica tres puntos básicos: la descentralización y el desplazamiento constante de la economía capitalista con la consiguiente expansión de diversas formas de economía, incluyendo las formas comunitarias y no capitalistas; la descentralización de la democracia representativa y el establecimiento en su lugar de formas de democracia directa, autónoma y comunales; y el establecimiento de mecanismos de pluralismo epistémico y cultural (interculturalidad), entre ontologías y mundos culturales diferentes. Desde una perspectiva postestructuralista, es posible hablar de la aparición de formas post-liberales y postcapitalistas de organización social. Es importante dejar en claro una vez más lo que significa "post". El postdesarrollo señaló la posibilidad de visualizar una época donde el desarrollo dejaba de ser un principio central de organización de la vida social; más aún, visualizaba tal desplazamiento como ocurriendo en el presente. Lo mismo es cierto para el post-liberalismo, como un espacio/tiempo en construcción, cuando la vida social ya no está completamente determinada por las construcciones de la economía, el individuo, la racionalidad instrumental, la propiedad privada, y así sucesivamente. "Postcapitalista" significa igualmente ver la economía como formada por una diversidad de prácticas capitalistas, capitalistas alternativas y no capitalistas (Gibson-Graham, 2006). El *post*, de manera sucinta, significa un descentramiento del capitalismo en la definición de la economía, del liberalismo en la definición de la sociedad y de las formas

estatales de poder como la matriz definidora de organización social. Esto no quiere decir que las formas del capitalismo, el liberalismo y el Estado dejarán de existir, sino que *su centralidad discursiva y social se han desplazado en alguna medida*, por lo que el rango de las actuales experiencias sociales que son consideradas como alternativas válidas y creíbles a lo que existe se amplía de manera significativa (Santos, 2007).

Como enfatizan los proponentes del BV y de los derechos de la naturaleza, estas nociones deben considerarse como procesos en construcción en lugar de conceptos acabados. Esto es aun más valido al considerar que la mayor parte de las políticas de los gobiernos progresistas en la actualidad minan las propias condiciones para su realización. A pesar de su ruptura con muchos de los principales postulados del modelo económico neoliberal, la mayoría de estos gobiernos mantienen estrategias de desarrollo basadas en la exportación de recursos naturales, tales como materias primas agrícolas y minerales, incluyendo petróleo y gas, pero también nuevas rúbricas como la soja en Argentina y Brasil. La principal diferencia en estas políticas de gobierno reside en que los ingresos se apropian de manera diferente, con especial énfasis en la reducción de la pobreza a través de políticas redistributivas. Pero la orientación neoextractivista del modelo plantea un enorme desafío y es la principal fuente de tensión entre Estados y sectores de la sociedad civil (Gudynas, 2010a). Este modelo afecta enormemente las posibilidades de la aplicación de los derechos a la naturaleza, en tanto el neo-extractivismo de los gobiernos progresistas no solo toleran sino que coexiste fácilmente con la

destrucción del ambiente (Gudynas, 2010b). También está claro, sin embargo, que los conceptos de derechos de la naturaleza y Buen Vivir han logrado colocar la cuestión del desarrollo nuevamente en la agenda con particular agudeza. Esto implica, a su vez, la apertura de la cuestión de la transición a una sociedad postextractivista. En Ecuador y Bolivia en particular, el post-estractivismo y el post-desarrollo reúnen en un debate crucial e intenso al Estado, las ONG, los movimientos sociales y los intelectuales. Existe la sensación de un impasse creado por la tensa convivencia de las políticas progresistas pero aún economicistas y desarrollistas a nivel del Estado, por un lado, y la capacidad de los movimientos para cuestionar tales políticas desde abajo por otro lado —un tipo de "mezcla promiscua" de la hegemonía capitalista y los contrapoderes del movimiento, de exigencias radicales para el cambio y la reconstitución de la dominación— (Colectivo Situaciones, 2009). Cómo opera esta dinámica en cada país no puede ser decidido de antemano y será de importancia más allá de la región dada la intensificación del extractivismo en el mundo por el capitalismo colonial global —una re-colonización global cada vez más cínica y destructiva, como lo sugieren las lecturas críticas de la película *Avatar*—.

Para volver una última vez a la pregunta con la que se inició este capítulo, ¿sigue siendo útil la noción de postdesarrollo para transmitir tanto el decentramiento del desarrollo y la reorientación de la práctica? Es cierto que el "postdesarrollo" ha llegado a tener muy diversos, y a menudo dispares, significados. Esta es la razón por la que traté de caracterizarlo de nuevo con cuidado al principio de estas notas. También es importante reconocer la

existencia de otras aéreas de investigación y de la vida social que podrían ser considerados relacionadas con, o como avanzando hacia, el postdesarrollo[30]. Al mismo tiempo, es posible identificar las áreas en las cuales el análisis del postdesarrollo continúa siendo de utilidad directa, incluyendo las siguientes: el surgimiento de nuevos espacios, como el Buen Vivir, para reconceptualizar la realidad social y, por lo tanto, para descentrar el desarrollo; los cambios en las condiciones de la producción del conocimiento sobre el desarrollo ("economía política de la verdad" del desarrollo), resultando en una pluralización de los conocimientos, incluidos los de los activistas de los movimientos sociales; y un cuestionamiento renovado de principios fundamentales de la modernidad eurocéntrica —desde el progreso lineal y el valor económico estándar hasta el individuo liberal y la naturaleza como inerte— fortaleciendo así los enfoques no antropocéntricos y no economicistas. El postdesarrollo sigue siendo útil en la articulación de las críticas de las tendencias existentes (por ejemplo, el neo-extractivismo), para descentrar los debates y orientar la investigación hacia posibilidades no-economicistas, y para mantener vivo el imaginario del más allá del desarrollo y de las alternativas *al* desarrollo (por ejemplo, el postextractivismo y las transiciones culturales y ecológicas). Por supuesto, es el caso de que muchos de estos aspectos críticos relativos a la globalización, la naturaleza y la economía han surgido en respuesta a otros procesos sociales, intelectuales y políticos, y no necesariamente en relación con el desarrollo per se. En este sentido, sería más apropiado sugerir que el postdesarrollo sigue siendo un concepto

apto para volver a impulsar, y contribuir a articular, muchas de las preguntas cruciales del presente.

Más que un desarrollo alternativo, el Buen Vivir constituye una alternativa al desarrollo, y en esa medida se puede ver como un avance en “el camino hacia el postdesarrollo” (Acosta, 2010). En el mejor de los casos, se puede decir que el despliegue de conceptos y de las luchas en torno al Buen Vivir y los derechos de la naturaleza, surgiendo bajo la influencia toque de la autonomía, constituyen una teoría y práctica post-dualista: es decir, una práctica del inter-ser. Como tales, son elementos clave en los diseños para el pluriverso. Implican formas relacionales de ser, hacer y conocer. De esta manera, las tendencias revisadas en esta sección se sitúan de lleno dentro de los discursos de la transición. Esto permite una cierta radicalización de la discusión del postdesarrollo. Esta es una discusión en la que todas las voces críticas pueden contribuir, ya sea en el Sur o el Norte global.

6. CONCLUSIÓN. EL FIN DE LA GLOBALIZACIÓN (TAL COMO LA CONOCÍAMOS)

En su libro *El fin del capitalismo (como lo conocíamos)*, las geógrafas feministas Gibson y Graham (1996) nos invitan a imaginar un momento cuando el dominio de la economía no sea tan aparentemente natural y completamente ocupado por el capitalismo. La tendencia del capitalismo a ocupar la economía, argumentan, es por lo menos en parte, un artefacto de los

discursos y hábitos de pensamiento impulsados por las teorías académicas de la economía política en ámbitos como el desarrollo y los estudios de la globalización. En otras palabras, nuestras propias teorías dotan al capitalismo con tanta capacidad para dominar y "penetrar" que se vuelve imposible para nosotros ver el espectro de diferencia económica que habita realmente en la vida social. Al liberar la economía del capitalocentrismo, el objetivo es volver a teorizarlo como diverso, y convertir esa diversidad en un punto de encuentro para las luchas por las subjetividades no-capitalistas y construcciones alternativas del mundo.

Me parece que algo similar ha ocurrido con los discursos de la globalización de todo tipo. En estos discursos, ya sean convencionales o de izquierda, un supuesto "espacio global" es visto como natural y totalmente ocupado por formas de vida socio-naturales, que son una extensión de la modernidad al estilo occidental. No importa cuán cualificada, la globalización en estos discursos siempre equivale a una profundización y a una universalización de la modernidad capitalista. Hay algo terriblemente erróneo con este imaginario, si vamos a tomar en serio los discursos de la transición, el concepto de Buen Vivir y los derechos de la naturaleza, y mucho más si queremos enfrentar la cada vez peor crisis ecológica. Para parafrasear una vez más, escarbe un discurso de la globalización y encontrará el *Homo oeconomicus* por todos lados; supuestos "individuos" insistiendo en convertirse en clones en miniatura del capitalismo (a través de, por ejemplo, la microfinanciación, el desarrollo rural modernizante); los supuestos de la racionalidad lineal como el

modo automático de pensar de quienes quieran “triunfar” en un “mundo competitivo’’; una visión de la naturaleza como recurso a extraer a cualquier precio; o incluso de grupos y movimientos que luchan desde dentro para recuperar el proyecto moderno con propósitos emancipadores. Como lo planteé en 1995, haciendo eco de la obra de la socióloga feminista canadiense Dorothy Smith (véase el capítulo 4 del libro del que este prefacio es parte), estos discursos reflejan una visión del mundo como es concebido por quienes lo gobiernan —un mundo desde arriba—. Estos discursos despliegan eficientes aparatos de poder que organizan las percepciones y experiencias de la gente.

Cabe reiterar que este punto de vista de la globalización como universal, totalmente economizada, deslocalizada, multicultural (aunque con las culturas modernas como el modelo por excelencia), donde “individuos” (ricos) están dotados de “derechos” y las naciones tienen que aceptar los dictados de la misma racionalidad global a riesgo de convertirse en “Estados fallidos”, es cada vez más posible gracias al inmenso poder de las corporaciones y es mantenido dentro de niveles manejables de des/orden por la fuerza militar. La cara oculta de la globalización, de esta manera, no es otra que la colonialidad global. Desde sus mismas condiciones globales están surgiendo, sin embargo, las respuestas y las formas de creatividad y resistencia que hacen cada vez más visible la pobreza, lo pernicioso y destructivo de este imaginario.

Como plantea Blaser (2010), el momento actual puede ser considerado como uno de intensa lucha entre dos visiones de la globalidad: la globalidad definida como la modernidad

universalizada, o la globalidad como un pluriverso —o, como lo enuncié antes, entre el mundo como universo y el mundo como pluriverso—[31]. Antes que en términos de la globalización, esta última posibilidad sería más apropiada describirla como un proceso de planetarización articulado en torno a una visión de la Tierra como un todo viviente que está siempre emergiendo de un ensamblaje de elementos y relaciones biofísicas, humanas y espirituales que hacen el pluriverso, desde la biosfera y la mecanosfera a la noosfera. Muchas de las funciones previstas en los discursos de la transición —desde las estrategias de re-localización hasta el surgimiento de una civilización ecológica—, encontrarán un espacio más acogedor en este concepto. Tenemos que dejar de apabullar a la Tierra con los dualismos de los siglos pasados, y reconocer la interrelación, apertura y pluralidad radicales que la habitan. Para lograr este objetivo, tenemos que empezar a pensar en la práctica humana en términos de diseño ontológico, o diseño de mundos y conocimientos de otro modo. Uno de los principios del diseño ontológico es el de construir en la diversidad ya existente, o sembrar diseños con la diversidad, lo que es el principio para el pluriverso. El diseño ya no implicaría la domesticación del mundo para (algunos) propósitos humanos, sino, para retomar las palabras de Berry (1999: 11), la construcción de mundos en los que los seres humanos y la Tierra pueden co-existir enriqueciéndose mutuamente. Más políticamente, “de esta manera la defensa de la vida humana, y las condiciones de vida en el planeta, puede convertirse en el nuevo horizonte de sentido de las luchas de resistencia de la mayoría de la población

mundial” (Quijano, 2010: 7).

Yendo mucho más allá de la crítica, un campo naciente de los estudios pluriversales debería —y ya lo hace, como he tratado de demostrar en las dos últimas secciones— descubrir las formas adoptadas por los múltiples mundos que componen el pluriverso, sin tratar de reducirlos a las manifestaciones de principios conocidos. Los estudios pluriversales se centrarían en aquellos procesos que ya no pueden ser fácilmente acomodados en la tabla epistémica de las ciencias sociales modernas. Esta es la razón por la cual los estudios pluriversales no pueden ser definidos en oposición a los estudios de la globalización, ni como su complemento, sino que requieren ser esbozados como un proyecto intelectual y político completamente diferente. No existe una noción única del mundo, el ser humano, la civilización, el futuro, o incluso lo natural que pueda ocupar totalmente el espacio de los estudios pluriversales. Incluso si en parte basándose en la tradición crítica de las ciencias naturales, humanas y sociales modernas, los estudios pluriversales viajarán su propio camino a medida que descubran mundos y conocimientos que las ciencias han desconocido o solo oblicuamente considerado. Para que los estudios críticos del desarrollo estén en sintonía con este proyecto, se requeriría de una transformación mucho más significativa que la permitida por el postdesarrollo.

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Lectura 2

Post-desarrollo: más allá de la crítica[32]

Aram Ziai[33]

> El proyecto post-estructuralista era… acabar para siempre con el monstruo del desarrollo.
>
> Escobar (2000: 13).

Durante la década pasada, el pensamiento sobre el post-desarrollo ha provocado un agitado debate en los estudios sobre desarrollo. Independientemente del éxito último de su proyecto, lo cierto es que sus proponentes se las han arreglado para convencer a mucha gente de que en efecto aquí estamos tratando con un "monstruo" y no con un simple concepto, o con un aparato técnico capaz de hacer del mundo un lugar mejor. En este trabajo, además de presentar de manera muy sumaria las hipótesis fundamentales de este enfoque teórico, nos proponemos revisar las críticas más importantes que ha despertado, y que nos llevarán a distinguir entre dos variantes

del post-desarrollo. Tras ello, nos centraremos en los puntos de esa crítica que no son fácilmente refutables, y que incluso los más radicales defensores del post-desarrollo parecen haber aceptado silenciosamente. Posteriormente, defenderemos el argumento de que, en sus últimas consecuencias, el pensamiento sobre el post-desarrollo supone en suma un giro post-estructuralista en el estudio de las relaciones Norte-Sur. Por último, se señalan algunas perspectivas sobre el rumbo que esta discusión puede tomar.

1. En la cita que encabeza este trabajo queda clara la tarea que se proponen lograr los proponentes del post-desarrollo (vid. Sachs, 1992a, Escobar, 1995 y Rahnema, 1997a). Cabe preguntarse no obstante por qué proclamar que el "desarrollo" es un "monstruo" y que significa "post-desarrollo" por lo demás. En palabras de Rahnema (1997):

El "desarrollo" fue una ideología que nació y fue refinada en el Norte, con el propósito fundamental de servir a las necesidades de los poderosos, como herramienta "apropiada" para su expansión económica y geopolítica… esa ideología ayudó a transformar un colonialismo obsoleto y moribundo en un instrumento, a veces atractivo, pero agresivo, para recuperar el terreno que comenzaba a perder… El mensaje oculto, aunque siempre claro, que todo proyecto de desarrollo ha transmitido a la gente es que sus formas tradicionales de vivir, pensar, y hace las cosas, les habrían condenado a una condición sub-humana (Rahnema, 1997b: 397, 384).

Sin embargo, a comienzos de los noventa la era del

“desarrollo” parece haber llegado a su fin. En palabras de Sachs (1992) “había llegado el momento de escribir su obituario”, y ello por cuatro razones: 1) Los imperativos ecológicos han desautorizado la pretensión de que los países industrializados puedan ser un modelo para el resto del mundo; 2) La idea del desarrollo fue una invención de la Guerra Fría y ya no se necesita; 3) El proyecto de transformar las áreas subdesarrolladas en desarrolladas no solo ha fracasado, la brecha entre ambas se ha profundizado; 4) La occidentalización del mundo que constituía uno de los núcleos del proyecto del desarrollo ha sido crecientemente rechazada. En su lugar, la gente en los márgenes del sistema, desilusionada por su fracaso, estaría buscando alternativas al desarrollo, re-inventando el conocimiento, la economía y la política sobre las bases de su propia identidad cultural.

2. Esas hipótesis que acabamos de esbozar han recibido no obstante críticas frontales, que pueden resumirse en los siguientes puntos:

- El pensamiento del post-desarrollo parte de una visión acrítica de las comunidades locales y de las culturas tradicionales. Sus textos parecen ofrecer “el último refugio para los nobles salvajes” (Kiely, 1999), ofreciendo una visión a la vez idealizada y desesperanzadora de la vida tradicional que proyecta imágenes románticas sobre la cruda realidad de esas “alternativas al desarrollo”.
- Por otro lado, el rechazo frontal de la modernidad y del desarrollo ignora numerosos aspectos positivos a los

que van inevitablemente unidos: desde los derechos individuales a los logros de la moderna medicina en la reducción de la mortalidad infantil (Corbridge, 1998: 145).

- Quienes proponen el post-desarrollo, en su celebración de la diferencia cultural, y su rechazo del universalismo, acaban aceptando o desarrollando una complicidad con las formas de opresión legitimadas por esas nociones (Knippenberger y Schuurman, 1994: 95). La mutilación genital femenina sería uno entre múltiples ejemplos.
- Después de todo, el post-desarrollo no es sino otra visión de una sociedad mejor, basada en los valores y las prácticas entendidos de una manera anti-occidental, pero que sigue diciendo a la gente como debe vivir, lo que resulta tan autoritario como el propio desarrollo (Cowen y Shenton, 1996: 457 y 470).

Una mirada detenida sobre esas críticas es válida al menos para una parte del pensamiento sobre el post-desarrollo, pues puede afirmarse que dentro de este enfoque conviven dos discursos en conflicto entre sí: por un lado, una variante neo-populista que ha sido convenientemente criticada, que representan autores como Alvares y Rahnema, y en segundo lugar, una visión más escéptica, muy diferente de la anterior y que resiste esa crítica mucho mejor, y que puede encontrarse en la obra de Nandy y Marglin. Esta variante escéptica es bien consciente de las relaciones de poder dentro de las culturas tradicionales y en cada comunidad local. Reconoce a su vez los elementos emancipatorios de la modernidad y a menudo

propone la noción de hibridación como práctica que mezcla elementos de la tradición indígena con otros de la modernidad occidental. Este enfoque mantiene un concepto constructivista de la cultura, lo que hace su relativismo menos peligroso puesto que define la cultura de acuerdo a lo que la gente realmente hace. Por último, esta perspectiva elude proponer fáciles modelos para las transformaciones sociales pues entiende que deben ser las comunidades, por sí mismas, las que decidan democráticamente hacia dónde quieren ir (véase Ziai, 2004).

3. Sin embargo, sucede también que la difusión que han alcanzado las críticas más severas al post-desarrollo ha impedido advertir que dos de las más significativas hipótesis de esta escuela de pensamiento son aceptadas usualmente, aunque de manera implícita, por sus críticos. Aunque afirmar el fracaso total del desarrollo del Sur como gran proyecto pueda parecer controvertido a la vista de las estadísticas de progreso elaboradas por los organismos de Naciones Unidas, en materias tales como la esperanza de vida o la mortalidad infantil desde los años cincuenta, resulta muy discutible que, en las condiciones actuales del sistema global, el desarrollo armonioso de las comunidades locales pueda ser viable. Sin embargo, poca gente del mundo de la cooperación y el desarrollo pondría en duda que:

- El concepto tradicional de “desarrollo” es sin duda euro-céntrico. La idea de caracterizar la Europa Occidental y América del Norte como “desarrollados” y África, Asia o América Latina como “subdesarrollados” es una

elaboración euro-céntrica en la que la sociedad propia es percibida como la que constituye el modelo ideal o normal, mientras las otras se perciben como desviaciones imperfectas de esa norma, o como versiones inferiores de aquella. Como si estuvieran siempre aplicados a un proceso de acercamiento a la norma, pero un proceso que nunca podrá culminar. El discurso del desarrollo ha evolucionado desde el discurso colonial, que constituye su predecesor directo en la medida en que ambos se empeñan en conceptualizar el Sur desde la perspectiva del Norte. Naturalmente no faltará quien señale que la vida en las sociedades industrializadas parece más fácil. En términos de recursos materiales, el estándar de vida de la mayoría de la gente en el primer grupo es seguramente superior al del segundo grupo. Sin embargo que ello suponga necesariamente una forma de vida superior es algo mucho más discutible. Esta premisa ignora además, como resultado de su nacionalismo metodológico, las relaciones económicas necesarias entre las sociedades acomodadas y las partes más pobres del mundo, y desprecia, más allá de la capacidad de comprar bienes materiales, otros muchos indicadores posibles para establecer lo que una “buena vida” o una “buena sociedad” puedan ser. Si definiéramos los crímenes violentos, el racismo, el suicidio, la alienación, la destrucción medioambiental, y tantos otros aspectos negativos, como indicadores de subdesarrollo, los

países industrializados difícilmente estarían en la cima de la escala del desarrollo. Por el contrario, resulta igualmente cierto que podemos imaginar formas muy diversas de medir el desarrollo, entendido como cambio social positivo. De igual modo, el que la mayoría de la gente del Sur comparta los valores convencionales del desarrollo puede ser debatido entre los proponentes y los defensores del post-desarrollo, pero el carácter no universal de esos valores no debería serlo.

- El concepto tradicional de desarrollo tiene implicaciones autoritarias y tecnocráticas. Resulta claro que cualquiera —generalmente una persona experta— que pretenda definir lo que es el “desarrollo” y como puede alcanzarse se sitúa en una posición de poder, toda vez que ese desarrollo se presenta siempre como sinónimo de un cambio social positivo. Después de todo, eso era también lo que daba forma a la noción de protectorado (Cowen y Sentón, 1996). El pensamiento sobre el post-desarrollo ha mostrado convincentemente que algunas de las medidas que se tomaron en el nombre del “desarrollo” tuvieron consecuencias nefastas para aquellas poblaciones a las que supuestamente iba a beneficiar. La violencia que tuvieron que sufrir estaba directamente relacionada con la pérdida de control acerca de si querían de verdad, o no, ese “desarrollo”, así como de decidir quién estaba en la posición discursiva para definir lo que habría de constituir el bien común, y qué o a quién había que sacrificar para

> lograrlo. El conocimiento sobre el “desarrollo” visto así es un conocimiento sobre las deficiencias de las formas de vida de los otros, sobre la necesidad de su transformación, el método para ello, y sobre la legitimidad última de toda esa operación. Frente al reconocimiento de la existencia de formas muy diversas de entender lo que constituye una buena sociedad, la adopción de una definición universal presume claramente una posición de poder.

Menos obvias resultan sin embargo las consecuencias que el rechazo de las implicaciones autoritarias del concepto de “desarrollo” pueda tener. Esto es algo que preocupa a quienes ven la modernidad como una aberración o un desvío del sendero natural de la historia, y predican el retorno a las comunidades de subsistencia. Cualquier posición que descanse explícitamente en estándares universales para clasificar y evaluar a las diversas sociedades subordina de hecho las incontables percepciones y valores de su sociedad y muy especialmente de otras sociedades. Esa posición resulta extremadamente peligrosa cuando se relaciona con el poder político para transformar las sociedades de acuerdo a esos valores supuestamente universales. Ese es precisamente el problema que suscita cualquier tecnología social o reforma tecnocrática que pretende reorganizar las sociedades de acuerdo a cualquier pretensión racional adoptada desde arriba, por muy bien intencionada y llena de sentido que pueda parecer. No en vano, incluso cuando se pretende actuar en nombre de un cierto comunismo, puede ser que ni siquiera después de todo se tenga esa buena

intención. Aquí de nuevo habrá quien pueda señalar, con argumentos bastante convincentes, que la reorganización racional de la sociedad es deseable y que quizás se justifique realizar algunos sacrificios para que la mayoría pueda mejorar su nivel de vida. El problema es que una vez planteado el debate sobre esta cuestión por el post-desarrollo, la cuestión de esa reorganización, incluso cuando se pretende a su manera, no puede darse por resuelta sin más. Por ello, la mera reiteración de la crítica a las grandes narrativas del progreso y del cambio social resulta cada vez menos convincente.

Estas dos hipótesis del post-desarrollo que acabamos de analizar, esto es, su carácter euro-céntrico y sus implicaciones tecnocráticas y autoritarias, no han sido contestadas ni siquiera por sus críticos más afilados. Aquellos que quieren “masacrar el monstruo del desarrollo” han dado algunos golpes que pueden ser fatales en el largo plazo.

4. Otro cuestionamiento que no ha sido hasta ahora mencionado es aquel que critica la supuesta consistencia teórica —basada generalmente en el análisis del discurso y el post-estructuralismo inspirado en Foucault— atribuida al post-desarrollo, y que, al parecer de sus críticos, resultaría poco convincente. Tales bases conceptuales tienen una gran similitud con la crítica tradicional de la ideología y el estructuralismo lingüístico, y su método más habitual consiste a menudo en sugerir que “allá donde el desarrollo pretende ser algo bueno, en realidad es algo malo”, aplicarlo a lo que el desarrollo resulta ser, y en consecuencia, rechazarlo. De este modo, el concepto de “desarrollo” con sus

promesas de prosperidad universal es identificado con un “espejismo decepcionante” (Rahnema, 1997c: X) o con un “mito fatal” (Esteva, 1991: 76). Como ha señalado acertadamente Crush, respecto a un importante representante del post-desarrollo: “en su afán por expulsar los conceptos erróneos, Sachs sugiere implícitamente que es posible llegar a una definición inequívoca de los mismos” (Crush, 1995: 3). Por su parte, Pieterse añade al respecto: “parecería que esa suerte de esencialización del concepto de desarrollo es necesaria para llegar al repudio radical del mismo… sin ese pathos anti-desarrollo el pensamiento del post-desarrollo parece perder su fundamento” (Pieterse, 2001: 106).

Aunque es perfectamente posible mantener el grueso de la crítica al desarrollo, e incluso aceptar una visión mucho más matizada del conjunto de prácticas que se despliegan en el nombre del desarrollo, lo cierto es que las críticas que acabamos de señalar siguen siendo válidas: rechazar de pleno el desarrollo presupone partir de una definición absolutamente precisa de lo que el desarrollo pueda ser. Esto desde luego es un punto de partida muy discutible para una perspectiva que se proclama post-estructuralista. Tanto el estructuralismo como el post-estructuralismo comparten que los signos lingüísticos se componen de significante (por ejemplo, la palabra “gato”), y significado (el animal que caza furiosamente ratones y produce ocasionalmente maullidos), que la relación entre ambos es generalmente arbitraria, y que el sentido es el resultado de la relación diferencial entre significantes (por ejemplo, “gato”, frente a “pato” o “rato”). Sin embargo, el estructuralismo asume que las

lenguas son sistemas estables en los que a cada significante corresponde generalmente un cierto significado. El post-estructuralismo, por el contrario, afirma que la relación entre significante y significado no es en modo alguno estable, sino que tiene que ser continuamente recreada, y que además hay innumerables variaciones del significado según los diversos contextos.

Pero sería demasiado simple dar por acabada la cuestión aquí, pues el pensamiento del post-desarrollo ha señalado, en línea con el post-estructuralismo, que el significante "desarrollo" ha sido usado con denotaciones muy diferentes a lo largo de su historia conceptual: proyectos de infraestructura perjudiciales para el medio ambiente y políticas medioambientales para reparar el perjuicio ocasionado, políticas de ajuste estructural que profundizaron la desigualdad y políticas sociales que quieren paliar sus efectos, y así tantas otras cosas. Hemos tenido desarrollo económico, integrado, sostenible, participativo, endógeno y desarrollo humano. Esteva ha denunciado esa "inflación conceptual" (Esteva, 1992: 12), y Sachs ha señalado que "el sentido del desarrollo ha acabado por explosionar, cubriendo una plétora cada vez más amplia de prácticas contradictorias… se ha llegado a un caos semántico total… el desarrollo se ha transformado en una especie de ameba amorfa. No puede contener nada porque sus contornos están demasiado difusos" (Sachs, 1999: 7).

El problema es obvio: si el desarrollo puede ser constantemente redefinido de manera arbitraria, ¿cómo pueden estar tan seguros quienes defienden el post-desarrollo de que

cualquiera que sea su contenido este debe ser rechazado? La respuesta aquí suele ser doble. En primer lugar, sugieren que el concepto estaría invariablemente instrumentalizado por una suerte de "campaña política" (Esteva, 1992:6): "Aquellos que pronuncian la palabra en cuestión no parecen decir nada más allá de proclamar sus buenas intenciones. De este modo, el desarrollo acaba careciendo de contenido pero no por ello pierde sus funciones: cualquier intervención que proclame una aspiración de mejora quedará así bendecida" (Sachs, 1999: 7).

En segundo lugar, desde el post-desarrollo se sugiere que quienes utilizan la palabra no pueden librarse de toda esa red de significados, que llevaría a la ceguera y la ofuscación de su lenguaje, pensamiento y acción. Más allá del contexto en que se utilice, o de las connotaciones que quiera darle cada persona, la expresión queda encorsetada e impregnada de significados no deseados. La noción de desarrollo, nos recuerda Esteva (1992: 9-10), siempre quiere implicar un cambio favorable, un paso desde lo simple a lo complejo, de lo inferior a lo superior, de lo peor a lo mejor. La palabra desarrollo indica que se estarían haciendo las cosas bien, que se avanza en el camino de lo necesario, ineludible, universal, hacia un objetivo deseable… "la metáfora del desarrollo otorga así hegemonía global a una genealogía de la historia puramente occidental, arrebatando a otros pueblos y culturas la oportunidad de definir sus propias formas de vida social… el énfasis en el crecimiento económico —establecido por los planificadores que dieron forma al famoso proyecto de desarrollo anunciado por Truman— es la expresión última de su propia esencia" (Esteva, 1992: 17). "Sin embargo,

cuando se aplica, la idea de desarrollo siempre implica que hay campeones que muestran el camino a los rezagados. Bastaría con seguir la planificación adecuada. Incluso cuando el crecimiento económico no se produce, quienes hablan de desarrollo siguen teniendo argumentos, invocando la universalidad, el progreso, las oportunidades abiertas… el desarrollo siempre puede mirar otros mundos y señalar sus carencias" (Sachs, 1999: 7).

En todo caso, existe una cierta tensión entre el planteamiento teórico de que el desarrollo es discurso siempre en proceso de readaptación constante, y que toma una y otra vez formas muy diferentes, y la idea de que el desarrollo tendría en el fondo unas características inmutables. No se puede afirmar a la vez la maleabilidad del desarrollo y que el desarrollo tenga una esencia.

Para clarificar esta cuestión, debemos distinguir diferentes pretensiones. No solo tenemos que diferenciar entre el desarrollo como concepto y el desarrollo como práctica, sino también, respecto de este último, la noción de desarrollo como proceso natural y desarrollo como política intencionada. E incluso esa intención misma, en sus dimensiones históricas, concretas y meramente abstractas. Respecto al desarrollo como concepto, comprendemos fácilmente sus raíces en el evolucionismo decimonónico, que por un lado entiende como natural el desarrollo del capitalismo a lo largo de la historia, pero a la vez aspira al desarrollo intencional del mismo en algunas áreas del planeta. En sus dimensiones concretas, el concepto de desarrollo, que evolucionó como sucesor del discurso colonial en

cuanto conceptualización de las relaciones Norte-Sur, señalaba a Europa Occidental y América del Norte como modelos ideales de desarrollo, enfatizando la necesidad de fomentar el crecimiento económico, la modernización y la industrialización. En cuanto abstracción, el desarrollo estaba basado en la presunción de que hay un proceso general de cambio que todas las sociedades habrían de experimentar tarde o temprano, y que ese proceso es además deseable, con independencia de las diferencias culturales que puedan existir.

Aunque en el plano conceptual puedan imaginarse otras formas de aplicación en las relaciones Norte-Sur en la era postcolonial, lo cierto es que en su práctica, no obstante, el proyecto del desarrollo estuvo vinculado históricamente a su función política durante de la Guerra Fría, y a las intervenciones en ese contexto desplegadas por los expertos. Desde una posición post-estructuralista, podemos concebir que a través de los constantes cambios discursivos y del surgimiento de nuevas prácticas, así como de una nueva conciencia ecológica, las sociedades occidentales puedan llegar a dejar de ser el modelo a seguir. Pero seguro que puede surgir un nuevo modelo o estándar universal que se pretenda válido tanto para las sociedades que pasan por ser desarrolladas como para las que se dirían subdesarrolladas, que de nuevo ignorará las diferencias culturales, y las nociones heterogéneas de lo que pueda ser una buena sociedad.

En todo caso, esa posición parece subestimar la capacidad de persistencia de las realidades discursivas, y de las relaciones entre significante y significado. Lo cierto es que por más que

podamos redefinir de manera radical el desarrollo, por ejemplo, como una relación armoniosa con la naturaleza y una forma de cooperación social entre iguales, no basta simplemente con cambiar el discurso. La red de significados preexistente seguirá presente en el pensamiento, el habla, y la escritura de todos los demás. Parece claro que al contemplar el desarrollo hay algunas premisas ligadas al concepto mismo que resulta prácticamente imposible cambiar, incluso discursivamente —tal es el caso, por ejemplo, de la idea de que las diversas sociedad son comparables en términos de su menor o mayor desarrollo—.

Sin embargo, algunas de esas mismas premisas parecen transformables, aunque no sin dificultades, en su práctica concreta. Por ejemplo, revisar la caracterización de los países industrializados como necesariamente más desarrollados, cuestionar la centralidad del crecimiento económico como elemento central del desarrollo, o repensar la noción de que el desarrollo habrá de surgir de las intervenciones planificadoras de los expertos.

En este sentido, hay que subrayar que durante las últimas décadas se ha producido una transformación muy notable del discurso del desarrollo que parece tener el potencial, incluso, de modificar sus propios fundamentos. Elementos de esa transformación, incluso en el contexto de la irrupción del neoliberalismo en el campo del desarrollo, pueden encontrarse, por ejemplo, en la integración de manera benigna de nociones tales como participación y sostenibilidad. A la luz de esos cambios, la posición post-desarrollista debería ser muy cuidadosa al delinear qué significa exactamente el desarrollo: el

desarrollo como concepto euro-céntrico concreto —aunque dejando espacio para un universalismo alternativo—, o un concepto abstracto en general, que abrace el relativismo cultural. Desarrollo como proceso natural o como política específica. Desarrollo como el agregado de las intervenciones concretas de los expertos occidentales, o como resultado de una intervención planeada… La confusión entre todas esas nociones no facilita desde luego el debate o la reflexión crítica sobre el desarrollo o el post-desarrollo. Quien se sitúe en una posición post-estructuralista, debe tener presente que las definiciones de desarrollo, las relaciones entre significante y significado, jamás pueden pretender validez universal o natural. Debe reconocer el carácter contingente, y en consecuencia político, de esas relaciones y la necesidad de pensar su justificación. Desde esa perspectiva, el debate teórico sobre estos temas puede abrir perspectivas muy prometedoras.

5. No cabe duda que la crítica de corte post-estructuralista introducida por las aportaciones del post-desarrollo ha mostrado un importante potencial de innovación en el plano teórico. Más interesante resulta sin embargo preguntarse sobre su potencial de transformación en la práctica: ¿Puede la práctica del desarrollo, sus políticas y proyectos, reformarse siguiendo los ideales del post-desarrollo o esa es una esperanza en vano? Por lo que respecta a los profesionales del desarrollo: ¿Pueden evitar las implicaciones euro-céntricas y autoritarias del concepto o las estructuras institucionales y discursivas del sistema del desarrollo se revelarán más fuertes? ¿Existen, en suma,

alternativas al desarrollo? ¿En qué medida las luchas de los movimientos sociales y las prácticas de las comunidades pueden ser su expresión? Esas iniciativas, ¿están acaso orientadas hacia el desarrollo entendido en su sentido tradicional, o por el contrario, se sitúan contra el mismo?

Por último, cabe preguntarse también por las nuevas formas híbridas de subjetividad, los modos en que pueda surgir una nueva forma de cooperación social, con aspiraciones y conocimientos muy diversos en presencia, así como sobre las relaciones de poder que en ese nuevo escenario puedan operar. Este número ofrece respuestas interesantes a todas estas importantes preguntas —otras pueden encontrarse en Ziai (2007)—. Todas esas contribuciones prometen en definitiva llevar el debate sobre el post-desarrollo más allá de la crítica que hasta ahora se ha podido escuchar.

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Lectura 3

El Sumak Kawsay en el discurso del movimiento indígena ecuatoriano[34]

Philipp Altmann

La Constitución Ecuatoriana de 2008 fue celebrada por buena parte de la izquierda nacional e internacional, no tanto debido a que formalmente declara que el país es "intercultural, plurinacional" (art. 1), una reivindicación antigua del movimiento indígena, sino, más bien, a que introduce el concepto del Buen Vivir o *Sumak Kawsay*. Este constituye una crítica al desarrollo modernizante en tanto propone una vida en armonía con la naturaleza y los otros seres humanos. El *Sumak Kawsay* ha sido discutido ampliamente por los intelectuales de izquierda, entre

quienes sobresale en Ecuador el economista Alberto Acosta (por ejemplo, 2010), y es considerado lo verdaderamente novedoso de la nueva Constitución.

Observado más cuidadosamente, sin embargo, se advierte que este concepto pretendidamente indígena no proviene directamente del movimiento indígena y su larga tradición de criticar la idea occidental de desarrollo para reivindicar la protección de la naturaleza. En las críticas provenientes del movimiento indígena no se habló nunca del Buen Vivir o del *Sumak Kawsay*, es decir, de un concepto único que integrara esa crítica al desarrollo capitalista. Este concepto aparece por primera vez en publicaciones posteriores al año 2000. La primera publicación del entorno del movimiento indígena ecuatoriano sobre este concepto proviene de una organización local de la Amazonía que en 2003 sistematiza el *Sumak Kawsay* en el contexto de su lucha contra la explotación petrolera en su territorio. En dicha publicación se plantea la idea de una estructura económica y política que permita la armonía entre individuo, sociedad y naturaleza, y se detalla su versión de la cosmovisión indígena.

Una buena parte de la discusión del nuevo concepto del Buen Vivir ocurre entre los intelectuales urbanos y mestizos, mientras que el movimiento indígena nacional comienza a manejarlo y a definirlo mejor recién en el contexto de la Constituyente 2007/2008. En este artículo se analizan las ideas centrales del discurso del movimiento indígena hasta la introducción del concepto del Buen Vivir, la aparición de este concepto en la escena de la sociedad civil, la apropiación del mismo por parte

del Gobierno ecuatoriano y grupos aines, y, finalmente, cómo el movimiento indígena pone en duda la capacidad definitoria del Gobierno.

El movimiento indígena ecuatoriano es un movimiento social, y como tal funciona. Distintas organizaciones de movilización social compiten entre sí por ganar nuevos miembros y recursos. Una de las estrategias fundamentales en esta competencia es la de apropiarse de “símbolos clave” (Zald, 1979: 13-14) que pueden ser materiales, como banderas o símbolos semejantes, o también inmateriales, como conceptos o ideas. Lo importante de estos símbolos clave es que sirven para movilizar a los miembros de la organización, lo cual propicia el acceso a nuevos recursos. Si la organización tiene éxito, otras organizaciones van a intentar copiar el símbolo clave, o a crear uno semejante, al tiempo que mantienen y subrayan sus diferencias con la organización en cuestión (Zald, 1979: 13-14).Así, los movimientos sociales y sus organizaciones compiten “por el predominio simbólico: cuál organización tiene los mejores programas, tácticas y líder es para alcanzar metas” (Zald y McCarthy, 1979: 3). En esto no es relevante si el símbolo clave releja la realidad, sino que se pueda utilizar como “herramienta organizativa” (Becker, 2008: 173) para movilizar a los miembros. La competencia por el predominio discursivo se puede expresar por lo que aquí se llamará “ataques conceptuales”: el intento de cambiar el discurso del movimiento a través de la introducción de conceptos que puedan servir como contraconceptos.

1. NATURALEZA Y SOCIEDAD EN EL

DISCURSO DEL MOVIMIENTO INDÍGENA

Ya desde la fundación de las primeras organizaciones del movimiento indígena, en las décadas de 1920 y 1930, estuvieron presentes algunas reivindicaciones étnicas y ecológicas. Sin embargo, no fue hasta el profundo cambio discursivo que tuvo lugar entre1975 y 1985 aproximadamente, que estas se insertaron plenamente en el pensar político de dicho movimiento. Este cambio se favoreció del fracaso de las reformas agrarias de1964 y 1973, incapaces de imponerse ante los intereses de los terratenientes (FENOCIN, 2004: 11), así como de la Ley de Fomento y Desarrollo Agropecuario de 1979, que puso un punto final a los intentos de reforma agraria. A su vez, la fuerza considerable de las organizaciones indígenas de la Amazonía, que por su poca integración en la estructura social del país priorizaron contenidos étnicos, así como los procesos de unificación de las organizaciones indígenas a partir de 1980, contribuyeron a una mayor relevancia de estos contenidos en el movimiento indígena a nivel nacional.

El discurso renovado se articuló en torno a conceptos de nacionalidad indígena y autonomía territorial, y combinó las antiguas ideas clasistas del movimiento indígena, hasta entonces sindicalista y socialista, con ideas identitarias hasta ese momento presentes solo en un plano secundario. En este sentido se invocó “la autodeterminación [de los grupos indígenas, P. A.] en un nuevo concepto de Estado ecuatoriano pluralista”(Federación de Centros Shuar, 1976: 129). Estos grupos indígenas fueron definidos por el propio movimiento indígena como nacionalidades. Así el movimiento indígena

señalaba la doble condición de los indígenas: económicamente explotados y a la vez política y culturalmente dominados (Pacari, 1984: 118-119), y exigía el reconocimiento de las nacionalidades indígenas y de su territorio (Pacari, 1984: 122) dentro de un régimen de autonomía política y económica (UNAE, s. f.: 43). Con este paso conceptual cambió la relación entre pueblo y tierra, caracterizada hasta mediados de la década de 1970 por una visión materialista de la tierra en tanto medio de producción y las subsiguientes demandas por una reforma agraria. El concepto de nacionalidad indígena implica:

> […] especificaciones en el modo de producción y en las manifestaciones socio-culturales, nacidas y desarrolladas en un territorio históricamente unido a la razón de ser de ese pueblo, en el que tanto la territorialidad, el origen del hombre, el desarrollo histórico como su in se manifiestan dentro de una cultura, de un saber y cosmovisión única (UNAE, s. f.: 47).

En concreto, se trata de cuatro estructuras precisas que abarcan buena parte de la actividad humana[35]. La estructura social y política se expresa en la relación de *ayllu-llacta ayllu-mama ayllu*, esto es: familia, comunidad ampliada y pueblo, este último definido por "una lengua común, una cultura común, un territorio común y vínculos económicos comunes" (Pacari, 1984: 115). Paralelamente a la estructura social y política existe una estructura legislativa que se manifiesta en la relación armónica entre tres unidades, *ayllu camachic-llacta camachic-mama ayllu camachic*, esto es: normas familiares-normas sociales-normas jurídicas de todo el pueblo. La estructura moral que sirve de base

para esta última estructura es el conocido *ama quilla*, *ama llulla*, *ama shua*, esto es: No seas perezoso, no mientas, no robes[36]. La cuarta estructura que define a la nacionalidad indígena es la estructura ideológica o cosmológica que se expresa en una relación armónica entre *pachamama-allpamama-runa*, o sea: universo-tierra-hombre (Pacari, 1984: 115).

De ello deriva el significado central de la tierra y el territorio en el desarrollo de la nacionalidad o la evolución del pueblo indígena. No es el mismo significado que les atribuye un Estado nacional liberal y burgués, a saber, como medio de producción, sino que contiene fuertes connotaciones espirituales.

La tierra para el nativo no significa el lote que la ley le puede asignar, o el patrimonio familiar.

> […] La tierra significa un lugar determinado donde vive y donde encuentra la razón de su existencia. Su concepto de tierra es el de un territorio, una patria extensa en la que se moviliza libremente en relación con los otros miembros del grupo. Un territorio cuyo concepto lo integra primordialmente el bosque (*sacha pacha*). En el *sacha pacha* (bosque) está todo, incluso, como un elemento más, la tierra (*allpa*). El *sacha pacha* (el bosque) es un territorio extenso que se ha mantenido, que se ha defendido para el grupo y en el que se encuentran libremente y vagando en toda su amplitud, más que las cenizas y huesos de sus antepasados, sus almas, las fuerzas y espíritus que rigen su vida y su destino (UNAE, s. f.: 34).

Estos nuevos conceptos fueron articulados por primera vez en un discurso coherente en el texto de Nina Pacari de 1984, fruto de su trabajo como Presidenta del *Taller Cultural*

Causanacunchic de Otavalo y Cotacachi (Huarcaya, 2010). Ese texto se convirtió poco después en la base de la ideología de la naciente CONAIE[37] institución que juntamente con otras organizaciones e individuos (CEAI, 1988: 2) presentó sus reivindicaciones por primera vez en la Propuesta de Ley de Nacionalidades, elaborada por la Comisión Especial de Asuntos Indígenas (aquí: CEAI), reunida de noviembre de 1987 a agosto de 1988 bajo el liderazgo del Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano (PSE) (CEAI, 1988: 2, 4). Aunque la Propuesta fue ignorada por el Congreso, la articulación de ideas y conceptos allí contenida marca la aparición de un nuevo discurso coherente. Allí se define "al Ecuador como Estado plurinacional y multiétnico" (CEAI, 1988: 8), en el cual participan los pueblos indígenas con su derecho a la autodeterminación (CEAI, 1988: 17). Estos pueblos son definidos "por sus características propias, organización, lengua y cultura" (CEAI, 1988: 17-18). Y, como tales, tienen derecho a sus tierras que "son indivisibles, inembargables e inafectables, preservando su lógica comunitaria" (CEAI, 1988: 12). La comisión detalla más:

> Las nacionalidades indígenas del Ecuador tienen derecho a su territorio, no solamente como condición para su subsistencia, sino como el espacio de desarrollo de su cultura y garantía de la conservación de las riquezas naturales del Ecuador (CEAI, 1988: 21).

Así que el Proyecto de una Ley de Nacionalidades retoma las ideas expresadas en los textos de las organizaciones indígenas y sus representantes desde mediados de la década de 1970. Y

prevé una crítica factible contra el régimen de autonomías, como habría detener lugar en el contexto del levantamiento indígena del *Inti Raymi* en 1990 (un buen ejemplo es Corral, en: León 1994: 35). La Comisión aclara que la plurinacionalidad no significa “un Estado dentro de otro Estado” (CEAI, 1988: 13-14), siendo ello un argumento de los opositores contra una autonomía indígena.

La historia de la CONAIE está estrechamente ligada a su propuesta de plurinacionalidad: Se trata de la primera organización indígena que combina reivindicaciones sociales con demandas étnicas, conceptos de igualdad con conceptos de diferencia. El levantamiento del *Inti Raymi* en 1990 y la demanda de la plurinacionalidad en este contexto generaron críticas en la sociedad civil, como resume León (1994). Se entendió esta demanda como un ataque a la integridad del Estado, como racismo al revés y como un intento de deshacer el mestizaje (Corral, en: León 1994: 34-35), este último entendido como mezcla cultural y biológica. También debido a ello la CONAIE se esforzó en explicar mejor el concepto de plurinacionalidad. El Proyecto Político presentado por la CONAIE en 1994 (CONAIE, 1994) define de manera integral qué se entiende por plurinacionalidad. La CONAIE aspira a instalar bajo este lema un Estado verdaderamente democrático, contrapuesto a un Estado controlado por elites políticas, con derechos específicos para los pueblos y nacionalidades indígenas y afro. Estos derechos se refieren al control autónomo sobre el territorio que habitan y a la representación de los pueblos y nacionalidades a nivel nacional mediante instituciones específicas. Básicamente,

“plurinacionalidad” significa más derechos para las llamadas minorías étnicas y más democracia y participación para todo el pueblo.

2. PRIMER ATAQUE CONCEPTUAL: LA INTRODUCCIÓN DE LA INTERCULTURALIDAD

Poco más tarde se introdujo un nuevo concepto en el discurso del movimiento indígena. Otra organización de este movimiento, la FENOCIN[38], había sufrido una profunda crisis desde 1986 (FENOCIN, 2004: 18), también como consecuencia de su orientación clasista que ignoró casi por completo lo étnico. Esta crisis llevó a una reorientación política y discursiva de la FENOCIN. Aunque sigue siendo una filial activa del sindicato Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Clasistas Unitarias de Trabajadores (CEDUCUT, antes CEDOC), ya en 1988 reconoció a través de una modificación de su nombre de entonces (FENOC-I) la participación indígena que constituía el 40 % de sus bases (Tamayo, 1996: 89-90). A su vez, el reconocimiento de los afroecuatorianos en 1997 implicó el cambio del nombre a FENOCIN y subrayó su nueva autopercepción como pluriétnica (FENOCIN, 2004: 20). La participación de la FENOCIN en la fundación de la Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Organizaciones del Campo (CLOC) en 1994 (FENOCIN, 1999: 168) y la incorporación de ésta a la organización campesina internacional La Vía Campesina en 1996 (FENOCIN, 2004: 25), acompañaron dicho proceso de reorientación política.

Un congreso celebrado en 1995 profundizó este cambio. La FENOCIN se declaró intercultural (FENOCIN, 2004: 20) y exigió un "desarrollo sustentable, equitativo y con identidad" (FENOCIN, 2004: 25), para poder establecerse como organización étnica alternativa. Definió de hecho la interculturalidad explícitamente como alternativa abierta a la plurinacionalidad, descrita como fundamentalismo étnico (FENOCIN, 1999: 150) pero sin romper con las propuestas específicas, como el establecimiento de un régimen de autonomías para indígenas y afroecuatorianos (FENOCIN, 1999: 157). No obstante, la interculturalidad también apunta a una mayor participación de todo el pueblo (FENOCIN, 2004: 39), dado que impugna toda forma de exclusión y racismo.

Por la historia de exclusiones, racismo y dominación, el diálogo intercultural en nuestro país debe ser profundamente crítico con el colonialismo interno y externo, proactivo en el enfrentamiento a todas las formas de racismo y paternalismo, y activo, en el sentido de ir construyendo en el proceso los cambios. La interculturalidad es un proceso que debe retomar las reivindicaciones sociales hechas por los pueblos indígenas y negros, hombres y mujeres, niños, jóvenes y adultos; más allá de las coyunturas políticas, que hay que iniciarlo desde lo pequeño y lo cotidiano. Esto implica cambios personales y de actitud, también cambios estructurales de la sociedad en su conjunto (FENOCIN, s. f.: 11).

La CONAIE integró rápidamente el nuevo concepto a su discurso. Si bien no se mencionaba en su "Proyecto Político" de 1994, está presente en su revisión de 1997. Mientras que la

primera versión refería a la interculturalidad solo en el contexto de la educación intercultural bilingüe, y el concepto de plurinacionalidad se relacionaba a la visión de una reforma del Estado, el más actual Proyecto Político de 2001 habla de la interculturalidad en el sentido de "unidad en la diversidad", combinando esta con un régimen político basado en la participación y la autodeterminación (CONAIE, 2001: 5).

3. UNA INNOVACIÓN CONCEPTUAL FALLIDA: LA BIODIVERSIDAD

El desarrollo más avanzado del pensamiento ecologista de la CONAIE se encuentra sin duda en su Propuesta de una Ley de Biodiversidad, del año 2004. En este texto la CONAIE detalla sus ideas acerca de la naturaleza en un marco de conservación y recuperación de la biodiversidad, en el contexto de la protección de los territorios indígenas. Propone consultas en los territorios antes de que se pueda manipular la naturaleza, por ejemplo a través de la construcción de pozos petroleros (CONAIE, 2004). No llega a demandar derechos de la naturaleza, como sí habría de proclamar la Constitución del 2008, ni menciona el *Sumak Kawsay*, Buen Vivir, ni tampoco críticas al antropocentrismo, concepto que la izquierda blanco-mestiza atribuye al Buen Vivir. La Propuesta de Ley de 2004 se mantuvo dentro del discurso político de la CONAIE con ideas como territorialidad, comunitarismo y autonomía local. Entiende la biodiversidad como "territorio más cultura" (Escobar, 1998: 70) o sea, se la introduce como "innovación discursiva" (Escobar, 1998: 53)

dentro del contexto de términos ya establecidos de autonomía, diferencia y territorialidad. De esta forma, el concepto de biodiversidad se ve extendido en un sentido cultural que va más allá del manejo y control de la naturaleza, en tanto traslada lo local y las personas que allí habitan al centro de esta visión de biodiversidad (Escobar, 1998: 53-54). El texto desarrolla la protección del medio ambiente y la conservación de la biodiversidad como condiciones necesarias para el bienestar de los seres humanos: La *pachamama* no se presenta como sujeto con derechos propios, sino que los derechos de la biodiversidad son derechos defensivos de las poblaciones locales contra los intereses nacionales o internacionales:

> Es necesario definir en el Ecuador normas que viabilicen la construcción de un país soberano, equitativo, que conserve sus condiciones naturales en función de las culturas que lo habitan, cimentando una territorialidad que permita visibilizar un futuro real para las generaciones futuras y de la biodiversidad (CONAIE, 2004: 31).

El desarrollo de un concepto de biodiversidad en conexión con control territorial y autonomía no prosperó, debido a la introducción en el mismo momento del concepto del Buen Vivir. Hoy día sigue habiendo referencias a la biodiversidad, aunque más bien en un plano secundario.

4. SEGUNDO ATAQUE CONCEPTUAL: EL SUMAK KAWSAY

4.1 DEL SUMA QAMAÑA AL SUMAK KAWSAY

Investigar el origen del *Sumak Kawsay*, su uso tradicional y sus significados en las diferentes circunstancias, constituye una tarea para la antropología. Las ciencias sociales destacan que la historia del Buen Vivir[39] como concepto político, con reivindicaciones críticas y potencial para el cambio, comienza con una serie de publicaciones a partir del 2000. Tanto trabajos de filosofía (Estermann, 1999) como de antropología (Spedding, 2010) confirman esta visión. Sin embargo, hasta el momento se carece de un trabajo antropológico profundo sobre el concepto y su historia entre los pueblos indígenas.

En el año 2000 se celebraron en Bolivia una serie de eventos bajo el rótulo de “Diálogo Nacional 2000” con el in de analizar los elementos culturales de la pobreza y del desarrollo. En este contexto, la agencia de cooperación alemana GTZ estableció, en cooperación con la Federación de Asociaciones Municipales, un programa especial llamado *Suma Qamaña* (Medina, 2011). En el marco de este programa, porciones “de la elite intelectual aymara, formada en una tradición académica antropológica, etnológica o etnohistórica” (Uzeda, s. f.: 2), en su centro Simón Yampara (Spedding, en: Uzeda, s. f.: 12) y Javier Medina, desarrollaron el nuevo concepto, y se inició su difusión en todo el país (Medina, 2011) y buena parte del continente. El hecho de que el concepto del Buen Vivir sea “una invención posmoderna de los intelectuales aymaras del siglo XXI (que no dejan de ser indígenas)” (Uzeda, s. f.: 20), no necesariamente le quita legitimidad, sino que se lo puede considerar, como Uzeda, “como parte de una recreación o innovación cultural” (Uzeda, s. f.: 20),

o sea, la manifestación de una cultura viva. La primera publicación sobre el nuevo concepto es editada por Medina mismo y publicada por la GTZ (Medina, 2001). Ya en el año 2002 empieza su difusión continental, con un seminario sobre desarrollo y cooperación, realizado por la GTZ en Panamá. En la publicación resultante de este evento se contraponen las maneras de pensar y las visiones de un Buen Vivir de Occidente y del mundo indígena (GTZ, 2002: 22-23), se introducen las primeras traducciones al guaraní (*Ñande Reku*) y quechua (*Kausay*) y se establece una definición provisional: "Vivir austeramente en armonía y equilibrio consigo mismo, con la comunidad y con el cosmos" (GTZ, 2002: 24).

4.2 EL SUMAK KAWSAY EN EL ECUADOR

Ese mismo año comenzó la historia del Buen Vivir en Ecuador. Carlos Viteri Gualinga, investigador y editor del diario quiteño El Hoy, publicó un texto sobre la concepción del desarrollo en la Amazonía[40]. Enfrenta allí la idea indígena del Buen Vivir o *alli kawsay* al desarrollo occidental con sus ideas de riqueza y pobreza puramente materiales. La concepción indígena va más allá de lo material, pues es "una visión holística acerca de lo que debe ser el objetivo o la misión de todo esfuerzo humano, que consiste en buscar y crear las condiciones materiales y espirituales para construir y mantener el 'buen vivir'" (Viteri, 2002: 1). Se trata más bien de una "filosofía de vida de las sociedades indígenas [y] constituye una categoría en permanente construcción" (Viteri, 2002: 1). Entonces, el Buen

Vivir no es un concepto análogo al desarrollo occidental (Viteri, 2002: 12) con sus criterios bien definidos y métodos científicamente probados. La base de este *alli kawsay* es el conocimiento, "la condición básica para la gestión de las bases locales ecológicas y espirituales de sustento y resolución autónoma de las necesidades" (Viteri, 2002: 2), lo que a su vez significa la adaptación al entorno. Viteri ya destaca el trasfondo espiritual del Buen Vivir, un fenómeno que acompañará el desarrollo de este concepto especialmente en la Amazonía:

> […] la selva y la tierra son estratos que unen los espacios físicos con lo intangible, lo material con lo espiritual, cuyo mediador constituye la persona sabia (yachac en runa shimi). La práctica social de ésta visión sobre la vida y el cosmos, resulta fundamental en la dinámica de la construcción del Alli Káusai (Viteri, 2002: 3).

Viteri advierte que el Buen Vivir se basa en la recreación de "los propios paradigmas, inclusive adoptando dinámicas económicas y conocimientos exógenos y adaptándolos a las exigencias y realidades actuales y futuras" (Viteri, 2002: 5). Con esto, también él interpreta el Buen Vivir como una innovación cultural que integra antiguas ideas sin romper con ellas.

Pocos meses más tarde, el economista Alberto Acosta cita la definición del Buen Vivir de Viteri. Él la entiende como una idea de la cosmovisión de las sociedades indígenas que buscan una vida en armonía con la naturaleza y no tienen una concepción unilineal del desarrollo, ni de la riqueza en el sentido occidental (Acosta, 2002: 46). En ese entonces, Acosta todavía buscaba

alternativas al “estilo de vida que pone en peligro el equilibrio ecológico mundial” (Acosta, 2002: 45) y aún no llega a integrar el concepto del Buen Vivir a su ideario.

El nuevo concepto irrumpe en el discurso del movimiento indígena en octubre de 2003. Una organización local en la Amazonía y filial de la CONAIE, llamada “Territorio Autónomo de la Nación Originaria del Pueblo Kichwa de Sarayaku”, publica, bajo la presidencia de Marlon Santi, un texto intitulado *Sarayaku Sumak Kawsayta Ñawpakma Katina Killka / El libro de la vida de Sarayaku para defender nuestro futuro*. En este texto se rechaza la exploración petrolera en su territorio y se afirma que en Sarayaku se vive en equilibrio con la selva (Sarayaku, 2003: 1). Con referencia al *Sumak Kawsay*, descrito como “la vida en plenitud” (Sarayaku, 2003: 10) o “la vida en armonía” (Sarakayu, 2003: 26), se propone que se declare su territorio “zona de interés biológico, cultural e histórico para el país y la humanidad” (Sarakayu, 2003: 26-27), protegida de influencias externas y regida autónomamente por sus habitantes. Definen al *Sumak Kawsay* como una “búsqueda permanente” (Sarakayu, 2003: 26), en la cual se orientan no solo según sus ancianos y sabios, sino también según deidades y entidades espirituales.

Nuestras principales divinidades, *Amazanga* y *Nunguli*, nos recuerdan que de la selva solo debemos aprovechar lo necesario si queremos tener un futuro. Nunca han aceptado que cazásemos más de lo permitido o que sembrásemos sin respetar las reglas del *Ukupacha* y el *Kaypacha*. Sus iras, complacencias y sabidurías nos han sido reveladas a través de nuestros sabios y mujeres, quienes nos han enseñado acerca de los secretos para alcanzar la armonía

de uno consigo mismo y con la naturaleza, nuestra máxima del *Sumak Kawsay*. Así, había que dar tiempo de regeneración a la naturaleza, para poder renovar nuestra propia vida. Hemos estado en permanente movimiento, permitiéndonos a nosotros y a las otras formas de vida continuar su ciclo. *Mushuk Allpa*, la tierra en permanente renovación, ha sido una premisa fundamental del *Sumak Kawsay*. […] Esta convivencia, y armonía nos enseñó a entender las múltiples dimensiones que componen la *Sumak Allpa*. El *muskuy* (conocimiento y comprensión) nos ha permitido adaptarnos adecuadamente a las condiciones de vida de la selva, y definir nuestra presencia en estos territorios, desde hace cientos de años, con nuestros antepasados Tayak Runa. A lo largo del tiempo esta ha sido nuestra nación. El territorio heredado de nuestros antepasados, donde gobernamos nuestra vida (Sarayaku, 2003: 34).

La conexión espiritual entre pueblo, territorio y metafísica conduce a una situación compleja que no admite negociaciones acerca del acceso de foráneos a este territorio. Este es más bien parte integral de la identidad del pueblo y por lo tanto no puede ser separado del mismo, por lo que la relación entre pueblo y territorio es muy diferente de la que prevalece entre la población mestiza.

Puede llamar la atención el momento de la incorporación de este nuevo concepto.

Los años entre 1999 y 2001 estuvieron marcados por constantes movilizaciones del movimiento indígena; en 2002 y 2003 representantes del mismo participaron en la campaña electoral y brevemente en el gobierno de Lucio Gutiérrez. El peso del movimiento indígena estaba en Quito, algo que también

influyó en su discurso y determinó que el énfasis se trasladase hacia concepciones de reorganización social y estatal a nivel nacional, quitando en cierta medida importancia a los aspectos locales y autonómicos (expresado en la revisión del Proyecto Político de la CONAIE en 2001). En este contexto, se podría interpretar el ataque discursivo por Sarayaku con la introducción del nuevo concepto de *Sumak Kawsay* como un intento de reorientar el enfoque político y discursivo de la CONAIE hacia el campo y las regiones periféricas.

El mismo año 2003, el concepto del Buen Vivir fue introducido en el entorno de la política de desarrollo, más concreto, en el Plan estratégico del CODENPE[41] una agencia estatal de desarrollo bajo control de las organizaciones indígenas. Allí se define como objetivo de sus esfuerzos

> […] el proceso que posibilita alcanzar el bienestar individual, familiar y colectivo, el mismo que incluye los aspectos de: integralidad de lo social, político, cultural, económico y del entorno natural. Involucra la sustentabilidad en cuanto a una relación productiva acorde con la preservación de un proceso permanente de búsqueda del buen vivir o bienestar personal, familiar, comunitario y colectivo (Maldonado, 2006: 114).

No obstante, aquí prevalece la orientación general de la institución, así que el Buen Vivir es enumerado como una de varias cosas que se quiere lograr mediante el desarrollo, aunque sea otro desarrollo.

A partir de este momento, el nuevo concepto del *Sumak Kawsay* comienza a establecerse en el discurso del movimiento

indígena. Un ejemplo interesante de este proceso es una publicación de la Universidad Intercultural Amawtay Wasi (UIAW), creada por la CONAIE y otras organizaciones del movimiento indígena, que en 2004 sistematiza el Buen Vivir en el contexto de la fundación oficial de esta institución. Allí se presentan las carreras de estudio ofrecidas y las bases institucionales, al tiempo que se detalla su visión de la cosmovisión indígena. Se afirma que se quiere "lograr un adecuado 'bien vivir' para las actuales y futuras generaciones" (UIAW, 2004: 168), que se desarrolla en un ambiente de interculturalidad, tanto de la sociedad como de la ciencia en tanto paradigma. Se establece que la UIAW quiere contribuir a ello mediante su programa especial y único de educación.

> La educación en esta visión está pensada como aprendizaje para lograr la relacionalidad, la vivencia simbolizada, el lenguaje simbólico, como una manera entre otras de caminar hacia la sabiduría, de acercarse a la comprensión del "bien vivir" (UIAW, 2004: 172-173).

Sin embargo, tras esta publicación se instala un periodo de silencio en torno al nuevo concepto, que no recibe mayor definición por las organizaciones e instituciones que lo usaron. Es solo a partir del Gobierno de Rafael Correa que reaparece como concepto político, en buena parte gracias a Alberto Acosta, en esta época una de las figuras centrales del nuevo Gobierno y de Alianza país. En el Plan de Gobierno de Alianza país 20072011 aparece el Buen Vivir como uno de los principios básicos. El "Buen Vivir en armonía con la naturaleza, bajo un

respeto irrestricto de los derechos humanos" (Alianza País, 2006: 3, 10) es definido como base programática de gobierno. Por ello no sorprende la introducción del nuevo concepto en la Constitución de 2008, en cuyo Preámbulo se declara que se quiere construir "una nueva forma de convivencia ciudadana, en diversidad y armonía con la naturaleza, para alcanzar el buen vivir, el sumak kawsay" (Constitución, 2008, Preámbulo). En otros 99 artículos se lo trata con más detalle (Acosta, 2010: 6), a saber: un régimen del Buen Vivir que abarca, entre otros aspectos, inclusión, equidad y educación. No obstante, la interpretación gubernamental del Buen Vivir prescinde de la dimensión territorial del concepto, central en las formulaciones de Viteri (2002) y Sarayaku (2003). De esta forma, la interpretación gubernamental prepara el camino hacia una abstracción aún mayor, lo cual habilita a hablar de un "giro biocéntrico" (Hernández, 2009: 62) en la política del Gobierno, o del Buen Vivir "como nuevo paradigma de desarrollo para América Latina" (Ramírez, 2010b: 5). Este discurso de un "socialismo del sumak kawsay o biosocialismo republicano [que] recupera una ética biocéntrica de convivencia" (Ramírez, 2010a: 73), afianzado en la nueva Constitución, se caracteriza por ser muy abierto y no interponer dificultades a la incorporación de afrodescendientes (Fernández, 2010: 17-18) ni de "algunos principios filosóficos universales: aristotélicos, marxistas, ecológicos, feministas, cooperativistas, humanistas […]" (Acosta, 2010: 13). El Gobierno subraya esta abstracción al incorporarla a programas como el Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir 2009-2013 del SENPLADES[42], el cual no rompe con los viejos paradigmas

de desarrollo modernizante.

5. EL NUEVO DISCURSO DEL MOVIMIENTO INDÍGENA

El año 2008 estuvo marcado por un desarrollo doble. Por un lado, Alberto Acosta y Mónica Chuji, los mayores defensores del Buen Vivir, se retiraron del Gobierno; por el otro, Marlon Santi, coautor en 2003 del Manifiesto de Sarayaku, fue elegido presidente de la CONAIE. De esta forma el *Sumak Kawsay* ingresó como concepto central al discurso del movimiento indígena a nivel nacional, mientras se retiró del discurso del Gobierno, al menos en cuanto a una definición mayor. El Gobierno entró, además, en una polémica por las leyes de agua y minería que el movimiento indígena interpretó como un ataque al Buen Vivir. Entonces el concepto del Buen Vivir fue utilizado en contra del Gobierno, en un intento de reapropiárselo. Después de romper el diálogo con el Gobierno a principios de 2010, la CONAIE describió al Gobierno y al Estado como un "sistema colonialista que destruye la madre naturaleza y ha significado el atropello a todos nuestros derechos" (CONAIE, 2010: 1). En ese contexto Correa fue considerado "falso socialista traidor, populista, genocida, fascista a los principios del sumak kawsay, además encubre el colonialismo del siglo XXI" (CONAIE, 2010: 2).

Para la CONAIE resultó sencillo incorporar el nuevo concepto a su discurso. De hecho, ya en la primera versión de su Proyecto Político propone "un Humanismo Integral donde el hombre y la

naturaleza están en estrecha y armónica interrelación garantizando la vida" (CONAIE, 1994: 11). Este humanismo integral se ubica dentro de un concepto de comunitarismo de un Estado Plurinacional a construir (CONAIE, 1994: 11). Para definirlo mejor, la CONAIE recurre a la tradición indígena que aspira a integrar a la actualidad:

> Consecuentes con el pasado y el presente, sustentamos el principio Humanista Integral, en la interrelación Hombre-Naturaleza-Sociedad; para conseguir mejores condiciones de vida individual y colectiva propugnando para ello la construcción de la Nueva Sociedad Plurinacional (CONAIE, 1994: 11).

Así, la CONAIE sería capaz de integrar el *Sumak Kawsay* en su lucha "por la construcción de una sociedad postcapitalista y postcolonial" (CONAIE, 2007: 1) basada en un cambio profundo de las estructuras económicas:

> El objetivo y los principios de la economía no debe ser la rentabilidad, sino el bienestar humano, el "vivir bien", el "sumak kawsay". La economía es solo una herramienta al servicio de la comunidad (CONAIE, 2007: 7).

De esta forma, "el principio de reciprocidad fomentado por las comunidades en prácticas como la minga, el randy randy, el cambia mano o maki mañachi" (CONAIE, 2007: 21) ofrece otra perspectiva a la economía, más allá de ganancia y crecimiento. Por ese motivo, el control de las comunidades indígenas sobre sus territorios es fundamental en la visión de la CONAIE, es allí

que hacen “una teología de la tierra, de la Madre Tierra, de la Pachamama” (Tenesaca, 2010: 108). Al mismo tiempo, piensan utilizar la integración marginal de sus conceptos clave como *Sumak Kawsay* o Plurinacionalidad en la Constitución “aunque sea de fachada” (Tenesaca, 2010: 108-109), exigiendo su ejercicio y realización sobre la base de la misma Constitución. La meta final de los esfuerzos de la CONAIE no es tan diferente de la del Gobierno: Es este otro caso de una reapropiación de un concepto:

> La Pachamama es la madre que amamanta a sus hijos; si esta madre que amamanta no está envenenada, no está saqueada, no está contaminada, es posible que, realmente, haya un socialismo (Tenesaca, 2010: 109).

También las otras organizaciones del movimiento indígena, como la FEINE[43] de orientación evangélica y más bien conservadora, incorporan el nuevo concepto a su discurso. Esta última quiere emprender “la construcción de una teología indígena para aportar a Sumak Kausay” (FEINE, 2010: 7).

6. CONCLUSIONES

El *Sumak Kawsay* es un concepto relativamente nuevo aunque presenta puntos de conexión con el discurso del movimiento indígena, particularmente el de la CONAIE, la mayor entre sus organizaciones. Desde su renovación discursiva ocurrida entre mediados de los 1970 y mediados de los 1980 el movimiento indígena estableció entre sus demandas contenidos identitarios y

étnicos, fundamentales para la construcción de un pueblo indígena con una relación especial con su territorio. Algunos conceptos, como la nacionalidad indígena y la autonomía territorial, expresan estas ideas, novedosas bajo esta formulación directa. La historia de estos conceptos, entendidos como “símbolos clave” (Zald, 1979: 13-14) y como herramientas organizativas (Becker, 2008: 173) en la competencia entre organizaciones y movimientos sociales y en la lucha de estos por sus demandas, permite comprender mejor el desarrollo del discurso del movimiento indígena como tal.

A fines de la década de 1980 estaba terminada la renovación del discurso del movimiento indígena (CEAI, 1988). En el primer Proyecto Político de la CONAIE, en 1994, el concepto consiente una mayor definición. Es recién en este momento que otra organización indígena, la FENOCIN, entra a competir con la CONAIE por recursos y miembros, y lo hace subrayando el nuevo concepto de interculturalidad, en explícita crítica al concepto de plurinacionalidad manejado por la CONAIE. De esta forma, la FENOCIN puede ganar algo de influencia y establecer su posición dentro del movimiento. El segundo ataque conceptual es la introducción del concepto del *Sumak Kawsay* como un concepto que retoma sobre todo las demandas de los pueblos indígenas de la Amazonía. Lo manejan organizaciones filiales de la CONAIE que buscan así incrementar su influencia dentro de la organización nacional. Este concepto lleva, conjuntamente con otros factores, a un cambio discursivo dentro del movimiento indígena nacional, también manifiesto en la presidencia de la CONAIE por parte de Marlon Santi en 2008.

Con este cambio doble, tanto en la presidencia como en el discurso, ciertas tendencias dentro de la organización pudieron ganar influencia.

Es llamativo que estos ataques conceptuales no llevaran a un debilitamiento del movimiento indígena o de sus organizaciones, sino que este fue capaz de integrar los nuevos conceptos en un discurso coherente ampliado. Así, el movimiento no solamente no ha sido debilitado, sino que ha podido adaptar su discurso a oportunidades políticas externas, como la centralidad del concepto de interculturalidad en la cooperación al desarrollo, o la del Buen Vivir en la crítica al desarrollo modernizante.

Desde el Gobierno de Rafael Correa, el Estado pretende apropiarse de los conceptos del movimiento indígena, entre ellos, el Buen Vivir. En este contexto se explica la creciente abstracción de este concepto y de sus contenidos, que en la versión de intelectuales no-indígenas ya no se refiere al territorio indígena y su trasfondo metafísico. Esta competencia discursiva entre movimiento y Gobierno lleva a un rápido desarrollo del nuevo concepto y así a una serie de definiciones divergentes. Mientras que los intelectuales no-indígenas intentan buscar referentes externos al Buen Vivir, incluyendo tradiciones de otros países o continentes, para así facilitar su expansión y difusión en amplios sectores sociales del país y fuera de él, el movimiento indígena intenta generalizar el concepto para integrarlo completamente en su discurso, manteniendo sus contenidos más importantes. No coinciden los diferentes grupos en aquello que consideran los puntos centrales del nuevo concepto: Los intelectuales no-indígenas se refieren sobre todo a la idea de una

relación armónica entre individuo, sociedad y naturaleza, mientras el movimiento indígena expande el concepto al comprender en él al territorio. Este combate epistemológico ocurre en este mismo momento. Los años venideros revelarán si el *Sumak Kawsay* ha de experimentar una difusión social y geográfica con una reducción de su contenido.

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NOTAS

1. Noé Cornago es profesor titular de Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad del País Vasco y director del Máster en Cooperación Internacional Descentralizada: Paz y Desarrollo de la misma universidad. Doctor en Ciencias Políticas y Sociología.

2. Traducción a cargo de Eduardo Restrepo del Prólogo de la reedición del libro *Encountering Development* (Princeton University Press, 1995, 2011). En 1996 fue publicado por Editorial Norma, Bogotá, como *La invención del Tercer Mundo: construcción y deconstrucción del desarrollo*. Este artículo está extraído de la *Revista Antropología Social*, nº 21,2012, pp. 23-62.

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3. Un programa de doctorado en estudios del desarrollo se inició en la Universidad Agrícola de China en Beijing en 2004. Aunque todavía es el único programa como tal, “hay muchos otros programas de doctorado en otras universidades, donde algunos de los estudiantes pueden hacer una investigación de tesis en estudios del desarrollo, incluso en antropología del desarrollo, en la Universidad de Sun Yat-Sen, por ejemplo. Ahora hay cerca de 30 universidades en China que tienen programas de licenciatura en estudios del desarrollo, aunque la mayoría de ellos son muy prácticos y orientados profesionalmente (similar a los procesos de profesionalización que se describe en su libro, ya que China está tomando el camino del desarrollo de la modernización)” (correo electrónico del profesor Ye Jingzhong de la Universidad Agrícola de China, 8 de agosto de 2010).

4. El fin del Consenso de Washington y la aparición de un “post-consenso de Washington” ha sido analizado, quizás el más famoso en los Estados Unidos, por Joseph Stiglitz (2006). Para la génesis del neoliberalismo en América Latina y otros lugares, véase la excelente elaboración de Naomi Klein (2007).

5. La idea de que la crisis supone el fin del monopolio del capital financiero ha sido discutida por la crítica marxista en particular; véase, por ejemplo, Bellamy, Foster y Magdoff (2008) y Panitch y Gindin (2008).

6. Véase, por ejemplo, el informe de una teleconferencia que une cinco países —Ghana, Etiopía, Tanzania, Zambia y los Estados Unidos—

patrocinada por el Instituto del Banco Mundial el 29 de marzo de 2010, la segundo de una serie de "debates sobre el desarrollo" a distancia organizado por el Banco en torno al tema *Repensar la globalización después de la crisis*. http:// wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/stories/experts-and-policymakers-trade-tips-boost-export-competitiveness-africa (Consultado el 8 de octubre de 2010).

7. Sería imposible hacer justicia aquí a la literatura académica sobre estudios campesinos. La revista *Development* ha dedicado una serie de números a la alimentación y la agricultura en la última década. Philip McMichael (2006, 2008) ha mapeado útilmente algunas de las nuevas agendas que los discursos campesinos plantean en agricultura y alimentación en el centro de las conceptualizaciones de las transformaciones políticas, económicas y ecológicas. Es de destacar que el *Journal of Peasant Studies*, un icono de los análisis marxistas sobre los campesinos y la "cuestión agraria" desde principios de los años setenta, recientemente se reestructuró para reflejar algunas de las agendas emergentes. Véase el número especial sobre "Perspectivas críticas en la política rural y el desarrollo", 36 (1), de 2009, y el excelente libro de Wendy Wolford (2010) para nuevos enfoques de los movimientos sociales rurales. Véanse también los textos influyentes de la red internacional de organizaciones campesinas y movimientos, Vía Campesina (www.viacampesina.org) y Desmerais (2007) para un estudio sobre esta red.

8. Una vez más, la literatura aquí es rica y escapa al alcance de este prefacio. Véanse Bhavnani, Foran y Kurian (2003) y Harcourt y Escobar (2005) para algunos enfoques recientes. Un tema importante, por ejemplo, anteriormente desconocido o al que se le dio una atención parcial ha sido la política del cuerpo en el desarrollo (véase Harcourt 2010 para un excelente resumen y un sugerente enfoque). Radcliffe, Laurie y Andolina (2009) han analizado útilmente las consecuencias de género del desarrollo y la forma en que se cruzan con movimientos indígenas transnacionalizados de maneras que pueden ser a la vez empoderantes y desempoderantes.

9. El trabajo del Grupo de Trabajo de Movimientos Sociales de la UNC en Chapel Hill (www.unc.edu/smwg/) en los últimos cinco años se ha centrado principalmente en esta idea. Véase el número especial de *Anthropological Quarterly* 81 (1), de 2006, producido colectivamente por el grupo. La idea de que los movimientos sociales deben ser vistos como productores de conocimiento es también el núcleo de otros pocos grupos de investigación en los Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido, incluyendo en la Universidad de Texas en Austin (Antropología), Cornell (Sociología del Desarrollo, por ejemplo, McMichael, ed. 2010), así como en América Latina. El equipo organizado por Xóchitl Leyva en el CIESAS, en San Cristóbal de las Casas, México ha producido varios volúmenes sobre la base de esta afirmación (véase, por ejemplo, Leyva, Burguete y Speed, 2008). Sonia E.

Álvarez y sus colegas en la Universidad de Massachusetts, Amherst ha estado al frente de un proyecto con equipos en Estados Unidos y América Latina, en parte centrados en la producción colaborativa del conocimiento. El conocido Colectivo Situaciones en Buenos Aires ha estado produciendo durante una década sus trabajos sobre esta base. Una breve introducción a la literatura sobre esta tendencia se encuentra en Escobar (2008), Casas-Cortés, Osterweil y Powell (2006).

10. No voy a ser capaz de discutir aquí el interesante movimiento en torno a la idea de *décroissance*, planteada por primera vez por Serge Latouche (por ejemplo, 2009) en Francia, Joan Martínez Alier (2009) y Jordi Pigem (2009) en Catalunya, y otros en el sur de Europa y América Latina. Hay un grado de heterogeneidad en estas propuestas, dependiendo de si el ímpetu es más político o económico, o si se aplica a los países de altos ingresos (Europa) o los más bajos ingresos, tales como América Latina (correo electrónico con Joan Martínez Alier y Eduardo Gudynas, enero de 2011). El aspecto más relevante de este movimiento para nuestros propósitos, es que las diversas propuestas comparten la crítica al exceso de consumo y al crecimiento basado en la economía y, por ende, la necesidad de cambiar la lógica del desarrollo hacia una menor producción y menor consumo en línea con los límites ecológicos del planeta. En la década del setenta, la Fundación Dag Hammarskjold llevó a cabo un ejercicio muy interesante sobre la base de unir a los países sobredesarrollados como Suecia y los países subdesarrollados como Tanzania en un marco único, como parte de su proyecto, "¿Y ahora qué" y su concepto general de "Otro desarrollo". Esto podría ser visto como un precursor de las teorías de de-crecimiento. Véase también el proyecto de la Fundación "*¿Qué sigue?*" (2006-2009) para un excelente ejemplo de pensamiento crítico y alternativo sobre el desarrollo (http://www.dhf.uu.se/). La Red de Objetores de Crecimiento para el Postdesarrollo fue creada en alguna conexión con el proyecto *Qué sigue* (www.apres-developpement.org). Los debates sobre la economía en América Latina son particularmente activos en el campo de las economías sociales y solidarias, inicialmente promovidas por José Luis Coraggio y Franz Hinkelamert entre otros, véase, por ejemplo, el número especial de *América Latina en Movimiento* 430 (2008), editado por Coraggio, http://www.alainet.org/publica/430.phtml

11. Estos autores suelen incluir el colectivo de autores representados en el *Diccionario del desarrollo* (Sachs, ed. 1992) y en *The postdevelopment reader* (Rahnema y Bawtree, 1997), Vandana Shiva (por ejemplo, 2004), James Ferguson (1990), y Rist (1997). Algunos críticos, por supuesto, han diferenciado los distintos autores. Para una discusión completa y la lista de referencias, véase Escobar (2000, 2007), véase también el análisis completo por Zai (2007), Simon (2007), y McGregor (2009). Lo que sigue es un relato muy resumido de los debates.

12. Véase especialmente Mosse (2005), Mosse y Lewis (2005) y Li (2007).

13. En otro lugar (Escobar, 2008b) analicé estos problemas en términos de cuatro estrategias problemáticas que afectan gran parte de la literatura de las ciencias sociales que enfatiza un enfoque disperso a lo social, como la teoría del actor-red: agentividad radical, conectividad radical, contextualidad radical e historicidad radical.

14. Como concluye Medeiros (2005), el problema que las agencias de desarrollo necesitan enfrentar no es tanto que la población local esté fuera de la modernidad, sino las formas específicas en que han sido producidas por la modernidad —es decir, la colonialidad del poder y la diferencia colonial—. Es su experiencia histórica de la modernidad lo que configura sus visiones, desconfianza, y esperanzas.

15. Esta sección tendrá un desarrollo pleno en un pequeño libro en curso, tentativamente titulado *El fin de la globalización (tal como la conocíamos): diseños para el pluriverso*. El libro también incluye un marco para el diseño ontológico.

16. Brevemente, el escenario "mundos convencionales" se basa en las fuerzas del mercado (los mercados globales impulsando el desarrollo global) o en la reforma política (el gobierno comprehensivo y la acción internacional para la reducción de la pobreza y la sustentabilidad ambiental), o una combinación de ambos. Estos escenarios podrían alcanzar una cierta moderación de las tendencias actuales, pero no pueden reunir la voluntad política para hacer que sus objetivos declarados sean viables. Del mismo modo, el segundo escenario, la "barbarización", tiene dos variantes: el "colapso" (colapso institucional) y el "mundo fortaleza" (apartheid global con la vasta mayoría del mundo excluido). Escritos de la GTI incluyen ideas sobre cómo trabajar hacia la transición a través de cambios institucionales y culturales concretos. La GTI se basa en el influyente análisis de escenarios y puntos de ramificación elaborado por el ecologista argentino Gilberto Gallopín. La GTI tiene actualmente su sede en el Instituto Tellus dirigido por Paul Raskin. Véanse GTI (2002), y el sitio web del proyecto, Iniciativa de la Gran Transición: http://www.gtinitiative.org/. Muchas de estas concepciones se basan en un marco de sistemas socio-naturales complejos interactuantes desde la comunidad al nivel planetario. Mientras que los escenarios más convencionales implican una teleología clara, el tipo de escenarios de la GTI se construyen sobre principios dinámicos no-lineales como parte del concepto de transición. Esto incluye los conceptos de bifurcación y macro-saltos (véase, por ejemplo, Goodwin 2007; Laszlo, 2008). Hay que decir que a pesar de su carácter global, la mayoría de los DsT todavía tiene la experiencia moderna occidental como punto de referencia y motor de cambio. Si bien esto tiene sentido dadas las hegemonías modernas, los DsT críticos requieren la incorporación de manera más explícita de las experiencias y las dinámicas de las socionaturalezas en el Sur global.

17. Véanse Greene (2003) y el trabajo del Centro de Estudios Ecozoicos en

Chapel Hill, dirigido por Herman Greene http://www.ecozoicstudies.org/.

18. El *enfoque de la transición* es un concepto extraordinario y un conjunto de herramientas. Iniciado en la ciudad de Totnes, Devon, Reino Unido (también el hogar del Schumacher College), se ha extendido rápidamente. Más de cien comunidades en todo el mundo han elaborado planes de la transición inspirados en el Manual. La cartilla para las iniciativas de la transición es detallada y viable. Véase también el sitio web relacionado, http://transitionculture.org/.

19. No voy a discutir aquí con más detalle lo que podríamos llamar "la política de la transición", la cuales quedan implícitas en muchos DsT. Esta política puede ser fructíferamente teorizada desde la izquierda y enfoques académicos (por ejemplo, los imaginarios autonomistas anti-capitalistas, las politicas anti-capitalistas deleuzeanas/guattarianas, análisis foucaultianos y feministas posthumanistas y biopolíticos, la autonomía de América Latina, la geografía crítica, etc.), pero necesitaran enfrentar los desafíos epistémicos y ontológicos de los discursos de la transición no eurocéntrica y biocéntrica. En mi opinión, la sociología de las ausencias y de las emergencias de Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) constituye el marco general más útil para pensar la política de la transición/traducción.

20. Para un exhaustivo abordaje de las transformaciones de América Latina durante la última década, incluyendo el argumento aquí realizado, y una serie completa de referencias, véase Escobar (2010a).

21. Véase la edición nº 453 de *América Latina en Movimiento* (marzo de 2010) dedicada a las "Alternativas civilizatorias", http://alainet.org/publica/453.phtml. Un foro acerca de "Perspectivas sobre la "Crisis de la Civilización" en el enfoque de los movimientos" se celebró en el Foro Social Mundial en Dakar (6 a 11 febrero, 2011), coordinado por Roberto Espinoza, Janet Conway, Jai Sen y Carlos Torres. Se contó con participantes de varios continentes.

22. Para la presentación y análisis de las nociones de Buen Vivir, derechos de la naturaleza y la plurinacionalidad, véanse los valiosos pequeños volúmenes de Acosta y Martínez (2009a, 2009b, 2009c), Acosta (2010), y Gudynas (2009a, 2009b).

23. En ambos, Gudynas y Macy, esta noción transformada del yo se basa en el enfoque de ecología profunda de Arne Naess y su visión pionera del yo ecológico.

24. Véase Escobar (2010b) para una discusión completa de la literatura sobre la relacionalidad en geografía, antropología y ecología.

25. En algunos relatos indígenas, la creación de la forma es vista como el paso de la "indistinción" a la "distinción" (véase, por ejemplo, Blaser, 2010 para el caso de los Yshiro de Paraguay).

26. Esta es una elaboración muy incompleta de lo que es un debate complejo que involucra cuatro posiciones sobre la modernidad: a) la modernidad como un proceso universal de origen europeo (discursos intra-euro/estadounidenses), b) las modernidades alternativas (variantes locales específicas de la misma modernidad universal), c) las modernidades múltiples, es decir, la modernidad como multiplicidad sin un origen o matriz cultural únicos (Grossberg, 2010), d) la modernidad/colonialidad, que señala la inextricable imbricación de la modernidad con la clasificación colonial de los pueblos en jerarquías, y la posibilidad de "alternativas a la modernidad" o la transmodernidad. Véase Escobar (2008a), capítulo 4 para un tratamiento más completo.

27. Véase Escobar (2010a) para una discusión completa, con especial referencia a Bolivia y, en particular, al trabajo de intelectuales aymara y otros latinoamericanos sobre el tema.

28. Los conflictos ontológicos involucrados en las economías neoextractivistas son objeto de un proyecto de investigación colaborativa adelantado por Mario Blaser, Marisol de la Cadena y este autor. El objetivo general del proyecto es el de la teorización del pluriverso como un espacio de las prácticas ontológicas-políticas.

29. Algunos de los textos principales incluyen Esteva (1997, 2005, 2006); Gutiérrez (2008); Mamani (2005, 2006); Zibechi (2006) y Patzi (2004).

30. En nuestra discusión sobre el estado actual de postdesarrollo (abril, 2010), Gudynas y yo hemos identificado varias áreas principales o corrientes relacionadas con el postdesarrollo. Entre ellas, además del BV y el biocentrismo, se encuentran los debates sobre la desmaterialización y el decrecimiento, las múltiples formas de valoración, la territorialidad y las nuevas formas de concebir la ruralidad, la decolonialidad, el cuidado y la espiritualidad, y las ontologías relacionales. Está claro que solo me he referido a algunas de ellas en este prefacio.

31. Se puede argumentar que "el mundo como pluriverso" es un oxímoron. Estoy tratando de mantener una tensión entre las epistemologías monistas o monismo metafísico, como los del científico de la computación Brian Cantwell Smith (1996) y los antropólogos ecológicos como Alf Hornborg (1996), y las posiciones de quienes postulan la coexistencia de mundos diferentes —y al menos en parte inconmensurables—.

32. Capítulo aparecido en la *Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación, REDC*, nº 24, IUDC, 2009, pp. 15-26. Traducción del inglés de Noé Cornago.

33. Profesor de Estudios de Desarrollo de la Universidad de Kassel.

34. En *Indiana*, nº 30, 2013, pp. 283-299.

35. Nina Pacari habla explícitamente de los kichwas. También la otra fuente consultada en este contexto, la UNAE, es una organización de kichwas, si bien amazónicos.

36. Incluida en la Constitución ecuatoriana de 1998 en el artículo 97, bajo la sección “Deberes de los ciudadanos”.

37. Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador, fundada en 1986.

38. Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras.

39. La traducción de *suma qamaña* y *sumak kawsay* como “buen vivir” o “vivir bien” ha sido criticada por muchas personas, especialmente indígenas. Se mantendrá esta traducción aquí, dado que es muy difundida y se ha establecido en el discurso. No obstante, la traducción que ofrece Huanacuni Mamani (2010: 7), “vida en plenitud”, es más acertada.

40. Según Acosta (2010: 43) este texto ya circulaba en forma de fotocopias en 2000.

41. Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador.

42. Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo, el plan tiene una página web: http://plan.senplades.gob.ec/ (consultado el 20 de agosto de 2013).

43. Consejo de Pueblos y Organizaciones Indígenas Evangélicas del Ecuador, fundado en 1980.

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Antología del Desarrollo

José Antonio Alonso
Breno Bringel
Noé Cornago
Enara Echart
Juan Pablo Prado
Tahina Ojeda (coord.)
José Ángel Sotillo (dir.)
Javier Surasky



CATARATA

IUDC Instituto Universitario de Desarrollo y Cooperación
UCM Universidad Complutense Madrid